## 1. Risk Assessment Matrix

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### Context and exposure to the war in Ukraine
- Vulnerabilities:
  - Geographical proximity to Russia and ongoing geopolitical tensions.
  - High passthrough effects from international energy prices to inflation.
- Linkages with Russia and Ukraine described as relatively contained.
- Russia remained a key source of energy imports, but effective dependence modest because of:
  - Large re-exports of Russian energy.
  - Relatively significant reliance on own shale oil.
- Additional exposures (e.g., electricity imports from Finland) noted as relatively contained.

### Public health and COVID-19 developments
- Pandemic navigation and outcomes:
  - Hospitalizations and severe health outcomes relatively contained despite surges.
  - Official restrictions among the lowest among peers; mobility indicators became less sensitive to successive waves.
  - Vaccination rate: 65 percent (lags the EU average).
- Omicron wave early-2022: unprecedented spike in cases but fewer severe infections.
- Policy response: remaining restrictions removed in March/April 2022; vaccination strategy re-calibrated to focus on risk groups and booster sub-targets.

### Economic recovery and real sector (key facts)
- Output and demand:
  - Output contracted by 3 percent in 2020.
  - Growth surged to 8¼ percent in 2021, driven by:
    - Final consumption expenditure growth of 6½ percent.
    - Buoyant exports: 20 percent in real terms.
  - Growth declined but was better than expected in 2022:Q1.
- Recovery drivers:
  - COVID-19 policy support.
  - Pillar II pension withdrawals: some 4 percent of GDP withdrawn in 2021; further periodic withdrawals set to continue.
  - Buoyant foreign investment.
- Sectoral performance:
  - Strong growth in ICT and manufacturing.
  - Pandemic-hit services (accommodation, food, recreation) struggled to recover.
- Labor market:
  - Unemployment: peaked at 7.7 percent in 2020:Q3; declined to 5.5 percent in 2022:Q1.
  - Employment and labor force participation recovered strongly in 2022:Q1 to pre-pandemic levels.
  - Nominal wage growth: 11 percent in March 2022.
  - High job vacancies and broad-based labor shortages; arrival of ~50,000 Ukrainian refugees assumed to slightly ease shortages in some sectors (Annex III).

### Inflation and price pressures
- Headline inflation: 20 percent y/y in May 2022.
- Core inflation: 10.4 percent in April 2022 (includes processed food).
- Producer Price Index (PPI) inflation: 33.7 percent in May 2022.
- Inflation drivers:
  - Energy (large share; rapid passthrough).
  - Food (pushed up by the war).
  - Housing and transport services (impacted by energy passthrough).
  - Growing domestic demand contributing to food and some services components.

### Fiscal position and public investment
- 2021 fiscal outcomes:
  - Budget deficit narrowed to 2.4 percent of GDP.
  - Public debt ratio: 18.1 percent of GDP (lowest in the EU).
  - Net public debt: 4.6 percent of GDP.
- Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) implementation commenced; prioritizes green and digital transitions.
- Cost overruns:
  - Higher construction costs estimated to have led to cost overruns of about 27 percent on public projects financed by EU Funds (see Annex IV).
- Macroprudential action announced:
  - Central bank increase in countercyclical capital buffer from zero to 1 percent effective December 2022.

### Financial sector developments and vulnerabilities
- Financial resilience:
  - Bank liquidity, capital, and profitability remained strong after moratoria/support measures expired.
  - Credit growth recovered to positive levels in all main segments, led by real estate.
  - Capital remained well above regulatory thresholds but declined in 2021 due to lending recovery and sizable dividend transfers to foreign parent banks.
  - NPLs trended down to 1 percent at end-2021.
- Housing market:
  - Authorities estimate housing market moderately overvalued in 2021.
  - House price growth accelerated in early-2022 due to strong demand and limited supply.
  - Government tightened eligibility of housing loan support program in March 2022.

### Economic outlook and near-term impact
- Staff baseline and near-term forecast:
  - Growth expected to fall to 1.2 percent in 2022 (owing to decline in confidence, higher energy and imported input prices, supply disruptions).
  - Output effects of the war estimated at 1.2 percentage points; increased fiscal support could mitigate by about 1 percentage point.
  - Output gap expected to turn slightly negative in 2022.
  - Unemployment to increase in 2022 moderately; employment recovery of early-2022 partly offsets upticks.
  - Inflow of around 50,000 Ukrainian refugees assumed (mostly women and children).
- Medium-term:
  - Growth to gradually recover to potential clip of around 3½ percent.
  - Supported by EU fund inflows (notably RRF), robust institutions, and economic flexibility.
  - War and supply disruptions projected to lead to higher economic scarring.

### Key macroeconomic projections (Estonia: Summary Medium-Term Macroframework)
- Real GDP growth (percent): 2021: 8.3; 2022: 1.2; 2023: 2.2; 2024: 3.8; 2025: 3.6; 2026: 3.3; 2027: 3.3
- Output gap (percent): 2021: 1.2; 2022: -0.1; 2023: -0.5; 2024: 0.1; 2025: 0.3; 2026: 0.2; 2027: 0.0
- Inflation (percent): 2021: 4.5; 2022: 16.8; 2023: 6.7; 2024: 2.5; 2025: 2.4; 2026: 2.4; 2027: 2.4
- Unemployment rate (percent): 2021: 6.2; 2022: 7.2; 2023: 6.9; 2024: 6.6; 2025: 6.2; 2026: 5.5; 2027: 4.8
- CAB (percent of GDP): 2021: -1.6; 2022: 0.1; 2023: 0.6; 2024: 0.2; 2025: -0.1; 2026: -0.4; 2027: -0.4
- Fiscal balance (percent of GDP): 2021: -2.4; 2022: -4.6; 2023: -3.9; 2024: -3.2; 2025: -2.6; 2026: -2.2; 2027: -1.8
- Structural balance (percent of GDP): 2021: -3.8; 2022: -4.7; 2023: -3.8; 2024: -3.3; 2025: -2.8; 2026: -2.3; 2027: -1.8
- General government debt (percent of GDP): 2021: 18.1; 2022: 20.9; 2023: 23.7; 2024: 25.9; 2025: 27.4; 2026: 28.5; 2027: 29.0

### External current account and competitiveness
- 2021 external balances:
  - Current account deficit: 1.6 percent of GDP.
  - Temporary/exceptional items in services: FDI-financed computer software imports of 4¼ percent of GDP; exceptional IP transfer receipts ~¾ percent of GDP; net deficit impact of these items: 3½ percent of GDP.
- EBA-lite assessment (2021):
  - Suggested CA gap: 4.2 percent of GDP after adjustments.
  - REER undervaluation implied by CA model: about 8 percent.
- Policy implication:
  - Structural reforms and public investment catalyzed by EU funds should help safeguard external competitiveness.

### Risks, contagion channels, and selected high-priority entries (Risk Assessment Matrix)
- Key downside risks:
  - Disruptions in energy supply, including possible shut-off of Russian gas.
  - Possible cyberattacks.
  - Potential spillovers from affected trading partners and sanctions.
  - Less orderly migrant flows.
  - Monetary policy normalization and tighter global financial conditions.
  - Attempts to evade sanctions creating AML/CFT exposures.
  - Further pandemic surprises and entrenching higher inflation via a wage-price spiral.
- Selected recommended policy responses (excerpted):
  - Diversify trade and energy imports; accelerate investments in energy efficiency and renewables; develop contingency plans for gas shut-off; step up AML/CFT risk monitoring.
  - Participate in European policy responses to high and volatile food and energy prices; incentivize domestic food and renewable energy production.
  - Enhance preparedness for cyberattacks through extensive risk monitoring with private and public stakeholders.
  - Deploy additional discretionary fiscal support targeted to security-related areas and migrant integration; prioritize AML/CFT and anti-corruption enhancements.

### Re-orienting fiscal policy and 2022 budget adjustments
- Original 2022 budget deficit target: 2.1 percent of GDP.
- Supplementary budget (May 2022): additional spending of 2.5 percent of GDP (energy security, internal security, refugee integration).
- Amended 2022 budget deficit target: 5.3 percent of GDP (implying fiscal stimulus of around 1 percent of GDP).
- Supplementary budget priorities and line items:
  - Social spending and temporary protection of refugees: 0.8 percent of GDP.
  - Energy subsidy package had been about 0.8 percent of GDP (expired in April); supplementary budget includes targeted measures to low-income households via an increase (by €   per person per month) in the subsistence allowance.
  - Defense spending: original 2022 defense budget increased to 2.1 percent of GDP and enhanced by supplementary package by 0.7 percent of GDP.
  - Tax measures: extension of 2020 excise duty cuts to 2023; further excise duty cut on diesel for agriculture to EU minimum until end-2022.
  - Spending on R&D: original 2022 Budget envisages enhanced spending of 1 percent of GDP on R&D.
  - Contingency plans for gas shut-off include:
    - Joint investment in an LNG terminal with Finland: EUR 30mn.
    - Central state gas reserve (20 percent of annual gas consumption) costing about 0.5 percent of GDP.
    - Investment in small-scale renewable energy solutions and interconnection capacity.
- Support measures to mitigate high energy prices (Oct 2021–Apr 2022):
  - Total cost of support package: 285 (Percent of 2022 GDP: 0.8)
  - Selected line items (EUR mln; Percent of GDP; Period covered):
    - Compensation of 50 pct of electricity network fee for all consumers: 88.3; 0.3; Oct 2021 - March 2022
    - Compensation of 100 pct of gas network fee for all consumers: 25.1; 0.1; Dec 2021 - March 2022
    - Compensation of the 65pct increase in the price of district heating compared to the price in October 2021 for household consumers: 14.0; 0.0; Feb-March 2022
    - Compensation of 80 pct of increase in energy prices for low-income households: 79.1; 0.2; Sept 2021 - March 2022
    - Price ceiling for household electricity consumers 12 cents/kWh, for consumption up to 650 kWh per month: 21.0; 0.1; Jan-March 2022
    - Price ceiling for household gas consumers 6.5 s  kWh, up to 2.75 MWh per month: 8.5; 0.0; Jan - March 2022
    - Reimbursement of "other 50%" of electricity network charges to business customers: 45.0; 0.1; Jan-March 2022
    - Support to natural gas network operators and cogeneration of natural gas: 4.0; 0.0; March-April 2022
- Fiscal outlook and staff view:
  - Staff’s updated macro assumptions imply a lower deficit than in the amended budget by 0.3 percent of GDP.
  - Revenues expected higher by 1.4 percentage points of GDP (driven by VAT/excise and personal income tax).
  - Staff forecasts expenditure higher by 1.0 percentage point of GDP reflecting inflation and cost overruns.
  - Staff supports expansionary stance entailed by amended budget (about 1 percent of GDP stimulus) but recommends fiscal agility and well-targeted spending to contain inflationary pressures.

### Financial sector supervision and macroprudential stance
- Supervisory priorities and recommendations:
  - Comprehensive and frequent bank portfolio reviews and updated stress-testing scenarios.
  - Closely monitor smaller banks with higher increases in risk exposures to ensure adequate capitalization.
  - Monitor effects of high inflation on credit risk and bank funding.
  - Internalize war-related risks into vulnerability assessments and contingency plans, with priority on cybersecurity.
- Specific numeric assessment:
  - Authorities estimate that a complete loss of exports to Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus would cause 60-day overdue loan ratios to increase from 0.3 to 0.8 percent.
- Macroprudential measures:
  - Countercyclical buffer of one percent mandatory from December 7, 2022.
  - Case for further macroprudential action should be continually re-assessed; attention to loans with DSTI ratios close to regulatory limit.
- AML/CFT and VASP supervision:
  - Amendments to AML/CFT law in force March 2022 strengthen VASP supervision.
  - Law on crypto-assets and crowdfunding services to be considered in the fall; expected to align with EU MiCA.
  - Recommendations: strengthen FIU staffing, enhance supervisory powers, and provide adequate sanctions capability.

### External Sector Assessment — key messages
- Overall assessment:
  - Estonia’s external position substantially stronger than implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies after adjusting for one-off factors.
  - NIIP: -13.3 percent of GDP in 2021; increased by about 10 percent of GDP from 2019.
  - Gross external debt: rose to 91 percent of GDP in 2020; declined to about 87 percent of GDP in 2021.
  - Government fiscal reserves: about 11 percent of GDP at end-2021.
- Current account (2021):
  - Actual CA: -1.6 percent of GDP.
  - Adjusted CA (net of cyclical/one-offs): 2.7 percent of GDP.
  - CA gap (EBA-lite): 4.2 percent of GDP.
- REER and competitiveness:
  - Nominal effective exchange rate appreciated 0.5 percent in 2021; REER appreciated 1.7 percent in 2021.
  - EBA-lite REER method suggests REER gap consistent with overvaluation; CA model implies REER undervaluation ~8 percent—CA model preferred for overall assessment.
- Reserves:
  - Reserves end-2021: 7 percent of GDP; assessed as adequate.

