## 1armea2022004

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---

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY — Context, Program Request, and Access
- Context and macro stance:
  - Economy maintained strong momentum driven by robust consumption and surge in inflows of income, capital, business, and labor.
  - Inflation increased markedly due to sharp rise in food and energy prices and booming economy.
  - Proactive monetary policy tightening and GDP growth deceleration are projected to bring inflation down in 2023.
  - Elevated uncertainty and significant downside risks from: the ongoing war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia; global financial tightening; slowdown in major trading partners; high food and energy prices.
  - Structural challenges: high unemployment, weak business environment, and low productivity growth.
- Authorities’ request:
  - Request for a new Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) to help maintain macroeconomic, financial, and fiscal stability, provide insurance against downside risks, and support structural reforms.
- SBA features:
  - Proposed 36-month SBA with access of 100 percent of quota (SDR 128.8 million).
  - Authorities intend to treat the arrangement as precautionary.
  - In the event of a shock, access to IMF financing and donors’ support will help maintain a reserve cover above 100 percent of the IMF reserve adequacy metric.
- Key dates and note: *December 7, 2022*.

### RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (selection of key facts and indicators)
- Growth and demand:
  - Real GDP growth: 11 percent y-o-y in first half of 2022.
  - Economic activity remained strong in July–September 2022; services and construction gained momentum.
  - Policy rate hikes: about 225 bps in 2022 and cumulative rise of 625 bps since December 2020.
- Inflation:
  - Headline inflation: 9.5 percent (y-o-y) in October 2022.
  - Elevated core inflation signals strong underlying price pressures.
- External sector:
  - Imports increased by 58 percent in January–August 2022 (y-o-y, in US$ terms).
  - Dram appreciated against the US dollar by about 19 percent in January–September 2022.
  - Real effective exchange rate appreciated by about 12 percent.
  - Gross international reserves (GIR) rose to 150 percent of the ARA metric (US$3725 million) at end-September 2022.
  - Capital account inflows, including FDI, more than offset widening current account deficit.
- Fiscal outturn (first three quarters of 2022):
  - Overall surplus: 0.6 percent of GDP against a budgeted deficit of 2.5 percent of GDP.
  - Revenue overperformance driven by corporate income taxes, VAT, and export stamp duties.
  - Under-execution of spending: 1.8 percent of GDP.
- Financial sector:
  - Banks’ CAR remain above minimum 12 percent; liquidity ample; NPLs 2.8 percent in August 2022.
  - CCB required since January 2022: 1.5 percent and additional 1.0 percent for SIIs.
  - ROE: 29.1 percent in August 2022 driven by non-interest income.
  - Mortgage lending growth: about 20 percent in January–August 2022 (after 38-percent growth in 2021).
- Selected policy rate:
  - CBA raised the policy rate by 50 bps to 10.5 percent in November (2022 reference).

### OUTLOOK AND RISKS
- Growth projections:
  - 2022: Real GDP growth projected to reach 11 percent.
  - 2023: Growth projected to decelerate to 4.5 percent.
  - Medium-term growth projected around 4.5 percent (subject to high uncertainty).
- Inflation projections:
  - Peak end-2022: 10 percent y-o-y.
  - End-2023: around 6 percent.
  - Converge to CBA target of 4 percent by 2025 if policies remain as expected and expectations anchored.
- Current account:
  - Projected to remain around 5½ percent of GDP in 2023 before converging to 5 percent of GDP thereafter.
- Key downside risks:
  - Tighter global financial conditions and slowdown in major trading partners.
  - Depreciation pressures on the dram, higher inflationary pressures, increased public debt vulnerabilities.
  - Rising global food and energy prices and logistical bottlenecks for trade through Georgia.
  - Intensified regional tensions.
- Upside scenarios:
  - Continued growth momentum if influx of international visitors and businesses supports business creation and high-skilled labor.
  - New regional cooperation and full implementation of 2021–26 reform agenda could strengthen medium-term growth.

### POLICY DISCUSSIONS — Program Objectives
- Fiscal:
  - Fiscal path for 2023–25 consistent with cyclical position, anchored by fiscal rules, keeping debt moderate.
  - Structural reforms to mobilize revenue, improve expenditure planning, and strengthen fiscal risk management.
- Monetary and exchange rate:
  - Proactive, data-dependent monetary policy stance.
  - Preserve two-way flexibility of the dram; limit FX interventions to mitigating disorderly market conditions while maintaining healthy reserve buffers.
- Financial sector:
  - Measures to stem risks from rapid housing price and mortgage lending growth, preserve banks’ capital buffers, and strengthen regulatory and supervisory framework.
- Structural reforms:
  - Reforms to facilitate trade and diversification, strengthen governance, improve business environment, foster employment, advance digitalization, and build climate resilience.

---

### A. BUILDING FISCAL SPACE AND CAPACITY TO SUPPORT GROWTH-ENHANCING POLICIES
- 2022 fiscal developments:
  - Headline fiscal deficit projected to narrow to 2½ percent of GDP in 2022.
  - Revenue increase of 0.5 percent of GDP compared to 2021 from corporate income taxes, mining sector export stamp duties, and social contributions.
  - Current expenditures expected to decline by 3.2 percentage points of GDP due to phasing out COVID-19 support.
  - Capital spending projected to increase by 1.6 percentage points of GDP despite under-execution of foreign-financed projects.
  - Projected 2022 fiscal performance implies a deficit reduction of about 2 percentage points of GDP relative to 2021.
- 2023 fiscal stance and recommendations:
  - Authorities’ 2023 budget (prior action) assumes overall deficit of 3.1 percent of GDP.
  - Budget supports capital spending increase of 1.4 percentage points of GDP and social protection about 0.2 percentage points of GDP.
  - Primary deficit projected at 1¾ percent of GDP; fiscal stance close to neutral, easing inflation and bringing debt close to 50 percent of GDP.
  - If revenues overperform: priority to strengthen fiscal buffers or invest in high-quality capital projects while avoiding overheating.
  - If adverse shocks materialize: allow automatic stabilizers to operate fully.
- Consolidation path and fiscal rules:
  - Fiscal consolidation of around 1 percent of GDP will bring debt below 50 percent of GDP by 2025.
  - Excerpt of Central Government Rules:
    - Fiscal deficit in T+1: < 7.5 percent of GDP; if Debt in T-1 > 40 percent of GDP: Budget deficit </= capital expenditures.
    - Current primary expenditure ceilings conditional on debt bands (50 < Debt in T-1 </= 60 percent of GDP; Debt in T-1 > 60 percent of GDP) with rules tying expenditure growth to average nominal GDP growth and tax revenues.
    - Debt: if Debt > 60 percent of GDP submit action plan to parliament to bring debt below 60 percent in next 5 years; if 50 percent < Debt </= 60 percent of GDP present action plan in MTEF to bring debt below 50 percent in next 5 years.

### TAX POLICY, TAX EXPENDITURES, AND REVENUE ADMINISTRATION
- Tax expenditures (Budget 2023, percent of GDP):
  - VAT: 4.40 percent
  - Of which: Health Care and Education: 1.31 percent
  - Profit tax: 0.87 percent
  - Income Tax: 1.00 percent
  - Of which: Mortgage Interest Tax Credit: 0.69 percent
  - Total: 6.28 percent
- Observations and reforms:
  - Budgeted tax expenditures of about 5 percent of GDP (excluding health and education) are higher than peers; streamlining them with detailed assessment and action plan (June 2023 SB) could yield substantial revenue.
  - Limit fiscal cost of mortgage interest tax credit—which benefits mainly top 10 percent of income distribution—to improve PIT progressivity and efficiency.
  - Other reforms: universal PIT declarations, tax individual capital gains, level tax burden across SME and general VAT/CIT regimes, introduce financial activities tax, reform excises, harmonize environmental taxes into a carbon tax.
- Revenue administration improvements:
  - SRC on-time CIT and VAT filings at 98.4 percent in 2021 and near 100 percent electronic filing rates.
  - Amendments to empower SRC to audit individuals (March 2023 SB).
  - Further steps: improve tax registry, manage arrears, address transfer pricing, prohibit high-value cash transactions, ensure SRC access to bank information for legal entities (March 2023 SB).
  - Cash transaction electronic thresholds (as of July 1, 2022):
    - Business transactions > 300,000 AMD (US$ 700) must be electronic.
    - Transactions between individuals > 500,000 AMD (US$ 1,100) must be electronic.

### PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND CAPITAL SPENDING
- Challenges: statistical misclassifications, weak budget monitoring/execution, gaps in government wage data, weak project execution for capital spending.
- Planned actions:
  - Action plan to strengthen PIM institutional framework (June 2023 SB) to raise capital spending significantly above 3 percent of GDP.
  - Improve MOF fiscal risk analysis and reporting (climate change, on-lending, PPPs).
  - Clarify SOEs’ mandate, reporting, transparency, viability; adopt decree clarifying ANIF requirements (March 2023 SB).
  - Institute comprehensive monitoring/approval/control framework for local government finances; develop concept note (September 2023 SB).
- Publication:
  - Public sector balance sheet planned by 2024.

### MONETARY POLICY AND INFLATION OUTLOOK
- CBA policy:
  - Policy rate raised to 10.5 percent in November (2022).
  - Monetary stance aimed at bringing inflation to single digits in 2023 and back to 4 percent by 2025; further changes data-dependent.
  - Exchange rate policy to maintain two-way flexibility; interventions to mitigate disorderly conditions and build reserves.
  - CBA strengthening policy framework via financial market development action plan, enhanced communication, surveys, data collection, and risk/scenario-based policy decision making.

### FINANCIAL SECTOR RESILIENCE AND MACROPRUDENTIAL MEASURES
- Mortgage and housing risks:
  - LTV limits for new mortgages: 90 percent for AMD loans and 70 percent for FX loans.
  - Draft legislation to ban mortgage lending in foreign currency.
  - Countercyclical capital buffer: 1.0 percent effective May 2023.
  - Banks may provide exceptions: up to 10 percent for AMD loans and 5 percent for FX loans that do not meet LTV limits.
  - Consider DSTI and DTI caps; regulations to account for income from informal sources, including remittances.
- Regulatory enhancements:
  - Raise CCB from 1.5 to 2.0 percent and SII buffer from 1.0 to 1.5 percent in January 2023 to partially compensate for planned minimum capital requirement adjustment from 12 to 11 percent.
  - Maintain higher risk weights (150–200 percent) for FX exposures; restrict dividends for banks unable to maintain CCB and SRB targets.
  - Require additional capital buffers where interest rate and market price risk from government security holdings is material.
  - Develop roadmap for Pillar 2 capital buffers (June 2023 SB).
  - Tighten enforcement of large exposure and internal borrower limits.
- Resolution and market infrastructure:
  - Strengthen resolution framework aligned with FSB Key Attributes (November 2023 SB: submission of draft law).
  - Review MOUs with home supervisors of foreign subsidiaries.
  - Facilitate introduction of over-the-counter repo trading platform (March 2023 SB).
  - Major review of payment system to align FMI operation and oversight with IOSCO Principles.

### STRUCTURAL REFORMS TO STRENGTHEN GROWTH PROSPECTS
- Orientation:
  - Export-led, investment-driven, knowledge-based growth aligned with 2021–26 Government Program.
- Infrastructure and trade:
  - Review to identify bottlenecks preventing completion of foreign-funded infrastructure projects (June 2023 SB).
  - Ease customs procedures and integrate public entities into electronic customs system.
- Access to finance and insolvency:
  - Access to finance main constraint per 2020 World Bank Enterprise Survey.
  - Strengthen capital markets, banks’ risk management, and insolvency regime.
  - Complete bankruptcy legislation review in H1 2023 to pave way for insolvency framework amendments (September 2023 SB).
- Agriculture and climate resilience:
  - Extend agricultural insurance scheme (September 2023 SB).
  - Update land registration, develop land markets, improve agricultural statistics, support climate-tolerant seeds.
  - Develop comprehensive climate mitigation and adaptation strategy.
- Labor market and public services:
  - New employment strategy (June 2023 SB) to encourage labor force participation, especially among young and female workers.
  - New education strategy to improve school-to-work transition and address skill mismatches; introduce credit system for transfers to vocational education.
  - Digitalization to foster public administration reforms and service efficiency.

---

### DIGITALIZATION, AML/CFT, AND GOVERNANCE
- Digitalization strategy:
  - Ambitious program to enhance access and efficiency of business, legal, and public services via integrated digital platforms.
  - Planned reforms: interoperability framework; comprehensive electronic identity strategy.
  - Expected outcomes: spearhead public administration reforms and improve public service delivery; Armenia fares relatively high among CCA countries but lags peers.
  - Risks: new data protection and cybersecurity risks requiring adoption of standards and exchange mechanisms for cybersecurity threat information.
- AML/CFT and beneficial ownership:
  - Beneficial ownership register amendments require registration of beneficial ownership of all legal entities (www.e-register.am).
  - By end-2023 register to include NGOs in line with MONEYVAL recommendations.
  - Priorities: compliance focus (SMEs, foreign companies, non-resident-owned entities), support CPC independence/resources, further legal amendments for public summaries of CPC integrity checks, public disclosure of asset declarations for senior leaders.
  - Financial intelligence: strengthen detection/investigation of tax evasion via more frequent dissemination of suspicious transactions and intelligence to SRC by FMC.
  - Complete planned ex-post audit of COVID-19 on-lending business support scheme by end-2023.

---

### THE NEW SBA — DESIGN, MONITORING, AND SAFEGUARDS
- Arrangement:
  - Three-year SBA with semi-annual reviews; intended precautionary.
  - Access phased equally over arrangement; total available: 128.8 millions of SDRs (100.00 percent of quota).
- Disbursement schedule (millions of SDRs; percent of quota per tranche; cumulative percent):
  - December 12, 2022: 18.400; 14.29; cumulative 14.29
  - June 9, 2023: 18.400; 14.29; cumulative 28.57
  - December 11, 2023: 18.400; 14.29; cumulative 42.86
  - June 10, 2024: 18.400; 14.29; cumulative 57.14
  - December 11, 2024: 18.400; 14.29; cumulative 71.43
  - June 9, 2025: 18.400; 14.29; cumulative 85.71
  - November 21, 2025: 18.400; 14.29; cumulative 100.00
- Monitoring framework:
  - Monetary Policy Consultation Clause (MPCC) based on inflation path consistent with staff baseline and CBA 4 percent target; symmetric bands reflect uncertainty.
  - Quantitative PCs and ITs include floor on fiscal balance; ceiling on cumulative budget domestic lending; continuous PC on non-accumulation of external public debt arrears; IT on stock of new public guarantees of external debt; floor on NIR; social assistance IT floor.
  - Structural benchmarks target revenue mobilization, quality infrastructure spending, fiscal risk containment, monetary transmission, bank supervision, access to finance, and labor participation.
- Safeguards and capacity to repay:
  - Updated safeguards assessment of the CBA to be completed by first review.
  - Armenia’s outstanding credit: 289 percent of quota (as of September 2022), projected to decline to 278 by end-2022.
  - Under adverse scenario, repayments to Fund peak at 7.6 percent of GIR (2.3 percent of exports of goods and services) in 2024.
  - Capacity to repay deemed adequate; firm commitments for next 12 months and good financing prospects for full period.

### PROGRAM CONDITIONALITY — Selected quantitative and program figures
- Program exchange rate: 405.65 dram per one U.S. dollar.
- MPCC inflation bands (presented for Dec-22 / Jun-23 test dates):
  - Upper-outer band: 12.5 / 10.5
  - Upper-inner band: 11.5 / 9.5
  - Mid-point: 10.0 / 8.0
  - Lower-inner band: 8.5 / 6.5
  - Lower-outer band: 7.5 / 5.5
- Selected indicative targets and PCs (examples presented):
  - Net official international reserves (stock, floor, in millions of U.S. dollars): 1,600 1,531 1,576 1,475 1,465 (table values as presented).
  - Program fiscal balance (flow, floor): -384 -124 -211 -315 -465 (table values as presented).
  - Ceiling on new government guaranteed external debt (stock, IT): US$ 100 million cumulative.
  - Social assistance spending floor examples (flow, floor): 65.0 20.0 40.1 60.1 80.2 (presented).

---

### STAFF APPRAISAL — Macroeconomic Policy and Reforms
- SBA objectives: support macro stability and inclusive growth via strong policy and structural reform agenda.
- Fiscal policy: 2023 stance appropriate; gradual consolidation aligned with rules; revenues overperformance to build buffers or finance high-quality reforms.
- Monetary policy and reserves: CBA’s tightening timely and appropriate; exchange rate flexibility should remain shock absorber; further reserve accumulation advisable amid capital inflows.
- Financial sector resilience: banking system well capitalized and liquid; monitor housing/mortgage risks; enhance macroprudential toolkit and resolution framework.
- Structural reform priorities: improve business environment, productivity, employment, governance, informality reduction, and climate resilience; digitalization to spearhead public administration reform.

