## 1gbrea2022001

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---

### Background and recent developments
- Context and challenges
  - UK entered 2021 facing a second Covid-19 wave, an ambitious vaccination campaign, extended 2020 support measures, additional BoE QE, and eased financial conditions.
  - EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) had just been concluded.
  - Key challenges: Covid resurgence, unsettled post-Brexit elements (financial sector, Northern Ireland Protocol), policy frameworks under review, climate policy details still being specified, structural transformation and competitiveness constraints.
- Recovery and activity
  - Recovery proceeded faster than expected in 2021 but experienced turbulence from Covid-Omicron.
  - By November 2021:
    - Services: surpassed pre-pandemic level by 1½ percent.
    - Manufacturing: about 1½ percent below pre-pandemic level.
  - Labor market:
    - Unemployment: 4.3 percent in Q3 2021.
    - Employee numbers above pre-pandemic levels; no job-loss uptick after furlough ended in September.
  - Services PMI: 53.6 in December 2021.
- Supply constraints and inflationary pressures
  - Daily new Covid cases peaked just below 220,000 in January 2022.
  - Consumer prices in December 2021: headline 5.4 percent, core 4.2 percent y-o-y.
  - Services inflation: 3.4 percent in December 2021 (from 2 percent in Q1–Q3).
  - Underlying wage growth: about a 3½–4 percent rate since June 2021.
  - Minimum wage increase pending: 6½ percent.
  - Energy price increases not fully passed through to regulated retail prices; further regulated increase scheduled for April 2022.
- Supply-side drivers
  - Persistent Covid effects, demand shifts to goods, reduced labor force participation, and Brexit-related migration impacts strained capacity.
  - Surveys show lengthy supplier delivery times, backlogs, material shortages, low inventories, and record-high unfilled job openings.

### Financial conditions, balance sheets, and vulnerabilities
- Financial conditions and lending
  - 2021: very accommodative financial conditions driven by compressed credit spreads and buoyant asset prices.
  - QE created ample banking-system liquidity; mortgage-market spread compression notable.
  - Credit-to-GDP gap: rose close to zero in early 2021 (first time in a decade), then fell slightly in Q2 as GDP recovered.
  - Corporate lending slowed as large corporates repaid loans and issued equity/bonds; SME debt reflected government-guaranteed loan schemes.
  - Mortgages availability increased; housing prices boomed but "red flags are not yet visible."
  - Consumer credit subdued but improving; January 2022 lending survey: corporate credit availability unchanged in 2021Q4; secured credit availability to households improved.
- Private-sector balance sheets
  - Households: larger cash positions and higher housing values; new savings concentrated among top two income quintiles; lowest income quintile has highest mortgage vulnerability.
  - Corporate leverage declined; SME equity gap estimated at one percent of turnover.
  - Companies at risk of falling from investment grade elevated at triple pre-pandemic levels.
  - Pockets of vulnerability in contact-intensive sectors and SMEs as support programs sunset.
- Banking sector and NBFIs
  - Aggregate CET1 ratio of major UK banks: 16.5 percent through 2021Q3.
  - BoE 2021 Solvency Stress Test: bank balance sheets generally robust; FSAP stress tests confirm sufficient capital and liquidity buffers for severe adverse shocks.
  - NBFIs: focus on riskier markets, complement bank lending, appear less procyclical under stress, but data gaps and global nature limit systemic-risk analysis.
  - Common NBFI issues: liquidity mismatch in MMFs and corporate bond funds, leveraged investors with poor margin-call preparedness, high risk-taking in corporate bond and collateralized loan obligation markets.

### Policy response and announced measures
- Fiscal policy
  - Government moved to targeted fiscal support and a medium-term consolidation plan.
  - March and October budgets (with a 3-year Spending Review) targeted pandemic-affected sectors and added spending for health backlogs, climate needs, and training.
  - Tax measures projected to lift tax-to-GDP ratio by about 2 percentage points to a 70-year high.
  - Fiscal trajectory: continued fiscal impulse in 2022; fiscal withdrawal beginning in 2023 and largest in 2024–25.
  - Medium-term plan would reduce deficit from about 8 to nearly 2 percent of GDP between FY21/22 and FY24/25 (with 3¾ percent of GDP from sunset of pandemic support measures).
  - Net public debt would fall by about 2 percentage points of GDP over the 5-year horizon.
  - Fiscal rules re-imposed: balanced current budget and declining debt trajectory over a rolling three-year horizon.
- Monetary policy and normalization
  - Policy rate: 0.1 percent for first eight months of 2021; produced a shadow rate some 2–3 percentage points below estimated neutral rate.
  - BoE prepared technically for negative rates if needed.
  - As inflation accelerated in Sept–Oct, BoE adopted a hawkish stance.
  - December 2021: BoE raised policy rate by 15 bps to 0.25 percent.
  - SONIA curve anticipated further 100 bps of rate hikes by end-2022.
  - BoE completed QE in December 2021 and announced QT strategy:
    - No reinvestment once policy rate hits 0.5 percent.
    - Outright sales once policy rate hits at least 1 percent, subject to "economic circumstances."
- Macroprudential and financial-sector measures
  - Crisis-related exceptional financial measures wound down; some remained (leverage ratio calculations, transitional ECL arrangements).
  - June 2021: authorities lifted remaining guardrails on capital distributions by large banks.
  - December 2021 stress test prompted raising CCyB from zero to one percent from December 2022.
  - O-SII buffer rates remain at December 2019 settings until at least 2023.
  - Authorities intended to remove the "affordability test" in 2022H1, subject to consultation.

### Key figures and indicators (selected)
- Unemployment: 4.3 percent in Q3 2021.
- Services: +1½ percent above pre-pandemic by November 2021.
- Manufacturing: about 1½ percent below pre-pandemic by November 2021.
- Services PMI: 53.6 in December 2021.
- Daily new Covid cases peak: just below 220,000 in January 2022.
- Consumer prices (Dec 2021): headline 5.4 percent; core 4.2 percent y-o-y.
- Services inflation: 3.4 percent in December 2021.
- Underlying wage growth: about a 3½–4 percent rate since June 2021.
- Minimum wage increase pending: 6½ percent.
- Aggregate CET1 ratio of major UK banks: 16.5 percent through 2021Q3.
- Credit-to-GDP gap: rose close to zero in early 2021.
- Projected fiscal deficit reduction: from about 8 to nearly 2 percent of GDP between FY21/22 and FY24/25.
- Contribution to deficit improvement from sunset of pandemic support: 3¾ percent of GDP.
- Anticipated SONIA-implied additional tightening: 100 bps by end-2022.
- BoE policy rate change: +15 bps to 0.25 percent in December 2021.
- CCyB increase announced: from zero to one percent from December 2022.
- SME equity gap estimate: one percent of turnover.

### Outlook and baseline projections
- Staff baseline: growth drops from an estimated outturn of 7.2 percent in 2021 to 4.7 percent in 2022; near-term inflation elevated; slowdown as inflation is contained.
- Near-term drivers:
  - Mild slowdown in Q1 from Omicron, followed by several quarters of elevated growth.
  - Private demand expected very strong in 2022 as investment responds to tax incentives, inventories rebuild, residential backlogs clear, and consumption remains strong (savings rate decline).
  - Current account deficit expected to increase to about 4.7 percent of GDP in 2022.
  - Output gap stays positive; tight labor market with wage settlements partly compensating real wage erosion.
- Medium-term:
  - Growth slows to about 1½ percent over 2023–24 (pre-pandemic potential), medium-term output 2–2¼ percentage points below pre-pandemic trend by 2025.
  - Factors: higher inactivity among older workers, lower net migration, higher reservation wages, lower capital stock from foregone investment, TFP hindered by less on-the-job learning and knowledge spillovers.
  - This is an improvement relative to the 4–5 percent scarring expected a year earlier.
- Inflation path
  - Expected to peak around 7 percent during spring 2022 when regulated energy-price increases kick in.
  - Return to 2 percent target by 2024Q2.

### Policy assumptions underlying the baseline
- Fiscal: policies as articulated in FY21/22 Budget and Spending Review; announced tax/spending and adjustment path honored.
- Monetary: further 75–125 bps increase (in line with markets’ expectations); balance-sheet reduction per plans (no reinvestment once policy rate reaches 0.5 percent in spring 2022; gradual asset sales starting in early 2023 after policy rate reaches 1 percent).
- Macroprudential: CCyB remains zero until Dec 2022 then increases to 1 percent, gradually towards 2 percent as financial cycle evolves; O-SII rates remain at Dec 2019 levels until Dec 2023.
- Structural: increased retraining funding and public investment per budget; climate policies per Net Zero plan including £30bn green public investment and £500m in household heating grants; Build Back Better measures implemented with slow behind-the-border progress post-Brexit.

### Risks to the outlook
- Overall balance of risks favors higher near-term inflation and lower medium-term growth.
- Near-term risks:
  - Stronger domestic demand plus supply constraints (or pandemic resurgence) could lift inflation further and raise medium-term expectations.
- Medium-term risks:
  - Return to target may require compressed incomes and below-average growth.
  - Global monetary tightening could reduce external demand and accentuate slowdown.
  - UK financial-sector problems or disruptive transitions could activate macro-financial feedback loops.
  - Trade problems with EU and higher adjustment costs may increase scarring.
- Geopolitical shocks:
  - Tensions in Eastern Europe could raise energy prices, slow trading partners, exacerbate inflation, and weaken growth via financial channels.

### Near-term macroeconomic management priorities and policy advice
- Four imperatives:
  - Calibrate near-term policy mix to address supply-demand imbalances and elevated inflation.
  - Optimize policies for greater volatility.
  - Refine robust policy frameworks to secure policy space and anchors.
  - Ensure Build Back Better overcomes barriers to deliver medium-term transformation.
- Monetary advice:
  - Support BoE starting tightening to move policy towards neutral (estimated between 1 and 1½ percent).
  - Pace should balance recovery risks and de-anchoring of expectations; monitor wage settlements, corporate pricing intentions, survey and market-implied inflation expectations, option market probabilities of high inflation.
  - Emphasize clear forward guidance to limit second-round effects.
- Fiscal advice:
  - Protect vulnerable households from higher cost of living.
  - Let prices reflect higher energy costs while revamping schemes to increase targeted support (examples: expand warm homes and winter fuel allowance from £140 to about £300 per low-income household, costing around £1 billion; or reinstate part of Universal Credit uplift).
  - Temporary VAT cut on household energy (e.g., 5 percent to zero) judged costly (~£2.5 billion) and less targeted.
  - For March fiscal review: (i) re-sequence fiscal package by raising more revenues now and investing more later; (ii) consider measures shifting consumption forward targeting pandemic beneficiaries (e.g., windfall/wealth taxes now paired with pre-announced future green subsidies).

### Macroprudential policy, housing risks, and mortgage measures
- Financial cycle slightly ahead of the economic one; low real rates and loose conditions could build stability risks.
- Staff supported gradual reestablishment of CCyB towards two percent and encouraged further steps to preempt systemic developments.
- Rationale for simplifying mortgage measures:
  - Existing measures broadly effective in containing household debt buildup.
  - Affordability test has contributed little at the margin.
  - Continued vigilance warranted as income support is removed; ensure bank stress tests capture housing-correction risks and contagion channels.
- Authorities’ view:
  - FPC judged risk environment standard; buffer increases can be met with existing capital rather than major recapitalization.
  - Simulations suggested LTI flow limit without affordability test, combined with FCA affordability testing, could deliver resilience.

### Nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs), liquidity, and market backstops
- Pandemic experience highlighted liquidity mismatches in many NBFIs and their limited access to BoE liquidity facilities during stress.
- Need to augment NBFI data collection and monitoring; coordinate with foreign authorities on cross-border NBFIs.
- BoE could consider allowing appropriately regulated, large, interconnected NBFIs access to repo and/or gilt purchase operations to strengthen backstops.
- Better liquidity management vis-à-vis large global NBFI sector would reduce international spillover risks.

### Structural transformation, Build Back Better, and leveling up
- Plan overview: three pillars (infrastructure, skills, innovation) and three strategies (Levelling up, Net Zero Strategy, Global Britain).
- Infrastructure commitments and targets
  - Use Levelling Up Fund, UK Shared Prosperity Fund, Towns Fund, High Street Fund; mobilize Infrastructure Bank.
  - £30bn funding for climate change priorities between 2021 and 2025.
  - £500m for grants to install new home heating systems and replace boilers.
  - Build Back Better commitment: capital spending average 2.7 percent of GDP until 2024–25; £100 billion investment up to 2024–25 including £21 billion for road infrastructure.
- Skills and innovation
  - Lifetime Skills Guarantee, Skills Bootcamps, 20 Institutes of Technology, additional classroom hours for 16–19-year-olds.
  - Increase public R&D investment to £20bn a year by FY24/25, part of objectives to reach £22bn by FY26/27 and economy-wide R&D to 2.4% of GDP in 2027.
  - Introduced £375m Future Fund: Breakthrough; Help to Grow program aiming to support over 100k SMEs.
- Funding and gaps
  - Authorities mobilized £26bn (about 1 percent of GDP) since 2020; CCC estimate needed capital investment to achieve net zero: rise from £10bn/year (0.4 percent of GDP) in 2020 to £50bn/year in 2030.
  - Assessment: an extra 1 percent (£21bn) a year of green investment needed to meet net zero target (Green Alliance).
  - Only £500m for grants to install about 30,000 home heating systems versus government target of 600,000 per year by 2028.
- Levelling up barriers and fiscal options
  - Public investment management strong but needs improvements: extend planning horizons, better national-subnational coordination, revise appraisal to reflect climate costs/benefits, publish cost-benefit and ex-post evaluations.
  - Revenue-raising options to fund leveling up (selected fiscal yields):
    - 2 percent rise in basic PIT: 0.2 percent of GDP (apply to two upper income quintiles recommended).
    - Reduce NICs while broadening VAT to OECD average: 0.2 percent of GDP.
    - One-off wealth tax above £2bn at 1 percent a year for five years: 0.7 percent of GDP (noting projection of £80bn total).
    - Modify dividend taxation: 0.1 percent of GDP.
- SME support and evaluation
  - SME equity/liquidity risks as pandemic-era support sunsets; scope to keep or expand programs such as reopening Future Fund with a larger envelope.
  - Bounce Back Loans: total disbursements £46bn (2 percent of GDP); deferred VAT repayments £33.5bn (1.4 percent of GDP).
- Active Labor Market Policies (ALMPs)
  - Kickstart, Restart, Skills Bootcamps, Lifetime Skills Guarantee; recommendations to evaluate and concentrate resources on most successful programs.
  - Recommendation to automate certain ALMP funding increases tied to unemployment cycles while preserving design discretion.

