## 1. Advancing Structural Reforms: 100 Concrete Steps

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### Context and reform framework
- Historic political transition: President Nazarbayev resigned in March 2019; Interim President Tokayev won early elections in June 2019 and emphasized continuity, enhanced dialogue, rule of law, governance, assessment of monetary and fiscal policy frameworks, increasing public wages and social payments, modernizing the tax system and the agriculture sector, reducing the number of state enterprises (SOEs), and stimulating SMEs.
- Reform framework rests on three pillars:
  - “Kazakhstan 2050” (long-term vision).
  - “Strategic Plan 2025” (implementation strategy).
  - Ministry/SOE/local government strategies and targets (reviewed bi-annually).
- “100 Concrete Steps” initiative:
  - Five streams: civil service (15 steps), rule of law (19), industrialization and growth (50), national identity and unity (3), accountability (10).
  - Implementation status: 58 steps completed, 39 underway, 3 transferred to another program.
  - Selected progress: single-window customs near completion; electronic invoices apply to all taxpayers; competition law harmonized with OECD standards; civil aviation management upgraded (including Open Skies); subsoil use code streamlined.
  - Postponements: private land ownership and universal asset and property declarations (postponed to 2025).

### Key contextual economic features (from source)
- Oil prices fell in late 2018 and recovered only partially.
- Real GDP growth: 4.1 percent in 2018 and 4.3 percent in January-September 2019.
- Positive output gap in 2018–19.
- Non-oil growth expected to moderate to 4 percent (estimated potential); could be higher with decisive reforms.
- Oil production expected to remain flat until 2023-24 when a $50 billion investment in the main Tengiz field will come online.
- Staff and authorities: broad agreement on recent developments; authorities’ medium-term growth forecast: 5–5  .5 percent, linked to increasing investment from 20 to 30 percent of GDP over five years.

---

### Recent developments, outlook, and risks
- Growth and drivers:
  - Real GDP growth: 4.1 percent in 2018; 4.3 percent in January-September 2019.
  - Drivers: construction and services, oil and gas investments, government and household consumption, wage hikes and retail lending.
- External sector and reserves:
  - Dollar exports rose by 26 percent in 2018 due to higher oil production and prices.
  - External debt: 10 percent of GDP lower than end-2017 (contextual statement in source).
  - 2019 current account: deteriorated with lower hydrocarbon exports and higher imports; reserves lower in H1:2019 with partial recovery in Q3.
  - Staff projects 2019 external position moderately weaker than fundamentals and desirable policies imply; reserves adequate for a floating currency.
  - Medium-term current account deficit: around 3 percent of GDP.
- Inflation and exchange rate:
  - Headline inflation: 5.5 percent in October 2019, up from 4.8 percent in March 2019.
  - Core inflation (excluding fruit, vegetables, fuels, utilities): has been rising since late 2018 and has exceeded 7 percent.
  - NBK interventions: September 2018 and March 2019.
- Monetary policy and liquidity:
  - NBK policy rate: raised back to 9.25 percent in September 2019 after an April cut and no change in the two subsequent meetings.
  - Stock of NBK open market operations exceeds KZT 4 trillion (6 percent of GDP) in H1:2019.
  - Liquidity: remains ample.
- Banking sector and cleanup:
  - Licenses revoked for three banks in late 2018–early 2019; support (KZT 1 trillion, 2 percent of GDP) provided to Tsesnabank, ownership transferred to a new investor.
  - Asset Quality Review (AQR) launched in August 2019 covering the 14 largest banks (70 percent of system assets); results expected in early 2020.
  - Retail lending growth: 22 percent (yoy through September 2019); some smaller banks expanding lending by over 40 percent since end-2018.
- Fiscal developments:
  - Overall balance: surplus in 2018; non-oil deficit close to 5 percent of GDP in 2018.
  - 2019 budget revised twice for social and regional initiatives; non-oil deficit expected to be around 7 percent of GDP in 2019.
  - Financing: larger National Fund (NFRK) transfers—KZT 2.7 trillion versus KZT 2 trillion—and a Eurobond.
  - Government debt: remains sustainable (Annex II).

---

### Risks
- Downside risks: heightened trade tensions, slower trading partner growth, commodity price uncertainty, policy slippages including further fiscal loosening and slow structural reform progress.
- Mitigating factors: substantial external and fiscal buffers.

---

### Selected completed institutional reforms (high level)
- Civil service: new career model introduced; 25 thousand civil servants put through certification process.
- Judiciary: switch from 5 to 3 tier system (first instance, appeal court, Supreme Court); High Judicial Council reforms and tighter qualification/examination for judges.
- Arbitration and dispute resolution: International Arbitration Center established; Astana International Financial Center (AIFC) launched with dispute-resolution mechanisms.
- Accountability: Public Council for police complaints; strategy for social rehabilitation; stricter requirements for new state programs; new evaluation system allowing independent external evaluation; institute for certification of state auditors; local governments given more budget autonomy and citizen participation mechanisms.
- National identity: "Eternal Country" enshrined in the Law on Assembly of People of Kazakhstan.

---

### 18. The AQR provides an opportunity to address long-standing issues and boost

### AQR, bank restructuring, and state support
- Disclosure of AQR procedures and results will be important; NBK indicated comprehensive follow-up actions if higher provisions, new capital, or changes in operations and management are needed.
- Staff view on further state support:
  - Should be only for large, viable banks and subject to safeguards in line with good practices, including shareholder contributions, changes in management, restructuring plans, strict oversight, exit strategy, and public disclosure.
  - State support should not come from NBK.
- State support to date:
  - Most state support came via face-value asset purchases by the Problem Loan Fund.
  - Additional funding provided via subsidized loans from the NBK to several large banks, with proceeds used to buy NBK notes.
  - Staff estimates state support since 2017: KZT 4.3 trillion (7 percent of GDP) provided by the budget, NFRK, and NBK.
  - PLF audited statements show fair value of assets acquired from troubled banks was just one-tenth of the book/acquisition value.
- Post-AQR expectations:
  - Banks need to adopt new, sustainable business models with less reliance on funding of deposits by SOEs, improved risk management and lending practices.

### Supervisory architecture and capacity
- NBK move and split pose challenges: possible reduction of supervisory capacity during/after transition; need effective coordination via an enhanced Financial Stability Council.
- New architecture should comply with best practices and core principles of effective supervision.
- Staff encouraged authorities to request a new FSAP review given substantial recent changes.
- Reorganization risks: staff turnover, resource adequacy, supervisory authority or independence, and corrective power.
- Critical requirements: alignment with international principles, strong coordination, macroprudential oversight, crisis preparedness, safety net, and resolution arrangements.

### State credit-support programs
- Recent initiatives target sectors, purchases (e.g., vehicles), products (e.g., mortgages), and borrowers (e.g., SMEs); complemented by one-time debt relief for low-income borrowers in June.
- Extensive state credit support has created reliance and impeded development of credit risk assessment and management.
- Staff recommendation: evaluate programs for effectiveness and streamline them.
- Structural reforms should enhance financial inclusion in a market-friendly manner, with social support coming from the budget.
- Authorities agreed state-support costs had been high but did not rule out follow-up aid depending on AQR findings; credit support programs to be reviewed and ineffective programs discontinued.

---

### Supervisory and macroprudential reforms (policy focus)
- NBK to deploy enhanced supervisory powers (2018) fully.
- NBK regulatory tightening from 2020: higher risk weights for uncollateralized consumer loans and strengthened household-debt-burden calculations.
- Enhance Financial Stability Council for inter-agency coordination.

---

### Fiscal policy: recent measures and medium-term orientation

### Near-term and medium-term stance
- 2019: relaxation of non-oil deficit to accommodate social support, regional development, higher wages, debt relief for low-income borrowers, and SME incentives.
- Consolidation expected to resume in 2020 and continue over the medium term; draft 2020–22 budget envisages lower non-oil deficit due to higher non-oil revenues from enhanced administration and spending moderation after 2019 increases.
- Staff recommended medium-term fiscal policy be guided by an anchor on gross public debt (moderately declining), existing floor on NFRK assets, and an operational target on non-oil deficit.
- Targeted non-oil deficit in 2024–25: 5 percent of non-oil GDP (consistent with staff’s estimates for long-term sustainability and intergenerational equity).
- Planned fiscal path objectives: stabilize gross debt; limit reliance on oil revenues; maintain NFRK buffers (in percent of GDP); help reduce the external imbalance.
- Staff sees need for additional, high-quality capital and social expenditures to support non-oil growth; requires higher non-oil revenues and maintaining fiscal space as a buffer.

### Key fiscal numbers and targets (from source)
- Authorities’ revenue goal: increase tax collections from 18 to 25 percent of GDP by 2025.
- State Program for Agro-Industrial Complex Development (2017–21): cost KZT 2.7 trillion (US$7 billion).
- Staff estimates productivity and output in agriculture grew on average at 0.6 and 2 percent during 2006–15, respectively.
- Staff estimate of state support since 2017: KZT 4.3 trillion (7 percent of GDP).

### Revenue policy recommendations
- Strengthen VAT administration (e.g., e-invoice) and customs controls; enhance risk-based compliance; reduce informality through digitalization; upgrade the large taxpayer unit.
- Consider tax policy changes: VAT (lowering the threshold, increasing the rate, addressing restrictive refund practices) and personal income taxes (e.g., higher taxation of capital income).
- Remove tax exemptions and holidays; review the mining tax regime.

### Expenditure and investment management
- Nurly Zhol infrastructure investments show positive results; second phase planned with stepped-up PPPs.
- Plans to convert spending units into independent legal entities (LEPLs) and devolve greater fiscal responsibility to local governments.
- Staff cautioned reforms are complex and require robust planning: accounting, controls, disclosure, risk management, and matching devolved revenues with spending.
- IMF TA recommended for investment management and PPP framework.