---

### REAL SECTOR, PRICES, EXTERNAL SECTOR, AND FISCAL PROJECTIONS (selected tables and projections)
- Real GDP growth (annual):
  - 2019: 7.6
  - 2020: -7.2
  - 2021: 5.7
  - 2022: 11.0
  - 2023–2027 (annual projection): 4.5, 4.5, 4.5, 4.5, 4.5
- Unemployment (percent):
  - 2019: 18.3; 2020: 18.2; 2021: 15.3; 2022: 14.8; 2023–2027: 14.7, 14.6, 14.5, 14.4, 14.3
- CPI (period average, percent change):
  - 2019: 1.4; 2020: 1.2; 2021: 7.2; 2022: 8.8; 2023: 7.5; 2024: 5.1; 2025: 4.5; 2026: 4.2; 2027: 4.1
- External sector (US$ millions):
  - Exports: 2019: 5,794; 2020: 3,818; 2021: 5,012; 2022: 7,786; 2023–2027: 8,525; 9,034; 9,533; 10,117; 10,743
  - Imports: 2019: -7,603; 2020: -5,082; 2021: -6,120; 2022: -9,244; 2023–2027: -10,080; -10,660; -11,252; -11,905; -12,579
  - Current account (% of GDP): 2019: -7.3; 2020: -3.8; 2021: -3.7; 2022: -5.6; 2023: -5.5; 2024: -5.4; 2025: -5.4; 2026: -5.3; 2027: -5.0
- Public debt and fiscal aggregates (selected percent of GDP):
  - PPG debt: 2019: 53.7; 2020: 67.4; 2021: 63.4; 2022: 55.3; 2023–2027: 53.9; 52.4; 51.1; 49.7; 48.3
  - Revenue and grants: 2019: 23.9; 2020: 25.2; 2021: 24.1; 2022: 24.6; 2023–2027: 24.7; 25.0; 25.3; 25.5; 25.9
  - Overall balance (cash basis): 2019: -1.0; 2020: -5.4; 2021: -4.6; 2022: -2.5; 2023–2027: -3.0; -2.5; -2.0; -1.5; -1.0

---

### ANNEX I — SPILLOVERS FROM THE WAR IN UKRAINE (selected impacts and flows)
- Cross-border developments:
  - International flights increased by about 150 percent since March (2022).
  - Number of tourists doubled in January–September 2022 vs same period 2021.
  - Spending per tourist increased by 50 percent in 2022H1 y-o-y.
- Relocation and business registration (February–August 2022):
  - Around 35 thousand people moved from Russia to Armenia.
  - Newly created foreign-owned companies: 1784.
  - Newly created non-resident individual entrepreneurs: 3132.
  - Newly created foreign-owned IT sector companies: 810.
  - Newly created non-resident individual entrepreneurs in IT: 2235.
  - Increase in registered non-resident employees: 6332 persons over same period.
- Money transfers and banking:
  - Money transfers increased by more than 130 percent y-o-y in January–August 2022.
  - Remittances more than doubled to $1.3 billion in 2022Q2.
  - Number of bank accounts of Russian residents in Armenia rose to about 61 thousand in February–July 2022 (~5-fold increase).
  - Non-resident current deposits increased by AMD 460 billion over same period.
- Trade with Russia:
  - Trade with Russia increased by almost 71.6 percent y-o-y in January–August 2022.
  - Exports to Russia contributed 28.3 percent to overall export growth of 52.9 percent y-o-y in January–August 2022.
  - Share of exports to Russia increased to about 36 percent in Jan–Aug 2022 from 27 percent in same period 2021.
- Macroeconomic and sectoral impacts:
  - Services 2022H1 growth (real y-o-y): accommodation, transportation, and financial services grew by 35–40 percent; IT services grew by 26 percent.
  - Construction grew by 20 percent in 2022H1.
  - Stock of FDI grew by 25 percent y-o-y in 2022H1.
  - Investment growth driven to 17 percent.
  - Wages grew by 12.9 percent y-o-y—15.3 percent in private sector—in Jan–Aug 2022.
  - Rental prices increased by 34 percent y-o-y by September 2022.
- Risks and policy implications:
  - Need to maintain adequate reserve buffers, complete reforms to diversify exports and trading partners, increase absorption capacity, and monitor observance of international sanctions.

### ANNEX II — EXTERNAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT (key metrics)
- NIIP: around -78.9 percent of GDP at end-2021 (improved from -81.3 percent in Dec 2020).
- REER and exchange rate:
  - REER appreciated on average by 1.1 percent in 2021 vs 2020.
  - REER appreciated by about 12 percent between Jan–Sep 2022.
  - Dram appreciated by about 19 percent in nominal terms since beginning of war in Ukraine.
- Reserves and ARA:
  - Gross international reserves: US$ 2.6 billion end-2020; ~US$ 3.2 billion end-2021 (~4.8 months of prospective imports).
  - Reserves estimated over 140 percent of the ARA metric at end-2021; 150 percent of projected 2022 ARA metric at end-Sep 2022; expected to remain above 110 percent throughout forecast horizon.
- External debt dynamics (baseline path, percent of GDP):
  - 2018: 85.9; 2019: 89.0; 2020: 100.1; 2021: 98.1; 2022: 76.6; 2023: 71.7; 2024: 69.3; 2025: 67.1; 2026: 65.1; 2027: 62.9
- Gross external financing need (US$ billions):
  - 2019: 2.8; 2020: 2.6; 2021: 2.4; 2022: 3.2; 2023: 3.6; 2024: 3.9; 2025: 4.5; 2026: 4.2; 2027: 4.2

### ANNEX III — RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX (selected risks and policy advice)
- Conjunctural risks with Likelihood = High:
  - Intensifying spillovers from Russia’s war in Ukraine: Policy advice includes tight monetary stance, flexible exchange rate, build fiscal buffers, mobilize external official financing, enhance financial supervision and AML/CFT.
  - Commodity price shocks: Maintain monetary stance, build fiscal and external buffers, reprioritize spending, provide targeted support to vulnerable.
  - Systemic social unrest: Build fiscal cushions, strengthen social safety nets, labor market reforms.
- Structural and domestic risks (selected):
  - Deepening geo-economic fragmentation and geopolitical tensions (Likelihood: High): Strengthen/diversify trade channels, contingency plans, social safety nets, structural reforms.
  - Financial sector risks (Likelihood: Medium): Enforce prudential/provisioning rules, implement macroprudential measures, monitor NPLs.
  - High inflation (Likelihood: High): Anchor expectations, clear communication, proactive monetary adjustments, build buffers.

### ANNEX IV — ILLUSTRATIVE ADVERSE SCENARIO (key assumptions and quantified items)
- Adverse scenario assumptions (selected):
  - Exports of goods contract: 20 percent in 2023.
  - Services exports decline: approximately 176 million US dollars relative to baseline.
  - Imported food prices increase: 20 percent.
  - Terms-of-trade deterioration: by 3 percent.
  - 2023 imports relative to baseline: 2.0 percent increase (food-price effect).
  - Remittances decline: 37 percent in 2023.
  - Baseline net capital inflows (2022–23): US$ 2.5 billion; Adverse scenario net inflows (2022–23): US$ 1.5 billion.
  - Difference in other capital flows: US$ 720 million decline + US$ 300 million additional withdrawal.
  - Exchange rate depreciation assumed: 25 percent.
  - Projected decline in 2023–24 imports: US$ 1.2 billion.
  - Additional fiscal deficit: 0.8 percent of GDP in 2023; 0.5 percent of GDP in 2024.
  - Public debt rise relative to baseline: close to 9 percentage points in 2023.
  - Additional development partner financing envisaged: about $250 million.
- Policy responses under adverse scenario:
  - CBA to increase policy rate to halt inflation from depreciation; allow dram depreciation of about 25 percent while intervening to avoid disorderly markets.
  - Fiscal policy to allow automatic stabilizers and target support to vulnerable while maintaining long-term sustainability.
  - Access at 100 percent of quota (SDR 128.8 million) would help maintain reserves above 95 percent of ARA metric.

### ANNEX V — PUBLIC DEBT SUSTAINABILITY (selected results)
- Recent developments:
  - Public debt: 63.4 percent of GDP in 2021.
  - 2021 fiscal deficit: 4.6 percent of GDP.
  - Government issued a 10-year Eurobond: $750 million at 3.9 percent interest in 2021.
  - Gross financing needs (GFN) narrowed to 10.3 percent of GDP in 2021.
- Projections:
  - Public debt projected to decline to 55.3 percent and central government debt to 51.3 percent in 2022.
  - Medium-term: debt expected to remain on declining path with gradual fiscal consolidation.
  - Gross financing needs projected to decline to about 7.0 percent of GDP by 2027.
  - A $500-million Eurobond maturity implies one-off rise in GFN in 2025; planned to be rolled-over.
- Vulnerabilities and stress tests:
  - High share of foreign currency debt remains a vulnerability.
  - Shocks to growth and exchange rate have largest impact on debt dynamics.
  - Historical-average scenario: government debt would rise to around 63 percent of GDP in 2027; GFN near 12.5 percent of GDP in 2027 without active measures.
  - Combined macro-fiscal shock could push public debt to 70 percent of GDP and GFN to 11.7 percent of GDP in 2027.

### ANNEX VI — REFORMING THE INSOLVENCY REGIME (selected priorities)
- Background: 2006 Bankruptcy Law under revision; current regime ineffective at preserving business value and creditor rights.
- Reform priorities:
  - Improve efficiency of insolvency process; modernize courts’ use of technology; clarify appeals.
  - Introduce out-of-court and hybrid restructuring mechanisms.
  - Strengthen creditor rights to information and participation.
  - Clarify relationship between reorganization proceedings and secured credit; rebalance control over collateral.
  - Regulate insolvency administrators: access, qualifications, remuneration, supervision, and sanctioning.
  - Address personal bankruptcy abuse and fraud; introduce disclosure and anti-fraud mechanisms.
  - Consider enterprise groups, micro/small enterprise insolvency, cross-border rules, and post-petition finance regulation.

### REPORTING, TRANSPARENCY, AND DATA REQUIREMENTS (selected)
- Detailed reporting commitments from CBA, MOF, SRC, National Statistical Service, and others with specified frequencies and timing (daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, annual) across a wide range of monetary, fiscal, banking, and external sector data (as detailed in reporting table).

*IMF staff report excerpt (Republic of Armenia).*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Context
- The economy has maintained a strong momentum, driven by robust consumption and a surge in inflows of income, capital, business, and labor.
- Inflation has increased markedly due to the sharp rise in food and energy prices and the booming economy.
- Proactive monetary policy tightening and GDP growth deceleration are projected to bring inflation down in 2023.
- Uncertainty is elevated and downside risks are significant due to:
  - the ongoing war in Ukraine and sanctions on Russia,
  - global financial tightening,
  - slowdown in major trading partners,
  - high food and energy prices.
- Structural challenges remain, including high unemployment, weak business environment, and low productivity growth.
- The authorities have requested a new Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) to help maintain macroeconomic, financial, and fiscal stability, provide insurance against downside risks, and support structural reforms.

### Program request and objectives (policies under the program)
- Fiscal:
  - A fiscal path for 2023–25 consistent with the cyclical position of the economy, anchored by the fiscal rules and keeping debt moderate throughout the program period.
  - Fiscal structural reforms to mobilize revenue and build fiscal space for growth-enhancing spending, improve expenditure planning, and strengthen fiscal risk management.
- Monetary and exchange rate policy:
  - A proactive and data dependent monetary policy stance in view of the evolution of inflation and inflation expectations.
  - Exchange rate policy will preserve the existing two-way flexibility of the dram, while maintaining healthy reserve buffers and limiting foreign exchange interventions to mitigating disorderly market conditions.
- Financial sector:
  - Measures to stem risks associated with rapid rises in housing prices and mortgage lending, preserve banks’ capital buffers, and strengthen the regulatory and supervisory framework.
- Structural reforms:
  - A package of reforms to facilitate trade and diversification, strengthen governance, improve the business environment, foster employment, advance digitalization, and build resilience against climate risks.

### Access under the new SBA
- A 36-month SBA is proposed with access of 100 percent of quota (SDR 128.8 million).
- The authorities intend to treat the arrangement as precautionary.
- In the event of a shock, access to IMF financing and donors’ support will help maintain a reserve cover above 100 percent of the IMF reserve adequacy metric.

*December 7, 2022*

### Recent developments
- Growth and demand:
  - GDP growth surprised on the upside in the first half of 2022: 11 percent y-o-y.
  - Economic activity remained strong in July–September 2022; services and construction gained momentum.
  - Strong consumption and higher commodity prices increased inflationary pressures despite policy rate hikes of about 225 bps in 2022 and a cumulative rise of 625 bps since December 2020.
- Inflation:
  - Headline inflation was 9.5 percent (y-o-y) in October 2022, above the CBA’s 4-percent target.
  - Elevated core inflation indicates strong underlying price pressures.
- External sector:
  - Imports increased rapidly by 58 percent in January–August 2022 (y-o-y, in US$ terms).
  - Dram appreciated against the US dollar by about 19 percent in January–September 2022.
  - Real effective exchange rate appreciated by about 12 percent.
  - Gross international reserves (GIR) rose to 150 percent of the ARA metric (US$3725 million) at end-September 2022.
  - Capital account inflows, including FDI, more than offset a significant widening of the current account deficit.
- Fiscal outturn:
  - Overall surplus reached 0.6 percent of GDP in the first three quarters of 2022 against a budgeted deficit of 2.5 percent of GDP.
  - Revenue overperformance driven by corporate income taxes, VAT, and export stamp duties.
  - Under-execution of spending amounted to 1.8 percent of GDP.
- Financial sector:
  - Banks’ capital adequacy ratios (CAR) remain well above the current minimum requirement of 12 percent; liquidity is ample; NPLs were 2.8 percent in August 2022.
  - Since January 2022, banks required to maintain a capital conservation buffer (CCB) of 1.5 percent and additional 1.0 percent for systemically important institutions (SII).
  - Profitability: Return on equity (ROE) reached 29.1 percent in August 2022 driven by non-interest income.
  - Mortgage lending grew by about 20 percent in January–August 2022, after 38-percent growth in 2021.
  - Consumer loan growth remained minor.

### Outlook and risks
- Growth projections:
  - Real GDP growth projected to reach 11 percent in 2022.
  - Growth projected to decelerate to 4.5 percent in 2023.
  - Medium-term growth projected around 4.5 percent, in line with current potential, subject to high uncertainty.
- Inflation projections:
  - Inflation projected to peak at end-2022 at 10 percent y-o-y.
  - Inflation projected to moderate to around 6 percent by end-2023.
  - Inflation expected to converge to the CBA’s target of 4 percent by 2025, provided policies remain as expected and inflation expectations remain anchored.
- Current account:
  - Current account deficit projected to remain at around 5½ percent of GDP in 2023 before converging to its norm in the medium term.
  - Expected convergence to 5 percent of GDP thereafter.
- Key risks (Annex III):
  - Tighter global financial conditions and slowdown in major trading partners could adversely affect remittances, trade, and financial flows.
  - Depreciation pressures on the dram, higher inflationary pressures, and increased public debt vulnerabilities possible.
  - Rising global food and energy prices and logistical bottlenecks for trade through Georgia could raise inflation and reduce consumption.
  - Intensified regional tensions could have adverse effects.
- Upside scenarios:
  - Continued growth momentum into 2023 and the medium term if influx of international visitors and businesses supports business creation in high productivity sectors and increases high-skilled labor.
  - New regional cooperation and transportation links and full implementation of the government’s 2021–26 reform agenda could result in stronger medium-term growth.
- Contingency:
  - In an illustrative adverse scenario (contraction in trading partners’ growth combined with large increase in food prices), significant depreciation of the dram and deterioration in trade balance, remittances, and capital flows could occur, making financial support from the Fund and other multilateral creditors essential (Annex IV).

### Policy discussions
- A new SBA would:
  - Support macroeconomic stability and implementation of the authorities’ reform agenda.
  - Provide a positive signal to IFIs and markets.
  - Provide buffers should downside risks materialize.
- Policy focus:
  - Appropriate short- and medium-term policy stance.
  - Reform commitments to create space for priority spending and foster an export-oriented, inclusive, and green growth.

### A. Building Fiscal Space and Capacity to Support Growth-Enhancing Policies
- 2022 fiscal developments:
  - Headline fiscal deficit projected to narrow to 2½ percent of GDP in 2022.
  - Revenue increase of 0.5 percent of GDP compared to 2021 from corporate income taxes, mining sector export stamp duties, and social contributions.
  - Current expenditures expected to decline by 3.2 percentage points of GDP due to phasing out of COVID-19-related support.
  - Capital spending projected to increase by 1.6 percentage points of GDP despite under-execution of foreign-financed projects.
  - Projected 2022 fiscal performance implies a deficit reduction of about 2 percentage points of GDP relative to 2021.
- 2023 fiscal stance and recommendations:
  - Authorities’ 2023 budget (prior action) assumes an overall deficit of 3.1 percent of GDP.
  - Budget supports a large increase in capital spending (1.4 percentage points of GDP) and social protection (about 0.2 percentage points of GDP).
  - Primary deficit projected at 1¾ percent of GDP; fiscal stance projected to remain close to neutral, helping to ease inflation and bring debt close to 50 percent of GDP.
  - If revenues overperform, priority should be to strengthen fiscal buffers or invest in high-quality capital projects while avoiding overheating.
  - If adverse shocks materialize, allow automatic stabilizers to operate fully.
- Fiscal consolidation path and rules:
  - A fiscal consolidation of around 1 percent of GDP will bring debt below 50 percent of GDP by 2025, consistent with fiscal rules.
  - Central Government Rules excerpt:
    - Fiscal deficit in T+1:
      - < 7.5 percent of GDP.
      - if Debt in T-1 > 40 percent of GDP: Budget deficit </= capital expenditures.
    - Current primary expenditure ceiling in T+1:
      - if 50 < Debt in T-1 </= 60 percent of GDP: Current primary expenditure growth </= average nominal GDP growth in previous 7 years.
      - if Debt in T-1 > 60 percent of GDP: Current expenditures </= tax revenues; Current primary expenditure growth </= average nominal GDP growth in previous 7 years – 0.5 pps.
    - Debt:
      - if Debt > 60 percent of GDP: Submit action plan to parliament to bring debt below 60 percent during next 5 years.
      - if 50 percent < Debt </= 60 percent of GDP: Present action plan in MTEF to bring debt below 50 percent during next 5 years.

