## 1hkgea2021006

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### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY — Overall assessment and strengths
- Banking supervision and regulation by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) remain strong.
- The assessment confirms the 2014 Basel Core Principles (BCP) assessment that the HKMA achieves a high level of compliance with the BCPs.
- The Basel III framework (and related guidance) and domestic and cross-border cooperation arrangements are firmly in place.
- The HKMA actively contributes to the development and implementation of relevant international standards.
- Updating the risk based supervisory approach helped the HKMA optimize supervisory resources.
- The HKMA’s highly experienced supervisory staff is a key driver to achieving one of the most sophisticated levels of supervision and regulation observed in Asia and beyond.

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY — Recent initiatives and evolving challenges
- Key priorities include supporting innovation (e.g., Smart Banking initiatives) and strengthening cyber resilience of banks.
- Supervisory environment challenges: geopolitical headwinds and competing supervisory priorities.
- Recent staffing trends:
  - Use of independent reviews by external auditors more than doubled from 2017 to 2018.
  - Recent increases to supervisory staff have been mostly devoted to newly identified areas of responsibility, resulting in challenges in managing supervisory resources with competing priorities.
- Continued attention needed regarding adequacy of supervisory resources given operational needs and changing responsibilities.

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY — Institutional independence and governance concerns
- Recommendation reiterated from 2014 FSAP: provide de jure operational independence to HKMA.
- Legal detail:
  - Banking Ordinance (Cap. 155) (BO) gives the Chief Executive (CE) of the HKSAR a reserve power to give directions to the Monetary Authority (MA) and the MA shall comply with any direction given.
  - The reserve power has never been invoked; existence in principle may undermine de jure operational independence.
- Suggested actions:
  - Remove or clarify the CE’s reserve power in the BO by specifying circumstances under which the CE may give directions to MA.
  - Regular review of checks and balances to ensure developmental/competitive initiatives do not conflict with prudential mandates.

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY — Supervision of governance and related party transactions
- HKMA strengthened regulatory framework emphasizing Board and INED roles since last FSAP; effective implementation is the focal point.
- HKMA needs to:
  - Review cases where individuals hold a large number of director/management positions in financial and non-financial entities for potential conflicts of interest and time commitment.
  - Intensify supervision on related party transactions by strengthening analysis of motivations behind intragroup transactions and closely monitoring banks’ implementation of the new connected party definition.

### BANKING SECTOR STRUCTURE AND SIZE
- Institutions (as of March 2019): 189 institutions—155 licensed banks, 18 restricted licence banks, and 16 deposit-taking companies.
- Banking assets: equivalent to over 822 percent of GDP.
- Four largest banks account for almost half of the total consolidated assets of the banking system.
- Domestic lending to the corporate sector: around half of the banking system’s total lending.
- Property-related lending: about 30 percent of total lending.
- Three tiers of deposit-taking institutions (authorized institutions, AIs):
  - Licensed banks (LBs): full range of banking business.
  - Restricted licence banks (RLBs): may take deposits of no less than HK$500,000 (or an equivalent amount in any other currency) without limit on term.
  - Deposit-taking companies (DTCs): may take deposits of no less than HK$100,000 (or an equivalent amount in any other currency) of a tenure of not less than three months.
- Retail deposits dominated by the three largest banks (local subsidiaries of overseas banking groups).
- Indigenous local banks play an important role in SME lending.
- Foreign bank branches (FBBs): some integral in private banking and derivatives; more than half of FBBs have relatively simple operations.

### RECENT TRENDS AND CONCENTRATION (selected figures)
- Asset growth over the past 5 years: rapid increases in asset size of 30 percent.
- Property development lending: increased 141 percent in 2014-2018.
- Mainland China related lending: increased 32 percent.
- Since 2014, banking assets in subsidiaries and branches of Mainland banking groups increased by 50 percent.
- Banking system profitability: double digit return on equity.
- Table snapshot (As of end-June 2019) — Authorized institutions supervised by the HKMA:
  - Licensed banks (LBs): 160 AIs, Market share (total assets) 99.2%, Total assets growth rate since 2014 31.2%
    - Local banks: 30 AIs, Market share 59.1%, Growth rate 39.7%
      - Subsidiaries of foreign banks and bank holding companies: 15 AIs, Market share 31.9%, Growth rate 43.8%
      - Subsidiaries of Mainland Chinese banking group: 7 AIs, Market share 20.3%, Growth rate 49.5%
      - Virtual banks*: 8 AIs, Market share n.a., Growth rate n.a.
    - Foreign bank branches (FBBs): 130 AIs, Market share 40.2%, Growth rate 20.5%
      - Branches of Mainland Chinese banking group/banks: 13 AIs, Market share 13.2%, Growth rate 47.8%
  - Restricted licence banks (RLBs): 18 AIs, Market share 0.7%, Growth rate 14.8%
  - Deposit taking companies (DTCs): 16 AIs, Market share 0.1%, Growth rate -53.8%
  - Total: 194 AIs, Market share 100%, Total assets growth rate since 2014 30.9%
  - (*All virtual banks have not commenced business.)

### PRESENCE OF G-SIBs AND FOREIGN BRANCHES
- All 29 G-SIBs identified by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in November 2018 undertake banking activities in the HKSAR.
- Foreign branches account for about 40 percent of the banking system’s total assets.
- Foreign branch business models: group liquidity hubs, investment banking, corporate lending, local interbank market participation.

### CAPITALIZATION, ASSET QUALITY, FUNDING, AND LIQUIDITY (selected figures)
- Capital adequacy: around 20 percent; Tier 1 capital ratio around 18 percent.
- Classified loan ratio: 0.56 percent (well below the long-run historical average of 2 percent since 2000).
- Loan to deposit ratio: increased from 51.5 percent as of end 2009 to 73.4 percent as of end March 2019.
- Funding composition: customer deposits close to 57 percent of liabilities.
- Exchange Fund assets: reached HK$4 trillion at end-2018.

### LEGAL, INSTITUTIONAL, AND SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK
- HKMA principal supervisory function (under the BO): promote the general stability and effective working of the banking system.
- HKMA four main functions:
  - (i) maintaining currency stability within the Linked Exchange Rate System (Section 3(1) of the Exchange Fund Ordinance (Cap. 66) (EFO));
  - (ii) promoting the stability and integrity of the financial system including the banking system (BO Section 7(1), etc.);
  - (iii) managing the Exchange Fund (EFO Section 3(2));
  - (iv) helping to maintain Hong Kong’s status as an international financial center, including the maintenance and development of Hong Kong’s financial infrastructure (EFO Section 3(1A)).
- Institutional separation within HKMA between regulatory/supervisory functions and market development functions.
- Developmental initiatives: Infrastructure Financing Facilitation Office (IFFO) established 2016; Fintech Facilitation Office established 2016 driving seven Smart Banking Initiatives; Centre for Green Finance (CGF) under IFFO announced in May 2019.
- Ongoing diligence required to ensure developmental initiatives do not impair prudential mandate; prudential objective should prevail where conflict exists.

### SUPERVISION COVERAGE AND GAPS — Non-deposit taking finance companies (NDFCs)
- NDFCs regulation:
  - Regulated under the Money Lenders Ordinance and licensed by the Licensing Court.
  - Hong Kong Police Force handles enforcement and investigations; Registrar of Money Lenders conducts site inspections and collects information.
  - If an NDFC is a subsidiary of a locally incorporated AI, the MA exercises consolidated supervision over the AI and the NDFC.
- NDFCs activity and risks:
  - Disbursing residential mortgages and consumer loans for marginal borrowers; industry remains small.
  - Authorities advised to consider imposing the same macroprudential limits on residential mortgages granted by NDFCs.
- Recommendation: reassess need for amending regulatory parameters by including NDFCs to ensure more timely recognition of risk and monitor potential spill-over effect of macroprudential policy.

### INSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES (selected legal details)
- Section 10 of the BO gives the CE a reserve power to “give such directions as he thinks fit” and indicates the MA “shall comply with any directions given.”
- The power has never been invoked; any exercise would need to be in accordance with the objectives and functions of the BO and would be a tool of last resort in critical circumstances.
- Recommendation: update legislation to reflect HKMA’s de facto operational independence by eliminating or specifying circumstances for CE directions; require disclosure of reasons for dismissal of MA for transparency.

### RESOURCING OF THE HKMA — STRUCTURE AND STAFFING (as at June 2019)
- BSD full-time equivalents for banking supervision: 187
  - Case management supervision: 76
  - Risk supervision: 111
- Turnover rate for banking departments over the past five years: 4.5%.
- BSD headcount developments:
  - Headcount increased from 156 in 2016 to 176 in 2019 (13 percent).
  - Banking assets increased by 31 percent over the last five years.
- Case management resourcing pressure:
  - 76 dedicated case management staff to supervise 194 banks.
  - Case Management Division 1: 18 people in total (headcount decreased from 26 in 2016 to 18 in 2019) responsible for 17 local banks including three D-SIBs.
  - Nine supervisors in the portfolio management team handle 85 banks’ CAMEL ratings and day-to-day supervision.
- Number of independent reviews by external auditors more than doubled from 2017 to 2018.

### RECOMMENDATIONS ON RESOURCING
- Continue to review supervisory resources and appropriately respond to changes in complexity and responsibilities.
  - More staff may need to be allocated to large bank supervision and technology risk supervision.
  - Allocate more staff to large bank supervision and technology risk supervision. — HKMA — C

### COOPERATION AND COLLABORATION — INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
- HKMA participated in or led 32 supervisory colleges in 2018 and cooperated with home supervisors for on-site examinations.
- MOUs and coordination:
  - HKMA has MOUs with SFC, IA, and MPFA; regular MOU meetings held.
  - HKMA and SFC entered into a new Side Letter in July 2019 to further enhance collaboration and information sharing arrangements.
- Domestic cross-sectoral observations:
  - As at end-June 2019: 115 AIs were registered institutions for securities businesses; 42 AIs were licensed as insurance intermediaries.
- Recommendations:
  - Formalize process of requesting relevant information from other domestic sectoral regulators before on-site examinations of non-banking activities of AIs. — HKSAR sectoral regulators — ST
  - Proactively identify information of common interest and develop more effective information sharing mechanisms. — HKSAR sectoral regulators — ST
  - Domestic sectoral regulators encouraged to conduct joint examinations on cross-sectoral business.

### BANKING SUPERVISION APPROACH AND ACTIVITIES
- Organizational responsibilities:
  - BSD, BCD and BPD are primary units for policy formulation and supervision of AIs for prudential and conduct risk.
  - BSD has six divisions: three case management divisions (vertical supervision) and three specialized risk divisions (horizontal supervision and on-site inspections).
- Enforcement and AML functions:
  - Enforcement and AML Department comprises two Enforcement Divisions and the AML & Financial Crime Risk Division.
  - AML Division moved under an Executive Director in 2015 with dedicated responsibility for HKMA’s AML/CFT and enforcement work.
- Risk-based supervisory process:
  - AIs assigned High/Medium/Low Supervisory priority ratings; high risk banks examined at least annually.
  - On-site examinations conducted: 401 in 2017 and 392 in 2018 (on-site examinations and thematic reviews respectively).