### Fiscal framework reform principles
- Problems: multiple, frequently-amended rules; complex system lacking comprehensive institutional coverage.
- Recommended principles: simplicity (few clear rules with sustainability anchor), broad coverage (general government, QFAs, SOEs, risks), flexibility (escape clauses and periodic reassessments), enforceability (transparency, communications, correction mechanisms, external scrutiny).
- Planned actions: PFM assessment; IMF Fiscal Transparency Evaluation; produce a fiscal risk statement for the 2021 budget.

---

### Structural reforms, SOE governance, agriculture, and governance

### SOE governance and privatization
- State footprint remains large—well above comparators.
- President Tokayev called for a review of Samruk Kazyna operations.
- Staff recommendations:
  - strengthen SOE governance and efficiency,
  - advance IPOs for big SOEs in transport, communications, and energy,
  - enhance protection of property rights and bankruptcy procedures.
- Authorities committed to IPOs for major SOEs and completing outstanding “Concrete Steps”.

### Agriculture: opportunities, constraints, and recommendations
- Opportunities: second-highest per capita availability of arable land and proximity to China and Russia.
- Constraints:
  - limited irrigation covers 1 percent of land;
  - lack of collateral accounts for 1 percent of total bank loans;
  - fragmented small farms in south; larger but heavily indebted farms in north;
  - shortcomings in certification, licensing, and phytosanitary control create export bottlenecks.
- Performance metrics:
  - Productivity and output grew on average at 0.6 and 2 percent during 2006–15, respectively.
  - Share of agriculture in GDP: 4.5 percent.
  - 45 percent of the population lives in rural areas.
  - 18 percent of the working age population is employed in the sector.
- Staff recommendations:
  - streamline support mechanisms,
  - better target financial support,
  - shift from direct subsidies to incentivizing investment and market-oriented means,
  - adopt a flexible north–south approach,
  - reduce dependency on state support in the medium term,
  - ensure continuity and careful execution of state programs.

### Governance and anti-corruption
- Existing frameworks: “100 Concrete Steps” and 2015–2025 National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NCAS).
- Progress: e-governance in tax administration and procurement; legal amendments enhancing identification and seizure of corruption proceeds; NBAC risk assessment of Samruk Kazyna.
- Observations and recommendations:
  - Harmonize legal framework with UN Convention Against Corruption.
  - Strengthen asset declaration system with enhanced verification; move to publication of declarations of high-level officials encouraged.
  - Criminalize additional corruption offences (e.g., offering or soliciting bribes); consider limiting immunities for some high-level officials.
  - Leverage AML/CFT tools for corruption detection and recovery of proceeds; align AML/CFT provisions with international standards, especially enhanced due diligence for PEPs and beneficial ownership transparency.
  - Strengthen independence of key agencies; target high-level and grand corruption and high-risk sectors.
- Recent actions:
  - Late November 2019 decree introducing personal responsibility (up to resignation) of senior management if subordinates convicted of corruption.
  - Anti-corruption centers opened in three regions.

---

### 32. Staff appraisal and governance commitments (excerpt)

### Staff macroeconomic appraisal (high level)
- Continued strong performance but downside risks.
- Drivers: consumption and investment pickup reflecting fiscal support, retail lending, and oil and gas investments.
- Headline inflation within 4–6 percent target band; core inflation higher.
- External position moderately weaker than fundamentals imply; reserves adequate.
- Non-oil growth expected at 4 percent (estimated potential) over the medium term.
- Inflation expected to remain elevated next year as utility rate cut effects dissipate.
- Balance of risks: negative (commodity prices, trade tensions).

### Monetary policy and NBK focus (staff advice)
- NBK rightly focused on inflation; further policy action may be needed given strong demand.
- Continue strengthening monetary and exchange rate framework: inflation-targeting and flexible ER.
- Recommended actions: strengthen NBK independence; increase coordination with government; improve monetary transmission by resolving banking sector issues; phase out subsidized lending; deepen capital markets; reduce dollarization; increase transparency on FX transactions on behalf of the NFRK and UAPF.

### Financial supervisory architecture and FSAP
- AQR should help move on from costly state support.
- Any further state support should go only to large and viable banks, subject to safeguards, and not come from NBK.
- Banking sector needs a new business model away from SOE deposits, NBK notes, government securities, and heavy retail lending reliance.
- Redesigned supervisory architecture must meet core principles; a new FSAP assessment recommended.

### Fiscal consolidation and structural reform momentum
- Fiscal consolidation should resume after 2019 easing.
- Recommended: assess and strengthen spending efficiency; discontinue ineffective programs; enhance revenue administration; remove exemptions; explore tax policy changes for equity and revenue.
- Structural reforms for diversification and inclusive growth should continue: competition, investment, productivity, business climate, governance, public administration.
- Additional IPOs for blue-chip SOEs recommended; protect property rights and bankruptcy procedures; overcome agriculture constraints.

---

### 43. Macroeconomic outlook and key projections (selected figures from staff projections)

- Real GDP (annual percent change):
  - 2016 1.1; 2017 4.1; 2018 4.1; 2019 3.6; 2020 3.8; 2021 3.4; 2022 5.3; 2023 3.1; 2024 3.1; 2025 3.1
- Real non-oil (annual percent change):
  - 2016 2.4; 2017 2.7; 2018 2.7; 2019 5.6; 2020 4.8; 2021 4.5; 2022 4.3; 2023 4.0; 2024 4.0; 2025 4.0
- Output gap (percent of potential GDP):
  - 2016 -1.7; 2017 -0.8; 2018 -0.2; 2019 0.3; 2020 0.2; 2021 0.1; 2022 -0.5; 2023 0.7; 2024 -0.1; 2025 0.0
- Consumer price index (eop):
  - 2016 8.5; 2017 7.1; 2018 5.3; 2019 5.6; 2020 5.5; 2021 5.0; 2022 4.5; 2023 4.0; 2024 4.0; 2025 4.0
- Current account (in billions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2016 -8.1; 2017 -5.1; 2018 -0.3; 2019 -5.0; 2020 -5.3; 2021 -6.4; 2022 -7.5; 2023 -7.0; 2024 -8.1; 2025 -9.2
- NBK gross international reserves (in billions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2016 29.7; 2017 31.0; 2018 30.9; 2019 29.5; 2020 30.6; 2021 32.0; 2022 33.5; 2023 35.0; 2024 36.9; 2025 38.7
- National Fund (including interest), e.o.p. (in billions of U.S. dollars):
  - 2016 61.2; 2017 58.3; 2018 58.0; 2019 61.5; 2020 65.1; 2021 69.3; 2022 75.3; 2023 82.6; 2024 90.9; 2025 99.7
- Gross public debt (percent of GDP):
  - 2016 19.7; 2017 19.9; 2018 20.3; 2019 20.7; 2020 21.0; 2021 20.7; 2022 20.5; 2023 20.0; 2024 19.9; 2025 19.9
- Non-oil fiscal balance (percent of GDP):
  - 2016 -8.7; 2017 -10.2; 2018 -4.9; 2019 -7.0; 2020 -6.4; 2021 -5.4; 2022 -4.5; 2023 -4.4; 2024 -4.2; 2025 -4.1
- Credit to private sector (percent change, y-o-y):
  - 2016 0.1; 2017 1.0; 2018 -0.2; 2019 3.4; 2020 8.8; 2021 9.9; 2022 10.1; 2023 11.8; 2024 9.7; 2025 10.0

---

### Annex I. External Sector Assessment (selected findings and recommendations)

### Overall assessment and NIIP
- Staff assesses Kazakhstan’s external position in 2019 as moderately weaker than implied by economic fundamentals and desirable policies.
- NIIP in 2018: $-61 billion (34 percent of GDP).
- NIIP at end-2017: $-56 billion.
- NIIP as of end-June 2019: $-59 billion.
- Over 70 percent of liabilities to non-residents are related to direct investments in Kazakhstan.

### Current account developments and drivers
- Current account broadly in balance in 2018; deficit reemerged in 2019.
- Oil and gas exports increased by 42 percent in 2018.
- Current account posted a deficit of $4.7 billion in January-September 2019 (2.7 percent of projected annual GDP).
- Specific 2019 import drivers: imports of machinery, equipment, vehicles, and parts increased by $3.2 billion or 41 percent (1.8 percent of 2019 GDP) during January-October 2019 relative to same period of 2018.

### Exchange rate models and reserves
- IMF EBA-lite CA model:
  - Cyclically-adjusted current account norm: -0.9 percent of GDP.
  - Actual cyclically-adjusted balance: -3.0 percent of GDP.
  - Implied gap: -2.1 percentage points.
  - Translates into a REER overvaluation of about 9 percent using standard elasticities.
- IREER model suggests real exchange rate undervalued by about 26 percent (model strongly influenced by demographic variables).
- Reserves and adequacy:
  - Reserves close to $30 billion in October 2019.
  - Reserve coverage: about 7 months of imports of goods and services; over 200 percent of short-term debt; 50 percent of broad money.
  - Based on ARA methodology, 2019 gross reserves projected above suggested range of 100–150 percent of the metric typical for commodity exporters.
  - NFRK assets currently at $60 billion provide additional buffer.

### External debt and vulnerabilities
- Total external debt declined by $8.4 billion in 2018, from 100.2 to 88.5 percent of GDP.
- Staff baseline projects further decline of the debt ratio over the medium term.
- Debt remains sustainable but sensitive to real ER shocks: a real depreciation of 30 percent would raise the debt ratio considerably—by over 30 percent of GDP more compared to the baseline scenario.