*Source: Executive Summary, 1armea2022004 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (PDF).*

### 16.      With growth projected to stabilize around its potential in 2024–25, a gradual fiscal

### 1armea2022004 - 16.      With growth projected to stabilize around its potential in 2024–25, a gradual fiscal

### Fiscal stance and consolidation
- The fiscal path envisages an annual deficit consolidation of about ½ percentage points of GDP in 2024–25, keeping debt on a gradual declining path in line with the fiscal rules.
- During the 3-year SBA:
  - Tax revenues are expected to increase by close to 1 percentage point relative to 2022.
  - Current expenditures will return to the 2019 pre-pandemic levels.
  - Capital expenditures will increase considerably to support Armenia’s large development needs.
- Publication of a public sector balance sheet by 2024 is planned to leverage previous technical assistance on sectorization of public enterprises.

### Fiscal structural reforms and expenditure priorities
- Reform objectives under the IMF-supported program:
  - More transparent, equitable, and efficient tax system aiming to increase the tax ratio to 25 percent of GDP by 2026 through growth-friendly base-broadening measures and strengthening revenue administration capacity (June 2023 SB).
  - Current spending restraint, better budget costing and planning, and containing fiscal risks.
  - Modernization of public administration to achieve long-term efficiency gains.
- Social and spending measures:
  - Expand coverage of the Family Benefit Program from 50 to 75 percent of the eligible population (indicative target).
  - Medium-term plans to introduce universal healthcare — concept note expected by end-2022 — need careful costing and planning.
  - Plans to increase pension benefits by 2026 at a potential cost of 0.8–1.3 percent of GDP should be gradually phased in while incentivizing later retirement.

### Tax expenditures and revenue measures
- Armenia: Tax Expenditures (Budget 2023)
  - VAT: 4.40 percent
  - Of which: Health Care and Education: 1.31 percent
  - Profit tax: 0.87 percent
  - Income Tax: 1.00 percent
  - Of which: Mortgage Interest Tax Credit: 0.69 percent
  - Total: 6.28 percent
- Observations and proposed revenue reforms:
  - Armenia’s budgeted tax expenditures of about 5 percent of GDP (excluding health and education) are higher than peers; streamlining them following a detailed assessment and action plan (June 2023 SB) could yield substantial additional tax revenue.
  - Limiting the fiscal cost of the mortgage interest tax credit—which benefits mainly taxpayers in the top 10 percent of the income distribution—would improve PIT progressivity and efficiency.
  - Other potential reforms include:
    - Introducing universal PIT declarations and taxing individual capital gains.
    - Leveling the tax burden across SME and general VAT/CIT regimes.
    - Introducing a financial activities tax to support adequate taxation of economic rents in the sector.
    - Reforming excises on alcoholic and sugary beverages, and tobacco.
    - Harmonizing environmental taxes into a carbon tax.

### Revenue administration improvements
- State Revenue Committee (SRC) achievements and needs:
  - On-time CIT and VAT filings at 98.4 percent in 2021 and near 100 percent electronic filing rates.
  - Proposed amendments to empower SRC to audit individuals (March 2023 SB) to strengthen compliance risk management ahead of universal PIT declarations.
  - Further steps to boost revenue capacity: improving the tax registry, managing arrears, addressing transfer pricing practices, prohibiting high-value cash transactions, and ensuring SRC systematic access to bank information of legal entities and individual taxpayers (legislative amendment to allow exchange of bank account information for legal entities between banks and the SRC — March 2023 SB).
- Cash transaction electronic thresholds (as of July 1, 2022):
  - All business transactions exceeding 300,000 AMD (US$ 700) and transactions between individuals exceeding 500,000 AMD (US$ 1,100) must be made electronically.

### Public financial management and capital spending
- Current challenges:
  - Statistical misclassifications, lack of systematic budget monitoring and execution processes, gaps in government wage data, and weak project execution for capital spending.
- Planned actions:
  - Develop an action plan to strengthen the PIM institutional framework (June 2023 SB) to raise capital spending significantly above 3 percent of GDP.
  - Improve MOF’s fiscal risk analysis and reporting related to climate change, on-lending, and PPPs via a reinvigorated fiscal risks department.
  - Clarify SOEs’ mandate, reporting, transparency, and viability requirements and adopt a government decree clarifying requirements for the Armenian National Interest Fund (ANIF) (March 2023 SB).
  - Institute a comprehensive monitoring, approval, and control framework of local government finances; develop a concept note for such a framework (September 2023 SB).

### Monetary policy and inflation outlook
- The CBA raised the policy rate by 50 bps to 10.5 percent in November.
- Monetary policy stance consistent with bringing inflation to single digits in 2023 and back to the CBA target of 4 percent by 2025; further policy changes should remain data dependent.
- Exchange rate policy: maintain two-way exchange rate flexibility; interventions guided by need to counter disorderly market conditions and build reserves to preserve a strong NIR position.
- CBA is strengthening the monetary policy framework by implementing a financial market development action plan, enhancing communication, surveys and data collection, and transitioning to a risk-based, scenario-based approach for policy decision making.

### Financial sector resilience and macroprudential measures
- Mortgage and housing risks:
  - Rapid rises in house prices and mortgage lending require careful monitoring.
  - LTV limits introduced for new mortgages: 90 percent for AMD loans and 70 percent for FX loans.
  - Draft legislation prepared to ban mortgage lending in foreign currency.
  - Countercyclical capital buffer set at 1.0 percent effective May 2023.
  - Banks may provide loans that do not meet LTV requirements for up to 10 percent for AMD loans and 5 percent for FX loans.
  - Consider introducing DSTI and DTI caps and other borrower-based measures; regulations needed to account for income from informal sources, including remittances.
- Regulatory and supervisory enhancements:
  - Preserve capital buffers: raise capital conservation buffer (CCB) from 1.5 to 2.0 percent and buffer for systemically important banks (SRB) from 1.0 to 1.5 percent in January 2023 to partially compensate for planned adjustment of minimum capital requirements from 12 to 11 percent.
  - Maintain higher risk weights (150–200 percent) for FX exposures; restrict dividends and discretionary payments for banks unable to maintain CCB and SRB at targeted levels.
  - Require additional capital buffers where interest rate and market price risk from government security holdings is material.
  - Develop formal road map for introduction of Pillar 2 capital buffers (June 2023 SB).
  - Tighten enforcement of large exposure and internal borrower limits.
- Bank resolution and market infrastructure:
  - Strengthen resolution framework aligned with the Financial Stability Board’s Key Attributes for Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (November 2023 SB on submission of draft law to parliament).
  - Review MOUs with home supervisors of foreign subsidiaries to facilitate information sharing.
  - CBA to facilitate introduction of an over-the-counter commercial trading platform for the overnight repo market (March 2023 SB).
  - Major review of the payment system to align FMI operation and oversight with IOSCO Principles.

### Structural reforms to strengthen growth prospects
- Program supports export-led, investment-driven, and knowledge-based growth guided by the 2021–26 Government Program.
- Infrastructure:
  - Expanding infrastructure critical to support exports and attract FDI; low execution rates of foreign-financed projects constrain development.
  - Authorities will conduct a review to identify and address bottlenecks preventing completion of foreign-funded infrastructure projects (June 2023 SB).
  - Continue easing customs procedures and integrating public entities into the government’s electronic customs system.
- Access to finance and insolvency:
  - Access to finance is the main business environment constraint per the 2020 World Bank Enterprise Survey.
  - Strengthen capital markets, banks’ risk management, and a robust insolvency regime.
  - Complete review of bankruptcy legislation in H1 2023 to pave way for insolvency framework amendments (September 2023 SB).
- Agriculture and climate resilience:
  - Deep reforms needed to address low growth, declining productivity, and vulnerability to extreme weather.
  - Extend agricultural insurance scheme to cover additional risks, crops, and regions (September 2023 SB).
  - Update land registration systems, develop land markets, improve agricultural statistics (e.g., digitized registries), and support adoption of climate-tolerant seeds.
  - Develop a comprehensive climate mitigation and adaptation strategy to meet international commitments and increase sector resilience.
- Labor market and public services:
  - New employment strategy (June 2023 SB) to encourage labor force participation, especially among young and female workers, and to enhance targeting and efficiency of active labor market policies.
  - New education strategy submitted to Parliament to improve school-to-work transition and address skill mismatches, including introducing a credit system to help students transfer to secondary and higher vocational education and aligning education with market requirements.
  - Digitalization could foster public administration reforms and access to more efficient public services.

*Source: IMF content unit 1armea2022004 - 16.*

### 28.      The authorities have launched an ambitious digitalization strategy. It aims at enhancing

### 1armea2022004 - 28.      The authorities have launched an ambitious digitalization strategy. It aims at enhancing

### Digitalization strategy and public administration
- The authorities have launched an ambitious digitalization strategy to enhance access to and efficiency of business, legal, and public services through the use of integrated digital platforms at all levels of society.
- Planned reforms include:
  - the development of an interoperability framework;
  - a comprehensive strategy for electronic identity.
- Expected outcomes:
  - Digitalization reforms will spearhead public administration reforms and foster greater efficiency in public service delivery through e-government, where Armenia fares relatively high among CCA countries but lags compared to other peer countries.
- Risks and required safeguards:
  - Increased digitalization will result in new risks that will require adopting data protection standards and a mechanism for exchange of information on cybersecurity threats.

### AML/CFT, beneficial ownership, and governance
- Recent and planned measures:
  - Legislation on the public beneficial ownership register (www.e-register.am) was amended to require registration of beneficial ownership of all legal entities, not only mining companies.
  - By end-2023, the register is expected to include also non-governmental organizations, in line with MONEYVAL recommendations.
- Implementation priorities:
  - Focus on compliance, especially among SMEs, foreign companies, and entities owned by non-residents now registered in Armenia.
  - Support the independence and resources of the Corruption Prevention Commission (CPC) so it can continue operating as a specialized entity in charge of verification of income and asset declarations.
  - Further legal amendments are needed to ensure summaries of CPC’s integrity checks are made publicly available.
  - Public disclosure of asset declarations of senior leaders and those in at-risk positions would provide enhanced accountability.
- Financial intelligence and transparency:
  - Strengthening detection and investigation of tax evasion would benefit from better use of financial intelligence, including more frequent dissemination of suspicious transactions and intelligence to the SRC by the FMC.
  - Procuring and completing the planned ex-post audit of the authorities’ COVID-19 on-lending business support scheme by end-2023 would demonstrate commitment to transparency in the use and effectiveness of public money.

### The new Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) — Length and access
- Proposed features:
  - A three-year Stand-by arrangement with semi-annual reviews to monitor progress under the program.
  - The authorities intend to treat the SBA as precautionary.
- Access:
  - Access is proposed to be set at 100 percent of quota (SDR 128.8 million) and be phased equally over the duration of the arrangement.
- Purpose:
  - The SBA would help catalyze support from other IFIs and provide insurance against potential external financing needs in the event of adverse shocks.
- Under the adverse scenario described earlier (⁋13):
  - Access to Fund financing, together with additional financing provided by other development partners, will allow to maintain a reserve cover of at least 100 percent of ARA metric.

### Monitoring, performance criteria, and structural benchmarks
- Monitoring framework:
  - The program will be monitored through a monetary policy consultation clause (MPCC), quantitative performance criteria (PCs) and indicative targets (ITs), and several structural benchmarks.
- MPCC:
  - Based on an inflation path consistent with staff’s baseline projections and achieving the CBA’s inflation target of 4 percent during the program horizon. The symmetric bands around the path reflect uncertainty.
- Quantitative PCs and ITs include:
  - PCs on the floor of fiscal balance;
  - a ceiling on cumulative budget domestic lending anchored by the fiscal rules;
  - a continuous PC on the non-accumulation of external public debt arrears;
  - an indicative target on the stock of new public guarantees of external debt;
  - a floor on net international reserves (NIR) to preserve accumulated buffers while accommodating large debt amortizations;
  - a social assistance IT setting a floor to ensure adequate government spending is appropriated through the budget to support vulnerable groups through specified social programs.
- Structural benchmarks aim at:
  - greater revenue mobilization through tax policy and revenue administration reforms;
  - removing obstacles to quality infrastructure spending;
  - containing fiscal risks;
  - improving the monetary policy transmission mechanism;
  - strengthening bank supervision;
  - improving access to finance; and
  - fostering labor force participation.

### Safeguards assessment and capacity to repay
- Safeguards:
  - An updated safeguards assessment of the CBA should be completed by the first review.
  - Outstanding recommendations from the last assessment are in progress and pertain to strengthening the central bank’s organic legal framework and establishing centralized operational risk management at the CBA.
- Armenia’s financial position and repayment capacity:
  - Armenia’s outstanding credit stands at 289 percent of quota (as of September 2022) and is projected to decline to 278 by end-2022.
  - Under the adverse scenario, repayments to the Fund would peak at 7.6 percent of GIR (2.3 percent of exports of goods and services) in 2024.
  - Armenia’s capacity to repay is deemed adequate and is supported by the downward debt trajectory in the medium term, and the authorities’ track-record of reforms and sound macroeconomic management.
  - Firm commitments for the next 12 months and good prospects for financing for the full period of the arrangement are in place.

### Risks to the program
- Overall assessment:
  - Risks to the program are elevated but manageable.
- Specific risk factors:
  - Global, regional, and domestic political economy risks might constrain the authorities’ ability to follow through on reforms.
  - The authorities’ long track record of sound macroeconomic policies is expected to support reform implementation.
  - Strong cohesiveness and good coordination among IFIs will buttress the authorities’ ownership of the program.

### Staff appraisal — macroeconomic policy and reforms
- Program objectives:
  - The SBA aims to support the authorities’ efforts to maintain macroeconomic stability and promote sustainable and inclusive growth through a strong policy and structural reform agenda.
- Fiscal policy:
  - The 2023 fiscal stance is appropriate to support development needs while paving the way for gradual fiscal consolidation over the medium term.
  - If revenue overperformance persists in 2023 compared to the budget, the authorities should build fiscal buffers to meet future shocks or, subject to the cyclical position of the economy, finance high-quality fiscal or institutional reforms.
  - Gradual fiscal consolidation under the program adheres to the fiscal rules, keeps debt on a declining path, and allows space for planned social and priority capital spending.
- Fiscal institutional reforms:
  - Efforts to adopt a more transparent, equitable, efficient, and environmentally friendly tax system and a stronger revenue administration will support revenue objectives and create space for development spending.
  - Plans to improve efficiency and effectiveness of government spending, enhance public financial management—including robust fiscal risk management, transparency, and governance—and ensure higher-quality public investment are welcome.
- Monetary policy and reserves:
  - The CBA’s efforts to address inflationary pressures have been timely and proactive; the current monetary policy stance is appropriate.
  - Further policy changes should remain dependent on the evolution of inflation and inflation expectations.
  - Reforms to foster capital market development will enhance the effectiveness of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
  - Staff welcomes the CBA’s intention to preserve the existing flexible exchange rate regime, while limiting foreign exchange interventions to mitigating disorderly market conditions and maintaining adequate reserve buffers.
  - Exchange rate flexibility should remain a key shock absorber supported by other policies as needed.
  - While international reserves are broadly adequate, some further reserve accumulation in the face of capital inflows will help provide additional cover against external shocks.
- Financial sector resilience:
  - The banking system is well capitalized and liquid thanks to prudent risk management and strong supervision.
  - Continued monitoring of financial sector risks and enhancing macroprudential tools will help stem risks associated with rapid rises in housing prices and mortgage lending.
  - Efforts to strengthen the regulatory and supervisory framework, ensure banks maintain adequate capital buffers, tighten enforcement practices, and enhance the resolution framework will further buttress financial system resilience.
- Structural reform priorities:
  - Improve the business environment, foster productivity, reduce unemployment, and address climate-related challenges.
  - Achieve these objectives by developing stronger trade links, building infrastructure, improving resource management, fostering access to finance and labor force participation, completing governance reforms, and reducing informality.
  - Ambitious digitalization efforts should spearhead public administration reforms and improve public service quality and delivery.