### Net Zero Strategy — assessment and recommendations
- Objectives and governance
  - Net Zero Strategy aims for carbon neutrality by 2050; cabinet-level monitoring; CCC leads monitoring and will publish annual reports.
  - Goal: reduce emissions from 1990 to 2035 by 78 percent.
  - 7th and 8th carbon budgets pending; targets have strong legal status under 2008 Climate Change Act.
- Implementation approach and financing
  - Electrification backbone: phase-out new petrol/diesel cars and vans by early 2030s; major heat-pump scale-up; power sector decarbonized by 2035; hydrogen and greenhouse gas removals supplement.
  - Strategy anticipates additional annual green investment rising to £50–60 billion by 2030, a third public.
  - Private investment expected to provide most of the £90bn needed to reach climate goals.
- Gaps and concerns
  - Uncertainty whether incentives (regulation, carbon pricing) will induce fast private-sector response.
  - Potential shortfalls in compensation for adversely affected groups and in public investment.
  - Heat and Buildings Strategy commitment: £500m in £5,000 grants over next three years would help ~30,000 households a year versus CCC estimate of at least 600,000 households per year.
  - Department estimate for retrofitting homes to band C: between £35bn and £65bn by 2035.
- Staff recommendations
  - Move towards comprehensive, predictable, uniform, and higher carbon price.
  - More grants for low-income households needing large investments; tailor ALMPs to retrain fossil-fuel industry workers.
  - Legal clarity on phase-ins and measures to relieve supply bottlenecks (e.g., skilled-worker visas).
  - Strengthen public investment management (climate analysis capacity, transparency, coordination).
  - Consider UK carbon tax on gas and electricity: projected to raise £57 billion over 2021–30 (Grantham Research Institute projection cited).

### Box: Quantitative Tightening (QT) in the UK — summary
- Benefits of well-communicated, predictable QT: restores room for policy action, manages liquidity as reserve demand falls, strengthens financial stability by mitigating volatility and risk premia, and clarifies monetary communication.
- UK-specific statistics and staff estimates:
  - Substantial room for further asset purchases at £174.5 billion as of end-FY21/22.
  - Headroom above £70 billion over FY22/23.
  - Medium-term monetary base needed could settle in 15–20 percent of nominal GDP and 1–5 percent of consolidated financial assets (versus 45 percent and 8 percent estimated at end-2021).
- BoE QT strategy outlined:
  - Cease reinvestment when Bank Rate rises to 0.5 percent; consider sales after Bank Rate at least 1 percent.
  - Conduct QT gradually and predictably; retain discretion for economic circumstances.
- Scenario calibrations:
  - Scenario 2: active gilt sales ~£300bn over 2023–25 to reduce monetary base to 20 percent of projected nominal GDP in 2025.
  - Scenario 3: balance-sheet shrink at half pace of Scenario 2, ~£50bn in active gilt sales over 2023–25 to reach monetary base of 28 percent of projected nominal GDP in 2025.
  - Assumed calibration: £100bn in QT raises shadow rate by 50bps (uncertain).
- Recommended refinements:
  - Announce medium-term QT objective and speed; delegate day-to-day QE/QT implementation to Bank executive while MPC sets strategy; reaffirm QT impacts considered when setting Bank Rate.

### External and public-debt assessments
- External position
  - External debt peaked at 337 percent of GDP in 2020 due to denominator effects; baseline projects decline to about 279 percent of GDP by 2026.
  - Almost half of external debt is short-term bank liabilities; public debt accounts for a tenth.
  - Net international investment position (NIIP) around -21.3 percent in 2021, projected to decline further to -30.0 percent by 2027.
  - More than ¼ of external debt denominated in foreign currency.
- External-debt projections (selected baseline values, percent of GDP)
  - 2016: 305; 2017: 309; 2018: 305; 2019: 298; 2020: 337; 2021: 317; 2022: 294; 2023: 286; 2024: 283; 2025: 281; 2026: 279.
- Scenario outcomes (selected)
  - Historical scenario: external debt climbs to 341 percent of GDP by forecast horizon.
  - Growth shock: external debt rises to 306 percent of GDP.
  - Depreciation shock (one-time real depreciation of 30 percent in 2021): external debt rises to 326 percent of GDP.
  - Combined shock outcome shown at 295 percent of GDP.
- Key implications
  - External debt sustainable in baseline given decline and UK’s net asset position in FX, but vulnerabilities remain:
    - Large short-term bank liabilities (near twice GDP in some measures).
    - Exchange-rate risk (more than ¼ foreign-currency denominated).
  - Policy implication: preserve strong policy frameworks, structural reforms to raise productivity, and manage market sentiment.

### Public debt and fiscal sustainability
- Baseline DSA indicators (selected)
  - Nominal gross public debt (percent of GDP): 110.0 (2020), 110.6, 106.0, 105.4, 102.0, 97.7, 93.5, 90.4 (through 2027).
  - Public gross financing needs (percent of GDP): 23.8 (2020), 16.0, 10.2, 10.6, 10.5, 10.7, 9.3, 9.1.
  - Real GDP growth (percent): -10.2 (2020), 10.4, 4.4, 1.2, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5 (2020–2027 sequence).
  - CPI inflation (period average): 1.8 (2019); CPI Inflation projected: 6.3 (2022), 3.1 (2023), 2.0 (2024).
- Stress tests and risk assessment
  - Risk assessment: moderate under several shock scenarios (severe demand shock, global tightening, supply-side recession).
  - Stress-test outputs show debt rises under adverse scenarios but baseline judged manageable; key sensitivities to primary-balance shocks, growth shocks, interest-rate shocks, and exchange-rate shocks.
  - GFN and fanchart indices reported; medium-term risk assessment generally low in the framework but vulnerabilities noted.

### Post-Covid scarring (Annex I)
- Estimated aggregate scarring by 2025: 2.2 percent of GDP.
- Composition by 2025:
  - Capital scarring: physical 0.4 percent of GDP; intangible 0.1 percent of GDP (total capital ~0.5 percent).
  - Labor supply: 0.5 percent of GDP (driven by lower participation and population changes).
  - Productivity-related factors: 1.1 percent of GDP (about half of total scarring), broken down as:
    - Knowledge spillovers (intangible decline multiplier 3.5): about 0.6 percent of GDP.
    - Human-capital losses from foregone on-the-job learning: about 0.5 percent of GDP.
    - Allocative inefficiency: about 0.1 percent of GDP.
- Key calibration assumptions and parameters:
  - Depreciation rates assumed to rise to 7½ percent in 2021–23 versus about 7¼ percent pre-pandemic.
  - Historical capital share: about 45 percent of income; labor share: about 55 percent.
  - Multiplier for intangible knowledge spillovers: 3.5 (Haskel, 2021).
  - Elasticity of TFP to cumulative labor hours calibrated to 2 percent.
  - Projected average labor participation over 2023–25: 63.6 percent vs pre-pandemic trend 64 percent.

### Phillips curve and inflation dynamics (Annex VI)
- Evidence suggests a steepening of the Phillips curve due to structural factors:
  - Digitalization, de-globalization, and increased inflation dispersion statistically significant in steepening the Phillips curve.
  - Decomposition of contributors to slope increase:
    - Inflation dispersion: 67 percent of increase.
    - De-globalization: 25 percent.
    - Digitalization: 8 percent.
- Estimated coefficients (sectoral manufacturing sample, 2008–2019; selected)
  - Digitalization: 0.0006* (Baseline), 0.0008** (Robustness).
  - De-globalization: 0.0066*** (Baseline), 0.0063*** (Robustness).
  - Inflation dispersion: 0.0168*** (Baseline), 0.0158*** (Robustness).
- Policy implication: Phillips-curve steepening implies larger inflation response to a given output gap; monitor sectoral inflation dispersion and import-share dynamics; be cautious not to underestimate pass-through in high and volatile inflation environments.

### Staff appraisal — synthesis of findings and policy guidance
- Recent performance: economy resilient with strong policy support; output and employment near pre-pandemic levels; financial stability maintained; fiscal policy moving to targeted support and consolidation.
- Outlook and risks: growth strong in 2022 but price pressures elevated; inflation expected to peak then return to 2 percent by 2024Q2; medium-term risks skew to lower growth and potential scarring.
- Monetary policy: support for withdrawing exceptional support; policy rate should be steadily brought toward neutral to return inflation to target by 2024Q2; pace must balance recovery and inflation-de-anchoring risks.
- Fiscal policy: retain a role in addressing large shocks and protecting vulnerable households; use contingency for targeted support; consider bringing forward some tightening from FY23/24 to FY22/23 if appropriate.
- Financial stability and macroprudential: maintain vigilance; reestablish CCyB as risks warrant; simplify mortgage recommendations with continued monitoring; strengthen NBFI data and liquidity backstops.
- Structural policies: opportunities to scale up Build Back Better within fiscal rules if additional revenues are raised; improve public investment management; prioritize effective ALMPs; strengthen Net Zero implementation via carbon pricing and upfront compensation/retraining.
- Trade and post-Brexit: continue work to resolve Northern Ireland Protocol dispute; support SMEs in adapting to border rules; preserve primacy of financial stability while considering competitiveness.

*Source: UNITED KINGDOM — INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2021).*

### 2021. The staff team comprised M. Flanagan (head), A. Ari, R. Chen,

### UNITED KINGDOM — 2021

### Background
- UK entered 2021 facing a second Covid-19 wave but with positive developments: an ambitious vaccination campaign beginning, extended support measures from 2020, additional Bank of England (BoE) quantitative easing (QE), and further eased financial conditions.
- The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) had just been concluded.
- Key challenges noted:
  - Covid cases spiking in early 2021 with attendant health, fiscal, and economic impacts.
  - Unsettled elements of the post-Brexit framework (notably for the financial sector and Northern Ireland Protocol implementation).
  - Policy frameworks under review; climate policy details not yet spelled out.
  - Structural transformation and competitiveness/growth in living standards remained long-term challenges.

### Recent Developments and Outlook
- Recovery and activity
  - Recovery proceeded faster than expected in 2021 but faced turbulence from Covid-Omicron.
  - By November 2021, economy exceeded end-2019 output level:
    - Services surpassed pre-pandemic level by 1½ percent.
    - Manufacturing remained about 1½ percent below pre-pandemic level.
  - Labor market:
    - Unemployment at 4.3 percent in Q3 (far below the 7 percent projected a year ago and just above the pre-pandemic level).
    - Employee numbers above pre-pandemic levels; no uptick in job losses after furlough ended in September.
  - Services PMI dropped to 53.6 in December 2021.
- Supply constraints and price pressures
  - Daily new Covid cases peaked just below 220,000 in January 2022 (about three times the previous peak in January 2021).
  - Consumer prices in December rose by 5.4 percent headline and 4.2 percent core y-o-y.
  - Services inflation climbed to 3.4 percent in December from 2 percent in Q1–Q3.
  - Underlying wage growth around a 3½–4 percent rate since June; a 6½ percent increase in the minimum wage pending.
  - Energy price increases not fully reflected in regulated retail prices; a further increase scheduled for April 2022.
- Supply-side drivers
  - Persistent Covid effects, behavioral demand shifts from services to goods, reduced labor force participation, and Brexit-related migration impacts contributed to capacity constraints.
  - Surveys showed historically lengthy supplier delivery times, backlogs of work, material shortages, low inventories, and record-high unfilled job openings.

### Financial Conditions, Balance Sheets, and Vulnerabilities
- Financial conditions and lending
  - 2021 saw very accommodative financial conditions driven by compressing credit spreads and buoyant asset prices.
  - QE created ample liquidity in the domestic banking system; spread compression notable in mortgage markets.
  - Credit-to-GDP gap rose close to zero in early 2021 (first time in a decade), then fell back slightly in Q2 as GDP recovered.
  - Corporate lending slowed: larger corporates repaid bank loans and issued more equity and bonds.
  - SME debt continued to reflect government-guaranteed loan schemes with more stringent eligibility criteria.
  - Mortgages availability increased; housing prices boomed but "red flags are not yet visible."
  - Consumer credit subdued but conditions improved in recent quarters.
  - January 2022 lending survey: corporate credit availability unchanged in 2021Q4; secured credit availability to households improved further.
- Private sector balance sheets
  - Households benefitted from increased cash positions and housing values; new savings concentrated among top two income quintiles; lowest income quintile has highest mortgage vulnerability.
  - Corporate leverage continued declining; estimated SME equity gap at one percent of turnover (much lower than a year ago).
  - Number of companies at risk of falling from investment grade elevated at triple pre-pandemic levels.
  - Pockets of vulnerability in contact-intensive sectors and SMEs as government support programs largely sunset.
- Banking sector and NBFIs
  - Aggregate CET1 ratio of major UK banks rose to 16.5 percent through 2021Q3.
  - BoE 2021 Solvency Stress Test indicates bank balance sheets generally robust; FSAP stress tests confirm sufficient capital and liquidity buffers for severe adverse shocks.
  - Banks maintained high capital ratios despite released buffers.
  - Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs) focus on riskier markets, complement bank lending, and appear less procyclical under stress, but:
    - Data gaps and global nature limit full systemic-risk analysis.
    - Common NBFI issues include liquidity mismatch in MMFs and corporate bond funds, leveraged investors with poor margin-call preparedness, and high risk-taking in corporate bond and collateralized loan obligation markets.

### Policy Response and Developments
- Fiscal policy
  - Government moved to more targeted fiscal support and a medium-term consolidation plan.
  - March and October budgets (the latter informed by the 3-year Spending Review) targeted pandemic support to deeply affected sectors and added spending for health backlogs, climate needs, and training programs.
  - Tax measures projected to lift the tax-to-GDP ratio by about 2 percentage points to a 70-year high.
  - Fiscal trajectory: continued fiscal impulse in 2022; fiscal withdrawal beginning in 2023 and largest in 2024–25.
  - Medium-term plan would reduce the deficit from about 8 to nearly 2 percent of GDP between FY21/22 and FY24/25 (with 3¾ percent of GDP accounted for by the sunset of pandemic support measures).
  - Net public debt would fall by about 2 percentage points of GDP over the 5-year horizon.
  - Fiscal rules re-imposed focused on achieving a balanced current budget and a declining debt trajectory over a rolling three-year horizon.
- Monetary policy and monetary normalization
  - Policy rate was 0.1 percent for the first eight months of 2021, producing a shadow rate some 2–3 percentage points below the estimated neutral rate.
  - BoE prepared technically for a negative policy rate if needed.
  - As inflation and expectations accelerated in September–October, BoE adopted a more hawkish stance.
  - In December 2021, BoE raised policy rate by 15 bps to 0.25 percent (first G7 central bank to raise in that cycle).
  - SONIA curve anticipated a further 100 bps of rate hikes by end-2022.
  - BoE completed QE program in December 2021 and announced a QT strategy:
    - No reinvestment once policy rate hits 0.5 percent.
    - Outright sales once policy rate hits at least 1 percent, subject to "economic circumstances."
- Macroprudential and financial-sector measures
  - Crisis-related exceptional financial sector measures wound down; some exceptional measures remained (leverage ratio calculations and transitional arrangements to ECL accounting).
  - Late-June 2021: authorities lifted remaining guardrails governing capital distributions by large banks (based on interim stress test results).
  - Full stress test results (published December 2021) prompted announcement to raise the counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCyB) rate from zero to one percent from December 2022.
  - O-SII buffer rates to remain at December 2019 settings until at least 2023.
  - Authorities announced intention to remove the "affordability test" in 2022H1, subject to consultation.

