## 1azeea2021001

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### Economic impact of COVID-19 — context and recent developments
- Pandemic and policy response
  - Containment, health, and economic relief measures helped slow infections and protect the vulnerable.
  - Defeating the pandemic and broadening the vaccine rollout is the immediate priority.
  - With oil reserves likely to be exhausted in the next few decades, multifarious reforms are needed to strengthen long-term fiscal sustainability and spur private sector-led, diversified and inclusive growth.
- Macroeconomic impact, 2020
  - Real GDP declined by 4.3 percent in 2020, driven by oil GDP, which fell by 7.0 percent.
  - Nonoil GDP dropped by 2.6 percent in 2020; contact-intensive and transportation sectors were most affected.
  - Inflation remained below 3 percent amid the recession; the real effective exchange rate appreciated by 5.5 percent.
  - Contraction in private credit was mild due to borrower support and interest rate cuts.
- Fiscal response and public finances
  - Authorities suspended the fiscal rule and implemented a relief package equal to 4.8 percent of GDP.
  - Overall fiscal balance shifted from a surplus of 8.2 percent of GDP in 2019 to a deficit of 6.5 percent of GDP in 2020.
  - Nonoil primary balance (NOPB) widened from -27 percent in 2019 to -30 percent of nonoil GDP in 2020.
  - The fiscal package was financed by drawing down State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) assets and reallocating spending.
  - Government debt remained below 35 percent of GDP, as of January 2021.
  - Outstanding guarantee to Agrarkredit on bond issued to acquire bad assets from the IBA: AZN 9.48 billion (13.1 percent of the 2020 GDP) as of January 1, 2021; terms: 30-year maturity, 5-year grace period, interest rate of 0.15 percent. Other guarantees account for additional 22 percent of GDP.
- External and reserve developments
  - Oil export revenues declined by 40 percent in 2020.
  - Current account: 9.1 percent of GDP surplus in 2019 turned into a 0.5 percent of GDP deficit in 2020.
  - Central Bank of Azerbaijan (CBA) international reserves increased by 2.3 percent to $6.4 billion.
  - SOFAZ assets: $43.6 billion at end-2020; combined external buffers reached 117 percent of GDP at end-2020.
  - Staff assesses the external position in 2020 as substantially weaker than the level consistent with medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
- Monetary and financial sector
  - Policy rate reduced by 125 basis points to 6.25 percent by end-2020 (reduction starting in June 2020).
  - CBA tightened reporting requirements for currency conversion in June 2020.
  - Financial conditions remain tighter than pre-pandemic due to manat real appreciation and sticky real lending rates.
  - Banking sector: buffers recovered from 2015–16 lows; CBA approved support measures and closed four medium-sized banks in April 2020.
  - Sectoral capital and liquidity ratios edged up in 2020, but improvements were uneven.
  - Bank profitability worsened; several large banks continue to run negative net open FX positions (NOFP).
  - Deposit dollarization declined in 2020 but remains close to 50 percent and concentrated in a few banks.

### Outlook and risks
- 2021 forecast and drivers
  - Staff projects real GDP to increase by 2.3 percent in 2021, driven by the nonoil sector.
  - The economy is reopening following the start of vaccination in mid-January (almost 10 percent of population fully vaccinated as of early June).
  - Increased gas production from the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) is projected to offset decline in oil output.
- Medium-term prospects and scarring
  - Prospects are subdued due to weak nonoil productivity growth and slowing capital accumulation.
  - Scarring includes prolonged decline in demand in contact-intensive sectors, increased unemployment, disruptions in learning, long-term health effects, and slowdown in investment.
  - Hydrocarbon output projected to remain stable as higher gas production compensates for declining productivity of aging oil fields.
- Risks (Annex IV)
  - Downside risks: emergence of more dangerous virus strains; problems in global vaccine rollout; domestic third wave and vaccination challenges; structural decline in productivity; oil price volatility; higher-than-expected Karabakh reconstruction needs; weaknesses in SOE and bank balance sheets; policy fragmentation/weak frameworks.
  - Upside risks: faster global recovery and higher oil prices; significant boost in structural reform efforts could improve prospects.
- Authorities’ view
  - Authorities more optimistic on growth, citing vaccination progress and National Priorities for Socio-Economic Development to improve SOE performance and boost nonoil productivity.

### Key policy recommendations (near-term and medium-term)
- Near-term and medium-term stance
  - Continue to support the economy in the near term and phase out exceptional support gradually to avoid jeopardizing the recovery.
  - Recalibrate fiscal plans and anchors to ensure long-term sustainability.
  - Align de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes.
  - Foster sustainable, inclusive, diversified and private sector-led growth.
  - Improve resilience and management of fiscal and financial risks, including contingency planning to evaluate available policy space.
- Fiscal policy specifics
  - Authorities and staff agreed accommodative fiscal stance is appropriate for 2021.
    - 2021 budget implies significant widening of the deficit based on oil price assumption of $40 per barrel.
    - Staff projects a smaller deficit reflecting a higher assumed oil price; under staff projection NOPB deteriorates by 1.8 percentage point of nonoil GDP.
  - Support should remain until recovery is firmly underway and then be phased out gradually; health spending must be sufficient for vaccine rollout.
  - Fiscal flexibility: allow automatic stabilizers and provide targeted on-budget fiscal support if downside risks materialize.
  - Staff recommended saving windfall gains from oil prices above 2021 budget assumptions and reallocating saved gains to cover additional needs to limit further deterioration in long-term fiscal position and buffers.
  - Authorities signaled intent to revise spending up to cover reconstruction, vaccination, and subsidies to agriculture.
- Long-term fiscal sustainability and adjustment needs
  - Declining oil revenues and high oil dependence (oil revenues account for half of total government revenues) imply need to increase effective taxation of the nonoil sector.
  - A large PIH gap: 21 percentage points of nonoil GDP gap from the long-term PIH-consistent NOPB benchmark of 9 percent of nonoil GDP under current policies.
  - Staff baseline: consolidated government’s net financial assets (NFA) decline to 7.1 percent of GDP by 2030 and the PIH gap reaches 14 percentage points of nonoil GDP in 2030; baseline assumes NOPB improves by 1 pp of nonoil GDP per year (in line with authorities’ plans).
  - Staff recommended a steady NOPB improvement of 1.5 percentage points of nonoil GDP per year on average during 2022–30 as an appropriate multi-year consolidation to improve long-term fiscal sustainability while balancing development needs and economic impact.
  - Even under the staff adjustment scenario, NFA would decline to 18 percent of GDP by 2030.

### Staff's Proposed Adjustment Scenario — selected figures
- Revenue (percent of GDP): 2021: 48.2; 2022: 49.1; 2023: 45.7; 2024: 43.1; 2025: 40.8; 2026: 39.0.
- Expenditure (percent of GDP): 2021: 57.2; 2022: 53.8; 2023: 51.8; 2024: 49.6; 2025: 47.9; 2026: 46.4.
- Overall balance (percent of GDP): 2021: -9.0; 2022: -4.7; 2023: -6.0; 2024: -6.5; 2025: -7.2; 2026: -7.4.
- Nonoil Primary Balance (percent of nonoil GDP): 2021: -32.6; 2022: -30.4; 2023: -29.0; 2024: -27.3; 2025: -26.1; 2026: -24.9.
- Debt (percent of GDP): 2021: 31.1; 2022: 30.8; 2023: 30.4; 2024: 29.9; 2025: 29.4; 2026: 28.9.
- SOFAZ Assets (millions of USD): 2021: 42,643; 2022: 42,065; 2023: 40,857; 2024: 40,719; 2025: 39,033; 2026: 37,145.
- Oil Prices ($ per barrel) assumed in staff scenario: 2021: 60.5; 2022: 56.8; 2023: 54.5; 2024: 53.3; 2025: 52.7; 2026: 53.7.
- Real Nonoil GDP Growth (percent): 2021: 3.5; 2022: 2.5; 2023–2026: 2.5 each year.
- Inflation (percent): 2021: 4.0; 2022–2026: 3.2 each year.

### Authorities’ preliminary adjustment scenario — selected figures
- Oil Prices ($ per barrel) assumed: 2021–2026: 40 each year.
- Authorities’ scenario shows larger near-term tightening of expenditure compared to staff but contemplates higher near-term spending for reconstruction; debt and SOFAZ paths differ due to coverage and assumptions.

---

### The composition of fiscal consolidation — objectives and instruments
- Consolidation objectives
  - Design consolidation to alleviate adverse impact on growth while mobilizing nonoil revenues.
  - Staff baseline: consolidation mainly through current expenditure restraint and rationalization (slower growth of wage bill, goods and services, and transfers) while pandemic- and reconstruction-related spending declines gradually.
  - Adjustment scenario: recommended reforms aim to achieve larger consolidation in a growth-friendly manner.
- Spending-efficiency and public investment
  - Broad-based improvements in spending efficiency, especially for infrastructure, via:
    - Expenditure reviews.
    - Performance budgeting.
    - Enhancements in the public investment management framework and governance.
  - Improvements in investment efficiency would also improve productivity.
- Wage bill and public employment
  - Recommendation: gradual reduction of the wage bill as a share of GDP.
  - Context: A 40 percent rise in public sector wages in 2019; public wage bill increased by 3 pp of GDP in the last two years to 9 percent of GDP, the second highest in the region; public employment is among the highest in EMDCs.
  - Suggested measures: anchor wage increases on labor productivity; gradual downsizing through attrition and reduction of “ghost” employees.
- Subsidy reform and SOE support
  - Phasing out generalized subsidies (which account for 15 percent of GDP, mostly owing to below-cost recovery domestic prices for energy products) would reduce fiscal support to SOEs, improve fairness, and help “green” the economy by containing energy consumption and GHGs emissions.
  - Authorities’ actions in January 2021: raised prices for lower-octane gasoline (by 11 percent), diesel (33 percent), and water and sewage fees (100 percent); deregulated prices of some oil products.
  - Timeline and scope of future subsidy reforms need to be identified in the context of broader SOE reforms and with adequate social protection to vulnerable groups.
- Revenue mobilization and tax reforms
  - Focus areas: Personal income taxes (no new exemptions, progressive taxation); modernizing property taxes (market value assessments); reducing tax expenditures and appending tax expenditure estimates to the budget.
  - Constraint: personal income tax reforms should be delayed until after the seven-year sunset clauses of the 2019 reforms expire.
  - Staff noted room for revenue mobilization using property tax modernization and reduction of tax expenditures over the medium term.
- Social spending, inclusion, and targeting
  - Reforms should create space to ensure appropriate social spending on health, education, and support of the vulnerable.
  - Staff reform priorities:
    - Improve adequacy of social assistance in the poorest quintiles by increasing benefit sizes.
    - Extend social insurance programs to include self-employed and informal workers.
    - Improve targeting and monitoring of social spending.
  - Recent improvements: e-government systems, e-transfers of cash to the unemployed, “ASAN” one-stop shop, centralization of social contributions.
- Authorities’ stance and actions
  - Authorities expected consolidation to be largely expenditure-driven and concurred it should be growth-friendly.
  - Intended focus: improve spending efficiency, enhance cost recovery of SOEs, and slow public wage bill growth.
  - Authorities proceeded with estimation of tax expenditures and planned to review tax reform options proposed by IMF technical experts.
  - Authorities did not see social spending reforms as an immediate priority, noting higher social spending per capita and lower poverty levels relative to peers.
- Fiscal anchor, debt targets, and frameworks
  - Authorities plan to reintroduce the fiscal rule in 2022, update MTEF and Debt Management Strategy.
  - Authorities’ intention: limit future general government debt issuance and keep the debt ratio (excluding Agrarkredit guarantees) below 20 percent of GDP.
  - Staff recommendations:
    - Set the floor for the average annual NOPB improvement at 1.5 pp in 2022–26.
    - General government debt target at 40 percent of GDP (including Agrarkredit guarantees), with the ceiling at 45 percent.
    - Provide buffers for adverse shocks and contingent liability risks.
  - Staff suggested estimating value-at-risk of SOFAZ assets and considering an asset-liability management framework.
  - Deeper public financial management reforms recommended, including MTEF, monitoring, reporting, and building Ministry of Finance macro-fiscal capacity.
- Fiscal risks, SOE profitability, and transparency
  - Some large SOEs operate at a loss due to operational inefficiencies, outdated equipment, and low regulated prices.
  - On-budget support to SOEs in 2020 amounted to over 2 percent of GDP; authorities expect it to fall to 0.5 percent of GDP in 2021.
  - Government-guaranteed SOE debt stood at 35 percent of the 2020 GDP in January 2021, including:
    - Agrarkredit debt to the CBA: 13.1 percent of GDP.
    - Foreign currency debt related to the SGC commercial enterprise: 9 percent of GDP.
    - SOEs in energy, oil, airline, railroad and other sectors: 5 percent of GDP.
    - Unclassified: 1 percent of GDP.
  - Staff recommended a comprehensive fiscal risk management framework, increased transparency, and timely publication of data and statements on fiscal risks and SOE performance.
  - Continued transparency (ex post budget execution reports and audits) and SOE reforms recommended to lessen corruption vulnerabilities.