### Migration, integration of Ukrainian refugees, and labor-market implications
- Integration scenarios:
  - High-quality integration (jobs matching skills) increases growth benefits relative to slow integration.
  - Labor reallocation to higher-pay sectors (health, social work, ICT) could increase annual wage income of refugees by 0.2 percent of GDP relative to slow integration.
- Fiscal and demographic notes:
  - Refugees initially contribute far less to government revenues than benefits received; net fiscal contribution becomes less negative over time with integration.
  - Minors: about one-third of refugee population; their education imposes a large fiscal cost but could be positive in the long run.
- Policy recommendations for integration:
  - Bolster ALMPs: skills recognition, language training, childcare, flexible labor markets.
  - Review residence and labor regulations and immigration quotas.
  - Stepped-up targeted skill and language training; facilitate employers’ hiring and investment in migrant workers.

### Public investment, construction costs, and project prioritization
- Construction cost dynamics:
  - Construction price index increased 4.6 percent in 2022:Q1 vs 2021:Q4 and 19.3 percent y/y.
  - Materials accounted for 86 percent of total index rise; wood and wood products up 15.7 percent; metal products up 18.8 percent.
  - Labor costs up 0.9 percent q/q; building machine use costs up 3.1 percent q/q; materials up 6.8 percent q/q.
- Cost overruns and project prioritization:
  - Higher-than-expected construction costs caused cost overrun of 1.3 percent of GDP on public investments in 319 projects budgeted at 4.7 percent of GDP (authorities’ preliminary analysis as of April 2022).
  - Authorities prioritized well-advanced projects and EU-funded projects; about 50 projects identified as critical (more than half related to EU funding).
  - Initial estimate of cost overruns: 27 percent (noted as initial, broadly comparable to typical cost overruns in Europe).
- Institutional recommendations:
  - Implement FTE and PIMA recommendations: central monitoring of public investment, project tracking for overruns/delays, and comprehensive fiscal risk disclosures.

### Energy security, climate commitments, and policy trade-offs
- Key points:
  - High gas prices risk delaying phasing out of oil shale (most CO2-intensive combustion technology).
  - REPowerEU Plan: opportunity to accelerate green transition while addressing immediate energy security.
  - Estonia’s state-owned Eesti Energia aims to "almost quadruple renewable electricity by 2026" while thermal plants in Narva may operate during high demand.
- Policy priorities:
  - Coordinate contingency planning with Baltic and Nordic neighbours due to integrated energy systems.
  - Increase electricity from renewable sources and related transmission capacity to avoid locking in oil-shale dependence.
  - Invest in energy efficiency (buildings, transport).
  - Adopt a comprehensive and predictable carbon pricing strategy to credibly achieve emissions targets.
  - Note: Natural gas accounts for less than a tenth of Estonia’s energy mix.

### Staff recommendations and authorities’ views (summary)
- Authorities broadly agreed with staff outlook and risk assessment; stressed that:
  - War affects Estonia significantly despite modest direct trade linkages.
  - Inflation projected to decelerate in 2023 in line with commodity prices but will weigh on consumption and GDP.
  - Risks to growth skewed to the downside; upside risks to inflation due to broadening pressures and potential wage acceleration.
  - Need to factor uncertainty into policies via careful contingency plans.
- Staff recommended:
  - Use fiscal space to address energy security, refugee integration, and green-digital transition while preserving macro stability.
  - Ensure fiscal agility and well-targeted support to vulnerable groups.
  - Strengthen ALMPs, training, and structural reforms to alleviate labor shortages and contain price pressures.
  - Enhance AML/CFT frameworks and supervisory capacity; monitor fintech/VASP risks.
  - Continue macroprudential vigilance and contingency planning for gas supply shocks and cyber risks.

_Italic: Source: 1estea2022001 — IMF staff report excerpts (Estonia country report chapter content provided)._

### 1. Risk Assessment Matrix _______________________________________________________________________________ 14

### 1. Risk Assessment Matrix

### Context and Exposure to the War in Ukraine
- Estonia’s economy is vulnerable to the fallout from the war in Ukraine due to:
  - Geographical proximity to Russia and ongoing geopolitical tensions.
  - High passthrough effects from international energy prices to inflation.
- Trade, financial, and other economic linkages with Russia and Ukraine are described as relatively contained.
- Russia has remained a key source of energy imports, but effective dependence on imported energy is modest because of:
  - Large re-exports of Russian energy.
  - Relatively significant reliance on own shale oil.
- Note: A fuller assessment would incorporate Estonia’s net imports of energy from other countries that depend on Russian energy supply (mainly electricity imports from Finland); these additional exposures are also described as relatively contained.

### Public Health and COVID-19 Developments
- Pandemic navigation:
  - Hospitalizations and severe health outcomes have been relatively contained despite surges.
  - Official restrictions on activity were among the lowest among peers and mobility indicators became less sensitive to successive pandemic waves.
  - Vaccination rate at 65 percent lags the EU average.
- Omicron wave in early-2022 caused an unprecedented spike in cases but fewer severe infections.
- Government removed remaining restrictions on activity in March/April 2022 and re-calibrated vaccination strategy to focus on risk groups and sub-targets for booster coverage.

### Economic Recovery and Real Sector
- Output and demand:
  - Output contracted by 3 percent in 2020.
  - Growth surged to 8¼ percent in 2021, driven by:
    - Final consumption expenditure growth of 6½ percent.
    - Continued strong investment.
    - Buoyant exports (20 percent in real terms).
  - Growth declined but was better than expected in 2022:Q1.
- Sources of recovery:
  - COVID-19 policy support.
  - Pillar II pension system withdrawals (some 4 percent of GDP withdrawn in 2021; further periodic withdrawals set to continue).
  - Buoyant foreign investment.
- Sectoral performance:
  - Strong growth in ICT and manufacturing.
  - Pandemic-hit services sectors (accommodation, food, recreation) struggled to recover.
- Labor market:
  - Unemployment peaked at 7.7 percent in 2020:Q3, declined to 5.5 percent in 2022:Q1.
  - Employment and labor force participation recovered strongly in 2022:Q1 to pre-pandemic levels.
  - High job vacancies and strong nominal wage growth of 11 percent in March 2022 indicate broad-based labor shortages.
  - Arrival of Ukrainian refugees appears to have slightly eased labor shortages in some sectors as of May (see Annex III), but the war negatively affected employment expectations, especially in manufacturing and construction.

### Inflation and Price Pressures
- Headline inflation reached 20 percent y/y in May 2022.
- More than one-half of inflation is explained by energy prices, which have a relatively high weight in the index and a large rapid passthrough from global energy prices.
- Core inflation reached 10.4 percent in April 2022 (includes processed food prices).
- Producer Price Index (PPI) inflation was 33.7 percent in May 2022, signaling significant supply-side price pressures.
- Inflation drivers include:
  - Energy (large share).
  - Food (pushed up by the war).
  - Housing and transport services (impacted by energy passthrough).
  - Growing domestic demand contributing to food and some services components.

### Fiscal Position and Public Investment
- 2021 fiscal outcomes:
  - Budget deficit narrowed to 2.4 percent of GDP.
  - Public debt ratio reduced to 18.1 percent of GDP (lowest in the EU).
  - Net public debt fell to 4.6 percent of GDP.
- Estonia’s Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) implementation has commenced, prioritizing green and digital transitions.
- Higher construction costs estimated to have led to cost overruns of about 27 percent on public projects financed by EU Funds (see Annex IV).
- Government actions:
  - Central bank announced increase in countercyclical capital buffer from zero to 1 percent effective in December 2022.

### Financial Sector Developments
- Financial resilience:
  - Bank liquidity, capital, and profitability remained strong after expiration of most moratoria and support measures.
  - Credit growth recovered to positive levels in all main segments, led by real estate.
  - Capital remains well above regulatory thresholds but declined in 2021 due to recovery in lending and sizable dividend transfers to foreign (Nordic) parent banks.
  - Nonperforming loans (NPLs) trended down to 1 percent at end-2021.
- Housing market:
  - Authorities estimate the housing market was moderately overvalued in 2021.
  - House price growth accelerated in early-2022 due to strong demand and limited supply.
  - Government tightened eligibility criteria of the housing loan support program in March 2022 to better target support.

### External Position and Competitiveness
- 2021 external balances:
  - Current account (CA) deficit estimated at 1.6 percent of GDP.
  - Deterioration driven by goods balance as imports rebounded from compressed 2020 levels.
  - Services balance included temporary flows:
    - FDI-financed imports of computer software services of 4¼ percent of GDP.
    - Receipts for an exceptional fee for intra-firm transfer of intellectual property rights of around ¾ percent of GDP.
    - Net deficit impact of these items: 3½ percent of GDP.
- EBA-lite assessment (2021):
  - Suggested CA gap of 4.2 percent of GDP after adjusting for cyclical and one-off factors.
  - Real effective exchange rate (REER) undervaluation of about 8 percent.
- Policy implications:
  - Structural reforms and public investment catalyzed by EU funds should help safeguard external competitiveness.

*Source: 1estea2022001 - 1. Risk Assessment Matrix (IMF staff; Estonia country report excerpts).*

### 11.      The war  in Ukraine is set to slow output recovery. Growth is expected to fall to

### 11.      The war  in Ukraine is set to slow output recovery. Growth is expected to fall to

### Economic outlook and near-term impact
- Growth is expected to fall to 1.2 percent this year, owing to a decline in confidence, a drag from higher energy and other imported input prices, and supply side disruptions.
- Manufacturing, transportation, construction, and agriculture sectors are particularly vulnerable to the effects of the war.
- The revised forecast for 2022 also reflects a negative carry-over effect from the one-off exports of software services in 2021.
- The output effects of the war (1.2 percentage points) would be mitigated by increased fiscal support (improving growth by about 1 percentage point).
- An inflow of around 50,000 Ukrainian refugees (mostly women and children) is assumed.
- The output gap is expected to turn slightly negative.
- Unemployment will increase in 2022, albeit moderately, with the employment recovery of early-2022 partly offsetting upticks in unemployment from (i) lower growth and (ii) the entry of Ukrainian refugees (whose employability is initially reduced) in the labor market.

### Medium-term growth and drivers
- Over the medium term, s    ’s   sel ne  ss mes      growth will gradually recover to its potential clip of around 3½ percent.
- Growth would be supported by EU fund inflows, notably from the RRF as well as Estonia’s robust institutions and economic flexibility.
- The war and related supply disruptions and uncertainty are projected to lead to higher economic scarring (in terms of permanent effects of the two shocks on GDP relative to pre-2020 projections).

### Inflation outlook
- Inflation is projected to remain higher for longer.
- The additional significant price increases (e.g., energy and food) triggered by the war in Ukraine would imply double digit headline inflation in 2022, though it will ease with the projected fall of energy prices.
- Staff assumes that core inflation will also fall over 2022–23 as the energy price declines put downward pressure on some services prices and monetary policy normalization by the ECB helps anchor expectations and limit the risk of a wage-price spiral.
- Inflation is projected to be modestly above the E B’s   percent target after 2023 due to continued price level convergence.

### Key macroeconomic projections (Estonia: Summary Medium-Term Macroframework)
- Real GDP growth (percent): 2021: 8.3; 2022: 1.2; 2023: 2.2; 2024: 3.8; 2025: 3.6; 2026: 3.3; 2027: 3.3
- Output gap (percent): 2021: 1.2; 2022: -0.1; 2023: -0.5; 2024: 0.1; 2025: 0.3; 2026: 0.2; 2027: 0.0
- Inflation (percent): 2021: 4.5; 2022: 16.8; 2023: 6.7; 2024: 2.5; 2025: 2.4; 2026: 2.4; 2027: 2.4
- Unemployment rate (percent): 2021: 6.2; 2022: 7.2; 2023: 6.9; 2024: 6.6; 2025: 6.2; 2026: 5.5; 2027: 4.8
- CAB (percent of GDP): 2021: -1.6; 2022: 0.1; 2023: 0.6; 2024: 0.2; 2025: -0.1; 2026: -0.4; 2027: -0.4
- Fiscal balance: 2021: -2.4; 2022: -4.6; 2023: -3.9; 2024: -3.2; 2025: -2.6; 2026: -2.2; 2027: -1.8
- Structural balance (percent of GDP): 2021: -3.8; 2022: -4.7; 2023: -3.8; 2024: -3.3; 2025: -2.8; 2026: -2.3; 2027: -1.8
- General government debt (percent of GDP): 2021: 18.1; 2022: 20.9; 2023: 23.7; 2024: 25.9; 2025: 27.4; 2026: 28.5; 2027: 29.0

### External current account
- The near term external current account is expected to be close to balance.
- The reversal of the one-off deterioration in the services balance of 2020–21 is projected to improve the current account in 2022.
- In outer years, additional imports from EU fund inflows and the growth recovery are projected to slightly reduce the external balance.

### Risks and channels of contagion
- Risks have clearly shifted to the downside. Key highly uncertain risks include:
  - (i) disruptions in energy supply, including a possible shut-off of Russian gas;
  - (ii) possible cyberattacks;
  - (iii) potential spillovers from the affected trading partners and sanctions; and
  - (iv) less orderly migrant flows.
- Monetary policy normalization and yet-tighter global financial conditions entail additional risks.
- The situation is likely to be fluid and conducive to higher systemic fallout from transactional risks, including due to corporate and individual counterparty and related AML/CFT exposures.
- Attempts to evade sanctions placed on Russia may create additional risks for Estonian financial institutions.
- Other risks include further surprises from the pandemic and an entrenching of higher inflation, if a wage-price spiral emerges.
- On the upside, good implementation of the Resilience and Recovery Plan (RRP) would support growth.
- Since most risks have significant fiscal implications, staff discussed fiscal contingency plans with a particular focus on the budget and energy sector policies and related inflation concerns.