### Key Figures and Indicators (selected from text)
- Unemployment: 4.3 percent in Q3 2021.
- Pre-pandemic service sector: +1½ percent by November 2021.
- Pre-pandemic manufacturing sector: about 1½ percent below by November 2021.
- Services PMI: 53.6 in December 2021.
- Daily new Covid cases peak: just below 220,000 in January 2022.
- Consumer prices: headline 5.4 percent, core 4.2 percent y-o-y in December 2021.
- Services inflation: 3.4 percent in December 2021 (from 2 percent in Q1–Q3).
- Underlying wage growth: about a 3½–4 percent rate since June 2021.
- Minimum wage increase pending: 6½ percent.
- Aggregate CET1 ratio of major UK banks: 16.5 percent through 2021Q3.
- Credit-to-GDP gap: rose to close to zero in early 2021 (first time in a decade).
- Projected fiscal deficit reduction: from about 8 to nearly 2 percent of GDP between FY21/22 and FY24/25.
- Contribution to deficit improvement from sunset of pandemic support: 3¾ percent of GDP.
- Anticipated SONIA-implied additional policy tightening: 100 bps by end-2022.
- BoE policy rate change: +15 bps to 0.25 percent in December 2021.
- CCyB increase announced: from zero to one percent from December 2022.
- SME equity gap estimate: one percent of turnover.

*Source: UNITED KINGDOM — INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2021).*

### 8.      The authorities have made substantial progress in laying out the reforms needed for

### 8. The authorities have made substantial progress in laying out the reforms needed for their “Build Back Better: Our Plan for Growth” program

### Plan overview: three pillars and three strategies
- Three pillars: infrastructure, skills, and innovation.
- Three strategies:
  - Levelling up agenda: deliver equal opportunities and quality of life throughout the UK via public investment in physical and digital infrastructure, public services in health care and education, and supporting local and innovative businesses.
  - Net Zero Strategy: deliver a decarbonized economy by 2050 with specific plans to reduce emissions from each sector and offset remaining emissions with greenhouse gas removals.
  - Global Britain vision: trade policy and regulatory reforms in the financial sector to deliver domestic prosperity through deeper integration into the global economic and financial system.

- Key policy elements (as presented in the plan):
  - Infrastructure
    - Use the Levelling Up Fund, UK Shared Prosperity Fund, Towns Fund, and High Street Fund to invest in broadband, roads, rail, city transport, and local priority projects (through the Levelling Up Fund).
    - £30bn funding for climate change priorities between 2021 and 2025, set out in the Net Zero Strategy and Spending Review 2021.
    - Of which, £500m for grants to install new home heating systems and replace boilers.
    - Open new trade and investment hubs.
    - Utilize the new Infrastructure Bank to crowd-in private investment.
  - Skills
    - Use the UK Shared Prosperity Fund to improve public services in education and skills in struggling regions, including a strong focus on improving adult numeracy.
    - Increase traineeships and apprenticeships and improve quality.
    - Introduce a Lifetime Skills Guarantee to give access to education and training throughout lives, including free courses at upper secondary level in economically valuable areas and skills bootcamps linked to job vacancies in growth sectors.
    - Commitment to open 20 Institutes of Technology (IoTs) to provide technical qualifications.
    - Funding for additional hours in the classroom for 16–19 years old.
  - Innovation
    - Develop innovative hubs of high-value activity in core cities.
    - Pursue regulatory reforms to unlock cutting-edge technologies and boost competition.
    - Increase public investment in R&D to £20bn a year by FY24/25, part of objectives to increase R&D spending to £22bn by FY26/27 and economy-wide R&D investment to 2.4% of GDP in 2027.
    - Review of R&D tax reliefs.
    - Consult on measures to address barriers posed to pension funds when looking to invest in high-growth innovative companies.
    - Introduced £375m “Future Fund: Breakthrough” to address the scale up gap for innovative businesses.
    - Launch the Help to Grow program to support over 100k SMEs improve their productivity through management training and digital adoption.

### Post-Brexit framework: progress and frictions
- Some progress has been made; observed economic effects are largely in the expected direction (e.g., trade with the EU has declined), but pandemic impacts complicate full assessment (including lower net migration).
- Trade policy actions:
  - Active engagement in the WTO.
  - Signed or reached agreement in principle on new FTAs with Australia and New Zealand.
  - Applied to join the CPTPP.
  - A dispute with the EU over implementing the Northern Ireland Protocol continues; the UK has threatened to trigger Article 16 and the EU has threatened retaliation, but negotiations continue.
- Financial sector developments:
  - “New Chapter for Financial Services” laid out a vision.
  - Possible reforms to the current prospectus regime were put forward.
  - A draft MoU on regulatory cooperation was agreed with the EU (unsigned).
  - The EC proposed to extend temporary equivalence for UK-based CCPs until mid-2025.
  - A financial services regulatory framework review is underway to deliver the government's vision for the financial sector outside the EU.

### Outlook and baseline projections
- Staff baseline: growth dropping from an estimated outturn of 7.2 percent in 2021 to 4.7 percent in 2022, elevated near-term inflation, and a subsequent economic slowdown as inflation is contained.
- Near-term growth drivers and impacts:
  - Mild slowdown in Q1 due to Omicron and associated restrictions, followed by several quarters of elevated growth.
  - Private demand expected to be very strong in 2022 as investment responds to tax incentives, inventories rebuild, residential building backlogs are cleared, and consumption remains strong (including due to a decline in the savings rate).
  - Current account (CA) deficit expected to increase to about 4.7 percent of GDP in 2022.
  - Supply expected to slowly expand via gradual return of workers from inactivity, slow unwind of global logistics backlogs, and normalization of energy input costs.
  - Output gap would stay positive and the labor market would remain tight, with wage settlements partly compensating for recent real wage erosion.
- Medium-term projection:
  - Growth would slow and converge towards pre-pandemic potential growth of about 1½ percent over 2023–24.
  - Medium-term output would settle at 2–2¼ percentage points below the pre-pandemic trend by 2025 due to: higher inactivity rates among older workers, lower net migration, higher reservation wages (including due to a higher fiscal wedge), lower capital stock from foregone investment, and TFP held back by reduced on-the-job learning and knowledge spillovers.
  - This estimate is a substantial improvement relative to the 4–5 percent expected a year ago.
- Inflation:
  - Expected to peak around 7 percent during the spring of 2022 when regulated energy price increases kick in.
  - Remain elevated as global supply-chain constraints and post-Brexit border controls raise import costs and tight labor markets and second-round effects lead to broader wage and price pressures.
  - Projected to return to the 2 percent target by 2024Q2.
- Staff forecasts for 2022 growth align with consensus at 4.7 percent.

### Policy assumptions in the baseline
- Fiscal
  - Policies as articulated in the FY21/22 Budget and Spending Review. Tax and spending measures and fiscal adjustment path as announced.
- Monetary
  - Further 75–125 bps increase (in line with markets’ expectations).
  - Balance sheet management as announced: balance sheet reduction to commence per stated plans involving non-reinvestment of maturing assets once the policy rate reaches 0.5 percent in spring 2022, and gradual asset sales starting in early 2023, some time after the policy rate reaches 1 percent.
- Macroprudential
  - The CCyB rate will remain at zero percent until December 2022 and then increase to 1 percent, gradually as the financial cycle evolves towards 2 percent.
  - O-SIIs rates will remain at the levels set in December 2019 until December 2023.
- Structural
  - Increased funding for retraining and public investment per the budget.
  - Climate policies per net zero plan, including £30bn in green public investment and £500m in grants to household heating systems.
  - Growth-enhancing policies per “Build Back Better: Our Plan for Growth” agenda.
  - Continued slow progress in addressing behind-the-border administrative problems post-Brexit and continued slow progress in trading partners and blocks.

### Risks to the outlook
- Overall balance of risks favors higher inflation in the near term and lower-than-forecasted growth in the medium term.
- Near-term risks:
  - Stronger-than-projected domestic demand interacting with continuing supply-side constraints (including a potential pandemic resurgence) could lift inflation further and push medium-term expectations upwards.
- Medium-term risks:
  - Returning to the inflation target may require a period of compressed incomes and below-average growth.
  - Global monetary policy tightening could reduce external demand and accentuate a slowdown.
  - Problems originating in the UK financial sector, including disruptive financial transitions, could activate macro-financial feedback loops and amplify a slowdown.
  - Trade problems with the EU and higher domestic adjustment costs to structural transformations may increase scarring and reduce potential growth.
- Geopolitical shocks:
  - Tensions in Eastern Europe could raise energy prices and slow major European trading partners, exacerbating inflation pressures and weakening the growth outlook; indirect impacts could be felt through financial market channels.

### External and public debt assessments
- External position in 2021 is preliminarily assessed to be weaker than the level implied by fundamentals and desirable policies.
- Major external vulnerabilities linked to high gross external debt, although net external debt remains low.
- Exchange rate flexibility is an important risk mitigation mechanism (a depreciation would improve the NIIP).
- MAC DSA suggests an overall low risk of sovereign stress, with some vulnerabilities in downside scenarios.
  - Domestic banking sector appears able to absorb residual financing needs in most scenarios (given NBFI gilt take-up at historical rates).
  - In downside scenarios (especially where QT is needed to address inflation), gilt yields may need to rise further to induce banks and non-banks to lift gilt holdings to historically large shares.
  - Given the long maturity of the UK’s gilt stock, the impact on public finances appears manageable.
- Staff assesses that the authorities have fiscal space.

### Near-term macroeconomic management priorities and policy advice
- Four policy imperatives:
  - Calibrate the near-term policy mix to address supply-demand imbalances and elevated inflationary pressure.
  - Optimize policies to cope with greater volatility that may extend beyond the near term.
  - Refine robust policy frameworks to further secure policy space and preserve strong anchors.
  - Ensure “Build Back Better: Our Plan for Growth” overcomes barriers to deliver medium-term transformation.

- Monetary policy advice:
  - Support for the BoE starting a rate tightening cycle to move monetary policy to a more neutral setting.
  - Staff suggested steadily adjusting the Bank Rate towards a neutral setting estimated between 1 and 1½ percent to support return of inflation to target by 2024Q2, with continuous review given high uncertainty.
  - Pace of adjustment should balance risks of slowing recovery and de-anchoring inflation expectations.
  - Key indicators to monitor: upcoming wage settlements, corporate pricing intentions, survey and market-implied inflation expectations, option market probabilities of high inflation.
  - Clearly communicated forward guidance is important to limit second-round effects.

- Fiscal policy advice:
  - Fiscal policy should retain an important role, including protecting those vulnerable to higher cost of living.
  - Recent measures noted: increase in the minimum wage and reduction in the Universal Credit taper rate.
  - Staff advised letting prices reflect higher energy costs while revamping existing schemes to increase targeted support. Example: expand the “warm homes and winter fuel allowance” (e.g., doubling it from currently £140 to about £300 per low-income household, costing around £1 billion) or reinstate part of the Universal Credit uplift, paid for via the existing large budget contingency.
  - Staff noted a temporary VAT cut on household energy (e.g., from 5 percent to zero) would be costly (about £2.5 billion), less targeted, and have only a small impact on inflation.
  - Tightening the energy price cap (with or without guaranteed loan support) would be less targeted and risk decapitalizing energy suppliers, delaying the problem.
  - For the March fiscal review, two key routes were suggested without re-opening the Spending Review:
    - Sequence the fiscal package differently by raising more revenues now and investing more later in a more ambitious “Build Back Better” agenda, reducing medium-term fiscal drag.
    - Consider measures that shift consumption to the future targeting taxpayers who benefited most from the pandemic (e.g., raising windfall or wealth taxes now and pre-announcing subsidies for future green investment such as VAT cuts, and/or incentivizing savings accounts for future green spending).

*Source: IMF staff summary of “Build Back Better: Our Plan for Growth” and IMF country report text.*

### 18.      Staff underscored the message from the FSAP that macroprudential policy should

### 1gbrea2022001 - 18.      Staff underscored the message from the FSAP that macroprudential policy should

### Macroprudential policy, housing risks, and mortgage measures
- Financial cycle appears to be slightly ahead of the economic one; with real rates low and financial conditions loose, financial stability risks could build as investors search for yield and mortgage lending grows.
- Staff supported a gradual reestablishment of the CCyB rate towards two percent and encouraged further steps as needed to preempt developments of a systemic nature.
- Rationale for simplifying mortgage market measures:
  - Existing measures have been broadly effective in containing the buildup of household debt and limiting the number of highly indebted households.
  - The affordability test in itself has contributed little at the margin (Figure 7).
  - Continued vigilance warranted as income support measures are removed and downside risks to the outlook could materialize.
  - Need to continue to analyze effectiveness of remaining measures, detect leakages early, and ensure bank stress test design captures housing market correction risks and related systemic risk contagion channels.

*Authorities’ views on macroprudential and mortgage policy*
- Authorities judged the risk environment to be at a standard level overall; the FPC had begun to raise the buffer rate and noted it could be met with existing capital rather than requiring major UK banks to strengthen capital positions.
- On mortgages, authorities’ simulations suggested the LTI flow limit, without the affordability test but alongside the FCA’s affordability testing under its Mortgage Conduct of Business framework, ought to deliver appropriate resilience in a simpler, more predictable, and more proportionate way.

### Managing policies under greater volatility — overview
- Macroeconomic landscape likely to remain volatile: Covid may become endemic; virulent waves could require mandated closures; tensions in Eastern Europe could affect commodity and financial markets; post-pandemic and post-Brexit adjustments and energy transition imply sectoral reallocations may be uneven.
- Shorter economic cycles with greater impact from supply-side disturbances may manifest.
- Financial market measures of expected inflation appear to be pricing some combination of higher inflation and risk due to volatility.
- Flexible and responsive policies will be needed; standard solution to recognition lags is optimizing policy design to build in the best automatic responses.