### Monetary, exchange rate and financial sector policy
- Monetary and exchange rate policy
  - Monetary policy is subordinated to the de facto peg, but staff saw room for further easing.
  - Real interest rates for manat loans remained in double digits; spread between CBA and Fed rates was sizeable.
  - Inflation projected to increase in 2021 to close to the mid-point of CBA’s band; core inflation remains below 3 percent on a cumulative y/y basis in 2021.
  - Staff view: consideration could be given to further easing to support the nascent recovery.
  - Staff advocated gradual move to a more flexible ER regime to facilitate adjustment to oil price shocks and foster market development.
  - Currency mismatches have declined since 2015–16 crisis; de-dollarization efforts needed.
  - Staff underscored risks to policy credibility from differences in de jure and de facto ER regimes.
  - Authorities reaffirmed IT as long-term goal but believed the de facto peg optimal for the foreseeable future.
  - Agreed steps to support eventual transition: improve policy coordination, strengthen CBA liquidity forecasting and research, initiatives to strengthen CBA independence, and improve interbank, money and FX markets.
- Financial sector policy and supervision
  - Prudential stance: pivot carefully from incentivizing banks to use buffers to rebuilding buffers and reducing problem assets over time.
  - Risks of reversing exceptional prudential easing prematurely vs delaying reversal.
  - Staff recommended evidence-based analysis of support measures' reversal effects, data reporting transparency, and targeted time-bound phase-out of support measures.
  - Authorities' approach: start with measures less binding for the banking sector and phase out others as recovery solidifies; replaced blanket deposit insurance with a limited guarantee program and scheduled tightening measures.
  - Specific prudential measures: roll back exemptions on borrowers’ credit histories soon; complement reduced risk weight on mortgage loans (reduced to 50 percent) with stronger prudential measures (e.g., LTV requirements in line with Basel III).
- Financial oversight, AML/CFT, and CBA independence
  - Strengthen supervision and regulation to prevent repeat credit-driven distress.
  - Amend CBA Law to increase independence in monetary policymaking and financial supervision.
  - Encourage banks to share ultimate beneficiary ownership details; enhance fit and proper tests for owners.
  - Continue progress in AML/CFT effectiveness and prepare for MONEYVAL assessment.
  - Bolster entity transparency with national registry for beneficial ownership and enhance prosecution and confiscation of ill-gotten proceeds.
  - Staff ready to support CBA in enhancing risk-based supervision and stress-testing.

---

### External sector assessment and reserve adequacy (Annex III)
- Current account and external balances
  - CA was 9.1 percent of GDP in 2019 and -0.5 percent of GDP in 2020.
  - Nonoil current account deficit is 12.5 percent of GDP; nonoil exports are 4 percent of GDP in 2019 and 2020.
  - CA forecast: surplus of 2.4 percent of GDP in 2021 then gradually declining with oil export volumes.
- External buffers and reserve adequacy
  - CBA gross international reserves: $6.4 billion by end-2020, equal to 15 percent of GDP and 4.5 months of next year’s imports of goods.
  - SOFAZ assets: $43.5 billion (102 percent of GDP) at end-2020; liquid part about 75 percent of SOFAZ assets.
  - Combined CBA and SOFAZ liquid assets equivalent to 25 months of next year’s imports.
  - Azerbaijan scores much better than most EMs on the ARA metric; reserve coverage projected to remain strong into 2026.
- External position assessment and gaps
  - Staff assesses the external position to be substantially weaker than the level consistent with medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
  - EBA-Lite commodity (PIH) approach: CA norm estimated at 18.5 percent of GDP in 2020; implies negative CA gap of 16.1 percent of GDP in 2020; medium-term CA gap expected to remain negative at 11.2 percent of GDP.
  - Current account model (EBA-Lite) after COVID adjustment: CA norm 5.7 percent of GDP in 2020; implies negative CA gap of 1.8 percent of GDP.
  - REER: manat de facto pegged since April 2017 at 1.7; REER was 12 percent stronger than 2017; REER gap estimated in range 6.0 to 6.8 percent; staff assesses medium-term REER gap at least 6.0 percent.
  - Closing CA gap will require sustained fiscal consolidation and financial deepening.

### Capital flows and risks
- Azerbaijan has been a net supplier of capital; inflows dominated by FDI to oil sector and portfolio inflows; outflows include trade credits, bank outflows, and outward FDI by the national oil company.
- Administrative and reporting requirements remain in effect to mitigate bank outflow risks; staff assessing these as capital flow management measures under the Institutional View.
- Risk Assessment Matrix (selected entries)
  - Unexpected shifts in the COVID-19 pandemic — Likelihood: Medium; Policy advice: slow fiscal consolidation if needed; monetary policy accommodative.
  - Widespread social discontent and political instability — Likelihood: High; Policy advice: provide adequate, temporary, targeted support.
  - Oversupply and volatility in oil market — Likelihood: Medium; Policy advice: large fiscal adjustment if prolonged decline; save windfalls if higher prices.
  - Failure to reverse fiscal easing — Likelihood: Medium; Policy advice: gradually phase out exceptional pandemic support; implement revenue measures.
  - Financial sector risks — Likelihood: Medium; Policy advice: reverse prudential easing gradually and strengthen supervision.
  - Weak SOE performance — Likelihood: Medium; Policy advice: comprehensive SOE reforms.

---

### Key macroeconomic projections and selected indicators (Table highlights)
- GDP at constant prices (annual percent change): 2018: 1.5; 2019: 2.2; 2020: -4.3; 2021: 2.3; 2022–2026: 1.7 (each year).
- Oil sector growth (percent): 2018: 0.5; 2019: 0.4; 2020: 7.0; 2021–2026: 0.2 (each year).
- Non-oil sector growth (percent): 2018: 2.1; 2019: 3.3; 2020: -2.6; 2021: 3.5; 2022–2026: 2.5 (each year).
- Consumer price index (period average, percent): 2018: 2.3; 2019: 2.7; 2020: 2.8; 2021: 4.0; 2022–2026: 3.2 (each year).
- Credit to private sector (annual percent change): 2018: 14.9; 2019: 15.2; 2020: -0.7; 2021: 5.0; 2022: 9.1; 2023: 10.2; 2024: 10.2; 2025: 10.5; 2026: 11.0.
- Gross investment (percent of GDP): 2018: 20.0; 2019: 20.1; 2020: 19.3; 2021: 17.6; 2022: 17.2; 2023: 17.8; 2024: 18.3; 2025: 18.3; 2026: 18.6.
- Consolidated government revenues (percent of GDP): 2018: 14.0; 2019: 11.2; 2020: 11.6; 2021: 10.0; 2022: 8.9; 2023: 8.4; 2024: 7.7; 2025: 6.8; 2026: 5.9.
- Overall fiscal balance (percent of GDP): 2018: 5.5; 2019: 8.2; 2020: -6.5; 2021: -5.6; 2022: -3.0; 2023: -4.4; 2024: -5.3; 2025: -6.0; 2026: -7.0.
- Non-oil primary balance (percent of non-oil GDP): 2018: -31.7; 2019: -27.2; 2020: -30.3; 2021: -32.1; 2022: -30.2; 2023: -29.3; 2024: -28.2; 2025: -27.2; 2026: -26.9.
- General government debt (percent of GDP): 2018: 18.7; 2019: 17.7; 2020: 21.4; 2021: 30.6; 2022: 31.4; 2023: 33.3; 2024: 33.3; 2025: 36.1; 2026: 39.8.
- Current account (percent of GDP): 2018: 12.8; 2019: 9.1; 2020: -0.5; 2021: 2.4; 2022: 1.9; 2023: 1.9; 2024: 1.7; 2025: 1.5; 2026: 1.4.
- Gross official international reserves (US$ millions): 2018: 5,626; 2019: 6,258; 2020: 6,369; 2021: 6,369; 2022: 6,569; 2023: 6,769; 2024: 6,969; 2025: 7,169; 2026: 7,369.
- Oil Fund Assets (US$ millions): 2018: 38,515; 2019: 43,323; 2020: 43,564; 2021: 42,554; 2022: 42,642; 2023: 42,550; 2024: 42,403; 2025: 42,193; 2026: 42,042.
- Assumed oil price, WEO plus $2-$3 premium (US$ per barrel): 2018: 70.3; 2019: 63.4; 2020: 44.3; 2021: 60.5; 2022: 56.8; 2023: 54.5; 2024: 53.3; 2025: 52.7; 2026: 53.7.
- Exchange rate (manat/dollar, end of period): 2018–2026: 1.7 consistently.

---

### Annex I — Response to the Pandemic (selected)
- Sectoral impacts (2020)
  - Oil sector contracted by 6.4 percent owing to OPEC+ cuts and structural decline.
  - Nonoil output declined by 3 percent in 2020.
  - Hospitality contracted by 59 percent; Construction declined by 8.8 percent; Trade declined by 1.3 percent.
  - Manufacturing expanded by 10.4 percent; Transportation expanded by 4.6 percent; Agriculture expanded by 2 percent.
  - Unemployment rose from 4.8 percent in 2019 to 7.2 percent in 2020.
- Fiscal relief package (2020)
  - Package amounted to 4.8 percent of the 2020 GDP.
  - Main instruments: loan guarantees and subsidized loans 2.2 percent of GDP; expansion of unemployment insurance and temporary public jobs 0.7 percent of GDP; partial salary payments and microentrepreneur support 0.4 percent of GDP; support to passenger transportation 0.4 percent of GDP; medical facilities scaling up 0.3 percent of GDP; reduced or deferred taxes 0.2 percent of GDP; purchase of medical supplies and allowances 0.1 percent of GDP; other relief 0.5 percent of GDP.
  - Financing: budget reallocations and increased transfers from SOFAZ; additional financing from the Solidarity Fund.
  - Coverage: package reached one fifth of the population; uptake substantial by end-2020.
  - Duration: most measures terminated end-2020; some social support measures extended.
  - Cash transfers: lump-sum subsistence payments to unemployed who registered; principal cash assistance replaced only 27 percent of average monthly income; additional social assistance for the most vulnerable during the pandemic was less than 0.1 percent of GDP.
- Financial sector measures
  - CBA measures included gradual policy rate reduction, easing on capital buffers and loan loss provisions, loan forbearance, temporary suspension of on-site inspections.
  - Reduction of aggregate capital requirements by 1 percentage point; delay of countercyclical buffer increase from 0 to 0.5 percent; reduction of risk weights for certain loans.

---

### Annex II — Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) — key figures and scenarios (As of February 22, 2021)
- Nominal gross public debt (percent of GDP): 2019: 12.3; 2020: 18.1; 2021: 21.4; 2022: 30.6; 2023: 31.4; 2024: 33.2; 2025: 33.3; 2026: 36.1; 2026 (alternate): 39.9.
- Public gross financing needs (percent of GDP): 2019: -2.1; 2020: -5.7; 2021: 9.4; 2022: 7.9; 2023: 4.7; 2024: 5.6; 2025: 9.3; 2026: 9.1; 2026 (alternate): 11.9.
- Net public debt (percent of GDP): 2019: -54.0; 2020: -72.1; 2021: -80.9; 2022: -54.4; 2023: -52.1; 2024: -47.9; 2025: -44.7; 2026: -38.5; 2026 (alternate): -31.3.
- Real GDP growth (percent): 2019: 1.5; 2020: 2.2; 2021: -4.3; 2022–2026: 2.3/1.7/1.7/1.7/1.7 (projected sequence).
- Effective interest rate (percent): 2019: 2.3; 2020: 3.8; 2021: 4.1; 2022: 4.1; 2023–2026: 2.8/3.5/4.2/4.8/5.4 (projected).
- Sovereign spreads: EMBIG (bp) = 366; 5Y CDS (bp) = 283.
- Identified debt-creating flows (percent of GDP, cumulative 2019–2026): cumulative: 24.7.
- Primary deficit (percent of GDP, cumulative 2019–2026): cumulative: 26.7.
- Contingent liability shock definitions: one-off increase in non-interest expenditures equal to 10 percent of banking sector assets; SOE/Financial sector shock combines financial sector and SOE contingent liability shocks with non-interest expenditures increased by 20 percent of SOE guarantees excluding Agrarkredit guarantees.
- Note: In 2021, DSA reflects inclusion to debt of Agrarkredit guarantee, and drawdown of SOFAZ assets in 2022–26.