### RISK-BASED SUPERVISION FRAMEWORK AND PORTFOLIO-BASED SUPERVISION (PBS)
- Two supervisory approaches: institution-based supervision and portfolio-based supervision.
- PBS applies to AIs with relatively insignificant operations and assessed to be low risk; more data-driven and standardized processes.
  - For AIs under PBS:
    - Greater reliance on off-site supervision.
    - BSD supervisors monitor financial conditions monthly by reviewing MIS reports specifically designed for the BSD’s portfolio supervision team.
    - No regular meetings with the Board; prudential meetings as needed.
    - Reliance on internal and external auditors to complement supervision.
    - Annual updates provided to HKMA on business plans and critical supervisory information for CAMEL assessments.
- Challenge: determination of proportional segments to apply PBS; appropriateness reviewed at least annually.
- Recommendation: strengthen communication with AIs by further articulating CAMEL supervisory ratings in notifications and/or clearly communicating qualitative assessment criteria for each component. — HKMA — ST

### CAMEL, SRP, AND NOTIFICATION PROCESS
- HKMA streamlined SRP and CAMEL processes in 2016.
- Annual CAMEL reviews for all AIs and SRP for all locally incorporated AIs.
- Approval committee quorum: three members — Executive Director of BSD (chair) and two Division Heads not involved in proposing ratings.
- Notification limitations:
  - Final composite rating and areas of weaknesses notified annually, but no discussion or evaluation of each component rating is typically provided.
  - CAMEL indicators and qualitative assessment criteria have not been made open to the industry.
- Recommendation: articulate CAMEL component criteria and improve notification practices.

### ON-SITE EXAMINATION PROCESS AND EXTERNAL AUDITORS
- On-site examination process includes pre-field-work assessment, field work, internal communication, draft report, final report; final report normally issued within three months after conclusion.
- External auditors:
  - Legal basis: section 63(3), 63(3A) and 59(2) of the BO.
  - AIs may be required to appoint external auditors to commission independent reviews covering corporate governance, risk management, IT, AML, internal audit, loan classification, business continuity, etc.
  - Benefits: extends HKMA reach and resources, particularly for small banks; auditor findings inform CAMEL assessments; tripartite meetings may be held.
  - Independence risks:
    - Attention to interdependency where a single firm provides multiple services.
    - HKMA has power to require an AI to use another firm under Section 59(2).
    - Previous BCP recommendation to grant HKMA direct power to reject/rescind external auditor appointment remains unaddressed; HKMA may request or invoke supervisory powers to achieve outcomes in practice.
  - Recommendation: review and update SPM IC-3 (2003) to reiterate importance of considering potential conflict of interest in auditor selection and require independent review report submission protocols.

### SUPERVISION OF FOREIGN BANK BRANCHES (FBBs)
- FBBs are not required to hold capital or observe capital adequacy requirements such as leverage ratios in the HKSAR; home supervisors responsible for overall capital adequacy.
- FBBs not subject to statutory limits on exposures and concentration of risks covering: LEs, connected lending, holding of shares, interest in land, etc.
- Around one third of AIs have not been inspected by the HKMA over the last five years; most of these are FBBs supervised on a portfolio basis.
- Some large FBBs have not had HKMA onsite examinations in the past five years; HKMA engaged independent external parties under section 59(2) or otherwise.
- Recommendation: conduct targeted and/or limited scope inspections on large FBBs that have not had an onsite inspection for long intervals; give special attention to systemically important FBBs. — HKMA — MT

### FINANCIAL GROUP SUPERVISION AND GROUP-WIDE APPROACH
- HKMA has strong legal and regulatory framework for consolidated supervision; analyzes AIs on solo and consolidated basis emphasizing corporate governance and robust risk management.
- Common group structures and coordinator arrangements detailed; internal guidance note issued in 2016 on imposing conditions on holding companies for consolidated supervision.
- Recommendations:
  - Review and update SPM CS-1 (2008) to be responsive to evolving group risks.
  - Consider incorporating standard conditions for IHCs and UHCs into SPM for enforceability.
  - Increase focus on risk concentration, group-wide corporate governance, intra-group transactions and exposures, and aggregate exposures to non-financial entities.

### CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, INEDS, AND BANK CULTURE
- SPM module CG-1 revised in October 2017 to clarify board/senior management responsibilities and strengthen INED roles; specific board-level committees expected.
- INED Development Program established 2016: experience sharing conference, thematic seminars, on-boarding sessions.
- Governance challenges:
  - No legal restrictions on individuals holding multiple positions across entities; examples noted of directors holding 40-50 directorships.
  - Recommendation: review and examine cases where individuals hold a large number of director/management positions to assess conflicts of interest and time commitment. — HKMA — ST
- Bank Culture Reform measures (2018-19):
  - Requiring AIs to conduct self-assessments.
  - Focused reviews of key culture areas.
  - Cultural dialogues with senior management and/or board members.
  - HKMA reviewing self-assessment reports covering 30 banks due July 2019.

### PRUDENTIAL REGULATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS — CAPITAL (selected figures)
- Industry consolidated capital ratios (In ppt):
  - Q1 2014 CET1 13.1 AT1 0.1 T2 2.8 Overall 15.9
  - Q1 2019 CET1 16.1 AT1 1.9 T2 2.4 Overall 20.4
- D-SIBs consolidated capital ratios (In ppt):
  - Q1 2014 CET1 12.6 AT1 0.1 T2 2.6 Overall 15.3
  - Q1 2019 CET1 15.9 AT1 1.9 T2 2.3 Overall 20.2
- HKMA implemented Basel III items: leverage ratio, capital buffers, higher loss absorbency for D-SIBs, revised securitization framework, TLAC holdings standard.
- Internal capital targets (ICTs) introduced in 2016; Pillar 2 capital requirements imposed on all locally incorporated AIs.

### CREDIT RISK SUPERVISION AND REAL ESTATE LENDING
- RCAP 2014/15: credit risk framework compliant; minor deviations in treatment of commercial real estate exposures to be amended.
- IRB banks RML risk-weight floors:
  - All new RMLs approved by IRB banks after 19 May 2017 25%
  - All existing RMLs approved by IRB banks on or before 19 May 2017 15%
- Tightening of LTV ratio and DSR requirements accompanied the risk-weight floors.
- HKMA monitoring systems for property market and Mainland-related lending; classified loan ratio of Mainland-related lending remained below 1% in past five years.
- Supervisory actions on lending to property developers (late 2016/early 2017):
  - Financing caps lowered in 2017:
    - from 50% to 40% of the site value;
    - from 100% to 80% of the construction cost;
    - overall cap from 60% to 50% of the expected value of completed projects.
  - Risk weight for exposures to property developers offering high LTV mortgages raised in 2017.
- Mainland-related lending (MRL) composition:
  - 41% to Mainland state-owned enterprises,
  - 31% to local and foreign companies investing in the Mainland,
  - 28% to Mainland private entities.
- Recommendation: continue to closely monitor AIs’ concentrated exposures to non-bank Mainland Chinese entities, particularly banking groups with both FBBs and subsidiaries, focusing on potential regulatory arbitrage.

### BANKING (EXPOSURE LIMITS) RULES (BELR) — IMPLEMENTATION AND SCOPE (effective July 1, 2019)
- BELR came into operation on July 1, 2019 with an additional six-month grace period for compliance.
- Under BELR, every AI (except for FBBs) subject to a statutory limit of 25 percent of its Tier 1 capital on financial exposure to any one person or group of related persons.
- Banks expected to identify connected counterparties by economic dependence when sum of exposures to one individual counterparty exceeds 5 percent of Tier 1 capital.
- Tighter limit of 15 percent applicable for exposures between banks that have been designated as G-SIBs.
- Local implementation adopts more conservative approaches than Basel in some areas (e.g., applies to all locally-incorporated AIs and does not provide for explicit window on ungrouping).
- Sovereign concentration capital treatment:
  - Exposures up to 100% of Tier 1 capital free of additional charge.
  - Exposures exceeding 100% of Tier 1 capital subject to increasing risk weights to calculate risk-weighted assets.
- Exemptions examples under BELR include IPO receiving banks, exposures from satisfaction of debts (dispose no later than 18 months), exposures in relation to specific HKSAR Government projects, exposures covered by a letter of comfort (with HKMA ceasing acceptance of existing letters of comfort to foreign bank subsidiaries from July 1, 2020).
- Property and equity investment limits under BELR:
  - Equity exposure ratio must not exceed 25%.
  - Value of interests in land must not exceed 50% of Tier 1 capital; interests in non-self-use land must not exceed 25%.
- HKMA observations:
  - AIs on average have interests in non-self-use-land and building of around 3-4 percent of Tier 1 capital.
  - HKMA stress-test indicated AIs’ interest in land will not jeopardize AIs under severe stress, but absolute regulatory limit appears high and should be closely supervised.
- Recommendations:
  - Minimize exemptions to LE limits as far as possible in line with Basel LE framework and closely monitor exposures exempted from BELR.
  - Conduct close monitoring of AIs’ implementation of new rules focusing on system change (e.g., application of economic interdependence).
  - Closely supervise changes of the AI’s non-self-use property.

### RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS (RPT) AND CONNECTED PARTIES
- SPM module on “Exposures to connected parties” revised November 2015 to expand scope of connected parties beyond Rule 85(1) of BELR.
- Connected parties include senior management and key staff, subsidiaries and fellow subsidiaries, controllers, relatives, etc.
- Exposure limit on single connected natural persons loosened from HK$1 million to HK$10 million based on quantitative impact study.
- From July 1, 2019 (subject to six-month grace period), AIs required to report connected party exposures determined under expanded scope in prudential return to HKMA.
- HKMA requires AIs to set internal limits on aggregate intragroup exposures expressed as a ratio to Tier 1 capital; no quantitative regulatory limits to intragroup exposures exist.
- Reporting of intragroup transactions exists but analysis may be insufficient; new banking return capturing exposures to intragroup companies effective from September 2019.
- Recommendation: intensify RPT supervision, strengthen analysis on nature of intragroup transactions, and consider improving prudential reporting template for RPT (additional fields suggested: type of exposures, internal exposure limits, value of non-exposure transactions, RP’s relationship to bank, collateral type and amount, asset classification).

### LIQUIDITY, IRRBB, OPERATIONAL RISK, AND DISCLOSURE (selected figures)
- Basel III LCR and NSFR implemented:
  - Average LCR of major banks: 162.4% (statutory minimum 100%).
  - Average LMR of other banks: 54.7% (statutory minimum 25%).
- BLAR 2019 amended level 2B assets; inclusion of Basel-compliant equity shares and triple-B rated debt securities effective January 2020.
- Liquidity stress testing: HKMA assumes funding contraction by an average of about 20% within one month.
- IRRBB:
  - Effective July 2019, IRRBB framework adopting 2016 BCBS standards implemented; standardized approach required (no internal model allowed).
  - Local adaptations: interest rates floored at –2 percent for all shock scenarios; distinction required between CNY and CNH.
- Operational risk and cyber security:
  - In past three years, HKMA conducted 23 on-site examinations related to technology risk.
  - Technology risk team size: around 22 persons (compared with eight in 2013).
- Disclosure:
  - Basel III related disclosure rules and revised Pillar 3 requirements implemented; Banking (Disclosure) Rules amended. Phase I and II of Basel revised Pillar 3 implemented from March 31, 2017 and June 30, 2018 respectively.

### MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS (select summary with custodians and timing where provided)
- Supervisory Responsibilities, Objectives, and Powers
  - Establish a framework to review checks and balances on a regular basis to ensure prudential objective not undermined by developmental initiatives. — HKMA — C
  - Reassess need for amending regulatory parameters by including NDFCs to ensure timely recognition of risk and monitor spill-over effects. — HKSAR authorities — MT
- Independence and Resourcing
  - Update legislation to reflect HKMA’s de facto operational independence by removing CE’s reserve power in BO or specifying circumstances for CE directions to MA. — HKSAR authorities — MT
  - Continue to review adequacy of supervisory resources and respond to changes; allocate more staff to large bank supervision and technology risk supervision. — HKMA — C
- Cooperation and Collaboration
  - Formalize process of requesting relevant information from domestic sectoral regulators before on-site examinations of non-banking activities of AIs. — HKSAR sectoral regulators — ST
  - Continue to proactively identify information of common interest and develop more effective information sharing mechanisms. — HKSAR sectoral regulators — ST
- Supervisory Approaches and Techniques
  - Strengthen communication with AIs by further articulating CAMEL supervisory ratings and qualitative criteria. — HKMA — ST
  - Strengthen supervisory framework on use of external auditors to manage conflicts of interest and supervisory objectivity risks. — HKMA — ST
  - Conduct targeted/limited scope inspections on FBBs that have not had onsite examinations for long intervals, especially systemically important FBBs. — HKMA — MT
  - Update group-wide supervisory approach to increase focus on risk concentration, group-wide corporate governance, intra-group transactions and exposures, and aggregate exposures to non-financial entities. — HKMA — ST
  - Review cases where individuals hold a large number of directors/management positions in other entities. — HKMA — ST
- Prudential Regulations and Requirements
  - Continue to closely monitor concentrated exposures to non-bank Mainland Chinese entities, particularly for banking groups with both FBBs and subsidiaries. — HKMA — C
  - Minimize exemptions to LE limits as far as practicable in line with the Basel framework and closely monitor exposures exempted from the BELR. — HKMA — MT
  - Closely supervise changes of AI’s non-self-use property. — HKMA — C
  - Consider improving prudential reporting template on related party transactions for more effective monitoring. — HKMA — ST
  - Strengthen analysis on the nature of intragroup transactions. — HKMA — ST

### APPENDIX I — FSAP 2014: ACTIONS TAKEN TO IMPROVE COMPLIANCE WITH THE BCPS (selected CPs)
- CP1 — Responsibilities, objectives and powers
  - Action Taken: Implemented/On-going. Continued vigilance required to ensure developmental and competitive considerations do not impair prudential standards.
- CP2 — Independence, accountability, resourcing
  - Main recommended actions to amend BO and require disclosure of dismissal reasons: Not Implemented.
  - Section 10 of BO retains CE reserve direction power; power has never been exercised.
- CP7 — Major acquisitions
  - Action Taken: Implemented. Domestic cross-sectoral resolution regime under FIRO commenced operation on 7 July 2017; resolvability assessments ongoing.
- CP8 — Supervisory approach
  - Action Taken: Implemented. HKMA intensified focus on business models, strategic risks, and cross-sectoral issues.
- CP9 — Supervisory techniques (foreign branches)
  - Action Taken: Partially implemented. Around one-third of AIs not inspected in over 5 years; guidance updated and FBB supervision refined.
- CP12 — Consolidated supervision
  - Action Taken: Implemented. Internal guidance note No. 2016-001 formalized analysis of non-financial activities of UHCs and measures to impose conditions.
- CP13 — Home-host relationships (resolution planning)
  - Action Taken: Implemented. MA empowered under FIRO for resolution planning and resolvability assessments; bilateral resolution planning for each of six D-SIBs established.
- CP20 — Related parties
  - Action Taken: Implemented. SPM CR-G-9 revised November 2015; connected party scope expanded; connected party reporting required from 1 July 2019 (subject to grace period).
- CP27 — Financial reporting and external audit
  - Action Taken: Partially implemented. HKMA lacks direct explicit power to reject/rescind auditor appointment but can achieve outcomes via supervisory powers and tripartite engagement; access to working papers possible through FRC.
- CP28 — Disclosure and transparency
  - Action Taken: Implemented. Basel III disclosure requirements and revised Pillar 3 implemented; additional HKMA published supervisory data (Mainland-related lending, LCR, NSFR, Leverage Ratio).

*Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY; selected chapters and Appendix I from Technical note prepared in the context of the FSAP mission to the HKSAR (September 10–24, 2019).*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY __________________________________________________________________________________ 6

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Overall assessment and strengths
- Banking supervision and regulation by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) remain strong.
- The assessment confirms the 2014 Basel Core Principles (BCP) assessment that the HKMA achieves a high level of compliance with the BCPs.
- The Basel III framework (and related guidance) and domestic and cross-border cooperation arrangements are firmly in place.
- The HKMA actively contributes to the development and implementation of relevant international standards.
- Updating the risk based supervisory approach helped the HKMA optimize supervisory resources.
- The HKMA’s highly experienced supervisory staff is a key driver to achieving one of the most sophisticated levels of supervision and regulation observed in Asia and beyond.

### Recent initiatives and evolving challenges
- Key priorities include supporting innovation (e.g., Smart Banking initiatives) and strengthening cyber resilience of banks.
- The supervisory environment has become more challenging with geopolitical headwinds.
- Recent increases to supervisory staff have been mostly devoted to newly identified areas of responsibility, resulting in challenges in managing supervisory resources with competing priorities.
- HKMA’s use of independent reviews by external auditors more than doubled from 2017 to 2018.
- Continued attention and review are needed regarding the adequacy of supervisory resources given operational needs and changing responsibilities.

### Institutional independence and governance concerns
- Staff reiterates the 2014 FSAP’s recommendation to provide de jure operational independence to HKMA.
- While the HKMA enjoys de facto operational autonomy, the Banking Ordinance (Cap. 155) (BO) gives the Chief Executive (CE) of the HKSAR a reserve power to give directions to the Monetary Authority (MA) and the MA shall comply with any direction given.
- Although such power has never been invoked and any exercise would be limited to furthering the objectives of the BO, its existence in principle may undermine the HKMA’s de jure operational independence.
- It would be desirable to remove or clarify the CE’s reserve power in the BO by specifying the circumstances under which the CE may give directions to MA.
- On-going diligence is needed to ensure that developmental/competitive considerations, particularly connected with new initiatives, are not in conflict with prudential mandates.
- The HKMA is recommended to review checks and balances on a regular basis to ensure that the objective of maintaining monetary and financial stability is not undermined by developmental initiatives.

### Supervision of governance and related party transactions
- The HKMA has strengthened its regulatory framework with emphasis on the roles and responsibilities of the Board and independent non-executive directors since the last FSAP.
- Effective implementation should be the focal point.
- The HKMA needs to:
  - Review cases where individuals hold a large number of director/management positions in financial and non-financial entities for potential conflicts of interest and time commitment.
  - Intensify supervision on related party transactions by strengthening analysis of motivations behind intragroup transactions and closely monitoring banks’ implementation of the new connected party definition.

### Cross-border, group-wide supervision, and concentrated exposures
- Continue to closely monitor concentrated exposures to non-bank Mainland Chinese entities, especially for banking groups that have both foreign banking branches (FBBs) and subsidiaries, with focus on potential regulatory arbitrage.
- In cases where banks take excessive risks, circumvent rigorous credit assessment, or bypass regulatory oversight, more transparent and direct discipline approaches may need to be considered.
- The group-wide supervisory approach needs updating to be more responsive to evolving risks.
- Supervisory focus should be placed on:
  - Risk concentration.
  - Group-wide corporate governance.
  - Intra-group transactions and exposures.
- Exempted exposures from the large exposure (LE) rules and banks’ non-self-use property investment should be closely monitored.
- Conduct limited scope onsite examinations of large FBBs that have not had an onsite presence for long intervals.

### Real estate lending and non-deposit taking finance companies (NDFCs)
- The HKMA has stepped up supervision of real estate lending:
  - Imposed risk-weight floors on residential mortgage loans (RMLs).
  - Raised risk weights for credit exposures to property developers offering high LTV mortgages.
  - Maintains sophisticated monitoring systems to oversee AIs’ exposure to real estate lending.
- NDFCs are regulated under the Money Lenders Ordinance and licensed by the Licensing Court, not by sectoral financial regulators.
- Although the NDFC industry remains small, these companies disburse residential mortgages and consumer loans for marginal borrowers.
- Regulatory parameters should be adjusted for more timely recognition of risk.
- The HKMA should continue to closely monitor whether macroprudential policies have spurred household exposures to NDFCs and property developers.

### Use of external auditors and cross-sector information sharing
- The framework for the use of external auditors should be strengthened to manage potential conflicts of interest and supervisory objectivity risks, given increased use of independent reviews.
- Information sharing mechanisms with other supervisors need enhancement given growing linkages among different types of financial institutions.
- Domestic sectoral regulators are encouraged to conduct joint examinations on cross-sectoral business to promote consistency.

### Main recommendations on banking regulation and supervision (summary)
- Supervisory Responsibilities, Objectives, and Powers
  - Establish a framework to review checks and balances on a regular basis to ensure that the objective of maintaining monetary and financial stability is not undermined by developmental initiatives. — HKMA — C
  - Reassess the need for amending regulatory parameters by including NDFCs to ensure more timely recognition of risk in the lending space and monitor potential spill-over effect of its macroprudential policy. — HKSAR authorities — MT
- Independence and Resourcing
  - Update the legislation to reflect the HKMA’s de facto operational independence in the law by removing the CE’s reserve power in the BO to direct the MA or by specifying the circumstances under which the CE may give directions to MA. — HKSAR authorities — MT
  - Continue to review the adequacy of supervisory resources and appropriately respond to changes in complexity, range of responsibilities, and desired supervisory activities.
    - Allocate more staff to large bank supervision and technology risk supervision. — HKMA — C
- Cooperation and Collaboration
  - Formalize the process of requesting relevant information from other domestic sectoral regulators before on-site examinations of non-banking activities of AIs. — HKSAR sectoral regulators — ST
  - Continue to proactively identify information of common interest and develop a more effective information sharing mechanism. — HKSAR sectoral regulators — ST
- Supervisory Approaches and Techniques
  - Strengthen communication with AIs by further articulating CAMEL supervisory ratings in notifications and/or clearly communicating qualitative assessment criteria. — HKMA — ST
  - Strengthen the supervisory framework on the use of external auditors to manage associated potential conflicts of interest and supervisory objectivity risks. — HKMA — ST
  - Conduct targeted and/or limited scope inspections on FBBs that have not had an onsite examination for long intervals, with special attention to systemically important FBBs. — HKMA — MT
  - Update group-wide supervisory approach to increase focus on risk concentration, group-wide corporate governance, intra-group transactions and exposures, and financial entities’ aggregate exposures to non-financial entities. — HKMA — ST
  - Review and examine cases where individuals hold a large number of directors/management positions in other financial and non-financial entities. — HKMA — ST
- Prudential Regulations and Requirements
  - Continue to closely monitor AIs’ concentrated exposures to non-bank Mainland Chinese entities, particularly of banking groups that have both FBBs and subsidiaries, focusing on potential opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. — HKMA — C
  - Minimize exemptions to LE limits as far as practicable in line with the Basel framework and closely monitor exposures exempted from the BELR. — HKMA — MT
  - Closely supervise changes of the AI’s non-self-use property. — HKMA — C
  - Consider improving the prudential reporting template on related party transactions for more effective monitoring (e.g., internal exposure limits, value of non-exposure transactions, types of exposures, RP’s relationship to bank, collateral type and amount, and asset classification, etc.). — HKMA — ST
  - Strengthen analysis on the nature of intragroup transactions. — HKMA — ST

*Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, Technical note prepared in the context of the FSAP mission to the HKSAR (September 10–24, 2019).*

### 4.   The HKSAR  has a large and advanced financial system dominated by banks. The

### 4.   The HKSAR  has a large and advanced financial system dominated by banks.

### Banking sector structure and size
- Number of institutions (as of March 2019): 189 institutions—155 licensed banks, 18 restricted licence banks, and 16 deposit-taking companies.
- Banking assets: equivalent to over 822 percent of GDP.
- Four largest banks account for almost half of the total consolidated assets of the banking system.
- Domestic lending to the corporate sector: around half of the banking system’s total lending.
- Property-related lending: about 30 percent of total lending.
- Three tiers of deposit-taking institutions (authorized institutions, AIs):
  - Licensed banks (LBs) can carry out the full range of banking business.
  - Restricted licence banks (RLBs) may take deposits of no less than HK$500,000 (or an equivalent amount in any other currency) without limit on term.
  - Deposit-taking companies (DTCs) may take deposits of no less than HK$100,000 (or an equivalent amount in any other currency) of a tenure of not less than three months.
- Retail deposits are dominated by the three largest banks (all local subsidiaries of overseas banking groups).
- Indigenous local banks (medium to small) play an important role in SME lending.
- Foreign bank branches (FBBs): some integral in private banking and derivatives; more than half of FBBs have relatively simple operations.