### Authorities’ views
- The authorities agreed with the staff’s outlook and risk assessment.
- They estimated that, despite relatively modest trade and other linkages with Russia and Ukraine, the war in Ukraine would affect Estonia’s economy significantly and through multiple channels.
- They projected a deceleration of inflation in 2023 in line with the expected evolution of global commodity prices, but noted that inflation would weigh on real consumption and GDP.
- Authorities agreed that risks to growth were skewed to the downside and stressed upside risks to inflation, given that it was becoming increasingly broad based.
- They were concerned that possible further acceleration of wage growth could entrench core inflation and cause a sustained deterioration in external competitiveness.
- Based on the downside risk profile, they highlighted the need to factor uncertainty in policies through careful contingency plans.

### Risk Assessment Matrix — selected entries and recommended policy responses
- High (short to medium term): ss  ’s  n  s on o  Uk   ne le ds  o esc l   on o sanctions and other disruptions.
  - Impact on Estonia: High — the war in Ukraine and Estonia’s geopolitical tensions with Russia increase likelihood trade and financial sector disruptions and confidence shocks.
  - Recommended policy response: Diversify trade, particularly imports of energy. Develop contingency plans, including to mitigate the risk of a gas shut-off by Russia. Accelerate investments in energy efficient and renewable sources of energy. Step up AML/CFT risk monitoring.
- High (short term): Rising and volatile food and energy prices.
  - Impact: High — War in Ukraine will cause high and volatile food and energy prices in the region.
  - Recommended response: Participate in European policy responses. Diversify energy and food supply. Incentivize domestic production of food and renewable energy.
- Medium (short term): Abrupt growth slowdown in China.
  - Impact: As an open economy, Estonia would be affected; however, limited complex production processes and industrial clusters reduce the likelihood of large supply chain disruptions.
  - Recommended response: Participate in global and European policy responses. Manage risk through supply diversification.
- Medium (short to medium term): Outbreaks of lethal and highly contagious COVID-19 variants.
  - Impact: Medium — relatively low level of vaccinations in Estonia implies a high impact, especially from the standpoint of downside risks.
  - Recommended response: Participate in global and European policy responses. Ramp up implementation of the vaccination strategy and other public health measures. Provide economic support in line with Estonia’s significant fiscal and other policy space. Mitigate “social scarring” through targeted steps to reduce inequality and gender gaps.
- High (short term to medium term): Geopolitical tensions and deglobalization.
  - Impact: High — Estonia’s geopolitical tensions with Russia are high due to Estonia’s strong support of Ukraine and could be exacerbated by worsening of the war in Ukraine and spillovers.
  - Recommended response: Deploy additional discretionary fiscal support. Prioritize such support in key security-related areas. Further enhance the anti-corruption and AML/CFT frameworks to protect the financial sector.
- Medium (short term): Cyberthreats.
  - Impact: High — Estonia’s geopolitical tensions with Russia and past cyberattacks, combined with significant reliance on ICT, make it susceptible.
  - Recommended response: Enhance preparedness for cyberattacks through extensive risk monitoring in cooperation with private and public sector stakeholders.
- High (short to medium term) country-specific risk: Disorderly migration flows.
  - Impact: High — the flow of refugees could further increase if the war in Ukraine escalates. Estonia can be a magnet for migrants given the population’s fluency in languages spoken by the migrants.
  - Recommended response: Deploy additional discretionary fiscal support to integrate migrants into society and address priority social concerns. Calibrate structural reforms to the migrants’ characteristics to facilitate their employment.

### Policy discussions and recommendations
- Discussions focused on: (i) fiscal policy to mitigate shocks and rebalance spending priorities; (ii) structural policies to support inclusive growth and diversify energy supply; and (iii) financial sector policies to safeguard financial stability.
- Estonia’s policy space and EU/ECB backstopping are major advantages to be leveraged in dealing with shocks.
- After responding to COVID-19, Estonia’s fiscal space should be re-deployed to address emerging challenges, including (i) addressing the economic and social impact of rising inflation; (ii) integrating refugees; and (iii) over the medium term, ensuring that the green and digital transitions remain on track, while addressing structural skill mismatches and financial stability priorities.

### Re-orienting fiscal policy — 2022 budget and supplementary measures
- The original 2022 budget targeted a deficit of 2.1 percent of GDP.
- In response to the war in Ukraine the supplementary budget passed in May 2022 entails additional spending of 2.5 percent of GDP, relatively equally allocated to energy security, internal security, and the integration of refugees.
- The amended 2022 budget targets a deficit of 5.3 percent of GDP, implying a fiscal stimulus of around 1 percent of GDP, and includes several priorities:
  - Social spending and temporary protection of refugees (0.8 percent of GDP). The supplementary budget aims at facilitating the integration of refugees through provision of social security, accommodation, education, childcare, schooling, and language training.
  - Support to mitigate higher energy costs. The energy subsidy package (about 0.8 percent of GDP) adopted at the turn of the year expired in April. The supplementary budget includes more targeted measures to low-income households, via an increase (by €   per person per month) in the subsistence allowance.
  - Defense spending. The original 2022 defense budget had already been increased to 2.1 percent of GDP and was enhanced by the supplementary budget package (by 0.7 percent of GDP), focusing on wartime emergency capacity and cyber security.
  - Tax measures. The original 2022 budget extends the 2020 excise duty cuts to 2023. The supplementary budget further cuts the excise duty on the diesel used in agriculture to the minimum level allowed in the EU until end-2022 to improve food security.
  - Spending on improving productivity and health. The original 2022 Budget envisions enhanced spending on R&D (1 percent of GDP), as well as expenditures on health, vaccinations, and testing.
  - Contingency plans. The supplementary budget includes contingency measures aimed at containing risks from a natural gas shut-off by Russia through (i) a joint investment in an LNG terminal with Finland (EUR 30mn); (ii) the establishment of a central state gas reserve (20 percent of annual gas consumption) costing about 0.5 percent of GDP; and (iii) investment in small-scale renewable energy solutions and interconnection capacity.

### Support measures to mitigate high energy prices, October 2021 - April 2022 (Estonia)
- Total cost of the support package: 285 (Percent of 2022 GDP: 0.8)
- Selected line items (EUR mln and Percent of GDP, Period covered):
  - Compensation of 50 pct of electricity network fee for all consumers: 88.3; 0.3; Oct 2021 - March 2022
  - Compensation of 100 pct of gas network fee for all consumers: 25.1; 0.1; Dec 2021 - March 2022
  - Compensation of the 65pct increase in the price of district heating compared to the price in October 2021 for household consumers: 14.0; 0.0; Feb-March 2022
  - Compensation of 80 pct of increase in energy prices for low-income households: 79.1; 0.2; Sept 2021 - March 2022
  - Price ceiling for household electricity consumers 12 cents/kWh, for consumption up to 650 kWh per month: 21.0; 0.1; Jan-March 2022
  - Price ceiling for household gas consumers 6.5 s  kWh, up to 2.75 MWh per month: 8.5; 0.0; Jan - March 2022
  - Reimbursement of "other 50%" of electricity network charges to business customers: 45.0; 0.1; Jan-March 2022
  - Support to natural gas network operators and cogeneration of natural gas: 4.0; 0.0; March-April 2022

### Fiscal outlook and efficiency
- Despite higher spending, strong fiscal revenue should help reduce the deficit relative to budgeted levels.
- Staff’s updated macroeconomic assumptions imply a lower deficit than in the 2022 amended budget (by 0.3 percent of GDP).
- Revenues are expected to be higher (by 1.4 percentage points of GDP), mostly driven by stronger VAT and excise revenues (by 0.5 percentage points of GDP) and personal income tax revenue reflecting stronger nominal wage growth and private consumption.
- Staff forecasts expenditure to be higher than in the amended budget (by 1.0 percentage point of GDP), reflecting additional pressures on the spending from higher inflation and cost overruns, including on construction projects.
- There are substantial risks that additional spending pressures could stem from a Russian gas shut-off, especially if alternative supply options cannot be achieved fully.
- Staff supports the expansionary fiscal stance entailed by the amended budget (about 1 percent of GDP stimulus), but recommends fiscal agility: a tighter stance and saving higher revenues could contain demand and limit risks from a wage-price spiral if high inflation fails to come down rapidly.
- Any envisioned spending increases should be carefully designed to be well-targeted to support the vulnerable and efficient so as to help contain inflationary pressures (e.g., established gas reserves, spending on which represents a fifth of supplementary budget).

*Source: IMF staff and Estonian authorities (content as supplied).*

### 19.      Over the medium term, the authorities should take advantage  of their fiscal space to

### 1estea2022001 - 19.      Over the medium term, the authorities should take advantage  of their fiscal space to

### Fiscal policy stance and priorities
- Medium-term fiscal priorities: (i) safeguarding essential current spending and boosting public investment; (ii) sustaining inclusive growth and energy security; and (iii) the green-digital transition.
- Current expenditures: projected to gradually decline as a share of GDP while accommodating essential social outlays. Specific projections and dynamics:
  - Energy and refugee-related costs as a share of GDP are expected to moderate from in 2023.
  - Spending on active labor market policies is projected to continue to rise.
  - Nominal public wage bill growth would remain above 6 percent annually, partly reflecting the need to build skills and capacity.
  - Social benefits are expected to gradually increase as a share of GDP from 2023 and stabilize over the medium term to accommodate needed spending on the elderly and announced enhancements to social protection.
- Authorities’ 2022 supplementary budget built on three pillars—energy security, refugee integration, and security/resilience—dictated by the war in Ukraine.
- The authorities emphasized contingency measures in the 2022 supplementary budget, including funding for gas reserves and the LNG terminal to help mitigate the risk of a shut-off of Russian gas.
- Authorities reaffirm commitment to medium-term fiscal consolidation and the goal of structural fiscal balance; central bank emphasized containing inflation as a rationale for fiscal prudence.

### Public investment, RRF, and fiscal multipliers
- Authorities’ medium-term fiscal plans focused on frontloading capital spending, expected to peak in 2023 and slowly decline thereafter (in line with the EU’s RRF and structural fund disbursement path).
- Staff projects a more backloaded investment path:
  - Investments steadily increasing in line with absorptive capacity, reaching 7.4 percent of GDP in 2025 and then declining as major security-related and infrastructure projects are completed.
- Final estimated total RRF allocation over 2021–2026: 2.8 percent of 2022 GDP; supports the green transition, the digital advantage, and social resilience.
- Staff estimates the cumulative growth impact of the RRF is about 3.2 percentage points over 2021–26, based on the estimated average multiplier of 0.9.

### Institutional upgrades, transparency, and fiscal risk management
- Further management and institutional upgrades recommended to implement efficient scaling up of investments, contain potential cost overruns, and boost spending efficiency to improve fiscal multiplier effects.
- Specific recommendations:
  - Implement PIMA recommendations to enhance long-term planning and project implementation.
  - Ensure timely and efficient implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) and absorption of EU Funds.
  - Enhance transparency, better define priorities, and improve management of fiscal risks given heightened uncertainty from the war in Ukraine.
  - Progress needed to ensure regular disclosures of fiscal risks, complementing recent enhancements in dissemination of granular fiscal information.
- The IMF’s Fiscal Transparency Evaluation found fiscal transparency institutions and governance procedures to be strong.

### Medium-term fiscal path and fiscal rules
- Authorities’ stability program assumes national fiscal rules resume from 2023, reducing the structural deficit by 0.5 percentage point annually, corresponding to:
  - Structural budget deficit target of 2 percent of GDP in 2026.
  - Achieving structural balance by 2030.
- Staff view: given Estonia’s still-low public debt, a somewhat more expansionary medium-term fiscal path is incorporated to support energy security, inclusive growth, and green-digital transition:
  - Staff projections suggest a medium-term structural deficit of 1.8 percent of GDP (by 2027) would be an appropriate objective that keeps debt at below 30 percent of GDP.
- Policy recommendation: enhance automatic stabilizers, which are among the lowest in the EU; accelerate the ongoing reform of unemployment benefits that links them to the cycle.

### Authorities’ views on fiscal policy and reforms
- Authorities agreed fiscal policy needed to respond to urgent new priorities within an efficient and sustainable medium-term framework and supported increased targeting of social support to low-income households.
- Noted policy measures:
  - Increase in the subsistence allowance aligned with enhanced targeting.
  - Recent tax and spending measures to support pensioners; planned income tax exemption for pensioners in 2023.
- Authorities undertaking a review of investment projects given rising construction costs, with the aim of improved prioritization and efficiency in leveraging EU funds.
- Recent adherence to the SDDS-plus standard to further support fiscal transparency.
- Recent spending review incorporates most IMF technical assistance recommendations on public investment management.
- Ongoing pension system review and potential scope for tax policy adjustments to increase the tax base and support inclusive growth, subject to future political consensus.

### Re-invigorating structural reforms and inclusive growth — Active Labor Market Policies (ALMPs) and labor supply
- Labor shortages are a significant challenge, especially in skill-intensive sectors such as ICT and healthcare.
- Policy recommendations:
  - Bolster ALMPs to address labor shortages and boost skills and productivity, helping to contain price pressures.
  - Well-tailored training to foster efficient absorption and reallocation of workers across sectors; training for young workers and those with lower qualifications could be further enhanced.
  - Draw on best practices (e.g., Germany’s “future starter” program) to increase qualification levels among young adults without vocational degrees.
- Estonia’s digital advantage expected to facilitate labor reallocation via remote work opportunities.
- In line with the Estonia 2035 strategy, policies should facilitate development of skills needed for the green transition and digital revolution.
- Productivity gains from more efficient labor reallocation critical to safeguard competitiveness amid upward pressures on wage growth.