---

### Financial development, inclusion, and stability (Annex VI) — key findings and policy directions
- Key findings
  - Azerbaijan lags peers in financial development and inclusion: accessibility and depth are low; financial markets underdeveloped; bank balance sheet weaknesses persist.
  - High collateral requirements and low use of bank credit for business finance are key obstacles.
  - Past credit expansions were driven by vulnerable banks and accompanied by weakened lending standards (2013–15 credit boom).
- Macro effects of credit shocks
  - Supply-driven credit booms amplify downturns; demand-driven credit booms have lasting benefits.
  - VAR analysis: increased credit supply boosts GDP in first 4 months then turns negative after 9 months; demand-driven shocks produce a 2.5-year boost to GDP.
- Policy recommendations
  - Strengthen bank supervision and regulation.
  - Promote SME financial literacy and improve financial sector transparency.
  - Strengthen prudential oversight, stress-testing, and transparency to mitigate supply-driven credit expansion risks.
- Data, surveillance, and TA
  - FIMSA received TA on FSIs in 2018; monetary and financial statistics improved after 2017–18 TA and are in full compliance with MFSMCG.
  - BOP statistics broadly in accordance with BPM6 but significant under-coverage and methodological inconsistencies remain.
  - Fiscal statistics reported according to GFSM 2014, but stock positions in assets and liabilities not yet reported.
  - Azerbaijan participates in the Enhanced General Dissemination System; National Summary Data Page launched Feb 2019.
  - Technical assistance timeline (selected 2011–21) includes AML/CFT, GFS, BOP, bank supervision, FSI, MFSMCG, transition to IT, banking sector supervision, macro-fiscal framework, and CPI.

---

*Italic: IMF staff report — "1. Economic Impact of COVID-19" and related annexes (Republic of Azerbaijan), content unit 1azeea2021001.*

### 1. Economic Impact of COVID-19 _________________________________________________________________ 6

### 1. Economic Impact of COVID-19

### Context and recent developments
- Pandemic and policy response
  - Containment, health, and economic relief measures helped slow infections and protect the vulnerable.
  - Defeating the pandemic and broadening the vaccine rollout is the immediate priority.
  - With oil reserves likely to be exhausted in the next few decades, multifarious reforms are needed to strengthen long-term fiscal sustainability and spur private sector-led, diversified and inclusive growth.
- Macroeconomic impact, 2020
  - Real GDP declined by 4.3 percent in 2020, driven by oil GDP, which fell by 7.0 percent.
  - Nonoil GDP dropped by 2.6 percent in 2020; contact-intensive and transportation sectors were most affected.
  - Inflation remained below 3 percent amid the recession; the real effective exchange rate appreciated by 5.5 percent.
  - Contraction in private credit was mild due to borrower support and interest rate cuts.
- Fiscal response and public finances
  - Authorities suspended the fiscal rule and implemented a relief package equal to 4.8 percent of GDP.
  - Overall fiscal balance shifted from a surplus of 8.2 percent of GDP in 2019 to a deficit of 6.5 percent of GDP in 2020.
  - Nonoil primary balance (NOPB) widened from -27 percent in 2019 to -30 percent of nonoil GDP in 2020.
  - The fiscal package was financed by drawing down State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) assets and reallocating spending.
  - Government debt remained below 35 percent of GDP, as of January 2021.
  - Outstanding guarantee to Agrarkredit on bond issued to acquire bad assets from the IBA: AZN 9.48 billion (13.1 percent of the 2020 GDP) as of January 1, 2021; terms: 30-year maturity, 5-year grace period, interest rate of 0.15 percent. Other guarantees account for additional 22 percent of GDP.
- External and reserve developments
  - Oil export revenues declined by 40 percent in 2020.
  - Current account: 9.1 percent of GDP surplus in 2019 turned into a 0.5 percent of GDP deficit in 2020.
  - Central Bank of Azerbaijan (CBA) international reserves increased by 2.3 percent to $6.4 billion.
  - SOFAZ assets: $43.6 billion at end-2020; combined external buffers reached 117 percent of GDP at end-2020.
  - Staff assesses the external position in 2020 as substantially weaker than the level consistent with medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
- Monetary and financial sector
  - Policy rate reduced by 125 basis points to 6.25 percent by end-2020 (reduction starting in June 2020).
  - CBA tightened reporting requirements for currency conversion in June 2020.
  - Financial conditions remain tighter than pre-pandemic due to manat real appreciation and sticky real lending rates.
  - Banking sector: buffers recovered from 2015–16 lows; CBA approved support measures and closed four medium-sized banks in April 2020.
  - Sectoral capital and liquidity ratios edged up in 2020, but improvements were uneven.
  - Bank profitability worsened; several large banks continue to run negative net open FX positions (NOFP).
  - Deposit dollarization declined in 2020 but remains close to 50 percent and concentrated in a few banks.

### Outlook and risks
- 2021 forecast and drivers
  - Staff projects real GDP to increase by 2.3 percent in 2021, driven by the nonoil sector.
  - The economy is reopening following the start of vaccination in mid-January (almost 10 percent of population fully vaccinated as of early June).
  - Increased gas production from the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) is projected to offset decline in oil output.
- Medium-term prospects
  - Prospects are subdued due to weak nonoil productivity growth and slowing capital accumulation.
  - Scarring from the pandemic includes prolonged decline in demand in contact-intensive sectors, increased unemployment, disruptions in learning, long-term health effects, and slowdown in investment.
  - Hydrocarbon output projected to remain stable as higher gas production compensates for declining productivity of aging oil fields.
- Risks (Annex IV)
  - Downside risks: emergence of more dangerous virus strains, problems in global vaccine rollout, domestic third wave and vaccination challenges, structural decline in productivity, oil price volatility, higher-than-expected Karabakh reconstruction needs, weaknesses in SOE and bank balance sheets, and policy fragmentation/weak frameworks.
  - Upside risks: faster global recovery and higher oil prices; significant boost in structural reform efforts could improve prospects.
- Authorities’ view
  - Authorities more optimistic on growth, citing vaccination progress and National Priorities for Socio-Economic Development to improve SOE performance and boost nonoil productivity.

### Policy discussions — Key recommendations
- Near-term and medium-term stance
  - Continue to support the economy in the near term and phase out exceptional support gradually to avoid jeopardizing the recovery.
  - Recalibrate fiscal plans and anchors to ensure long-term sustainability.
  - Align de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes.
  - Foster sustainable, inclusive, diversified and private sector-led growth.
  - Improve resilience and management of fiscal and financial risks, including contingency planning to evaluate available policy space.
- Fiscal policy specifics
  - Authorities and staff agreed accommodative fiscal stance is appropriate for 2021.
    - 2021 budget implies significant widening of the deficit based on oil price assumption of $40 per barrel.
    - Staff projects a smaller deficit reflecting a higher assumed oil price; under staff projection NOPB deteriorates by 1.8 percentage point of nonoil GDP.
  - Support should remain until recovery is firmly underway and then be phased out gradually; health spending must be sufficient for vaccine rollout.
  - Fiscal flexibility: allow automatic stabilizers and provide targeted on-budget fiscal support if downside risks materialize.
  - Staff recommended saving windfall gains from oil prices above 2021 budget assumptions and reallocating saved gains to cover additional needs to limit further deterioration in long-term fiscal position and buffers.
  - Authorities signaled intent to revise spending up to cover reconstruction, vaccination, and subsidies to agriculture.
- Long-term fiscal sustainability and adjustment needs
  - Declining oil revenues and high oil dependence (oil revenues account for half of total government revenues) imply need to increase effective taxation of the nonoil sector.
  - A large PIH gap: 21 percentage points of nonoil GDP gap from the long-term PIH-consistent NOPB benchmark of 9 percent of nonoil GDP under current policies.
  - Staff baseline: consolidated government’s net financial assets (NFA) decline to 7.1 percent of GDP by 2030 and the PIH gap reaches 14 percentage points of nonoil GDP in 2030; baseline assumes NOPB improves by 1 pp of nonoil GDP per year (in line with authorities’ plans).
  - Staff recommended a steady NOPB improvement of 1.5 percentage points of nonoil GDP per year on average during 2022–30 as an appropriate multi-year consolidation to improve long-term fiscal sustainability while balancing development needs and economic impact.
  - Even under the staff adjustment scenario, NFA would decline to 18 percent of GDP by 2030.
- Scenario projections (selected figures, Staff's Proposed Adjustment Scenario)
  - Revenue (percent of GDP): 2021: 48.2; 2022: 49.1; 2023: 45.7; 2024: 43.1; 2025: 40.8; 2026: 39.0.
  - Expenditure (percent of GDP): 2021: 57.2; 2022: 53.8; 2023: 51.8; 2024: 49.6; 2025: 47.9; 2026: 46.4.
  - Overall balance (percent of GDP): 2021: -9.0; 2022: -4.7; 2023: -6.0; 2024: -6.5; 2025: -7.2; 2026: -7.4.
  - Nonoil Primary Balance (percent of nonoil GDP): 2021: -32.6; 2022: -30.4; 2023: -29.0; 2024: -27.3; 2025: -26.1; 2026: -24.9.
  - Debt (percent of GDP): 2021: 31.1; 2022: 30.8; 2023: 30.4; 2024: 29.9; 2025: 29.4; 2026: 28.9.
  - SOFAZ Assets (millions of USD): 2021: 42,643; 2022: 42,065; 2023: 40,857; 2024: 40,719; 2025: 39,033; 2026: 37,145.
  - Oil Prices ($ per barrel) assumed in staff scenario: 2021: 60.5; 2022: 56.8; 2023: 54.5; 2024: 53.3; 2025: 52.7; 2026: 53.7.
  - Real Nonoil GDP Growth (percent): 2021: 3.5; 2022: 2.5; 2023–2026: 2.5 each year.
  - Inflation (percent): 2021: 4.0; 2022–2026: 3.2 each year.
- Authorities’ preliminary adjustment scenario (selected figures)
  - Oil Prices ($ per barrel) assumed: 2021–2026: 40 each year.
  - Authorities’ scenario shows larger near-term tightening of expenditure compared to staff but contemplates higher near-term spending for reconstruction; debt and SOFAZ paths differ due to coverage and assumptions.

*Source: IMF staff report — "1. Economic Impact of COVID-19" (Republic of Azerbaijan).*

### 16.      The composition of fiscal consolidation

### 16.      The composition of fiscal consolidation

### Composition and objectives of consolidation
- Consolidation should be designed to alleviate its likely adverse impact on economic growth while mobilizing nonoil revenues.
- Staff’s baseline assumed consolidation mainly through current expenditure restraint and rationalization, resulting in slower growth of spending on wage bill, goods and services, and transfers, while pandemic- and reconstruction-related spending declines gradually.
- In the adjustment scenario, recommended reforms aim to achieve larger consolidation in a growth-friendly manner.

### Spending-efficiency and public investment
- Broad-based improvements in spending efficiency, especially for infrastructure where high quality was achieved at a relatively high cost in the past, through:
  - Expenditure reviews.
  - Performance budgeting.
  - Enhancements in the public investment management framework and governance.
- Improvements in investment efficiency would also improve productivity.

### Wage bill and public employment
- Recommendation: gradual reduction of the wage bill as a share of GDP.
- Context and facts:
  - A 40 percent rise in public sector wages in 2019.
  - The public wage bill increased by 3 pp of GDP in the last two years to 9 percent of GDP, the second highest in the region.
  - Public employment is among the highest in EMDCs.
- Suggested measures: anchor wage increases on labor productivity; gradual downsizing through attrition and reduction of “ghost” employees as another source of savings.