### Key external-sector policy recommendations
- Allow the exchange rate to adjust to external pressures.
- Use buffers (NBK reserves, NFRK assets) to smooth short-term volatility if needed.
- Maintain fiscal sustainability by raising non-oil revenue and improving spending efficiency.
- Tighten fiscal policy to help contain the current account deficit.
- Accelerate structural reforms to increase productivity and non-oil exports and diversify the economy.
- Strengthen financial stability and closely monitor SOE and financial sector risks.
- Proceed with planned privatizations (IPOs of Samruk Kazyna’s largest assets) and implement safeguards to improve transparency and accountability.

---

*Source: 1kazea2020001 - 1. Advancing Structural Reforms: 100 Concrete Steps (excerpt); Annex I; Annex IV; selected chapter excerpts.*

### 1. Advancing Structural Reforms: 100 Concrete Steps  ____________________________________________ 7

### 1. Advancing Structural Reforms: 100 Concrete Steps

### Context
- Historic political transition: President Nazarbayev resigned in March 2019; Interim President Tokayev won early elections in June 2019 and emphasized continuity, enhanced dialogue, rule of law, governance, assessment of monetary and fiscal policy frameworks, increasing public wages and social payments, modernizing the tax system and the agriculture sector, reducing the number of state enterprises (SOEs), and stimulating SMEs.
- Economic performance and reform challenges:
  - Oil prices fell in late 2018 and recovered only partially.
  - Strong domestic demand sustained momentum despite weaker trading-partner growth and trade tensions.
  - Fiscal consolidation postponed to accommodate new social spending.
  - Monetary policy focused on inflation; tenge continued to float with limited intervention.
  - Implementation challenges: private sector development, economic diversification, banking issues, governance vulnerabilities, widespread subsidies and state support.

### Recent developments, outlook, and risks
- Growth and drivers:
  - Real GDP growth: 4.1 percent in 2018 and 4.3 percent in January-September 2019, led by construction and services; positive output gap.
  - Drivers: oil and gas investments, government and household consumption, wage hikes and retail lending.
  - Non-oil growth expectations: expected to moderate to 4 percent (estimated potential); could be higher with decisive reforms.
- External sector and reserves:
  - Dollar exports rose by 26 percent in 2018 due to higher oil production and prices, closing the current account deficit that year.
  - External debt: 10 percent of GDP lower than end-2017.
  - 2019 current account: deteriorated with lower hydrocarbon exports and higher imports; reserves lower in H1:2019 with partial recovery in Q3.
  - Staff projects the 2019 external position to be moderately weaker than fundamentals and desirable policies imply; reserves adequate for a floating currency (Annex I).
  - Medium-term current account deficit: around 3 percent of GDP.
- Inflation and exchange rate:
  - Headline inflation: 5.5 percent in October 2019, up from 4.8 percent in March 2019.
  - Core inflation (excluding fruit, vegetables, fuels, utilities): has been rising since late 2018 and has exceeded 7 percent.
  - Inflation expectations: remain stable.
  - Tenge: under pressure in H2:2018; stable in 2019. NBK intervened in September 2018 and March 2019.
- Monetary policy and liquidity:
  - NBK policy rate: after a rate cut in April and no change in two subsequent meetings, the NBK raised the rate back to 9.25 percent in September 2019.
  - Stock of NBK open market operations exceeds KZT 4 trillion (6 percent of GDP) in H1:2019.
  - Liquidity: remains ample.
- Banking sector and cleanup:
  - Licenses revoked for three banks in late 2018–early 2019; support (KZT 1 trillion, 2 percent of GDP) provided to Tsesnabank, ownership transferred to a new investor.
  - Asset Quality Review (AQR) launched in August 2019 covering the 14 largest banks (70 percent of system assets); results expected in early 2020.
  - Credit trends: retail lending growth 22 percent (yoy through September 2019); corporate credit remains sluggish; lending growth uneven with some smaller banks expanding lending by over 40 percent since end-2018.
- Fiscal developments:
  - Overall balance: surplus in 2018; non-oil deficit close to 5 percent of GDP in 2018.
  - 2019 budget revised twice to incorporate social and regional initiatives (higher wages for lower-paid public employees, housing and support for vulnerable households, debt relief for low-income borrowers, regional and rural infrastructure).
  - Non-oil deficit expected to be around 7 percent of GDP in 2019.
  - Financing: larger National Fund (NFRK) transfers—KZT 2.7 trillion versus KZT 2 trillion—and a Eurobond.
  - Government debt: remains sustainable (Annex II).
- Structural reform progress and outlook:
  - Many flagship “100 Concrete Steps” completed; IPO of Kazatomprom in 2018; IPO preparations for Air Astana, KazMunaiGas, and Kazakhtelekom underway (timeline not set).
  - Kazakhstan improved scores on World Economic Forum Competitiveness Index and World Bank Doing Business Report in 2019.
  - Oil production expected to remain flat until 2023-24, when a $50 billion investment in the main Tengiz field will come online.
- Risks:
  - Downside risks: heightened trade tensions, slower trading partner growth, commodity price uncertainty, policy slippages including further fiscal loosening and slow structural reform progress.
  - Mitigating factors: substantial external and fiscal buffers.

### Authorities’ views
- Broad agreement with staff’s assessment of recent developments and external sector outlook.
- Government medium-term growth forecast: 5–5  .5 percent, linked to target of increasing investment from 20 to 30 percent of GDP over five years.
- Authorities see risks mainly from outside.

### Structural reforms — Box 1: “100 Concrete Steps”
- Framework: reforms rest on three pillars—“Kazakhstan 2050” (long-term vision), “Strategic Plan 2025” (implementation strategy), and ministry/SOE/local government strategies and targets; strategies reviewed bi-annually.
- The “100 Concrete Steps” initiative:
  - Five streams: civil service (15 steps), rule of law (19), industrialization and growth (50), national identity and unity (3), accountability (10).
  - Implementation status: 58 steps completed, 39 underway, 3 transferred to another program.
  - Examples of progress:
    - Private land ownership: postponed.
    - Single-window customs procedures: work near completion.
    - Electronic invoices apply to all taxpayers.
    - Universal asset and property declarations: postponed to 2025.
    - Competition law harmonized with OECD standards.
    - Civil aviation management upgraded, including Open Skies.
    - Subsoil use code streamlined to attract investment and foster job creation.
- Selected completed reforms under other pillars:
  - Effective Civil Service:
    - New career model introduced.
    - 25 thousand civil servants put through certification process.
  - Judiciary and dispute resolution:
    - Judicial system switched from 5 to 3 tier system: first instance, appeal court, and Supreme Court.
    - International Arbitration Center established to investigate investment disputes.
  - Accountability and governance:
    - Public Council created to consider complaints about police actions.
    - Strategy for social rehabilitation of citizens approved.
    - Requirements for development of new state programs tightened.
    - New evaluation system approved allowing for independent external evaluation.
    - Institute for certification of state auditors established.
    - Local governments given more budget autonomy and mechanism introduced for citizen participation in draft local budgets.
  - National identity and unity:
    - Idea of "Eternal Country" enshrined in the Law on Assembly of People of Kazakhstan.

### Policy discussions and recommendations
- Overall priorities: enhance NBK independence, improve monetary policy transmission and communications, complete AQR and address banking issues, pursue medium-term fiscal consolidation, upgrade fiscal framework, and push structural reforms for inclusive growth.
- A. Monetary and exchange rate policy — staff recommendations:
  - Increase NBK independence; use impending NBK split to strengthen governance and divest non-core NBK assets to reduce balance-sheet risk and quasi-fiscal pressures.
  - Improve coordination between fiscal and monetary policy to achieve a well-balanced policy mix.
  - Develop domestic financial markets to strengthen pass-through of policy rate changes to market rates.
  - Reduce dollarization: deposit dollarization remains 45 percent; dedollarization requires sustained policies and two-sided ER flexibility; targeted measures may help (e.g., affecting FX liabilities and lending).
  - Phase out credit subsidies: evaluate extensive credit support programs for households, businesses, and regions; discontinue poorly-targeted or ineffective programs.
  - Further strengthen analytics and communications: focus on developments, prospects, risks, and policy responses.
  - Operational transparency: report systematically on NFRK conversions and introduce regular, pre-announced auctions for NFRK conversions to increase transparency and predictability.
- B. Financial stability — staff observations and measures:
  - State support since 2017: staff estimates KZT 4.3 trillion (7 percent of GDP) provided by the budget, NFRK, and NBK.
  - Problem Loan Fund (PLF): audited statements show fair value of assets acquired from troubled banks was just one-tenth of the book/acquisition value.
  - Enhanced NBK supervisory powers (2018) aim to address misreporting but have not been fully deployed.
  - Consumer lending growth: rapid; may reflect financial deepening given low household indebtedness, but potential risks exist.
  - NBK regulatory tightening from 2020: higher risk weights for uncollateralized consumer loans and strengthened household-debt-burden calculations.

*Source: 1kazea2020001 - 1. Advancing Structural Reforms: 100 Concrete Steps (excerpt).*

### 18. The AQR provides an opportunity to address long-standing issues and boost

### 18. The AQR provides an opportunity to address long-standing issues and boost

### Financial sector: AQR, bank restructuring, and state support
- Disclosure of AQR procedures and results will be important; the NBK indicated it will introduce comprehensive follow-up actions if higher provisions, new capital, or changes in operations and management are needed.
- Staff view: any further state support should be only for large, viable banks and subject to safeguards in line with good practices, including:
  - shareholder contributions,
  - changes in management,
  - restructuring plans,
  - strict oversight,
  - exit strategy,
  - public disclosure.
- State support should not come from NBK.
- Most state support came via face-value asset purchases by the Problem Loan Fund; additional funding was provided via subsidized loans from the NBK to several large banks, with proceeds used to buy NBK notes.
- Post-AQR, banks will need to adopt a new, sustainable business model with:
  - less reliance on funding of deposits by SOEs,
  - improved risk management and lending practices.