### Recent trends and concentration
- Asset growth over the past 5 years: rapid increases in asset size of 30 percent.
- Property development lending: increased 141 percent in 2014-2018.
- Mainland China related lending: increased 32 percent.
- Banks’ profitability: strong with double digit return on equity from high fee and commission income and stable net interest margin.
- Since 2014, banking assets in subsidiaries and branches of Mainland banking groups increased by 50 percent.
- Table snapshot (As of end-June 2019) — Authorized institutions supervised by the HKMA:
  - Licensed banks (LBs): 160 AIs, Market share (total assets) 99.2%, Total assets growth rate since 2014 31.2%
    - Local banks: 30 AIs, Market share 59.1%, Growth rate 39.7%
      - Subsidiaries of foreign banks and bank holding companies: 15 AIs, Market share 31.9%, Growth rate 43.8%
      - Subsidiaries of Mainland Chinese banking group: 7 AIs, Market share 20.3%, Growth rate 49.5%
      - Virtual banks*: 8 AIs, Market share n.a., Growth rate n.a.
    - Foreign bank branches (FBBs): 130 AIs, Market share 40.2%, Growth rate 20.5%
      - Branches of Mainland Chinese banking group/banks: 13 AIs, Market share 13.2%, Growth rate 47.8%
  - Restricted licence banks (RLBs): 18 AIs, Market share 0.7%, Growth rate 14.8%
  - Deposit taking companies (DTCs): 16 AIs, Market share 0.1%, Growth rate -53.8%
  - Total: 194 AIs, Market share 100%, Total assets growth rate since 2014 30.9%
  - Source: HKMA. (*All virtual banks have not commenced business.)

### Presence of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs)
- All 29 G-SIBs identified by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in November 2018 undertake banking activities in the HKSAR.
- Foreign branches account for about 40 percent of the banking system’s total assets.
- Business models among foreign branches: group liquidity hubs, investment banking activities, corporate lending, local interbank market participation.

### Capitalization, asset quality, funding, and liquidity
- Capital adequacy: around 20 percent; Tier 1 capital ratio around 18 percent.
- Solvency stress tests by the HKMA: banks’ capital adequacy resilient to domestic and external shocks, including sharp increases in interest rates.
- Profitability: supported by steady improvements in net interest income.
- Funding composition: customer deposits close to 57 percent of liabilities.
- Classified loan ratio: 0.56 percent (well below the long-run historical average of 2 percent since 2000).
- Loan to deposit ratio: increased from 51.5 percent as of end 2009 to 73.4 percent as of end March 2019.

### Exchange Fund and systemic backstops
- Exchange Fund assets: reached HK$4 trillion at end-2018.
- Exchange Fund composition:
  - Backing Portfolio: fully backed by high-quality, highly liquid US dollar-denominated assets to cover the Monetary Base.
  - Investment Portfolio: invested in bond and equity markets in both developed and emerging market economies with a view to preserving the Exchange Fund's value and long-term purchasing power.
  - Long-Term Growth Portfolio: invested in private equity and overseas real estate to help diversify risks and enhance medium-to-long term returns.
- Primary objective: maintain currency stability (through the Linked Exchange Rate System).
- Additional uses: maintain the stability and integrity of the HKSAR's monetary and financial systems, provide liquidity and capital to the banking system when there are issues with systemic stability, and provide a backstop for the Deposit Protection Scheme.

### Legal, institutional, and supervisory framework
- Legal system: common law jurisdiction; Basic Law provides constitutional framework and maintains pre-existing laws except where they contravene the Basic Law.
- HKMA principal supervisory function (under the BO): promote the general stability and effective working of the banking system.
- HKMA four main functions:
  - (i) maintaining currency stability within the Linked Exchange Rate System (Section 3(1) of the Exchange Fund Ordinance (Cap. 66) (EFO));
  - (ii) promoting the stability and integrity of the financial system including the banking system (BO Section 7(1), etc.);
  - (iii) managing the Exchange Fund (EFO Section 3(2));
  - (iv) helping to maintain Hong Kong’s status as an international financial center, including the maintenance and development of Hong Kong’s financial infrastructure (EFO Section 3(1A)).
- Institutional separation: operational demarcation within HKMA between regulatory/supervisory functions (Banking Supervision Department, Banking Policy Department, Banking Conduct Department, Enforcement and Anti-Money Laundering Department, Resolution Office) and market development functions (Market Development Division under the External Department).
- Developmental initiatives by HKMA: Infrastructure Financing Facilitation Office (IFFO) established in 2016; Fintech Facilitation Office established in 2016 driving seven Smart Banking Initiatives; Centre for Green Finance (CGF) under IFFO announced in May 2019.
- Ongoing diligence required to ensure developmental/competitive initiatives do not impair prudential mandate; where a conflict exists, the prudential objective should prevail.

### Supervision coverage and gaps
- Prudential supervision split among four principal financial regulators: the MA (HKMA), Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), Insurance Authority (IA), and Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority (MPFA).
- Non-deposit taking finance companies (NDFC):
  - Regulated under the Money Lenders Ordinance and licensed by the Licensing Court.
  - Hong Kong Police Force handles enforcement and investigations; Registrar of Money Lenders conducts site inspections and collects information.
  - If an NDFC is a subsidiary of a locally incorporated AI, the MA exercises consolidated supervision over the AI and the NDFC.
  - NDFCs are disbursing residential mortgages and consumer loans for marginal borrowers; size of NDFC industry remains small.
  - Authorities advised to consider imposing the same macroprudential limits on residential mortgages granted by NDFCs.

### Institutional independence and governance issues
- HKMA performs supervisory tasks in an operationally independent manner.
- De jure independence concerns:
  - Section 10 of the BO gives the Chief Executive (CE) a reserve power to “give such directions as he thinks fit” and indicates the MA “shall comply with any directions given.”
  - The power has never been invoked; any exercise would need to be in accordance with the objectives and functions of the BO and would be a tool of last resort in critical circumstances.
  - Existence of the reserve power may, in principle, undermine the HKMA’s de jure operational independence.
- Dismissal of the MA:
  - Recommendation from the 2014 BCP assessment to amend BO (Section 10) and to confirm reasons for which the MA could be dismissed and to publicly disclose reasons for dismissal has yet to be addressed.
  - The Financial Secretary (FS) has power to dismiss the MA but is required under common law to act reasonably; decisions subject to judicial review.
  - In practice, HKMA publicly announces changes and reasons for staff changes at Executive Director level or above; legally, the MA can be dismissed by the government without disclosing the reasons.

### Recommendations (selected)
- Establish an internal framework to review checks and balances on a regular basis to ensure that the objective of maintaining monetary and financial stability is not undermined by developmental initiatives.
- Ensure the HKMA’s mandate for prudential supervision is not compromised by its developmental mandates/competitive considerations through institutional safeguards, especially in planning resource allocation and in setting supervisory and regulatory priorities.
- Reassess the need for amending the regulatory parameter by including NDFCs, to ensure a more timely recognition of risk in the lending space and monitor a potential spill-over effect of its macroprudential policy.
- Where there is a conflict between the prudential supervisory objective and other objectives, the prudential objective should prevail; ensure the HKMA’s corporate-wide resource allocation will not be affected by any conflict.

*Source: 1hkgea2021006 - 4.   The HKSAR  has a large and advanced financial system dominated by banks.*

### 22.   While there is no legally specified minimum of the MA’s office term after

### 22.   While there is no legally specified minimum of the MA’s office term after

### Governance of the MA
- Recent practice aligns with accepted standards:
  - The previous MA served his position for ten years.
  - The current MA has been appointed for a term of five years; this was determined after consultation with the Exchange Fund Advisory Committee’s Governance Sub-Committee.
- Recommendations concerning legal framework:
  - Consideration should be given to update the legislation to reflect the HKMA’s de facto operational independence in the law, so that the HKMA has de jure discretion to take any supervisory and regulatory actions as needed.
    - Eliminate the provisions allowing the CE to direct the MA or to specify the circumstances under which the CE may give directions to MA (e.g., such power may be used in the most extreme circumstances and any override should be made public).
  - Legislative amendment is recommended to require the disclosure of the reasons of dismissal for MA for more transparency.

### Resourcing of the HKMA — structure and staffing
- BSD organizational structure and responsibilities:
  - BSD consists of Case Management Teams, Risk Specialist Teams and Banking System Surveillance Teams.
  - Case Management Teams: day-to-day supervision of AIs, conducting annual CAMEL and supervisory review process (SRP) assessments, promoting home-host supervision, formulating supervisory plans, assessing overall risk governance, maintaining dialogue with the Board and senior management.
  - Risk Specialist Teams: supervision of specific banking risks (credit, market, liquidity, operational and technology risks), conduct off-site and on-site inspections.
  - Banking System Surveillance Teams: monitor market development and trends, identify emerging risks and irregularities of individual AIs.
- Staffing and resource allocation (as at June 2019 and related points):
  - Number of full-time equivalents for banking supervision: 187
    - Case management supervision: 76
    - Risk supervision: 111
  - About half of the 187 staff members of the BSD are allocated to case management and the rest to credit, market, liquidity, operational and technology risk specialists and banking system surveillance.
  - Turnover rate for banking departments over the past five years: 4.5%.
  - The HKMA introduced portfolio-based supervision (PBS) for AIs with smaller and less complex operations.
  - BSD headcount developments:
    - Headcount increased from 156 in 2016 to 176 in 2019 (13 percent) to facilitate supervision of operational and technology risks and supervision of virtual banks.
    - HKMA staff increase devoted to new responsibilities; banking assets have increased by 31 percent over the last five years.
  - Case management resourcing pressure:
    - Dedicated case management manpower: 76 staff to conduct institution specific supervision of 194 banks.
    - Case Management Division 1 (in charge of 17 local banks supervision including three D-SIBs): 18 people in total (headcount decreased from 26 in 2016 to 18 in 2019).
    - Nine supervisors in the portfolio management team are tasked with handling 85 banks’ CAMEL ratings and day-to-day supervision.
- Table 3 key statistics (As at June 2019):
  - Number of full-time equivalents for banking supervision: 187
  - Case management supervision: 76
  - Risk supervision: 111
  - Number of G-SIBs headquartered in the HKSAR: 0
  - Number of AIs designated as D-SIBs: 6
  - Number of AIs supervised: 194
  - Market share of D-SIBs (% of banking assets): 45%
  - Banking assets as % of GDP: 835%
- Use of external auditors:
  - The number of independent reviews by external auditors more than doubled from 2017 to 2018.