### Fiscal policy and automatic stabilizers
- Fiscal policy has a key role in addressing volatility through automatic stabilizers.
- Staff estimate: changes enacted in the Spending Review will allow the UK’s automatic stabilizers to offset about 65 percent of market income shocks, versus up to 80 percent for some advanced economies, placing the UK slightly above the middle of the OECD rankings.
- Authorities recognized pressures on households from rising cost of living and calculated support already given at £12 billion this fiscal year.
- Staff recommendations and findings:
  - Focus critical improvements on pandemic-era programs aimed at protecting marginalized labor market participants and small businesses.
  - Recommended retaining business rates relief but refining targeting of viable companies by using turnover data.
  - Suggested more automatic increases in funding for active labor market policies (ALMPs) tied to the cycle while preserving some discretion to adapt design (examples cited: Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland where budgets for labor market services and ALMPs automatically increase with rising unemployment).
  - Pandemic-era support programs (e.g., furlough scheme, Universal Credit uplift, targeted support) could be redeployed in the event of a virulent Covid wave, but these should not be part of automatic stabilizers due to adverse impacts on labor and capital allocation incentives.
  - Recommendation to delimit circumstances where extreme-support programs (e.g., Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, 100 percent government-guaranteed business loans like Bounce Back Loan Scheme) would be used.

### Monetary policy — trade-offs and framework
- BoE’s remit clarified in 2013 gives discretion to manage the path of inflation to its target, including seeing through large/persistent shocks to avoid raising the sacrifice ratio.
- Flexible IT framework has never coped with an extended period of supply-side disruptions; BoE’s ability to see-through shocks could be constrained by need to keep inflation expectations anchored.
- Periods of high and volatile inflation historically associated with stronger pass-through of relative price shocks through second-round effects.
- Possible steepening of the Phillips curve post-pandemic and difficulties in accurately measuring the output gap imply policy rate may need to become more responsive to the inflation gap.
- Importance of avoiding inaction bias; careful communication needed to prepare markets for potentially more frequent policy moves.
- Authorities’ view: BoE acknowledged risks and trade-offs, stressed importance of keeping inflation expectations well anchored.

### Nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs), liquidity, and market backstops
- FSAP commended authorities’ swift policy actions at pandemic outset to restore market liquidity and maintain financial stability.
- Experience highlighted liquidity mismatches in many NBFIs and their lack of access to BoE liquidity facilities during stress.
- Need to augment data collection and monitoring of NBFIs and to work with foreign authorities given cross-border nature of many NBFIs.
- BoE can strengthen backstops by considering allowing appropriately regulated, large, and interconnected NBFIs access to repo and/or gilt purchase operations.
- Better liquidity management in the UK vis-à-vis the large and global NBFI sector would help reduce potential spillovers internationally.

### Anchoring policies, fiscal rules, and monetary operational issues
- Strong policy frameworks helped the UK respond to the pandemic while keeping borrowing costs low, containing public debt ratio, and preserving financial stability. With higher public debt and inflation going forward, fiscal and monetary anchoring will be essential.
- New fiscal rules: include debt and current deficit targets, caps on investment and welfare, have a 3-year rolling nature, and incorporate an escape clause providing flexibility to manage volatility.
- Staff warned frequent changes in rule design could jeopardize credibility; recommended that when design is altered, parliament receive structured commentary on alignment with higher-order fiscal objectives, with OBR materials made available on a timelier basis (e.g., annually) and most relevant indicators updated before rules are considered and voted on.
- Monetary framework near lower bound:
  - BoE prepared system for negative interest rates and has experience with QE and Term Funding Schemes.
  - Staff recommended further guidance on managing the process back towards the steady-state balance sheet for QT; argued for placing QT on a pre-programmed course to enhance predictability and cement Bank Rate as key instrument.
  - BoE should be alert to liquidity fluctuations during tightening and ready to smooth liquidity with short-term Open Market Operations if significant pressures emerge.
  - Recommendation for a calendar-based schedule of reviews of the monetary framework.

### Financial system resilience and supervisory priorities
- Financial system resilient with robust oversight and supervision, but opportunities for enhancements exist.
- FSAP suggested approaches to ensure resilience amid structural transitions (market-based finance growth, Libor cessation, green finance, cyber risk, rapid adoption of financial technologies).
- Recent failures of Greensill and Archegos (not systemic) illustrate challenges in identifying NBFI vulnerabilities.
- Critical needs:
  - Address data and information gaps to analyze NBFI risks.
  - Expand surveillance of activities beyond the regulatory perimeter and coordinate with other jurisdictions.
  - Continue proactive approach on green finance, cyber threats, and financial innovations.
  - Enhance risk-based AML/CFT supervision and improve accuracy of public beneficial ownership registry through verification.

### Structural transformation and policy gaps
- "Build Back Better: Our Plan for Growth" agenda progress noted, but policies may need to be scaled up:
  - Leveling up: transport infrastructure gaps; on average, only 40 percent of citizens can travel from their house to the city center within 30 minutes, compared to 70 percent in Europe.
  - The £5.7 billion included in the budget will cover only part of the estimated £31 billion of additional investment identified by the National Infrastructure Commission needed to completely close the gap.
  - Regional disparities in productivity partly explained by skill mismatches (London and the South East concentrate 35 percent of the skill-adjusted size of the workforce while only accounting for 26 percent of the total population).
  - Net Zero Strategy: gaps in some sectoral plans, potential shortfalls in public investment, and questions whether carbon pricing and regulatory measures will change private behavior and investment quickly enough.
  - Trade and legislative reforms post-Brexit remain large in scale: over 70 existing EU trade agreements were rolled over, but only two new FTAs have been signed to date; onshoring of EU legislation completed and several major financial sector reform processes have been started.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2022/english/1gbrea2022001.pdf*

### 31.      To facilitate a more ambitious leveling up agenda, barriers would have to be

### 31. To facilitate a more ambitious leveling up agenda, barriers would have to be overcome

### Barriers and required reforms for ramping up public investment
- Further ramping up public investment requires overcoming concerns about preserving value-for-money and deliverability of projects.
- Staff recognizes that the UK has one of the strongest public investment management frameworks worldwide but improving it would help facilitate catch up from years of low investment (the ratio to GDP in the UK has been among the lowest in the G7 group) and could motivate a less restrictive budgetary investment cap going forward.
- An ongoing dialogue between the UK and IMF is assessing public investment management, covering both standard and green investment projects. The preliminary assessment recommends:
  - extending planning horizons;
  - improving the coordination between national and sub-national governments;
  - revising project appraisal methodologies to better reflect the costs and benefits of climate change;
  - publishing the cost-benefit analysis and ex-post evaluations of large investment projects.

### Labor market policies and active labor market programs (ALMPs)
- Staff welcomed the authorities’ efforts to improve training programs, noting that experience should guide next steps (Table 13).
- Newly-introduced programs to facilitate labor relocation and prevent long-term unemployment:
  - Sector-Based Work Academy Program;
  - Skills Bootcamps;
  - Kickstart;
  - Restart.
- Observations and recommendations:
  - Programs look well-targeted to sources of labor scarring (see Annex I) and remain cyclically relevant given a projected 2023–24 slowdown in the economy.
  - Some review will be needed about their relative success and value-for-money of all new programs before concentrating further resources on the most successful of them.
  - If reviews show programs are not delivering desired outcomes, alternative approaches on ALMP design and delivery by Job Centers with enhanced engagement with stakeholders and more flexibility could be considered, drawing on models applied in other countries.

### Support for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
- Authorities' programs on equity or equity-like support are comprehensive but primarily focus on innovative firms or startups and are conservative on allocated resources (Table 14).
- Risks and recommendations:
  - SME liquidity and equity gaps in deeply-affected industries may grow as pandemic-era business support measures fully sunset in 2022 (indeed, insolvencies started to climb back from pandemic-era troughs in late 2021), and to the extent risks to the outlook materialize.
  - Addressing gaps for viable firms would help mitigate sources of capital and TFP scarring in the medium-term (see Annex I).
  - Staff sees scope to keep or expand some recent programs, such as reopening the Future Fund with a larger envelope.
  - If tax and Bounce Back Loan repayments options are exhausted, similar options could be restored as needed (although attaching some viability assessment via the involvement of private lenders/investors).

### Budget and revenue-raising options to fund leveling up
- Some scope exists to use budget reallocation to fund a more ambitious leveling up approach, but realistically the government would need to raise more revenues.
- Staff argued the focus should be on taxes targeting high income earners and the wealthy.
- A revenue-based strategy would have a side-benefit of keeping policy within the newly-applicable fiscal rules and could finance additional “Build Back Better: Our Plan for Growth” priorities, as effective programs were designed (e.g., in the education area).

Options to Enhance the “Build Back Better: Our Plan for Growth” Effort (Measures and Fiscal Yield)
- Increase PIT for the two upper income quintiles (per Institute for Fiscal Studies recommendation).
  - 0.2 percent of GDP
  - A 2 percent rise to the basic rate of the personal income tax would yield 0.2 percent of GDP, and a 1 percent rise in the higher rate, 0.05 percent. For distributional purposes, staff recommends applying the tax increase to the group of the two upper quintiles.
- Make VAT/Labor tax adjustments (per Institute for Fiscal Studies recommendation).
  - 0.2 percent of GDP
  - Reducing National Insurance Contributions while broadening the VAT tax base to the level of the OECD average, could as a package generate some new revenues, incentivize hiring and cool down private consumption (thus alleviating ongoing demand-supply mismatches).
- Introduce a tax on property (per Wealth Tax Commission recommendations).
  - 0.7 percent of GDP
  - A one-off wealth tax payable on all individual wealth (after mortgages and other debts) above £2bn and charged at 1 percent a year for five years would raise a total of £80bn (or nearly 2 percent of GDP a year).
- Modify dividends’ taxation (per Tax Foundation recommendations).
  - 0.1 percent of GDP
  - Basic-rate taxpayers would pay no tax on dividends; higher-rate taxpayers would face a 26 percent rate.

### Net Zero Strategy — staff recommendations for more ambitious implementation
- Key levers for more ambitious implementation:
  - (i) move towards a comprehensive, predictable, uniform, and higher carbon price (to encourage adaptation);
  - (ii) more grants for low-income households living in homes that require significant investments and tailoring a section of ALMP programs to retrain workers from fossil-fuel industries;
  - (iii) greater legal clarity about phase-in and other more direct measures to relieve supply bottlenecks (like facilitating visas for skilled foreign workers);
  - (iv) strengthening public investment management (including through continuing to build capacity for climate analysis across government, increasing transparency, and intensifying coordination across devolved and local governments (per the recently concluded Green-PIMA)).
- Budgetary neutrality and revenue potential:
  - Importantly, all these could be done while being neutral in budgetary terms (e.g., a UK carbon tax on gas and electricity could raise enough revenues to pay for all the above-mentioned initiatives).
  - Note: a UK carbon tax on domestic gas and electricity would generate revenue projected to be £57 billion over the period 2021–30 (Grantham Research Institute projection cited).

### Global Britain — near-term priorities and regulatory issues
- Trade with the EU:
  - The most pressing issue is to amicably resolve the dispute with the EU over the Northern Ireland Protocol to limit uncertainty in the UK-EU relationship that may be affecting private investment in the UK.
  - Measures to support smooth implementation of the TCA remain key; staff encouraged enhanced support to SMEs to comply with border regulation, including document preparation and adaptation to the new ports IT system.
  - Staff supported promoting an open, transparent trade policy and working effectively with partners to build a stronger, rules-based trading system anchored in the WTO.
- Financial sector regulation and competitiveness:
  - Near-term political debate centers on whether UK financial sector regulators should explicitly consider international competitiveness in their prudential decision-making.
  - Experience before the GFC showed regulators could encounter a conflict between financial stability objectives and competitiveness considerations.
  - It will be important to preserve the primacy of financial stability, prudential safety and soundness objectives while maintaining strong governance, operational independence, and sufficient resources for regulatory and supervisory agencies.
  - Staff will continue discussing regulatory reforms more broadly in future consultations as they develop further.

### Authorities’ views (summarized)
- Authorities were satisfied with progress on “Build Back Better: Our Plan for Growth,” but cognizant of lingering challenges.
- They considered the budgetary efforts announced in the Spending Review sufficient to meet leveling up goals but were open to improvements within this envelope and more support if needed.
- They welcomed the dialogue with the Fund to improve public investment management.
- They agreed that new ALMP programs should be evaluated frequently, and funding could subsequently be redirected to the most successful ones.
- They stressed monitoring the financial conditions of SMEs.
- Concerning the Net Zero strategy, authorities saw pace and sequencing as delicately balanced politically and favored giving existing incentives time to take hold while pushing forward in areas with gaps and calibrating policies over the transition.
- On Global Britain, authorities emphasized desire to find a solution to Northern Ireland Protocol issues with the EU, commitment to maintaining the highest international standards and practices for financial regulation and supervision, and commitment to international cooperation.

