## 1smrea2020001

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### Health impact and containment measures
- As of March 23, 187 people have contracted the virus, resulting in 67 hospitalizations and 20 reported deaths.
- About 425 people are in active quarantine, including vital health and law enforcement personnel.
- With its small population (33,000), San Marino has become the country with the highest rate of infection and deaths per capita.
- Containment timeline:
  - March 8: Lockdown on the entire territory; schools, universities, and some public offices closed; selected services allowed to remain open with restrictions.
  - March 14 Decree Law: Prohibited social gathering and events in public places; suspended all construction and retail activities except essential services related to food and health.
  - Private businesses required to reduce active employees by 50 percent and encouraged telework where possible.

### Near-term economic relief and staff appraisal
- Economic relief measures:
  - Supplemental wage mechanism for temporary lay-offs expanded.
  - Payments of taxes, utility bills, sanctions and other administrative deadlines postponed.
  - Temporary curtailment of public sector wages to redirect resources to the health sector.
  - Some commercial banks granted temporary suspension of existing mortgage and loan instalments.
- Staff appraisal and monitoring:
  - Staff strongly supports authorities’ response and is closely monitoring developments.
  - The Staff Report was prepared on a lapse of time basis and reflects discussions in January 2020; it does not reflect the implications of COVID-19 becoming a global pandemic.

### Pre-existing banking system vulnerabilities and fiscal consequences
- Banking system stresses and past interventions:
  - Significant deposit outflows left the banking system with low liquidity.
  - Persistent bank losses, poor asset quality, and sizable capital shortfalls led to multiple bank failures in recent years.
  - Recent bank interventions largely relied on regulatory forbearance and state support, widening fiscal deficits and increasing implicit public debt to unsustainable levels.
- Political response:
  - Elevated risks and consensus on need for broad reform triggered snap elections in early-December and the formation of a four-party coalition government.

### Outlook, baseline projections, and risks
- Staff baseline: an unsustainable muddle-through scenario with banking vulnerabilities not fully addressed.
- Medium-term GDP growth projection under baseline: decelerate to around 0.5 percent.
- 2020 projection assumption: the COVID-19 outbreak will be contained in the first half of the year.
- Selected macro projections (Real GDP and related series, 2018–25):
  - Real GDP: 1.7, 1.1, 0.7, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5, 0.5
  - Domestic demand: 1.4, 0.2, 0.2, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6
  - Final consumption: -1.0, -0.4, -0.2, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1
  - Fixed investment: 3.1, 3.5, 1.2, 1.7, 1.7, 1.7, 1.7, 1.7
  - Exports: 1.3, 2.2, 1.8, 1.6, 1.6, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5
  - Imports: 1.0, 1.9, 1.8, 1.6, 1.7, 1.7, 1.7, 1.7
  - Employment (percent change): 2.4, 2.6, 1.0, 0.8, 0.7, 0.3, 0.3, 0.2
  - Unemployment: 8.0, 7.7, 7.8, 7.8, 7.8, 7.8, 7.8, 7.8
  - Inflation rate (average): 1.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.6, 1.6
  - Current account (percent of GDP): -1.6, 0.7, 0.3, 0.0, -0.1, -0.2, -0.1, -0.1
- Key risks (domestic and external):
  - Resurgence of deposit outflows given CBSM’s limited liquidity buffers.
  - Insufficient banking system restructuring increasing recovery costs and weakening financial intermediation.
  - Household vulnerability amplified by lower growth and higher unemployment (household NPLs account for 14 percent of total NPLs).
  - Full bank bailout combined with slow fiscal consolidation would amplify fiscal risks.
  - External risks include weaker growth in trading partners and wider spread of COVID-19.

### Main policy recommendations (high-level)
- Overarching objectives:
  - Repair the banking system.
  - Safeguard public finances.
  - Implement structural reforms to promote sustained economic growth.
- Key pillars:
  - Restore banking system viability (including upfront recapitalization and deep restructuring).
  - Reduce fiscal risks and ensure fiscal sustainability.
  - Introduce structural reforms to strengthen the labor market, infrastructure, and business climate.

### Repairing the banking system and safeguarding financial stability — prioritized measures
- Upfront loss-recognition and consolidation:
  - Carry out a new prudent AQR and solvency stress test consistent with international standards.
  - Avoid regulatory forbearance; repeal laws that allow spreading losses over time.
  - CBSM should intervene in banks that fail to deliver a credible capital management plan; consolidate resolved banks by transferring good assets into a bridge bank and leaving non-core assets in a liquidation entity.
- Recapitalization and burden sharing:
  - Recapitalization should involve burden sharing with wider coverage than current law; only systemically-important and viable banks to receive restricted public support following agreement on restructuring plans.
- Liquidity and CBSM buffers:
  - Align ELA framework with international best practice: restrict to fully-collateralized loans to solvent banks contingent on credible repayment plans.
  - Limit CBSM’s budget financing to exceptional needs and on a temporary basis.
- Deep restructuring and cost reduction:
  - Reduce operating costs by rationalizing branch networks and staffing.
  - Increase income-generating assets by addressing CRSM legacy losses and converting tax credits into coupon-bearing assets.
  - Revoke BNS banking license quickly as envisaged.
- NPL resolution acceleration:
  - Speedy NPL resolution, liberalization of the real estate market, removal of cap on tax deductibility for loan-loss provisions, stricter supervisory requirements on provisioning and timely write-offs, and streamlined judicial insolvency and enforcement procedures.
- Proposed Asset Management Company (AMC) — considerations and risks:
  - Key AMC elements under discussion:
    - SPV fully state-owned and locally managed; AMC/BNS owned by local banks; potential foreign servicer involvement.
    - Funding via state-guaranteed senior bonds to foreign investors; NPLs transferred at net book value (NBV); payments partly cash and partly junior bonds to originator banks; escrow arrangements and a risk-sharing hierarchy with state as final backstop if needed.
  - Risks/safeguards:
    - Effectiveness unclear if not all banks offload NPLs; need sufficient write-downs (preferably via new AQR) and market-based transfer pricing; strong governance and a sunset clause critical; operating costs of AMC should be weighed against benefits.
- Strengthening oversight, governance, and AML/CFT:
  - Enhance CBSM crisis response capacity and independence; review CBSM law; apply “Fit and Proper” regulation; allocate more resources to supervisors and AML/CFT authorities.
  - Continue AML/CFT reforms including second National Risk Assessment and preparations for the Moneyval on-site visit.

### Fiscal outlook, debt, and financing needs
- Recent fiscal and liquidity indicators:
  - 2019 fiscal deficit: 2.5 percent of GDP.
  - Government liquidity buffers at end-2019: €32 million.
  - Expiring CBSM loans: €55 million.
  - Official public debt (end-2019): 32 percent of GDP.
  - Implicit fiscal liabilities: about 54 percent of GDP.
  - Implicit public debt (official + implicit liabilities): 86 percent of GDP.
- 2020 budget and staff projections:
  - The 2020 budget targets a deficit of 1.2 percent of GDP, excluding CRSM recapitalization and partial repayment of pension fund deposits following BCIS’ resolution.
  - Staff project the 2020 fiscal deficit to double relative to the 2019 level and stand at 5 percent of GDP.
- Fiscal projections (Percent of GDP, 2018–2025):
  - Revenues: 23.0 (2018), 21.6 (2019 Est.), 20.2 (2020), 19.9 (2021), 20.0 (2022), 20.1 (2023), 20.1 (2024), 20.1 (2025)
  - Expenditures: 24.5 (2018), 24.1 (2019 Est.), 25.3 (2020), 25.2 (2021), 25.2 (2022), 25.4 (2023), 25.3 (2024), 25.3 (2025)
  - of which bank support: 3.1 (2018), 2.3 (2019 Est.), 2.2 (2020), 2.0 (2021), 1.8 (2022), 1.6 (2023), 1.5 (2024), 1.3 (2025)
  - Overall Balance: -1.6 (2018), -2.5 (2019 Est.), -5.0 (2020), -5.3 (2021), -5.1 (2022), -5.3 (2023), -5.2 (2024), -5.1 (2025)
  - Primary Balance: -1.2 (2018), -2.1 (2019 Est.), -4.6 (2020), -4.6 (2021), -4.3 (2022), -4.4 (2023), -4.2 (2024), -4.0 (2025)
  - Primary Balance, net of bank support: 1.9 (2018), 0.3 (2019 Est.), -2.4 (2020), -2.7 (2021), -2.5 (2022), -2.7 (2023), -2.7 (2024), -2.7 (2025)
  - Public debt (official): 30.3 (2018), 32.0 (2019 Est.), 34.4 (2020), 39.0 (2021), 43.3 (2022), 47.7 (2023), 52.0 (2024), 56.2 (2025)
  - Implicit public debt /1: 78.8 (2018), 85.8 (2019 Est.), 86.9 (2020), 88.9 (2021), 90.8 (2022), 92.9 (2023), 95.0 (2024), 97.1 (2025)
  - /1 Official public debt plus tax credits, CRSM legacy losses, and commitments related to BCIS resolution.
- Public debt dynamics and financing needs:
  - Public debt increased to 85.8 percent of GDP in 2019 from 78.8 percent of GDP in 2018, mainly owing to the recent BCIS bailout.
  - Public debt is projected to increase to 97.1 percent of GDP by 2025.
  - 2020 gross financing needs are projected to increase to about 10.6 percent of GDP from 3.7 percent in 2019.
  - Projection assumption: the short-term loan from CBSM is repaid in 2020 by issuing a new 10-year bond with 2 percent interest rate.