### Subsidy reform and SOE support
- Phasing out generalized subsidies (which account for 15 percent of GDP, mostly owing to below-cost recovery domestic prices for energy products) would:
  - Reduce the need for fiscal support to the SOEs.
  - Improve fairness.
  - Help “green” the economy by containing energy consumption and greenhouse-gas (GHGs) emissions.
- Authorities’ actions in January 2021:
  - Raised prices for lower-octane gasoline (by 11 percent), diesel (33 percent), and water and sewage fees (100 percent).
  - Deregulated prices of some oil products.
- Timeline and scope of future subsidy reforms need to be identified in the context of broader SOE reforms and with adequate social protection to vulnerable groups.

### Revenue mobilization and tax reforms
- Recommended focus areas:
  - Personal income taxes: no new exemptions, progressive taxation.
  - Modernizing property taxes: market value assessments.
  - Reducing tax expenditures from extensive exemptions; append tax expenditure estimates to the budget.
- Constraint: personal income tax reforms should be delayed until after the seven-year sunset clauses of the 2019 reforms expire.
- Staff noted room for revenue mobilization using property tax modernization and reduction of tax expenditures over the medium term.

### Social spending, inclusion, and targeting
- Reforms should create space to ensure appropriate social spending on health, education, and support of the vulnerable.
- Rationale:
  - Promote inclusive growth and raise productivity against pandemic-induced increases in unemployment, poverty and scarring.
  - Facilitate subsidy and SOE reforms and transformations from diversification, digitalization and climate change.
- Staff reform priorities:
  - Improve adequacy of social assistance in the poorest quintiles by increasing the size of benefits paid to the poor.
  - Extend social insurance programs to include self-employed and informal workers.
  - Continue improving efficiency and effectiveness of social spending through better targeting and monitoring.
- Recent improvements to assist implementation:
  - E-government systems including e-transfers of cash to the unemployed during the pandemic and the “ASAN” one-stop shop for public e-services.
  - Centralization of social contributions for benefit programs.

### Authorities’ stance and actions
- Authorities expected consolidation to be largely expenditure-driven and concurred it should be growth-friendly.
- They intended to focus on improving spending efficiency, enhancing cost recovery of SOEs, and slowing public wage bill growth.
- Authorities proceeded with estimation of tax expenditures and planned to review tax reform options proposed by IMF technical experts.
- Authorities did not see social spending reforms as an immediate priority, noting:
  - Social spending per capita was higher in Azerbaijan than in most regional peers.
  - Poverty levels were lower than in global peers.
  - Social spending increased significantly in recent years following increases in wages and other payments.
- Authorities agreed future wage increases should be aligned with productivity growth.

### Fiscal anchor, debt targets, and medium-term frameworks
- A well-designed fiscal anchor enhances policy credibility and long-term fiscal sustainability while reducing procyclicality.
- Authorities plan to reintroduce the fiscal rule in 2022, update the medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) and Debt Management Strategy.
- Authorities’ intention: limit future general government debt issuance and keep the debt ratio (excluding Aqrakredit guarantees) below 20 percent of GDP.
- Staff recommendations for the fiscal rule:
  - Set the floor for the average annual NOPB improvement at 1.5 pp in 2022–26.
  - General government debt target at 40 percent of GDP (including Agrarkredit guarantees), with the ceiling at 45 percent.
  - Provide buffers for adverse shocks and contingent liability risks.
- Staff did not recommend an operational target for the stabilization portion of SOFAZ assets but suggested estimating the value (of SOFAZ assets)-at-risk would be useful.
- Over the medium term, consideration of an asset-liability management framework is suggested to evaluate risk-return trade-offs of public financial assets and liabilities in an integrated manner.
- Deeper public financial management reforms recommended, including MTEF, monitoring, and reporting, and building Ministry of Finance macro-fiscal capacity.

### Fiscal risks, SOE profitability, and transparency
- Some large SOEs operate at a loss due to operational inefficiencies, outdated equipment, and low regulated prices.
- Improving SOE profitability would reduce the drain on public resources and increase room for productive spending.
- Necessary measures:
  - Enhance SOE operational efficiency.
  - Strengthen financial control and reporting.
  - Gradually eliminate generalized subsidies.
  - Better monitoring and management of risks from SOE guaranteed debt.
- Contextual facts and figures:
  - On-budget support to SOEs in 2020 amounted to over 2 percent of GDP; authorities expect it to fall to 0.5 percent of GDP in 2021.
  - Government-guaranteed SOE debt stood at 35 percent of the 2020 GDP in January 2021, including:
    - Agrarkredit debt to the CBA (local currency debt related to the past banking crisis): 13.1 percent of GDP.
    - Foreign currency debt related to the Southern Gas Corridor commercial enterprise: 9 percent of GDP.
    - SOEs in energy, oil, airline, railroad and other sectors: 5 percent of GDP.
    - Unclassified: 1 percent of GDP.
- Staff recommended putting in place a comprehensive framework for fiscal risk management, accompanied by increased transparency and timely publication of data and statements on fiscal risks and SOE performance.
- Continued efforts to ensure transparency of government spending (especially for COVID-19 and reconstruction) are important, including publication of ex post budget execution reports and audits.
- SOE reforms and increased transparency of public spending will help lessen vulnerabilities to corruption.

### Monetary and Exchange Rate (ER) Policy
- Monetary policy context and assessment:
  - Monetary policy is subordinated to the de facto peg, but staff saw room for further easing.
  - Despite recent interest rate cuts, financial conditions were tighter than prior to the pandemic.
  - Real interest rates for manat loans remained in double digits.
  - The spread between CBA and Fed rates was sizeable.
  - Low financial integration limited short-term capital flows.
  - Inflation projected to increase in 2021 to close to the mid-point of CBA’s band, mainly owing to one-off increases in administered prices and higher global food prices; core inflation remains below 3 percent on a cumulative y/y basis in 2021.
  - Output gap still negative, slow money growth, and nominal effective ER appreciating—this increase was expected to be short-lived.
  - Inflation expectations were well anchored and risks to inflation were balanced.
- Staff view: consideration could be given to further easing to support the nascent recovery, especially if downside risks materialize.
- CBA view: current monetary stance appropriate given mandate on price stability and uncertain inflation outlook; CBA intends to continue regular reassessment of the outlook.
- Exchange rate regime and transition:
  - Staff advocated a gradual move to a more flexible ER regime to facilitate adjustment to oil price shocks and foster market development.
  - The de facto peg has been effective in keeping inflation under control but limits CBA’s ability to provide monetary support in times of stress and puts a higher burden on fiscal policy.
  - Maintaining competitiveness is challenging under the peg since main trading partners have more flexible regimes.
  - Greater ER flexibility would support diversification, encourage development of financial markets, and better management of currency risks.
  - Preferable to introduce increased ER flexibility from a position of strength while external buffers are projected to remain sufficient.
  - Currency mismatches have declined since the 2015–16 crisis and appear manageable, but efforts to de-dollarize the economy are needed, including improving policy credibility and possibly widening the differential in reserve requirements for FX and manat deposits.
  - Staff underscored risks to policy credibility from the difference in Azerbaijan’s de jure and de facto ER regimes and from framing policy communication in inflation-targeting terms, urging authorities to address inconsistencies.
- Authorities’ stance:
  - Reaffirmed IT as long-term goal but believed the de facto peg to be optimal for the foreseeable future.
  - Authorities believed the manat was at a fair value but acknowledged their empirical analysis was backward-looking and country-specific, contrasting with staff’s forward-looking, PIH-based, and multilaterally consistent EBA-Lite framework.
  - CBA did not see the need for an official change in the ER regime, asserting market participants and the public understood CBA’s policy of keeping the ER pegged to the dollar.
- Agreed steps to support eventual transition to IT and market development:
  - Improve policy coordination (recent establishment of an Economic Council).
  - Strengthen CBA liquidity forecasting and research capacity and communication.
  - Initiatives to strengthen CBA independence in monetary policy making.
  - Improve functioning of interbank, money and FX markets, and monetary transmission.

### Financial Sector Policy
- Prudential policy stance:
  - Authorities and staff agreed prudential policies need to pivot carefully from incentivizing banks to use buffers to rebuilding buffers and reducing problem assets over time.
  - Risks of reversing exceptional prudential easing prematurely: could adversely affect bank soundness indicators.
  - Risks of delaying reversal: could mask growing vulnerabilities, undermine credit quality and market discipline, and put future stability at risk.
- Staff recommendations:
  - Use available breathing space to ascertain implications of support measures and likely impact of their reversal on the recovery and bank balance sheet strength through evidence-based analysis.
  - Ensure data reporting transparency and close communication with financial market participants to phase out financial sector support measures in a targeted and time-bound manner.
- Authorities’ intended approach:
  - Start with measures less binding for the banking sector and phase out other measures as the recovery solidifies.
  - Recently replaced a blanket deposit insurance with a limited guarantee program.
  - Implemented or scheduled a list of tightening measures.
- Specific prudential measures suggested:
  - Roll back exemptions on borrowers’ credit histories soon to mitigate adverse impacts on lending standards.
  - Complement the reduced risk weight on mortgage loans (reduced to 50 percent last year) with stronger prudential measures (i.e., LTV requirement in line with Basel III standards) to prevent deterioration in mortgage portfolio quality.

*Source: 1azeea2021001 - 16.      The composition of fiscal consolidation*

### 25.      Staff saw strengthening financial oversight as an important complement to medium-

### 25.      Staff saw strengthening financial oversight as an important complement to medium-term reforms aimed to improve access to finance

### Financial oversight, banking sector vulnerabilities, and stress tests
- Findings:
  - Financial development and access to finance have been declining since the 2015–16 crisis and lag peers.
  - Past credit expansions were driven largely by weaker banks, which may cause bank distress and output loss.
  - Stress-testing exercise confirmed that systemic banks are resilient against credit risks yet vulnerable to direct and indirect FX risks.
  - The restructured loan portfolio quality was deteriorating, with some systemic and mid-sized banks remaining exposed to the FX risks mostly due to their outstanding net open FX positions.
  - Bank profitability remains subdued as a consequence of weak credit demand and increased loan impairment charges.
  - IMF staff expressed readiness to continue supporting CBA in efforts to enhance risk-based supervision and stress-testing.
- Quantitative scenario note from stress tests:
  - The adverse scenario assumes that the nonoil real GDP growth rate is 2 percentage points below the baseline forecast during 2021-23.
- Recommendations:
  - Strengthen supervision and regulation to prevent repeat credit-driven distress, including strengthening financial oversight of both lenders’ risk-taking activities and borrowers’ credit risk.
  - Implement a targeted and time-bound plan to phase out exceptional prudential easing introduced in response to the pandemic, balancing risks from prematurely phasing out forbearance and delaying reversal to credit quality and market discipline.

### Central Bank of Azerbaijan (CBA) independence, transparency, and AML/CFT
- Findings and authorities’ actions:
  - Authorities agreed some vulnerabilities exist but considered them unlikely to pose a serious threat to banking stability.
  - Authorities plan to publish the Financial Stability Report this year, including financial soundness indicators and stress tests results.
- Recommendations:
  - Amend the CBA Law to increase its independence in monetary policymaking and financial supervision.
  - Encourage banks to share more details on the ultimate beneficiary ownership and enhance fit and proper tests for those who own and control banks, to better assess shareholders’ financial strength and sources of funding.
  - Continue progress in enhancing the effectiveness of the AML/CFT framework, including in preparation for the upcoming MONEYVAL assessment and to mitigate potential pressure to correspondent banking relationships.
  - Bolster entity transparency through swift adoption and operationalization of the national registry for beneficial ownership, and enhance prosecution, conviction, and confiscation of ill-gotten proceeds.
  - Use preventive measures related to domestic politically exposed persons and apply risk-based supervision for banks.