### Staff appraisal — key findings and policy guidance
- Recent performance and resilience:
  - The economy proved resilient with strong policy support; rapid vaccination helped reopen the country and weather Covid waves with less health toll.
  - Output and employment have returned to close to pre-pandemic levels.
  - Financial stability has been maintained, and fiscal policy has rotated towards more targeted support with a consolidation plan in place to stabilize public debt and deficits in the medium term.
  - The external position for 2021 is preliminarily assessed to be weaker than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
- Outlook and risks:
  - Growth should remain strong in 2022, but so too will price pressures and risks.
  - Inflation should peak as the current Covid-Omicron wave passes; in the medium term, supply bottlenecks should ease allowing inflation to gradually return to target by 2024Q2.
  - Real GDP would be held back by recent investment shortfalls and a less-than-full recovery of labor force participation.
  - Near-term risk of higher inflation; 2–3 years out the risk shifts to lower growth as policy interventions are expected to pull demand back.
  - New Covid-19 waves and potential macro-financial feedbacks as interest rates rise are continuing risks; tensions in Eastern Europe could exacerbate price pressures even while slowing the economy.
- Monetary policy:
  - Monetary policy needs to withdraw the exceptional support provided during 2020–21 to help counter price pressures.
  - Staff welcomes the recent increase in the policy rate and notes the policy rate will need to be steadily brought to a neutral setting to bring inflation back to target by 2024Q2.
  - Pace needs balance: risk that overly rapid action could slow the recovery vs. risk that too slow a pace could allow second-round effects of inflation to proliferate. At present, data suggest the latter risk is of greater concern.
- Fiscal policy:
  - Fiscal policy should retain an important role in responding to large macroeconomic shocks.
  - If the present outlook holds, fiscal policy can use the budget contingency to provide targeted support to the most vulnerable to insulate them from sharp cost of living increases.
  - Authorities could bring forward some fiscal tightening from FY23/24 to FY22/23 to help contain demand in the short run with the benefit of reducing the drag on growth in outer years.
  - If a virulent Covid-19 wave requires widespread mandated closures, authorities should be ready to redeploy a subset of the most successful previous exceptional programs with attention to lessons learned on design, targeting and timely sunset.
- Financial stability and macroprudential policy:
  - The financial cycle appears to be slightly ahead of the economic one, calling for continuing assiduous macroprudential and supervisory vigilance.
  - The Financial Policy Committee decision to gradually reestablish the countercyclical capital buffer is in line with the current risk environment; data also support proposed simplification of structural mortgage recommendations.
  - Vigilance about housing market developments and broader systemic risk developments remains important; bank stress test design must continue to capture housing market correction risks and related systemic risk contagion channels.
- Other policy adjustments and priorities:
  - Changes enacted through the Spending Review increase automatic fiscal stabilizers; opportunities exist to automatize certain pandemic programs aimed at protecting marginalized labor market participants and small businesses.
  - BoE should sharpen its reactions to inflation gaps while carefully laying groundwork with markets for policy moves.
  - Need to strengthen liquidity risk resilience in NBFIs; UK authorities could consider allowing large, interconnected, and appropriately regulated NBFIs access to facilities to strengthen backstops to the functioning of core markets.
  - Further refinements to fiscal and monetary frameworks could help address new challenges: ensure timely information to illuminate how new fiscal rules meet higher-order objectives; for monetary policy, further cement Bank Rate as key instrument by making quantitative tightening strategy as predictable as possible and providing short term liquidity if tightening reveals liquidity mismatches.
  - Financial stability framework enhancements: address perimeter of systemic risk monitoring, accelerate efforts to address data and information gaps (including at the international level), track exposures and risk management practices of complex cross-border financial firms, and push ahead with approaches to tackle climate and cyber threat related risks.
- Growth plan and Net Zero:
  - Authorities have a comprehensive growth plan; opportunities to further advance the effort could be financed even within proposed fiscal rules if additional revenues are raised.
  - With funding, public investment could be scaled up, supported by improving public investment management, and higher funding for ALMPs could be allocated to the most successful programs.
  - Further opportunities to strengthen education and training could be pursued within an expanded resource envelope; well-implemented policies would help address inequality and strengthen supply-side resilience.
  - Net Zero Strategy is a major achievement; opportunities to strengthen it include more ambitious carbon pricing and regulation, more rapid extension of the UK’s ETS, legally clarifying the phase in of regulations, and more upfront compensation for vulnerable groups and retraining programs for carbon economy workers.
- Trade and post-Brexit frameworks:
  - The UK has made major strides in post-Brexit trade and financial sector frameworks, but much work lies ahead.
  - Staff urges UK and EU to find mutually beneficial outcomes on contentious issues and to preserve primacy of financial stability objectives while safeguarding robust management of domestic and cross-border financial sector systemic risks.

*Source: IMF staff summary of chapter content from 1gbrea2022001.*

### 46.      It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard

### Box 1. Quantitative Tightening in the UK

### Benefits of well-communicated and predictable QT
- Building space for monetary policy action (at the lower bound): QT can help restore space relative to a minimum estimate of necessary free float. (Ramsden, 2021)
- Liquidity management: Removing reserves through reducing the central bank’s balance sheet can be most efficient as reserve demand falls when recovery strengthens and uncertainty declines.
- Strengthening financial stability: Well-telegraphed QT can mitigate volatility and rising risk premia in government bond and other asset markets that could arise from sudden shifts in market expectations about the size of the central bank’s balance sheet.
- Stronger communication of monetary policy: Communicating policy via policy rate decisions is advantageous, but direct and indirect impacts of QT need to be internalized.

### UK-specific assessment and key statistics
- Staff estimates substantial room for further asset purchases at £174.5 billion as of end-FY21/22.
- Staff estimates headroom above £70 billion over FY22/23.
- Medium-term monetary base needed to satiate reserve demand could settle in the 15–20 percent of nominal GDP and 1–5 percent of consolidated economy-wide financial assets range (versus 45 percent of nominal GDP and 8 percent of financial assets estimated at end-2021).
- QE has indications of reducing gilt turnover, especially at longer maturities.
- Historical consistency: the 15–20 and 1–5 percent ranges are consistent with average levels over 2013–15.

### Bank of England (BoE) QT strategy (as outlined)
- Cease reinvestment of maturing assets when the Bank Rate rises to 0.5 percent.
- Consider selling assets only after the Bank Rate rises to at least 1 percent.
- Conduct QT in a gradual and predictable manner, retaining discretion to alter plans in response to economic circumstances and market conditions.
- The Bank does not envision using QT decisions to provide forward guidance about the future path of the Bank Rate; sequencing of rate hikes prior to QT aims to create space for rate cuts if a negative shock materializes.

### Assessment of the strategy: liquidity, financial stability, and monetary communication
- Liquidity management:
  - Large discretion and significant QE headroom aid BoE in countering shocks to reserve demand and unexpected impacts from QT.
- Financial stability:
  - Near-term: strategy provides clarity about the evolution of BoE’s balance sheet and gives substantial advance notice to markets to limit volatility and risk premia.
  - Medium-term: wide-open discretion could fail to guide markets about a shifting BoE footprint and create some uncertainty.
- Monetary policy stance and communication:
  - Normalization: preference to rely on the Bank Rate as active policy tool simplifies the monetary toolkit.
  - Flexibility: by not committing to further QE tapering or a reinvestment period prior to liftoff, BoE retains flexibility to tighten more rapidly.
  - Communication disadvantages: (i) tying QT to Bank Rate thresholds and (ii) leaving QT undefined beyond the 1 percent Bank rate threshold may make thresholds focal points for market expectations and complicate signaling.

### Scenarios and illustrative impacts on the shadow rate
- Assumptions for scenarios:
  - QT profile calculated according to maturity profile of BoE’s APF gilt portfolio, assuming reinvestment of maturing assets ceases in February 2022.
  - Scenarios 2 and 3 assume active gilt sales start at end-2022.
  - Scenario 2: active gilt sales of about £300bn over 2023–25, consistent with reducing the monetary base to 20 percent of projected nominal GDP in 2025.
  - Scenario 3: balance sheet shrinks at half the pace of scenario 2, with about £50bn in active gilt sales over 2023–25, consistent with reducing the monetary base to 28 percent of projected nominal GDP in 2025.
- Calibration:
  - While £100bn in QT is assumed to raise the shadow rate by 50bps, there is considerable uncertainty around this figure which is based on estimates for QE.
  - The time profile is generated by assuming QT’s impact on the shadow rate is flow-based, non-cumulative and materializes within the same year, though it could be more frontloaded due to announcement effects or more backloaded due to transmission lags.

### Recommended refinements to improve clarity and cement the Bank Rate role
- Announce a medium-term objective for QT based on needed system-wide reserves and consultations with market participants:
  - MPC could decide on and announce a balance sheet size target range and a speed at which to approach this, with ability to revise strategy if new information arises.
- Delegate day-to-day implementation of QE/QT to the Bank executive while keeping the MPC in charge of setting the strategy:
  - Avoids the impression that QE/QT implementation signals desired monetary stance or future policy actions (except when Bank Rate is constrained by the ELB).
- Re-affirm that the BoE takes into account the impact of QT on monetary policy stance and transmission when setting the level of the Bank rate:
  - Embarking on QT would lead to a tighter effective monetary stance by influencing broader financial conditions.

---

### Box 2. The UK’s Net Zero Strategy

### Objectives and governance
- The Net Zero Strategy is a comprehensive plan to reach carbon neutrality by 2050.
- Published with new sectoral plans and includes a cabinet-level monitoring framework:
  - Climate Action Strategy Committee led by the PM and the Climate Action Implementation Committee led by sectoral ministries.
- The Climate Change Committee (CCC), an independent body, will lead the monitoring framework and publish annual reports.
- The Strategy is anchored by budgets for carbon emissions and sets a pathway to meet the UK’s Nationally Determined Contribution for 2030.
- Goal of reducing emissions from 1990 to 2035 by 78 percent.
- The 7th and 8th carbon budgets are still pending.
- Targets have strong legal status enshrined by the 2008 Climate Change Act.

### Key features and implementation approach
- Prioritizes known technologies and solutions:
  - Electrification forms the backbone, with new petrol and diesel cars and vans phased out by the early 2030s and a major scale-up in heat pumps.
  - Power sector grows to support electrification and is fully decarbonized by 2035.
  - Hydrogen supplements where electrification is more limited.
  - Greenhouse gas removal includes major tree planting and peatland restoration.
- Sectoral contributions and scenarios:
  - Government sets out expected contributions by each sector; ranges around a central delivery path reflect multiple possible scenarios for meeting Net Zero by 2050.
  - All sectors contribute under all scenarios, including agriculture, aviation, industry, and shipping.
- Financing and investment:
  - Primarily relies on private sector investment, seeded by public investment.
  - Strategy anticipates additional annual green investment rising to £50–60 billion by 2030, a third of which would be public.
  - Policy signals targeted at industry level aim to grow markets for low carbon goods and incentivize business investment (e.g., the 2030 phase-out date for petrol and diesel cars and vans).

*Source: Bank of England and IMF staff calculations.*

### Box 2. The UK’s Net Zero Strategy (concluded)

### Box 2. The UK’s Net Zero Strategy (concluded)

### Climate Policy Issues — summary findings
- The Heat and Buildings Strategy regulations aim to bolster the low carbon heating market and create new investment opportunities for businesses.
- Gaps that could frustrate achievement of targets include:
  - Uncertainty whether incentives (including regulation and carbon pricing) will induce a sufficiently fast private sector behavioral response.
  - Potential shortfalls in compensation mechanisms for those adversely affected by the transition.
  - Potential shortfalls in needed public investment, including due to gaps in the framework for managing green public investment.

### Private Sector Role
- Regulations remain unspecified in a number of areas (example: there is not clear legislation underpinning the promised phasing out of coal power by 2024).
- New climate regulation and clear incentives are needed to incentivize the behavior of private agents and induce green private investment.
  - The Net Zero Strategy anticipates green private investment should be the main source of the £90bn necessary to reach the climate goals.

### Carbon Pricing
- The current layering of carbon pricing tools (climate change levy, carbon price support, fuel excises, etc.) leads to a variation in carbon prices across sectors.
- The UK’s Emissions Trading System currently applies to energy intensive industries, the power generation sector and aviation, and needs to be extended to more sectors to get to net zero.
- End users have expressed concern about the lack of liquidity in ETS UK.
- ETS UK rules require the government to consider intervening if carbon permits consistently trade at more than 2.5 times their 2-year average price, which makes the price subject to market speculation.

### Compensation Mechanisms (households and labor)
- Net zero requires upgrading insulation and installing low-carbon heating systems in 17 million homes which have an energy performance certificate below band C.
- The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy estimates that retrofitting all houses to band C will require (preliminary estimates) between £35bn and £65bn by 2035.
- The Net Zero strategy commitment to spend £500m in £5,000 grants over the next three years is insufficient:
  - At £5,000 per grant, £500m would only help 30,000 households a year.
  - The Climate Change Committee (CCC) estimates that at least 600,000 households are necessary per year.
- The strategy commits additional funding for new training programs (example: Skills Bootcamps) that could help individuals get necessary training to work in the green economy.
  - The strategy projects 440,000 well-paid jobs are projected to be created in new green industries by 2030.
- Grants of £5,000 will be available to lower income households to replace their gas boiler with a low carbon heat pump as part of efforts to cut emissions from homes.

### Green Public Investment
- The CCC estimates that capital investment required to achieve net zero will rise from around £10bn/year (0.4 percent of GDP) in 2020 to £50bn/year in 2030 (remaining at this level until 2050).
- No plans have been announced as to how much of that will be in the form of public investment.
- Authorities’ mobilization of £26bn (about 1 percent of GDP) since 2020 is far from the CCC estimate.
- An IMF Green PIMA mission pointed to weaknesses in PIM that may impede scaling up, including:
  - Coordination with devolved administrations and local governments.
  - Oversight and monitoring of public corporations.
  - The PPP framework including climate risks.
  - The appraisal and selection of climate-related projects.
  - Climate budget coding.

### Authorities’ observations and strategic approach
- Authorities noted the elaboration of a net-zero strategy underscored the importance of retaining some degree of flexibility.
- They singled out the importance of a credible and predictable legal framework, but with some flexibility embedded to allow the market to find the most affordable solutions.
- They pointed to tracking the impact of policies on different demographic groups and different stakeholders as key, since they may respond differently to the same interventions.
- The Strategy should be flexible enough to incorporate modifications in the mix of policies as lessons are learned.

*Source: 1gbrea2022001 - Box 2. The UK’s Net Zero Strategy (concluded).*

### 0.4 percent of GDP.

### 1gbrea2022001 - 0.4 percent of GDP.

### Fiscal measures, announcements, and assessments
- Increase public investment in infrastructure, including on green projects.
  - Funding for roads has increased substantially; green investment was also raised (though there is scope to raise it further to meet the Net Zero Strategy targets).
  - Build Back Better commitment: capital spending will average 2.7 percent of GDP until 2024–25; a total of £100 billion of investment in economic infrastructure up to 2024–25, including £21 billion for road infrastructure.
  - Assessment of green investment shortfall: "An extra 1 percent (£21bn) a year of green investment would be needed to meet net zero target (Green Alliance)."
  - Only £500 million for grants to install about 30,000 new home heating systems (Government target: 600,000 per year by 2028).
- Strengthen the social safety net.
  - Extend UC’s pandemic uplift; adjust level of earnings and speed at which it is withdrawn; improve fairness of housing support under UC.
  - The UC uplift was extended from March to September 2021. The Autumn budget included a softening of the phasing out, leaving it at 55 percent of the initial complement.
- Enhance Active Labor Market Policies (ALMPs) and increase funding by 0.1–0.2 percent of GDP.
  - Funding in ALMPs has increased but to a lesser degree (about 0.0012 percent of GDP).
- Consider timing and composition of fiscal adjustment when the pandemic abates, starting with a Spending Review in 2021.
  - Authorities laid out a medium-term consolidation plan in the March 2021 budget, and further modified this in the October Supplementary Budget, drawing on the findings of the Spending Review.
- Replace pension triple lock by CPI indexation after retirement.
  - The triple lock was suspended for one year.
- Raise revenues (which will necessitate higher rates on major tax bases).
  - PIT thresholds were frozen and CIT rates and national insurance contributions were raised.