### Fiscal adjustment strategy and recommendations
- Medium-term fiscal anchors:
  - Staff consider public debt of about 50 percent of GDP and government deposits covering at least two months of spending as adequate medium-term anchors.
- Staff-stated feasible adjustment:
  - Increase the primary fiscal surplus, net of bank support, to 2.5 percent of GDP from 0.3 percent of GDP in 2019.
- Proposed fiscal adjustment (Proj. % of GDP, 2020-2025):
  - Tax Increase total: 1.5
    - VAT: 0.6
    - SMAC rebate: 0.6
    - Petroleum rebate: 0.3
  - Spending Cuts total: 1.6
    - Pension reform: 0.6
    - Reduction in transfers to other government units: 1.0
  - Total Net Adjustment (net of the impact of automatic stabilizers): 2.2
- Revenue measures:
  - Replace the single-stage import tax with a VAT; recommended three rates: standard rate of 15 percent, reduced rate of 10 percent for most services, and 5 percent for food and other basic goods.
  - Reform the regressive consumption allowance, repeal discounts on petroleum products, and remove other wasteful rebates.
- Expenditure measures:
  - Reform the pension system to address an annual pension system deficit currently at 2.5 percent of GDP (recommendations include delaying retirement age, increasing contribution rates, and rationalizing benefits).
  - Increase spending efficiency via spending reviews and reform social safety nets.
- Public Financial Management and financing strategy:
  - Draft PFM law aims to unify and align public sector accounting to international standards and enhance budget planning, management, reporting, and controls.
  - Diversify financing sources while developing debt and cash management capacity.

### Banking system status, resolution framework, and BCIS application (key figures)
- Selected exact figures:
  - Population: (33,000).
  - Bank deposits are now at about 30 percent below their 2014 level.
  - Seven-day liquidity coverage ratios remained at about 30 percent.
  - CBSM reserves increased to €385 million at end-2019 from €223 million at end-2018.
  - Estimated banking system capital shortfalls, based on the 2017 AQR update, stand at 51 percent of GDP.
  - NPL ratio increased to about 57 percent in November 2019 from 53 percent at end-2018.
  - Pension funds’ deposits transferred to the new public entity as part of BCIS resolution: about €100 million, 7 percent of GDP.
  - In the BCIS resolution, a small amount of uninsured deposits written off was estimated at €16 million.
- Bank resolution framework:
  - Bank resolution law enacted in June 2019 expanded resolution authorities’ powers (early intervention, transfer of assets and liabilities, bridge institution, state support).
  - The law protects all but a limited category of uninsured deposits and allows conversion of protected uninsured deposits into senior bonds with longer maturity.
- BCIS resolution structure:
  - Insured deposits transferred to three private banks with performing loans and NPL fund (“Odisseo”) shares.
  - Capital shortfall and a small portion of the NPL book transferred to a newly-created public entity alongside pension funds’ deposits (about €100 million, 7 percent of GDP) with state repayment over 8–10 years.
  - The rest of the bank was nationalized and renamed Banca Nazionale Sammarinese (BNS); assets largely NPLs and tax credits; uninsured deposits converted into bonds.
  - Shareholders’ equity wiped out; uninsured deposits written off estimated at €16 million.

### Financial soundness and sectoral indicators (selected exact figures)
- Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets: 13.7 (2017), 12.3 (2018), 9.2 (2019. Sept)
- NPL ratio 5/5: 54.0 (2017), 53.0 (2018), 57.4 (2019. Sept)
- NPL coverage ratio 5/5: 56.0 (2017), 59.9 (2018), 65.0 (2019. Sept)
- Return on equity (ROE): -10.1 (2017), -16.1 (2018), -79.3 (2019. Sept)
- Liquid assets to total assets: 18.6 (2017), 22.8 (2018), 19.4 (2019. Sept)
- Liquid assets to short-term liabilities: 33.3 (2017), 41.2 (2018), 32.8 (2019. Sept)
- Banking system assets (millions of euros): 2,612.2 (2012) ... 1,252.2 (2019, supervisory data, latest as of Nov 2019)

### Public debt stress-test scenarios (selected outcomes)
- Real growth shock (real GDP growth rate declines by one-standard deviation below the baseline during 2021–22):
  - Public debt ratio increases to 101.4 percent of GDP by 2022, and to 107.5 percent of GDP by 2025.
- Primary balance shock (primary balance declines by half of its standard deviation in both 2021–22):
  - Public debt increases to 100 percent of GDP by 2025.
- Real interest rate shock (interest rate increases by 300 basis points by 2021):
  - Public debt projected to increase to 99 percent of GDP by 2025.
- Combined macro-fiscal shock:
  - Public debt reaches 104 percent of GDP by 2022, and then gradually increases to 112 percent of GDP by 2025.
- Contingent liability customized shock (new intervention in the banking sector equal to 10 percent of GDP, accompanied by an interest rate increase of 50 basis points, and a real growth shock as above):
  - Public debt reaches 118 percent of GDP by 2025.

### Structural reforms, labor market, and social protection recommendations
- Labor market and employment:
  - Further liberalize hiring, including of nonresidents.
  - Revisit the supplemental wage for temporary layoffs and rationalize unemployment benefit durations.
  - Revamp vocational training to mitigate skill mismatch.
  - Discontinue the surcharge on direct hiring of cross-border workers (surcharge is 4.5 percent additional contribution rate).
- Social protection and ALMPs:
  - Subject Active Labor Market Policies (ALMP) to rigorous cost-benefit analysis and continuous monitoring.
  - Consider standard unemployment benefit conditioned on active job search and training; link duration of unemployment benefits to employment period.
  - UPAL to coordinate between firms, schools, and universities to improve matching.
- Business climate and economic integration:
  - Improve starting a business, obtaining construction permits, protecting minority investors, and speeding contract enforcement.
  - Conclude the EU association agreement.
  - Invest in telecommunication and transportation infrastructure.

### Data, statistics, and surveillance caveats
- Data improvements:
  - Since 2018, authorities produce balance of payment and IIP statistics annually.
  - Implementing IMF e-GDDS recommendations and publishing critical data through the National Summary Data Page in January 2020.
- Data limitations and caveats:
  - Gross external debt does not include FDI debt instrument liabilities; gross financing needs may be underestimated.
  - External sector historical data availability limited; many statistics available with delays, lower frequency, or gaps.
  - Monetary and financial statistics improvements since June 2015 follow IMF MFS methodology and are not strictly comparable to earlier periods.

### Annex highlights — corporate vulnerability, reserves, and labor market outcomes (selected)
- Corporate sector:
  - Output loss of about one-third in the last decade; number of firms shrank by about one quarter compared with 2008.
  - Firms’ liquidation rate: about 5 percent per annum.
  - Firms’ net return on equity around 10 percent; average ROA around 4 percent in 2012–18.
- Reserve adequacy and liquidity buffers:
  - Aggregate liquidity buffers around 60 percent of 2014 levels despite improvement since end-2018.
  - ARA EM metric: international reserves amount to 71 percent of the metric (below generally adequate range of 100–150 percent).
  - Staff reserve gap declined to 8 percent (i.e. €34 million) at end-2019 from 28 percent at end-2018.
- Labor market and social benefits:
  - Economy "has lost more than 30 percent of its output" since the global financial crisis.
  - Unemployment increased from "about 4 percent" to a peak of "9 percent in 2015", and "somewhat stabilized to about 8 percent" in recent years.
  - Employment (excluding self-employment) declined by 4 percent since 2008; total employment declined by about 6 percent including self-employed.
  - Sectoral employment changes (2008–2018): Construction: "40 percent" decline; Finance: "26 percent" decline; Public enterprises: "12 percent" decline; Public administration: "9 percent" decline.

### Article IV scheduling and selected headline statistics
- Staff propose the next Article IV consultation follows a standard 12-month cycle.
- Selected headline statistics:
  - GDP per capita (2018): 45,670 U.S. dollars
  - Life expectancy at birth (2018): 86.6 years
  - Population (2018): 33,419 persons
  - Literacy, adult (2015): 96 percent
  - Unemployment rate (average; percent): 8.1 (2017), 8.0 (2018), 7.7 (2019), 7.8 (2020–25 projected range)

*International Monetary Fund — Staff Report for the 2020 Article IV Consultation (material as presented in the source).*

### 1.      San Marino has been severely hit by the Covid-19 outbreak. As in other

### 1.      San Marino has been severely hit by the Covid-19 outbreak. As in other

### Health impact and epidemiological facts
- As of March 23, 187 people have contracted the virus, resulting in 67 hospitalizations and 20 reported deaths.
- About 425 people are in active quarantine, including vital health and law enforcement personnel.
- With its small population (33,000), San Marino has become the country with the highest rate of infection and deaths per capita.

### Containment measures adopted by authorities
- March 8: First set of containment measures — lockdown on the entire territory of San Marino; schools, universities, and some public offices ordered to close while selected services allowed to remain open, subject to some restrictions.
- March 14 Decree Law: Prohibited social gathering and events in public places; suspended all construction and retail activities except for essential services related to the provision of food and health.
- Private businesses, including in the manufacturing sector, required to reduce the number of active employees by 50 percent and encouraged employees to work from home where possible.

### Economic relief and fiscal measures implemented
- Supplemental wage mechanism for temporary lay-offs expanded to include reduction of the workforce related to containment measures.
- Payments of taxes, utility bills, sanctions and other administrative deadlines have been postponed.
- Wages of public sector employees have been temporary curtailed to re-direct more resources to the health sector.
- Some commercial banks have granted temporary suspension of existing mortgage and loan instalments to further support the liquidity of families and firms.