### Structural policy, growth, and diversification
- Findings:
  - Deep-rooted impediments hinder private sector growth and job creation: weak governance and institutions, limited SME access to credit; inefficient labor, product, and service markets; and sizeable skill gaps.
  - The combined result includes high informality, limited nonoil FDI, weak entrepreneurship and SME development, and slow productivity growth.
  - Scarring from the pandemic (including increased insolvency, unemployment, learning losses, etc.) needs to be addressed.
  - Improving inclusiveness requires expanding economic opportunities for women and the young.
- Reform priorities and recommendations:
  - Design and implement comprehensive reforms aligned with recently released national priorities to promote sustainable, inclusive, and green growth.
  - Leverage the recently created Azerbaijan Holding Company to improve corporate governance and efficiency of SOEs.
  - Apply the Anti-Monopoly law to lower entry barriers and improve market efficiency.
  - Identify ways to improve competition in the financial sector, where net interest margins appear high by comparison to peers, to help improve access to finance.
  - Pursue WTO accession to expose domestic producers to international competition and encourage productivity and diversification improvements.
  - Develop the green growth agenda and reform generalized energy subsidies.
  - Apply the OECD’s Investment Guidelines to help attract FDI and know-how while minimizing tax expenditures.
  - Follow up on the most macro-critical aspects of governance recommendations from the 2019 Article IV report.

### Fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policy guidance
- Fiscal policy:
  - Assessment: Fiscal policy was appropriately eased during the pandemic; consolidation should start in 2022.
  - Recommendation: Begin growth-friendly fiscal consolidation in 2022 and sustain it over the long term to gradually achieve a significant reduction in the nonoil primary deficit.
  - Guidance: Windfall revenue from higher-than-budgeted oil prices should be saved.
  - Design: Consolidation should be accompanied by measures to protect the vulnerable and support education and health, and by stepped structural and financial sector reforms to mitigate adverse growth impacts.
  - Institutional: Planned fiscal adjustment should be supported by the revised fiscal rule; the authorities intend to revise and re-launch it in 2022 using the nonoil primary balance and debt-to-GDP targets.
  - Public financial management reforms needed: medium-term fiscal framework, fiscal risk management, and transparency to support rule implementation and credibility.
- Monetary policy:
  - Observation: CBA has reduced policy rates since the outbreak of the pandemic; financial conditions remain tighter than when the pandemic started.
  - Recommendation: Further monetary easing could be considered to support the nascent recovery, especially if downside risks materialize.
  - Inflation: Following a recent temporary uptick, inflation is projected to remain close to the mid-point of the CBA target range.
- Exchange rate policy:
  - Recommendation: Consider a gradual move to a more flexible ER regime in the medium term.
  - Rationale: The de facto peg has kept inflation under control but makes maintaining competitiveness challenging as main trading partners have more flexible regimes; a more flexible exchange rate would facilitate adjustment to oil price shocks, reduce adjustment burden on fiscal policy, and support diversification and market development.
  - Risk: The current difference between the de jure flexible exchange rate regime and the de facto pegged one and framing policy communication in inflation-targeting terms poses risks to policy credibility and needs to be addressed promptly.
  - External position: Deemed to be substantially weaker than the level consistent with medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies (Annex III).

### Staff appraisal and overall conclusions
- 2020 assessment:
  - Azerbaijan faced an unprecedented challenge in 2020, but timely and appropriate policy response mitigated the impact of the pandemic on the economy.
  - A significant relief package helped cushion the impact of the pandemic and the decline in oil prices.
  - With vaccination progressing and lockdown measures gradually eased, the economy has started to recover.
- Near-term challenge:
  - Properly calibrate phasing out COVID-19-related stimulus to avoid endangering the recovery while preparing to address structural challenges.
- Long-term challenge:
  - Azerbaijan is running out of oil in the coming decades; the economy needs to wean off dependence on oil revenues.
- Key prescriptions:
  - Start fiscal consolidation in 2022 while protecting vulnerable groups and supporting education and health.
  - Revise and relaunch the fiscal rule in 2022 anchored on the nonoil primary balance and debt-to-GDP targets.
  - Consider further monetary easing if downside risks materialize.
  - Plan a gradual move to a more flexible exchange rate regime in the medium term.
  - Phase out pandemic-related forbearance measures in a targeted, time-bound manner while strengthening financial oversight.
  - Accelerate structural reforms to raise nonoil growth and foster economic diversification, including governance and anti-corruption frameworks, addressing pandemic scarring, and pursuing the green agenda under the Azerbaijan 2030 Priorities.
  - Support reforms with improved AML/CFT effectiveness and enhanced financial sector oversight.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpt (content unit 1azeea2021001).*

### 38.      It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation takes place on the standard

### 1azeea2021001 - 38.      It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation takes place on the standard

### Recommendation
- It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation takes place on the standard 12-month cycle.

### Real Sector Indicators
- Unemployment Rate (In percent): chart timeline from 2015Q1 to 2021Q1 shown (no single summary number provided).
- CPI inflation (Headline, Food, Non-Food, and Services Inflation) (In percent): chart timeline Jan-15 to Jan-21 shown.
- Sectoral Contributions to Growth (In percent): Agriculture; Industry incl. construction; Mining; Services; Real GDP Growth — chart timeline 2015Q1 to 2020Q3 shown.
- Real Oil GDP and Real nonoil GDP Growth (In percent): chart timeline 2015Q1 to 2020Q3 shown.

### External Sector
- Export of Goods: Main Commodities (Percent of Total Export, 2020):
  - Mineral fuels, oils and their products 87.2%
  - Vegetable products 4.5%
  - Base Metals 1.5%
  - Precious Metals and Stones 1.5%
  - Textiles 1.3%
  - Plastic and rubbers 1.2%
  - Beverages, liquors, and tobacco 0.7%
  - Chemicals 0.6%
  - Machines 0.5%
  - Animal hides 0.1%
  - Other exports 0.8%
  - Non-hydrocarbon 12.8%
- Current Account (Percent of GDP): chart shows Trade balance, Service balance, Net income, Current account (2010–2020).
- Capital and Financial Account (Percent of GDP): series for Other investment, net; Portfolio investment, net; Direct investment, net; Capital and financial account (2010–2020).
- Gross Official Reserves: CBA Reserves and Import Coverage (LHS: In billions of USD; RHS: In months of imports) plotted 2010–2020.
- Nonoil Imports, Exports, and Current Account Balance (In percent of nonoil GDP): chart 2010–2020.

### Fiscal Sector
- Consolidated Government Revenues (In percent of GDP) charted 2011–2020: Oil Revenues and Non-oil Revenues.
- VAT, Income tax, Excise tax, Other nonoil revenue tax (Percent of GDP) charted 2011–2020.
- Capital and Current Expenditures (In percent of GDP) charted 2011–2020.
- Overall balance and oil budget revenues (In percent of GDP) charted 2011–2020.
- NOBPB (in percent of nonoil GDP, RHS), Fiscal Breakeven Price, WEO Oil Price (US$ per barrel) charted 2011–2020.
- Total Public Debt (In percent of GDP) charted 2011–2020: Direct Borrowing; Publicly Guaranteed Debt.

### Monetary and Exchange Rate Developments
- Nonoil Sector's REER, NEER, Relative Prices (April 2017 = 100) charted Jan-11 to Dec-20.
- Private Credit by Sectors (In billions of manat): Household and Non-financial private corporate series Jan-15 to Jul-20.
- Deposit and Lending Interest Rates (Percent, average, end of period): LC Deposit Rate, FX Deposit Rate, LC Lending Rate, FX Lending Rate (Jan-14 to Sep-20).
- CBA FX Auctions and AzN/US$ Rate: FX Demanded, FX Supplied, Official ER (Avg, RHS) (Jan-18 to Oct-20); noted "Second devaluation" and "First devaluation".
- Money Supply and Deposit Dollarization (Percent, y-o-y): CBA Base Money, Broad money (M3), Manat broad money (M2), Deposit Dollarization (FCD/TD) (RHS) (Jan-14 to Sep-20).
- CBA Interest Rate Corridor (Percent): CBA Repo Rate, CBA Refinancing Rate, CBA Reverse Repo Rate, CBA Notes (Jan-14 to Sep-20).
- CBA Base Money and Manat reserve/foreign reserves series shown.

### Banking Sector
- Bank Capital Adequacy Ratio (Percent): median, upper quartiles, lower quartiles 2011–2020.
- Overdue Loans (Percent of total loans) 1/ (time series Jan-15 to Jul-20). Footnote: "According to the 2015 FSAP report, for statistical purposes only overdue payments are classified as non-performing loans (NPLs). The reported time series of NPLs does not fully reflect actual NPLs."
- Bank Profitability Indicators (Percent): ROA, ROE, NIM plotted 2011–2020.
- Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (Percent): LTD (FX loans/FX deposits), LTD (LC loans/LC deposits), LTD (Total) Jan-14 to Jun-20.
- Growth of Deposits in Local Currency (Percent, y-o-y): LC Demand Deposits, LC Time Deposits Jan-14 to Sep-20.
- Growth of Deposits in Foreign Currency (Percent, y-o-y, Constant ER): FX Demand Deposits, FX Time Deposits Jan-14 to Sep-20.

### Social Spending and Inclusive Growth
- Social Spending (In percent of GDP) 2017–2021: Education, Health, Social Protection (capital expenditures shaded).
- Social Spending (LHS: In percent; RHS: In $ US per capita) chart comparing EM, CCA, AZE with values plotted; Azerbaijan 2021 approved budget noted.
- Population Covered By at least One Social Benefit (In percent of population): series with values such as 93.3, 91.9, 60, 51.6 for various comparators plotted.
- Vulnerable Persons Covered By Social Assistance (In percent of population) with comparator values (e.g., 92.9, 74.2, 15.6, 14.1, 13.4, 7.5).
- Health Efficiency Frontier: Healthy Life Expectancy, Total health expenditure per capita, PPP$ plotted.
- Teachers and Outcome, Secondary: Teacher student ratio and Net Enrollment - Secondary (in percent) plotted.
- Inclusive Growth Indicators table (selected):
  - GDP per capita growth (percent; 2018-20 average) -1.2 (Azerbaijan), 1.8 (EMDE Average)
  - Unemployment rate (% of total labor force, 2020) 6.0 (Azerbaijan), 6.9 (EMDE Average)
  - Gross Fixed Capital Formation (percent of GDP; 2018-20 average) 19.1 (Azerbaijan), 24.4 (EMDE Average)
  - Female unemployment rate (% of female labor force, 2020) 6.8 (Azerbaijan), 8.3 (EMDE Average)
  - Youth unemployment rate (% ages 15-24, 2020) 15.7 (Azerbaijan), 15.9 (EMDE Average)
  - Labor force participation (% ages 15+, 2020) 66.1 (Azerbaijan), 62.0 (EMDE Average)
  - Poverty headcount ratio at $3.20/day (percent of population; 2005) 0.0 (Azerbaijan), 31.9 (EMDE Average)
  - Multidimensional poverty (percent of population) 2.4 (Azerbaijan), 31.2 (EMDE Average)
  - Prevalence of stunting (% of children under 5, 2013) 17.8 (Azerbaijan), 21.7 (EMDE Average)
  - GINI Index (2005) 26.6 (Azerbaijan), 39.8 (EMDE Average)
  - Life expectancy at birth (years, 2018) 72.9 (Azerbaijan), 72.3 (EMDE Average)
  - Access to electricity (% of population, 2018) 100.0 (Azerbaijan), 81.1 (EMDE Average)
  - Individuals using internet (% population, 2019) 79.8 (Azerbaijan), 46.9 (EMDE Average)
  - Account at a financial institution (% age 15+, 2017) 28.6 (Azerbaijan), 48.9 (EMDE Average)
  - Domestic credit to private sector (% GDP, 2019) 22.2 (Azerbaijan), 43.4 (EMDE Average)
  - Government expenditure on education, total (% GDP, 2018) 2.5 (Azerbaijan), 4.4 (EMDE Average)
  - Health expenditure, domestic general government (% of GDP, 2018) 0.9 (Azerbaijan), 2.8 (EMDE Average)