### Migration, integration of Ukrainian refugees, and labor market supply
- Workers’ inflows have recently recovered following the pandemic but remain insufficient to significantly address labor shortages.
- 2021 issuance of residence permits for employment increased the most in the ICT and construction sectors.
- Smooth integration of Ukrainian refugees could contribute to easing labor shortages and requires:
  - Stepped-up targeted skill and language training (Annex III).
  - Review of residence and labor regulations and immigration quotas.
- In May (year not specified in excerpt), Estonia adopted amendments to the Aliens Act and the Act on Granting International Protection to Aliens to make migration from non-EU countries more flexible.
- Authorities combining short-term social support for refugees (e.g., housing and medical care) with efforts to facilitate their integration into the Estonian labor market and educational system.

### Social protection, poverty, inequality, and gender
- Policies should re-double focus on reducing poverty and inequality while addressing Estonia’s large and evolving social needs.
- Observations and risks:
  - Recent progress in reducing inequality reflected effectiveness of pandemic support measures and gains from recent reforms.
  - Lingering weaknesses (e.g., old-age poverty) and new challenges from higher inflation, energy costs, and inflow of refugees.
  - Given the high share of food and energy expenditure, the impact of inflation in Estonia would be highly regressive compared to peers.
  - Still-elevated old-age poverty set to be partially mitigated by recent pension increases and the planned income tax exemption for pensioners in 2023.
- Policy guidance: efficiently focus on pockets of social vulnerabilities and internalize impacts of higher inflation and energy costs; address difficult social conditions of incoming refugees from Ukraine.
- Gender policy:
  - Multi-faceted action needed to reduce the gender pay gap (GPG) and motherhood penalty.
  - Motherhood penalty: women suffer a lasting income drop of about 33 percent after giving birth to their first child.
  - Compliance with the planned EU Pay Transparency Directive, enhanced child-care, and long-term care services are critical to faster reduction in the GPG.
  - Authorities aim to decrease the Gender Pay Gap to 5 percent by 2035.
  - The upcoming Welfare Development Plan will provide a framework to monitor progress and implement follow-up and contingency measures.

### Digital transformation and connectivity
- Estonia remains a global leader in e-government; further digitalization agenda aims at upgrading cybersecurity capabilities, broadband corridors, data governance, and core IT services.
- RRP provides resources, investment support, and digital skills training to address gaps such as digital capacity in SMEs and rural connectivity.
- Broadband and 5G targets and gaps:
  - Although broadband coverage is wide and expanding, speed lags the EU target of the gigabit society.
  - The gigabit society target is 100 Mbps speed.
  - Planned roll-out of 5G bands should be accelerated to meet goals of covering major cities by 2023 and transport corridors by 2025.
  - Key achievements include elimination of legal obstacles and feasibility of activation of 5G earlier than expected, by end-2022.

### Climate, energy security, and the green transition
- Estonia’s European Green Deal commitment: achieve climate neutrality by 2050, hinging on phasing-out the domestic oil shale sector.
- Climate and security priorities should be harmonized with reducing dependence on imported energy from Russia via investments in:
  - Green energy generation.
  - Gas reserve build-up.
  - Energy supply diversification.
- Notes and priorities:
  - Natural gas accounts for less than a tenth of Estonia’s energy mix.
  - Contingency planning for supply disruption should be supplemented by close coordination with Baltic and Nordic neighbours due to integrated energy systems.
  - To avoid high gas prices delaying phasing out electricity generation from oil shale, priority is to increase electricity produced from renewable sources and related transmission capacity (Annex V).
  - Continued investment in energy efficiency in buildings and transport sectors is important.
  - Need for greater quantification and operationalization of final and intermediate targets to ensure balanced GHG reduction across sectors.
  - A comprehensive and predictable carbon pricing strategy should be the centerpiece for credibly achieving emissions targets.
- Authorities stated a temporary increase in electricity production from oil-shale would be implemented in a way fully consistent with climate objectives.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpt (1estea2022001).*

### 32.      Supervisors should continue to be vigilant given the new risks caused by the war. Bank

### Supervisors should continue to be vigilant given the new risks caused by the war.

### Financial sector vulnerabilities and supervisory priorities
- Bank capital buffers were further bolstered during the 2021 Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process cycle.
- Corporate and household balance sheets are robust; direct exposures of the financial sector to Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are limited.
- The full extent of indirect links and associated risk factors, including from the implementation of sanctions and countersanctions, are harder to assess (Annex VI).
- Supervisory recommendations:
  - Conduct comprehensive and frequent bank portfolio reviews and risk assessments.
  - Integrate portfolio reviews with updated stress-testing scenarios.
  - Closely monitor smaller banks, which have experienced a higher increase in risk exposures, to ensure they are well-capitalized.
  - Monitor effects of high inflation on credit risk and bank funding.
  - Internalize war-related risks into vulnerability assessments, monitoring, and contingency plans, with priority on cybersecurity.

- Specific numeric assessment:
  - The authorities estimate that a complete loss of exports to Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, would cause the 60-day overdue loan ratios to increase from 0.3 to 0.8 percent.

### Macroprudential stance and housing market
- The macroprudential stance is appropriate but requires careful monitoring of housing market developments.
- The new countercyclical buffer framework will take effect in December 2022 and entails a tighter effective stance.
- Upward momentum in house prices and credit was sustained even during the early phase of the war in Ukraine.
- The case for further macroprudential action should be continually re-assessed in line with cyclical and housing market conditions; outcomes depend on the evolution and impact of the war in Ukraine and are subject to large uncertainty.
- Monitoring should pay particular attention to riskier loans such as those with debt-service-to-income ratios close to the regulatory limit.
- The government’s tightening of the eligibility criteria of the housing loan support program in March 2022 is welcomed.
- The tightening of the countercyclical buffer is described as appropriate given sustained upward momentum in house prices and credit.

### AML-CFT, VASPs, and supervisory capacity
- AML-CFT measures are being strengthened through legislative and supervisory actions, but AML/CFT supervisory capacity needs enhancement in line with ML/TF risks.
- The rapid rise of virtual asset service providers (VASPs) entails substantial ML/TF risks and supervisory challenges, as highlighted by the 2020 National Risk Assessment.
- Amendments to the AML/CFT law that came into force in March 2022 aim to strengthen supervision of VASPs.
- A law on crypto-assets and crowdfunding services to be considered by parliament in the fall is expected to limit risks in the Fintech sector, in line with the EU proposal on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA).
- The Moneyval assessment is ongoing, with results expected at around the end of the year.
- Staff recommendations:
  - Strengthen Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) staffing and capacity.
  - Continually enhance capacity in other agencies.
  - Provide AML/CFT supervisors with adequate powers to issue effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.

### Authorities’ views and actions
- Authorities emphasize enhanced supervisory vigilance and continual monitoring of sectoral exposures related to the war in Ukraine.
- No major issue was seen with increased dividend pay-outs by foreign-owned banks at this juncture, given strong capitalization and profitability, but constant close monitoring is necessary.
- Authorities expect banks to manage sanctions implementation without major business damage, though it poses challenges.
- On macroprudential policy, authorities were proactively evaluating risks from accelerating credit and rising housing prices and intended to reassess the need for prudential action in H2 2022.
- Authorities committed to improving AML/CFT framework, supervising VASPs, addressing fintech risks, enhancing capacity across agencies, strengthening supervisory powers to impose sanctions, and upgrading capacity to address cybersecurity threats.

### Economic outlook implications for financial policy
- The economy rebounded strongly from the pandemic but faces war-related headwinds; Estonia’s geographical proximity to Russia increases vulnerabilities despite contained direct exposures.
- Recent surge in inflation is becoming more broad-based and amplifies policy challenges.
- Outlook and risks:
  - The outlook has become less favorable and is subject to downside risks from trade disruptions, higher energy prices, lower confidence, and supply bottlenecks.
  - Growth is expected to gradually recover starting from 2023.
  - Inflation is projected to ease over 2022–23 and return to more normal levels by 2024.
  - Balance of risks to growth is tilted to the downside; risks to inflation are tilted to the upside, including risk of a wage-price spiral.
- Fiscal and structural policy implications relevant to financial stability:
  - Fiscal space should be proactively and efficiently used to address security, resilience, alternative energy supply, and refugee integration.
  - Contingency planning should be a continual policy priority.
  - Plans to roll back fiscal accommodation over the medium term should account for fiscal space, evolving public spending priorities, and include mechanisms to increase fiscal policy countercyclicality.
  - Should inflation fail to decline as expected, a more rapid and sizable fiscal consolidation may be necessary to preserve macroeconomic stability.
  - Structural policies (active labor market policies, training, integration of refugees, social support, digital transition) are important to catalyze inclusive growth and help contain price pressures.

- Climate and energy policy interactions:
  - Securing alternative energy supplies requires prompt infrastructure investments and coordination with Baltic and Nordic peers.
  - Estonia’s European Green Deal commitment to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 should be safeguarded and operationalized, including restructuring the oil shale sector and accelerating green energy projects.
  - A comprehensive and predictable carbon pricing strategy remains critical to achieving climate targets.

*International Monetary Fund — Staff appraisal and recommendations from the Estonia country report excerpt*

### 42.      It is recommended  that the next Article IV consultation be completed on the standard

### 1estea2022001 - 42.      It is recommended  that the next Article IV consultation be completed on the standard

### Recommendation
- It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation be completed on the standard 12-month cycle.

### COVID-19 Developments (2021–22)
- Charts presented for: Daily Covid-19 Hospitalizations (Patients per 1 million people; weighted by population), New Weekly Covid-19 Deaths (7-day moving average cases per 100k people), Positive Tests Rate (7-day average positive tests rates; simple average), Weekly Covid-19 Tests (7-day average tests, in thousands per 1 million people).
- Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P.; Our World In Data; IMF, WEO; and IMF staff calculations.

### Real Sector Developments (2009–22)
- GDP Growth and Contributions (YoY, percent): series plotted with contributions from Consumption, GCF, Net exports, GDP.
- Industrial Production (YoY, percent): series from Jan-10 to Jan-22.
- Retail Sales (YoY, percent): series from Jan-10 to Jan-22.
- Confidence Indicators (Percent balance) 1/: Industrial Confidence Indicator and Consumer Confidence Indicator (balance equals percent of respondents reporting an increase minus percent reporting a decrease).
- Employment Growth and Unemployment Rate (Percent): series plotted; unemployment and employment growth tracked.

### External Developments (2004–21)
- Current Account (Percent of GDP) components shown: Exports of goods and services, Imports of goods and services, Net current transfers, Net income payments; Current Account (RHS).
- External Position (Percent of GDP): Gross debt (external), Net debt, NIIP (RHS).
- Saving and Investment (Percent of GDP): National saving, Investment, Current account (RHS).
- Capital and Financial Accounts (Percent of GDP): Capital transfers, FDI, Portfolio investments, Other 1/ (Other defined as sum of financial derivatives and other investments).
- Sources: Haver; Statistics Estonia; and IMF staff calculations.

### External Competitiveness (2008–21)
- REER vs EU28 Index (2008Q1=100): REER-CPI: total economy; REER-ULC: total economy (series from Jun-08 to Dec-21).
- Estonia's Market Share in Selected Countries (Percent) and Export Composition (Billions of Euros) by product categories.
- Unit Labor Cost (2008Q1=100, SA) and Real Wages (2008Q1=100, SA) indices plotted.
- Productivity (Output per working person, 2008Q1=100): Total economy and Manufacturing productivity series.
- Sources: DOTS; Haver; WEO; and EU Commission.

### Fiscal Developments and Structure (2004–21)
- General Government (2004-21) (Percent of GDP): Revenue, Expenditure, Overall balance (RHS).
- General Government Debt, 2021 (Percent of GDP) — country comparisons plotted.
- Public Social Expenditures, 2020 (Percent of GDP) categories: Other, Unemployment, Family and children, Old age, Sickness and disability.
- General Government Capital Expenditures, 2021 (Percent of GDP) — country comparisons.
- Tax Wedge, 2020 (Single person at 100% of average earnings, no child) — country comparisons.
- GINI Coefficient, 2020 (Gini index of 0 to 100) — country comparisons.
- Sources: WEO; Eurostat; and OECD.