### Staff appraisal and near-term focus
- Staff strongly supports the authorities’ response to the ongoing health crisis.
- The authorities’ near-term efforts are focused on limiting and containing the adverse social and economic effects of the COVID-19 outbreak.
- The Staff Report was prepared on a lapse of time basis and reflects discussions in January 2020; it does not reflect the implications of COVID-19 becoming a global pandemic and resulting strains in global trade, commodity, and financial markets.
- Staff is closely monitoring the situation and will continue to work on assessing its impact and the related policy response in San Marino and globally.

### Context: pre-existing banking system vulnerabilities and fiscal consequences
- Significant deposit outflows left the banking system with low liquidity.
- Persistent bank losses, poor asset quality, and sizable capital shortfalls led to multiple bank failures in recent years.
- Recent bank interventions largely relied on regulatory forbearance and state support, which widened fiscal deficits, eroded fiscal buffers, and increased the implicit public debt to unsustainable levels.
- Elevated risks and a shared recognition that a broad coalition is critical to advance necessary reforms triggered snap elections in early-December and the establishment of a four-party coalition government.

### Outlook and risks (as described)
- With no credible measures to restore banking system health and in the face of a continued weak external environment, economic growth is projected to remain subdued in the coming years.
- Slow progress in repairing the banking system and failure to restore fiscal sustainability are the key and material risks.
- The recent outbreak of COVID-19 in San Marino and Italy has significantly increased uncertainty.

### Main policy recommendations (summary)
- Urgently develop a stabilization plan that safeguards financial stability, restores fiscal sustainability, and removes supply-side bottlenecks to sustained growth.
  - Financial sector:
    - Safeguard the central bank’s liquidity buffers.
    - Develop a credible strategy to secure banks’ viability and sustainability through upfront loss recognition, recapitalization with burden sharing, deep restructuring with significant reduction in non-performing loans and operating costs, and improvement of financial sector governance and oversight.
  - Fiscal policy:
    - Put public finances on a sustainable path and gradually rebuild fiscal buffers, including by restricting state support to the banking system and implementing an ambitious fiscal adjustment that relies on both revenue and expenditure measures.
    - Urgently reform the pension system and reduce fiscal risks through diversification of sovereign financing sources and enhancement of debt and cash management capacity.
  - Structural reforms:
    - Strengthen labor supply, including by further relaxing hiring of nonresidents, rationalizing the social benefits system, and mitigating skill mismatch.
    - Further improve the business climate and address infrastructure gaps to advance economic integration.

### Recent developments and macro-financial indicators (selected exact figures)
- Population: (33,000).
- Bank deposits are now at about 30 percent below their 2014 level.
- Seven-day liquidity coverage ratios remained at about 30 percent.
- CBSM reserves increased to €385 million at end-2019 from €223 million at end-2018.
- Estimated banking system capital shortfalls, based on the 2017 AQR update, stand at 51 percent of GDP.
- NPL ratio increased to about 57 percent in November 2019 from 53 percent at end-2018.
- Pension funds’ deposits transferred to the new public entity as part of BCIS resolution: about €100 million, 7 percent of GDP.
- In the BCIS resolution, a small amount of uninsured deposits written off was estimated at €16 million.

### Bank resolution framework and BCIS application (Box 1 key points)
- A bank resolution law was enacted in June 2019, expanding resolution authorities’ powers: early intervention, transfer of assets and liabilities to third parties, establishment of a bridge institution, and provision of state support.
- The law protects all but a limited category of uninsured deposits, restricting the scope of bail-in on top of loss absorption by shareholders’ equity, hybrid capital instruments, and subordinated debt; protected uninsured deposits can be converted into senior bonds with longer maturity.
- The failed BCIS was resolved with the balance sheet split into three parts:
  - Insured deposits transferred to three private banks, along with performing loans and NPL fund (“Odisseo”) shares.
  - The capital shortfall and a small portion of the bank’s NPL book transferred to a newly-created public entity alongside pension funds’ deposits (about €100 million, 7 percent of GDP), which the state committed to repay over a period of 8–10 years.
  - The rest of the bank was nationalized and renamed as Banca Nazionale Sammarinese (BNS); its assets largely consist of NPLs and tax credits that do not generate income, while a high share of its liabilities are uninsured deposits that were converted into bonds to mitigate immediate liquidity pressures.
- Shareholders’ equity was wiped out and a small amount (estimated at €16 million) of uninsured deposits were written off.

*International Monetary Fund — Staff Report for the 2020 Article IV Consultation (material as presented in the source).*

### 9.      The banking system’s unviable cost and income structure resulted in persistent losses.

### 9.      The banking system’s unviable cost and income structure resulted in persistent losses.

### Banking system losses, structure, and drivers
- The banking system is estimated to have registered a loss in 2019—the tenth year in a row—owing to exceptionally high cost-to-income ratios and sizable additional provisions made in BCIS resolution.
- Income constraints:
  - High share of non-income bearing assets such as NPLs and tax credits.
  - Limited fee and commission income.
- Cost pressures:
  - High funding cost.
  - Large inefficiencies partly reflecting the oversized branch network and high concentration of employment in the banking sector.
- Structural issues highlighted:
  - Most of BNS’s assets do not generate income; BNS is currently unviable as a bank and its banking license needs to be revoked as envisaged.
  - Continued CBSM ownership of the newly-created BNS creates a significant conflict of interest and poses risks to CBSM’s financial autonomy.

### Fiscal position and implicit public debt (Box 2)
- 2019 fiscal deficit: 2.5 percent of GDP.
- Government liquidity buffers at end-2019: €32 million.
- Expiring CBSM loans: €55 million.
- Official public debt (end-2019): 32 percent of GDP.
- Implicit fiscal liabilities: about 54 percent of GDP.
- Implicit public debt (official + implicit liabilities): 86 percent of GDP.
- Components of implicit fiscal liabilities:
  - CRSM legacy losses remaining as of end-2019: €455 million (32 percent of GDP). Government committed in 2017 to amortize CRSM legacy losses over 25 years.
  - Banking system tax credits: €209 million (15 percent of GDP). Staff consider these tax credits legitimate fiscal costs that are not realizable in the foreseeable future and part of bank recapitalization cost.
  - BCIS’ pension fund deposits to be repaid by government over 8–10 years: €100 million (7 percent of GDP).

### External position and 2019 outcomes
- 2019 current account balance: shifted to a slight surplus of 0.7 percent of GDP from a deficit of -1.6 percent in 2018 (income balance improved).
- Net international investment position: modestly decreased to 244 percent of GDP from 247 percent of GDP in 2018 as banks liquidated foreign portfolio investment and reduced loan exposure to non-residents.
- Real effective exchange rate (REER) in 2019: remained broadly stable; staff analysis points to an over-valuation (caution given data weaknesses).

### Outlook, baseline scenario, and macro projections
- Staff’s baseline: an unsustainable muddle-through scenario where banking sector vulnerabilities are not fully addressed; financial and economic conditions gradually worsen.
- Medium-term GDP growth projection under baseline: decelerate to around 0.5 percent, primarily reflecting lower investment growth and weaker net exports.
- 2020 projection assumption: the COVID-19 outbreak will be contained in the first half of the year.
- Selected macro projections (2018–25) — percentage changes or levels as presented:
  - Real GDP: 1.7, 1.1, 0.7, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5, 0.5
  - Domestic demand: 1.4, 0.2, 0.2, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6
  - Final consumption: -1.0, -0.4, -0.2, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1
  - Fixed investment: 3.1, 3.5, 1.2, 1.7, 1.7, 1.7, 1.7, 1.7
  - Exports: 1.3, 2.2, 1.8, 1.6, 1.6, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5
  - Imports: 1.0, 1.9, 1.8, 1.6, 1.7, 1.7, 1.7, 1.7
  - Employment (percent change): 2.4, 2.6, 1.0, 0.8, 0.7, 0.3, 0.3, 0.2
  - Unemployment: 8.0, 7.7, 7.8, 7.8, 7.8, 7.8, 7.8, 7.8
  - Inflation rate (average): 1.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.6, 1.6
  - Current account (percent of GDP): -1.6, 0.7, 0.3, 0.0, -0.1, -0.2, -0.1, -0.1

### Risks
- Key domestic risks:
  - Resurgence of acute deposit outflows given CBSM’s limited liquidity buffers — could increase liquidity pressures, disrupt the payment system, and undermine financial stability.
  - Insufficient banking system restructuring leading to higher bank recovery costs, eroded confidence, and weakened financial intermediation with adverse growth implications.
  - Household vulnerability: although household debt is low and their NPLs account for only 14 percent of total NPLs, lower growth and higher unemployment would exacerbate vulnerabilities with negative feedback to banks.
  - A full bank bailout combined with slow fiscal consolidation would amplify fiscal risks, increase debt service payments, and crowd-out productive spending.
- External risks:
  - Weaker-than-expected growth in key trading partners and wider spread of COVID-19 in San Marino and Italy — adverse effects on trade, tourism, consumption, investment, and fiscal costs of response to the virus.

### Authorities’ views (summary)
- Authorities broadly concurred with staff’s risk assessment and agreed that piecemeal reforms are unsustainable.
- Agreed on need for a comprehensive strategy to restore banking sector viability and re-establish trust, and to safeguard public finances.
- Noted progress in enhancing supervisory powers and ongoing efforts to develop a stabilization plan.
- Acknowledged fiscal risks from slow fiscal consolidation and intend to carry out fiscal reforms to contain future public debt increases.
- Confident that structural reforms to improve external competitiveness will promote exports and growth.
- Following COVID-19 spread, noted plans to provide temporary support to hard-hit sectors as needed.

### Policy agenda — high-level priorities
- Overarching objectives:
  - Repair the banking system.
  - Safeguard public finances.
  - Implement structural reforms to promote sustained economic growth.
- Key pillars: Restore banking system viability (including upfront recapitalization and deep restructuring); reduce fiscal risks and ensure fiscal sustainability; introduce structural reforms to strengthen labor market, infrastructure, and business climate.