### Key Macroeconomic Projections and Indicators (Selected from Tables)
- Table 1: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2018–26 (annual percentage change unless specified)
  - GDP at constant prices:
    - 2018 1.5
    - 2019 2.2
    - 2020 -4.3
    - 2021 2.3
    - 2022 1.7
    - 2023 1.7
    - 2024 1.7
    - 2025 1.7
    - 2026 1.7
  - Of which: Oil sector1/:
    - 2018 0.5
    - 2019 0.4
    - 2020 7.0
    - 2021 0.2
    - 2022 0.2
    - 2023 0.2
    - 2024 0.2
    - 2025 0.2
    - 2026 0.2
  - Non-oil sector:
    - 2018 2.1
    - 2019 3.3
    - 2020 -2.6
    - 2021 3.5
    - 2022 2.5
    - 2023 2.5
    - 2024 2.5
    - 2025 2.5
    - 2026 2.5
  - Consumer price index (period average):
    - 2018 2.3
    - 2019 2.7
    - 2020 2.8
    - 2021 4.0
    - 2022 3.2
    - 2023 3.2
    - 2024 3.2
    - 2025 3.2
    - 2026 3.2
  - Domestic credit, net:
    - 2018 8.5
    - 2019 9.3
    - 2020 6.7
    - 2021 4.2
    - 2022 8.1
    - 2023 9.4
    - 2024 9.3
    - 2025 9.6
    - 2026 9.7
  - Credit to private sector:
    - 2018 14.9
    - 2019 15.2
    - 2020 -0.7
    - 2021 5.0
    - 2022 9.1
    - 2023 10.2
    - 2024 10.2
    - 2025 10.5
    - 2026 11.0
  - Manat base money:
    - 2018 11.7
    - 2019 27.3
    - 2020 11.6
    - 2021 10.5
    - 2022 9.0
    - 2023 9.1
    - 2024 9.2
    - 2025 9.3
    - 2026 9.4
  - Total broad money:
    - 2018 5.7
    - 2019 19.9
    - 2020 1.1
    - 2021 8.3
    - 2022 6.4
    - 2023 6.4
    - 2024 6.4
    - 2025 6.4
    - 2026 6.4
  - Exports f.o.b. (annual % change):
    - 2018 37.2
    - 2019 -4.5
    - 2020 -36.6
    - 2021 32.1
    - 2022 -5.6
    - 2023 -3.7
    - 2024 -2.1
    - 2025 -2.1
    - 2026 -0.2
  - Gross investment (percent of GDP) 2018–26: 20.0; 20.1; 19.3; 17.6; 17.2; 17.8; 18.3; 18.3; 18.6
  - Consolidated government (percent of GDP) 2018–26: 14.0; 11.2; 11.6; 10.0; 8.9; 8.4; 7.7; 6.8; 5.9
  - Gross national savings (percent of GDP) 2018–26: 32.8; 29.2; 18.7; 20.0; 19.1; 19.7; 20.0; 19.9; 20.0
  - Overall fiscal balance (In percent of GDP) 2018–26: 5.5; 8.2; -6.5; -5.6; -3.0; -4.4; -5.3; -6.0; -7.0
  - Non-oil primary balance, in percent of non-oil GDP 2018–26: -31.7; -27.2; -30.3; -32.1; -30.2; -29.3; -28.2; -27.2; -26.9
  - General government debt (percent of GDP) 2018–26: 18.7; 17.7; 21.4; 30.6; 31.4; 33.3; 33.3; 36.1; 39.8
  - General government and government-guaranteed debt (percent of GDP) 2018–26: 48.2; 47.7; 54.1; 46.0; 44.4; 43.5; 40.4; 40.4; 40.8
  - Current account (deficit) (percent of GDP) 2018–26: 12.8; 9.1; -0.5; 2.4; 1.9; 1.9; 1.7; 1.5; 1.4
  - Gross official international reserves (in millions of U.S. dollars) 2018–26: 5,626; 6,258; 6,369; 6,369; 6,569; 6,769; 6,969; 7,169; 7,369
  - Nominal GDP (in millions of manat) 2018–26: 80,092; 81,896; 72,432; 85,122; 86,748; 89,235; 92,441; 96,181; 100,348
  - Oil Fund Assets (in millions of U.S. dollars) 2018–26: 38,515; 43,323; 43,564; 42,554; 42,642; 42,550; 42,403; 42,193; 42,042
  - Assumed oil price, WEO plus $2-$3 premium (in U.S. dollars per barrel): 70.3; 63.4; 44.3; 60.5; 56.8; 54.5; 53.3; 52.7; 53.7
  - Exchange rate (manat/dollar, end of period) 2018–26: 1.7 consistently.

- Table 2: Balance of Payments, 2018–26 (In millions of U.S. dollars) (selected rows)
  - Exports, f.o.b.:
    - 2018 20,794
    - 2019 19,868
    - 2020 12,588
    - 2021 16,629
    - 2022 15,701
    - 2023 15,119
    - 2024 14,801
    - 2025 14,494
    - 2026 14,463
  - Imports, f.o.b.:
    - 2018 -10,952
    - 2019 -11,335
    - 2020 -10,077
    - 2021 -11,916
    - 2022 -11,223
    - 2023 -10,938
    - 2024 -10,778
    - 2025 -10,568
    - 2026 -10,607
  - Trade balance 2018–26: 9,841; 8,533; 2,512; 4,713; 4,478; 4,181; 4,023; 3,926; 3,856
  - Services, net 2018–26: -2,062; -2,616; -2,841; -2,759; -2,885; -2,806; -2,781; -2,777; -2,774
  - Factor income, net 2018–26: -2,460; -2,061; -456; -1,321; -1,499; -1,313; -1,239; -1,223; -1,193
  - Transfers, net 2018–26: 731; 509; 558; 575; 897; 916; 932; 949; 966
  - Current account balance 2018–26: 6,051; 4,365; -228; 1,208; 991; 977; 935; 875; 855
  - Financial account, net 2018–26: -3,191; 135; -2,401; -2,211; -696; -861; -875; -878; -798
  - Overall balance 2018–26: 3,508; 5,143; -1,988; -1,011; 288; 109; 53; -10; 50
  - Memorandum items:
    - Current account balance (in percent of GDP) 2018–26: 12.8; 9.1; -0.5; 2.4; 1.9; 1.9; 1.7; 1.5; 1.4
    - Gross official international reserves 2018–26: 5,626; 6,258; 6,369; 6,369; 6,569; 6,769; 6,969; 7,169; 7,369
    - Oil Fund assets 2018–26: 38,515; 43,323; 43,564; 42,554; 42,642; 42,550; 42,403; 42,193; 42,042
    - Public and publicly guaranteed external debt (in percent of GDP) 2018–26: 47.1; 47.3; 55.8; 50.2; 52.2; 54.9; 55.7; 58.7; 62.4
    - Oil price (US$ per barrel) 2018–26: 70.3; 63.4; 44.3; 60.5; 56.8; 54.5; 53.3; 52.7; 53.7
    - Exchange rate (average, AZN/$): 1.7 consistently.
    - Nominal GDP (in millions of U.S. dollars) 2018–26: 47,113; 48,174; 42,607; 50,072; 51,028; 52,491; 54,377; 56,577; 59,028

- Table 4: Statement of Consolidated Government Operations, 2018–26 (In millions of manat) (selected rows)
  - Total revenue 2018–26: 30,925; 33,915; 24,481; 26,975; 29,083; 28,621; 28,532; 28,559; 28,895
  - Tax revenue 2018–26: 11,255; 13,870; 13,804; 15,527; 16,073; 16,214; 16,511; 16,930; 17,444
  - Nontax revenue 2018–26: 19,650; 20,025; 10,657; 11,429; 12,990; 12,387; 12,001; 11,608; 11,431
    - Of which: Oil Fund revenues 2018–26: 17,614; 19,031; 9,361; 10,728; 12,278; 11,658; 11,251; 10,834; 10,628
  - Total Expenditure 2018–26: 26,543; 27,232; 29,261; 31,707; 31,691; 32,565; 33,429; 34,326; 35,961
  - Current Expense 2018–26: 15,329; 17,660; 20,893; 23,191; 23,931; 25,087; 26,314; 27,803; 29,494
  - Net Acquisition of Nonfinancial Assets 2018–26: 11,214; 9,572; 8,368; 8,516; 7,760; 7,478; 7,114; 6,523; 6,467
  - Overall balance 2018–26: 4,382; 6,683; -4,780; -4,731; -2,608; -3,945; -4,897; -5,767; -7,066
  - Non-oil primary balance 1/ (in million manat) 2018–26: -15,131; -14,020; -15,755; -17,946; -17,851; -18,350; -18,700; -19,021; -19,964
  - Memorandum: Oil revenue 2018–26: 20,056; 21,271; 11,580; 13,842; 15,831; 15,040; 14,529; 14,023; 13,810
  - Non-oil revenue 2018–26: 10,869; 12,644; 12,901; 13,133; 13,252; 13,580; 14,003; 14,535; 15,085
  - Non-oil GDP (in million of manats) 2018–26: 47,787; 51,600; 51,980; 55,952; 59,186; 62,607; 66,225; 70,053; 74,102

- Table 6: Summary Accounts of the Central Bank, 2018–26 (In millions of manat)
  - Net foreign assets 2018–26: 11,400; 12,052; 14,747; 14,747; 15,087; 15,427; 15,767; 16,107; 16,447
  - Reserve money 2018–26: 10,644; 13,125; 15,053; 16,211; 17,245; 18,160; 19,126; 20,146; 21,223
  - Manat reserve money 2018–26: 9,546; 12,153; 13,564; 14,988; 16,337; 17,824; 19,464; 21,274; 23,274

- Table 7: Monetary Survey, 2018–26 (In millions of manat)
  - Net foreign assets 2018–26: 15,314; 17,284; 18,812; 20,892; 21,312; 21,733; 22,155; 22,578; 23,002
  - Broad money 2018–26: 24,078; 28,866; 29,186; 31,611; 33,628; 35,775; 38,060; 40,493; 43,083
  - Manat broad money 2018–26: 14,656; 18,239; 20,303; 21,496; 23,203; 25,043; 27,023; 29,155; 31,450
  - Credit to the economy 2018–26: 13,058; 15,036; 14,934; 15,681; 17,107; 18,852; 20,832; 23,123; 25,667
  - Memorandum: Gross official international reserves (US$ millions) 2018–26: 5,626; 6,258; 6,369; 6,369; 6,569; 6,769; 6,969; 7,169; 7,369

### Policy-Relevant Observations (implicit in data)
- The fiscal position shows substantial reliance on oil revenues: Oil Fund revenues and oil-related items dominate nontax revenue and total revenue lines (e.g., Oil Fund revenues 17,614 in 2018; 19,031 in 2019; 9,361 in 2020).
- Overall fiscal balances turn from surplus in 2018–19 to sizeable deficits in 2020–26 (Overall balance: 4,382 in 2018; 6,683 in 2019; -4,780 in 2020; negative through 2026).
- Non-oil primary balances remain large deficits in percent of non-oil GDP across 2018–26 (e.g., -31.7 in 2018; -32.1 in 2021; -26.9 in 2026).
- External buffers: Gross official international reserves and Oil Fund assets remain sizable in absolute terms (Reserves: 5,626 US$ mn in 2018 to 7,369 US$ mn in 2026; Oil Fund assets: 38,515 US$ mn in 2018 to 42,042 US$ mn in 2026) despite projected drawdowns and fluctuations.
- Economic growth: After a contraction in 2020 (-4.3 percent GDP), gradual recovery is projected with modest growth rates (GDP at constant prices 2.3 in 2021; 1.7 annually 2022–2026).

*Source: Republic of Azerbaijan — IMF staff report content as provided in the supplied PDF excerpt.*

### Annex I. Response to the Pandemic

### Annex I. Response to the Pandemic

### Pandemic impact on output, employment, and sectors
- Overall 2020 recession was driven by the oil sector contracting by 6.4 percent owing to OPEC+ cuts on top of a gradual structural decline in oil production.
- Nonoil output declined by 3 percent in 2020.
- Contact-intensive sectors were hardest hit:
  - Hospitality contracted by 59 percent.
  - Construction declined by 8.8 percent.
  - Trade declined by 1.3 percent.
- High labor intensity of contact-intensive sectors led unemployment to rise from 4.8 percent in 2019 to 7.2 percent in 2020, and poverty increased.
- Large informal sector was severely affected.
- Resilient sectors that expanded in 2020:
  - Manufacturing: expanded by 10.4 percent.
  - Transportation: expanded by 4.6 percent.
  - Agriculture: expanded by 2 percent.