*IMF staff report excerpt (Republic of Armenia).*

### 42.      Staff supports the authorities’ request for approval of a three-year Stand-by

### 1armea2022004 - 42.      Staff supports the authorities’ request for approval of a three-year Stand-by

### Program endorsement and documentation
- Staff supports the authorities’ request for approval of a three-year Stand-by Arrangement.
- The attached Letter of Intent and MEFP provide a strong set of policies to pursue the objectives of the program.

### Real sector developments
- Real GDP growth:
  - 2019: 7.6
  - 2020: -7.2
  - 2021: 5.7
  - 2022: 11.0
  - 2023–2027 (annual projection): 4.5, 4.5, 4.5, 4.5, 4.5
- Drivers and labor market:
  - Growth driven by consumption and services recovery supporting output to fully recover to its pre-COVID trend.
  - Nominal wage growth has been strong.
  - Unemployment (in percent): 2019: 18.3; 2020: 18.2; 2021: 15.3; 2022: 14.8; 2023–2027: 14.7, 14.6, 14.5, 14.4, 14.3
- Inflation:
  - CPI (period average; percent change): 2019: 1.4; 2020: 1.2; 2021: 7.2; 2022: 8.8; 2023: 7.5; 2024: 5.1; 2025: 4.5; 2026: 4.2; 2027: 4.1
  - CPI (end of period; percent change): 2019: 0.7; 2020: 3.7; 2021: 7.7; 2022: 10.0; 2023: 6.0; 2024: 4.5; 2025–2027: 4.0, 4.0, 4.0
  - Note: Strong demand and high food prices keep inflation pressures high.

### External sector and external financing
- Exports and imports (in millions of U.S. dollars):
  - Exports: 2019: 5,794; 2020: 3,818; 2021: 5,012; 2022: 7,786; 2023–2027: 8,525; 9,034; 9,533; 10,117; 10,743
  - Imports: 2019: -7,603; 2020: -5,082; 2021: -6,120; 2022: -9,244; 2023–2027: -10,080; -10,660; -11,252; -11,905; -12,579
- Current account balance (in percent of GDP):
  - 2019: -7.3; 2020: -3.8; 2021: -3.7; 2022: -5.6; 2023: -5.5; 2024: -5.4; 2025: -5.4; 2026: -5.3; 2027: -5.0
- Financing composition:
  - The current account deficit has widened but is mostly financed by FDI.
  - FDI (net, in millions of U.S. dollars): 2019: 233; 2020: 86; 2021: 342; 2022: 649; 2023–2027: 376; 470; 541; 562; 579
- Reserves and import cover:
  - Gross international reserves (in millions of U.S. dollars): 2019: 2,850; 2020: 2,616; 2021: 3,230; 2022: 3,746; 2023–2027: 3,547; 3,491; 3,377; 3,262; 3,178
  - Import cover (months): 2019: 6.7; 2020: 5.1; 2021: 4.2; 2022: 4.5; 2023–2027: 4.0; 3.7; 3.4; 3.1; 2.9

### Fiscal developments and medium-term fiscal stance
- Fiscal consolidation and debt:
  - A gradual fiscal consolidation will keep debt on a declining path in line with the fiscal rules.
  - Public and publicly-guaranteed (PPG) debt (in percent of GDP): 2019: 53.7; 2020: 67.4; 2021: 63.4; 2022: 55.3; 2023–2027: 53.9; 52.4; 51.1; 49.7; 48.3
  - Central Government's PPG debt (in percent): 2019: 50.1; 2020: 63.5; 2021: 60.3; 2022: 51.3; 2023–2027: 50.0; 48.7; 47.8; 47.1; 46.3
  - Share of foreign currency debt (in percent): 2019: 80.6; 2020: 77.0; 2021: 72.6; 2022: 67.7; 2023–2027: 65.4; 63.6; 61.8; 60.6; 59.9
- Revenue, expenditure, and balances (in percent of GDP):
  - Revenue and grants: 2019: 23.9; 2020: 25.2; 2021: 24.1; 2022: 24.6; 2023–2027: 24.7; 25.0; 25.3; 25.5; 25.9
  - Tax revenue (in percent of GDP): 2019: 22.1; 2020: 22.0; 2021: 22.1; 2022: 22.4; 2023–2027: 22.8; 23.1; 23.4; 23.6; 23.9
  - Expenditure: 2019: 24.9; 2020: 30.6; 2021: 28.7; 2022: 27.0; 2023–2027: 27.7; 27.5; 27.3; 27.0; 26.9
  - Overall balance on a cash basis (in percent of GDP): 2019: -1.0; 2020: -5.4; 2021: -4.6; 2022: -2.5; 2023–2027: -3.0; -2.5; -2.0; -1.5; -1.0
- Tax reform objective:
  - Tax reforms will put tax revenues on a gradual path towards the authorities’ target of 25 percent of GDP.
- Public investment:
  - Capital expenditures are projected to grow in line with the authorities’ plan to spur public investment.

### Monetary and financial sector developments
- Central Bank policy and rates:
  - The CBA raised the policy rate, reaching 10.5 percent in November (2022 reference).
  - Lending and deposit rates—already high—have been affected little.
- Money and credit (percent changes and levels):
  - Reserve money (percent change): 2019: 8.8; 2020: 18.3; 2021: 17.1; 2022: 6.2; 2023–2027 (selected): 4.4 (2023), 11.2 (2024), 10.7 (2025), 5.2 (2026), 6.1 (2027)
  - Broad money (percent change): 2019: 11.2; 2020: 9.0; 2021: 13.1; 2022: 11.8; 2023–2027 (selected): 10.2 (2023), 12.0 (2024), 9.7 (2025), 7.5 (2026), 7.6 (2027)
  - Private sector credit growth (percent change): 2019: 18.5; 2020: 14.3; 2021: -3.9; 2022: 3.0; 2023–2027: 4.0; 5.3; 5.3; 5.0; 4.9
- Financial sector indicators:
  - Recent pick-up in credit growth driven by an increase in dram mortgage loans.
  - Loan and deposit dollarization, albeit declining, remains high.
  - Banks’ profitability has improved driven by non-interest income including foreign exchange gains and lower provisioning.
  - Banks’ capital buffers are solid.
  - NPLs—excluding watch loans—have risen but remain low.
- Monetary accounts highlights (selected levels):
  - Broad money (end of period, in billions of drams): 2019: 3,085.5; 2020: 3,362.0; 2021: 3,802.6; 2022 (Dec): 4,237.0; 2023 (Dec): 4,672.1 (projection)
  - Private sector credit (in percent of GDP, end of period): 2019: 58.5; 2020: 70.8; 2021: 60.3; 2022: 62.1; 2023–2027 projections show gradual increases with 2027: 64.6
  - Dollarization in bank deposits (percent): 2019: 45.8; 2020: 43.4; 2021: 42.3; 2022: 43.1; 2023–2027: 41.4; 40.2; 37.8; 36.9; 37.1

### Balance of payments (selected figures, in millions of U.S. dollars)
- Current account (levels): 2019: -997; 2020: -478; 2021: -515; 2022: -1,036; 2023–2027: -1,142; -1,201; -1,288; -1,346; -1,377
- Trade balance: 2019: -1,722; 2020: -1,382; 2021: -1,505; 2022: -2,280; 2023–2027: -2,223; -2,189; -2,181; -2,162; -2,134
- Capital and financial account total: 2019: 1,181; 2020: 229; 2021: 927; 2022: 1,465; 2023–2027: 1,036; 1,317; 1,309; 1,310; 1,295
- Overall balance: 2019: 663; 2020: -499; 2021: 505; 2022: 429; 2023: -106; 2024: 116; 2025: 21; 2026: -36; 2027: -82

### Central government operations (selected fiscal aggregates)
- Nominal GDP (in billions of drams): 2019: 6,543.3; 2020: 6,181.9; 2021: 6,983.0; 2022: 8,293.7; 2023–2027: 9,185.6; 10,023.3; 10,893.3; 11,816.1; 12,809.6
- Total revenue and grants (in billions of drams): 2019: 1,565.5; 2020: 1,560.7; 2021: 1,683.8; 2022: 2,036.5; 2023–2027: 2,271.5; 2,505.6; 2,755.2; 3,016.5; 3,313.4
- Total expenditure (in billions of drams): 2019: 1,629.4; 2020: 1,894.6; 2021: 2,004.3; 2022: 2,240.2; 2023–2027: 2,545.1; 2,753.4; 2,969.8; 3,191.7; 3,446.1
- Overall balance (above-the-line, in billions of drams): 2019: -63.9; 2020: -334.0; 2021: -320.5; 2022: -203.7; 2023–2027: -273.6; -247.7; -214.6; -175.3; -132.7
- Program balance (in percent of GDP): 2019: -1.4; 2020: -6.4; 2021: -6.2; 2022: -4.3; 2023–2027: -4.7; -3.8; -3.3; -2.3; -2.2
- Primary balance (in percent of GDP): 2019: 0.3; 2020: -4.4; 2021: -4.0; 2022: -1.5; 2023–2027: -1.8; -0.9; -0.6; 0.2; 0.3

### Proposed Fund credit and review schedule under the Standby Arrangement
- Total available: 128.8 millions of SDRs (100.00 percent of quota; cumulative 100.00)
- Disbursement and review dates, amounts (millions of SDRs), and percent of quota (each tranche):
  - December 12, 2022 (Board approval of the arrangement): 18.400; 14.29; cumulative 14.29
  - June 9, 2023 (Observance of end-Dec 2022 PC and completion of first review): 18.400; 14.29; cumulative 28.57
  - December 11, 2023 (Observance of end-June 2023 PC and completion of second review): 18.400; 14.29; cumulative 42.86
  - June 10, 2024 (Observance of end-Dec 2023 PC and completion of third review): 18.400; 14.29; cumulative 57.14
  - December 11, 2024 (Observance of end-June 2024 PC and completion of fourth review): 18.400; 14.29; cumulative 71.43
  - June 9, 2025 (Observance of end-Dec 2024 PC and completion of fifth review): 18.400; 14.29; cumulative 85.71
  - November 21, 2025 (Observance of end-June 2025 PC and completion of sixth review): 18.400; 14.29; cumulative 100.00

*Source: IMF staff report and staff calculations as presented in the provided content.*

### Annex I. Spillovers from the War in Ukraine

### Annex I. Spillovers from the War in Ukraine

### Cross-border developments and transmission channels
- International arrivals and tourism:
  - Number of international flights increased by about 150 percent since March.
  - Number of tourists in Armenia doubled in January–September 2022 compared to the same period of 2021.
  - Spending per tourist increased by 50 percent in 2022H1 y-o-y.
  - Hotel occupancy rates in Armenia are at record highs; hotel occupancy has exceeded pre-COVID19 levels.
- Relocation of businesses and individuals (February–August 2022):
  - Around 35 thousand people moved from Russia to Armenia.
  - State Register of Legal Entities recorded newly created foreign-owned companies: 1784.
  - Newly created non-resident individual entrepreneurs: 3132.
  - Newly created foreign-owned IT sector companies: 810.
  - Newly created non-resident individual entrepreneurs in IT: 2235.
  - Increase in registered non-resident employees in Armenia: 6332 persons over the same period.
- Money transfers and banking:
  - Money transfers increased by more than 130 percent y-o-y in January–August 2022.
  - Remittances more than doubled to $1.3 billion in 2022Q2.
  - Number of bank accounts of Russian residents in Armenia rose to about 61 thousand in February–July 2022 (about a 5-fold increase).
  - Non-resident current deposits in Armenian commercial banks increased by AMD 460 billion over the same period.
- Trade with Russia:
  - Trade with Russia increased by almost 71.6 percent y-o-y in January–August 2022.
  - Exports to Russia made the largest positive contribution of 28.3 percent to overall export growth of 52.9 percent y-o-y in January–August.
  - Share of exports to Russia increased to about 36 percent in January–August 2022 from 27 percent in the same period of 2021.

### Macroeconomic and sectoral impacts
- Contribution to 2022 growth:
  - Services 2022H1 (real y-o-y): accommodation, transportation, and financial services grew by 35–40 percent; IT services grew by 26 percent.
  - Construction grew by 20 percent in 2022H1.
  - Stock of FDI grew by 25 percent y-o-y in 2022H1.
  - Investment growth driven to 17 percent.
- Price pressures and labor market:
  - Wages grew by 12.9 percent y-o-y—15.3 percent in the private sector—in January–August 2022.
  - Rental prices increased by 34 percent y-o-y by September 2022 (described as skyrocketed to historic levels).
  - Inflation picked up quickly when the war in Ukraine broke out despite monetary policy tightening and rapid dram appreciation.
- Financial sector effects:
  - Number of correspondent banking relationships in ruble and renminbi with Russian and Chinese banks increased during May–August.
  - Sanctioned bank VTB remains operational but downsized from 8th at end-2021 to 14th by asset size.
  - Gross capital inflows projected about US$ 1.4 billion for 2022; non-resident deposit increase of some US$ 0.6 billion since the beginning of the war could pose reversal risk.
  - Authorities built external buffers by carrying out US$ purchases totaling approximately US$ 0.3 billion in the first three quarters of 2022.

### Risks, uncertainties, and integration challenges
- Labor integration:
  - Survey data suggests 90 percent of international visitors are of working age (18–45 years), 77.4 percent have a high level of education, and 76.3 percent are employed—mainly in the IT sector (70.2 percent).
  - More than half of surveyed individuals intend to stay in Armenia for at least six months.
  - Challenges cited: high prices and quality of accommodation, difficulties opening bank accounts, transferring money from Russia, and accessing healthcare, education, childcare, and employment.
- Policy implications:
  - Need to maintain adequate reserve buffers to respond to potential balance of payments shocks.
  - Urgency to complete reforms to diversify Armenia’s export basket and trading partners and increase absorption capacity.
  - Importance of continued stringent monitoring of observance of international sanctions by companies and banks.

*Source: Annex I. Spillovers from the War in Ukraine.*

### Annex II. External Sector Assessment

### Overall assessment and near-to-medium term policy guidance
- Overall assessment (2021): The external position of Armenia in 2021 was broadly in line with the level implied by fundamentals and desirable policies.
- Near-term policy: Prudent fiscal policy remains important to contain excessive current account expansion amid robust growth and buoyant domestic consumption.
- Medium-term policy: Implementation of structural reforms to improve exports and attract foreign investment.

### Foreign assets, liabilities, and NIIP
- Net international investment position (NIIP):
  - NIIP improved to around -78.9 percent of GDP at end-2021, from -81.3 percent in December 2020.
  - Under staff’s baseline projections, NIIP expected to worsen slightly in 2022 and remain stable at around -80 percent of GDP in the medium-term.
- Composition:
  - Share of FDI over total liabilities declined from 44 percent of GDP at end-2016 to close to 40 percent at end-2021, indicating a rise in vulnerability as debt replaces FDI.

Key 2021 figures (percent of GDP):
- NIIP: -79.0
- Gross Assets: 48.5
- Debt Assets: 21.6
- Gross Liab.: 127.4
- Debt Liab.: 87.0

### Current account developments and assessment
- 2021 current account balance (CAB): narrowed to -3.7 percent of GDP from -3.8 percent in 2020.
- 2022 projection: current account expected to widen to around -5.6 percent of GDP due to increased imports, relative strength of the dram against the US dollar, and higher non-fuel commodity prices.
- 2023 projection: CA deficit expected to remain around 5½ percent of GDP, then gradually converge to its norm of 5 percent of GDP in the medium-term.
- EBA-Lite CA model (2021):
  - Adjusted CA: -4.1
  - CA Norm (from model): -5.0
  - CA Gap: 0.9
  - REER Gap (in percent): -3.0 (EBA-Lite), -5.4 (REER model), -3.2 (ES model)
  - Elasticity: -0.29

### Real exchange rate (REER)
- REER appreciated on average by 1.1 percent in 2021 relative to 2020.
- Between January and September 2022, REER further appreciated by about 12 percent.
- Dram appreciation against the US dollar: appreciated on average by 19 percent in nominal terms since the beginning of the war in Ukraine.

### Capital and financial accounts
- Net capital flows: increased to approximately 0.9 billion US dollars in 2021, up from 0.6 billion in 2020.
- Drivers: higher portfolio inflows (Eurobond issuances) and rebound in FDI; other capital inflows declined to -0.2 billion US dollars from 0.4 billion in 2020, reflecting contraction in loan inflows.
- Sovereign spreads and vulnerabilities:
  - Spreads on Armenia’s Eurobond increased by more than 200 basis points between end-January and end-September 2022.
  - Elevated deposit dollarization and high share of non-resident foreign currency deposits increase vulnerability to sudden shifts in global financial conditions.
- Policy priorities: Continued de-dollarization efforts and policies to increase the share of FDI in external financing, including timely implementation of structural reforms.

### Reserves and FX intervention
- Gross international reserves:
  - Increased from US$ 2.6 billion at end-2020 to approximately US$ 3.2 billion at end-2021 (~4.8 months of prospective imports).
  - SDR allocation: approximately US$ 176 million in August 2021.
  - Authorities’ US$ purchases in first three quarters of 2022: approximately US$ 0.3 billion.
- Reserve adequacy (ARA metric):
  - Reserves estimated to be over 140 percent of the ARA metric at end-2021.
  - Strengthened to 150 percent of the projected 2022 ARA metric at end-September 2022.
  - Expected to remain above 110 percent throughout the forecast horizon.