### Selected fiscal measures (March and October 2021 Budgets, cumulative size)
- Corporate tax rate increase: 1.9 (percent GDP) — 19 percent rate for profits up to £50,000 and 25 percent rate for profits over £250,000, from April 2023.
- Income tax threshold freezes: 0.7 (percent GDP) — maintain personal allowance and higher rate threshold at 2021–22 levels up to 2025–26.
- Increase in national contributions: 1.3 (percent GDP) — 1.25 percent increase from April 2022.
- Increase dividend taxes: 0.1 (percent GDP) — 1.25 percent increase from April 2022.
- Capital allowance super-deduction: -1.1 (2021–22), 0.1 (2023–26) (percent GDP) — 130 percent deduction for main rate assets and 50 percent 1st year allowance for special rate assets for 2 years.
- Cuts in business rates*: -0.9 (2021–22), -0.3 (2023–26) (percent GDP) — targeted to specific sectors (e.g., 50 percent relief for retail, hospitality and leisure).
- VAT reduced rates for hospitality, accommodation, and attractions*: -0.8 (percent GDP) — targeted to 5 percent from 15 July 2020 until September 30, 2021 and 12.5 percent until March 31, 2022, when it will return to 20.
- Support for households: 1.2 (percent GDP) — extension of CRJS, SEISS and UC uplift from March to September 2021.
- Support for businesses*: 0.8 (percent GDP) — extension of Restart Grants.
- UC taper and work allowances: 0.3 (2021–22), 0.4 (2023–26) (percent GDP) — UC taper rate reduced from 63 to 55 percent and a £500 p.a. increase in work allowances introduced from 1 December 2021.
- Traineeships and reskilling programs: 0.1 (percent GDP) — £150m extension of programs for 16–24-year-olds and £500m for training health staff.
- Suspension of the pension triple lock uprating mechanism: -0.2 (percent GDP) — suspended for 1 year (2022–23).
- Plan for Health and Social Care spending: 1.4 (percent GDP) — 95 percent of this spending envelope is for health backlogs.
- Notes: items marked * denote newly introduced targeted pandemic support.

### Key public sector aggregates and projections (selected figures from Table 5)
- Revenue (percent of GDP): 36.6 (2019/20); 37.0 (2026/27 projected).
- Expenditure (percent of GDP): 39.1 (2019/20); 38.9 (2026/27 projected).
- Net lending/borrowing (overall balance, percent of GDP): -2.5 (2019/20); -1.4 (2026/27 projected).
- General government gross debt: 83.0 (2019/20); 88.9 (2026/27 projected).
- Public sector gross debt: 92.6 (2019/20); 93.5 (2026/27 projected).
- Public sector net debt: 84.1 (2019/20); 84.5 (2026/27 projected).
- Real GDP growth (percent): 0.6 (2019); -10.2 (2020); 7.2 (2021); 4.7 (2022); 2.3 (2023); 1.3 (2024); 1.6 (2025); 1.5 (2026); 1.5 (2027.

### Medium-term macroeconomic scenario highlights (Table 6, selected)
- Real GDP (percent change): 1.7 (2019); -9.4 (2020); 7.2 (2021); 4.7 (2022); 2.3 (2023); 1.3 (2024); 1.6 (2025); 1.5 (2026); 1.5 (2027).
- CPI Inflation, period average: 1.8 (2019); 0.9 (2020); 2.6 (2021); 6.3 (2022); 3.1 (2023); 2.0 (2024); 2.0 (2025); 2.0 (2026); 2.0 (2027).
- Current account (percent of GDP): -2.7 (2019); -2.6 (2020); -3.4 (2021); -4.7 (2022); -4.3 (2023); -4.0 (2024–27 projected).

### Balance of payments and external positions (selected)
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): -2.7 (2019); -2.6 (2020); -3.4 (2021); -4.7 (2022); -4.3 (2023); -4.0 (2024–27).
- Net investment position (percent of GDP): -25.5 (2019); -21.1 (2020); -21.3 (2021); -22.3 (2022); -23.9 (2023); -25.6 (2024); -27.1 (2025); -28.6 (2026); -30.0 (2027).

### Strengthening automatic stabilizers (Table 9)
- Revenue stabilizers options and pandemic responses:
  - VAT payments deferred between 20 March 2020 and 30 June 2020 to 31 March 2021; cumulative total £33.5bn.
  - Business rates relief for retail, hospitality and nurseries: about 382,000 businesses eligible; cost about £11.5bn.
  - Super-deduction introduced for expenditure from 1 April 2021 until end-March 2023: companies can claim 130 percent capital allowances.
  - Options: legislate contingent VAT deferral; introduce investment tax-deductions during downturns; extend super-deduction beyond 2023 for green projects.
- Expenditure stabilizers options and pandemic responses:
  - UC uplift: £20 a week from March 2020, extended; equivalent one-off payment of £500 to eligible Working Tax Credit claimants in April 2021.
  - Options: make UC uplift permanent; legislate automatic extension of unemployment benefits during high unemployment or disasters.
  - ALMPs: Kickstart, Restart, increase in work coaches and funding; recommendation to make more automatic funding of youth-oriented ALMPs while preserving discretion.
  - Furlough and short-time working: CJRS and SEISS supported 11.7 million jobs furloughed by 1.3 million employers via grants worth £70 billion; SEISS supported 2.9 million self-employed with £28.1 billion in grants.
  - Recommendation: CJRS should not be part of regular automatic stabilizers; use for very large, temporary, non-structural shocks.

### Active Labor Market Policies (Table 13) — key initiatives and outcomes
- Kickstart program (16–24 year-olds): announced July 2020 as a £2bn scheme to fund up to 250,000 six-month placements; as of 5 December 2021, over 112,000 Kickstart jobs started; program end extended from Dec. 2021 to March 2022.
- Restart Program for long-term jobless: £2.9bn scheme announced November 2020 to support over 1,000,000 long-term unemployed over 3 years; launched July 2021.
- Work coaches: £2.3bn invested across Plan for Jobs and Spending Review 2020 to hire 13,500 work coaches (doubling to 27,000); hired 13,500 coaches in 8 months.
- Job Entry Targeted Support (£200 mill.): 176,000 job seekers benefited of which over 30,000 were hired.
- Job Finding Support: Over 43,000 beneficiaries; program extended until end of December 2021.
- Apprenticeship wage subsidy: £3,000 subsidy for new apprentices hired before September 2021; 162,000 apprentices hired under scheme.
- Lifetime Skills Guarantee and Skills Bootcamps: about 15,000 expected to benefit from Skills Bootcamps this year; ambition to quadruple available places by 2024/25.

### Investment, equity support to SMEs, and related measures (Tables 12, 14)
- R&D and innovation commitments:
  - Increase public sector investment in R&D to £20bn a year by 2024–25; core university funding increase £1.1 billion per year by 2024–25; funding for Innovate UK around £1 billion per annum by 2024–25; £800 million by 2025–26 for ARIA.
  - Public resources for R&D projected to be 1.1 percent of GDP by 2024, below target of 2.4 percent of GDP.
- Equity and equity-like support programs (selected amounts):
  - Future Fund: Breakthrough — £375m, 0.02% of GDP.
  - Life Sciences Investment Program — £200m, 0.01% of GDP.
  - British Patient Capital Core Program — £1.3bn, 0.06% of GDP.
  - Temporary business rates relief — £1.7bn (0.07% of GDP), described also as about £1.7bn by Apr 2023 and about 0.2% of total turnovers of eligible sectors.
  - Bounce Back Loans (BBL) total disbursements: £46bn (2% of GDP); estimated NPV support ~£0.5bn, about 1% total business turnovers (with assumptions noted).
  - Deferred VAT repayments total amount: £33.5bn (1.4% of GDP); NPV support ~£0.5bn, about 1% total business turnovers under an 11-installment assumption.

### Financial stability, FSAP findings, and recommendations (Table 11)
- Selected FSAP findings:
  - Evaluating systemic risk in NBFIs remains a challenge because of global nature and data gaps; recent failures of Greensill and Archegos highlight global regulator challenges.
  - Banks’ climate disclosures remain incomplete despite authorities being at the frontier of analyzing climate-related financial risks.
  - Financial innovations and greater reliance on cloud and third-party services raise systemic and cyber risk concerns.
  - High money laundering threats, particularly from foreign crimes; challenges on risk-based AML/CFT supervision and accuracy of the People with Significant Control (PSC) Register.
- Key recommendations:
  - Accelerate efforts to close data gaps on NBFI activities, including all Sterling asset holdings and flow-of-funds data (FSSA, key recommendation 13).
  - Strengthen information sharing with third-country authorities and review supervision of hybrid cross-border transactions and mixed financial groups (FSSA, key recommendation 14).
  - Seek additional statutory powers to review resilience of third-party critical services, including cloud services (FSSA, key recommendation 3).
  - Enhance on-the-ground reviews of systemically important firms and depth of AML/CFT supervision (FSSA, key recommendation 4).
  - Improve verification of beneficial ownership information on the PSC Register and support Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories on similar registers (FSSA, key recommendation 6).

### Fiscal rules and framework (Table 10 — timeline of major changes)
- 1998 rules: current budget balanced on average over economic cycle; national debt < 40 percent of national income.
- 2008–2016: multiple adjustments and suspensions during crises and updated Charter for Budget Responsibility targets.
- 2020+ (manifesto/Spring Budget 2020 announcements, not formally adopted): current budget balanced by third year of forecast period; public sector investment average no more than 3 percent of GDP; reassess fiscal plans if debt interest exceeds 6 percent of revenue; welfare cap.
- 2021 rule updates:
  - Public sector net debt (excluding BoE) as percent of GDP should be falling by third year of rolling forecast.
  - Current budget should be balanced by third year of rolling forecast.
  - Public sector net investment should not exceed 3 percent of GDP on average over rolling forecast.
  - Welfare cap remains.

### Anti-corruption and corporate transparency (Table 15 — authorities’ self-assessment)
- Corporate transparency actions:
  - Three detailed public consultations on corporate transparency and register reform in 2021 in preparation for legislation.
  - Spending Review October 2021 includes £63 million for Companies House system upgrades; increased work with law enforcement.
  - UK joined the Beneficial Ownership Leadership Group on September 1, 2021, and signed up to best practice beneficial ownership disclosure principles.
- OECD Working Group on Bribery recommendations:
  - UK reported full or partial implementation of 37 out of 44 recommendations as of June 2021.
  - Several recommendations declared fully implemented (e.g., improve detection of foreign bribery in tax system; training for public procurement; improve international cooperation procedures; review of UK Export Finance compliance).
  - One recommendation upgraded to partially implemented: ensure Article 5 is clearly binding on prosecutors and investigators.
  - Ongoing work on extending Anti-Bribery Convention implementation to Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories.
- International anti-corruption:
  - Technical assistance unit established February 2021 to support low- and middle-income countries on corruption and illicit finance capacity building.
  - Global Anti-Corruption sanctions regime launched April 2021 (asset freezes and travel bans for serious corruption).
  - UK published comprehensive update on actions taken in the 3rd year of the UK anti-corruption strategy in December 2021.

*Source: 1gbrea2022001 - 0.4 percent of GDP.*

### Annex I.  Post-Covid Scarring in the UK

### Annex I. Post-Covid Scarring in the UK

### Framework and output decomposition
- Medium-term potential output decomposition (as presented):
  - 푌푌 = 퐹퐹(퐴퐴, 푅푅, 퐾퐾, 퐿퐿) ∗ 퐸퐸 = 퐴퐴 ∗ 푅푅푠푠푠푠 ∗ 퐾퐾푠푠푠푠 ∗ 퐿퐿푠푠푠푠 ∗ 퐻퐻 ∗ 푃푃푃푃푃푃 ∗ 푃푃퐴퐴푅푅푃푃 ∗ (1−푢푢) ∗ (퐻퐻/푁푁) ∗ 퐸퐸
  - Definitions: 퐴퐴 = total factor productivity (TFP); 푅푅, 퐾퐾, 퐿퐿 = intangible, tangible and human capital; 퐻퐻 = labor hours; 푃푃푃푃푃푃 = population; 푃푃퐴퐴푅푅푃푃 = labor participation rate; 푢푢 = natural unemployment rate; 퐻퐻/푁푁 = hours per worker; 퐸퐸 = allocative efficiency.

### Channels of scarring — qualitative assessment
- Capital
  - Reduced investment in physical capital and intangible assets during the 2020 downturn and due to uncertainty about post-Covid and post-Brexit economic structure.
  - Possible rise in depreciation rates of both tangible and intangible capital as some pandemic-era investments become obsolete (example: contact tracing software).
- Labor supply
  - Reduced net migration associated with the pandemic and Brexit.
  - Increased mortality has a smaller impact.
  - Inactivity rose sharply during 2020, especially among ages 16–24 and 50+. Inactivity among younger cohorts was likely driven by increased further education and reversed in 2021; decreased participation among older cohorts likely related to early retirement and expected to linger.
  - Unemployment and hours per worker are not expected to be affected much in the medium term; furlough scheme contained structural damage and sectoral/occupational mismatches were short-lived.
  - Staff forecast a temporary rise in unemployment as growth slows toward medium-term trend over 2023–24, with labor market policies expected to minimize mismatches and structural unemployment.
- Productivity-related factors
  - Human capital: negative medium-term impact from loss of schooling, foregone on-the-job learning for furloughed/unemployed workers, reduced knowledge spillovers from remote work, and loss of foreign-worker talent due to reduced migration.
  - Allocative efficiency: shifts in sectoral GVA shares seen in 2020 largely reverted in 2021; misallocation expected to have only a limited contribution to medium-term scarring.
  - TFP: lower intangible investment during the pandemic is expected to lower aggregate TFP via reduced knowledge spillovers. Covid-related adoption of some digital technologies could mitigate negative TFP shocks but may partly reflect mitigation of the negative shock rather than a net productivity gain.