### Fiscal response and coverage
- A fiscal relief package amounted to 4.8 percent of the 2020 GDP.
- Main instruments included:
  - Loan guarantees and subsidized loans to certain borrowers: 2.2 percent of GDP.
  - Expansion of unemployment insurance and temporary public jobs: 0.7 percent of GDP.
  - Partial payment of salaries and support to microentrepreneurs: 0.4 percent of GDP.
  - Financial support to passenger transportation (mostly the national airline): 0.4 percent of GDP.
  - Scaling up medical facilities and building of new hospitals: 0.3 percent of GDP.
  - Reduced or deferred taxes to qualified taxpayers: 0.2 percent of GDP.
  - Purchase of medical supplies, payment of allowances to medical workers: 0.1 percent of GDP.
  - Other COVID-19 relief programs: 0.5 percent of GDP.
- Financing: package was financed mainly through the budget by reallocating spending and increasing transfers from SOFAZ; additional financing came from the Solidarity Fund (private donations).
- Coverage: package reached one fifth of the population; uptake was substantial by end-2020.
- Duration: spending and tax relief measures terminated at the end of 2020, though some social support measures were extended.
- Cash transfers:
  - Largest cash transfer: lump-sum subsistence payments to unemployed workers (including informal sector) who registered with the State Employment Service.
  - Principal cash assistance to the unemployed replaced only 27 percent of average monthly income.
  - Additional social assistance for the most vulnerable during the pandemic was meagre (less than 0.1 percent of GDP).
  - Pre-pandemic social assistance expenditure and coverage of the poorest quintile were well below the average for EM economies.
  - Unemployment insurance remains a small program with tight eligibility criteria.

### Financial sector measures
- CBA policies included:
  - Gradual reduction of the CBA policy rate.
  - Easing requirements on bank capital buffers and loan loss provisions.
  - Loan forbearance on interest payment and credit histories.
  - Temporary suspension of on-site inspections.
- Borrower support programs accounted for a significant portion of loan portfolios in affected sectors.
- Scope for liquidity support was limited by the de facto peg.
- Specific CBA measures noted:
  - Reduction of aggregate capital requirements by 1 percentage point.
  - Delay in planned countercyclical buffer increase from 0 to 0.5 percent.
  - Reduction of risk weights for certain loans (mortgage loans, medical equipment).
  - Loan loss provision deterioration and onsite inspections suspended.

---

### Annex II. Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) — key figures and scenarios

### Public debt and macro projections (As of February 22, 2021)
- Nominal gross public debt (percent of GDP): 2019: 12.3; 2020: 18.1; 2021: 21.4; 2022: 30.6; 2023: 31.4; 2024: 33.2; 2025: 33.3; 2026: 36.1; 2026 (alternate): 39.9.
- Public gross financing needs (percent of GDP): 2019: -2.1; 2020: -5.7; 2021: 9.4; 2022: 7.9; 2023: 4.7; 2024: 5.6; 2025: 9.3; 2026: 9.1; 2026 (alternate): 11.9.
- Net public debt (percent of GDP): 2019: -54.0; 2020: -72.1; 2021: -80.9; 2022: -54.4; 2023: -52.1; 2024: -47.9; 2025: -44.7; 2026: -38.5; 2026 (alternate): -31.3.
- Real GDP growth (percent): 2019: 1.5; 2020: 2.2; 2021: -4.3; 2022–2026: 2.3/1.7/1.7/1.7/1.7 (projected sequence).
- Inflation (GDP deflator, percent): 2019: 8.3; 2020: -0.2; 2021: -7.3; 2022: 18.6; 2023–2026: -0.2/0.6/1.3/1.8/2.1 (projected).
- Nominal GDP growth (percent): 2019: 9.8; 2020: 2.0; 2021: -11.3; 2022: 17.5; 2023–2026: 1.9/2.9/3.6/4.0/4.3 (projected).
- Effective interest rate (percent): 2019: 2.3; 2020: 3.8; 2021: 4.1; 2022: 4.1; 2023–2026: 2.8/3.5/4.2/4.8/5.4 (projected).
- Sovereign spreads: EMBIG (bp) = 366; 5Y CDS (bp) = 283.

### Debt dynamics and flows (selected)
- Change in gross public sector debt (percent of GDP, cumulative): 2019: 1.6; 2020: -0.6; 2021: 3.3; 2022: 9.2; 2023: 0.8; 2024: 1.8; 2025: 0.1; 2026: 2.8; cumulative 2019–2026: 18.5.
- Identified debt-creating flows (percent of GDP): 2019: -0.2; 2020: -9.4; 2021: 8.0; 2022: 1.7; 2023: 2.6; 2024: 3.9; 2025: 4.7; 2026: 5.4; cumulative: 24.7.
- Primary deficit (percent of GDP): 2019: -3.7; 2020: -8.9; 2021: 5.8; 2022: 4.8; 2023: 2.3; 2024: 3.7; 2025: 4.5; 2026: 5.2; cumulative: 26.7.
- Primary (noninterest) revenue and grants (percent of GDP): 2019: 38.9; 2020: 41.5; 2021: 33.8; 2022: 31.7; 2023: 33.5; 2024: 32.1; 2025: 30.9; 2026: 29.7; cumulative: 186.6.
- Primary (noninterest) expenditure (percent of GDP): 2019: 35.2; 2020: 32.6; 2021: 39.6; 2022: 36.5; 2023: 35.9; 2024: 35.8; 2025: 35.4; 2026: 34.9; cumulative: 213.3.
- Automatic debt dynamics (percent of GDP): 2019: 0.0; 2020: -0.4; 2021: 2.3; 2022: -3.0; 2023: 0.4; 2024: 0.4; 2025: 0.4; 2026: 0.4; cumulative: -1.0.
- Other identified debt-creating flows (percent of GDP): 2019: 3.5; 2020: -0.1; 2021: -0.1; 2022–2026: -0.1/-0.1/-0.2/-0.2/-0.2; cumulative: -1.1.
- Residual, including asset changes (percent of GDP): 2019: 1.7; 2020: 8.8; 2021: -4.7; 2022: 7.6; 2023: -1.8; 2024: -2.1; 2025: -4.6; 2026: -2.6; cumulative: -6.1.

### Alternative scenarios and risks
- Baseline, Historical, Constant Primary Balance, and Contingent Liability Shock scenarios are modeled with differing assumptions on real GDP growth, inflation, primary balance, and effective interest rate.
- Contingent liability shock definition: one-off increase in non-interest expenditures equal to 10 percent of banking sector assets; SOE/Financial sector shock combines financial sector and SOE contingent liability shocks with non-interest expenditures increased by 20 percent of SOE guarantees excluding Aqracredit guarantees.
- Note: In 2021, DSA reflects inclusion to debt of Aqracredit guarantee, and drawdown of SOFAZ assets in 2022–26.

---

### Annex III. External Sector Assessment — findings and policy implications

### Current account and external balances
- Current account (CA) swung from a large surplus to a small deficit in 2020:
  - CA was 9.1 percent of GDP in 2019 and -0.5 percent of GDP in 2020.
  - Nonoil current account deficit is 12.5 percent of GDP, driven by large nonoil imports.
  - Nonoil exports are low at 4 percent of GDP in 2019 and 2020.
- CA forecast: expected to swing back to a surplus of 2.4 percent of GDP in 2021 and then gradually decline in tandem with oil export volumes.

### External buffers and reserve adequacy
- CBA gross international reserves reached $6.4 billion by end-2020, equal to 15 percent of GDP and 4.5 months of next year’s imports of goods.
- SOFAZ assets totaled $43.5 billion (102 percent of GDP) at end-2020; the liquid part is about 75 percent of SOFAZ assets.
- Combined CBA and SOFAZ liquid assets are equivalent to 25 months of next year’s imports.
- Azerbaijan scores much better than most EMs on IMF’s Assessing Reserve Adequacy (ARA) metric; reserve coverage projected to remain strong into 2026.

### External position assessment and gaps
- Staff assesses the external position to be substantially weaker than the level consistent with medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
- EBA-Lite commodity approach (PIH-based) estimates:
  - CA norm estimated at 18.5 percent of GDP in 2020.
  - Implies a negative CA gap of 16.1 percent of GDP in 2020.
  - Medium-term CA gap expected to remain negative at 11.2 percent of GDP.
  - Closing the gap will require sustained fiscal consolidation.
- Current account model (EBA-Lite framework) estimates:
  - CA norm estimated at 5.7 percent of GDP in 2020 after adjusting for temporary COVID-19 impact.
  - Implies a negative CA gap of 1.8 percent of GDP.
  - Policy changes that would reduce the CA gap over the medium term include:
    - (i) deeper and sustained fiscal consolidation than assumed in the baseline;
    - (ii) financial deepening, with bank credit to the private sector rising closer to the EM average;
    - (iii) an increase in public health expenditures from current 2 percent of GDP by 0.5 percent of GDP in the medium term, closer to the EM average while improving spending efficiency.
- Exchange rate and REER:
  - The manat has been de facto pegged to the dollar at a rate of 1.7 since April 2017.
  - REER was 12 percent stronger than 2017.
  - Recent appreciation driven mostly by the U.S. dollar nominal appreciation vis-à-vis trading partners (particularly Russia and Turkey).
  - REER models suggest the exchange rate is significantly overvalued, with the REER gap in a range of 6.0 to 6.8 percent, consistent with the negative CA gap over the medium term.
  - The PIH-based permanent income model could indicate a much larger REER gap, in line with the larger CA gap implied by a constant real annuity.
- Overall quantitative staff assessment:
  - Staff assesses the CA gap to be -11.2 percent of GDP, based on the constant real annuity estimated by the EBA-Lite commodity approach.
  - Medium-term REER gap assessed to be at least 6.0 percent.

*Source: Annex I–III, "Annex I. Response to the Pandemic" (IMF staff projections and assessments as presented in the source content).*

### 6.8 percent, also considering the current account and REER models.

### 1azeea2021001 - 6.8 percent, also considering the current account and REER models.

### Capital flows, current account, and external positions
- Azerbaijan has been a net supplier of capital.
- Capital and financial accounts are generally open but domestic financial markets are underdeveloped compared to regional and global peers.
- Capital inflows are dominated by FDI, mostly to the oil sector, and portfolio inflows.
- Capital outflows include trade credits, bank outflows, and outward FDI, mainly by the national oil company.
- Risks of increased bank outflows are mitigated through administrative and reporting requirements introduced in response to the 2015–16 crisis and largely remaining in effect.
- Administrative and reporting requirement measures are being assessed by staff using the Institutional View on Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows, as they might constitute capital flow management measures.

Current account projections and norms (figure annotations preserved)
- Chart labels / annotations: 5.7, 12.6, 14.4
- Projection series referenced: Current account projection; Current account norm, constant real annuity; Current account norm, constant real per capita annuity.
- Figure title: Azerbaijan: Forecasted CA and CA Norm under Bems-Carvalho (Oil Resource) Adjustment (In percent of GDP)

### Exchange rates, reserves, and reserve adequacy
- Sources used: National authorities, Haver, IMF FAD Reserve Adequacy Tool, and IMF staff calculations.
- Note: The data for EM refer to a sample of 47 emerging markets.
- Oil Fund Assets and Gross Official Reserves (In billions of USD) — figure shows Oil Fund Assets and CBA Reserves (no invented point estimates beyond supplied axis labels).
- Exchange rate and CBA FX reserves figure: exchange rate in AzN per USD plotted alongside CBA reserves (billion USD, RHS). Axis tick labels included in figure: 3,900; 4,400; 4,900; 5,400; 5,900; 6,400; 6,900; 1.45; 1.5; 1.55; 1.6; 1.65; 1.7; 1.75; 1.8; 1.85; 1.9; 1.95; Jan-16 through Jan-21 time axis.
- Reserve coverage comparisons and ARA metrics referenced: ARA Metric 3 Months Imports Broad Money; Reserve Coverage in Azerbaijan and Emerging Markets (2020, In Percent); Liquid Reserves as Percent of Metric with Suggested Adequacy Range and Reserves (% of ARA EM Metric).