### External debt dynamics and stress tests
- External debt-to-GDP ratio:
  - Declined to 98.1 percent at end-2021 from 100.1 percent at end-2020.
  - Expected to decline substantially in 2022 due to large dram appreciation against the US dollar and to continue declining over the medium term with gradual fiscal consolidation.
- Shock sensitivity:
  - A one-time 30-percent real depreciation would raise external debt-to-GDP to above 100 percent.
  - Shocks to growth and the current account would also lead to higher external debt relative to baseline.
  - External debt remains broadly resilient to interest rate shocks given the relatively high share of concessional financing in external public debt.
- Baseline external debt projections (selected):
  - Baseline external debt path (percent of GDP): 85.9 (2018); 89.0 (2019); 100.1 (2020); 98.1 (2021); 76.6 (2022); 71.7 (2023); 69.3 (2024); 67.1 (2025); 65.1 (2026); 62.9 (2027).
  - Change in external debt: -2.9 (2018); 3.1 (2019); 11.1 (2020); -2.0 (2021); -21.5 (2022); -4.9 (2023); -2.3 (2024); -2.2 (2025); -2.0 (2026); -2.2 (2027).
  - Identified external debt-creating flows (4+8+9) in percent of GDP: -1.4 (2018); -1.7 (2019); 10.5 (2020); -7.6 (2021); -23.3 (2022); -4.0 (2023); -1.9 (2024); -1.7 (2025); -1.5 (2026); -1.6 (2027).
  - External debt-to-exports ratio (in percent): 216.5 (2018); 212.0 (2019); 336.4 (2020); 278.6 (2021); 187.7 (2022); 178.3 (2023); 175.2 (2024); 172.3 (2025); 168.7 (2026); 164.8 (2027).
  - Gross external financing need (in billions of US dollars): 2.5 (2018); 2.8 (2019); 2.6 (2020); 2.4 (2021); 3.2 (2022); 3.6 (2023); 3.9 (2024); 4.5 (2025); 4.2 (2026); 4.2 (2027).
- Scenario sensitivity (selected outcomes from figure descriptions):
  - One-time real depreciation of 30 percent occurs in 2022 and raises external debt-to-GDP materially in scenario tests.
  - Combined growth, interest rate and current account shock tests show higher debt paths relative to baseline.

### Key macroeconomic assumptions underlying baseline projections
- Real GDP growth (in percent): 5.2 (historical average); 7.6 (2019); -7.2 (2020); 5.7 (2021); 3.7 (2022); 4.5 (2023); 11.0 (2024); 4.5 (2025); 4.5 (2026); 4.5 (2027).
- GDP deflator in US dollars (change in percent): 2.7 (historical average); 1.6 (2019); 0.0 (2020); 3.8 (2021); -0.3 (2022); 4.4 (2023); 20.8 (2024); 6.3 (2025); 3.0 (2026); 2.6 (2027).
- Nominal external interest rate (in percent): 4.4 (historical average); 4.7 (2019); 4.6 (2020); 4.3 (2021); 4.3 (2022); 0.5 (2023); 4.3 (2024); 4.2 (2025); 4.2 (2026); 4.1 (2027).
- Growth of exports (US dollar terms, in percent): 12.1 (historical average); 15.7 (2019); -34.2 (2020); 29.7 (2021); 7.5 (2022); 17.6 (2023); 55.3 (2024); 9.5 (2025); 6.0 (2026); 5.5 (2027).
- Growth of imports (US dollar terms, in percent): 17.5 (historical average); 13.1 (2019); -33.2 (2020); 20.3 (2021); 3.7 (2022); 18.2 (2023); 50.8 (2024); 8.9 (2025); 5.7 (2026); 5.5 (2027).
- Current account balance, excluding interest payments (in percent of GDP): -3.4 (historical average); -3.7 (2019); 0.6 (2020); 0.3 (2021); -1.7 (2022); 3.6 (2023); -2.4 (2024); -2.6 (2025); -2.6 (2026); -2.7 (2027).
- Net non-debt creating capital inflows (in percent of GDP): 1.8 (historical average); 1.8 (2019); 0.2 (2020); 2.4 (2021); 3.0 (2022); 2.4 (2023); 4.0 (2024); 1.9 (2025); 2.2 (2026); 2.4 (2027).

*Source: Annex II. External Sector Assessment.*

### Annex III. Risk Assessment Matrix

### Annex III. Risk Assessment Matrix

### Conjunctural risks
- Intensifying spillovers from Russia’s war in Ukraine
  - Likelihood: High
  - Possible Impact: Broader sanctions on Russia could adversely affect Armenia’s trade—including tourism—remittances and investment inflows, increase food prices and inflation further, and put pressure on the dram. The sanctions may also pose financial stability and compliance risks, potentially exacerbating CBR pressures.
  - Policy Advice:
    - Maintain a tight monetary policy stance to keep inflation expectations anchored.
    - Maintain a flexible exchange rate to act as a shock absorber.
    - Build fiscal buffers and provide targeted support to the most vulnerable, especially to address potential food insecurity.
    - Mobilize external official financing in case the available resources prove insufficient to provide an adequate response.
    - Enhance supervision of the financial sector to ensure implementation of AML/CFT preventive measures that also mitigate sanctions evasion risk.

- Commodity price shocks
  - Likelihood: High
  - Possible Impact: Rising food and energy prices could build further inflationary pressures, lead to food and energy insecurity, hamper economic activity, and cause social discontent.
  - Policy Advice:
    - Maintain adequate monetary policy stance to curtail inflationary pressures.
    - Build fiscal and external buffers, reprioritize spending and provide necessary, targeted support to the most vulnerable.

- Systemic social unrest
  - Likelihood: High
  - Possible Impact: Negative spillovers from the war in Ukraine, rise in food and energy prices, shortage of food supplies, and new pandemic waves may lead to social discontent and political instability in Armenia.
  - Policy Advice:
    - Build fiscal cushions, strengthen social safety nets, undertake labor market reforms, and put in place necessary administrative and policy measures to help secure food and energy supplies.

- Abrupt global slowdown or recession
  - Likelihood: Medium (with multiple regional high/medium-high risk nodes in text)
  - Possible Impact: A slowdown in trading partners will affect economic activity and result in an abrupt bout of risk aversion for Armenia.
  - Policy Advice:
    - Allow the exchange rate to operate as a shock absorber, intervene in the fx market to address disorderly market conditions.
    - Strengthen and diversify trade channels/markets. Enhance diplomacy.

- Local Covid-19 outbreaks
  - Likelihood: Medium
  - Possible Impact: Renewed lockdowns would affect economic activity, may trigger capital outflows and dram depreciation, and cause debt defaults.
  - Policy Advice:
    - Provide fiscal measures to ensure adequate vaccine rollout for the population, and targeted support to households and companies that are most adversely affected and vulnerable to the pandemic.

- De-anchoring of inflation expectations and stagflation
  - Likelihood: Medium
  - Possible Impact: Armenia’ economic outlook could worsen due to lower export demand and remittances and depreciation of the dram. Armenia’s external debt is not sensitive to interest shocks, but public debt is sensitive to exchange rate shocks. Dollarization in the financial system also makes it vulnerable to exchange rate shocks.
  - Policy Advice:
    - Diversify trade channels, continue the de-dollarization efforts, maintain exchange rate flexibility, and strengthen banking supervision and provisions to respond in the event of higher NPLs in dollar.

### Structural Risks
- Deepening geo-economic fragmentation and geopolitical tensions
  - Likelihood: High
  - Possible Impact: The war in Ukraine and regional tensions would have adverse political and economic implications, including higher uncertainty and lower trade and investment.
  - Policy Advice:
    - Strengthen and diversify trade channels/markets. Enhance diplomacy.
    - Prepare and implement contingency plans. Strengthen social safety nets. Undertake structural reforms to build resilience of the domestic economy.

- Cyberthreats
  - Likelihood: Medium
  - Possible Impact: Highly uncertain assessment of systemic risks and potential economic costs due to insufficient information and evolving risks.
  - Policy Advice:
    - Strengthening international and regional cooperation and developing government and business contingency and continuation plans.

- Natural disasters related to climate change
  - Likelihood: Medium
  - Possible Impact: Higher frequency and severity of natural disasters would cause severe economic damages and disrupt economic activities.
  - Policy Advice:
    - Undertake a comprehensive climate risk assessment of Armenia and develop national adaptation and mitigation policies to strengthen the resilience against climate change risks.

### Domestic Risks
- Financial sector risks
  - Likelihood: Medium
  - Possible Impact: An NPL rise could undermine financial stability and increase government contingent liabilities. Sanctions could cause reputational damage to the economy and increase transaction costs.
  - Policy Advice:
    - Enforce prudential and provisioning rules that are consistent with international standards and strengthen further the regulatory and supervisory framework and the effective implementation of AML/CFT measures to support the establishment of new CBRs.
    - Implement macroprudential measures. Closely monitor the financial sector.

- Geopolitical tensions and regional conflict
  - Likelihood: High
  - Possible Impact: Armenia may face greater uncertainty, lower trade, investment, and remittances, exchange rate pressures, and food supply disruptions (e.g., due to ban on food items by Russia).
  - Policy Advice:
    - Enhance diplomacy, prepare, and implement contingency plans, strengthen social safety nets, diversify trade markets/channels, enhance monitoring of the financial sector, maintain flexibility of the exchange rate as a shock absorber.
    - CBA interventions in the FX market in case to address disorderly market conditions.

- High inflation
  - Likelihood: High
  - Possible Impact: Persistent inflation above CBA’s target and an extended period of monetary policy tightening may cause loss of access to finance, dampen economic activity, cause social discontent, and increase fiscal pressures. High food prices—including due to border disruptions—raise food security concerns.
  - Policy Advice:
    - Analyze drivers of inflation, anchor inflation expectations, deliver clear communication on monetary policy priorities, and proactively respond with adequate monetary policy adjustments, whenever required.
    - Build external and fiscal buffers to provide targeted support to the most vulnerable, if needed.

---

### Annex IV. Illustrative Adverse Scenario

- Context
  - Baseline: Armenia’s reserve position is expected to remain adequate throughout the forecast horizon (Annex II) and the country does not face a financing gap.
  - Risk: An external shock could widen the current account deficit and curtail capital inflows, creating a potential balance of payments need.

- Adverse scenario assumptions
  - Growth contraction for 2023 in the US, the Euro Area, and Russia with negative impact on Armenia’s trade balance, remittances, and capital inflows; some permanent scarring on output level with growth rates recovering by 2024–25.
  - Supply chain disruptions due to the war in Ukraine and unresolved border disruptions along Armenia’s trading routes with Russia result in a significant increase in food prices.
  - Shocks to gas prices remain moderate due to Armenia’s long-term contracts with Russia.
  - Exports: Exports of goods contract by 20 percent in 2023 (corresponding to 1.6 standard deviations of the historical change in goods exports). Service exports decline by approximately 176 million US dollars relative to the baseline (equivalent to 1.6 standard deviations of the historical change in service credits).
  - Food prices: A 20 percent increase in imported food prices (1.6 standard deviations of the historical nonfuel commodity price change) leads to a deterioration of Armenia’s terms-of-trade (by 3 percent) and a 2.0 percent increase in the 2023 imports relative to baseline.
  - Remittances: Projected to decline by 37 percent in 2023—about 1.6 standard deviations of the historical change in net transfers.
  - Capital flows: Under the baseline, net capital inflows are projected to reach a cumulative amount of US$ 2.5 billion in 2022–23. Under the adverse scenario, net inflows are projected to remain at around US$ 1.5 billion during the same period. The difference is equivalent to 1.6 standard deviations decline in other capital flows (US$ 720 million), plus a further withdrawal of US$ 300 million.

- Effects
  - A higher current account deficit and capital outflows would put downward pressures on the dram and induce depreciation of 25 percent to absorb the shock.
  - Exchange rate adjustment leads to further import compression via higher import prices and pass-through to consumer prices.
  - Staff projects a US$ 1.2 billion decline in 2023–24 imports relative to the baseline based on VAR impulse response estimates linking consumption and exchange rate shocks to imports.
  - Exports would increase somewhat after the initial phase of the shock.

- Policy responses under the adverse scenario
  - Central bank to increase the policy rate to halt inflationary pressures stemming from dram depreciation, dampening growth.
  - Limited exchange rate intervention may be needed to avoid disorderly market conditions; authorities are assumed to let the dram depreciate by about 25 percent and act as a shock-absorber.
  - Fiscal policy would allow automatic stabilizers to operate and be geared toward targeted support to the most vulnerable while maintaining long-term fiscal sustainability.
  - Scenario incorporates a moderate fiscal deficit widening relative to the baseline in 2023–24, equivalent to 0.8 percent of GDP additional deficit in 2023 and 0.5 percent in 2024. The overall deficit would revert to its baseline level by 2025.
  - A larger deficit, the dram depreciation, and lower GDP level would raise public debt by close to 9 percentage points relative to baseline in 2023.

- Implications and financing needs
  - Reserves would decline below 95 percent of the ARA metric in 2023 under the adverse scenario.
  - Access at 100 percent of quota (SDR 128.8 million) under a Fund-supported program would help maintain reserves above 95 percent of ARA metric.
  - Additional financing of about $250 million is expected to be provided by development partners to ensure that the reserves remain above 100 percent of ARA in 2023 and over the program horizon.

- Key quantified items (as presented)
  - Exports of goods contraction: 20 percent in 2023.
  - Services exports decline: approximately 176 million US dollars relative to baseline.
  - Imported food prices increase: 20 percent.
  - Terms-of-trade deterioration: by 3 percent.
  - 2023 imports relative to baseline: 2.0 percent increase (from food-price effect).
  - Remittances decline: 37 percent in 2023.
  - Baseline net capital inflows (2022–23): US$ 2.5 billion.
  - Adverse scenario net inflows (2022–23): US$ 1.5 billion.
  - Difference in other capital flows: US$ 720 million decline + US$ 300 million additional withdrawal.
  - Exchange rate depreciation assumed: 25 percent.
  - Projected decline in 2023–24 imports: US$ 1.2 billion.
  - Additional fiscal deficit: 0.8 percent of GDP in 2023; 0.5 percent of GDP in 2024.
  - Public debt rise relative to baseline: close to 9 percentage points in 2023.
  - SDR 128.8 million = 100 percent of quota access example.
  - Additional development partner financing envisaged: about $250 million.

---

### Annex V. Public Debt Sustainability Analysis

- Recent developments and 2021 data
  - Public debt declined to 63.4 percent of GDP in 2021.
  - Drivers in 2021: interest rate-growth differential contributed -5.1 percentage points; exchange rate appreciation contributed 3.8 percentage points.
  - The 2021 fiscal deficit was 4.6 percent of GDP.
  - Government financed a 10-year Eurobond worth $750 million at 3.9 percent interest rate in 2021.
  - Gross financing needs narrowed to 10.3 percent of GDP in 2021.

- Projections and baseline outlook
  - Public debt is projected to decline further to 55.3 percent and central government debt to 51.3 percent in 2022.
  - Debt is expected to remain on a declining path over the medium term in line with the fiscal rules.
  - Projected contributors: lower fiscal deficit, strong GDP growth, and exchange rate appreciation. Decline in policy lending to Nagorno-Karabakh as a share of GDP will also reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio.
  - After using the fiscal rule’s escape clause during 2020–21, authorities committed to bring central government debt below 60 percent of GDP and put it on a gradual declining path; this objective is projected to be achieved in 2022.

- Medium-term financing needs
  - Gross financing needs are projected to decline over the medium term to about 7.0 percent of GDP by 2027.
  - A $500-million Eurobond maturity implies a one-off rise in GFN in 2025, planned to be rolled-over.
  - Remaining external gross financing (on average around $600 million per annum) is projected to be met from official multilateral/bilateral sources.
  - Share of external financing projected to decline over the projection horizon, with an increase in borrowing through domestic T-bills and bond issuances, mostly in longer maturities.
  - No IMF financing is assumed in the baseline, as the authorities intend to treat the SBA as precautionary.

- Vulnerabilities and stress test findings
  - The high share of foreign currency debt remains a source of vulnerability.
  - Alternative scenarios and stress tests suggest that shocks to growth and the exchange rate would have the largest impact on debt dynamics and government financing needs.

*Source: 1armea2022004 - Annex III. Risk Assessment Matrix*

### 4. Baseline projections are subject to significant uncertainty. Historically, Armenia’s

### 1armea2022004 - 4. Baseline projections are subject to significant uncertainty. Historically, Armenia’s

### Uncertainty around the baseline projections
- Growth, primary balance, and inflation in Armenia have been volatile historically.
- External and geopolitical factors amplifying uncertainty:
  - The war in Ukraine and border tensions with Azerbaijan.
  - Potential slowdown in advanced economies.
  - Tightening of global financial conditions.
- Fan-chart ranges for government gross public debt (public sector defined as general government):
  - Symmetric distribution (10th–90th percentiles):
    - 2022: between 49 and 62 percent of GDP.
    - 2027: between 35 and 63 percent of GDP.
  - Asymmetric distribution (rules out real exchange rate appreciation) at the end of the projection horizon:
    - Debt could range between 40 and 67 percent of GDP.