### A. Repairing the Banking System and Safeguarding Financial Stability
- Addressing capital shortfalls and improving liquidity — sequenced measures:
  - Upfront loss-recognition following a fresh AQR:
    - Carry out a new prudent AQR and solvency stress test using loan classification and loss estimation consistent with international standards.
    - Avoid regulatory forbearance, including on capital calculations; repeal laws that allow spreading losses over time.
  - Consolidation through resolution:
    - CBSM should intervene in banks that fail to deliver a credible capital management plan.
    - Resolved banks to be consolidated by transferring good assets into a bridge bank and leaving non-core assets in a liquidation entity.
  - Recapitalization with burden sharing:
    - Given limited fiscal space, recapitalization should involve burden sharing with wider coverage than current law.
    - Only systemically-important and viable banks to receive restricted public support following agreement on a restructuring plan.
- Increasing banking system liquidity and preserving CBSM buffers:
  - Align ELA framework with international best practice: restrict to fully-collateralized loans to solvent banks contingent on credible repayment plans.
  - Limit CBSM’s budget financing to exceptional needs and on a temporary basis.
  - Attract reputable banking group ownership participation and sell NPLs and banks’ real estate portfolios to strategic investors.
- Restoring medium-term viability:
  - Deep restructuring to increase efficiency and restore profitability.
  - Priorities: reduce high operating costs by rationalizing the branch network and staffing; increase income-generating assets by addressing CRSM legacy losses and converting tax credits into coupon-bearing assets (e.g., government bonds).
  - Repeal law that allows the volume of tax credits to increase as recoveries from NPLs of failed banks decline.
  - Revoke BNS banking license quickly as envisaged.
- Accelerating NPL resolution:
  - Speedy NPL resolution would reduce burdens and free up resources for new lending.
  - Recent steps: liberalization of the real estate market; removal of the cap on tax deductibility for loan-loss provisions; CBSM’s stricter supervisory requirements on provisioning and timely write-offs.
  - Streamline judicial processes to expedite insolvency and enforcement procedures.
- Proposed Asset Management Company (AMC) — considerations and risks:
  - Authorities are considering transforming BNS into an AMC to tackle system-wide NPLs; modalities under discussion.
  - Key elements of the proposed AMC:
    - Governance: an SPV fully state-owned and locally managed; AMC/BNS owned by local banks and tasked to manage and recover NPLs, potentially with a foreign servicer.
    - Funding: SPV to issue state-guaranteed senior bonds to foreign investors to fund purchases.
    - Transfer pricing: NPLs transferred at net book value (NBV); payments partly cash (from senior bonds subscribers) and partly junior bonds issued to originator banks; part of cash held in escrow and paid at senior bonds’ expiry.
    - Risk sharing hierarchy: losses absorbed first by junior bonds held by selling banks, then escrow reserves, with potential additional contributions from banks; state as final backstop if needed.
  - Risks and safeguards:
    - Effectiveness unclear if not all banks offload NPLs.
    - Need sufficient write-downs (preferably via new AQR) and market-based transfer pricing to reduce fiscal risks and delayed loss recognition.
    - Strong governance structure and a sunset clause critical to limit political interference and speed recovery.
    - Operating costs of AMC (servicing fees and interest payments) should be weighed against benefits as higher costs reduce final payouts to banks.
    - Involving foreign special servicers would help attract foreign NPL investors.
- Strengthening bank oversight and reducing risks:
  - Enhance CBSM’s crisis response capacity: overhaul lender-of-last-resort facilities and strengthen contingency plans.
  - Regulators and supervisors, including AML/CFT authorities, need adequate resources and powers for systemic risk monitoring, regular inspections, and enforcement.
  - Adopt “Fit and Proper” regulation to improve corporate governance.
- Strengthening CBSM independence and resources:
  - Review CBSM law to clarify mandate and decision-making responsibilities; strengthen institutional and financial independence; set limits on government financing.
  - Apply stronger eligibility and dismissal criteria to Governing Council members and allocate more resources to supervisory activities.
- Mitigating financial integrity risks:
  - Continue enhancements to AML/CFT framework: second National Risk Assessment, AML/CFT inspections for designated non-financial professions and businesses, legislation on targeted financial sanctions implementation, expansion of corporate governance guidelines including voluntary AML committees.
  - Prepare for the Moneyval on-site visit focusing on technical compliance and AML/CFT effectiveness.
  - Allocate more human and financial resources to the Financial Intelligence Agency and enhance banks’ customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting.

*Source: IMF staff report text (chapter 9).*

### 25.      The 2020 budget deficit is set to widen significantly. The 2020 budget targets a deficit of

### The 2020 budget deficit is set to widen significantly.

### Fiscal outlook and projections
- The 2020 budget targets a deficit of 1.2 percent of GDP, excluding CRSM recapitalization for its 2019 loss and a partial repayment of pension fund deposits following BCIS’ resolution.
- Staff project the 2020 fiscal deficit to double relative to the 2019 level and stand at 5 percent of GDP.
- With government’s low liquidity buffers, financing the deficit will be challenging, especially given heavy reliance on the domestic market.

- Fiscal projections (Percent of GDP, 2018–2025):
  - Revenues: 23.0 (2018), 21.6 (2019 Est.), 20.2 (2020), 19.9 (2021), 20.0 (2022), 20.1 (2023), 20.1 (2024), 20.1 (2025)
  - Expenditures: 24.5 (2018), 24.1 (2019 Est.), 25.3 (2020), 25.2 (2021), 25.2 (2022), 25.4 (2023), 25.3 (2024), 25.3 (2025)
  - of which bank support: 3.1 (2018), 2.3 (2019 Est.), 2.2 (2020), 2.0 (2021), 1.8 (2022), 1.6 (2023), 1.5 (2024), 1.3 (2025)
  - Overall Balance: -1.6 (2018), -2.5 (2019 Est.), -5.0 (2020), -5.3 (2021), -5.1 (2022), -5.3 (2023), -5.2 (2024), -5.1 (2025)
  - Primary Balance: -1.2 (2018), -2.1 (2019 Est.), -4.6 (2020), -4.6 (2021), -4.3 (2022), -4.4 (2023), -4.2 (2024), -4.0 (2025)
  - Primary Balance, net of bank support: 1.9 (2018), 0.3 (2019 Est.), -2.4 (2020), -2.7 (2021), -2.5 (2022), -2.7 (2023), -2.7 (2024), -2.7 (2025)
  - Public debt (official): 30.3 (2018), 32.0 (2019 Est.), 34.4 (2020), 39.0 (2021), 43.3 (2022), 47.7 (2023), 52.0 (2024), 56.2 (2025)
  - Implicit public debt /1: 78.8 (2018), 85.8 (2019 Est.), 86.9 (2020), 88.9 (2021), 90.8 (2022), 92.9 (2023), 95.0 (2024), 97.1 (2025)
  - /1 Official public debt plus tax credits, CRSM legacy losses, and commitments related to BCIS resolution.

### Medium-Term fiscal sustainability: targets and adjustment strategy
- Staff consider public debt of about 50 percent of GDP and government deposits covering at least two months of spending as adequate medium-term fiscal anchors.
- An upfront loss-recognition and a full bank recapitalization by the state would increase public debt to about 87 percent of GDP in 2020, substantially increasing financing risks.
- Staff consider increasing the primary fiscal surplus, net of bank support, to 2.5 percent of GDP from 0.3 percent of GDP in 2019 as a feasible adjustment supported by revenue and expenditure measures.
- Note: "Additional measures would be needed to reverse the fiscal relaxation in 2020."

- Proposed fiscal adjustment (Proj. % of GDP, 2020-2025):
  - Tax Increase total: 1.5
    - VAT: 0.6
    - SMAC rebate: 0.6
    - Petroleum rebate: 0.3
  - Spending Cuts total: 1.6
    - Pension reform: 0.6
    - Reduction in transfers to other government units: 1.0
  - Total Net Adjustment (net of the impact of automatic stabilizers): 2.2
  - /1 In net terms, cumulative.

- Revenue-side recommendations:
  - Replace the single-stage import tax with a VAT, provided it is designed with sufficiently-high rates and limited exemptions and implemented on a timeline consistent with tax administration capacity.
    - Staff recommended a three rates structure: a standard rate of 15 percent, with reduced rates of 10 percent for most services and 5 percent for food and other basic goods.
  - Reform the regressive consumption allowance, repeal discounts on petroleum products, and remove other wasteful rebates to broaden the tax base.

- Expenditure-side recommendations:
  - Reform the pension system to address an annual pension system deficit currently at 2.5 percent of GDP and projected to rise, by delaying retirement age, increasing contribution rates, and rationalizing benefits.
  - Increase spending efficiency via spending reviews across public sector units and reform social safety nets.

### Public Financial Management (PFM) and financing strategy
- Authorities plan to modernize the PFM framework and diversify financing options.
  - Draft PFM law aims to unify and align public sector accounting to international standards and enhance budget planning, management, reporting, and controls.
  - Government is considering diversifying financing sources to reduce reliance on domestic investors and increase system-wide liquidity.
- Recommendations for financing strategy:
  - Broaden financing sources while taking into account debt sustainability and cost-risk considerations.
  - Accompany broadening with development of debt and cash management capacity and a broad fiscal strategy.
  - Careful prioritization is needed given limited resources.