### Risk Assessment Matrix — external and domestic risks, likelihood, impact, and policy advice
- Unexpected shifts in the COVID-19 pandemic
  - Likelihood: Medium
  - Possible impact: New more dangerous virus strains, problems in vaccine rollout could delay reduction in Covid cases and phase-out of lockdown measures, necessitating higher budget spending and lowering revenues; slower global growth reducing oil and natural gas exports.
  - Policy advice: Fiscal consolidation could be slowed down, with additional well-targeted spending provided as needed to health and other sectors to fight the pandemic. Monetary policy should remain accommodative.
- Widespread social discontent and political instability
  - Likelihood: High
  - Possible impact: Social tensions erupt as the pandemic and inadequate policy response cause socio-economic hardship or unequal access to vaccines; growing political polarization weakens policymaking and confidence.
  - Policy advice: Ensure adequate, temporary, and targeted support to the population most adversely affected and vulnerable to the pandemic.
- Oversupply and volatility in the oil market
  - Likelihood: Medium
  - Possible impact: Given Azerbaijan’s high oil dependence, the economy could go into recession in case of a large oil decline. Oil fund savings could cushion the shock; a prolonged oil price increase could generate a large windfall.
  - Policy advice: A prolonged oil price decline would necessitate a large fiscal adjustment. Windfall revenue from higher-than-budgeted oil prices should be saved. Over the medium/long term, implement structural reforms to foster greater diversification in production and exports, boost competitiveness, and reduce dependency on oil.
- Intensified geopolitical tensions and security risks
  - Likelihood: High
  - Possible impact: Greater security risks would raise oil prices helping growth but could negatively affect FDI in the region.
  - Policy advice: Avoid pro-cyclical fiscal policy and spending of revenue windfalls resulting from temporary oil price increase.
- Accelerating de-globalization
  - Likelihood: Medium
  - Possible impact: Disruptions in global trading system and regional integration would adversely affect plans to expand nonoil exports and oil processing industry and attempts to enter global value chains.
  - Policy advice: Maintain sufficient fiscal buffers to provide space to respond to adverse impact of global trading disruptions.
- Failure to reverse fiscal easing
  - Likelihood: Medium
  - Possible impact: Increased public debt and/or reduction of SOFAZ assets; undermines intragenerational equity though not threatening fiscal sustainability.
  - Policy advice: Gradually phase out exceptional budgetary pandemic support, followed by reduction in subsidies and tight spending control; implement revenue measures to boost non-oil budget revenues in the medium-term.
- Financial sector risks
  - Likelihood: Medium
  - Possible impact: Deterioration of asset quality and restructured loans becoming nonperforming could weaken banking soundness and reduce capacity to extend new loans; government may need to provide financial support with additional fiscal costs.
  - Policy advice: Reverse gradually the easing of prudential regulation in response to the pandemic, followed by strengthening of financial supervision and regulation.
- Weak SOE performance
  - Likelihood: Medium
  - Possible impact: Continued losses, negative impact on growth, and growing contingent liabilities to the budget; high government guarantees are a large fiscal risk.
  - Policy advice: Implement comprehensive reforms to improve corporate governance and efficiency of SOEs.
- Higher oil price (scenario)
  - Likelihood: Medium
  - Possible impact: Stronger global growth leads to higher oil price, strengthening export revenues and fiscal balance.
  - Policy advice: Avoid a pro-cyclical increase in budget expenditures.

### Priorities for tax reforms — findings, needed reforms, and key statistics
- Strategic objective: Reduce dependence on oil production and informal activity; greater tax effort required to sustain public finances; lay groundwork for tax reforms and strengthen tax administration capacity.
- Revenue targets and implications:
  - To maintain consolidated revenues at 30 percent of GDP beyond 2026, nonoil tax effort will need to increase by 1.3 percent of nonoil GDP in 2027, and gradually rise by 10.8 percent of nonoil GDP in 2040.
- Tax structure and rates:
  - VAT rate: 18 percent with registration obligatory for taxpayers with annual turnovers exceeding AZN 200,000 ($120,000).
  - CIT rate: 20 percent.
  - PIT structure: marginal PIT rates are 14 percent on monthly taxable incomes up to AZN 2,500 and 25 percent on the portion of income exceeding AZN 2,500, but the top rate applies only to the public and petroleum sectors.
  - PIT tax holiday: A key tax reform effective January 1, 2019 exempted from PIT for a period of seven years employees working in the nonoil & gas and non-state sectors and earning up to AZN 8,000 per month (equivalent to $56,000 annual income). The tax rate applicable on the portion of income above AZN 8,000 is 14 percent.
  - The top PIT rate for the non-public and nonoil sectors (14 percent) is lower than the average of the group of comparator countries and the CIT rate is slightly below the average rate of the comparators.
- Tax revenue performance and buoyancy:
  - Tax revenue as a share of GDP: 14.6 percent of GDP in 2019, an improvement of 1.5 pp over 2018, stemming mainly from increased VAT collection.
  - VAT C-efficiency: 0.52 in 2018 (comparable to lower-middle income average 0.50, below upper-middle income average 0.62).
  - PIT revenues: on a downward trend, falling by 0.7 pp of GDP during 2016–19.
  - Buoyancy analysis (2000–19): simple linear regression indicates on average a 1 pp change in GDP led to a 1.1 pp change in total tax revenues in the same year.
  - Buoyancy by tax: VAT buoyancy equals 1; PIT buoyancy coefficient 0.85; non-oil CIT buoyancy 0.94 with respect to non-oil GDP.
  - Interpretation: buoyancy stems entirely from oil sector CIT, underscoring revenue risks from long-term slowdown in oil GDP growth and weak responsiveness of non-oil tax instruments.
- Recommended tax reform directions and measures:
  - PIT: Following the scheduled end of the PIT holiday for non-public, nonoil wage earners in 2026, implement a progressive PIT system based on end-of-year declaration of all income sources, with taxes withheld credited against end-of-year liability. Introduce a PIT schedule with a small exemption level and at least one additional (non-zero) marginal tax rate; design top rate to increase tax paid by the richest individuals.
  - Property tax: Gradually replace existing property tax (net book value for legal entities; amount per square meter for physical persons) with one based on market values for residential and nonresidential properties to improve revenue buoyancy and fairness.
  - Tax exemptions: Numerous exemptions may cause revenue leakages via abusive transfer pricing and VAT chain disruptions or relocating investment/employment without net increases. Calculate cost of tax exemptions (forgone revenues) and assess relative to measured benefits; append an annual tax expenditure report to the budget. Reducing exemptions would broaden the tax base and likely improve revenue performance.
- Recent policy and administrative measures to reduce informality and expand base:
  - Expanded electronic information exchange with government agencies for tax control.
  - “Cash-back” incentives for consumers to promote whitening of turnovers in retail trade and services.
  - Tighter financial sanctions for illegal employment and undeclared income.
  - Policy changes: PIT tax holiday in nonoil non-public sector; tighter eligibility for simplified tax regime; reduced turnover tax rate of simplified regime; cuts to income tax rate for micro-businesses; expanded tax incentives to attract investment and create agglomeration effects.

### Financial access and development indicators (figures preserved)
- Azerbaijan: Firm Credit Access Measures figure indicates measures such as value of collateral needed for a loan (% of the loan amount), percent of firms needing a loan, percent of firms identifying access to finance as a major constraint, percent of firms with a bank loan/line of credit (country comparisons shown but specific values retained only in figures).
- Azerbaijan: Financial Development Index (AZE, CCA and EMDE Averages, 1980–2018) — index components include Overall, Financial Institutions, Financial Markets (figure referenced).

*Source: IMF staff calculations and national authorities (content unit: 1azeea2021001 - 6.8 percent, also considering the current account and REER models.).*

### Annex VI. Financial Development, Inclusion, and Stability

### Annex VI. Financial Development, Inclusion, and Stability

### Key findings on financial development and inclusion
- Azerbaijan lags its peers in financial development and inclusion: accessibility and depth are low, financial markets are underdeveloped, and weaknesses in bank balance sheets persist.
- High collateral requirements and low use of bank credit for business finance are among key obstacles.
- Azerbaijan reports some Financial Access Survey (FAS) indicators, including commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults and ATMs per 100,000 adults adopted by the UN to monitor Target 8.10 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

### Evidence on credit expansions, bank risk, and lending standards
- Past credit expansions were driven by vulnerable banks and accompanied by a weakening of lending standards.
- When credit booms are propelled by banks’ increased lending capacity, weaker banks tend to expand risky lending aggressively; without strong prudential oversight, rapid credit expansions are accompanied by excessive risk-taking, exacerbating bank distress in an economic downturn.
- An analysis using the future loan loss provision ratio to gauge current lending standards shows that the 2013–15 credit boom in Azerbaijan was driven by banks with low capital ratios and weak lending standards.
- The riskiness of credit originations is measured as:
  - RCO_t^X = (sum_{i,t ∈ High Growth} X_{i,t} / N_{t,High Growth}) − (sum_{i,t ∈ Low Growth} X_{i,t} / N_{t,Low Growth})
  - Where High Growth refers to banks with credit increases in the top quartile, Low Growth in the bottom quartile, X_{i,t} is bank riskiness (the capital ratio or z-score), and (N_{t,High Growth}, N_{t,Low Growth}) are the numbers of banks in each group.
  - Lower X_{i,t} means greater risk, and negative RCO_t^X indicates credit expansion driven by weaker banks.

### Macro effects: supply-driven vs demand-driven credit booms
- Busts in supply-driven credit booms amplify economic downturns while demand-driven credit booms have lasting economic benefits.
- In a vector autocorrelation (VAR) analysis:
  - Increased credit supply boosts GDP in the first 4 months but the impact turns negative after 9 months, lasting for 2.5 years.
  - An increase in credit demand is followed by a 2.5-year boost to GDP.
- Azerbaijan: Impulse Response of Real GDP Growth After Credit Shock shows annualized additional monthly growth in percentage points for supply-driven and demand-driven shocks (dashed lines or dots indicate 90 percent confidence intervals).

### Selected empirical indicators and time references (as presented)
- The 2013–15 credit boom in Azerbaijan is identified as driven by banks with low capital ratios and weak lending standards.
- Impulse responses indicate positive GDP effects for the first 4 months after a credit supply shock, a reversal after 9 months, and effects lasting for 2.5 years; demand-driven shocks produce a 2.5-year boost to GDP.
- Time series charts referenced span Jan-08 through Jul-20 for corporate credit and household credit series.

### Policy recommendations and reform priorities
- To ensure sustainable financial deepening where increases in credit supply and demand go hand in hand, reforms should include:
  - Strengthening bank supervision and regulation.
  - Promoting SME financial literacy.
  - Improving financial sector transparency.
  - Strengthening prudential oversight, stress-testing, and transparency to mitigate risks from supply-driven credit expansion.

### Financial sector surveillance, data, and technical assistance highlights
- The Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FIMSA) received technical assistance on financial soundness indicators (FSIs) in 2018; available source data would allow compilation and dissemination of monthly core and encouraged FSIs for deposit takers broadly in compliance with the FSI Compilation Guide.
- Monetary and financial statistics improved after 2017–18 TA missions and are in full compliance with the Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual and Compilation Guide (MFSMCG); the Central Bank regularly reports monetary data using standardized report forms (SRFs).
- Balance of payments (BOP) statistics are broadly in accordance with BPM6, and International Investment Position (IIP) compilation was re-initiated in 2015 after a 6-year hiatus; significant under-coverage and methodological inconsistencies remain in trade in goods and services, investment income, and some financial account components.
- Fiscal statistics: authorities report annual general government data according to GFSM 2014, but stock positions in assets and liabilities have yet to be reported; compilation of longer time series, including sub-annual series, is needed.
- Azerbaijan participates in the Enhanced General Dissemination System; its National Summary Data Page was launched in February 2019.

### Technical assistance timeline (selected items, 2011–21)
- Multiple technical assistance missions and topics delivered include: AML/CFT Diagnostic (Feb/Mar 2011), Government Finance Statistics (Sep 2011), Balance of Payments Statistics (Mar 2012), Bank Restructuring and Bank Supervision (Mar 2014; Sep 2015; Oct 2016), Financial Soundness Indicators (Q1 2018), Monetary and Financial Statistics (Q1 2018), Regulatory and Prudential Framework (Q1 2018), Transition to Inflation Targeting (Q3 2018), Banking Sector (Q1 2020), Financial Sector Supervision (Q2 2020), Risk-Based Supervision (Q4 2020), Macro-Fiscal Framework (Q2 2021), Consumer Price Index (Q2 2021).

_Italic: Annex VI. Financial Development, Inclusion, and Stability, Staff Report for the 2021 Article IV Consultation (Informational Annex), Prepared by Middle East and Central Asia Department (In Consultation with Other Departments), July 1, 2021._

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2021/english/1azeea2021001.pdf_