### Supervisory architecture and capacity
- The NBK move and split pose challenges:
  - possible reduction of supervisory capacity during or after the transition,
  - need to ensure effective coordination among agencies on macroprudential oversight and contingency issues via an enhanced Financial Stability Council.
- The new architecture should comply with best practices and core principles of effective supervision.
- Given substantial changes over the last five years in the monetary and exchange framework, the financial sector, and supervision, staff encouraged the authorities to request a new review under the IMF-World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP).
- Reorganization risks: staff turnover, resource adequacy, supervisory authority or independence, and corrective power.
- Critical requirements for any reform:
  - alignment with international principles of effective supervision,
  - strong coordination, macroprudential oversight, crisis preparedness, safety net, and resolution arrangements.

### State credit-support programs
- Recent initiatives target sectors, purchases (e.g., vehicles), products (e.g., mortgages), and borrowers (e.g., SMEs); complemented in June by one-time debt relief for low-income borrowers.
- Extensive state credit support has made banks and borrowers reliant on subsidies, impeding development of credit risk assessment and management.
- Staff recommendation: evaluate programs for effectiveness and streamline them.
- Structural reforms should enhance financial inclusion in a market-friendly manner, with social support coming from the budget.
- Authorities’ view: agreed state-support costs had been high, but did not rule out follow-up aid depending on AQR findings; credit support programs would be reviewed and ineffective programs discontinued.

### Fiscal policy: recent measures and medium-term orientation
- Near-term priorities: social support, including regional development, with a relaxation of the non-oil deficit; measures targeted households, SMEs, regions, and public employees in health, education, and social sectors.
- Staff view: merit in supporting vulnerable groups, but did not favor the procyclical stance in 2019; some measures (e.g., debt relief, a three-year ban on SME tax audits, new income tax exemptions) may have benefited from further consideration.
- Consolidation expected to resume in 2020 and continue over the medium term; draft 2020–22 budget envisages a lower non-oil deficit due to higher non-oil revenues from enhanced administration and spending moderation (erosion) after increases in 2019.
- Staff recommended medium-term fiscal policy be guided by an anchor on gross public debt (moderately declining), in addition to the existing floor on NFRK assets and an operational target on non-oil deficit.
- Planned fiscal path objectives:
  - stabilize gross debt,
  - limit reliance on oil revenues,
  - maintain NFRK buffers (in percent of GDP),
  - help reduce the external imbalance.
- Targeted non-oil deficit in 2024–25: 5 percent of non-oil GDP (consistent with staff’s estimates for long-term sustainability and intergenerational equity).
- Staff sees need for additional, high-quality capital and social expenditures to support non-oil growth; this will necessitate higher non-oil revenues and maintaining fiscal space as a buffer.

Key fiscal numbers and targets:
- Authorities’ revenue goal: increase tax collections from 18 to 25 percent of GDP by 2025.
- Staff note: productivity and output in agriculture grew on average at 0.6 and 2 percent during 2006–15, respectively (see Agriculture section for sector context).

Revenue policy recommendations:
- Strengthen VAT administration (e.g., e-invoice) and custom controls; enhance risk-based compliance, reduce informality through digitalization, and upgrade the large taxpayer unit.
- Consider tax policy changes: VAT (lowering the threshold, increasing the rate, addressing restrictive refund practices) and personal income taxes (e.g., higher taxation of capital income).
- Remove tax exemptions and holidays to broaden the tax base; review the mining tax regime given favorable mining prospects.

Expenditure and investment:
- Infrastructure investments under Nurly Zhol have started to show positive results for firm performance.
- Second phase of Nurly Zhol planned with stepped-up public-private partnerships (PPPs).
- Plans to convert spending units into independent legal entities (LEPLs) and consider devolving greater fiscal responsibility to local governments.
- Staff cautioned these reforms are complex and require robust planning: accounting, controls, disclosure, risk management, and matching devolved revenues with spending.
- IMF TA would be helpful; strong investment management practices and a robust PPP management framework recommended.

Fiscal framework shortcomings and reform principles:
- Current framework: several rules, forward-looking orientation, medium-term budget exercise, five-year forecasts; but system is complex, lacks comprehensive institutional coverage, and rules have been frequently amended, sometimes leading to procyclical policies.
- Key principles for reform:
  - Simplicity: few, clear, mutually-consistent rules with a sustainability anchor.
  - Broad coverage: encompass general government; improve classification and reporting to cover QFAs, SOEs, and risks; publish regular, comprehensive reports on the NFRK with externally-audited financial statements.
  - Flexibility: include robust escape clauses and periodic reassessments.
  - Enforceability: strong transparency provisions, robust communications, correction mechanisms, and effective external scrutiny.
- Staff advised a thorough PFM assessment and an IMF Fiscal Transparency Evaluation; producing a fiscal risk statement for the 2021 budget is planned and will require preparatory work, possibly with IMF TA support.
- Authorities’ view: agreed with staff on strengthening the fiscal framework and remain committed to fiscal sustainability, higher non-oil revenues, enhanced spending efficiency, and closing the infrastructure gap.

### Structural reforms and SOE governance
- Objective: create a conducive environment for private sector participation to support diversification and inclusive growth; state footprint remains large—well above comparators.
- Authorities focus: infrastructure, improving business conditions, encouraging entrepreneurship (special attention to SMEs and agriculture).
- President Tokayev called for a review of Samruk Kazyna operations (state holding managing most SOEs in energy, transportation, utilities).
- Staff recommendations:
  - strengthen SOE governance and efficiency,
  - advance IPOs for big SOEs in transport, communications, and energy to boost credibility, reduce corruption vulnerabilities, and support growth,
  - enhance protection of property rights and bankruptcy procedures.
- Authorities’ view: committed to IPOs for major SOEs and completing outstanding “Concrete Steps”; see agriculture as a priority for rural development and employment.

### Agriculture: opportunities, constraints, and policy orientation
- Opportunities:
  - Kazakhstan has the world’s second-highest per capita availability of arable land and proximity to China and Russia.
  - Agriculture could be a major engine for diversification and non-oil exports.
- Constraints and sector weaknesses:
  - infrastructure and irrigation gaps; limited irrigation covers 1 percent of land,
  - poor access to technology and financing; lack of collateral accounts for 1 percent of total bank loans,
  - farms fragmented and small in south; larger but heavily indebted in north,
  - wide spatial dispersion, poor connectivity, and market access increase costs,
  - shortcomings in certification, licensing, and phytosanitary control create export bottlenecks—Kazakhstan remains a net food importer despite being among the world’s largest wheat exporters.
- Performance metrics:
  - Productivity and output grew on average at 0.6 and 2 percent during 2006–15, respectively.
  - Share of agriculture in GDP is 4.5 percent.
  - 45 percent of the population lives in rural areas.
  - 18 percent of the working age population is employed in the sector.
- State program:
  - State Program for Agro-Industrial Complex Development (2017–21) targets boosting labor productivity and exports by 2.5 times at a cost of KZT 2.7 trillion (US$7 billion).
  - Some progress made but more is needed to achieve ambitious goals.
- Staff recommendations:
  - streamline support mechanisms,
  - better target financial support,
  - shift balance from direct subsidies to incentivizing investment and market-oriented means,
  - adopt a flexible approach to reflect north–south diversity,
  - reduce dependency on state support in the medium term,
  - ensure continuity and careful execution of state programs.

### Governance and anti-corruption
- Kazakhstan has made high-level commitments: “100 Concrete Steps” and the 2015–2025 National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS).
- Gains: moves to e-governance in tax administration and procurement (limiting single-source purchases); legal amendments to enhance identification and seizure of corruption proceeds.
- Staff observations and recommendations:
  - further harmonize legal framework to meet commitments under the UN Convention Against Corruption,
  - strengthen asset declaration system through enhanced verification,
  - move to publication of declarations of high-level officials and political appointees is encouraged,
  - on enforcement, target high-level and grand corruption and high-risk sectors,
  - criminalize additional corruption offences (e.g., offering or soliciting bribes),
  - revisit immunity for some high-level officials and entities,
  - leverage AML/CFT tools to support corruption detection and recovery of proceeds,
  - strengthen independence of key agencies.
- Authorities’ view: underscored importance of structural reforms and pointed to higher Doing Business and Competitiveness Index rankings as signs of success; expressed commitment to IPOs for major SOEs and to completing outstanding “Concrete Steps”.

*Republic of Kazakhstan: IMF staff report content (chapter excerpt).*

### 32. The authorities reiterated their commitment to improving governance and addressing

### 32. The authorities reiterated their commitment to improving governance and addressing corruption risks

### Governance and anti-corruption commitments
- Authorities reaffirmed aspiration to implement international best practices.
- Cited public administration and legal reforms that promote transparency, efficiency, and participation in international forums and consultations.
- Expressed optimism that judiciary reforms will contribute to progress.
- Acknowledged need to address high-level corruption and noted steps to address corruption vulnerabilities in SOEs.
- Agreed that the legal framework could benefit from improved provisions on investigation, prosecution, and recovery of proceeds.
- Committed to strengthening the AML/CFT regime, recognizing that AML/CFT measures play an important role in corruption enforcement.

### Business environment and governance indicators (figure context)
- Figure compares World Bank Ease of Doing Business, Worldwide Governance Indicators, and WEF Global Competitiveness Indicators (survey-based and official-data mixes), summarizing perceptions of business environment and quality of governance.

### Macroeconomic performance and risks (Staff appraisal)
- Strong performance has continued, but risks are on the downside.
- Drivers of growth: pick-up of consumption and investment reflecting fiscal support, retail lending, and oil and gas investments.
- Headline inflation has increased but remains within the 4–6 percent target band; core inflation is higher.
- External position is moderately weaker than implied by fundamentals and desirable policies; reserves are adequate.
- Non-oil growth is expected to remain strong at 4 percent, the estimated potential level, over the medium term.
- Inflation is expected to remain elevated next year, including as the effect of utility rate cuts dissipates.
- Balance of risks is negative, reflecting vulnerability to commodity prices and trade tensions.