### Recommendations on resourcing
- The HKMA is recommended to continue to review its supervisory resources and appropriately respond to changes in complexity, range of responsibilities, desired supervisory intensity, and importance of the banking sector in the HKSAR.
  - More staff may need to be allocated to large bank supervisory functions and increased supervisory activities related to technology risk.

### Cooperation and collaboration — international and domestic
- Home-host and international cooperation:
  - HKMA strengthened coordination with home supervisors of international banks (e.g., Prudential Regulation Authority) and regulators in Mainland China (e.g., China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission).
  - HKMA participated in or led 32 supervisory colleges in 2018 and cooperated with home supervisors for on-site examinations; HKMA may participate in examinations and exchange examination reports.
  - Example: In 2016, as an intermediate home supervisor, HKMA organized a joint examination with host supervisor in Mainland China and the European home supervisor on Mainland Chinese operations of a G-SIB.
- Domestic cooperation and MOUs:
  - HKMA has MOUs with other domestic sectoral financial regulators to set out frameworks for supervisory cooperation and information sharing (e.g., Section 120 of the BO).
  - HKMA holds regular MOU meetings with the SFC, IA, and MPFA.
  - MOU between HKMA and IA specifies coordination for supervision of financial groups with both banking and insurance entities:
    - HKMA coordinator when an AI has an authorized insurer as its subsidiary.
    - IA coordinator if the holding company of an AI is an authorized insurer.
  - As at end-June 2019:
    - 115 AIs were registered institutions for securities businesses.
    - 42 AIs were licensed as insurance intermediaries.
  - HKMA and SFC entered into a new Side Letter in July 2019 to further enhance collaboration and information sharing arrangements.
- Information sharing and supervisory consistency:
  - HKMA and SFC meet regularly to share information and discuss enforcement-related matters; joint thematic examinations have been conducted on the sale of investment products of AIs.
  - In supervising AIs’ insurance intermediary activities, HKMA carried out supervisory activities and consulted IA on survey templates; IA took up direct supervision of insurance intermediaries as of September 23, 2019.
  - Current timing of information exchange is conducted on a need basis and may need to be stepped up for day-to-day supervision; HKMA indicated discussions with IA to prepare a list of information to be shared.

### Recommendations on cooperation and information sharing
- Domestic sectoral regulators are encouraged to actively conduct joint examinations on cross-sectoral business to promote consistency in supervisory activities.
- Formalize the process of requesting relevant information from other domestic sectoral regulators before on-site examination of non-banking activities of AIs.
- Continue to proactively identify information that may be of common interest and refine the information sharing mechanism as necessary to reflect industry development.
  - The types and frequency of information to be shared should be reviewed and updated on a regular basis (e.g., yearly) to reflect industry development.

### Banking supervision approach and activities
- Organizational responsibilities:
  - BSD, BCD and BPD are primary units for policy formulation and supervision of AIs for prudential and conduct risk.
  - BSD has six divisions: three case management divisions (vertical supervision) and three specialized risk divisions (horizontal supervision and on-site inspections).
  - Risk teams provide input for CAMEL, SRP assessments, discuss risk governance issues, and share on-site examination reports and observations from off-site work.
  - BCD supervises AIs’ conduct on the sale of investment, insurance and MPF products.
  - BPD formulates regulatory policies for the banking sector.
- Enforcement and AML functions:
  - Enforcement and AML Department consists of two Enforcement Divisions and the AML & Financial Crime Risk Division.
  - AML Division moved under an Executive Director in 2015 with dedicated responsibility for overseeing HKMA’s AML/CFT and enforcement work.
  - HKMA takes a risk-based approach to AML/CFT supervision and from 2015 expanded resources for developing an AML/CFT risk assessment model and a thematic review of AIs’ sanctions regimes.
- Risk-based supervision process:
  - HKMA adopts a risk-based supervisory approach; supervisory intensity correlates with identified systematic risks and supervisory concerns.
  - Specialized risk teams conduct annual risk profiling on AIs to prioritize supervisory work; AIs are assigned High/Medium/Low Supervisory priority ratings.
  - Banks in the high risk category will be examined at least annually; medium or low risk banks will be subject to less frequent on-site inspections.
  - On-site examination activity: in 2017 and 2018, the HKMA performed 401 and 392 on-site examinations and thematic reviews respectively.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2021/english/1hkgea2021006.pdf*

### 40.   The HKMA  has further refined its approach to risk-based supervision with resources

### 40.   The HKMA  has further refined its approach to risk-based supervision with resources allocated according to the risk profile of AIs since the 2014 FSAP.

### Risk-based supervision framework
- A new framework determines the type of supervisory approach for each AI based on quantitative and qualitative factors such as the size and complexity of the AI’s operations in Hong Kong, presence of significant supervisory concerns, etc.
- Two supervisory approaches: institution-based supervision and portfolio-based supervision.
- Traditional institution-based supervision is applicable to locally incorporated banks and major foreign branches given their systemic importance in the banking sector.

### Portfolio-based supervision (PBS)
- PBS applies to AIs with relatively insignificant operations and assessed to be low risk; more data-driven and standardization of processes are applied.
- For AIs under PBS:
  - Greater reliance on off-site supervision.
  - BSD supervisors monitor financial conditions monthly by reviewing MIS reports specifically designed for the BSD’s portfolio supervision team.
  - There are no regular meetings with the Board; prudential meetings are held as needed.
  - HKMA relies on internal and external auditors to complement supervision.
  - AIs under PBS provide an annual update to the HKMA on their business plans and critical supervisory information, which is taken into account in annual CAMEL assessments.
- Determination of proportional segments to apply PBS is a key challenge; appropriateness of supervisory basis is reviewed at least annually.
- If significant concerns are identified during off-site supervision, the AI will be moved to institution-based supervision.
- Example noted: 2018 CAMEL assessment identified a few AIs under PBS rated "3” but not all were subsequently transferred to institution-based supervision.

### CAMEL and SRP processes, notification, and communication
- HKMA streamlined the SRP and CAMEL assessment processes in 2016 to enhance efficiency by eliminating redundancies.
- Every year, the HKMA conducts CAMEL reviews of all AIs and SRP reviews of all locally incorporated AIs.
- Supervisors maintain a risk-focused approach; results are reviewed by CAMEL/SRP approval committees independently.
  - The approval committee has a quorum of three members: Executive Director of the BSD (chair) and two approving members (Division Heads of the BSD) not involved in proposing the ratings.
- Composite CAMEL rating and minimum capital requirement from CAMEL and SRP reviews are communicated to individual AIs in writing.
- Notification process limitations:
  - Final composite rating and areas of weaknesses are notified annually, but there is no discussion or evaluation of each component rating (capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earning, liquidity).
  - CAMEL indicators and qualitative assessment criteria have not been made open to the industry; AIs often do not know how a rating was decided or what qualitative criteria were used.
  - HKMA revised notification template to require an AI to inform its Board or head office of its supervisory rating and SRP result.
  - SRP supervisory policy manual (CA-G-5) is currently being revised to reflect the latest Basel standards.
- Recommendation:
  - Strengthen communication with AIs by further articulating CAMEL supervisory ratings in notifications and/or clearly communicating qualitative assessment criteria for each component.

### On-site examination process
- Specialized risk teams propose on-site examinations based on factors including:
  - prevailing and emerging industry risk factors;
  - latest risk profiling assessments;
  - common/significant weaknesses identified in previous examinations;
  - comments from case management teams.
- On-site teams follow terms of reference approved by Division Heads specifying objectives, scope, key areas, and sampling methodologies.
- Mandated activities of on-site examinations: pre-field-work assessment, field work, internal communication, preparation of draft report, issue of final examination report.
- Final examination report includes findings, recommendations for remedial measures, and the AI’s management responses; normally issued within three months after conclusion of the on-site visit.
- If a finding is classified high severity, HKMA will require the AI to report it to the Board of Directors or the regional head office if the AI is incorporated outside Hong Kong.

### Use of external auditors
- External auditors are an important element of HKMA supervisory process; legal framework for major duties is set out in section 63(3), 63(3A) and 59(2) of the BO.
- An AI may be required to appoint external auditors to commission independent reviews; major control areas that may be covered include:
  - Corporate governance;
  - risk management system;
  - controls relating to specific operational areas (e.g., lending or trading activities);
  - loan classification system;
  - information technology;
  - business continuity planning;
  - prevention of money laundering;
  - internal audit function.
- Benefits of relying on external auditors: extends HKMA’s reach and resources, particularly to small banks; auditor findings inform HKMA discussions and are taken into account in annual CAMEL assessments; tripartite meetings may be held.
- The number of independent reviews by auditors more than doubled from 2017 to 2018.
- Auditors for independent reviews under section 59(2) of the BO are appointed by AIs and approved by the HKMA; SPM IC-3 emphasizes potential conflict of interest is taken into account in auditor selection for regulatory reporting purposes.
- All supervisory audit costs are borne by the AIs.
- Independence and conflicts of interest:
  - Particular attention should be given to interdependency between audit firms and supervised banks where a single firm provides multiple services.
  - HKMA has the power to require an AI to use another firm of auditors for independent reviews under Section 59(2) and SPM IC-3; several cases noted where HKMA made this request.
  - Previous BCP assessment recommended HKMA be granted direct power to reject and rescind appointment of an external auditor deemed to have inadequate independence; this recommendation has yet to be addressed.
  - HKMA may request the AI to consider appropriateness of retaining the external auditor or invoke general supervisory power to reject or rescind the appointment; assessor noted several cases where HKMA made this request effectively.
- Recommendation:
  - FSAP supports HKMA’s review and update of current SPM IC-3 issued in 2003 (e.g., reiterate importance of considering potential conflict of interest in auditor selection for independent reviews, explicitly require independent review report to be submitted simultaneously to HKMA and to the AI/Board where necessary).

### Supervision of Foreign Bank Branches (FBBs)
- HKMA is effective in supervising significant presence of foreign banks and cross-border branch issues; cooperation and information sharing with foreign authorities is key.
- Foreign bank branches are not required to hold capital or observe capital adequacy requirements such as leverage ratios in the HKSAR; responsibility for supervising overall capital adequacy rests with home supervisors.
- FBBs are not subject to statutory limits on exposures and concentration of risks covering: LEs, connected lending, holding of shares, interest in land, etc.
- A “Certificate of Compliance” requires an AI to certify compliance with various statutory limits under the BO.
- Regulatory monitoring and reporting framework for FBBs is similar to local AIs and commensurate with their activities; information collected includes Mainland activities, RMB business activities, liquidity monitoring, foreign currency position, loans and advances and provisions, residential mortgage survey, etc.
- Liquidity stress testing framework includes large foreign bank branches.
- HKMA is updating internal guidance on FBB supervision to reflect latest supervisory approaches.
- Around one third of AIs in the HKSAR have not been inspected by the HKMA over the last five years; AIs with no onsite presence are mostly FBBs supervised on a portfolio basis.
- Some large FBBs have not been subject to HKMA examinations in the past five years; for such AIs HKMA engaged independent external parties to conduct reviews under section 59(2) of the BO or otherwise.
- Although offsite information did not indicate material weaknesses, direct verification through on-site examinations remains necessary, especially for large FBBs.
- Recommendation:
  - Conduct targeted and/or limited scope inspections on FBBs that have not had an onsite inspection for long intervals; give special attention to systemically important/large FBBs.