### Promoting sustainable growth: structural reforms
- Key areas for reform:
  - Labor market:
    - Further liberalize hiring processes, including of nonresidents.
    - Revisit the supplemental wage for temporary layoffs and rationalize duration of unemployment benefits.
    - Revamp vocational training programs to mitigate skill mismatch.
  - Business climate:
    - Improve areas such as starting a business, obtaining construction permits, protecting minority investors, and speeding up contract enforcement.
  - Economic integration:
    - Conclude the EU association agreement to simplify procedures for domestic exporting firms.
    - Invest in telecommunication and transportation infrastructure to support expansion into higher value-added sectors.

### Data and statistics
- Improvements:
  - Since 2018, authorities produce balance of payment and IIP statistics annually.
  - Implementing recommendations of the IMF’s e-GDDS and publishing critical data through the National Summary Data Page in January 2020.
- Remaining needs:
  - Further improve data quality, coverage, and reporting frequency by providing greater resources to the Statistical Office.

### Staff appraisal: risks and priority actions
- Banking sector risks:
  - Weaknesses include significant deposit outflows, low liquidity, poor asset quality, and considerable recapitalization needs.
  - Multiple bank failures and state support have eroded government liquidity buffers and led to excessive accumulation of implicit public debt.
- Growth outlook:
  - Absent significant policy change, growth prospects are projected to remain subdued with downside risks; COVID-19 outbreak in San Marino and Italy has increased uncertainty.
- Urgent priorities and recommendations:
  - Implement a comprehensive and credible stabilization plan to restore banking viability, ensure fiscal sustainability, and address structural impediments.
  - Increase banking system liquidity and boost CBSM reserves:
    - Enhance liquidity management, align ELA framework with international best practice, and restrict budget financing to exceptional, temporary needs.
    - Attract reputable banking group ownership participation and sell NPLs and real estate portfolios to strategic investors.
  - Deep banking system restructuring:
    - Conduct a fresh asset quality review and upfront loss-recognition; repeal laws allowing banks to spread losses over time.
    - Promptly address banks’ capital shortfalls; CBSM to intervene in undercapitalized banks that fail to raise capital.
    - State support only for systemically-important and viable banks following burden sharing.
    - Reduce operating costs by rationalizing branch networks and staffing, increase income-generating assets, and consider converting tax credits into coupon-bearing assets.
    - Accelerate NPL resolution by strengthening supervision and streamlining judicial procedures.
    - Carefully consider plans to establish an AMC to avoid public finance risks and delayed loss recognition.
  - Strengthen CBSM institutional framework and financial integrity:
    - Provide supervisors adequate resources and powers, review CBSM law to enhance institutional and financial independence, and continue anti-money laundering reforms.
  - Fiscal consolidation:
    - Implement VAT and pension reforms, rationalize tax exemptions, better target social benefits, increase spending efficiency, and limit state contributions to bank recapitalization.
    - External market access plans should account for debt sustainability and be accompanied by debt and cash management capacity development.
  - Address supply-side bottlenecks:
    - Reform labor market distortions, mitigate skill mismatch, improve business climate, close infrastructure gaps, and conclude the association agreement with the EU.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpt.*

### 40.      Staff propose that the next Article IV consultation with the Republic of San Marino

### 1smrea2020001 - 40.      Staff propose that the next Article IV consultation with the Republic of San Marino

### Article IV scheduling
- Staff propose that the next Article IV consultation with the Republic of San Marino follows a standard 12-month cycle.

### Macroeconomic developments
- Economic activity has recovered from a prolonged and deep recession, yet real GDP remains well below its pre-crisis levels.
- Unemployment rate remained elevated at just below 8 percent despite recent increases of employment, which largely reflect a rising share of cross-border workers.
- Headline inflation increased in the last quarter of 2019 following a deceleration in previous quarters, while core inflation further declined.
- Selected headline statistics:
  - GDP per capita (2018): 45,670 U.S. dollars
  - Life expectancy at birth (2018): 86.6 years
  - Population (2018): 33,419 persons
  - Literacy, adult (2015): 96 percent
  - Unemployment rate (average; percent): 8.1 (2017), 8.0 (2018), 7.7 (2019), 7.8 (2020–25 projected range)

### High-frequency indicators and sectoral activity
- Exports growth remained strong as exports of services increased; imports growth moderated, partly due to lower growth of capital goods and raw materials.
- The number of enterprises slightly increased following a prolonged contraction; employment growth was largely driven by manufacturing.
- Tourism arrivals and hotel stays rebounded strongly at end-2019, though exhibiting highly volatile growth.
- Approvals of housing construction declined sharply while car registration remained broadly stable.
- Employment growth sectoral contributions show notable roles for manufacturing, construction, accommodation and food services, wholesale and retail trade, financial and insurance activities, and professional services.

### Fiscal developments
- Public interventions in the banking sector have contributed to a deterioration of the primary fiscal balance, resulting in a rapid increase in public debt from a low level.
- Government revenues are below euro area average; tax revenue losses from the financial sector have been significant.
- While the size of government is small, spending is rigid and mostly on social transfers and wages.
- Selected fiscal numbers (percent of GDP unless otherwise noted):
  - Revenues: 22.3 (2017), 23.0 (2018), 21.6 (2019), 20.2 (2020), 19.9 (2021), 20.0 (2022), 20.1 (2023), 20.1 (2024), 20.1 (2025)
  - Expenditure: 25.7 (2017), 24.5 (2018), 24.1 (2019), 25.3 (2020), 25.2 (2021), 25.2 (2022), 25.4 (2023), 25.3 (2024), 25.3 (2025)
  - Overall balance: -3.4 (2017), -1.6 (2018), -2.5 (2019), -5.0 (2020), -5.3 (2021), -5.1 (2022), -5.3 (2023), -5.2 (2024), -5.1 (2025)
  - Government debt (official): 25.9 (2017), 30.3 (2018), 32.0 (2019), 34.4 (2020), 39.0 (2021), 43.3 (2022), 47.7 (2023), 52.0 (2024), 56.2 (2025)
  - Implicit public debt /1: 76.6 (2017), 78.8 (2018), 85.8 (2019), 86.9 (2020), 88.9 (2021), 90.8 (2022), 92.9 (2023), 95.0 (2024), 97.1 (2025)
  - Primary Balance net of bank support: -0.1 (2017), 1.9 (2018), 0.3 (2019), -2.4 (2020), -2.7 (2021), -2.5 (2022), -2.7 (2023), -2.7 (2024), -2.7 (2025)
- Composition of current expenditure, 2018 (Millions of Euros):
  - Goods and Services: 4.5
  - Interest: 92.8
  - Wages: 4.5
  - Transfers: 219.3
  - (Note: values listed in source under "Composition of Current Expenditure, 2018 (Millions of Euros)".)

### External sector and balance of payments (selected)
- Current account (in percent of GDP): -0.1 (2017), -1.6 (2018), 0.7 (2019), 0.3 (2020), 0.0 (2021), -0.2 (2022), -0.2 (2023), -0.1 (2024), -0.1 (2025)
- Balance of goods and services (in percent of GDP): 7.8 (2017), 7.8 (2018), 7.8 (2019), 6.5 (2020), 6.1 (2021), 5.9 (2022), 5.9 (2023), 6.0 (2024), 6.3 (2025)
- Exports (in millions of euros): 1,581.5 (2017), 1,638.7 (2018), 1,687.6 (2019), 1,709.9 (2020), 1,742.1 (2021), 1,778.9 (2022), 1,816.9 (2023), 1,854.7 (2024), 1,898.8 (2025)
- Imports (in millions of euros): 1,464.1 (2017), 1,496.3 (2018), 1,561.4 (2019), 1,594.2 (2020), 1,628.2 (2021), 1,664.2 (2022), 1,699.4 (2023), 1,734.0 (2024), 1,773.4 (2025)
- Gross international reserves (in millions of euros): 252.7 (2017), 248.1 (2018), 410.6 (2019), 395.6 (2020), 380.6 (2021), 365.6 (2022), 350.6 (2023), 335.6 (2024), 321.6 (2025)

### Financial sector conditions
- Downsizing of the Sammarinese banking sector has continued since the global financial crisis due to outflows of deposits and certificates of deposit (CDs), largely by non-residents.
- NPLs continue to be high, and the loan provision coverage is likely insufficient given a large volume of ageing NPLs; NPLs are distributed more towards non-residents and the service sector.
- Liquidity situation has deteriorated since 2015 due to deepening banking sector uncertainties; banks continue to report losses, reflecting high operational cost and high NPLs.
- Selected financial soundness indicators:
  - Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets: 13.7 (2017), 12.3 (2018), 9.2 (2019. Sept)
  - NPL ratio 5/5: 54.0 (2017), 53.0 (2018), 57.4 (2019. Sept)
  - NPL coverage ratio 5/5: 56.0 (2017), 59.9 (2018), 65.0 (2019. Sept)
  - Return on equity (ROE): -10.1 (2017), -16.1 (2018), -79.3 (2019. Sept)
  - Liquid assets to total assets: 18.6 (2017), 22.8 (2018), 19.4 (2019. Sept)
  - Liquid assets to short-term liabilities: 33.3 (2017), 41.2 (2018), 32.8 (2019. Sept)
  - Banking system assets (millions of euros): 2,612.2 (2012) ... 1,252.2 (2019, supervisory data, latest as of Nov 2019) as reported in the source.
- Banking sector profitability and liquidity indicators show negative net profit and net income trends through 2019; 2019 Nov data include losses made by the failed Banca CIS and reflect adjustments related to Banca CIS resolution.