### Structural reform needs and priorities
- Decisive reforms are needed to overcome long-standing challenges.
- Key challenges to address:
  - Ensure structural reform measures are well targeted and effective in promoting private sector growth.
  - Reduce dependency on oil and state support.
  - Resolve outstanding issues in the banking sector.
  - Strengthen governance.
- Authorities’ policy agenda signals continuity following a smooth political transition.

### Monetary policy and NBK focus
- The NBK has remained rightly focused on inflation; risks continue due to strong demand, and further policy action may be needed.
- Although the stock of NBK notes has declined, banking sector liquidity remains significant.
- Structural issues: insufficient credit demand by companies in good financial standing.

### Monetary and exchange rate framework recommendations
- Continue efforts to strengthen the monetary and exchange rate framework; inflation-targeting and a flexible ER have served Kazakhstan well.
- Recommended actions:
  - Strengthen NBK independence.
  - Further increase coordination with the government.
  - Improve monetary transmission by resolving banking sector issues, phasing out subsidized lending, deepening capital markets, and reducing dollarization.
  - Increase transparency, including more explanation of developments, prospects, risks, and policy responses and publication of additional information on FX transactions on behalf of the NFRK and UAPF.

### Banking sector: AQR and state support
- The AQR should help Kazakhstan move on from costly state support for banks; it will be instrumental to understanding banks’ financial health and needed actions.
- Further state support, if any, should:
  - Go only to large and viable banks.
  - Be subject to robust safeguards, including shareholder contributions and adoption of comprehensive restructuring plans.
  - Not come from the NBK.
- The banking sector needs a new business model; sector has relied on SOE deposits, NBK notes, government securities, and recently retail lending.
- State credit-support initiatives should be scaled back so growth impetus shifts to the private sector.

### Financial supervisory architecture redesign risks
- Redesign (split of the NBK, relocation to Nur-Sultan, establishment of a new financial regulation and development agency) carries risks that must be addressed.
- New architecture should comply with core principles and best practices, particularly for independence, powers, and inter-agency cooperation on macroprudential and safety net, contingency, and resolution issues.
- Essential elements for success: appointment of strong management, adequate resources, adoption and implementation of credible restructuring plans following the AQR.
- A new FSAP assessment would be important to take stock of substantial changes, benchmark to comparator countries and best practices, and guide reform efforts.

### Fiscal policy and consolidation
- Fiscal consolidation should resume after easing the fiscal stance in 2019 for social outlays.
- Rationale: return to consolidation needed at a time of strong performance to stabilize gross debt, limit reliance on oil revenues, and sustain buffers.
- Ongoing and recommended actions:
  - Assess and strengthen spending efficiency and discontinue ineffective programs.
  - Enhance revenue administration.
  - Further actions to enhance risk-based tax compliance, including upgrading the large taxpayer unit.
  - Removal of exemptions and holidays to help broaden the tax base.
  - Explore scope for tax policy changes (VAT, income taxes) to enhance equity and progressivity and meet ambitious revenue targets.

### Fiscal framework upgrade
- Aim to assess and upgrade the fiscal policy framework, including rules, is welcome.
- Changes are multidimensional and complex and require significant preparatory work.
- Guiding principles for changes: simplicity, broad coverage, flexibility, and enforceability.
- Upgrading would benefit from an IMF PFM assessment and Fiscal Transparency Evaluation.
- Greater use of PPPs, conversion of spending units into independent legal entities, and subnational fiscal changes require careful planning and execution.
- IMF TA would be helpful in these areas.

### Structural reforms to support inclusive growth and diversification
- Maintain structural reform momentum for diversification and strong, sustainable, inclusive growth.
- Authorities focused on: competition and investment; productivity; further improving the business climate; governance and public administration.
- Recommendations:
  - Careful monitoring of state programs to ensure they create a conducive environment for investment and growth.
  - Conclusion of additional IPOs for blue-chip SOEs to send a strong signal and boost credibility.
  - Enhance protection of property rights and bankruptcy procedures.
  - Further efforts to overcome structural constraints in agriculture.

### Governance, transparency, and rule-of-law reforms
- Sound governance arrangements are key to inclusive growth and reducing corruption risks.
- Areas for further work:
  - Access to information.
  - Criminalization of additional corruption offences.
  - Revisiting the scope of immunities.
  - Leveraging AML/CFT tools to support anti-corruption efforts.
  - Asset declarations would benefit from enhanced verification and publication.
  - Strengthen independence of key agencies.
  - Judicial reforms to strengthen property rights, rule of law, and investment.

*Republic of Kazakhstan — Staff appraisal and governance commitments (excerpt).*

### 43. It is proposed that the next Article IV consultation takes place on the standard

### 1kazea2020001 - 43. It is proposed that the next Article IV consultation takes place on the standard

### Macroeconomic outlook and key projections
- Real GDP (annual percent change): 2016 1.1; 2017 4.1; 2018 4.1; 2019 3.6; 2020 3.8; 2021 3.4; 2022 5.3; 2023 3.1; 2024 3.1; 2025 3.1
- Real oil (annual percent change): 2016 -2.9; 2017 8.7; 2018 8.4; 2019 -0.3; 2020 0.0; 2021 1.4; 2022 0.4; 2023 10.0; 2024 0.0; 2025 -0.1
- Real non-oil (annual percent change): 2016 2.4; 2017 2.7; 2018 2.7; 2019 5.6; 2020 4.8; 2021 4.5; 2022 4.3; 2023 4.0; 2024 4.0; 2025 4.0
- Output gap (in percent of potential GDP): 2016 -1.7; 2017 -0.8; 2018 -0.2; 2019 0.3; 2020 0.2; 2021 0.1; 2022 -0.5; 2023 0.7; 2024 -0.1; 2025 0.0
- Consumer price index (eop): 2016 8.5; 2017 7.1; 2018 5.3; 2019 5.6; 2020 5.5; 2021 5.0; 2022 4.5; 2023 4.0; 2024 4.0; 2025 4.0
- GDP deflator (annual percent change): 2016 13.6; 2017 11.2; 2018 9.2; 2019 5.0; 2020 4.4; 2021 4.4; 2022 4.5; 2023 5.1; 2024 5.2; 2025 5.4
- Real effective exchange rate: 2016 -26.7; 2017 7.0; 2018 -0.8; 2019 ..................; 2020 ...; 2021 ...

### External sector and balance of payments
- Current account (in billions of U.S. dollars): 2016 -8.1; 2017 -5.1; 2018 -0.3; 2019 -5.0; 2020 -5.3; 2021 -6.4; 2022 -7.5; 2023 -7.0; 2024 -8.1; 2025 -9.2
- Trade balance (in billions of U.S. dollars): 2016 9.3; 2017 16.7; 2018 25.5; 2019 19.3; 2020 17.1; 2021 15.7; 2022 14.8; 2023 17.7; 2024 17.3; 2025 16.8
- Exports (f.o.b., in billions of U.S. dollars): 2016 35.5; 2017 47.3; 2018 59.8; 2019 56.5; 2020 55.2; 2021 55.3; 2022 56.3; 2023 61.2; 2024 63.0; 2025 64.8
  - Oil and gas condensate (in billions of U.S. dollars): 2016 19.3; 2017 26.6; 2018 37.8; 2019 33.1; 2020 31.4; 2021 30.2; 2022 29.7; 2023 33.1; 2024 33.1; 2025 33.2
  - Non-oil exports (in billions of U.S. dollars): 2016 16.2; 2017 20.7; 2018 22.0; 2019 23.5; 2020 23.8; 2021 25.1; 2022 26.6; 2023 28.2; 2024 29.9; 2025 31.6
- Imports (f.o.b., in billions of U.S. dollars): 2016 26.2; 2017 30.6; 2018 34.2; 2019 37.3; 2020 38.1; 2021 39.6; 2022 41.5; 2023 43.5; 2024 45.7; 2025 48.0
- Services and income balance (in billions of U.S. dollars): 2016 -17.2; 2017 -21.7; 2018 -26.7; 2019 -25.2; 2020 -23.3; 2021 -23.0; 2022 -23.2; 2023 -25.5; 2024 -26.0; 2025 -26.7
- NBK gross international reserves (in billions of U.S. dollars): 2016 29.7; 2017 31.0; 2018 30.9; 2019 29.5; 2020 30.6; 2021 32.0; 2022 33.5; 2023 35.0; 2024 36.9; 2025 38.7
- In months of next year's imports of g&n.f.s.: 2016 8.8; 2017 8.0; 2018 7.5; 2019 7.2; 2020 7.3; 2021 7.3; 2022 7.3; 2023 7.3; 2024 7.3; 2025 7.3
- National Fund (including interest), e.o.p. (in billions of U.S. dollars): 2016 61.2; 2017 58.3; 2018 58.0; 2019 61.5; 2020 65.1; 2021 69.3; 2022 75.3; 2023 82.6; 2024 90.9; 2025 99.7
- External debt (percent of GDP): 2016 119.0; 2017 100.2; 2018 88.5; 2019 91.2; 2020 87.0; 2021 82.5; 2022 78.4; 2023 72.5; 2024 68.7; 2025 64.8
- Excluding intracompany debt (percent of GDP): 2016 42.9; 2017 37.8; 2018 32.2; 2019 33.6; 2020 32.8; 2021 32.3; 2022 31.9; 2023 30.2; 2024 29.3; 2025 28.3
- World oil price (U.S. dollars per barrel, WEO): 2016 42.8; 2017 52.8; 2018 68.3; 2019 60.6; 2020 58.0; 2021 55.3; 2022 54.6; 2023 54.7; 2024 55.2; 2025 55.9