### Financial group supervision and group-wide approach
- Since 2014 FSAP, HKMA has a strong legal and regulatory framework for consolidated supervision; analyzes AIs on a solo and consolidated basis, emphasizing corporate governance and robust risk management.
- Common group structures:
  - Type One: group comprised of an AI and its subsidiaries.
  - Type Two: AI and subsidiaries part of an international banking group or other supervised financial group headed by an overseas bank or regulated holding company.
  - Type Three: AI and subsidiaries headed by an unregulated holding company controlling entities involved in wider financial and commercial activities (diversified financial group).
- Sectoral regulatory regime uses coordinated approach for group-level supervision:
  - There are 25 cross-sectoral financial groups including banking sector entities and securities/futures sector entities.
  - There are six cross-sectoral financial groups that include insurance sector entities and securities/futures sector entities.
  - “Lead coordinator” arrangements facilitate effective exercise of functions (e.g., HKMA acts as coordinator where an AI has a subsidiary that is an authorized insurer; IA acts as coordinator where an AI has a holding company that is an authorized insurer).
- HKMA formalized analysis of non-financial activities of ultimate holding companies (UHCs) since last FSAP:
  - Internal guidance note “Imposing Conditions on Holding Companies of Locally Incorporated Licensed Banks for the Purpose of Consolidated Supervision” issued in 2016; used to assess group risks and supplement consolidated supervision with controller group review where necessary.
  - Internal guidance note is not legally binding nor publicly available.
- Ownership and IHC expectations:
  - General policy: a person holding more than 50 percent of the share capital of a locally incorporated AI should be a bank or financial institution in good standing.
  - If not owned by a bank or financial institution, HKMA expects AI to be held through an immediate holding company (IHC) in the HKSAR whose sole purpose is to hold the shares in the bank, with supervisory conditions imposed under section 70 of the BO.
  - Pillar 2 capital add-on imposed on the IHC appears to be consistently set at the same level as the corresponding AI, without a separate SRP decision.
- Two cases exist where a local mid-sized AI and sister companies are headed by UHCs that are not supervised by HKMA or any other regulators; such UHCs are required to submit annual assessment reports by an audit firm on:
  - the financial condition of the UHC group;
  - the ability of the UHC group to provide timely capital and/or liquidity support to the IHC and the AI if needed.
- Recommendations:
  - FSAP supports HKMA’s review and update of SPM CS-1 issued in 2008 to remain responsive to evolving forms and sources of risk for banking groups.
    - Consider incorporating standard conditions of the internal guideline to be observed by IHCs and UHCs into the SPM to add enforceability and clarity.
    - Increase focus on risk concentration, group-wide corporate governance, intra-group transactions and exposures, and financial entities’ aggregate exposures to non-financial entities.

*1hkgea2021006 - 40.   The HKMA  has further refined its approach to risk-based supervision with resources allocated according to the risk profile of AIs since the 2014 FSAP.*

### 61.   The HKMA  continues to strengthen its supervisory framework  on corporate

### The HKMA continues to strengthen its supervisory framework on corporate governance

### Corporate governance supervisory guidance (October 2017)
- Major revisions to supervisory guidance (SPM module CG-1 “Corporate Governance of Locally Incorporated Authorized Institutions”) were made to:
  - Clearly outline the responsibilities of the board and senior management;
  - Strengthen the composition of board members and role of INEDs to ensure effective board function (i.e.: chair of the board and its committees should be INEDs, require a minimum number of INEDs as board members);
  - Establish specific board-level committees (i.e. nomination committee, audit committee, risk committee, remuneration committee) to assist the board in discharging its responsibilities.

### INED Development Program (established 2016)
- Program components:
  - (i) an experience and insight sharing conference between INEDs and the HKMA to be held annually;
  - (ii) thematic seminars relevant to the work of INEDs;
  - (iii) on-boarding sessions to help newly appointed INEDs familiarize themselves with the evolving landscape of the banking industry and of the regulatory environment.

### Governance challenges and recommendations
- Observations:
  - In the HKSAR, there are no restrictions for individuals to hold multiple positions in different entities within the financial group; it is not uncommon for a director of a foreign subsidiary to hold one or more positions in other group entities.
  - Examples were noted where individuals (a Board member, Chief Executive or Alternate Chief Executive) in a local AI held multiple director/management positions in other non-financial entities within a wider group, which may compromise independent judgment and create conflicts of interest.
  - Independence is viewed as crucial for the board to carry out its fiduciary duty and function in the best interests of the entity and its stakeholders.
  - While the SPM requires sufficient time commitment for directors (including NEDs and INEDs), in practice many directors in AIs hold a large number of director/management positions. Example: one NED in an AI can have 40-50 different directorships in other financial/non-financial companies.
- Recommendation:
  - Review and examine the cases where individuals hold a large number of directors/management positions in financial and non-financial entities with focus on potential conflicts of interest and time commitment on the roles.

### Conduct risk supervision (BCD approach)
- Supervisory approach:
  - BCD takes a proportionate approach when assessing the conduct risk of AIs based on size and complexity; frequency, intensity, and depth of on-site examinations and off-site reviews are determined by the potential risk that the AI poses.
  - The HKMA’s conduct risk supervision relies on analysis of supervisory returns, surveys, banking complaints, and thematic onsite examinations.
  - BCD supervises AIs’ conduct on the sale of investment, insurance, and MPF products; examination findings on conduct related issues are integrated in the annual CAMEL rating.

### Banking complaints and enforcement
- Key statistics and trends:
  - The HKMA received 1,948 complaints against AIs and their staff members in 2018, a 9% increase from the previous year;
  - 21% of complaints related to the provision of banking services;
  - Complaints concerning the provision of banking services increased by 39% over the year to 417 cases in 2018.
  - Other complaint categories: freezing and closing accounts arising from risk assessment, service quality, client agreement terms, fees and charges, mis-selling of investment/insurance products, remittance.
- Handling:
  - The HKMA’s Enforcement & AML Department receives complaints directly from the public and handles every complaint in accordance with established procedures.

### Bank Culture Reform (initiated by HKMA)
- Objectives and focus:
  - Promote adoption of a holistic and effective framework and foster sound culture within AIs; strengthen banks’ risk culture as a proactive deterrent to misconduct.
  - Three pillars emphasized: governance, incentive systems, and assessment and feedback mechanisms.
- Supervisory measures implemented in 2018-19:
  - (i) requiring AIs to conduct self-assessments;
  - (ii) conducting focused reviews of key areas of bank culture (e.g., incentive system of front offices in retail banks);
  - (iii) undertaking cultural dialogues with senior management and/or board members of AIs focused on supervisory observations on culture and conduct issues.
- Implementation status:
  - The HKMA is reviewing the self-assessment reports covering the 30 banks which were due in July 2019, with a view to drawing insights for industry reference and assessing the culture of individual banks.
- Recommendation:
  - Under increasing competition and a weakening economy, continue to analyze and focus on the root causes of identified misconduct and consider enforceable actions as necessary.

### Prudential regulations and requirements — Capital
- Capital ratio trends (consolidated basis):
  - Breakdown of Industry's (All local AIs) Capital Ratio (In ppt)
    - Q1 2014 CET1 13.1 AT1 0.1 T2 2.8 Overall 15.9
    - Q1 2019 CET1 16.1 AT1 1.9 T2 2.4 Overall 20.4
  - Breakdown of D-SIBs' Capital Ratio (In ppt)
    - Q1 2014 CET1 12.6 AT1 0.1 T2 2.6 Overall 15.3
    - Q1 2019 CET1 15.9 AT1 1.9 T2 2.3 Overall 20.2
  - Note: The capital ratios of D-SIBs as of Q1 2014 are computed based on the capital positions of AIs which were then designated by the HKMA as D-SIBs in 2015 when the D-SIB framework was implemented in Hong Kong.
- Framework and implementation:
  - The capital framework in the HKSAR is in line with the Basel III requirements and takes a proportionate approach; the RCAP of the BCBS on Hong Kong’s capital framework conducted in 2014/15 concluded compliance with the Basel framework.
  - Implemented items include leverage ratio, capital buffers, higher loss absorbency capital requirements for D-SIBs, revised securitization framework, and TLAC holdings standard.
  - Very small AIs (i.e.: total asset size of not more than HK$10 billion) may use a simpler basic approach (modified Basel I) for credit risk of non-securitization exposures.
- Internal targets and Pillar 2:
  - Since 2016, the HKMA introduced internal capital targets (ICTs) for each of the CET1, Tier 1 and Total capital ratios; ICTs replace non-statutory trigger ratios.
  - HKMA requires all locally incorporated AIs to set up internal leverage ratio targets at levels above the statutory minimum.
  - Pillar 2 capital requirements are imposed on all locally incorporated AIs; supervisory policy manual updated in 2016 to clarify Pillar 2 operation, allocation among CET1/Tier1/Total capital ratios, differentiation between P2A and P2B, and consideration of BCR buffer overlap.

### Capital framework updates in progress
- HKMA is amending the BCR to incorporate the Basel revised capital standards on the treatment of counterparty credit risk exposures and equity investments in funds; these standards were originally scheduled for implementation on 1 January 2017 but were tentatively deferred to sometime around end-2020.
- Implemented updates include the revised securitization framework, capital treatment of expected loss provisions and the TLAC holdings standard.