### Projections and outlook (selected)
- Real GDP (percent change): 0.4 (2017), 1.7 (2018), 1.1 (2019), 0.7 (2020), 0.8 (2021), 0.7 (2022), 0.6 (2023), 0.5 (2024), 0.5 (2025)
- Inflation rate (average; percent): 1.0 (2017), 1.8 (2018), 1.0 (2019), 1.2 (2020), 1.4 (2021), 1.5 (2022), 1.6 (2023), 1.6 (2024), 1.6 (2025)
- Nominal GDP (millions of euros): 1,353.1 (2017), 1,401.7 (2018), 1,430.3 (2019), 1,457.6 (2020), 1,490.9 (2021), 1,523.8 (2022), 1,556.1 (2023), 1,587.8 (2024), 1,619.4 (2025)

*Source: World Economic Outlook, Sammarinese authorities, and IMF staff.*

### 2019. Sept

### 1smrea2020001 - 2019. Sept

### Monetary and Financial Statistics (selected data and growth rates)
- Broad Money (end of period, millions of euros): 1,472.8; 1,539.1; 1,635.1; 1,430.0; 1,466.7; 1,441.6; 1,459.6; 1,598.1.
- Transferable Deposits (millions of euros): 1,334.7; 1,385.8; 1,449.7; 1,340.5; 1,372.2; 1,370.5; 1,398.5; 1,444.7.
- Other Deposits (millions of euros): 138.2; 153.4; 185.4; 89.4; 94.5; 71.1; 61.1; 153.4.
- Long-term securities excluded from Broad Money (millions of euros): 2,582.2; 2,661.8; 2,570.8; 2,233.8; 2,052.3; 1,549.1; 1,418.5; 1,196.7.
- Net foreign assets (annual percentage change): -18.4; 1.7; -5.0; -6.8; -8.7; -12.6; -6.2; -0.5.
- Net domestic assets (annual percentage change): 42.2; 7.0; 8.7; -21.9; 4.5; -18.8; 0.3; -6.6.
- Claims on private sector (annual percentage change): -2.2; 1.9; 7.9; -6.6; -5.1; 1.1; -7.0; -3.1.
- Corporates (annual percentage change): -7.4; 1.5; -8.3; 5.2; -3.3; 1.3; -7.2; -1.4.
- Households (annual percentage change): 8.7; 2.6; 36.4; -20.5; -7.9; 0.9; -6.6; -5.7.
- Broad Money (annual percentage change): -0.1; 4.5; 6.2; -12.5; 2.6; -1.7; 1.2; 9.5.
- Note: "Data beginning in June 2015 accord to the IMF’s monetary and financial statistics methodology, and are not strictly comparable to earlier periods." (Annual percentage change; In Millions of euros, end of period)

### Annex I — Corporate Vulnerability in San Marino: Key findings
- Output loss and firm exit:
  - San Marino experienced an output loss of about one-third in the last decade.
  - The number of firms shrank by about one quarter compared with the 2008 level.
  - Firms’ liquidation rate: about 5 percent per annum.
  - Domestic corporate NPLs increased sharply and remained elevated, especially in the service sector.
- Profitability and leverage:
  - Firms’ net return on equity stands around 10 percent.
  - The average return on total assets (ROA) in San Marino stood at around 4 percent in 2012–18.
  - Financial leverage is high (financial debts divided by net equity; sectoral charting shows San Marino among countries with elevated leverage).
- Sectoral stress:
  - Service sector, particularly food and accommodation (hotels and restaurants), shows low profitability and high financial leverage.
  - Hotels and restaurants have continuously made losses while carrying the highest debt burden.
  - Decline in number of firms in hotel and restaurant sector: 8 percent versus total decline of 24 percent.
- Financing structure changes:
  - Shareholder loans and group company loans in total financial debt: 42 percent in 2017 compared with 36 percent in 2013.
  - Many firms turned to internal resources for investment as cross-border financing became harder.
- Debt repayment capacity:
  - Improvements noted due to declining interest payments and accumulated liquidity assets.
  - High reliance on short-term debt: 60 percent of total financial debt.
  - Elevated debt levels and short-term funding reliance represent significant repayment risk if banks cannot roll over existing loans.

### Annex II — External Sector Assessment: Major indicators and judgments
- 2019 balances and positions:
  - 2019 current account (CA) actual: 0.7 percent of GDP (shifted from a deficit of 1.6 percent in 2018).
  - Cyclically adjusted CA: 0.9 percent.
  - Multilaterally Consistent Cyclically adjusted CA Norm: 10.8 percent.
  - CA-Gap: -9.9% (CA-Gap = [a]-[b]).
  - Of which Policy gap: 3.2%.
  - Elasticity: -1.2.
  - REER Gap (implied): 8.6%.
  - CA-Fitted: 13.0%.
  - Residual: 12.3% (Residual = [a]-[f]).
  - Net IIP: 244 percent of GDP in 2019 (from 247 percent of GDP in 2018).
  - Gross international reserves: €416 million at end-2019 from €249 million in 2018.
- Competitiveness and trade:
  - San Marino lost about two-thirds of its world export market share compared to the pre-crisis period.
  - REER findings:
    - CA approach implies an REER overvaluation with an implied REER gap of about 9 percent of GDP (text: "about 11 percent and 9 percent of GDP, respectively" for CA norm and implied REER gap).
    - REER index model suggests REER overvaluation by about 11 percent; much of the deviation reflects large residuals (8 percent).
  - Labor productivity declined and unit labor costs increased relative to neighboring Italian regions.
  - San Marino lags peers on regulations for starting a business, enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency, protecting minority investors, and dealing with construction permits.
- Staff judgment:
  - Staff view the REER as overvalued and the external position as weaker than implied by fundamentals and desirable policy settings.
  - This assessment is supported by erosion of external competitiveness and significant reduction in export market share.
- Notes on data:
  - San Marino recently started to produce balance of payment and IIP statistics; significant data weaknesses and poor model fit warrant caution.

### Annex II — Reserve Adequacy and Liquidity Buffers
- System-wide liquidity buffers:
  - Aggregate liquidity buffers have declined considerably in recent years; overall liquidity improved since end-2018 but still around 60 percent of the liquidity buffers in 2014.
  - Improvement in 2019 driven by one-off factors including divestment of illiquid securities by the CBSM and shifts of pension fund bank deposits into the CBSM.
- Reserve indicators:
  - Some metrics (reserves to broad money; reserves to short-term external debt) suggest comfortable levels, but imports coverage ratio indicates insufficiency.
  - ARA EM metric (composite): international reserves amount to 71 percent of the metric (below generally adequate range of 100–150 percent).
- Reserve needs and gaps:
  - Staff’s developed reserve needs metric indicates the reserve gap declined to 8 percent (i.e. €34 million) at end-2019 from 28 percent at end-2018.
  - Despite improvements, international reserves remain below “safe” levels and CBSM may need higher buffer if further liquidity support to banks and government becomes likely.
- Reserve needs components (as defined by staff metric):
  - Sum of: reserve requirements; sight deposits (excluding government deposits); fiscal buffer; credit lines (expected loans) to banks and the government.
- Reserve Coverage Metrics (as of end-2019):
  - GIR Coverage and Banking Sector Liquidity and other metric comparisons are provided in staff charts (ARA EM, 3 months of imports, 20% of Broad Money, 100% of short-term debts, Reserve needs metric).

### Annex III — Risk Assessment Matrix: Risks, impacts, and policy responses
- High-likelihood / High-impact risks and recommended policy responses:
  - Weaker-than-expected growth in the euro area:
    - Impact: Large, direct adverse effects through trade and investment; prolonged anemic growth and low inflation.
    - Policy responses:
      - Ease the pace of fiscal adjustment and reevaluate periodically;
      - Address financial sector vulnerabilities;
      - Proceed with fiscal and structural reforms;
      - Further diversify trade and financing options.
  - Coronavirus outbreak (global pandemic risk identified as high-impact):
    - Impact: Widespread disruptions to tourism, supply chains, containment costs, financial markets; adverse effects on growth and public finances.
    - Policy responses:
      - Ease the pace of fiscal adjustment to accommodate urgent spending needs;
      - Provide temporary support to hard-hit sectors;
      - Increase collaboration with international agencies to improve containment and mitigation.
  - Slow banking system repair, including recapitalization and balance-sheet cleanup:
    - Impact: Deterioration of confidence, financial outflows, higher liquidity pressures, credit retrenchment, adverse growth implications.
    - Policy responses:
      - Extend central bank powers and tools for tackling failing banks;
      - Apply bank resolution tools and liquidity safeguard measures on an “as needed” basis;
      - Accelerate implementation targets in a financial sector strategy and strengthen CBSM-government coordination.
  - Slow fiscal consolidation and delays in implementing fiscal reforms:
    - Impact: High public debt and narrow tax base increase vulnerabilities and reduce ability to respond to shocks; high debt service crowds out productive spending.
    - Policy responses:
      - Advance fiscal reforms, develop debt management capacity, and establish a Treasury department;
      - Diversify financing options;
      - Seek technical support as needed.
  - Loss of cross-border electronic payment services:
    - Impact: Severe curtailment of cross-border payments, abrupt adjustment in consumption and trade, potential short-term currency shortages.
    - Policy responses:
      - Improve central bank liquidity immediately;
      - Apply liquidity safeguard measures to restore the payment system.
- Medium- and Low-probability risks (selected):
  - Sharp rise in risk premia:
    - Impact: Debt service and refinancing difficulties; stress on leveraged firms; capital outflows.
    - Policy responses:
      - Carefully assess alternative options for external financing;
      - Address financial sector vulnerabilities;
      - Apply liquidity safeguards as needed.
  - Tensions with neighboring Italy:
    - Impact: Could dissuade Italian corporates and banks from doing business with San Marino.
    - Policy responses:
      - Build fiscal buffers and pursue structural reforms;
      - Enhance international relations; further diversify trade.