### Debt structure and vulnerabilities
- Key vulnerabilities flagged by the heat map:
  - Residency composition of debt.
  - Currency composition of debt (foreign-currency–denominated debt).
- External public debt and creditor composition:
  - External public debt stood at about US$6.6 billion at end-2021 (48 percent of GDP).
  - A large share is owed to multilateral and bilateral official creditors (74 percent).
  - Outstanding Eurobonds at end-2021: US$1.75 billion (US$0.5 billion each maturing in 2025 and 2029 and US$0.75 billion maturing in 2031).
  - Average interest rate of the external public debt is relatively low at 3 percent (owing to the high share of debt to multilateral official creditors).
- Market and debt-service indicators (selected):
  - Bond Spread over U.S. Bonds (Spread (bp)) reported in table as 486 (as of noted spread footnote).
  - External public debt concentration by creditor type (2021, residency/instrument details summarized later).

### Scenarios and implications for fiscal consolidation
- Historical-average scenario (key variables at their historical averages):
  - Government debt would rise to around 63 percent of GDP in 2027.
  - Gross financing need would rise near 12.5 percent of GDP in 2027.
  - Implication: without active policy measures to reduce the fiscal deficit, debt sustainability would be jeopardized.
- Stress-test outcomes and most impactful shocks:
  - Shocks to growth and the exchange rate have the largest impact on debt indicators.
  - Combined macro-fiscal shock (real GDP contracts by 4.5 percent in 2023–24 in each year relative to baseline together with a worsening primary balance):
    - Public debt can increase to 70 percent of GDP.
    - Public gross financing needs can surge to 11.7 percent of GDP in 2027.
- Policy measures noted by the government to strengthen sustainability:
  - Implement quality tax policy and administrative measures to improve revenues as a share of GDP.
  - Reprioritize spending by reducing current expenditures and increasing the share of capital expenditures.
  - These measures are expected to strengthen fiscal sustainability and help mitigate macroeconomic shock risks.

### Stress-test details and scenario assumptions (selected underlying assumptions and shocks)
- Baseline scenario underlying assumptions (in percent unless otherwise indicated):
  - Real GDP growth: 2022 = 11.0; 2023 = 4.5; 2024 = 4.5; 2025 = 4.5; 2026 = 4.5; 2027 = 4.5
  - Inflation: 2022 = 7.0; 2023 = 6.0; 2024 = 4.5; 2025 = 4.0; 2026 = 3.8; 2027 = 3.7
  - Primary Balance: 2022 = -1.5; 2023 = -1.8; 2024 = -0.9; 2025 = -0.6; 2026 = 0.2; 2027 = 0.3
  - Effective interest rate: 2022 = 5.1; 2023 = 5.7; 2024 = 5.8; 2025 = 5.7; 2026 = 5.4; 2027 = 5.4
- Historical scenario underlying assumptions (in percent unless otherwise indicated):
  - Real GDP growth: 2022 = 11.0; 2023 = 3.7; 2024 = 3.7; 2025 = 3.7; 2026 = 3.7; 2027 = 3.7
  - Inflation: 2022 = 7.0; 2023 = 6.0; 2024 = 4.5; 2025 = 4.0; 2026 = 3.8; 2027 = 3.7
  - Primary Balance: 2022 = -1.5; 2023 = -2.5; 2024 = -2.5; 2025 = -2.5; 2026 = -2.5; 2027 = -2.5
  - Effective interest rate: 2022 = 5.1; 2023 = 5.7; 2024 = 6.0; 2025 = 6.0; 2026 = 5.8; 2027 = 5.9
- Constant Primary Balance scenario assumptions (in percent unless otherwise indicated):
  - Primary Balance held at -1.5 for 2022–2027 with other variables same as baseline for growth and inflation.
  - Effective interest rate: 2022 = 5.1; 2023 = 5.7; 2024 = 5.8; 2025 = 5.8; 2026 = 5.5; 2027 = 5.6

### Stress-test specific shocks (selected values reported)
- Primary Balance Shock scenario (selected years):
  - Real GDP growth: 2022 = 11.0; 2023 = 4.5; 2024 = 4.5; 2025 = 4.5; 2026 = 4.5; 2027 = 4.5
  - Inflation: 2022 = 7.0; 2023 = 6.0; 2024 = 4.5; 2025 = 4.0; 2026 = 3.8; 2027 = 3.7
  - Primary balance sequence: -1.5; -2.7; -1.9; -0.6; 0.2; 0.3
  - Effective interest rate sequence: 5.1; 5.7; 5.9; 5.9; 5.6; 5.6
- Real GDP Growth Shock scenario (selected years):
  - Real GDP growth: 2022 = 11.0; 2023 = 0.0; 2024 = 0.0; 2025 = 4.5; 2026 = 4.5; 2027 = 4.5
  - Inflation: 2022 = 7.0; 2023 = 4.9; 2024 = 3.3; 2025 = 4.0; 2026 = 3.8; 2027 = 3.7
  - Primary balance sequence: -1.5; -3.2; -3.9; -0.6; 0.2; 0.3
  - Effective interest rate sequence: 5.1; 5.7; 6.0; 6.1; 5.8; 5.7
- Real Interest Rate Shock:
  - Effective interest rate sequence: 5.1; 5.7; 6.4; 6.7; 6.9; 7.2 (other baseline variables held)
- Real Exchange Rate Shock:
  - Inflation: 2023 = 10.2 (with other inflation and growth as baseline)
  - Effective interest rate sequence: 5.1; 6.1; 5.6; 5.6; 5.3; 5.3
- Combined Macro-Fiscal Shock (selected):
  - Real GDP growth sequence: 11.0; 0.0; 0.0; 4.5; 4.5; 4.5
  - Inflation: 7.0; 4.9; 3.3; 4.0; 3.8; 3.7
  - Primary balance sequence: -1.5; -3.2; -3.9; -0.6; 0.2; 0.3
  - Effective interest rate sequence: 5.1; 6.1; 6.2; 6.7; 7.0; 7.2

### Composition of public debt and 2021 decomposition (selected figures)
- Total public sector debt (debt stock, end-2021, residency principle):
  - Total: 9,225.69 (In mln. US$), 100 percent of total debt, 63.4 percent of GDP.
- External (including guarantees) (2021):
  - US$6,648.40 (72.1 percent of total debt, 45.7 percent of GDP).
  - Multilateral creditors: US$3,770.89 (40.9 percent of total debt, 25.9 percent of GDP).
    - IMF: US$439.00 (4.8 percent of total debt, 3.0 percent of GDP).
    - World Bank: US$1,760.62 (19.1 percent of total debt, 12.1 percent of GDP).
    - ADB/AfDB/IADB: US$778.67 (8.4 percent of total debt, 5.4 percent of GDP).
    - Other Multilaterals: US$792.61 (8.6 percent of total debt, 5.4 percent of GDP).
    - EDB: US$324.09 (3.5 percent of total debt, 2.2 percent of GDP).
    - EIB: US$154.80 (1.7 percent of total debt, 1.1 percent of GDP).
  - Bilateral Creditors: US$1,151.17 (12.5 percent of total debt, 7.9 percent of GDP).
    - Paris Club: US$1,125.81 (12.2 percent of total debt, 7.7 percent of GDP).
    - Germany/KFW: US$417.44 (4.5 percent of total debt, 2.9 percent of GDP).
    - RF: US$356.53 (3.9 percent of total debt, 2.5 percent of GDP).
  - Bonds: US$1,701.68 (18.4 percent of total debt, 11.7 percent of GDP). (Instrument principle shows 2022 projection US$1,750.00, 19.0 percent of total debt, 12.0 percent of GDP.)
  - Commercial creditors: US$24.65 (0.3 percent of total debt, 0.2 percent of GDP).
- Domestic (including guarantees) (2021):
  - US$2,577.3 (27.9 percent of total debt, 17.7 percent of GDP).
  - Held by residents, total: US$2,566.1 (27.8 percent of total debt, 17.6 percent of GDP).
  - Held by non-residents, total: US$112.4 (1.2 percent of total debt, 0.8 percent of GDP).
  - T-Bills: US$101.1 (1.1 percent of total debt, 0.7 percent of GDP).
  - Bonds (domestic): US$2,416.7 (26.2 percent of total debt, 16.6 percent of GDP).
- Debt service (instrument principle, selected):
  - External debt service (In mln. US$) rows indicate 373.2, 406.9, 492.7 with percent of GDP 2.6, 2.2, 2.4 respectively (as shown in the decomposition table).

### Debt dynamics summary (from contributions and projections)
- Nominal gross public debt (percent of GDP) series (selected from table header):
  - 2020 = 49.1; 2021 = 67.4; 2022 = 63.4; 2023 = 55.3; 2024 = 53.9; 2025 = 52.4; 2026 = 51.1; 2027 = 49.7 (table shows additional earlier values; preserved as printed).
- Public gross financing needs (percent of GDP) series:
  - 2020 = 7.4; 2021 = 11.5; 2022 = 10.3; 2023 = 8.7; 2024 = 9.7; 2025 = 9.3; 2026 = 10.8; 2027 = 7.7; further cell shows 7.0 (table layout indicates projections across years).
- Change in gross public sector debt (cumulative row):
  - 1.6; 13.7; -3.9; -8.2; -1.3; -1.5; -1.3; -1.4; -1.4; -15.1 (as presented).
- Identified debt-creating flows (cumulative row):
  - 2.1; 15.6; -4.0; -7.4; 0.3; -0.2; 0.0; -0.5; -0.3; -8.1 (as presented).
- Primary deficit (yearly/sequence row):
  - 2.2; 4.4; 4.0; 1.5; 1.8; 0.9; 0.6; -0.2; -0.3; 4.2 (as presented).
- Primary (noninterest) revenue and grants (percent of GDP sequence):
  - 22.0; 25.2; 24.1; 24.6; 24.7; 25.0; 25.3; 25.5; 25.9; 151.0 (table formatting indicates cumulative or aggregated presentation).
- Primary (noninterest) expenditure (percent of GDP sequence):
  - 24.1; 29.6; 28.1; 26.0; 26.5; 25.9; 25.9; 25.3; 25.6; 155.2 (as presented).
- Automatic debt dynamics cumulative contribution:
  - -0.6; 10.0; -9.0; -10.6; -1.9; -1.2; -1.0; -1.1; -1.1; -16.9 (as presented).
- Interest rate/growth differential cumulative row:
  - -1.6; 5.8; -5.1; -7.3; -2.5; -1.6; -1.4; -1.4; -1.4; -15.7 (as presented).
- Exchange rate depreciation contribution (selected):
  - 1.1; 4.2; -3.8 (table shows further ellipsis indicating zeros or not applicable beyond).

*Source: IMF staff. (As presented in the source content.)*

### Annex VI. Reforming the Insolvency Regime

### Annex VI. Reforming the Insolvency Regime

### Background
- Armenia is in the process of reforming its 2006 Bankruptcy Law.
- Since the transition to a market economy, the Armenian insolvency regime has not been effective in achieving its function of preserving business value and protecting creditor rights.
- The current law has been analyzed by various institutions, such as the EBRD, the Good Governance Fund (UK) and the ADB, and all studies have revealed numerous issues in the practical operation of the system.
- A full revision offers the opportunity of bringing bankruptcy law closer to best international practices so that it can fulfil its core role in finance, business, and society.

### Reform priorities and substantive findings
- Efficiency of the insolvency process
  - Armenia is one of the few countries that has specialized insolvency courts.
  - To maximize the potential of specialization, it would be necessary to streamline the insolvency process by making full use of new technologies and by clarifying the regulation of appeals.
- The restructuring toolbox
  - Armenia lacks restructuring practice.
  - The introduction of out-of-court and hybrid restructuring mechanisms could usefully complement reforms in the insolvency regime.
- Creditor rights in insolvency
  - One of the major shortcomings of the insolvency regime is the lack of creditor control.
  - The rights of creditors should be strengthened, particularly by expanding the rights to receive information and the rights to participate in critical decisions.
- Reorganization and control of collateral
  - The most problematic area of the current regime is the relationship between reorganization proceedings and secured credit.
  - The system is biased towards providing the control of collateral to the insolvency representative.
  - Secured creditors can request the court to release the collateral, but there are no clear grounds for a judicial decision and the end result is that the rights of secured creditors are often ignored.
- Insolvency administrators
  - Aside from allegations of lack of integrity, insolvency administrators in Armenia do not appear to have the necessary qualifications.
  - It would be crucial to regulate access and requirements for the profession, establish a remuneration regime with proper incentives, and establish a supervisory and sanctioning regime, preferably administered by a specialized institution.
- Personal bankruptcy
  - There is a widespread perception that there is frequent abuse and fraud in the operation of the personal insolvency regime.
  - The law should introduce mechanisms to control fraudulent and deliberate bankruptcy, and to ensure that debtors make accurate disclosure of their assets and liabilities.

### Other issues and opportunities for comprehensive reform
- Regulation of post-petition finance in reorganizations requires attention.
- The system for the appointment of insolvency administrators requires review.
- A full reform is an opportunity to consider additional matters, including:
  - the insolvency of enterprise groups,
  - the insolvency of micro and small enterprises,
  - rules for cross-border insolvency.

*Prepared by Jose Garrido (IMF, Legal Department).*

### 3.      The enclosed Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) and the

### 1armea2022004 - 3.      The enclosed Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) and the

### Program request and intent
- Government requests a 36-month Stand-By Arrangement in the cumulative amount of SDR 128.8 million (100 percent of quota).
- The Stand-By Arrangement is intended to be precautionary and to provide insurance against external shocks.
- Government will treat the MEFP policies as adequate to achieve program objectives and will consult the IMF in advance of any revisions to the MEFP policies; will provide IMF staff with data and information necessary for monitoring.

### Recent developments (selection of key facts)
- Real GDP surged by 11 percent in the first half of 2022, driven by private consumption and led by services, manufacturing, and construction.
- Headline inflation declined to 9.1 percent year-on-year; core inflation rose to 10.2 percent in August.
- Current account deficit was 4 percent of GDP in the first half of 2022, largely financed by FDI.
- Dram appreciation of 19 percent in January–August 2022.
- Gross international reserves climbed to US$ 3.6 billion (4½ months of imports) at end-August 2022, supported by CBA foreign exchange purchases.
- CBA raised the policy rate to 10.5 percent in November (tightening since end-2020).
- Fiscal surplus of 0.6 percent of expected annual GDP in the first three quarters of 2022 against a budgeted deficit of 2.5 percent of GDP.
- Higher-than-budgeted tax revenue contributed 0.9 percent of GDP to the overperformance.
- Public debt declined sharply at end-June 2022 due to strong fiscal and GDP growth and dram appreciation.
- Financial soundness indicators of the banking sector continue to improve; authorities monitor risks from quickly rising mortgage lending.
- Structural reforms under the previous SBA progressed in governance, business environment, targeted health and social spending.

### Outlook for 2023 and the medium term; risks and scenarios
- Real GDP: double-digit growth expected in 2022; deceleration projected in 2023 as monetary policy tightens and global growth slows; convergence to potential over the medium term.
- Inflation: expected at around 10 percent by end-2022; projected to moderate significantly by the second half of 2023 and converge to the CBA’s 4 percent target within the program horizon.
- Current account: projected to widen in the second half of 2022 and gradually converge to about 5 percent of GDP in the medium term.
- Risks:
  - Downside: renewed regional tensions; tighter global financial conditions limiting capital inflows and affecting remittances and trade; logistical bottlenecks and higher food prices raising inflation and depressing consumption.
  - Upside: strong 2022 growth could carry into 2023, causing overheating and rising inflation; new transportation links, integration of international visitors, increased exports, and full implementation of the 2021–26 agenda could yield higher medium-term growth.

### Fiscal policy stance and targets
- 2023 budget: as a prior action, adopt a 2023 budget with an overall deficit of around 3 percent of GDP to allow increased capital spending while containing current expenditures and keeping debt-to-GDP on a declining path.
- 2024–25 path: narrow the deficit in line with the cyclical position and the rules-based fiscal framework and reduce debt toward 50 percent of GDP.
- Any revenue over-performance to be allocated to improve fiscal buffers and institutional resilience.

### Fiscal reforms and quantitative goals
- Revenue-enhancing measures:
  - Aim to increase tax revenues (including social security contributions) to 25 percent of GDP over the medium term.
  - Conduct expenditure reviews and prioritization.
  - Complete reforms to ensure higher-quality public investment.
- Pension measures:
  - Government program envisages average pension reach level of minimum consumption basket and minimum pension reach food security basket; potential fiscal cost of 0.8–1.3 percent of GDP.
  - Plan to phase in increases gradually, initially focusing on minimum pensions; incentivize later retirement; encourage voluntary participation of self-employed and farmers in Pillar II.
- Childcare: intend to make childcare benefits for children under the age of two universal (with appropriate work incentives) as of 1 January 2023.
- Public investment: improve PIM process for infrastructure development; ensure PIM fully operational (action plan, June 2023 SB).