### Fiscal sector: balances, revenues, and debt
- Total revenue and grants (percent of GDP): 2016 17.0; 2017 19.8; 2018 21.4; 2019 19.9; 2020 20.1; 2021 20.4; 2022 20.7; 2023 20.8; 2024 20.9; 2025 20.6
- Tax revenue (percent of GDP): 2016 15.2; 2017 16.2; 2018 17.9; 2019 17.9; 2020 18.1; 2021 18.4; 2022 18.7; 2023 18.8; 2024 18.9; 2025 18.6
  - Oil tax revenue (percent of GDP): 2016 4.1; 2017 5.9; 2018 7.4; 2019 6.8; 2020 6.4; 2021 6.1; 2022 5.8; 2023 5.8; 2024 5.8; 2025 5.3
  - Non-oil revenue (percent of GDP): 2016 11.1; 2017 10.3; 2018 10.5; 2019 11.1; 2020 11.7; 2021 12.3; 2022 13.0; 2023 13.0; 2024 13.1; 2025 13.2
- Total expenditure and net lending (percent of GDP): 2016 21.6; 2017 24.1; 2018 18.9; 2019 20.1; 2020 20.1; 2021 19.7; 2022 19.4; 2023 19.3; 2024 19.3; 2025 19.3
- Overall fiscal balance (percent of GDP): 2016 -4.5; 2017 -4.3; 2018 2.5; 2019 -0.2; 2020 0.1; 2021 0.6; 2022 1.3; 2023 1.5; 2024 1.6; 2025 1.3
- Non-oil fiscal balance (percent of GDP): 2016 -8.7; 2017 -10.2; 2018 -4.9; 2019 -7.0; 2020 -6.4; 2021 -5.4; 2022 -4.5; 2023 -4.4; 2024 -4.2; 2025 -4.1
- Structural non-oil fiscal balance (percent of non-oil GDP): 2016 -10.4; 2017 -7.7; 2018 -6.2; 2019 -9.0; 2020 -8.0; 2021 -6.7; 2022 -5.4; 2023 -5.2; 2024 -5.0; 2025 -4.7
- Gross public debt (percent of GDP): 2016 19.7; 2017 19.9; 2018 20.3; 2019 20.7; 2020 21.0; 2021 20.7; 2022 20.5; 2023 20.0; 2024 19.9; 2025 19.9
- NFRK assets (percent of GDP): 2016 44.6; 2017 35.0; 2018 32.3; 2019 34.8; 2020 34.6; 2021 34.0; 2022 34.0; 2023 33.6; 2024 34.0; 2025 34.2

### Monetary sector and banking system
- NBK policy rate (eop; percent): 2016 12.0; 2017 10.3; 2018 9.3; 2019 9.3; 2020 ......; 2021 ......
- Reserve money (percent change, y-o-y): 2016 8.7; 2017 7.3; 2018 20.1; 2019 2.8; 2020 6.9; 2021 7.5; 2022 7.2; 2023 9.6; 2024 8.3; 2025 8.8
- Broad money (percent change, y-o-y): 2016 15.6; 2017 -1.7; 2018 7.0; 2019 0.8; 2020 5.6; 2021 5.8; 2022 5.3; 2023 8.0; 2024 7.7; 2025 8.6
- Credit to private sector (percent change, y-o-y): 2016 0.1; 2017 1.0; 2018 -0.2; 2019 3.4; 2020 8.8; 2021 9.9; 2022 10.1; 2023 11.8; 2024 9.7; 2025 10.0
- Credit to the private sector (percent of GDP): 2016 29.6; 2017 25.8; 2018 22.7; 2019 21.4; 2020 21.5; 2021 21.8; 2022 22.1; 2023 22.3; 2024 22.5; 2025 22.7

Banking sector financial soundness indicators (2016–2019 Q1)
- Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets: 2016 16.3; 2017 21.8; 2018 21.9; 2019 Q1 23.2
- Non-performing Loans to Total Gross Loans: 2016 6.7; 2017 9.3; 2018 7.4; 2019 Q1 8.6
- Provisions as percent of NPL: 2016 72.2; 2017 89.2; 2018 75.1; 2019 Q1 83.4
- Return on Assets: 2016 1.9; 2017 0.1; 2018 3.2; 2019 Q1 0.6
- Return on Equity: 2016 17.9; 2017 1.3; 2018 25.6; 2019 Q1 4.6
- Liquid Assets to Total Assets (Liquid Asset Ratio): 2016 25.4; 2017 34.7; 2018 35.8; 2019 Q1 40.1
- Customer Deposits to Total (Non-interbank) Loans: 2016 111.7; 2017 122.9; 2018 124.3; 2019 Q1 128.2

### Capital markets and market indicators
- Kazakhstan and Russia Five-Year CDS (basis points): 2014–2019 series shown (KAZ and RUS; chart source)
- KASE, MSCI EM Europe Index (Jan. 1, 2014 = 100): index series 2014–2019 (chart source)
- 12M NDF Tenge/USD and Ruble/USD series: 2014–2019 (chart source)
- KDB Spread (Kazakhstan Development Bank, relative to 10 yr US Treasury) and EMBIG series: 2014–2019 (chart source)
- 7D repo rate and FX 1D swap rate: market indicator series 2014–2019 (chart source)

### Oil sector indicators
- Oil GDP (Billion Tenge): 2016 79.8; 2017 87.0; 2018 103.1; 2019 121.5; 2020 161.1; 2021 153.1; 2022 148.7; 2023 114.3; 2024 114.2; 2025 158.3; 159.9; 8 (table shows sequential values)
- Oil GDP (Billion Dollars): 2016 23.3; 2017 31.6; 2018 45.3; 2019 40.0; 2020 38.3; 2021 37.0; 2022 36.6; 2023 40.4; 2024 40.8; 2025 41.2
- Oil GDP / Total GDP (percent): 2016 17.0; 2017 19.0; 2018 25.3; 2019 22.7; 2020 20.3; 2021 18.1; 2022 16.5; 2023 16.4; 2024 15.3; 2025 14.1
- Oil production (Millions metric tons): 2016 78.0; 2017 86.2; 2018 90.3; 2019 90.0; 2020 90.0; 2021 91.3; 2022 91.7; 2023 100.8; 2024 100.8; 2025 100.7
- Oil production (Millions barrels per day): 2016 1.60; 2017 1.77; 2018 1.86; 2019 1.85; 2020 1.85; 2021 1.88; 2022 1.88; 2023 2.07; 2024 2.07; 2025 2.07
- Oil exports (Millions of USD): series presented for 2016–2025 with values including 2016 192; 2017 962; 2018 658; 2019 437; 2020 796; 2021 330; 2022 803; 2023 1396; 2024 3018; 2025 3296 (table entries as shown)
- Oil fiscal revenues (Billion Tenge): 2016 193; 2017 432; 2018 134; 2019 592; 2020 457; 2021 0469; 2022 4480; 2023 7496; 2024 3558; 2025 4599 (table entries as shown)
- Oil fiscal revenues (Billion USD): 2016 5.7; 2017 9.9; 2018 13.3; 2019 11.9; 2020 12.1; 2021 12.4; 2022 12.8; 2023 14.4; 2024 15.4; 2025 15.5
- NFRK assets (end-period, in billions of U.S. dollars): 2016 61.2; 2017 58.3; 2018 58.0; 2019 61.5; 2020 65.1; 2021 69.3; 2022 75.3; 2023 82.6; 2024 90.9; 2025 99.7
- NFRK inflows total (in billions of USD): 2016 4.5; 2017 11.2; 2018 14.7; 2019 10.5; 2020 10.6; 2021 10.9; 2022 11.2; 2023 12.5; 2024 13.4; 2025 13.9
  - Receipts from oil companies (in billions of USD): 2016 3.3; 2017 6.2; 2018 9.3; 2019 7.9; 2020 7.8; 2021 7.8; 2022 7.9; 2023 8.9; 2024 9.5; 2025 9.6
  - Investment income (in billions of USD): 2016 1.2; 2017 4.9; 2018 5.4; 2019 2.6; 2020 2.8; 2021 3.1; 2022 3.3; 2023 3.6; 2024 4.0; 2025 4.4
- NFRK outflows total (in billions of USD): 2016 10.1; 2017 6.3; 2018 0.2; 2019 7.1; 2020 6.9; 2021 6.7; 2022 5.1; 2023 5.1; 2024 5.1; 2025 5.1
  - Guaranteed Transfer To The Budget (in billions of USD): 2016 6.2; 2017 8.8; 2018 7.5; 2019 7.1; 2020 6.9; 2021 6.7; 2022 5.1; 2023 5.1; 2024 5.1; 2025 5.1
  - Targeted Transfers To The Budget (in billions of USD): 2016 2.2; 2017 1.4; 2018 0.1; 2019 0.0; 2020 0.0; 2021 0.0; 2022 0.0; 2023 0.0; 2024 0.0; 2025 0.0
- Net addition to NFRK (in billions of USD): 2016 -2.2; 2017 -2.9; 2018 -0.3; 2019 3.5; 2020 3.6; 2021 4.2; 2022 6.0; 2023 7.3; 2024 8.3; 2025 8.8

### Monetary accounts (selected end-period levels, in billions of tenge)
- Broad money (end-period): 2016 19,799; 2017 19,456; 2018 20,813; 2019 20,976; 2020 22,141; 2021 23,434; 2022 24,672; 2023 26,634; 2024 28,686; 2025 31,166
- Reserve money (end-period): 2016 5,163; 2017 5,537; 2018 6,651; 2019 6,838; 2020 7,311; 2021 7,857; 2022 8,421; 2023 9,231; 2024 9,995; 2025 10,878
- Net foreign assets (Monetary Survey): 2016 10,857; 2017 11,489; 2018 13,329; 2019 13,523; 2020 14,080; 2021 14,772; 2022 15,528; 2023 16,369; 2024 17,310; 2025 18,225
- Net domestic assets (Monetary Survey): 2016 9,361; 2017 8,470; 2018 7,948; 2019 7,916; 2020 8,525; 2021 9,125; 2022 9,607; 2023 10,729; 2024 11,840; 2025 13,404
- Credit to the private sector (end-period): 2016 13,917; 2017 14,049; 2018 14,015; 2019 14,493; 2020 15,763; 2021 17,322; 2022 19,075; 2023 21,333; 2024 23,394; 2025 25,737

*Source: Kazakhstani authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.*

### Annex I. External Sector Assessment

### Annex I. External Sector Assessment

### Overall assessment
- Staff assesses Kazakhstan’s external position in 2019 as moderately weaker than implied by economic fundamentals and desirable policies.
- The current account deficit has increased due to higher imports and terms-of-trade deterioration.
- Reserves are at an adequate level for a floating ER regime.
- External debt is projected to decline further as a percent of GDP, but it remains vulnerable to ER depreciation.