*Source: 1smrea2020001 - 2019. Sept*

### Annex IV. Social Benefits and Labor Market Outcomes

### Annex IV. Social Benefits and Labor Market Outcomes

### Recent Developments in the Labor Market
- San Marino’s economy "has lost more than 30 percent of its output" since the global financial crisis.
- Unemployment:
  - Increased from "about 4 percent" to a peak of "9 percent in 2015".
  - "Somewhat stabilized to about 8 percent" in recent years.
  - Youth unemployment "tripled during the crisis" and has only modestly recovered.
- Employment levels (excluding self-employment):
  - "Overall level of employment (excluding self-employment) has declined by 4 percent" since 2008.
  - "Considering the number of self-employed, total employment declined by about 6 percent since 2008."
- Sectoral employment changes (2008–2018 cumulative):
  - Construction: decline of "40 percent".
  - Finance: decline of "26 percent".
  - Public enterprises: decline of "12 percent".
  - Public administration: decline of "9 percent".
  - Manufacturing remains the economy’s largest employer.
  - "Transport, commerce, accommodation and food services and especially other professional services" now account for "more than 40 percent of total employment, compared to 30 percent in 2002."
- Public sector share of dependent employment: "reaching 19 percent in 2018 compared with 30 percent in the 1990s."

### Cross-border Workers and the 2017 “Development Law”
- Cross-border worker trends:
  - Share of cross-border workers in total employment "reached 30 percent in 2008."
  - "Since 2017, employment growth has been for the most part driven by the hiring of cross-border workers."
- Sectoral composition of cross-border employment:
  - Cross-border workers are "more prevalent in lower paying sectors, like manufacturing, construction, commerce, accommodation and food service."
  - Sammarinese workers are "predominantly employed in high paying sectors such as the financial sector and public administration."
- Wage differentials:
  - "The average salary in the public sector is about 30 percent higher than that of an average private sector employee."
  - "In the finance sector the average wage is 80 percent higher."
  - Note: "Only 6.8 percent of the private sector workforce has a university degree, compared to about 22 percent in the public sector."
- Development Law (2017) changes:
  - Hiring process partly liberalized: employers can recruit from the employment registry or "hire directly cross border workers, by paying a surcharge (4.5 percent additional contribution rate, earmarked to finance the Office for Active Labor Market Policies)."
  - Equalization of status: "Since September 2017, cross-border workers can also be hired with open-ended contracts" (previously open-ended contracts allowed only after seven years of employment).

### Skills Gap and Hiring Difficulties
- Employer survey findings (UPAL):
  - In 2017 "about one in two firms reported difficulties in finding qualified local candidates," largely due to unavailability of needed skills.
  - After the Development Law, "one in four firms lamented difficulties in hiring."
  - Skill shortages most acute for "skilled industrial and construction trades workers."
  - Services firms report difficulties hiring for "marketing, accounting and sales experience."
- Implication: firms increasingly look abroad because of a domestic skills mismatch.

### Measuring Unemployment Rates
- UPECEDS publishes two unemployment series:
  - "Overall" unemployment rate: considers as unemployed those registered on the employment list.
  - "Narrow" unemployment rate: excludes people seeking fixed term or part-time employment (not considered "immediately" employable).
- The difference between the two series "is constant throughout the years and did not increase significantly after the crisis."
- The group excluded in the narrow definition ("voluntary" unemployed) are "predominantly women (85 percent)."

### Options for Reforms and Social Protection Recommendations
- Promote growth to create employment:
  - "Further streamline the hiring process" to reduce firms’ search costs and speed up job creation.
  - "The surcharge on direct hiring of cross-border workers should be discontinued," as it negatively impacts firms’ ability to expand, especially those facing skills gaps.
- Reduce frictional unemployment:
  - "A better understanding of the profiles of the workforce registered on the employment list is needed."
  - "Lowering the hourly wage differentials between the private and public sectors can strengthen labor market participation."
- Address the skills gap through training and ALMP reform:
  - San Marino institutions: UPAL (job placement services and counseling) and CFP (training).
  - Subject Active Labor Market Policies (ALMP) "to rigorous cost-benefit analysis and continuously monitor their supposed impact."
  - Tax incentives for hiring from the employment list "appear wasteful" — consider "bolster[ing] existing incentives for training at the firm level."
  - "UPAL can play a coordinating role between firms, schools, and universities to better match labor demand and supply."
- Social protection adjustments to promote job search:
  - Wage supplementation system (CIG) is intended for temporary shocks but "is also used for prolonged economic downturn and corporate restructuring, thereby suppressing unemployment figures." Consider providing "a standard unemployment benefit, conditioned on active job search and training" in such cases.
  - Duration of unemployment benefits: current "maximum duration of the unemployment benefits is 24 months, even for those that only worked for 6 months continuously." Recommendation: "Linking the duration of unemployment benefits to employment period will reduce abuse and support more active job search."
  - The Indennita economica speciale (IES), for workers unemployed because of company closure, "is normally given for 12 months," and recipients benefit from "priority in their ranking on the employment list."

*Source: Annex IV. Social Benefits and Labor Market Outcomes (1smrea2020001).*

### 78.8 percent of GDP in the previous year mainly due to the recent bailout of BCIS. In the absence of

### Public and external debt outlook for San Marino

### Public debt dynamics and financing needs
- Public debt, adjusted to include government’s commitments to the banking sector and the pension funds, increased to 85.8 percent of GDP in 2019 from 78.8 percent of GDP in 2018, mainly owing to the recent BCIS bailout.
- Public debt is projected to increase further to 97.1 percent of GDP by 2025 on the back of persistent fiscal deficits and weak growth.
- 2020 gross financing needs are projected to increase to about 10.6 percent of GDP from 3.7 percent in 2019 due to a larger fiscal deficit and the repayment of a government loan from the CBSM.
- Gross financing needs are projected to decline in 2021 but remain on an upward path throughout the projection period and reach 11.9 percent of GDP in 2025, partly due to re-current state recapitalization of CRSM, which will facilitate a gradual recognition of public debt and thus increase interest payments.
- Projection assumption: the short-term loan from CBSM is repaid in 2020 by issuing a new 10-year bond with 2 percent interest rate.

### Policy recommendations and risks
- The unsustainable level of implicit public debt calls for:
  - an ambitious and durable fiscal consolidation;
  - a restricted public sector contribution to bank recapitalization;
  - stronger public debt management capacity; and
  - careful design of a banking sector recapitalization strategy to limit future incurrences of public debt.
- Elevated public gross financing needs pose significant financing risks given the lack of market access, limited domestic financing sources, and weak debt management capacity.
- Adverse economic conditions will further amplify these financing and debt sustainability risks.

### Adverse scenarios and stress-test outcomes
- Real growth shock (real GDP growth rate declines by one-standard deviation below the baseline during 2021–22):
  - public debt ratio increases to 101.4 percent of GDP by 2022, and to 107.5 percent of GDP by 2025.
- Primary balance shock (primary balance declines by half of its standard deviation in both 2021–22):
  - public debt is expected to increase to 100 percent of GDP by 2025.
- Real interest rate shock (interest rate increases by 300 basis points by 2021):
  - public debt projected to increase to 99 percent of GDP by 2025.
- Combined macro-fiscal shock (combination of the above shocks):
  - public debt reaches 104 percent of GDP by 2022, and then gradually increases to 112 percent of GDP by 2025.
- Contingent liability customized shock (new intervention in the banking sector equal to 10 percent of GDP, accompanied by an interest rate increase of 50 basis points, and a real growth shock as above):
  - public debt reaches 118 percent of GDP by 2025.
- These scenarios indicate high vulnerability of public debt to negative shocks to GDP growth, materialization of contingent liabilities, and combined macro-fiscal shocks.

### External debt outlook
- Gross external debt stood at 76 percent of GDP in 2018, with deposit liabilities of deposit-taking corporations accounting for the largest component.
- Gross external debt is estimated to have declined to 67 percent of GDP in 2019 with continued capital outflows, including from the banking system.
- Gross external debt is projected to remain on a downward trajectory over the medium term, reaching 49 percent of GDP at the end of the forecast horizon.
- All else equal, lower growth, a deterioration in the current account, and slower price growth relative to key trading partners (real exchange rate depreciation) would result in a higher trajectory of external debt relative to the baseline.

*REPUBLIC OF SAN MARINO — INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND*

### 5.      The analysis is subject to several caveats reflecting limited data availability. First, due to

### 1smrea2020001 - 5. The analysis is subject to several caveats reflecting limited data availability. First, due to

### Key caveats and data limitations
- Gross external debt does not include FDI debt instrument liabilities; gross financing needs may be underestimated.
- External sector historical data availability is limited (only two data points), requiring assumptions about averages and standard deviations of key variables used for stress tests (non-interest current account balance, export and import growth, non-debt creating capital flows).
- Many statistics are available with delays, at lower-than-standard frequency, or with gaps (notably balance of payments, IIP, external debt components, and some monetary and financial sector breakdowns).