### Financial Sector Developments (2008–22)
- Non-performing Loans 1/ (Percent of outstanding loans) series for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (definitions: Estonia loans overdue by more than 60 days; Latvia overdue >90 days; Lithuania includes impaired loans and loans past due by 60 days but not impaired).
- Regulatory Tier 1 Capital to Risk-weighted Assets 2/ (Percent) — series for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (latest data for Lithuania is 2021Q1).
- Loan-to-Deposit Ratio (Percent) series 2010–2022 for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.
- Households' Balance Sheets (Billions of Euros): Total assets and liabilities series.
- Sources: Haver; national authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

### Public Sector Debt Sustainability Analysis — Baseline Scenario (As of May 31, 2022)
- Sovereign Spreads: EMBIG (bp) 3/ = 82; 5Y CDS (bp) = 68.
- Nominal gross public debt (percent of GDP): 2019 = 18.1; 2020 = 19.0; 2021 = 18.1; 2022 = 20.9; 2023 = 23.7; 2024 = 25.9; 2025 = 27.4; 2026 = 28.5; 2027 = 29.0.
- Public gross financing needs (percent of GDP): 2020 = 2.0; 2021 = 9.7; 2022 = 10.0; 2023 = 6.0; 2024 = 5.7; 2025 = 3.4; 2026 = 3.0; 2027 = 2.5.
- Real GDP growth (percent): 2020 = -3.0; 2021 = 8.3; 2022 = 1.2; 2023 = 2.2; 2024 = 3.8; 2025 = 3.6; 2026 = 3.3; 2027 = 3.3.
- Inflation (GDP deflator, percent): 2020 = -0.3; 2021 = 5.5; 2022 = 13.1; 2023 = 5.7; 2024 = 2.7; 2025 = 2.7; 2026 = 2.6; 2027 = 2.6.
- Nominal GDP growth (percent): 2020 = -3.2; 2021 = 14.3; 2022 = 14.5; 2023 = 8.5; 2024 = 6.6; 2025 = 6.4; 2026 = 6.0; 2027 = 6.0.
- Effective interest rate (percent): 2020 = 0.8; 2021 = 0.4; 2022 = 0.2; 2023 = 0.2; 2024 = 0.8; 2025 = 0.6; 2026 = 0.5; 2027 = 0.5; 2028 = 0.4 (table notes include formula and decomposition).
- Change in gross public sector debt (percent of GDP): 2020 = 0.2; 2021 = 10.4; 2022 = -0.9; 2023 = 2.8; 2024 = 2.9; 2025 = 2.2; 2026 = 1.5; 2027 = 1.1; cumulative = 11.0.
- Identified debt-creating flows, automatic debt dynamics, other identified flows, and residuals tabulated.
- Public sector defined as general government; projections based on available data.

### Public Debt Composition and Alternative Scenarios (2022–27)
- Baseline underlying assumptions (in percent): Real GDP growth 2022 = 1.2; 2023 = 2.2; 2024 = 3.8; 2025 = 3.6; 2026 = 3.3; 2027 = 3.3. Inflation 2022 = 12.6; 2023 = 5.7; 2024 = 2.7; 2025 = 2.7; 2026 = 2.6; 2027 = 2.6. Primary Balance 2022 = -4.6; 2023 = -3.8; 2024 = -3.1; 2025 = -2.5; 2026 = -2.1; 2027 = -1.7. Effective interest rate 2022 = 0.2; 2023 = 0.8; 2024 = 0.6; 2025 = 0.5; 2026 = 0.5; 2027 = 0.5.
- Historical scenario and Constant Primary Balance scenario assumptions provided (Constant Primary Balance: Primary Balance = -4.6 each year 2022–2027).
- Charts shown for Gross Nominal Public Debt (percent of GDP), Public Gross Financing Needs (percent of GDP), Debt by Maturity (Medium and long-term vs Short-term), and By Currency (Local vs Foreign currency-denominated) for projection years.

### Selected Macroeconomic and Social Indicators (2019–27) — Key Figures
- GDP (nominal; billions of Euro): 2019 = 27.7; 2020 = 26.8; 2021 = 30.7; 2022 = 35.1; 2023 = 37.9; 2024 = 40.4; 2025 = 43.0; 2026 = 45.6; 2027 = 48.3.
- Annual change (in percent): 2019 = 7.4; 2020 = -3.2; 2021 = 14.3; 2022 = 14.5; 2023 = 8.0; 2024 = 6.6; 2025 = 6.4; 2026 = 6.0; 2027 = 6.0.
- Real GDP growth (YoY, percent) 1/: 2019 = 4.1; 2020 = -3.0; 2021 = 8.3; 2022 = 1.2; 2023 = 2.2; 2024 = 3.8; 2025 = 3.6; 2026 = 3.3; 2027 = 3.3.
- Average HICP (year-on-year change in percent): 2019 = 2.3; 2020 = -0.6; 2021 = 4.5; 2022 = 16.8; 2023 = 6.7; 2024 = 2.5; 2025 = 2.4; 2026 = 2.4; 2027 = 2.4.
- GDP deflator (year-on-year change in percent): 2019 = 3.2; 2020 = -0.3; 2021 = 5.5; 2022 = 13.1; 2023 = 5.7; 2024 = 2.7; 2025 = 2.7; 2026 = 2.6; 2027 = 2.6.
- Average monthly wage (year-on-year growth in percent): 2019 = 7.4; 2020 = 2.9; 2021 = 6.9; 2022 = 9.5; 2023 = 8.0; 2024 = 6.0; 2025 = 5.0; 2026 = 4.8; 2027 = 4.5.
- Unemployment rate (ILO definition, percent, pa): 2019 = 4.4; 2020 = 6.8; 2021 = 6.2; 2022 = 7.2; 2023 = 6.9; 2024 = 6.6; 2025 = 6.2; 2026 = 5.5; 2027 = 4.8.
- Average nominal ULC (year-on-year growth in percent): 2019 = 5.5; 2020 = 5.7; 2021 = -1.1; 2022 = 7.8; 2023 = 6.8; 2024 = 3.1; 2025 = 1.6; 2026 = 2.0; 2027 = 1.7.
- General government (ESA10 basis; percent of GDP): Revenue 2019 = 39.6; 2020 = 40.3; 2021 = 40.0; 2022 = 38.7; 2023 = 39.1; 2024 = 39.7; 2025 = 40.1; 2026 = 40.2; 2027 = 40.3. Expenditure 2019 = 39.4; 2020 = 45.9; 2021 = 42.3; 2022 = 43.3; 2023 = 43.0; 2024 = 42.9; 2025 = 42.8; 2026 = 42.4; 2027 = 42.1.
- Financial surplus (+) / deficit (-) (percent of GDP): 2019 = 0.1; 2020 = -5.6; 2021 = -2.4; 2022 = -4.6; 2023 = -3.9; 2024 = -3.2; 2025 = -2.6; 2026 = -2.2; 2027 = -1.8.
- Total general government debt (percent of GDP): 2019 = 8.6; 2020 = 19.0; 2021 = 18.1; 2022 = 20.9; 2023 = 23.7; 2024 = 25.9; 2025 = 27.4; 2026 = 28.5; 2027 = 29.0.
- Net government debt 2/: 2019 = -2.2; 2020 = 3.0; 2021 = 4.6; 2022 = 9.1; 2023 = 12.8; 2024 = 15.7; 2025 = 17.8; 2026 = 19.4; 2027 = 20.5.
- Current account (percent of GDP): 2019 = 2.5; 2020 = -0.3; 2021 = -1.6; 2022 = 0.1; 2023 = 0.6; 2024 = 0.2; 2025 = -0.1; 2026 = -0.4; 2027 = -0.4.
- Gross external debt/GDP (percent) 3/: 2019 = 76.3; 2020 = 91.1; 2021 = 86.8; 2022 = 78.4; 2023 = 75.2; 2024 = 73.5; 2025 = 72.0; 2026 = 70.9; 2027 = 69.9.
- Exchange rate (US$/Euro - period averages): 2019 = 1.12; 2020 = 1.14; 2021 = 1.18.
- Output gap (percent of potential output): 2019 = 2.1; 2020 = -3.1; 2021 = 1.2; 2022 = -0.1; 2023 = -0.5; 2024 = 0.1; 2025 = 0.3; 2026 = 0.2; 2027 = 0.0.
- Growth rate of potential output (percent): 2019 = 4.0; 2020 = 2.2; 2021 = 3.8; 2022 = 2.6; 2023 = 2.6; 2024 = 3.1; 2025 = 3.4; 2026 = 3.4; 2027 = 3.5.
- Social indicators: Population (2021, pa) = 1.33 million; Per capita GDP (2020) = $23,050; Life expectancy at birth: 82.7 (female) and 74.2 (male); Poverty rate (share of the population below the established risk-of-poverty line) = 22.2 percent; Main exports: machinery and appliances.
- Sources: Estonian authorities; Eurostat; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

### Summary of General Government Operations (2019–27) — Key Items (Percent of GDP)
- Revenue and Grants: 2019 = 39.6; 2020 = 40.3; 2021 = 40.0; 2022 = 38.7; 2023 = 39.1; 2024 = 39.7; 2025 = 40.1; 2026 = 40.2; 2027 = 40.3.
- Revenue (excluding grants): 2019 = 37.4; 2020 = 37.8; 2021 = 37.7; 2022 = 36.4; 2023 = 36.4; 2024 = 37.0; 2025 = 37.5; 2026 = 37.7; 2027 = 37.8.
- Tax revenue: 2019 = 21.6; 2020 = 21.4; 2021 = 22.2; 2022 = 21.5; 2023 = 21.3; 2024 = 21.5; 2025 = 21.8; 2026 = 21.9; 2027 = 22.0.
  - Direct taxes: 2019 = 7.4; 2020 = 7.8; 2021 = 8.6; 2022 = 7.8; 2023 = 7.6; 2024 = 7.6; 2025 = 7.7; 2026 = 7.7; 2027 = 7.8.
    - Personal income tax: 2019 = 5.5; 2020 = 6.2; 2021 = 7.0; 2022 = 6.3; 2023 = 6.0; 2024 = 6.0; 2025 = 6.1; 2026 = 6.0; 2027 = 6.1.
    - Corporate profits tax: 2019 = 1.8; 2020 = 1.7; 2021 = 1.6; 2022 = 1.5; 2023 = 1.5; 2024 = 1.6; 2025 = 1.6; 2026 = 1.7; 2027 = 1.7.
  - Indirect taxes: 2019 = 14.2; 2020 = 13.6; 2021 = 13.7; 2022 = 13.7; 2023 = 13.7; 2024 = 13.9; 2025 = 14.1; 2026 = 14.2; 2027 = 14.2.
    - VAT: 2019 = 9.0; 2020 = 9.1; 2021 = 9.4; 2022 = 9.2; 2023 = 9.1; 2024 = 9.1; 2025 = 9.1; 2026 = 9.2; 2027 = 9.2.
    - Excises: 2019 = 4.1; 2020 = 3.3; 2021 = 3.2; 2022 = 3.4; 2023 = 3.6; 2024 = 3.7; 2025 = 3.9; 2026 = 4.0; 2027 = 4.0.
- Expenditure: 2019 = 39.4; 2020 = 45.9; 2021 = 42.3; 2022 = 43.3; 2023 = 43.0; 2024 = 42.9; 2025 = 42.8; 2026 = 42.4; 2027 = 42.1.
  - Expense (current expenditure): 2019 = 34.5; 2020 = 40.0; 2021 = 36.7; 2022 = 36.3; 2023 = 36.0; 2024 = 35.7; 2025 = 35.4; 2026 = 35.4; 2027 = 35.4.
  - Net acquisition of NFA (capital expenditure): 2019 = 4.9; 2020 = 5.9; 2021 = 5.6; 2022 = 6.9; 2023 = 7.0; 2024 = 7.2; 2025 = 7.4; 2026 = 7.0; 2027 = 6.7.
- Structural balance: 2019 = -0.5; 2020 = -5.1; 2021 = -3.8; 2022 = -4.7; 2023 = -3.8; 2024 = -3.3; 2025 = -2.8; 2026 = -2.3; 2027 = -1.8.
- Financing (accrual basis) and components (Net incurrence of liabilities, Net acquisition of financial assets) presented for each year.
- Sources: Eurostat; Statistics Estonia; and IMF staff calculations.

### General Government Financial Assets and Liabilities (2016–21) — Selected Levels (Millions of Euros)
- Total Assets: 2016 = 9,059; 2017 = 9,405; 2018 = 9,595; 2019 = 9,657; 2020 = 11,007; 2021 = 11,820.
  - Fiscal reserves: 2016 = 2,144; 2017 = 2,146; 2018 = 2,149; 2019 = 2,553; 2020 = 2,941; 2021 = 3,479.
    - Currency and deposits: 2016 = 1,063; 2017 = 1,368; 2018 = 1,220; 2019 = 1,738; 2020 = 2,173; 2021 = 2,651.
  - Loans: 2016 = 706; 2017 = 713; 2018 = 724; 2019 = 719; 2020 = 997; 2021 = 1,011.
  - Equity: 2016 = 5,186; 2017 = 5,539; 2018 = 5,585; 2019 = 5,225; 2020 = 5,718; 2021 = 5,917.
- Total Liabilities 1/: 2016 = 2,979; 2017 = 3,128; 2018 = 3,351; 2019 = 3,748; 2020 = 6,802; 2021 = 7,778.
  - Securities other than shares: 2016 = 221; 2017 = 264; 2018 = 194; 2019 = 248; 2020 = 2,261; 2021 = 2,001.
  - Loans: 2016 = 1,927; 2017 = 1,894; 2018 = 1,931; 2019 = 2,116; 2020 = 3,077; 2021 = 3,493.
  - Other accounts receivable/payable: 2016 = 770; 2017 = 908; 2018 = 1,172; 2019 = 1,322; 2020 = 1,395; 2021 = 2,151.
- Source: Statistics Estonia. (1/ Including commitments under the European Financial Stability Fund.)