### Credit risk supervision
- RCAP findings:
  - The capital framework for credit risk was compliant with the Basel standards based on 2014/15 RCAP; some minor deviations found in treatment of commercial real estate exposures under the standardized approach, but current practice is similar to the revised Basel Capital Framework.
  - HKMA intends to amend/rectify these areas in accordance with the BCBS implementation timetable.
- IRB measures and macroprudential steps:
  - HKMA imposed risk-weight floors on residential mortgage loans (RML) for IRB banks as part of counter-cyclical macro-prudential measures:
    - All new RMLs approved by IRB banks after 19 May 2017 25%
    - All existing RMLs approved by IRB banks on or before 19 May 2017 15%
  - Tightening of LTV ratio and DSR requirements accompanied the risk-weight floors.
- Supervisory resources and monitoring:
  - HKMA employs skilled credit risk professionals for on-site examinations; BSD credit risk division performs on-site examinations and supports monitoring of high risk profiled AIs.
  - HKMA has sophisticated monitoring systems for property market and Mainland-related lending; a database on large corporate exposures and risk assessments has been developed.
  - Classified loan ratio of Mainland-related lending has remained below 1% in the past five years under HKMA supervision.
- Off-site surveillance for residential real estate exposures includes:
  - analyzing monthly survey on residential mortgage lending and other periodic surveys and quarterly returns on loans and advances and provisions;
  - monitoring data from independent sources (e.g. the Land Registry, the ‘Sales of First-hand Residential Properties Electronic Platform,’ and property agents) to assess mortgage financing by non-bank entities and associated risks;
  - keeping close dialogue with AIs active in mortgage lending and monitoring daily news on the property and mortgage markets.
- Supervisory actions on lending to property developers:
  - In late 2016 and early 2017, in response to aggressive land acquisition and high LTV mortgages by developers, HKMA lowered financing caps for construction loans in 2017:
    - from 50% to 40% of the site value;
    - from 100% to 80% of the construction cost;
    - overall cap from 60% to 50% of the expected value of completed projects.
  - The risk weight for capital charges was raised in 2017 for exposures to property developers offering high LTV mortgages.
  - The HKMA conducted thematic examinations from Q3 2017 to Q4 2018 to ensure prudent underwriting standards in lending to property developers.
- Mainland-related lending (MRL) monitoring:
  - HKMA introduced the Return of Mainland Activities and three surveys on MRL since 2014 to collect granular data (MRL by borrower type, by risk mitigation type, and loan quality).
  - Selected AIs were required to provide lists of exposures to mega corporates including Mainland state-owned entities, Mainland private entities and non-Mainland entities to enhance analysis and risk identification.
- Exposure composition (Mainland-related lending):
  - 41% of total outstanding Mainland related lending was lent to Mainland state-owned enterprises (mostly central state-owned enterprises),
  - 31% to local and foreign companies investing in the Mainland,
  - 28% to Mainland private entities.
- Supervisory expectations and actions:
  - AIs are expected to set internal limits for concentration (specific counterparties, groups of counterparties, economic sectors, geographical areas); HKMA determines adequacy of limits.
  - No explicit supervisory limit has been imposed on sectoral or geographical concentration of exposures; FBBs have generally not been required to set regulatory prudential limits on LEs or concentrated exposures.
  - Supervisory focus should be on potential for regulatory arbitrage in banking groups with both subsidiaries and FBBs in the HKSAR.
- Pre-emptive supervisory actions and enforcement:
  - HKMA and SFC joint on-site inspection found high risk equity financing disguised through multi-layer transactions and opaque structures; a joint circular asked relevant financial institutions to review complex financing arrangements and warned about the malpractice.
  - HKMA commonly requires independent reviews by external auditors to identify root causes of severe deficiencies and accountable staff; results are followed up and AIs may be required to suspend particular business until rectification measures are implemented.
- Recommendations:
  - Continue to closely monitor AIs’ concentrated exposures to non-bank Mainland entities, particularly of banking groups that have both FBBs and subsidiaries with focus on potential opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.
  - Continue to demonstrate willingness to act upon AIs that attempt to circumvent rigorous credit risk assessments or bypass regulatory oversight.

*Excerpt from IMF country report chapter on Hong Kong SAR supervisory and prudential practices*

### 80.   The new Banking (Exposure Limits) Rules (BELR) that came into operation in July 2019

### 80.   The new Banking (Exposure Limits) Rules (BELR) that came into operation in July 2019

### Overview of BELR implementation and scope
- BELR came into operation on July 1, 2019 and the HKMA has allowed an additional six-month grace period for banks to comply with them.
- The rules implement the standards on LE issued by the BCBS in April 2014; BCBS timetable envisaged full implementation by January 1, 2019.
- Under the BELR, every AI (except for FBBs) is subject to a statutory limit of 25 percent of its Tier 1 capital on its financial exposure to any one person or group of related persons.
- Banks are expected to identify possible connected counterparties by economic dependence when the sum of all exposures to one individual counterparty exceeds 5 percent of Tier 1 capital.
- Exemptions are allowed for sovereign, central bank, and interbank intraday exposures.
- A tighter limit of 15 percent is applicable for exposures between banks that have been designated as G-SIBs.
- Local implementation adopts more conservative approaches than the Basel framework in some areas (e.g., rules apply to all locally-incorporated AIs and do not provide for an explicit window on ungrouping).

### Sovereign concentration risk capital treatment
- AIs are subject to new capital charges on significant sovereign concentration risk.
- Capital charges follow a marginal risk weight add-on approach.
- Any exposure to sovereigns up to 100% of Tier 1 capital is free of additional charge.
- Exposures exceeding 100% of Tier 1 capital are subject to increasing risk weights that serve to calculate the risk-weighted assets subject to capital requirements.

### Exemptions under BELR (examples and limits)
- BELR provide more exemptions than detailed in Basel LE standards.
- Examples of exemptions:
  - Receiving banks of an Initial Public Offering (IPO) to other banks for placing IPO subscription monies received to the interbank market are exempted (rule 48(1)(l)).
  - Exposures acquired by an AI in the course of satisfaction of debts due to an AI are exempted and have to be disposed when the earliest opportunity arises but no later than 18 months (rule 48(1)(e)).
  - Exposures in relation to specific projects backed by the HKSAR Government (rules 48(1)(h), (i) and (j)) are exempted; exemptions granted on a case-by-case basis.
  - Exposures covered by a letter of comfort are exempted (rule 57(1)(d)). HKMA determined to cease acceptance of existing letters of comfort provided to foreign bank subsidiaries from July 1, 2020 (a one-year grace period).
- HKMA rationale: local exemptions take into account specific characteristics of the Hong Kong market and are designed to minimize the risk of potential side effects on financial stability.

### Property and equity investment limits and observations
- Rule 11 of the BELR: an AI incorporated in Hong Kong must maintain an equity exposure ratio not exceeding 25%.
- Part 6 of the BELR: an AI incorporated in Hong Kong must maintain the value of holding of interests in land at a ratio not exceeding 50% compared to the amount of its Tier 1 capital; for interests in non-self-use land, the ratio must not exceed 25%.
- AIs are expected to set internal limits for monitoring other kinds of concentration such as economic sectors and geographical areas under SPM module CR-G-8.
- HKMA observed AIs on average have interests in non-self-use-land and building of around 3-4 percent of Tier 1 capital.
- HKMA stress-test indicated AIs’ interest in land will not jeopardize AIs even in times of severe stress in real estate markets, but the absolute regulatory limit appears high and further increases should be prevented by close supervision.

### Recommendations related to BELR and concentration
- Minimize exemptions to LE limits as far as possible in line with Basel LE framework and closely monitor the exposures that are exempted from the BELR rules.
  - Conduct close monitoring on AIs’ implementation of new rules focusing on their system change (e.g., application of economic interdependence).
- Closely supervise changes of the AI’s non-self-use property.

### Related Party Transactions (RPT) and connected parties
- SPM module on “Exposures to connected parties” revised in November 2015 requiring AIs to adopt an expanded scope of connected parties.
- Connected parties in the SPM module include, in addition to those specified in Rule 85(1) of the BELR:
  - the senior management and key staff of an AI;
  - an AI’s subsidiaries, fellow subsidiaries and other entities over which the AI is able to exert control;
  - the controllers, directors or senior management and key staff of the entities specified above;
  - the relatives of those persons referred to above, etc.
- The exposure limit on single connected natural persons was loosened from HK$1 million to HK$10 million based on quantitative impact study results.
- Revised provisions for connected parties’ exposure limits have been in effect since July 2019 subject to a six-month grace period.
- HKMA requires AIs to set internal limits on aggregate intragroup exposures expressed as a ratio of aggregate intragroup exposures to Tier 1 capital; there are no quantitative regulatory limits to intragroup exposures.
- Reporting of intragroup transactions to the HKMA exists, but analysis of the transactions may have been insufficient; the new banking return capturing exposures to intragroup companies will be effective from September 2019.

### RPT supervision gaps and recommendations
- Current information collected for monitoring connected party transactions may not be sufficiently granular for in-depth assessment.
  - Suggested additional data fields: type of exposures, internal exposure limits, value of non-exposure transactions, RP’s relationship to bank, collateral type and amount, asset classification.
- Recommendations:
  - Intensify supervision on RPT to check whether AIs’ identification of connected party, Board of Directors reporting requirements, internal limits are being properly set and observed considering the changes of rules.
    - Strengthen analysis of the nature of intragroup transactions and take appropriate actions where necessary.
  - Consider the need to improve the prudential reporting template on RPT for more effective monitoring.

### Other prudential requirements: liquidity, IRRBB, operational risk, disclosure
- Basel III LCR and NSFR implemented according to Basel timeline since January 2015 and January 2018 respectively.
  - AIs that are internationally active or significant to the stability of the banking sector are required to comply with relevant LCR and NSFR requirements.
  - Other AIs required to comply with Liquidity Maintenance Ratio (LMR); those with considerable business size required to comply with Core Funding Ratio (simplified NSFR).
  - Average LCR of major banks is 162.4%, above statutory minimum of 100%.
  - Average LMR of other banks is 54.7%, above statutory minimum requirement of 25%.
- Banking (Liquidity) (Amendment) Rules 2019 (BLAR) expanded the scope of level 2B assets and liquefiable assets under the LCR and LMR respectively; amendment to include Basel-compliant equity shares and triple-B rated debt securities as level 2B assets will come into effect in January 2020.
- Liquidity stress testing:
  - HKMA’s supervisory liquidity stress test assumes funding of banks would contract by an average of about 20% within one month.
  - If an AI has liabilities denominated in a foreign currency that account for 5% or more of its total liabilities, the AI is required to include that currency into its liquidity stress test program and conduct separate stress tests for that currency.
  - Thematic reviews conducted in 2018 on preparedness for possible tightening of US dollar liquidity.
- Interest rate risk in the banking book (IRRBB):
  - Effective from July 2019, IRRBB framework adopting the 2016 BCBS standards implemented; standardized approach required (no internal model allowed).
  - Most FBBs continue to be subject to previous interest rate risk framework.
  - Local adaptations include:
    - All locally incorporated AIs and their affiliated overseas incorporated AIs operating in the HKSAR required to implement the local standardized IRRBB framework (overseas incorporated AIs covered in the local IRRBB framework are exempted from the outlier tests as they are not subject to local capital requirements).
    - Most overseas incorporated AIs remain subject to the 2004 BCBS standards locally and expected to follow home jurisdiction IRRBB standards.
    - Interest rates are floored at –2 percent for all shock scenarios in the local IRRBB framework.
    - AIs must report all major currencies until at least 90% of relevant interest rate sensitive items are covered.
    - AIs are required to distinguish between CNY and CNH under the local IRRBB framework.
- Operational risk and cyber security:
  - Operational risks, including cyber security issues, are a key focus for the HKMA.
  - In the past three years, the HKMA conducted 23 on-site examinations in relation to technology risk.
  - There are around 22 persons in the HKMA technology risk team (compared with eight in 2013).
  - HKMA has conducted on-site inspections in technology risk management, business continuity management, outsourcing and general operational risk management; attention to third-party cloud outsourcing and outsourcing to overseas jurisdictions.
- Disclosure requirements:
  - Disclosure requirements related to Basel III standards (LCR, leverage ratio, CCyB and NSFR) and revised Pillar 3 disclosure requirements have been implemented.
  - Banking (Disclosure) Rules (BDR) were amended and associated standard disclosure templates and tables were issued.
  - Phase I and Phase II of the Basel revised Pillar 3 disclosure requirements implemented in the HKSAR from March 31, 2017 and June 30, 2018 respectively.

*Source: 1hkgea2021006 - 80.   The new Banking (Exposure Limits) Rules (BELR) that came into operation in July 2019*

### Appendix I.  FSAP 2014: Actions Taken to Improve Compliance

### Appendix I.  FSAP 2014: Actions Taken to Improve Compliance with the BCPs

### CP1 — Responsibilities, objectives and powers
- Main recommended Actions:
  - There is continued need to be vigilant to ensure that, in the future, developmental and even competitive considerations are not allowed to impinge upon and impair prudential standards
- Action Taken:
  - Implemented/On-going.
  - There is a strong tradition and commitment within the HKMA, communicated publicly, of recognizing such stability as a prerequisite and cornerstone for maintaining Hong Kong’s position as an international financial center.
  - Within the HKMA, there is clear delineation of responsibilities among departments, the work of which contribute to the overall stability and development of Hong Kong’s financial system. The banking departments of the HKMA are primarily responsible for the prudential supervision and conduct supervision of banks, while some other departments are undertaking macro-surveillance, liquidity support, and market operations functions to ensure monetary stability.
  - In planning for developmental work, an overarching consideration for the HKMA is the implications of the initiatives on monetary and financial stability.