### Quantification approach and assumptions
- Capital scarring
  - Estimated by comparing pre- and post-pandemic staff forecasts for physical and intangible capital stock in 2025 using the perpetual inventory method:
    - 퐾퐾푡+1 = (1 − 훿훿푡푡퐾퐾) 퐾퐾푡 + 퐼퐼푡푡퐾퐾
    - 푅푅푡+1 = (1 − 훿훿푡푡푅푅) 푅푅푡 + 퐼퐼푡푡푅푅
  - Depreciation rates (훿훿푡푡퐾퐾, 훿훿푡푡푅푅) are assumed to rise to 7½ percent in 2021–23 in the post-pandemic forecasts (versus about 7¼ percent pre-pandemic).
  - Historical average capital share in income: about 45 percent.
  - Result: scarring due to physical capital = 0.4 percent of GDP; intangible capital = 0.1 percent of GDP.
- Labor scarring
  - Labor hours decomposition: 퐻퐻 = 푃푃푃푃푃푃 ∗ 푃푃퐴퐴푅푅푃푃 ∗ (1 − 푢푢) ∗ (퐻퐻/푁푁)
  - Unemployment returned to natural rate in 2021; no significant change in average hours per worker.
  - Changes driven largely by labor force participation (projected to settle below pre-pandemic trend) and population (pre-pandemic based on ONS 2018 projections; post-pandemic based on 2020).
  - Historical average labor share in income: about 55 percent.
  - Result: labor contributes 0.5 percent of GDP to scarring.
- Productivity-related scarring
  - Staff estimate productivity-related factors account for about half of total scarring, consistent with empirical estimates based on past pandemics.
  - Total productivity-related scarring estimated at about 1.1 percent of GDP (equivalent to less than half a standard deviation decrease in TFP’s growth contribution over 2020–25).
  - Breakdown:
    - Knowledge spillovers due to decline in intangible capital: about 0.6 percent of GDP, using a multiplier of 3.5 based on Haskel (2021).
    - Human capital losses from foregone on-the-job learning: about 0.5 percent of GDP, consistent with projected cumulative loss of labor hours (amounting to a quarter of a work year over 2020–25) and literature-based elasticities.
    - Productivity losses from allocative inefficiency: about 0.1 percent of GDP.
  - Calibration and elasticities:
    - Multiplier for intangible knowledge spillovers: 3.5.
    - Elasticity of TFP to cumulative labor hours calibrated to 2 percent.
    - Empirical wage effect: an extra year’s experience on the job raises wages by 1–3 percent (literature reference used).

### Aggregate scarring estimates and composition by 2025
- Overall scarring by 2025: 2.2 percent of GDP.
- Contribution shares:
  - Capital (physical + intangible): about a quarter of total scarring (physical = 0.4 percent of GDP; intangible = 0.1 percent of GDP).
  - Labor supply: about a quarter of total scarring (labor = 0.5 percent of GDP).
  - Productivity-related factors: about half of total scarring (total = 1.1 percent of GDP), with human capital and knowledge spillovers each accounting for 20–25 percent of scarring and allocative inefficiency less than 5 percent of total scarring.
- Labor participation trajectory and comparison:
  - Projected average participation over 2023–25: 63.6 percent.
  - Pre-pandemic trend reference: 64 percent (on the back of an upward trend in 2019).
- Offsetting factors noted:
  - Elevated government investment and pandemic support measures have partially offset adverse effects on private investment.

*Source: Annex I. Post-Covid Scarring in the UK (IMF staff calculations and analysis).*

### Annex IV. External Debt Sustainability Analysis

### Annex IV. External Debt Sustainability Analysis

### Background
- External debt peaked at 337 percent of GDP in 2020, mainly due to denominator effects as the pandemic and Brexit depressed nominal GDP.
- Before the pandemic, external debt had stayed at around 300 percent of GDP since 2013.
- Almost half of external debt comprises short-term bank liabilities, while public debt accounts for a tenth.
- The net international investment position has consistently stayed above -30 percent of GDP over the past decades, as positive valuation gains have tended to offset financial account deficits.
- More than ¼ of external debt is denominated in foreign currency.

### Baseline assessment and projections
- Under the baseline scenario, external debt is projected to decline from the 2020 peak of 337 percent of GDP to about 279 percent of GDP by 2026.
- Drivers of baseline decline:
  - Economic recovery.
  - Non-interest current account dynamics that induce positive debt dynamics.
- Identified external debt-creating flows and dynamics (selected exact figures from the framework):
  - Baseline: External debt — 2016: 305; 2017: 309; 2018: 305; 2019: 298; 2020: 337; 2021: 317; 2022: 294; 2023: 286; 2024: 283; 2025: 281; 2026: 279 (percent of GDP).
  - Change in external debt — 2016: 18.7; 2017: 3.2; 2018: -3.8; 2019: -6.5; 2020: 38.6; 2021: -19.9; 2022: -23.4; 2023: -7.8; 2024: -2.2; 2025: -2.9; 2026: -1.3 (percent of GDP).
  - Current account deficit, excluding interest payments — 2016: 0.7; 2017: -1.4; 2018: -1.7; 2019: -3.2; 2020: -1.5; 2021: -2.3; 2022: -1.1; 2023: -1.3; 2024: -1.4; 2025: -1.3; 2026: -1.3 (percent of GDP).
  - External debt-to-exports ratio (in percent) — 2016: 1083; 2017: 1027; 2018: 1000; 2019: 962; 2020: 1198; 2021: 1202; 2022: 1138; 2023: 1047; 2024: 1020; 2025: 999; 2026: 986.
  - Gross external financing need (in billions of US dollars) — 2016: 588; 2017: 658; 2018: 485; 2019: 912; 2020: 630; 2021: 260; 2022: 566; 2023: 615; 2024: 724; 2025: 734; 2026: 765; 2027 (if present in table): 802; 2028: 183; 2029: 51 (as printed in table sequence).
  - Key macro assumptions (selected):
    - Real GDP growth (in percent): 2016: 2.3; 2017: 2.1; 2018: 1.7; 2019: 1.7; 2020: -9.4; 2021: 0.9; 2022: 3.6; 2023: 7.2; 2024: 4.7; 2025: 2.3; 2026: 1.3; 2027: 1.6; 2028: 1.5.
    - Nominal external interest rate (in percent): 2016: 1.5; 2017: 1.6; 2018: 2.0; 2019: 1.9; 2020: 1.3; 2021: 1.7; 2022: 0.3; 2023: 2.0; 2024: 2.0; 2025: 2.0; 2026: 2.0.
    - Growth of exports (US dollar terms, in percent): 2016: -4.1; 2017: 5.2; 2018: 9.2; 2019: 0.8; 2020: -13.0; 2021: 1.3; 2022: 8.5; 2023: 9.1; 2024: 6.9; 2025: 13.4; 2026: 7.8; 2027: 6.0; 2028: 5.9.
    - Growth of imports (US dollar terms, in percent): 2016: -4.0; 2017: 3.6; 2018: 9.2; 2019: -0.5; 2020: -15.9; 2021: 0.6; 2022: 8.5; 2023: 14.0; 2024: 12.3; 2025: 11.7; 2026: 6.9; 2027: 6.4; 2028: 5.6.
- Gross debt assets at about 300 percent of GDP and a net assets position in foreign currency provide insurance against shocks.

### Scenario and shock analysis (selected outcomes)
- Historical scenario (ten-year average including the Covid crisis and sizable pound depreciation):
  - External debt climbs to 341 percent of GDP by the end of the forecast horizon.
- Growth shock (standardized shock calibrated to ½ standard deviation for interest rates, growth, and the current account):
  - External debt would rise to 306 percent of GDP.
- Depreciation shock:
  - External debt would rise to 326 percent of GDP following a one-time real depreciation (figure notes: one-time real depreciation of 30 percent occurs in 2021).
- Combined and other scenario outcomes (from bound tests figures, selected values):
  - Interest rate shock baseline: 279; interest rate shock outcome shown at 281 (percent of GDP).
  - Current account shock outcome shown at 284 (percent of GDP).
  - Combined shock outcome shown at 295 (percent of GDP).
  - Growth shock outcome shown at 306 (percent of GDP).
  - Historical scenario outcome shown at 341 (percent of GDP).
- Sensitivities:
  - Short-term liability positions are about twice the value of GDP, increasing sensitivity to market sentiment.
  - A real depreciation would lead to a sizable increase of external debt since more than ¼ is foreign currency denominated.

### Key findings and implications
- External debt is sustainable in the baseline, given projected decline to about 279 percent of GDP and the UK’s net asset position in foreign currency.
- Vulnerabilities remain due to:
  - Large stock of short-term bank liabilities (almost half of external debt).
  - Public policy and market sentiment risks given short-term liabilities at twice GDP.
  - Exchange rate risk given more than ¼ of external debt in foreign currency.
- Policy and reform implications:
  - Structural reforms to increase productivity and preservation of strong policy frameworks would help contain external vulnerabilities.
  - Upholding robust policy frameworks and implementing appropriate structural reforms are vital to preserving sustainability as the country adjusts to the post-Brexit trade regime.

*International Monetary Fund — Annex IV. External Debt Sustainability Analysis*

### 11.      The risk assessment is moderate under a number of shock scenarios including a severe

### 11.      The risk assessment is moderate under a number of shock scenarios including a severe

### Summary risk assessment
- The risk assessment is described as moderate under a number of shock scenarios including:
  - a severe shock to demand (e.g., due to the emergence of a highly virulent Covid variant),
  - a tightening of global financial conditions (e.g., due to sharper-than-expected rate hikes by the Federal Reserve and/or the ECB) that raises private and public borrowing costs and reduces GDP growth,
  - a recession caused by supply-side disruptions (e.g., due to supply-chain problems or a rise in commodity prices) that hits production while also leading to inflationary pressures and tighter monetary policies.
- In a climate change early action scenario, where steadily rising carbon prices would weigh on economic activity, the risk signal could be low or moderate depending on the fiscal impact, which hinges on carbon reduction methods (extent of reliance on revenue-raising carbon taxes versus public investments).

### Baseline DSA projections and key indicators (select figures)
- Nominal gross public debt (in percent of GDP): 110.0, 110.6, 106.0, 105.4, 102.0, 97.7, 93.5, 90.4 (Act./Est. as of January 12, 2022; years 2020–2027 shown)
- Public gross financing needs (in percent of GDP): 23.8, 16.0, 10.2, 10.6, 10.5, 10.7, 9.3, 9.1 (2020–2027)
- Real GDP growth (in percent): -10.2, 10.4, 4.4, 1.2, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5 (2020–2027)
- Inflation (GDP deflator, in percent): 6.0, 0.4, 6.7, 2.4, 2.3, 2.0, 2.1, 2.2 (2020–2027)
- Nominal GDP growth (in percent): -4.9, 11.0, 11.4, 3.6, 3.8, 3.5, 3.6, 3.6 (2020–2027)
- Effective interest rate (in percent): 1.2, 1.8, 1.6, 1.4, 1.3, 1.2, 1.2, 1.2 (2020–2027)
- Ratings (as listed): Moody's Aa3/Aa3; S&Ps AAAA; Fitch AA-/AA-
- Sovereign spreads: EMBIG (bp) 3/119; 5Y CDS (bp) 10

### Contribution to changes in public debt (selected flows and cumulative)
- Change in gross public sector debt (cumulative, percent of GDP): 21.1, 0.6, -4.6, -0.6, -3.4, -4.3, -4.2, -3.1, -20.2 (2020–2027 cumulative)
- Identified debt-creating flows: 17.8, -0.7, -4.2, -0.2, -3.0, -3.9, -3.8, -2.2, -17.3
- Primary (non-interest) deficit (percent of GDP): 14.1, 6.2, 1.9, 1.2, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5, 0.2, 5.1
- Primary (noninterest) revenue and grants (percent of GDP): 36.9, 35.9, 35.9, 36.7, 36.8, 36.9, 37.1, 35.2, 218.6 (note: cumulative)
- Primary (noninterest) expenditure (percent of GDP): 51.0, 42.1, 37.8, 37.9, 37.5, 37.5, 37.6, 35.3, 223.7 (note: cumulative)
- Automatic debt dynamics (contribution, percent of GDP): 5.6, -9.0, -9.8, -2.3, -2.6, -2.3, -2.2, -2.2, -21.4
  - Of which: real interest rate contribution: -3.9, 1.3, -5.4, -1.0, -1.0, -0.8, -0.8, -0.9, -10.0
  - Of which: real GDP growth contribution: 9.5, -10.3, -4.4, -1.2, -1.5, -1.5, -1.4, -1.3, -11.4
- Other identified debt-creating flows (cash requirements adjustments incl. privatization, negative): -1.8, 2.1, 3.7, 0.9, -1.1, -2.2, -2.1, -0.1, -1.0
- Contingent liabilities: 0.0 in all years shown
- Residual, including asset changes: 3.3, 1.3, -0.4, -0.4, -0.4, -0.4, -0.4, -0.9, -2.9

### Composition of public debt and alternative scenarios (baseline assumptions and scenarios)
- Baseline underlying assumptions (select):
  - Real GDP growth (percent): 4.4 (2022), 1.2 (2023), 1.5 (2024), 1.5 (2025), 1.5 (2026), 1.5 (2027)
  - Inflation (percent): 6.7, 2.4, 2.3, 2.0, 2.1, 2.2
  - Primary Balance (percent of GDP): -1.9, -1.2, -0.7, -0.6, -0.5, -0.2
  - Effective interest rate (percent): 1.6, 1.4, 1.3, 1.2, 1.2, 1.2
- Historical scenario (selected differences):
  - Real GDP growth under historical scenario: 4.4, 1.6, 1.6, 1.6, 1.6, 1.6
  - Primary Balance under historical scenario: -1.9, -3.8, -3.8, -3.8, -3.8, -3.8
  - Effective interest rate under historical scenario: 1.6, 1.4, 1.4, 1.4, 1.5, 1.5
- Constant Primary Balance scenario:
  - Primary Balance fixed at -1.9 for 2022–2027 while other assumptions follow baseline.

### Realism of baseline assumptions and forecast track record (selected diagnostics)
- Forecast track record percentile ranks (United Kingdom median forecast error, 2012–2020):
  - Real GDP Growth median forecast error: -0.37; Has a percentile rank of: 54%
  - Primary Balance median forecast error: -0.36; Has a percentile rank of: 54%
  - Inflation (Deflator) median forecast error: 0.15; Has a percentile rank of: 76%
- Boom-Bust analysis and realism checks note: "Not applicable for United Kingdom, as it meets neither the positive output gap criterion nor the private credit growth criterion."
- 3-year CAPB adjustment and average CAPB level diagnostics:
  - The UK has a percentile rank of 2% for 3-year CAPB adjustment distribution.
  - The UK has a percentile rank of 74% for 3-year average level of CAPB.