### Balance of Payments Summary (2019–27) — Selected Items (Millions of Euros; percent of GDP)
- Current Account (millions): 2019 = 700; 2020 = -69; 2021 = -497; 2022 = 412; 2023 = 209; 2024 = 91; 2025 = -52; 2026 = -185; 2027 = -207.
- Primary Current Account 1/: 2019 = 2,867; 2020 = 1,663; 2021 = 1,971; 2022 = 2,533; 2023 = 2,713; 2024 = 2,584; 2025 = 2,440; 2026 = 2,308; 2027 = 2,285.
- Trade Balance (millions): 2019 = 1,153; 2020 = 129; 2021 = 496; 2022 = 778; 2023 = 196; 2024 = 524; 2025 = 883; 2026 = 162; 2027 = 53.
  - Exports of goods (millions): 2019 = 13,340; 2020 = 13,387; 2021 = 16,323; 2022 = 18,373; 2023 = 18,959; 2024 = 19,800; 2025 = 20,759; 2026 = 21,722; 2027 = 22,730.
  - Imports of goods (millions): 2019 = 14,270; 2020 = 13,535; 2021 = 17,655; 2022 = 20,185; 2023 = 20,909; 2024 = 21,983; 2025 = 23,170; 2026 = 24,356; 2027 = 25,578.
- Services Balance (millions): 2019 = 2,083; 2020 = 277; 2021 = 1,381; 2022 = 2,489; 2023 = 2,769; 2024 = 2,835; 2025 = 2,899; 2026 = 2,950; 2027 = 3,101.
  - Exports of services (millions): 2019 = 7,195; 2020 = 5,713; 2021 = 8,364; 2022 = 8,263; 2023 = 8,946; 2024 = 9,512; 2025 = 10,114; 2026 = 10,671; 2027 = 11,332.
- Net lending (+) / borrowing (-) balance (millions): 2019 = 1,179; 2020 = 497; 2021 = 2,306; 2022 = 616; 2023 = 842; 2024 = 754; 2025 = 652; 2026 = 562; 2027 = 585.
- Financial Account (millions): 2019 = 848; 2020 = 971; 2021 = 1,951; 2022 = 616; 2023 = 842; 2024 = 754; 2025 = 652; 2026 = 562; 2027 = 585.
- Direct investment (millions): 2019 = -1,088; 2020 = -2,780; 2021 = -464; liabilities and assets components provided.
- Change in reserves (millions): 2019 = 596; 2020 = 338; 2021 = 421; 2022 = -852; 2023 = -405; 2024 = -365; 2025 = -237; 2026 = -924; 2027 = 6.
- Total external debt (percent of GDP) 3/: 2019 = 76.3; 2020 = 91.1; 2021 = 86.8; projections follow.
- Sources: Bank of Estonia; and IMF staff estimates and projections. (1/ Excluding interest payments and reinvested earnings. 2/ Includes operations in debt securities. 3/ Starting in 2000, definition widened to include money market instruments and financial derivatives.)

### Macroeconomic Framework (2019–27) — Key Ratios (Percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated)
- Real GDP growth (percent): 2019 = 4.1; 2020 = -3.0; 2021 = 8.3; 2022 = 1.2; 2023 = 2.2; 2024 = 3.8; 2025 = 3.6; 2026 = 3.3; 2027 = 3.3.
- Domestic demand real growth (percent): 2019 = 2.8; 2020 = 3.3; 2021 = 7.7; 2022 = -2.6; 2023 = 2.0; 2024 = 4.7; 2025 = 4.5; 2026 = 4.0; 2027 = 3.7.
- Net exports contribution to real GDP (ppts): 2019 = 2.2; 2020 = -4.6; 2021 = -0.9; 2022 = 3.8; 2023 = 0.3; 2024 = -0.7; 2025 = -0.8; 2026 = -0.7; 2027 = -0.4.
- Gross saving (percent of GDP): 2019 = 28.6; 2020 = 30.0; 2021 = 28.9; 2022 = 26.9; 2023 = 26.6; 2024 = 27.2; 2025 = 27.5; 2026 = 27.6; 2027 = 27.7.
- Investment (percent of GDP): 2019 = 26.1; 2020 = 30.2; 2021 = 30.5; 2022 = 26.8; 2023 = 26.1; 2024 = 27.0; 2025 = 27.7; 2026 = 28.0; 2027 = 28.2.
- Memorandum items include fiscal balance, revenues, expenditure, structural balance, total general government debt, net non-debt creating capital inflows, unemployment rate, average wage growth, labor compensation share of GDP, output gap, and potential output growth with exact values for each year 2019–2027.
- Sources: Estonian authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

### Indicators of External Vulnerability (2016–21)
- Exports of goods and services (year-on-year, percent): 2016 = 4.8; 2017 = 7.9; 2018 = 6.4; 2019 = 6.8; 2020 = -7.0; 2021 = 29.3.
- Imports of goods and services (year-on-year, percent): 2016 = 5.3; 2017 = 7.1; 2018 = 8.5; 2019 = 4.5; 2020 = -2.1; 2021 = 29.9.
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2016 = 1.2; 2017 = 2.3; 2018 = 0.8; 2019 = 2.5; 2020 = -0.3; 2021 = -1.6.
- Capital and financial account balance (percent of GDP): 2016 = 2.3; 2017 = 3.2; 2018 = 2.2; 2019 = 4.3; 2020 = 1.9; 2021 = 7.5.
- Total external debt 1/ (percent of GDP): 2016 = 88.7; 2017 = 83.4; 2018 = 78.2; 2019 = 76.3; 2020 = 91.1; 2021 = 86.8.
- Debt service to exports of GNFS: 2016 = 69.5; 2017 = 61.2; 2018 = 51.5; 2019 = 46.4; 2020 = 57.5; 2021 = 49.8.
- External interest payments to exports of GNFS (percent): 2016 = 1.9; 2017 = 1.7; 2018 = 1.6; 2019 = 1.5; 2020 = 1.7; 2021 = 1.3.
- External amortization payments to exports of GNFS (percent): 2016 = 67.7; 2017 = 59.4; 2018 = 49.5; 2019 = 44.3; 2020 = 55.7; 2021 = 48.2.
- Exchange rate (per US$, period average): 2016 = 1.11; 2017 = 1.13; 2018 = 1.18; 2019 = 1.12; 2020 = 1.14; 2021 = 1.18.
- Financial Market Indicators: Tallinn stock exchange index (OMX Tallinn) end of period: 2016 = 1076; 2017 = 1242; 2018 = 1163; 2019 = 1280; 2020 = 1344; 2021 = 2001. Foreign currency debt rating (Standard & Poor's long-term foreign exchange sovereign rating) through 2021 = AA-.
- Sources: Estonian authorities; Bloomberg; Standard & Poor's; and IMF staff estimates. (1/ External debt includes money market instruments and financial derivatives.)

### Households — Financial Assets and Liabilities (2015–21) (Millions of Euros)
- Total Assets: 2015 = 22,741; 2016 = 25,904; 2017 = 29,266; 2018 = 32,025; 2019 = 35,755; 2020 = 37,605; 2021 = 42,521.
  - Currency and deposits: 2015 = 6,503; 2016 = 7,040; 2017 = 7,263; 2018 = 7,983; 2019 = 8,591; 2020 = 9,761; 2021 = 11,572.
  - Shares and other equity: 2015 = 12,484; 2016 = 14,539; 2017 = 17,144; 2018 = 18,814; 2019 = 20,862; 2020 = 21,003; 2021 = 29,087.
  - Insurance technical reserves: 2015 = 3,144; 2016 = 3,589; 2017 = 4,150; 2018 = 4,458; 2019 = 5,356; 2020 = 5,910; 2021 = 648.
- Total Liabilities: 2015 = 8,488; 2016 = 8,996; 2017 = 9,679; 2018 = 10,298; 2019 = 11,043; 2020 = 11,578; 2021 = 12,243.
  - Loans: 2015 = 7,934; 2016 = 8,404; 2017 = 9,045; 2018 = 9,585; 2019 = 10,283; 2020 = 10,786; 2021 = 11,412.
    - Short-term loans: 2015 = 202; 2016 = 153; 2017 = 169; 2018 = 255; 2019 = 279; 2020 = 261; 2021 = 223.
    - Long-term loans: 2015 = 7,732; 2016 = 8,251; 2017 = 8,876; 2018 = 9,330; 2019 = 10,003; 2020 = 10,525; 2021 = 11,188.
- Net Financial Assets: 2015 = 14,253; 2016 = 16,908; 2017 = 19,587; 2018 = 21,727; 2019 = 24,712; 2020 = 26,027; 2021 = 30,278.
- Memorandum item: Liabilities to gross wages and salaries ratio: 2015 = 116.3; 2016 = 115.9; 2017 = 114.6; 2018 = 112.3; 2019 = 109.9; 2020 = 112.4; 2021 = 110.8.
- Sources: Eesti Pank; and Statistics Estonia.

### Financial Soundness Indicators (2015–21)
- Capital adequacy:
  - Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets: 2015 = 36.5; 2016 = 35.1; 2017 = 30.6; 2018 = 31.0; 2019 = 27.0; 2020 = 27.9; 2021 = 24.3.
  - Regulatory Tier I capital to risk-weighted assets: 2015 = 36.0; 2016 = 34.5; 2017 = 30.1; 2018 = 30.4; 2019 = 26.6; 2020 = 27.3; 2021 = 23.5.
- Asset composition and quality:
  - NPLs to gross loans (non-financial sector): 2015 = 2.8; 2016 = 2.2; 2017 = 2.4; 2018 = 1.6; 2019 = 2.0; 2020 = 1.6; 2021 = 1.1.
  - Loans to households (sectoral distribution): 2015 = 44.3; 2016 = 42.5; 2017 = 44.4; 2018 = 44.9; 2019 = 46.2; 2020 = 46.2; 2021 = 45.5.
  - Loans to non-financial corporations: 2015 = 41.4; 2016 = 40.8; 2017 = 37.7; 2018 = 37.5; 2019 = 35.9; 2020 = 35.7; 2021 = 35.4.
- Earnings and profitability:
  - Return on assets: 2015 = 2.1; 2016 = 2.5; 2017 = 2.2; 2018 = 2.0; 2019 = 1.4; 2020 = 1.1; 2021 = 1.2.
  - Return on equity: 2015 = 6.8; 2016 = 13.9; 2017 = 11.4; 2018 = 10.8; 2019 = 8.8; 2020 = 7.3; 2021 = 9.4.
  - Interest margin to gross income: 2015 = 57.0; 2016 = 54.5; 2017 = 57.9; 2018 = 59.8; 2019 = 59.2; 2020 = 60.7; 2021 = 62.6.
  - Noninterest expenses to gross income: 2015 = 45.9; 2016 = 43.4; 2017 = 46.8; 2018 = 47.2; 2019 = 56.3; 2020 = 55.5; 2021 = 57.2.
- Liquidity:
  - Liquid assets to total short-term liabilities: 2015 = 29.2; 2016 = 31.5; 2017 = 28.1; 2018 = 26.4; 2019 = 25.0; 2020 = 30.6; 2021 = 31.0.
  - Loans to deposits 1/: 2015 = 105.0; 2016 = 103.8; 2017 = 118.7; 2018 = 114.4; 2019 = 105.5; 2020 = 90.0; 2021 = 91.3.
- Sources: IFS database, Eesti Pank, and Financial Supervisory Authority. (1/ Data is as of 2021Q3.)

*Source: IMF staff compilation from the Estonia chapter content provided.*

### Annex I. External Sector Assessment

### Annex I. External Sector Assessment

### Overall Assessment
- Estonia’s external position is substantially stronger than implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies, despite a moderate current account deficit in 2021 that was explained by a temporary spike in imports of computer services.
- Over the medium term, the current account balance is expected to converge toward the norm.
- Estonia’s net international investment position has been improving and is expected to follow a similar trajectory over the medium term.
- Potential Policy Responses:
  - Short term: fiscal policy should continue to play a key role in responding to the pandemic and mitigating the impact from the war.
  - Macroprudential policies: focus on preventing/containing real estate imbalances and reducing financial sector risks.
  - Structural policies: increase productivity and resilience through higher capital investment and health spending to mitigate long-term scarring.
  - Foster green and digital transformation to address other important challenges.