### CP2 — Independence, accountability, resourcing
- Main recommended Actions:
  - It is recommended that amendments to the BO be made to eliminate or specify the circumstances under which the legal authority of the Chief Executive of the HKSAR to give directions to the MA may be exercised.
  - It is recommended that legislative amendments be made to confirm the reasons for which the MA could be dismissed and to provide for the public disclosure of the reasons for the dismissal of the MA.
- Action Taken:
  - Not Implemented.
  - Section 10 of the BO reserves a right to the Chief Executive (CE) of the HKSAR Government to give to the FS and the MA such directions as the CE thinks fit with respect to the exercise of their respective functions under the BO.
  - The power reflects the HKSAR Government’s ultimate responsibility to formulate monetary and financial policies and supervise financial markets as enshrined in the Basic Law. The power would have to be exercised in accordance with the objectives and functions of the BO and in practice would only be used as a tool of last resort to implement specific remedial measures in the most critical and extreme circumstances. Any unreasonable use would be subject to judicial review. Such power has never been exercised.
  - There is a deeply embedded constitutional and political convention of restraint such that any arbitrary attempt to abuse the power would be politically untenable. These considerations, together with institutional arrangements to ensure a high degree of operational autonomy of the HKMA, provide strong backing for the MA to exercise supervisory power independently and professionally.
  - On dismissal/reasons: It is not general practice in Hong Kong to prescribe in law the reasons for removing a statutory appointment or to require public disclosure of such reasons. Section 42 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1) provides that any person having a power to make such an appointment shall also have the power to remove, suspend, dismiss or revoke the appointment. The letter appointing the MA makes it clear that it is not the FS’ intention to terminate the MA’s employment except for cause such as the MA's inability to discharge, or not adequately carry out, his functions or duties; serious misconduct; conviction of a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment; and bankruptcy.

### CP7 — Major acquisitions
- Main recommended Actions:
  - It is recommended that supervisory practices be enhanced with respect to assessing whether major acquisitions and investments by other entities in the banking group will hinder effective implementation of corrective measures in the future, in particular the resolvability of the AI.
- Action Taken:
  - Implemented.
  - Significant progress since the 2014 FSAP in establishing the domestic cross-sectoral resolution regime under the Financial Institutions (Resolution) Ordinance (Chapter 628) (“FIRO”) (which commenced operation on 7 July 2017) and strengthening domestic and cross-border resolution planning for AIs.
  - Pursuant to section 12(1) of the FIRO, the MA as the resolution authority may conduct resolvability assessments to determine impediments to orderly resolution of an AI or its holding company and will take into account, among other matters, any major acquisitions and investments by other entities in an AI’s group.
  - Resolvability assessment is ongoing and supported by bilateral resolution planning between the HKMA and an AI.

### CP8 — Supervisory approach
- Main recommended Actions:
  - It is recommended that the HKMA continues to intensify its focus on business models and strategy and providing greater consideration to cross-sectoral issues.
- Action Taken:
  - Implemented.
  - HKMA has intensified focus on supervision of strategic and business model risks and given greater consideration to cross-sectoral issues, including:
    - Strategies and business models:
      - Putting more emphasis on AIs’ strategic risks and business model risks during prudential interviews with senior management and meetings with the board to facilitate forward-looking risk assessments on new trends and developments such as the impact of digitalization and fintech development.
      - Intensifying offsite reviews on AIs’ business performance and projections, and emerging risks.
    - Cross-sectoral issues:
      - Strengthening communication between the HKMA and other regulators.
      - Organizing joint examinations/reviews by the HKMA and the SFC on certain business activities of a number of banking groups (which consist of registered institutions and licensed corporations).
      - Sharing with other regulators diverse information (e.g.: aggregate results of a quarterly survey on banks’ product distribution and certain information about banks’ non-compliance with the Securities and Futures Ordinance and the guidelines of the SFC).

### CP9 — Supervisory techniques (foreign branches)
- Main recommended Actions:
  - It is recommended that the HKMA pays close attention to the frequency of on-site review of the AIs which are incorporated overseas, i.e., the foreign branches in HKSAR.
  - The HKMA should consider a review and as necessary a revision of internal guidance relating to foreign branches.
- Action Taken:
  - Partially implemented.
  - HKMA adopts a risk-based approach; frequency of on-site reviews depends on factors such as size and risk profile of individual AIs. Since the 2014 FSAP, HKMA further strengthened supervision of FBBs:
    - FBBs with complex and sizable operations in Hong Kong are subject to supervision on an institutional basis.
    - FBBs with small business scale and lower risk profile are supervised on a portfolio basis.
  - Independent external parties are engaged to conduct reviews, including reviews under section 59(2) of the BO on effectiveness of AIs’ risk management systems and controls.
  - Nonetheless, around one-third of AIs have not been inspected by the HKMA in over 5 years.
  - Implemented (guidance updates):
    - New internal guidance note, "Overview of Portfolio Management Teams," to provide guidance on supervision of AIs mostly FBBs with small business scale and lower risk profile on a portfolio basis.
    - Internal guidance note, “Refinements to SRP and CAMEL Assessment Process,” updated to provide guidance on conducting Supervisory Review Process (“SRP”) and CAMEL rating review of AIs under portfolio-based supervision.
    - HKMA is currently updating an internal guidance on “Risk Based Supervisory Approach for Foreign Bank Branches” to bring it in line with current supervisory practice.

### CP12 — Consolidated supervision
- Main recommended Actions:
  - It is recommended that the HKMA considers formalizing its process for analyzing non-financial activities of Ultimate Holding Companies (UHC).
- Action Taken:
  - Implemented.
  - HKMA formalized the process through internal guidance note (No. 2016-001) “Imposing Conditions on Holding Companies of Locally Incorporated Licensed Banks for the Purpose of Consolidated Supervision” in 2016.
  - As set out in the internal guidance note (applicable where none of the holding companies of a local bank is a supervised financial institution), the HKMA will:
    - impose conditions on the UHC Group (e.g. conditions related to financial, intra-group exposure, independent review, composition of management team and others);
    - require regular submission of information and independent assessment report by the UHC Group to the HKMA.

### CP13 — Home-host relationships (resolution planning)
- Main recommended Actions:
  - It is recommended that the HKMA maintains momentum on establishing its domestic resolution regime so that it is able to focus on domestic resolution plans in relation to institutions that are part of international groups.
- Action Taken:
  - Implemented.
  - The MA as the resolution authority under the FIRO is empowered to undertake resolution planning and resolvability assessment, and to direct an AI or its holding company to take measures to remove or mitigate impediments to orderly resolution.
  - HKMA has been conducting resolution planning for AIs at both domestic and international levels and continues AI-specific resolution planning in close coordination with relevant home and host authorities.
  - Structured bilateral resolution planning programs established and advanced for each of the six domestic systemically important banks (“D-SIBs”) in Hong Kong, five of which are part of an international group.
  - For each D-SIB, a preferred resolution strategy has been determined and a resolvability assessment conducted to identify impediments. The indicative LAC requirements have been communicated to these D-SIBs.
  - Considerable progress by these D-SIBs to implement structural changes to address impediments to resolvability, including build-up of LAC resources, replacement of a chain of overseas holding companies with a clean holding company in Hong Kong, and establishment of a Hong Kong service company.

### CP20 — Related parties
- Main recommended Actions:
  - It is recommended that the HKMA executes its plans to seek legal reform to expand the definition of “connected party” (or the equivalent term under the BO) to include senior management, as well as make the corresponding changes to the SPM.
  - Current plans to incorporate the requirement that write-offs of related party exposures exceeding specific amounts are subject to prior approval by an AI’s board should be completed.
- Action Taken:
  - Implemented.
  - SPM module CR-G-9 “Exposures to connected parties” was revised in November 2015 to require AIs to adopt an expanded scope of “connected party” for internal risk management purposes. Paragraph 3.2.1 includes connected parties in addition to those specified in section 83 of the BO (replaced by rule 85(1) of the BELR):
    - (i) the senior management and key staff of an AI;
    - (ii) an AI’s subsidiaries, fellow subsidiaries and other entities over which the AI is able to exert control;
    - (iii) the controllers, minority shareholder controllers, directors, senior management and key staff of the AI’s subsidiaries, fellow subsidiaries and other entities referred to in (ii); and
    - (iv) the relatives of those persons referred to in (i) and (iii) who are natural persons.
  - From 1 July 2019 (subject to a grace period of six months), an AI is required to report its connected party exposures determined under the expanded scope in a prudential return to the HKMA for monitoring purposes.
  - Implemented: The relevant requirement on write-off approvals was incorporated into paragraph 3.1.4 of SPM CR-G-9 in November 2015.

### CP27 — Financial reporting and external audit
- Main recommended Actions:
  - It is recommended that the HKMA is granted the direct power to reject and rescind the appointment of an external auditor who is deemed to have inadequate expertise or independence, or is not subject to or does not adhere to established professional standards.
  - It is recommended that a supervisor be granted the direct power to access external auditors’ working papers, where necessary.
- Action Taken:
  - Partially implemented.
  - HKMA does not have a direct and explicit power to reject or rescind the appointment of an external auditor, but may achieve the same results through:
    - Day-to-day contacts with AIs to raise concerns over competence or independence of external auditors and request the AI to consider appropriateness of retaining the external auditor.
    - Invoking power under section 52(1)(A) of the BO to direct the AI to reject or rescind the appointment of its external auditor if the AI is not responsive without appropriate justifications.
    - Experience indicates it was not necessary to invoke legal power as AIs have been responsive to HKMA’s comments.
  - Gateways for HKMA to understand audit findings and access working papers if circumstances warrant:
    - Regular dialogue with external auditors through tripartite meetings;
    - Under section 51 of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) Ordinance, the FRC may disclose information including audit working papers it obtains to the HKMA.

### CP28 — Disclosure and transparency
- Main recommended Actions:
  - It is recommended that the HKMA reviews best practices in other countries and consider publication of time series data sourced from its regulatory returns, disclosed on an individual institution bases, that would enhance the public and financial community’s understanding of AIs’ operations and risk profile.
- Action Taken:
  - Implemented.
  - Disclosure requirements related to the Basel III standards (i.e. LCR, leverage ratio, CCyB ratio and net stable funding ratio) as well as the revised Pillar 3 disclosure requirements (both phases I and II) promulgated by the BCBS in 2015 and 2017 have been implemented in Hong Kong by amendments to the Banking (Disclosure) Rules (Cap. 155M) and issuance of associated standard disclosure templates and tables.
  - HKMA publishes regularly supervisory data and information of interest to the market and the general public. Since the last FSAP in 2014, the following additional data have been published:
    - Mainland-related lending (by types of AIs, by types of borrowers and asset quality);
    - Basel III LCR;
    - Basel III NSFR; and
    - Basel III Leverage Ratio.

*Appendix I.  FSAP 2014: Actions Taken to Improve Compliance with the BCPs — source document provided.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2021/english/1hkgea2021006.pdf_