### Stress tests (macro-fiscal) — selected scenario impacts and assumptions
- Stress test scenarios include: Primary Balance Shock, Real GDP Growth Shock, Real Interest Rate Shock, Real Exchange Rate Shock, Combined Shock, Contingent Liability Shock.
- Selected scenario-specific baseline assumptions (examples shown):
  - Baseline Real GDP growth: 4.4, 1.2, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5 (2022–2027)
  - Primary Balance under Primary Balance Shock: -1.9, -5.2, -2.7, -0.6, -0.5, -0.2
  - Primary Balance under Real GDP Growth Shock: -1.9, -3.7, -5.7, -0.6, -0.5, -0.2
  - Effective interest rate under Real Interest Rate Shock: 1.6, 1.4, 1.5, 1.5, 1.7, 1.8
  - Effective interest rate under Real Exchange Rate Shock: 1.6, 1.4, 1.3, 1.3, 1.3, 1.3
  - Primary Balance under Combined Shock: -1.9, -5.2, -5.7, -0.6, -0.5, -0.2
  - Primary Balance under Contingent Liability Shock: -1.9, -13.1, -0.7, -0.6, -0.5, -0.2
- Stress test outcomes (illustrative metrics shown in figures):
  - Gross Nominal Public Debt (in percent of GDP) can rise above baseline under shocks; charts display values across 2022–2027 with spikes under Combined and Contingent Liability shocks.
  - Public Gross Financing Needs (in percent of GDP) shown rising under stress scenarios across 2022–2027.

### Public DSA risk assessment heat-map and indicators (select thresholds and metrics)
- Risk-assessment color coding rule (figure note): green if debt burden benchmark of 85% is not exceeded under the specific shock or baseline, yellow if exceeded under specific shock but not baseline, red if benchmark is exceeded under baseline.
- Benchmarks and thresholds (as listed):
  - Bond spreads thresholds: 400 and 600 basis points
  - External financing requirement thresholds: 17 and 25 percent of GDP
  - Change in the share of short-term debt thresholds: 1 and 1.5 percent
  - Public debt held by non-residents thresholds: 30 and 45 percent
- Reported indicator values and notes:
  - Bond spread (as reported): 118 bp
  - Public debt held by non-residents: no data (not applicable for United Kingdom in figure)
  - External financing requirement and other indicators presented in heat-map format (color-coded by benchmark exceedance)

### Sovereign risk and Debt Sustainability Framework / GFN risk assessment
- Debt fanchart and GFN financeability indices (selected values):
  - Debt fanchart index: 0.77
  - GFN financeability index: 7.33
  - Medium-term index described as average of debt fanchart and GFN financeability indices; thresholds for index zoning noted (High-Moderate and Moderate-Low) with values shown (e.g., High-Moderate 2.08 for debt fanchart; High-Moderate 17.89 for GFN financeability)
  - Prob. of debt non-stabilization: 0.33 (index 0.01 shown under a column)
- Risk signals from framework: Debt fanchart assessment = Low risk; Gross financing risk assessment = Low risk; Medium-term risk assessment = Low risk
- Memo: Sterling bank assets/GDP = 197.15%

### GFN scenario analysis (methodology notes and scenario labels)
- GFN risk assessment adjusts baseline projection according to shocks to real GDP growth and the primary deficit; vertical axis shows the impact of shocks to real GDP growth in 2022, halving each year until shock ceases at end-2024.
- Pass-through elasticities used (Cesa-Bianchi and Ferrero (2021) estimates): elasticity of 0.25 under a demand shock and -0.71 under a supply shock.
- Bank of England response assumption: BoE responds to 1 percent higher inflation by increasing its net gilt sales (or decreasing its net purchases) by £50bn relative to the baseline QE/QT trajectory.
- NBFI asset growth assumption: assumed to stop during recessions, with NBFI gilt holdings capped slightly above the historical share of their balance sheet.
- Risk scenarios depicted in figure 7 include labels: Deep recession scenario; Climate change early action scenario; Supply disruption scenario; Global financial tightening scenario.

*Source: IMF staff.*

### Annex VI.  Steepening of the Phillips Curve in the UK

### Annex VI.  Steepening of the Phillips Curve in the UK

### Phillips curve framework and estimation approach
- Modern expectations-augmented Phillips curve specification used:
  - πt = α + β ŷt + γ Et[πt+1] + δ Xt + φ (ŷt / Xt)
  - Where πt denotes inflation at time t, α is a constant term, ŷt is a measure of slack in economic activity, Et[πt+1] represents inflation expectations, and the vector Xt captures structural factors that may shift the Phillips curve and/or change its slope.
- Staff developed several specifications based on recent UK and cross-country data (2008–2019 for sectoral Phillips curve):
  - Sectoral πt measured with sectoral PPI and ŷt as deviation of sectoral output from trend.
  - Controls included expected and lagged inflation and real exchange rate movements, with sector, country, time and sector-country fixed effects.
  - Structural factors measured as:
    - Digitalization: share of enterprises receiving e-commerce orders.
    - De-globalization: negative of the share of inputs imported from non-EU countries.
    - Inflation dispersion: standard deviation of inflation across sectors.
- Additional analysis used monthly price-quote level data to examine association between e-commerce penetration and frequency of price changes.

### Literature context and motivations
- Prior literature has reported:
  - Flattening of the Phillips curve since the 1980s (attributed to better anchoring of expectations and structural changes).
  - Alternative findings of downward shifts in the Phillips curve due to a fall in NAIRU.
  - Evidence of non-linearities where slope varies with inflation and slack.
- Recent methodological refinements in the literature include exploiting regional variation within monetary unions and using monetary policy surprises as instruments.
- For the UK, prior research findings include claims of substantial post-1980 flattening, downward shifts due to trend NAIRU decline, and non-linearity.

### Empirical findings (staff results)
- Price-quote level (UK) result:
  - Greater e-commerce intensity at the sectoral level is associated with a significantly higher frequency of price changes.
  - This result is robust to defining price flexibility with either positive or negative price changes only and including sector and year fixed effects.
- Sectoral Phillips curve estimates (pooling 10 manufacturing sub-sectors in 23 Advanced European economies over 2008–2019):
  - All three structural factors (Digitalization, De-globalization, Inflation dispersion) have a statistically significant impact in steepening the Phillips curve.
  - Findings are robust to excluding the 2008–10 period associated with the global financial crisis and to controlling for non-linearities.
- Estimated coefficients (Baseline and Robustness specifications):
  - Digitalization: 0.0006* (Baseline); 0.0008** (Robustness)
    - Note: Coefficients correspond to percent increases in e-commerce.
    - Driscoll-Kraay standard error in parentheses: (-0.0003) in both columns.
    - Significance: * indicates 10 percent level for baseline; ** indicates 5 percent level for robustness.
  - De-globalization: 0.0066*** (Baseline); 0.0063*** (Robustness)
    - Note: Coefficients correspond to percent decreases in import shares.
    - Standard errors: (-0.0012) in both columns.
    - Significance: *** indicates 1 percent level.
  - Inflation dispersion: 0.0168*** (Baseline); 0.0158*** (Robustness)
    - Note: Coefficients correspond to a standard deviation increase in inflation dispersion.
    - Standard errors: (-0.0030) in both columns.
    - Significance: *** indicates 1 percent level.
  - Robustness specification excludes the years 2008–19 and controls for the square of the output gap and inflation expectations terms.

### Quantified contributions to steepening and interpretation
- Decomposition of contributors to increase in slope of the Phillips curve (UK):
  - Increased inflation dispersion accounts for 67 percent of the increase in the slope.
  - De-globalization explains 25 percent of the increase in the slope.
  - Digitalization explains 8 percent of the increase in the slope.
- Scenario and calibration notes:
  - Calculations assume online retail share in the UK stays 7 percentage points above the pre-Covid level after 2022 (as per the BoE’s Decision Maker Panel), a decline in the share of trade in GDP and a rise in inflation dispersion by 2 percentage points (in line with actual changes between 2019 and 2022).
  - Estimates can be considered a lower bound for pass-through of shocks to inflation in the current context with high and volatile inflation, given evidence that such periods are associated with stronger spillovers from relative price changes to broader inflation.

### Policy-relevant implications
- Structural changes can increase the responsiveness of inflation to domestic slack:
  - Digitalization (through higher price flexibility) increases frequency of price changes but contributes modestly to steepening relative to other factors.
  - De-globalization (reduced import shares) raises the relevance of domestic slack for inflation and potentially increases labor bargaining power, contributing materially to steepening.
  - Greater inflation dispersion (across sectors) is the largest contributor to steepening and may reflect unlocking of wage and price rigidities and de-anchoring of inflation expectations from repeated cost-push shocks and sectoral re-allocation.
- Practical interpretation for policymakers:
  - The Phillips curve in the UK may steepen meaningfully, implying a larger inflation impact from a given increase in the output gap.
  - Given the calibrated contributions, monitoring sectoral inflation dispersion and import share dynamics is important for assessing inflation responsiveness to domestic conditions.
  - Because estimates likely provide a lower bound in high and volatile inflation environments, policymakers should be cautious about underestimating pass-through from relative price shocks.

_Implied source: IMF staff calculations; ONS; BoE Decision Maker Panel._

### 4.      The authorities also presented the “Levelling-up” White Paper, a long-term plan to

### 1gbrea2022001 - 4.      The authorities also presented the “Levelling-up” White Paper, a long-term plan to

### Levelling-up White Paper — scope and staff view
- Provides evidence of regional differences in economic outcomes and life chances (example: "a child on free school meals in London has over twice the chance of going to university than one outside London").
- Fleshes out the Build Back Better Strategy with twelve national targets in areas including employment, skills, R&D, health, and transport or connectivity.
- Covers resources needed to meet those targets by 2030; resulting budgetary estimates are described as largely consistent with the allocations of the Spending Review.
- Staff welcomes the plan but sees opportunities to be more ambitious in spending, especially in:
  - public investment
  - education
  - training programs

### European Commission decision on UK central counterparties (CCPs)
- On February 8, the European Commission adopted the decision to extend the temporary equivalence for the UK central counterparties (CCPs) until the end-June 2025.
- The 3-year extension alleviates short-term market stability concerns.
- The long-run status of UK CCPs remains uncertain; fragmentation could ultimately lead to increased costs to clear derivatives.

### Staff appraisal — energy compensation and fiscal options
- Upcoming review period for fiscal performance and outlook presents an opportunity to refine the announced energy compensation scheme to support broader government objectives.
- Possible adjustments proposed by staff:
  - Focus support on low-income households.
  - Better support climate objectives (example: transform the repayment of the energy bill discount into subsidies for households willing to invest in green home renovations).
- To finance adjustments and consistent with the net zero strategy, authorities could consider raising carbon taxation and/or fuel duties when energy prices start to decline.

### Statement by the UK Executive Director and delegation — macroeconomic and policy assessment
- Recovery and support:
  - Recovery in the UK economy has outperformed expectations.
  - Faster-than-anticipated growth and a strong recovery in employment.
  - Government transitioned pandemic-related support towards more targeted fiscal interventions and anchored fiscal policy around a credible and well-designed medium-term consolidation plan, supported by new fiscal rules.
  - The government’s Plan for Jobs supports business to protect and create new jobs.
- Energy and cost-of-living support:
  - On 3rd February the government announced a tailored package of support for consumers, including:
    - a universal, fiscally-neutral element to help smooth all household energy bills
    - a more targeted rebate on council taxes
    - discretionary support for lower-income households
    - expansion of the warm homes discount scheme to support the most vulnerable
- Monetary policy and inflation:
  - The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) increased interest rates to 0.5% to support inflation returning sustainably to the 2% target.
  - Consumer price inflation: "The MPC’s central forecast sees UK CPI inflation peak at just over 7% in April."
  - December decision: raise rates to 0.25% (first rate rise from a major advanced economy central bank since the pandemic began).
  - February decision: increase Bank Rate by a further 0.25 percentage points, to 0.5%.
  - MPC also decided to begin reducing the stock of UK government bond purchases and sterling non-financial investment-grade corporate bond purchases by ceasing to reinvest maturing assets, and initiated a programme of corporate bond sales.
- Macroprudential and financial system policy:
  - Authorities have begun to adjust macroprudential policy.
  - A one percentage point rise in the counter-cyclical capital buffer has been announced for December 2022 (based on the Financial Policy Committee’s judgment that overall vulnerabilities are returning to their standard level).
  - In due course, absent a material change in the outlook for financial stability, the FPC would expect to increase the rate further to 2%.
- Public investment and institutional reforms:
  - Under government capital plans, public sector net investment will reach the highest sustained levels as a share of GDP since the late 1970s.
  - Reforms advanced to deliver infrastructure projects better, faster, and greener.
  - UK volunteered to undertake a Public Investment Management Assessment (PIMA) and was an early adopter of the green PIMA pilot module.
  - "Leveling up" agenda to spread opportunity, improve public services, boost living standards, and empower local leaders and communities.
- Net zero and climate commitments:
  - UK adopted a legally-binding target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by 2050.
  - Government announced plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 78% by 2035 compared to 1990 levels.
  - System of five-year carbon budgets established under the 2008 Climate Change Act.
  - Net Zero Review (released October 2021) provides economic analysis on trade-offs; Net Zero Strategy and the Heat and Buildings Strategy set out further plans.
  - UK Emissions Trading Scheme demonstrates commitment to carbon pricing and will be aligned with the net zero target.
  - UK was the first country to commit to fully mandatory climate-related financial disclosure requirements across the economy by 2025.
- Financial System Stability Assessment (FSAP) — resilience and priorities:
  - Multi-year build-up of resilience in the UK financial system supported the economy through the pandemic.
  - UK banks remained well-capitalized and played a key role in government-guaranteed lending schemes.
  - Insurers and UK financial market infrastructures demonstrated high levels of operational and financial resilience.
  - No widespread crystallizations of distress in household or corporate sectors to date.
  - Effective interagency cooperation highlighted (preparing for UK departure from the EU, LIBOR transition, Covid response, monitoring regulatory perimeter).
  - Climate risk: authorities welcomed IMF assessment of climate-related balance sheet risks; UK leads efforts internationally (Network for Greening the Financial System, IOSCO, the FSB, the G7 and G20).
  - Bank of England’s Climate Biennial Exploratory Scenario noted as one of the most ambitious stress testing exercises internationally.
  - PRA first prudential regulator to set out supervisory expectations on managing financial risks from climate change.
  - Work underway to adapt regulation to foster innovation while ensuring safe and sustainable financial services (payments, cyber risks, operational resilience).
  - Global regulatory gaps remain in understanding and responding to evolving non-bank finance risks (liquidity mismatches in money market and other investment funds, use of leverage and exposures to derivatives, fragile liquidity in some markets).
- Frustration with selective quotation:
  - Authorities expressed frustration that the FSAP was selectively quoted in Table 11 of the Article IV staff report and emphasized the importance of full consistency between surveillance products and advice.
- Concluding note:
  - Authorities express appreciation for IMF analysis and advice and look forward to continued collaboration on domestic and international macroeconomic challenges.

*Italic: Source: 1gbrea2022001 (PDF chapter/section).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2022/english/1gbrea2022001.pdf_