### Foreign Assets and Liabilities: Position and Trajectory
- Background:
  - NIIP continued to increase but remained negative at -13.3 percent of GDP in 2021.
  - The NIIP increased by about 10 percent of GDP from 2019.
  - Negative NIIP largely reflects net inflow of FDI, followed by net inflow of other investments.
  - Gross external debt: increased in 2020 by 15 percentage points to 91 percent of GDP; returned to declining trend in 2021, falling by 4 percentage points to about 87 percent of GDP.
  - Government fiscal reserves: about 11 percent of GDP at end-2021.
- Assessment:
  - The current NIIP and its projected path do not imply risks to external sustainability or a need for a substantial CA adjustment.
  - Estonia’s NIIP compares favorably with many European peers and further improvement will enhance resilience against shocks given aging-related pressures and portfolio flow volatility.
- 2021 (% GDP) statistics (as reported):
  - NIIP: -13.3
  - Gross Assets: 188.1
  - Debt Assets: 46.1
  - Gross Liab.: 201.4
  - Debt Liab.: 12.3

### Current Account
- Background:
  - Current account (CA) deficit in 2021: 1.6 percent of GDP (second consecutive year of deficit after many years of surpluses), due to an exceptional surge in software services imports.
  - 2021 exports increased by 29.3 percent; imports increased by 29.5 percent (recovery from COVID-19 shock in 2020).
  - Imports included a large temporary component related to computer services over 2020–21 equivalent to 9½ percent of GDP over two years, linked to an FDI operation acquiring intangible fixed assets for software development.
  - Goods trade balance deficit: 4.3 percent of GDP.
  - Services balance in 2021: 4.5 percent of GDP (lower than pre-pandemic average 7.5 percent of GDP for 2016–19).
- EBA-lite model results (Estonia: EBA-lite Model Results, 2021) (in percent of GDP):
  - CA-Actual: -1.6
  - Cyclical contributions (from model): -0.3
  - COVID-19 adjustor: -0.3
  - Additional temporary/statistical factors: -3.5
  - Natural disasters and conflicts: -0.2
  - Adjusted CA: 2.7
  - CA Norm (from model): -1.5
  - Adjusted CA Norm: -1.5
  - CA Gap: 4.2
  - o/w Relative policy gap: 3.5
  - Elasticity: -0.53
  - REER Gap (in percent): -7.9 4.8
  - Notes: 1/ Based on the EBA-lite 3.0 methodology; 2/ Additional cyclical adjustment to account for the temporary impact of the tourism (0.3 percent of GDP); 3/ Cyclically adjusted, including multilateral consistency adjustments.
- Assessment:
  - The CA position in 2021 is substantially stronger than implied by fundamentals and desirable policies.
  - The EBA-lite CA methodology suggests a multilaterally consistent CA deficit norm of 1.5 percent of GDP.
  - Adjusted current account (net of cyclical and one-off factors) was a surplus of 2.7 percent of GDP in 2021, producing a CA gap of 4.2 percent of GDP.
  - Estimated policy gap: 3½ percent of GDP, partly explained by the need to reduce the fiscal deficit while increasing public health spending.
  - Going forward, two countervailing forces for CA dynamics:
    - Temporary factors that increased computer services imports in 2020–21 are expected to unwind and push the CA back into surpluses.
    - Increased public and private investment (from reforms and scaling up public investment for COVID-19 aftermath and security needs) is expected to push the CA balance downward in the long term.

### Real Exchange Rate
- Background:
  - Nominal effective exchange rate appreciated by 0.5 percent in 2021.
  - Real effective exchange rate (REER) appreciated by 1.7 percent in 2021.
  - Nominal appreciation driven by strengthening of the euro against currencies of major trading partners; Estonia’s higher inflation than main trading partners contributed to higher real appreciation.
  - ULC-based real exchange rate measures depreciated in 2021 reflecting strong productivity growth in 2021.
- Assessment:
  - EBA-lite REER method suggests the REER gap is consistent with overvaluation (consistent with previous year assessment), contrasting with a REER undervaluation of about 8 percent implied by the CA model.
  - The CA model is the preferred model for the overall assessment given its more robust results for Estonia.
  - ULC-based and nonprice competitiveness indicators point to stronger competitiveness in 2021 than price-based REER indicators suggest.
  - ULCs, productivity trends, and nonprice competitiveness should be continually monitored.

### Capital and Financial Accounts: Flows and Policy Measures
- Background:
  - Large increase in the capital account surplus due to a large intra-group transfer of property rights.
  - Financial account (BPM6) increased from 0.4 percent of GDP in 2020 to 6.4 percent of GDP in 2021.
  - Direct investment inflows were the main drivers, reflecting an increase in direct investment abroad through intra-group debt related to the ICT sector.
- Assessment:
  - Risks related to capital flows are assessed to be small.

### FX Intervention and Reserves Level
- Background:
  - The euro has the status of a global reserve currency; reserves held by euro area economies are typically low by standard metrics.
  - Reserves for Estonia as of end-2021: 7 percent of GDP.
- Assessment:
  - Reserve level is assessed to be adequate.

_Annex I. External Sector Assessment — Prepared by Bogdan Lissovolik_

### 6.      High-quality integration could increase

### 6.      High-quality integration could increase

### Integration and growth benefits
- High-quality integration (most refugees find employment in occupations that match their skills profile) increases growth benefits relative to slow or low-quality integration.
- Employment in higher-pay sectors such as health and social work and information and communication should be higher than current employment patterns given refugees' educational and professional background.
- Such a labor reallocation could increase the annual wage income of refugees by 0.2 percent of GDP relative to the slow integration scenario.
- Job vacancy and employment scenarios notes:
  - Low and high employment rate scenarios assume unemployment rate of 30% and 12% respectively, and labor participation rate of 70%.
  - "Matches skills profile" scenario is based on the distribution of workers across economic activities by educational level in 2021.
  - Two-fifth of refugee workers are assumed to have tertiary education, 1/5 upper-secondary, and 1/5 below that level.

### Fiscal contribution and demographics
- Newly arrived refugees initially contribute far less to government revenues (including income and consumption tax) than the social benefits and services they receive; over time net fiscal contribution is expected to become less negative with labor market integration.
- Previous studies generally find fiscal costs are much higher for refugees compared to labor migrants (Rowthorn, 2008), but the situation with the Ukrainian refugees could differ because of their temporary protection status, which grants immediate access to the labor market.
- Highly skilled workers tend to earn more and contribute more to government revenues while relying less on social benefits—and most of the refugees fall under this category.
- Demographic profile implications:
  - Minors make up a third of the refugee population and their education imposes a large fiscal cost.
  - Over the medium-to long-run, once the children enter the labor force, they could have a positive impact on the fiscal balance as net contributors.
- Empirical evidence cited:
  - Damas de Matos (2021) estimates the fiscal ratio (government revenue to government expenditure) of immigrants in OECD countries for the period 2006–18, including by age group.
  - In all countries, immigrants contributed more than they received in social protection, health, and education; however, this ratio was relatively low for Estonia due to government expenditures related to health and old age. This cost is likely to be relatively low for the Ukrainian refugees.

### Active labor market policies and integration measures
- Active labor market policies (ALMPs) and supportive measures are crucial for high-quality integration:
  - Facilitate skills recognition.
  - Provide language training.
  - Fulfill childcare needs.
  - Increase overall flexibility of labor markets to help refugees rapidly integrate and avoid “skills downgrading.”
- Given that most working-age refugees are women with children, education support, including at the pre-primary level, will be important for labor force participation.
- Language training could increase employment options; a recent survey finds social work employers are open to hiring foreign-born workers but stress the need for proficiency in Estonian.
- For migrants in general, providing a clear path to residency and employment security once they begin to work is important (Koczan and others, 2021) and can help employers hire and invest in migrant workers.
- Measures could be introduced to minimize adverse impacts on native workers, including pressures on housing affordability.

### Fiscal payoff and timing
- Adequate public spending on integration and adaptation of refugees will pay off in fiscal terms:
  - Kancs and Lecca (2018) find that for EU countries receiving refugees, depending on the integration policy scenario, the year in which the net fiscal balance becomes positive could vary between 9 and 19 years.
- Previous findings:
  - While immigrants in many countries contributed more than they received when considering individualized items only, when all public expenditure is included, the net fiscal contribution remains positive in one-third of the countries (note in text: "However, when all public expenditure (e.g., defense, waste management) is included, the net fiscal contribution remains positive in one-third of the countries.").

### Construction costs, public investment cost overruns, and prioritization (related fiscal context)
- Construction prices and public investment cost overruns (preliminary analysis as of April 2022):
  - Construction price index in Estonia increased by 4.6 percent in 2022:Q1 compared to 2021:Q4 and by 19.3 percent y/y.
  - The y/y increase in Q1 primarily reflected the rising cost of materials, which accounted for 86 percent of the total index rise.
  - Compared to the fourth quarter of 2021:
    - Labor force was 0.9 percent more expensive.
    - Cost of using building machines rose by 3.1 percent.
    - Costs of materials were up by 6.8 percent.
  - Impact of the war in Ukraine on construction prices became apparent in March 2022, driven by rising prices of wood and wood products (by 15.7 percent) and higher prices of metal products (18.8 percent).
- Public investment cost overrun estimates and prioritization:
  - Higher-than-expected construction costs caused a cost overrun of 1.3 percent of GDP on the public investments in 319 projects budgeted at 4.7 percent of GDP (authorities’ preliminary analysis as of April 2022).
  - The authorities adopted a multi-pronged approach to guide prioritization based on degree of implementation, funding risks, and sector of investment:
    - Well-advanced projects (60–100 percent completion) were given higher priority scores than less advanced projects.
    - Projects with external funding expiring earlier were classified as critical; state-budget financed projects were attributed a low priority.
    - Projects at risk of losing foreign funds because of missed milestones were given a high criticality score.
    - Investments in energy security, health, and the green-digital transition are considered critical.
    - More than half of the 50 projects classified as critical (as of April 2022) were related to EU funding, mostly investments in hospitals, the medical system, and infrastructure (e.g., road and railway).
  - Notes in Annex:
    - 319 projects were evaluated, of which 89 are connected with EU funding.
    - About 50 projects were identified as critical or close to critical, as of April 2022.
  - A textual note: "Initial estimates of cost overruns are initial (27 percent) is broadly comparable to typical cost overruns in Europe."

### Investment management and institutional recommendations
- High uncertainty and new spending priorities call for faster implementation of the FTE and PIMA recommendations:
  - The authorities’ initial steps (public projects review and prioritization) align with FTE recommendations but should be further institutionalized.
  - FTE report recommendations include:
    - Monitor the public investment budget centrally.
    - Track projects for potential cost overruns and delays.
    - Ensure information on total project costs remains readily available.
  - A comprehensive overview of fiscal risks is warranted and should include quantification of the likelihood of risk materialization as well as potential costs.
  - Accelerating implementation of PIMA recommendations on long-term strategic planning and project implementation would help efficiently spend on new priorities.

*Source: IMF staff and Estonian authorities text (chapter excerpt).*

### 6.      Energy security strategies should be harmonized with climate commitments. For Estonia,

### 6.      Energy security strategies should be harmonized with climate commitments. For Estonia,

### Energy security, affordability, and climate commitments
- High gas prices pose a risk of delaying the phasing out of electricity generation from highly carbon-intensive oil shale.
- In line with the REPowerEU Plan, the current energy security challenge should be used as an opportunity to accelerate the green transition.
- Policy options aimed at addressing energy security and affordability should be assessed from a long-term sustainability perspective.
- Definitions and context:
  - Oil shale: "an energy-rich sedimentary rock that can be either burned for heat and power generation or used for producing liquid fuels."
  - Electricity production from oil shale is "the most CO2-intensive among all combustion technologies."
  - The Energy Trilemma: finding a balance between security, affordability, and sustainability.
- Estonia’s state-owned energy group Eesti Energia aims to "almost quadruple renewable electricity by 2026," although it foresees that "the thermal power plants in Narva will continue to participate in the electricity market during periods of high demand."

### Key implications and policy considerations
- Short-term energy security measures (e.g., reliance on alternatives during high gas prices) risk locking in highly carbon-intensive generation unless explicitly aligned with climate commitments.
- The REPowerEU Plan provides a policy framework to prioritize actions that both address immediate security concerns and advance decarbonization.
- Long-term sustainability assessment should be applied to affordability and security measures to avoid undermining climate objectives.

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### Annex VI. Recent Developments in Estonia’s Banking Sector

### Structure and concentration
- Estonia has a bank-centric financial system, in which banks account for "about 85 percent of assets."
- The banking sector comprises "nine banks licensed in Estonia (down from 42 in 1992)," as well as "five branches of foreign banks."
- Four banks are recognized as systemically important institutions by Eesti Pank: the two largest are Swedish-owned Swedbank and SEB; the third largest (in terms of Estonian assets) is Luminor (majority owned by US investment firm Blackstone); the fourth is Estonian-owned LHV Pank.
- The three largest systemic banks are under ECB supervision. The remaining banks have a combined market share of "less than 10 percent." Branches of foreign banks account for "about 2 percent of banking system assets."

### Capitalization and profitability
- The system’s capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is "among the highest in the EU, at well over 20 percent," though it "has been on a downward trend since 2014."
- Drivers of the downward trend: growth of loan portfolios and a change in the tax code that made dividend payouts more attractive.
- Small banks are, on aggregate, "significantly less well capitalized than the large banks."
- The four systemic banks are required by Eesti Pank to maintain additional institution-specific capital buffers on top of pillar-2 based capital buffers.
- A countercyclical capital buffer of "one percent will become mandatory for all banks starting from December 7, 2022."
- Profitability: return on equity (RoE) has been "consistently around 8–10 percent in recent years." The COVID pandemic has had no significant effect on system profitability.

### Asset quality and risks
- Non-performing loans are low but vulnerable: the banking system’s NPL level is "around one percent," which is lower than before the pandemic.
- Loan portfolios have withstood the pandemic well, aided by the economy structure and the use of grace periods for affected debtors; grace period loans are fading out.
- Accommodation sector is an exception but makes up only a small part of banks’ loan portfolios.
- Direct exposures to Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are "very limited." Indirect exposures, to clients with connections to these countries, amount to "2.2 percent of total assets."
- The war in Ukraine and current very high inflation could negatively affect household and firm finances and thereby the quality of loan books.
- Pre-war stress tests indicated Estonia’s banking system should be able to withstand plausible economic shocks.