### Public sector debt dynamics and baseline projections (selected indicators)
- As of December 30, 2018: Nominal gross public debt 33.4 (in percent of GDP?—value shown in figure heading context).
- Public gross financing needs (selected years): 4.0, 2.7, 3.7, 10.6, 8.2, 8.8, 10.1, 11.0, 11.9 (values shown across the figure).
- Real GDP growth (in percent): -3.1 (2018), 1.7 (2019), 1.1 (2020), 0.7 (2021), 0.8 (2022), 0.7 (2023), 0.6 (2024), 0.5 (2025).
- Inflation (GDP deflator, in percent): 1.2 (2018), 1.9 (2019), 0.9 (2020), 1.2 (2021), 1.5 (2022), 1.5 (2023), 1.5 (2024), 1.5 (2025).
- Nominal GDP growth (in percent): -2.0 (2018), 3.6 (2019), 2.0 (2020), 1.9 (2021), 2.3 (2022), 2.2 (2023), 2.1 (2024), 2.0 (2025).
- Effective interest rate (in percent) (defined as interest payments divided by debt stock excluding guarantees): 0.6, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.1, 1.2 (values shown across projection years).
- Change in gross public sector debt (cumulative projection to 2025): 6.7, 1.8, 7.0, 1.1, 2.0, 1.9, 2.1, 2.1, 2.1; cumulative 11.4 (figure shows these yearly contributions and cumulative change).
- Identified debt-creating flows (selected): 1.5, 0.3, 0.2, 3.3, 3.5, 3.4, 3.5, 3.5, 3.5 (projection series), cumulative 20.7.
- Primary deficit (in percent of GDP): 3.1, 1.2, 2.1, 4.6, 4.8, 4.5, 4.5, 4.4, 4.2 (values shown across years); cumulative primary deficit 27.1.
- Primary (noninterest) revenue and grants (in percent of GDP): 22.8, 23.0, 21.6, 20.2, 19.9, 20.0, 20.1, 20.1, 20.1 (projection series).
- Primary (noninterest) expenditure (in percent of GDP): 25.9, 24.2, 23.7, 24.9, 24.7, 24.5, 24.5, 24.4, 24.4 (projection series).
- Automatic debt dynamics (interest rate/growth differential contribution, percent): 0.5, -2.3, -1.2, -1.1, -1.3, -1.1, -1.0, -0.9, -0.8 (projection series); cumulative -6.1.
- Residual, including asset changes (percent of GDP): 5.2, 1.6, 6.8, -2.2, -1.5, -1.5, -1.4, -1.4, -1.4; cumulative -9.3 (figure notes include asset changes and interest revenues; for projections includes exchange rate changes).
- Deposit drawdown (other identified debt-creating flows, percent of GDP): -2.1, 1.4, -0.7, -0.2, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, -0.2.

### Underlying assumptions and alternative scenarios (selected)
- Baseline real GDP growth (2020–2025): 0.7, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5, 0.5.
- Baseline inflation (2020–2025): 1.2, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5.
- Baseline primary balance (2020–2025): -4.6, -4.8, -4.5, -4.5, -4.4, -4.2.
- Effective interest rate (baseline series): 0.6, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.1, 1.2.
- Historical scenario primary balance (2020–2025): -4.6, -2.9, -2.9, -2.9, -2.9, -2.9.
- Constant Primary Balance scenario assumes primary balance held at -4.6 across 2020–2025.
- Composition of public debt is presented by maturity (short-term vs. medium and long-term) and by currency (local vs. foreign currency-denominated) across 2018–2025 (figures provided).

### Stress test results and selected shock outcomes
- Stress tests presented include: Primary Balance Shock; Real GDP Growth Shock; Real Interest Rate Shock; Real Exchange Rate Shock; Combined Shock; Contingent Liability Shock.
- Example stress-test mechanics and outcomes (figures convey trajectories rather than single-point tables):
  - Real GDP growth shock path example: baseline series 0.7, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5, 0.5 versus shocked series with large negative outcomes such as 0.7, -3.3, -3.5, 0.6, 0.5, 0.5 (values shown in stress test figure).
  - Primary balance under combined macro-fiscal shock: -4.6, -7.2, -8.1, -4.5, -4.4, -4.2 (figure entries).
  - Contingent liability shock scenario shows a primary balance series including -4.6, -15.5, -4.5, -4.5, -4.4, -4.2 and effective interest rate spikes like 0.6, 0.8, 1.5, 1.8, 2.1, 2.3 (figure entries).
- Stress-test outputs include projections of gross nominal public debt in percent of GDP and in percent of revenue, and public gross financing needs (in percent of GDP) under each shock across 2020–2025 (figures depict ranges and percentile bands).

### Risk assessment and heat map indicators (selected)
- Benchmarks and interpretation:
  - Debt burden benchmark: 85 percent (cell highlighted logic described).
  - Gross financing needs benchmark: 20 percent of GDP.
  - External financing requirement benchmarks: 17 and 25 percent of GDP.
  - Bond spread benchmark levels: 400 and 600 basis points (for long-term bond spreads).
  - Change in the share of short-term debt: 1 and 1.5 percent.
  - Public debt held by non-residents: 30 and 45 percent.
- Heat map components include Market Perception, Debt level, Debt profile vulnerabilities, and indicators against lower and upper risk-assessment benchmarks (figure shows San Marino’s cells by indicator; text notes some indicators “Not applicable for San Marino” and some values such as “28%” and “12” in figure annotations).

### External debt sustainability (Table AVI.1 and bound tests)
- Baseline external debt (selected series, in percent of GDP): 89.4 (2017), 76.4 (2018), 67.2 (2019), 63.0 (2020), 59.2 (2021), 56.1 (2022), 53.5 (2023), 51.0 (2024), 49.1 (2025).
- Change in external debt (percent of GDP): -16.9 (2018), -13.0 (2019), -9.2 (2020), -4.2 (2021), -3.8 (2022), -3.1 (2023), -2.6 (2024), -2.5 (2025), -1.9 (final).
- Identified external debt-creating flows (percent of GDP): -7.6 (2018), -9.8 (2019), 4.5 (2020), 0.3 (2021), 0.6 (2022), 0.8 (2023), 0.8 (2024), 0.8 (2025), 0.8.
- Current account deficit, excluding interest payments (percent of GDP): 0.0, 0.8, -1.5, -1.1, -0.7, -0.6, -0.5, -0.6, -0.6 (series).
- Deficit in balance of goods and services (percent of GDP): -7.8, -7.8, -7.8, -6.4, -5.9, -5.6, -5.6, -5.6, -5.7.
- Exports (US$ index series shown): 159.5, 161.2, 161.1, 157.4, 154.5, 152.3, 150.5, 148.7, 148.5 (table entries).
- Imports (US$ index series): 151.8, 153.3, 153.3, 150.9, 148.6, 146.6, 144.9, 143.1, 142.8.
- Net non-debt creating capital inflows (negative means outflows): -1.9, 0.5, 0.4, 1.1, 1.1, 1.0, 0.9, 0.9, 0.9.
- Automatic debt dynamics (percent of GDP): -5.7, -11.2, 5.6, 0.3, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.4, 0.4.
- Residual, incl. change in gross foreign assets (percent of GDP): -9.3, -3.2, -13.7, -4.5, -4.4, -3.9, -3.4, -3.3, -2.6.
- External debt-to-exports ratio (in percent): 56.1, 47.4, 41.7, 40.0, 38.3, 36.8, 35.6, 34.3, 33.1.
- Gross external financing need (in billions of US dollars; in percent of GDP shown in table): 0.0, 0.6, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5 (series) and corresponding percent of GDP figures shown (10-Year and other annotations present in table).
- Scenario with key variables at historical averages projects external debt levels like 63.0, 64.9, 66.8, 69.0, 71.4, 73.5, 5.1 (table shows a row titled "Scenario with key variables at their historical averages 5/" with those values).

### Statistical issues and data adequacy (surveillance)
- General: Data provision broadly adequate for surveillance, but gaps remain due to resource constraints; some key statistics in real and fiscal sectors available only with delays, lower frequency, and lower detail.
- National accounts: Data for 2007 onward compiled in accordance with ESA95, annual frequency with about 10 months delay; methodological improvements since 2015 caused historical revisions.
- Price statistics: Consumer prices data available monthly.
- Government finance statistics: Authorities provided central government, state-owned enterprises, and social security fund data for 2004–18 and preliminary 2019; some data not compiled according to IMF standards (e.g., financing items treated as expenditures).
- Monetary and Financial Statistics: In 2018, CBSM began using standardized Report Forms to submit MFS to the Fund; data for Other Financial Corporations not available; need to improve classification of commercial bank assets/liabilities.
- Financial Sector Surveillance: Authorities regularly report FSIs; 11 out of 12 core and 5 out of 13 encouraged FSIs for deposit takers are disseminated quarterly; FSIs for other financial corporations, nonfinancial corporations, and households are not reported; recommendation to provide quarterly FSI data within a time lag no more than four months.
- External Sector Statistics: Balance of payments and IIP compilation started in 2018; frequency, coverage and reporting should be improved (data currently reported once a year with a long lag).

### Fund relations and periodicity (selected administrative details)
- Membership Status: Joined September 23, 1992; Article VIII.
- Quota: 49.20 (SDR Million), 100.00 (Percent of Quota).
- Fund holdings of currency: 37.05 (SDR Million), 75.30 (Percent of Quota).
- Reserves tranche position: 12.15 (SDR Million), 24.70 (Percent of Quota).
- Net cumulative allocation (SDR Dept): 15.53 (SDR Million), 100.00 (Percent of Allocation); Holdings 8.88 (57.17 percent).
- Projected charges/interest (SDR Million) 2020–2024: 0.05 each year; Total 0.05 each year.
- Exchange arrangements: Uses the euro since January 1, 1999; central monetary institution is the Central Bank of San Marino (CBSM); de jure and de facto exchange rate arrangement classification: “no separate legal tender”.
- Latest Article IV consultation: Previous consultation discussions January 23–February 1, 2019; concluded March 20, 2019.
- FSAP: Review completed in 2010.
- Technical assistance: Listed across years (examples include 1997 STA Multi-sector, 2004 STA Monetary and financial statistics, 2016 MCM Cassa di Risparmio Bank Restructuring, 2018 FAD VAT readiness, 2019 STA E-GDDS).
- Resident Representative: None.

*Source: IMF staff (content as provided in the informational annex of the Republic of San Marino staff report).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2020/english/1smrea2020001.pdf_