### Net International Investment Position (NIIP)
- NIIP in 2018: $-61 billion (34 percent of GDP).
- NIIP at end-2017: $-56 billion.
- Change in 2018 driven mainly by a sizable decrease in assets (by almost $13 billion) reflecting reduction in residents’ direct and portfolio investment.
- External liabilities declined by $8 billion due to share buybacks and redemption of Eurobonds by Kazakh companies.
- NIIP as of end-June 2019: $-59 billion.
- Over 70 percent of liabilities to non-residents are related to direct investments in Kazakhstan (mitigating factor).

### Current account developments
- Current account was broadly in balance in 2018, but pressures reemerged in 2019.
- Oil and gas exports increased by 42 percent in 2018.
- Non-oil exports rose by 6 percent in 2018, with growth spread across most product groups.
- Income payments related to FDI increased by 24 percent, partially offsetting the larger trade surplus.
- Deterioration of the terms of trade since the beginning of 2019 reversed the positive trend.
- Current account posted a deficit of $4.7 billion in January-September 2019 (2.7 percent of projected annual GDP).
- Under staff baseline projections, the current account will remain in deficit over the medium term; significant uncertainty due to commodity price volatility and other risks.
- Specific import drivers in 2019: imports of machinery, equipment, vehicles, and parts increased by $3.2 billion or 41 percent (1.8 percent of 2019 GDP) during January-October 2019 relative to same period of 2018.
- Policy levers to contain the deficit:
  - Tighter fiscal policy.
  - Acceleration of structural reforms to increase productivity and higher non-oil exports.

### External position models and exchange rate assessment
- IMF EBA-lite CA model:
  - Cyclically-adjusted current account norm: -0.9 percent of GDP.
  - Actual cyclically-adjusted balance: -3.0 percent of GDP.
  - Implied gap: -2.1 percentage points.
  - Translates into a REER overvaluation of about 9 percent using standard export and import elasticities.
- IREER model:
  - Suggests real exchange rate undervalued by about 26 percent, strongly influenced by demographic variables with longer-term impact.
- Note: models have limitations for commodity exporters facing large terms-of-trade swings.
- Real exchange rate trend:
  - Since mid-2018 the tenge has weakened, initially reflecting tightening of global financial conditions, and more recently lower oil prices and domestic factors.
  - The NBK has largely stayed out of the market and allowed the tenge to adjust.

### Reserves and adequacy
- Based on the IMF’s ARA methodology, in 2019 the NBK’s gross reserves are projected to be above the suggested range of 100–150 percent of the metric typical for commodity exporters.
- Reserves: close to $30 billion in October 2019.
- Reserve coverage:
  - About 7 months of imports of goods and services.
  - Over 200 percent of short-term debt.
  - 50 percent of broad money.
- Since the beginning of 2019, reserves have declined, reflecting portfolio investment outflows and government and quasi-sovereign debt repayments, but they remain at a comfortable level.
- The assets of the NFRK are currently at $60 billion and provide an additional buffer.

### External debt and sustainability
- Total external debt declined by $8.4 billion in 2018, from 100.2 to 88.5 percent of GDP, mostly due to reduction in private sector and SOE debt, including intracompany debt related to FDI.
- Staff baseline projections envisage a further decline of the debt ratio over the medium term.
- Debt remains sustainable but sensitive to real ER shocks:
  - A real depreciation of 30 percent would raise the debt ratio considerably—by over 30 percent of GDP more compared to the baseline scenario.

### Key policy recommendations
- Allow the exchange rate to adjust to external pressures.
- Use buffers (NBK reserves, NFRK assets) to smooth short-term volatility if needed.
- Maintain fiscal sustainability by raising non-oil revenue and improving spending efficiency.
- Tighten fiscal policy to help contain the current account deficit.
- Accelerate structural reforms to increase productivity and non-oil exports and to diversify the economy.
- Strengthen financial stability and closely monitor SOE and financial sector risks.
- Proceed with planned privatizations (IPOs of Samruk Kazyna’s largest assets) and implement safeguards to improve transparency and accountability.

*Source: Annex I. External Sector Assessment (IMF staff).*

### Annex IV. Addressing Corruption Vulnerabilities and

### Annex IV. Addressing Corruption Vulnerabilities and Improving the Rule of Law

### A. Corruption Vulnerabilities

- Governance gaps and corruption vulnerabilities may affect investment and growth in any country context; corruption may lead to higher direct costs for investors and the government, as well as delays and other indirect costs and inefficiencies.
- Kazakhstan’s reform agenda addressing these challenges includes the “100 Concrete Steps” reform initiative and the 2015–2025 National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NCAS). Responsibilities for detecting and preventing corruption are assigned to line ministries, the Accounts Committee, the National Bureau of Anti-Corruption (NBAC), and the Agency for Civil Service Affairs. The NBAC and the Prosecutor General (PGO) are primarily responsible for enforcement.
- Legal framework:
  - Primary anti-corruption laws: the 2015 Law on Combatting Corruption, the Criminal Code, and the Code of Administrative Offences.
  - The Law on Combatting Corruption conceptualizes corruption, provides the mandate for relevant bodies, and articulates the main duties of public and private sectors in detecting and reporting corruption offenses, which are categorized in the Administrative and Criminal Codes.
  - Delineation of administrative and criminal offenses could be made more precise to ensure consistent investigative approaches.
- Progress and measures in detection/prevention:
  - Financial disclosure is in place, covering candidates for public office, civil servants, heads of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and spouses.
  - Failure to submit a declaration or filing an incomplete or inaccurate declaration is an administrative offense.
  - A move to universal declaration of income and property by all individuals is underway; consideration is being given to some form of publication of declarations of high-level officials.
  - “100 Concrete Steps” includes actions on merit-based recruitment and promotion, performance-based salary increases, and establishment of a corruption-prevention unit.
  - Specific sectoral projects are underway in transport and education.
  - The NBAC is conducting a risk assessment of Samruk Kazyna, the main state holding for SOEs.
  - A recent NBAC survey found that 54 percent of respondents reported lower corruption than the preceding year.
- Areas for strengthening preventive measures:
  - Target critical risks—notably, SOEs and subsoil contracts—with SOEs made subject to robust corporate-governance rules, compliance procedures, and fiscal regulations.
- Offense definitions and liability:
  - The definition of a bribery offense could be expanded: the notion of a bribe in the Criminal Code is anchored to material or monetary advantages and not intangible benefits; the offense is considered not completed without actual transfer of the bribe.
  - Legal entities currently may not be held criminally liable; they may be held responsible for administrative infractions. Administrative liability is narrow, may apply only where actions do not contain evidence of a crime, and legal entities may be exempted from liability where a criminal case is pursued. Administrative liability is triggered only where an act was committed, authorized, or approved by an individual in a management capacity.
- Enforcement patterns:
  - Enforcement actions often target lower-level officials. Some categories of high-level officials enjoy immunity (e.g., members of parliament). Nonetheless, there are instances of high-level officials who have been convicted (prime ministers, ministers and deputy ministers, presidential administration officials, heads of regional administrations).
- Asset recovery and AML/CFT:
  - Progress has been made in clarifying procedures for confiscation of criminal proceeds; however, confiscation is not mandated in corruption cases, but left to the discretion of the court.
  - AML/CFT tools should be better leveraged: under international standards, politically-exposed persons (PEPs) should be subject to a higher degree of scrutiny; transparency of corporate ownership and identification of ultimate beneficiaries are promoted by the AML/CFT regime.
  - Kazakhstan’s legal framework only partially provides for the application of these tools. Although the AML/CFT Law requires identification of beneficial owners of accounts and transactions, the availability of accurate and current beneficial ownership information is incomplete.
  - Provisions in the AML/CFT law requiring financial institutions to implement enhanced due diligence measures for domestic PEPs should be brought into line with international standards.
- Recent actions:
  - In late November 2019, President Tokayev signed a decree amending legal acts related to the civil service and corruption to introduce personal responsibility (up to resignation) of senior management (e.g., ministers, regional governors), in case their subordinates are convicted of corruption.
  - Anti-corruption centers are being opened—in three regions already, with more to follow—to facilitate dialogue between civil society and state bodies.
  - Despite these efforts, anti-corruption reforms remain focused on improving the effectiveness of public administration; further targeting of corruption vulnerabilities among the riskiest categories of officials and sectors is recommended.