### Liquidity and funding
- The banking system is liquid and increasingly funded by domestic customer deposits.
- Deposit growth during the pandemic helped build high volumes of liquid assets and limited liquidity risks.
- The banking system’s liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) is "over 150 percent (compared to a minimum requirement of 100 percent)."
- Deposit growth has allowed foreign-owned banks to reduce reliance on parent funding. Deposits now account for "over    percent of the banking system’s external funds." (figure in source missing spacing)
- Loan-to-deposit ratio declined to "about 80 percent" during the pandemic but is now rising as loan growth accelerates and deposit growth slows.
- Deposits of non-residents are declining and do not constitute a significant source of funding.
- Further funding diversification has come from increased issuance of debt securities.

### Competition and non-bank intermediation
- Competition is increasing within the banking sector and from the non-bank financial sector.
- Some domestically owned banks are growing strongly and aiming to increase market share, contributing to increased competition and indications of greater risk-taking.
- Market shares vary by segment: domestic banks' market share has reached "almost 50 percent in the long-term corporate loan segment," and "just over 20 percent for housing loans."
- Non-bank financial intermediation is growing rapidly (from a low base). Estonia has a well-developed fintech sector.

### Real estate and housing lending
- Mortgage and other real estate lending have been buoyant, fueling housing price increases.
- House prices have been rising steadily since 2009, affordability indicators have deteriorated.
- The pace of price increases accelerated to "around 20 percent in 2021."
- Housing loans represent the bulk of the increase in loans to households; loans to real estate firms have also been growing rapidly.
- Real estate firms have increased their access to non-bank sources of funding.

*International Monetary Fund — Republic of Estonia chapter excerpts*

### 7.      The war  in Ukraine has increased the risk of cyberattacks. In active  communication  with  the

### 7.      The war in Ukraine has increased the risk of cyberattacks. In active communication with the

### Cyber and financial-sector preparedness
- Banks and other supervised financial sector entities have been preparing to withstand a possible sudden increase in cyberattacks and mitigate the potential consequences.
- The risk of cyberattacks on financial institutions has become more pronounced but no systemic impact on the continuity of services has materialized to date.
- The sector has taken measures to counter possible attacks and has analyzed fallback solutions to deal with service interruptions.
- The Bank of Estonia continues to regularly assess financial stability risks and will take measures to avoid systemic risks building up.

### Fund relations — membership and resources
- Membership Status: Joined: May 26, 1992; Article VIII.
- Quota: 243.6 SDR Million; Percent Quota: 100.00.
- Fund holdings of currency: 183.89 SDR Million; 75.49 percent.
- Reserve Tranche Position: 59.73 SDR Million; 24.52 percent.
- Net cumulative SDR allocation: 295.44 SDR Million; 100.00 percent.
- Holdings: 262.14 SDR Million; 88.73 percent.
- Outstanding Purchases and Loans: None.
- Latest Financial Arrangements (In millions of SDR):
  - Stand-by: Approval Date 03/01/2000 — Expiration Date 08/31/2001 — Amount Approved 29.34 — Amount Drawn 0.00.
  - Stand-By: Approval Date 12/17/1997 — Expiration Date 03/16/1999 — Amount Approved 16.10 — Amount Drawn 0.00.
  - EFF: Approval Date 07/29/1996 — Expiration Date 08/28/1997 — Amount Approved 13.95 — Amount Drawn 0.00.
- Projected Payments to Fund: None.

### Technical assistance and supervisory engagement (2000–22)
- Summary table of Fund technical assistance missions from 2000–22 lists Department, Issue, Action Date, and Counterpart (selected examples):
  - FAD: Pension reform — Mission April 2000 — Ministries of Finance and Social Affairs.
  - MAE: Banking Supervision — Staff Visit December 2000 — Bank of Estonia.
  - FAD: Tax Policy — Mission March 2001 — Ministry of Finance.
  - FAD: Medium-term Budget Technical Assistance — December 2003 — Ministry of Finance.
  - LEG: Corporate Insolvency Law Technical Assistance — May 2018–April 2021 — Ministry of Justice.
  - STA: BOP and Prices statistics Regional training — May 2017–April 2023 — Bank of Estonia.
  - LEG: AML/CFT Regional TA — September 2021–November 2022 — Bank of Estonia.

### Statistical issues — data adequacy and dissemination (As of June 10, 2022)
- General: Estonia’s data provision to the Fund is adequate for surveillance purposes.
- National Accounts:
  - Compiled by Statistics Estonia in accordance with ESA 2010.
  - Quarterly GDP estimates at current and at constant prices compiled using production, income and expenditure approaches.
  - Annual and quarterly national accounts compiled at previous year prices and chain-linked to 2015, using double deflation.
  - Reference year updated from 2010 to 2015; national accounts time series revised in August 2019.
- Price statistics:
  - CPI and components published monthly on the fifth working day after the reference period.
  - Owner-occupied housing is excluded.
  - Industrial producer price, export price, and import price indexes compiled monthly and disseminated within one month after the end of reference period.
  - Services producer price index disseminated quarterly.
- Government finance statistics:
  - Fiscal data published by the Ministry of Finance; historical data also on Statistics Estonia’s website.
  - Monthly central government data disseminated one month after the reference period; provides detailed revenue breakdown but not expenditure breakdown.
  - Comprehensive annual data compiled according to ESA2010 and reported for dissemination in the IMF’s GFS database.
- Monetary and financial statistics:
  - Compiled by the Bank of Estonia consistent with the IMF’s Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual and Compilation Guide.
  - Aggregate financial data reported monthly; majority disseminated on the Bank of Estonia’s webpage on the 20th banking day after the end of the reporting period.
  - Individual bank data available quarterly since 2008Q1 on the Financial Supervision Authority’s webpage.
- Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs):
  - BoE compiles quarterly data for 16 of the 18 core FSIs and 6 of the 12 additional FSIs for deposit-takers.
  - Estonia reports data on several indicators in the Financial Access Survey (FAS), including two indicators (commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults and ATMs per 100,000 adults) adopted by the UN to monitor Target 8.10 of the SDGs.
- External sector statistics:
  - Quarterly balance of payments, external debt, and IIP compiled consistent with BPM6.
  - Import/export data available forty days after the end of the reference month.
  - Data Template on International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity disseminated monthly, within five banking days.
- Data standards:
  - Estonia adhered to SDDS Plus on January 11, 2022.
  - A data ROSC report published November 2001 and updated June 2002.
  - The 2009 fiscal transparency ROSC indicated Estonia met nearly all requirements of the transparency code and approached best international practice in some areas.

### Data dissemination timetable (As of June 10, 2022) — selected entries
- Exchange Rates: Date of latest observation June 9, 2022 — Date received June 10, 2022 — Frequency D — Frequency of Reporting D — Frequency of Publication D.
- International Reserve Assets and Reserve Liabilities of the Monetary Authorities: Date of latest observation May 2022 — Date received June 7, 2022 — Frequency M — Frequency of Reporting M — Frequency of Publication 5D.
- Reserve/Base Money: Date of latest observation April 2022 — Date received May 12, 2022 — Frequency M — Frequency of Reporting M — Frequency of Publication 9D.
- Broad Money: Date of latest observation April 2022 — Date received May 27, 2022 — Frequency M — Frequency of Reporting M — Frequency of Publication 4W.
- Consumer Price Index: Date of latest observation May 2022 — Date received June 9, 2022 — Frequency M — Frequency of Reporting M — Frequency of Publication 5D.
- GDP/GNP: Date of latest observation Q1/2022 — Date received June 4, 2022 — Frequency Q — Frequency of Reporting Q — Frequency of Publication 2M.
- External Current Account Balance: Date of latest observation Q1/2022 — Date received June 9, 2022 — Frequency Q — Frequency of Reporting Q — Frequency of Publication 6W.
- Gross External Debt: Date of latest observation Q1/2022 — Date received June 9, 2022 — Frequency Q — Frequency of Reporting Q — Frequency of Publication 1Q.
- Notes:
  - Daily (D), Weekly (W), Monthly (M), Quarterly (Q), Annually (A); Not Available (NA).
  - With the adoption of the euro as from 1 January 2011, the Bank of Estonia has ceased to quote and publish the daily official exchange rates since the determination of the exchange rate of the euro against third currencies is the responsibility of the European Central Bank.

### Recent economic developments, outlook, and risks (Statement by authorities, August 29, 2022)
- Growth and outlook:
  - The strong growth in the Estonian economy in the beginning of this year is expected to weaken.
  - The Estonian economy is expected to record a low growth in 2022 and gradually recover to its potential growth thereafter.
  - Growth is projected to weaken in the second half of the year but will pick up gradually thereafter.
- Inflation and labor market:
  - Inflation has continued to accelerate and has been well above the euro area average.
  - High and increasingly broad-based inflation not fully explained by energy price surge and supply disruptions; buoyant domestic demand and money withdrawn from the second pension pillar contributed.
  - Labor force participation and employment continued to grow in the first quarter.
  - Unemployment rate has remained low despite a relatively large number of Ukrainian refugees entering the labor market.
  - Very high inflation readings will cause real wages to fall this year and, coupled with rising cost of borrowing, will limit households’ ability to consume going forward.
- Risks:
  - Downside risks may materially affect the outlook; uncertainty surrounding the baseline forecast is exceptionally high.
  - Key risks: further spillovers from Russia’s war against Ukraine, energy market disruptions, prolonged supply-chain constraints, higher-than-expected inflation, tighter monetary policy, and pandemic-related risks.

### Fiscal policy and public investment
- Fiscal stance:
  - Authorities committed to pursue a prudent fiscal policy.
  - Estonia’s public debt to GDP ratio remains the lowest in the EU.
  - Fiscal policy framework centered around a balanced budget rule in structural terms.
  - Current structural deficit is expected to narrow over the coming years.
- 2022 measures:
  - 2022 supplementary budget adopted in May to guarantee energy security, strengthen defense capabilities, and maintain social cohesion, including by assisting Ukrainian refugees.
- Public investment management:
  - A spending review launched to improve public investment management.
  - Ministry of Finance concluded a mapping exercise of public construction projects in May due to rapidly increased construction costs.
  - Government prioritizing ten critical projects that received EU Cohesion Policy funding and will have to be completed by the end of the next year; most will receive additional funding to cover cost overruns.

### Structural policies — energy, labor, and social measures
- Energy security and transition:
  - Natural gas and electricity imports from Russia have stopped; as of now, there are no immediate supply risks.
  - Estonia’s diversified energy mix and large oil shale reserves will allow it to permanently phase out all Russian energy imports.
  - A significant reduction in natural gas usage is expected; procurement of a natural gas strategic reserve is ongoing.
  - Estonian and Finnish governments working on a new LNG terminal to complement current supply via the LNG terminal in Lithuania.
  - 90 days of reserves built up for diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel.
  - Baltic Synchronization Project will connect Estonia’s electricity grid with the Continental European Network while decoupling it from Russia’s electricity system.
  - Authorities aim to reach carbon neutrality by 2050.
  - National Development Plan for the Energy Sector until 2030 and Transport and Mobility Development Plan 2021-2035 articulated.
  - Authorities remain committed to phasing out oil shale in electricity generation by 2035.
  - New government goal: increase share of renewables in electricity consumption to 100% by 2030.
- Labor market and skills:
  - Addressing skill mismatches remains important to alleviate pressures in the tight labor market.
  - Active labor market policies will remain essential; enhancing digital skills is a priority.
  - Changes in the unemployment benefit system are being prepared to adjust benefits according to the cyclical position of the labor market.
  - Authorities will continue to strongly support Ukrainian refugees to facilitate integration and labor market participation.
- Gender pay gap:
  - High gender pay gap remains a concern despite steady improvement.
  - Authorities committed to decrease the gender pay gap to 5 percent by 2035.
  - Adoption of the EU Pay Transparency Directive and the Estonian Welfare Development Plan 2023-2030 expected to have a positive impact.

### Financial sector vulnerabilities and AML/CFT
- Financial sector resilience:
  - Financial sector remains resilient; direct impact of the war on the Estonian financial sector is small.
  - Macro- and microprudential capital requirements help ensure banks hold sufficient capital.
- Housing market:
  - Vulnerabilities in the housing market have increased further due to strong income and savings growth, supply difficulties, and large price increases for construction materials.
  - Share of riskier housing loans has slightly increased with competition between banks becoming tighter.
  - Higher interest rates may start to limit demand; Bank of Estonia may tighten requirements for issuing housing loans if needed.
- AML/CFT efforts:
  - Authorities have made great efforts to prevent use of the financial system for money laundering and terrorist financing.
  - Supervisory efficiency has risen significantly and staffing for AML/CFT supervisors has been substantially increased.
  - Authorities will continue international cooperation, including through the IMF’s Nordic-Baltic regional AML/CFT analysis and by ensuring compliance with FATF standards as assessed by MONEYVAL.
  - Authorities have pinpointed risks related to virtual asset service providers (VASPs); measures to improve transparency, regulation, and supervision of VASPs are needed.
  - Draft law on crowdfunding and virtual assets and the EU Regulation on Markets in Crypto-assets (MiCA) are expected to further limit the risks.

*Prepared by European Department; informational annex to the Republic of Estonia — Staff Report for the 2022 Article IV Consultation (as of June 27, 2022).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2022/english/1estea2022001.pdf_