### Revenue policy details and tax-administration measures
- Tax policy changes:
  - Implement approved mining fiscal regime reform from January 1, 2023.
  - Gradually repeal mortgage interest tax credit associated with new developments in Yerevan.
  - Move toward a pre-filled universal PIT declaration and introduce taxation of individual capital gains.
  - Maintain a simple and unitary-rate VAT regime.
  - Assess tax expenditures (including indirect taxes) to identify opportunities for rationalization (June 2023 SB).
  - Harmonize tax burden across firms of different sizes by simplifying compliance rather than preferential tax treatment for small enterprises.
  - Excise reform to revise specific excises on alcohol, tobacco, and other goods; increase stamp duty on gambling; assess harmonization of environmental taxes into a unified carbon price (or proxy).
- Revenue administration strengthening:
  - Enhance SRC capacity to monitor taxpayers and sources of income; introduce universal income tax declaration with pre-filled information.
  - Grant SRC authority to audit natural persons and expand indirect audit methods (March 2023 SB).
  - Amend legislation to grant SRC power to obtain bank account information of legal entities on request (March 2023 SB).
  - Develop concept note and roadmap for SRC access to bank information for individuals, balancing enforcement and confidentiality.
  - Develop implementation plan to assign transfer pricing audit responsibilities within SRC with access to data and increased resources.

### Efficiency-improving expenditure policies and social measures
- Wages: establish system to regularly collect and analyze general government wage bill and better integrate compensation and employment policies into the budget process.
- Health: working with World Bank to introduce comprehensive health coverage; finalize concept note by end of 2022 and reflect estimated costs in next MTEF.
- Social safety nets: improve coverage and targeting of Family Living Standards Enhancement Benefits via beneficiary registration, vulnerability assessment (Hybrid Means Testing), and labor market incentives.
- Review effectiveness and efficiency of support to Nagorno Karabakh with NK authorities.

### Public financial management, fiscal risk, and transparency
- MoF reformulation to enhance institutional, personnel, and analytical capacities; improve expenditure classification, monitoring, and budget execution reporting.
- Program-based budgeting: conduct regular program monitoring and evaluations; establish coordinating council for budget execution.
- Public investment management: develop action plan to strengthen PIM institutional framework and processes (June 2023 SB); improve PPP transparency by publishing contracts, analyzing fiscal risks, and disclosing lifetime fiscal implications in 2023 budget.
- Fiscal risk management:
  - MoF fiscal risk department to conduct monitoring, assessment, and management of fiscal risks, including contingent liabilities from financial sector, in coordination with CBA.
  - Mainstream and improve quality and coverage of fiscal risks in budget documentation.
  - Develop concept note specifying mandate, reporting, transparency, and viability requirements of public sector units; adopt government decree enacting requirements for strategic SOEs such as ANIF (March 2023 SB).
  - Prepare concept note for monitoring, approval and control framework related to local governments and local government borrowing (September 2023 SB).
- Debt and cash management: strengthen cash planning and management; improve data exchange between CBA and MoF for deficit financing and liquidity management, including enhanced cash forecasting and debt flow templates.
- Government financial statistics: publish public sector balance sheet; improve cooperation across Armstat, MOF, and CBA; consider clarifying statistical treatment of lending to NK in fiscal accounts consistent with the Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014.

### Monetary and exchange rate policies
- Continue inflation-targeting framework; monitor inflation outlook to determine necessary policy rate changes.
- Seek to foster domestic financial market development and deepen financial inclusion to enhance monetary transmission amid global supply shocks and high dollarization.
- Enhance communications toolkit and improve data collection and surveys, especially on inflation expectations.

*Attachment I. Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP), Republic of Armenia*

### 12.      Our exchange rate policy will continue to support the inflation targeting

### 12.      Our exchange rate policy will continue to support the inflation targeting

### Exchange rate policy
- Maintain strong commitment to exchange rate flexibility; exchange rate to play a shock-absorbing role on both sides.
- CBA foreign exchange interventions limited to mitigating disorderly market conditions, while maintaining healthy reserve buffers.

### Financial sector stability and development
- Implemented measures:
  - Implemented Basel III capital and liquidity standards; enhanced risk-based supervision.
  - Introduced macroprudential LTV limits on new mortgages: 90 percent for AMD loans and 70 percent for FX loans.
- Pillar 2 capital buffers (June 2023 SB):
  - Develop a formal roadmap for introduction of Pillar 2 capital buffers.
  - Update regulatory requirements on Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP) in line with Basel standards.
  - Develop internal tools, methodologies and processes to assess and challenge banks’ own estimates of Pillar 2 capital add-ons.
  - Develop governance structure for review and approval of Pillar 2 capital requirements and other supervisory measures for individual banks.
  - Enhance capacity to assess and rate banks’ material risks and quality of risk management, including those related to Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing.
- Additional near-term measures:
  - Maintain higher risk weights (150 – 200 percent) and higher loan loss provision for FX loans (20 percent higher) to mitigate FX risks until introduction of Pillar 2 buffers.
  - Continue to restrict payment of dividends and other discretionary distributions for banks unable to maintain the Capital Conservation Buffer and/or the buffer for systemically important banks at the CBA targeted levels.
- Large exposure and related-party limits:
  - Banks whose exposures exceed single external and internal borrower limits of 20 and 5 percent, respectively, have gradually decreased them per schedules agreed with the CBA; exposures monitored closely and enforcement practices to be strengthened.
- Recovery and resolution planning (November 2023 SB):
  - Submit to parliament a draft law for an enhanced bank resolution framework in line with the Financial Stability Board’s Key Attributes for Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions.
  - Improve capacity to assess banks’ recovery plans, develop resolution plans for systemically important banks, and effectively resolve weak banks.
- Capital market and market infrastructure:
  - Continue implementation of the Government’s 2020 capital market development action plan, including improving tax transparency and certainty of securities taxation.
  - Facilitate introduction of an over-the-counter commercial trading platform for the overnight repo market (March 2023 SB).
  - Assess payment systems and market infrastructure against IOSCO’s Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures and address gaps.
- Real estate and borrower risk mitigation:
  - Monitor and mitigate risks from rapidly rising real estate prices; developed draft legislation to restrict mortgage lending in foreign currency.
  - Consider (i) setting well-calibrated countercyclical capital buffers; and (ii) introducing new macroprudential borrower-based tools as necessary.
  - Develop supervisory guidelines for banks to comprehensively assess all income sources of borrowers and collect relevant information needed to introduce new borrower-based tools.

### Structural reforms
- Overall orientation:
  - Government Program for 2021–26 emphasizes a knowledge-based, export-oriented, investment-driven growth model to foster productivity, reduce poverty, and enhance social protection.
  - Priorities include developing trade links, infrastructure for connectivity and green energy, improving transport/land/water management, access to finance, labor force participation, governance reforms, reducing informality, and digitalization of public administration.
- Planned reforms and actions:
  - Infrastructure development, trade diversification, and investment:
    - Conduct a study, with IMF TA support, to identify bottlenecks in execution of foreign-funded projects (June 2023 SB).
    - Develop strategy to evaluate capacity to export specific high value-added products in third countries and a roadmap to raise exporters' awareness of selected target markets.
    - Accelerate digitization of cross-border documents for customs declarations and streamline cross-border trade requirements.
  - Access to finance, especially for SMEs:
    - Strengthen the insolvency regime and enhance corporate transparency.
    - Approve a concept note on review of bankruptcy legislation (September 2023 SB) to strengthen creditors' rights.
    - Complete review and approval of the new Corporate Governance Code.
    - Develop programs for research and innovation to support SMEs.
    - Review consumer protection rules to regulate relationships between construction developers and clients.
  - Human capital and labor market policies:
    - Improve education infrastructure and curriculum; address skill mismatches, low labor force participation—especially among women—and high structural unemployment.
    - Reform tertiary vocational education (TVET) by implementing the education strategy action plan to (i) consolidate the TVET sector, (ii) align initial and tertiary VET systems, and (iii) integrate study pathways toward tertiary VET.
    - Approve a costed employment strategy, including to bolster active labor market policies (June 2023 SB).
    - Introduce measures to expand access to early childhood development programs and services to foster female labor force participation and develop human capital.
  - Agriculture policies:
    - Address fragmented land ownership and small-scale farming by introducing a modern land registration system and developing land rental and sales markets.
    - Align agricultural sector statistics with international best practice, reduce informality, and broaden the taxable base of the agricultural sector.
    - Expand the existing agricultural insurance scheme to cover more risks, regions, and crops (September 2023 SB).
    - Improve infrastructure and strengthen management of water resources.
  - Governance and rule of law:
    - Expand anti-corruption efforts and enhance business climate to facilitate foreign investment.
    - Reinforce resources, capacity, and independence of the judiciary.
    - Strengthen legal framework for domestic politically exposed persons by introducing regulations on receiving gifts and strengthen legislative protection of whistle-blowers.
    - Continue improving effectiveness of AML/CFT framework by reviewing existing legislation and, if necessary, bringing it into compliance with relevant international standards.
    - Fully implement the recently amended legal framework for beneficial ownership.
    - Finalize and publish results of an ex-post audit of the COVID-19 on-lending business support scheme.
- Public administration reform:
  - Ambitious reform aims to: (i) develop a data-driven, result-oriented, and accountable strategic planning system; (ii) ensure citizen-centric and technology-based state and community service delivery; (iii) move toward a merit-based and professional public service; and (iv) build institutions to ensure best value for money.
  - Frontloaded implementation focused on institution building; plan to complete a functional review of the nonfinancial public sector and create a fiscal council over time.
  - Introduce an annual process for adjusting basic salaries guided by resource availability and periodic comprehensive pay reviews to establish greater consistency in remuneration across government and between public and private sectors.
- Digital transformation:
  - Prepare a roadmap for introduction of national digital ID and interoperability of services across providers.
  - Requirements include: (i) review or introduction of data- and consumer-protection laws and development of cyber security capacity; (ii) creation of necessary infrastructure and standards; (iii) clear communication strategy on digital ID functions, scope, risks, and safeguards.
  - Create and resource an innovation center or sandbox to promote fintech development and facilitate regulatory framework for new firms and business models.
  - Reduce informality through legislation requiring electronic payments for high-value transactions.
- Climate change strategy:
  - Design a comprehensive strategy to fight climate change; acknowledge rising average temperature, declining average annual precipitation, and increased variability of climate conditions.
  - Adopted climate mitigation and adaptation targets in 2021–26 government program and codified in legislation (decree N 610-L).
  - Study options to introduce carbon pricing (or proxy pricing) and consider recycling revenues through targeted transfers to offset most of the increase in fossil fuel and electricity prices.
  - Consider sectoral instruments such as feebates in transport, power, industry, building, forestry, extractive, and agricultural sectors.
  - Engage in public investment to transition to a cleaner energy system and develop a more coherent regulatory framework.
  - Accelerate adaptation to climate change as outlined in sectoral adaptation strategy documents.
  - Success dependent on adequacy of international financial, technological, and capacity-building support.

### Program monitoring and safeguards
- Monitoring framework:
  - Program monitored through quantitative performance criteria, indicative targets, a monetary policy consultation clause, and structural benchmarks.
  - Semiannual program reviews based on end-June and end-December test dates.
  - First review expected on or after June 9, 2023 and will assess performance as of end-December 2022.
  - Second review expected on or after December 11, 2023 and will assess performance as of end-June 2023.
  - All quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets listed in Table 1; structural benchmarks in Table 2; Technical Memorandum of Understanding defines quantitative PCs and monetary policy consultation clause and data provision requirements.
  - During IMF-supported program period, authorities will not introduce or intensify any exchange restrictions, introduce or modify multiple currency practice and will continue to comply with all obligations under Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreements.
- Safeguards:
  - CBA to maintain a strong safeguards framework and internal controls environment in accordance with best practice and international standards.
  - An updated safeguards assessment to be completed by the time of the First Review.
  - Continue current best practice of engaging independent external audit firms to conduct annual audit of the CBA’s financial statements in accordance with international standards.

### Key quantitative performance criteria and indicative target figures (as presented)
- Net official international reserves (stock, floor, in millions of U.S. dollars): 1,6001,5311,5761,4751,465
- Program fiscal balance (flow, floor): -384-124-211-315-465
- Budget domestic lending (cumulative flow, ceiling): 5 10 10 10 10
- External public debt arrears (stock, ceiling, continuous criterion): 00000
- MPCC / Inflation bands (percent):
  - Inflation (upper-outer band, inflation consultation, percent): 12.5 11.5 10.5 9.5 8.5
  - Inflation (upper-inner band, percent): 11.5 10.5 9.5 8.5 7.5
  - Inflation (mid-point, percent): 10.0 9.0 8.0 7.0 6.0
  - inflation (lower-inner band, percent): 8.5 7.5 6.5 5.5 4.5
  - Inflation (lower-outer band, inflation consultation, percent): 7.5 6.5 5.5 4.5 3.5
- Indicative targets:
  - New government guaranteed external debt (stock, ceiling, in millions of USD): 100.........100
  - Social assistance spending of the government (flow, floor): 65.0 20.0 40.1 60.1 80.2
- Program exchange rate:
  - Program exchange rate of the Armenian dram to the U.S. dollar is set at 405.65 dram per one U.S. dollar.

### Selected structural benchmarks and deadlines (as presented)
- Prior Action: MOF — Adopt 2023 budget with an overall deficit of around 3 percent of GDP.
- March 2023:
  - MOF/SRC — Publish a detailed assessment of tax expenditures and an action plan for their rationalization.
  - MOF/SRC — Amend the Tax Code to empower the SRC with authority to audit natural persons and include broader indirect audit methods.
  - DPM/CBA/MOF/SRC — Amend legislation to allow exchange of bank account information for legal entities on request and to allow SRC access to bank account information for legal entities refusing to provide it upon a court order.
  - CBA (March 2023) — Facilitate introduction of an over-the-counter commercial trading platform for the overnight repo market.
- June 2023:
  - DPM/MOE/MOF — Adopt a government decree clarifying mandate, reporting, transparency, and viability requirements for ANIF and its subsidiaries, based on concept note for public sector units.
  - CBA (June 2023 SB) — Develop a formal roadmap for introduction of Pillar 2 capital buffers.
  - DPM/MOF/MTAI — Conduct a study to identify bottlenecks in execution of foreign-funded projects.
  - MLSA — Approve a costed employment strategy, including to bolster active labor market policies.
- September 2023:
  - DPM/MOE/MOF — Develop an action plan to strengthen the PIM institutional framework and processes to ensure an effective cycle of planning, budgeting, implementing, and monitoring of large capital projects.
  - MOF — Develop a concept note on monitoring, approval, and control framework related to local governments and local government borrowing.
  - MOJ (September 2023) — Draft and submit the concept paper on review of the legislation on bankruptcy.
  - MOE (September 2023 SB) — Expand the agricultural insurance scheme to cover more risks, regions, and crops.
- November 2023:
  - CBA (November 2023 SB) — Prepare and submit to parliament a draft law for an enhanced bank resolution framework in line with the Financial Stability Board’s Key Attributes for Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions.

*Source: Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies dated November 15, 2022 (Republic of Armenia).*

### 3. The program sets PCs, ITs, and the Monetary Policy Consultation Clause (MPCC) for defined

### 3. The program sets PCs, ITs, and the Monetary Policy Consultation Clause (MPCC) for defined test dates

### Program conditionality: PCs, ITs, and MPCC
- Performance criteria (PCs):
  - Floor on the net official international reserves (NIR) of the Central Bank of Armenia (CBA).
  - Floor on the program fiscal balance.
  - Ceiling on domestic budgetary lending.
  - Ceiling on the stock of external public debt arrears (continuous).
- Indicative targets (ITs):
  - Ceiling on new government guaranteed external debt.
  - Floor on social spending of the government.
- Monetary Policy Consultation Clause (MPCC):
  - Headline inflation (see MPCC details below).

### Net official international reserves (NIR): definition and monitoring
- NIR (stock) of the CBA = total gross official international reserves (excluding commercial bank required and excess reserves at CBA in FX) minus gross official reserve liabilities.
- Gross official international reserves include:
  - CBA’s holdings of monetary gold (excluding amounts pledged as collateral).
  - Holdings of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), including SDR allocations.
  - The country’s reserve position at the IMF.
  - Holdings of convertible currencies in cash or in nonresident financial institutions (deposits, securities, or other financial instruments).
- Gross reserves held in the form of securities and other financial instruments are marked to market.
- Excluded from gross reserves:
  - Balance on the government’s Special Privatization Account (SPA).
  - Capital subscriptions in foreign financial institutions and illiquid foreign assets.
  - Any assets that are pledged, collateralized, or otherwise encumbered.
  - Claims on residents.
  - Claims in foreign exchange arising from derivatives in foreign currencies vis-à-vis domestic currency (such as futures, forwards, swaps, and options).
  - Precious metals other than gold.
  - Assets in nonconvertible currencies and illiquid assets.
- Official reserve liabilities defined as:
  - Total outstanding liabilities of the government and the CBA to the IMF (excluding SDR allocations).
  - Convertible currency liabilities of the CBA to nonresidents with an original maturity of up to and including one year.
  - Commitments to sell foreign exchange arising from derivatives (such as futures, forwards, swaps, and options).
- Monitoring and conversion:
  - NIR is monitored in U.S. dollars.
  - For program monitoring, assets and liabilities in convertible currencies other than the U.S. dollar are converted into dollar-equivalent values using the convertible exchange rates as specified in Table 1.