### B. Rule of Law: Contract Enforcement and Property Rights

- Importance:
  - A reliable judicial system is key to enforcing contracts and protecting property rights. Investor behavior may be affected by predictability and timeliness of enforcement and the quality of the judiciary (technical capacity and independence).
- Judicial reform measures:
  - “100 Concrete Steps” includes measures to ensure rule of law, strengthen qualification and selection of judges, and improve judicial accountability.
  - The High Judicial Council (HJC) plays a key role in recruitment, appointment, and disciplining of judges.
  - To improve recruitment, a digitalized scoring process has been introduced and the qualification exam made more rigorous.
  - Judicial salaries have been increased.
  - Following recommendations by the European Commission’s Venice Council, the HJC has enacted changes to separate performance evaluation from reversal rates and to develop objective criteria for assessment of judicial candidates and judges.
  - Further efforts are needed to ensure that judges are well protected from undue influence or reversal, including the right to challenge any verdict issued by any court, civil or criminal.
- Measures to boost FDI and dispute resolution:
  - Elements to attract FDI include a Coordination Council on Investment Attraction under the Prime Minister (who also serves as Investment Ombudsman and Chairman of the Board of KazakhInvest) and a longstanding Foreign Investors’ Council as a dialogue platform.
  - In 2018, the Astana International Financial Center (AIFC) was launched to support investment-promotion activities and incorporates dispute resolution mechanisms (court, arbitration).
  - Kazakhstan’s standing in international business environment and competitiveness assessments has improved, but judicial quality and integrity continue to be cited in surveys as important impediments.
  - Some high-profile international arbitration disputes involving foreign investors may have contributed to investor uncertainty.
  - AIFC’s dispute-resolution mechanisms are in place but have not yet been thoroughly tested.

### C. Recommendations

- The NCAS should include measurable benchmarks at the national, ministerial, and agency levels to facilitate monitoring.
- Risk assessment and analysis should prioritize high-risk activities, sectors, entities, and officials.
- The application of the Criminal and Administrative Codes should be clarified and harmonized, where needed. The legal framework should be updated to ensure public access to information and whistleblower protection, and bribery should be criminalized in line with international standards, including offering and solicitation of bribes and tangible and intangible benefits.
- Legal entities, including SOEs, should be held liable for the full range of corruption offenses, as well as money laundering, and regardless of proceedings against individuals. The level of authority of those whose conduct triggers liability should be flexible and not limited to managers, and liability should be triggered for failure to supervise or to implement adequate internal controls.
- Confiscation should be mandatory in corruption cases.
- The scope of immunity should be re-considered. Immunity from criminal prosecution should not apply when officials are acting outside of or misusing their positions to engage in corruption and financial crime.
- The AML/CFT framework should be further aligned with international standards, in particular, to ensure the implementation of enhanced due diligence measures for PEPs, and improve the transparency of the beneficial owners of assets.
- Enhance training and capacity building for judges on arbitration and commercial law.

*Prepared by: The Middle East and Central Asia Department (In Consultation with Other Departments).*

### 3.      July 2011: Bankruptcy legislation.

### 3.      July 2011: Bankruptcy legislation.

### Training and local presence
- Officials from Kazakhstan have participated in IMF courses and workshops in Washington, at the Joint Vienna Institute, and in the region in:
  - macroeconomic management, monetary and exchange policy and operations, central bank communications, budgetary expenditure control, financial programming, taxation, and statistics.
- The IMF maintains a local office in Almaty.

### Relations with other international financial institutions
- World Bank: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kazakhstan
- European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: https://www.ebrd.com/kazakhstan.html
- Asian Development Bank: https://www.adb.org/countries/kazakhstan/main

### Statistical issues — I. Assessment of Data Adequacy for Surveillance (As of November 2019)
- General:
  - Data provision has some shortcomings, but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
  - The most affected areas are the balance of payments and national accounts.
- National accounts:
  - The Committee on Statistics (CS) under the Ministry of National Economy has made considerable progress in improving the statistical infrastructure and making the coverage of the business register more comprehensive.
  - Annual estimates of the oil and gas sector are compiled and disseminated following international standards, but only in Russian.
  - The CS compiles quarterly GDP on a cumulative basis—instead of a discrete basis—and using “comparable prices” instead of fixed base or previous year prices.
  - The CS is updating the method used to compile volume movements for taxes on products used to construct movements in real GDP.
  - A target date to publish discrete quarterly GDP estimates by June 2019 was missed, partly due to staff turnover; further TA is scheduled (March 2020).
- Price statistics:
  - Kazakhstan compiles consumer, producer, and import/export price indices.
  - The quality of the monthly consumer price index is affected by occasional use of administrative price controls.
  - Typically, for each good or service administrative controls are imposed on the variety that is included in the CPI basket. Since producers/importers are not compensated by the government for any losses due to the price controls, they may switch to non-controlled varieties and/or compensate by increasing the prices of non-controlled varieties.
- Government finance statistics:
  - Nationally based budget data do not follow international standards, but progress is being made to align with GFSM 2014.
  - Authorities expanded coverage reported for the IMF government Finance Statistics Yearbook to include the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan, State Social Insurance Fund, and the Compulsory Health Insurance Fund.
  - Authorities can now report annual data for the consolidated general government, including a financial balance sheet.
  - Statistics on the enlarged government (including public enterprises) are not available.
  - Classification of assets and liabilities does not fully comply with GFSM 2014.
- Monetary statistics:
  - The National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK) reports SRF 1SR and 2SR monthly for publication in the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) with a lag of about one month.
  - Following IMF TA, the NBK developed a framework for compiling SRF 4SR for other financial corporations (OFCs) and started publishing quarterly data from March 2015.
  - Remaining inconsistencies exist in reporting inter-bank positions due to lack of information on the counterpart sector of certain transactions.
  - Kazakhstan reports data on several indicators of the Financial Access Survey (FAS) including the two indicators adopted by the UN to monitor Target 8.10 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults and ATMs per 100,000 adults.
- Financial sector surveillance:
  - Kazakhstan participates in the IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) and Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS).
  - The country reports 34 financial soundness indicators (FSIs) for posting on the IMF’s FSI website on a quarterly basis:
    - all 12 core FSIs and 11 of the 13 encouraged FSIs for deposit takers,
    - and 11 encouraged FSIs for other sectors and markets (two FSIs for OFCs, four FSIs for nonfinancial corporations, two FSIs for households, and three FSIs for real estate markets).
- Balance of payments:
  - The NBK reports quarterly BOP and IIP data in line with BPM6 and the Reserves Template.
  - Kazakhstan participates in the World Bank’s Quarterly External Debt Statistics (QEDS).
  - A new Law on Currency regulation and Currency Control, adopted in July 2018, changes the status of branches and representative offices of foreign companies from nonresident to resident and introduces stronger reporting requirements for financial transactions.
  - In external debt statistics, discrepancies exist between data compiled by different governmental agencies owing to methodological differences, including coverage of external debt of publicly-owned corporations.
  - Authorities are cooperating with relevant agencies in the ECU partner countries to resolve these problems.

### Statistical issues — II. Data Standards and Quality
- Kazakhstan has subscribed to the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) since March 2003.
- Data ROSC published in 2008.

### Kazakhstan: Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance (As of November 29, 2019) — selected entries and data-quality assessments
- Exchange Rates
  - Date of latest observation: Nov/29/2019
  - Date received: 11/29/2019
  - Frequency of Data: D
  - Frequency of Reporting: D
  - Frequency of publication: D
- International Reserve Assets and Reserve Liabilities of the Monetary Authorities
  - Date of latest observation: Oct/2019
  - Date received: 11/29/2019
  - Frequency of Data: M
  - Frequency of Reporting: M
  - Frequency of publication: M
- Reserve/Base Money
  - Date of latest observation: Oct/2019
  - Date received: 11/25/2019
  - Frequency of Data: M
  - Frequency of Reporting: M
  - Frequency of publication: M
  - Data Quality—Methodological Soundness: O, O, LO, LO
  - Data Quality—Accuracy and Reliability: O, O, O, O, O
- Broad Money
  - Date of latest observation: Oct/2019
  - Date received: 11/25/2019
  - Frequency: M / M / M
- Central Bank Balance Sheet
  - Date of latest observation: Oct/2019
  - Date received: 11/29/2018
  - Frequency: M / M / M
- Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Banking System
  - Date of latest observation: Oct/2019
  - Date received: 11/25/2019
  - Frequency: M / M / M
- Interest Rates
  - Date of latest observation: Oct/2019
  - Date received: 11/25/2019
  - Frequency: M / M / M
- Consumer Price Index
  - Date of latest observation: Oct/2019
  - Date received: 11/4/2019
  - Frequency: M / M / M
  - Data Quality—Methodological Soundness: O, O, O, O
  - Data Quality—Accuracy and Reliability: O, O, LO, O, O
- Revenue, Expenditure, Balance, and Composition of Financing — General Government
  - Date of latest observation: 10/1/2019
  - Date received: 10/30/2019
  - Frequency: M / M / M
  - Data Quality—Methodological Soundness: O, LO, LO, LO
  - Data Quality—Accuracy and Reliability: O, O, O, O, LNO
- External Current Account Balance
  - Date of latest observation: Q3/2019
  - Date received: 11/8/2019
  - Frequency: Q / Q / Q
  - Data Quality—Methodological Soundness: LO, O, O, O
  - Data Quality—Accuracy and Reliability: O, O, O, O ,O
- GDP/GNP
  - Date of latest observation: Q3/2019
  - Date received: 11/15/2019
  - Frequency: Q / Q / Q
  - Data Quality—Methodological Soundness: O, O, O, LO
  - Data Quality—Accuracy and Reliability: LO, O, LO, O, O
- Gross External Debt
  - Date of latest observation: Q2/2019
  - Date received: 9/30/2019
  - Frequency: Q / Q / Q
- International Investment Position
  - Date of latest observation: Q2/2019
  - Date received: 10/10/2019
  - Frequency: Q / Q / Q

*Source: 1kazea2020001 - 3.      July 2011: Bankruptcy legislation. — https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2020/english/1kazea2020001.pdf*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2020/english/1kazea2020001.pdf_