### MPCC: Headline inflation definition and consultation triggers
- Headline inflation = year-on-year rate of change of the Consumer Price Index as measured by Armenia’s National Statistics Service.
- Consultation triggers for the December 2022 test date:
  - MPCC considered met if headline inflation falls within the upper and lower (outer bands) around the mid-point target specified in Table 1 in the LOI/MEFP.
  - Consultation with IMF Board triggered if inflation falls outside the outer bands for the end December 2022 test date; consultation will address:
    - The stance of monetary policy and whether the Fund-supported program remains on track.
    - Reasons for deviations from the specified band, taking into account compensating factors.
    - Proposed remedial actions, as deemed necessary.
  - Staff consultation clause: CBA will consult with IMF staff on the outlook for inflation and the proposed policy response if inflation falls outside the inner bands and within the outer bands for the December 2022 test date.
- Inflation consultation bands (as presented):
  - Dec-22Jun-23
  - Upper  outer band12.510.5
  - Upper  inner band11.59.5
  - Center point10.08.0
  - Lower Inner band8.56.5
  - Lower outer band 7.55.5

### External public debt arrears PC
- Definition:
  - External public debt arrears = external debt obligations of the government that have not been paid when due in accordance with the relevant contractual terms (taking into account any contractual grace periods).
- Scope and monitoring:
  - This PC excludes arrears on external financial obligations of the government subject to rescheduling.
  - The PC is monitored continuously by the authorities; any occurrence of new external arrears should be immediately reported to the Fund.
  - Ceiling on external payment arrears is set at zero.

### Program fiscal balance: measurement and components
- Program fiscal balance:
  - Cumulative from the beginning of the fiscal year.
  - Measured from the financing side as the negative of the sum of net domestic banking system credit to the central government, net domestic nonbank financing, and net external financing to the central government.
  - If a general subsidy or any other fiscal transaction is introduced off-budget, the overall balance will be measured including the subsidy and other fiscal transactions as part of government spending.
- Component definitions:
  - Net banking system credit to the central government = change during the period of net credit to the central government.
  - Net nonbank financing = sum of:
    1. Change during the period of outstanding treasury bills and bonds to nonbanks (including accrued interest for treasury bills and excluding accrued interest for treasury bonds).
    2. Any other disbursement or transaction that increases nonbanks’ claims on the central government plus withdrawals from the Special Privatization Account (SPA) or the treasury sub-account containing privatization proceeds in drams, less amortization paid by the central government to private resident nonbank agents.
  - Net external financing = total debt-increasing disbursements from non-residents to the central government (including Fund net purchases credited directly to the government accounts at the CBA) less total amortization from the central government to non-residents. Net external financing also includes any privatization proceeds received from non-residents in foreign currency and not held in the SPA.
- Treatment of net lending:
  - External and domestic net lending, recorded as financing items, are excluded from the calculation of the program fiscal balance; this effectively treats net lending as an expenditure item when loans are made and as a revenue item when loans are repaid.

### Specific exclusions and accounting treatments
- Transactions related to extension of the operating life of the Metsamor nuclear power station (lending from the Russian Federation to the Ministry of Finance of Armenia and from the MoF to the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant JSC) will be excluded from the measure of the program fiscal deficit.
- Project implementation units with accounts at the CBA:
  - Grants received by these units are recorded in fiscal accounts as external grants on the revenue side and as foreign-financed expenditure on the expenditure side.
  - Loans to finance investments intermediated through the banking system are recorded in financial accounts as a financing item below the line and excluded from net lending.
- Special Privatization Account (SPA) treatment:
  - Foreign currency proceeds from selling enterprises credited to the SPA; use is reflected in the state budget.
  - SPA held at the CBA; proceeds invested abroad together with the CBA’s international reserves.
  - SPA proceeds included in CBA monetary accounts as part of net foreign assets with a counter entry in other items net.
  - Any withdrawal from the SPA accounted for as privatization proceeds used to finance the budget and recorded below the line.
  - Domestic currency proceeds from selling enterprises to residents are deposited in a sub-account of the treasury single account and treated as a financing item recorded below the line.
  - Privatization proceeds received from non-residents in foreign currency and not held in the SPA are treated as a financing item (sale of financial assets) and recorded below the line.

### Domestic budgetary lending: definition and exclusions
- Defined as the gross amount of new loans made to resident individuals, enterprises, or entities financed from the state budget or other general government resources.
- Includes, but is not limited to, loans financed from the Economic Stabilization Fund and lending under existing or prospective government programs (e.g., agricultural sector support and real estate development programs).
- Lending operations related to targeted projects financed with external loans and grants are excluded from the calculation of the ceiling on budget domestic lending.

### Ceiling on government guaranteed external debt (IT)
- A cumulative ceiling (IT) of $100 million for the program period applies to new government guarantees of the total of concessional and non-concessional external financing, excluding the Eurobond and any similar refinancing instruments.
- Measurement and coverage:
  - Issuance of debt guarantees measured at the exchange rates listed in Table 1.
  - Limit covers debt guarantees issued by the general government to entities outside the general government (excluding the CBA).
  - Guarantee issuance monitored monthly; the Ministry of Finance will provide data within 21 days from the end of the month.

### Social assistance spending floor (IT)
- Floor on social assistance spending of the government includes:
  - Family Living Standards Enhancement Benefits.
  - Childcare benefits for children less than two years of age.
  - Allowances for old age, disability, and loss of breadwinner.

### Quantitative adjusters and modifications to PCs/ITs
- Definitions used for adjusters:
  - Budget support grants to the public sector = grants received by the general government for direct budget support from external donors and not related to project financing.
  - Project support grants = grants received by the general government for public sector projects.
  - Budget support loans to the public sector = disbursements of commercial loans (e.g., Eurobonds), loans from bilateral and multilateral donors for budget support, and Fund purchases credited directly to the government accounts at the CBA.
  - Project financing to the public sector = disbursements of loans from bilateral and multilateral donors for public sector projects.
- Adjustments to the floor on NIR:
  - Adjusted upward (downward) by the cumulative amount of any excess (shortfall) of budget support grants and loans, CBA project financing, EEU customs pool transfers and government project financing loans and grants including for onlending disbursed through the CBA, compared to program amounts as indicated in Table 2.
  - Adjusted downward for any external public debt amortization amounts in excess of program amounts.
  - Adjusted upward by the amount of any privatization proceeds received from non-residents in foreign currency and not held in the SPA.
- Adjustments to the floor on the program fiscal balance (cash basis):
  - Adjusted upward (downward) by the cumulative total amount of the budget support grants received in excess (shortfall) of the program amounts (Table 2), subject to a cap of $100 million per year in either direction.
  - Adjusted downward (upward) by the cumulative total amount of the project financing loans received in excess (shortfall) of the program amounts (Table 2), subject to a cap of $100 million in either direction.
- Adjustment to the ceiling on domestic budgetary lending:
  - Adjusted upward by the amount of undisbursed funds under domestic budgetary lending programs approved in the previous year.

*Source: IMF staff (1armea2022004 - 3. The program sets PCs, ITs, and the Monetary Policy Consultation Clause (MPCC) for defined test dates).*

### 17. The government and the CBA will provide the IMF the information specified in the following

### 17. The government and the CBA will provide the IMF the information specified in the following

### Reporting requirements (selected items from the table)
- CBA balance sheet
  - Summary — Frequency: Daily — Timing: The following working day
  - Summary at program exchange rates; and by chart of accounts at actual official exchange rates — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within 25 days of the end of each month
- Monetary survey
  - Summary banking system balance sheet for the central bank at both program exchange rates and by chart of accounts at actual official exchange rates; the consolidated balance sheet of commercial banks by chart of accounts at actual official exchange rates — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within 25 days of the end of each month
- International reserves
  - By chart of accounts; at (i) program exchange rates; and (ii) at actual official exchange rates — Frequency: Daily — Timing: The following working day
- Foreign exchange market
  - Official exchange rates (buying and selling); daily trade volume, and weighted average exchange rate of the interbank, intrabank and Nasdaq-OMX — Frequency: Daily — Timing: Within 1 day
  - CBA foreign exchange operations, (exchange rate, volume) — Frequency: Daily — Timing: Within 1 day
- Interest rates
  - Refinance rate — Frequency: At least monthly — Timing: Within 1 days of the CBA Board decision
- Interbank money market
  - Daily interbank repo volume and interest rate and number of trades — Frequency: Daily — Timing: Within 1 day
- CBA operations
  - Repo (reverse repo) operations, open market operations, Lombard credits, deposit facility, and foreign exchange swaps (volumes, maturity, yields, exchange rates) — Frequency: Daily — Timing: Within 1 day
- Bank liquidity
  - Reserves and excess reserves, by currency — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within 15 days of the end of each reference period
- Interest rates and flows of the funds attracted and allocated by commercial banks
  - By currency and maturity — Frequency: Weekly — Timing: First working day of the next week
- T-bill and coupon bond financing, CBA securities
  - Auction data: date, original and remaining maturities, issuance volume, allocation, average yield and coupon yield (if available) — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: First working day of the next month
- Banking data
  - Sectoral distribution of loans and deposits; dollarization of loans and deposits; loan maturities; interbank rate, by volume and maturity; T-bill rate, bond yield; deposit and lending rates, by maturity; monthly weighted average interest rate on government bonds — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within 25 days of the end of each month
- Banking indicators
  - Capital adequacy; asset composition and quality; profitability; liquidity; open FX positions; and compliance with prudential norms — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within 30 days of the end of each month
- Banking sector stress tests
  - Results of stress tests on exchange rate, liquidity, and credit risk — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within 30 days of the end of each month
- On-lending via commercial banks
  - On lending via the CBA and government (from, KfW, WB, ADB, etc.) by type of on-lending projects (including loan disbursements and repayments) — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within 10 days of the end of each month.
- CPI
  - Index of core inflation — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within 21 days of the end of each month
- Transfers
  - Non-commercial transfers of individuals — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within 35 of the end of each month
- Other monetary data
  - IFS format — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within 45 days of the end of each month
- Balance of payments
  - Detailed balance of payments data — Frequency: Quarterly — Timing: Within 95 days of the end of each quarter
- T-bill and coupon bond financing (holders)
  - By holders, i.e., CBA, resident banks, resident nonbanks, and nonresidents — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within 7 days of each month
- External debt
  - Disbursements and stock of outstanding short-term and contracting or guaranteeing and outstanding stock of medium-and long-term external debt of the government, the CBA, and state-owned companies (by company); any stock of arrears on external debt service and outstanding stock of government guarantees and external arrears — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within 21 days of the end of each month. For project implementation units, within 21 days of the end of each month (preliminary data) and within 45 days of the end of each month (final data)
- Ministry of Finance — Revenue collection
  - Total revenue collected separately by the tax administration and customs administration, including revenue by individual tax, license fee for export of minerals, social contributions and army servicemen insurance fund contributions — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within 7 days of the end of each month
- Treasury single account (TSA)
  - Detailed breakdown of central treasury account, including deposits at the central treasury, Special Privatization Account, off budget account, monetization account, state budget account and the Republic correspondent account—flows during the month and end of month stocks — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within 7 days of the end of each month
- Consolidated central government
  - State budget — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within 30 days of the end of each month
- Consolidated general government
  - Central and local governments, and Non-Commercial Enterprises that belong within the general government (NCEs) — Frequency: Quarterly — Timing: Within 60 days of the end of each quarter; Annual — Timing: Within 180 days of the end of each year
- Budget execution
  - All cash receipts, cash expenditures, including domestic and external debt-service payments, external and domestic borrowing and lending operations, and inflow of grants to the central government; expenditure data will be provided according to both economic and functional classifications, consistent with the GFSM2001 methodology — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within one month following the end of each month.
- National Statistical Service — Trade Statistics
  - Detailed export and import data — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within 28 days of the end of each month
- National Statistical Service — Balance of payments
  - Detailed BOP data — Frequency: Quarterly — Timing: Within 45 days of the end of each quarter
- National Statistical Service — CPI
  - By category — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within 21 days of the end of each month
- State Revenue Committee — Tax arrears
  - By type of tax — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within 30 days of the end of each quarter (monthly data provided on a quarterly basis)
- State Revenue Committee — Large taxpayers
  - Data on the number of taxpayers and amount of taxes collected from taxpayers included in the list for special control approved annually by the chairman of SRC — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within 45 days after the end of each month
- State Revenue Committee — Risk-based selection
  - Percentage of selected companies chosen on the basis of risk-based approach, and identified additional revenue to be collected from risk-based audits (monthly data provided on a quarterly basis) — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within 45 days of the end of each quarter
- State Revenue Committee — Pension system
  - Number of participants in the pension second pillar, social payments and funded contributions — Frequency: Monthly — Timing: Within two months of the end of each quarter (monthly data provided on a quarterly basis)

### Statement by Mr. Rashkovan and Mr. Scholer — Authorities' request and objectives
- The authorities have requested a 36-month Stand-By Arrangement with access at 100% of quota, to be used on a precautionary basis.
- Purpose: provide insurance against external shocks and complement structural reform agenda to build an export-led, investment-driven, and knowledge-based economic growth model.
- Builds on the 2019-22 SBA and capacity development, including CCAMTAC.

### Macroeconomic developments & outlook
- 2022 rebound driven by robust domestic consumption and a large inflow of external income, capital, and labor; double-digit growth with inflation increasing less quickly than regional peers.
- Key risks: extreme uncertainty and downside risks from the external environment, exposure to repercussions of the war in Ukraine and deterioration in main trading partners (Russia, EU, USA), and regional instability.
- Medium-term potential growth target: 7% over the medium-term.

### Fiscal policy
- Fiscal outturns in 2021 and 2022 were much better than anticipated, driven by buoyant tax revenues (corporate income taxes, VAT, mining sector taxation) and current expenditure restraint.
- Capital spending projected to increase by 1.6pp of GDP.
- 2023 stance: neutral fiscal stance to help ease inflation and reduce public debt levels.
- Tax-to-GDP ratio target: 25% by 2026.
- Revenue-side reforms: reduce the tax policy gap, rationalize tax expenditures, broaden the tax base, strengthen revenue administration (including universal income tax declaration system).
- Expenditure-side reforms: improve spending efficiency on public sector wages, healthcare, pensions, and social safety nets.
- Public financial management improvements: upgrade Ministry of Finance capacity for costing fiscal initiatives, regular program evaluations, fiscal risk identification, and better data production and sharing.
- Review planned to close execution gap on foreign-funded infrastructure projects.

### Monetary policy
- Inflation target: 4% over the medium term.
- Early tightening since end-2020 helped; CBA ready to pursue further tightening if warranted and committed to anchoring inflation expectations and CBA independence.
- Exchange rate policy: commitment to exchange rate flexibility on both sides; FX interventions limited to avoiding disorderly market developments.

### Financial sector policies
- Banking sector resilience maintained through COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine due to prudent risk management and strong supervision.
- Capital conservation buffer requirement: 1.5/2.5%.
- Ratio of liquid assets to total short-term liabilities: comfortably above 100%.
- NPLs: 2.8% of gross loans.
- Further steps: strengthen risk-based supervision, implement Pillar 2 capital buffers, maintain higher risk weights and loss provisions for FX loans, develop a draft law for enhanced bank resolution framework, introduce an over-the-counter commercial trading platform for the overnight repo market.

### Structural policies
- Complementary reforms to:
  - Improve the business environment (access to finance, facilitate foreign investment, insolvency regime reform, strengthen judiciary resources/capacity/independence, AML/CFT improvements).
  - Enhance labor market outcomes (education sector reform, expand early childcare, develop and cost an employment strategy based on active labor market policies).
  - Foster digitalization (national digital ID as cornerstone for e-government and broader digital transformation).
  - Address agriculture sector obstacles (modern land registration system, expand agricultural insurance, improve water management).
- Climate strategy: design a comprehensive strategy based on national mitigation and adaptation targets; consider carbon pricing with revenues used to protect the most vulnerable.

### Program objectives, financing, and safeguards
- Program closely aligned with authorities’ reform agenda to ensure ownership and IMF catalytic role; firm financing commitments from other donors for the first 12 months; good prospects for full-period financing.
- Reserve projection: remain above 110% of the ARA metric over the entire forecast horizon.
- Staff DSA: projects decline in public debt and gross financing needs over the medium-term; even under a very adverse scenario, government debt not expected to exceed 70% in 2027 — compared to a level of 63.4% in 2021.
- Safeguards: new safeguards assessment of the CBA by the time of the first review and finalization of the ex-post audit of the COVID-19 on-lending business support scheme.

### Concluding remarks
- Authorities view a precautionary Fund program as a positive signal for their reform agenda and as useful insurance against external downside risks.

*Source: 1armea2022004 - 17. The government and the CBA will provide the IMF the information specified in the following*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2022/english/1armea2022004.pdf_
