## 1slvea2022001

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### Economic outlook and projections
- Real GDP growth:
  - -7.9 percent in 2020
  - 10.0 percent in 2021
  - 3.2 percent in 2022
  - About 2 percent over the medium term; expected to converge to 2 percent by 2026
- Inflation (average):
  - -0.4 percent in 2020
  - 3.5 percent in 2021
  - 2.8 percent in 2022
- Terms of trade (percent change): 6.0 in 2020; -5.4 in 2021; 3.4 in 2022
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): 0.5 in 2020; -3.9 in 2021; -2.5 in 2022
- Gross international reserves (mill. U.S. dollars): 3,083 in 2020; 3,510 in 2021; 3,980 in 2022
- Nominal GDP (billions of U.S. dollars): 24.6 in 2020; 27.9 in 2021; 29.4 in 2022

### Fiscal position, debt dynamics, and financing needs
- Fiscal balances:
  - Overall balance (percent of GDP): -8.2 in 2020; -5.8 in 2021; -4.9 in 2022
  - Primary balance (percent of GDP): -3.8 in 2020; -1.1 in 2021; 0.0 in 2022
- Tax revenue (percent of GDP): 18.5 in 2020; 20.4 in 2021; 20.9 in 2022
- Public sector gross debt:
  - 89.2 percent of GDP in 2020
  - 84.4 percent of GDP in 2021
  - 84.8 percent of GDP in 2022
  - Projected to rise to about 96 percent of GDP by 2026 (including pensions) under current policies
- Financing needs and drivers:
  - Fiscal deficit projected at 5¾ percent of GDP in 2021 and about 5 percent of GDP in 2022 (staff projection)
  - Unidentified cumulative financing gap for 2022–26 about US$8 billion (28 percent of GDP) without consolidation
  - Gross financing requirements (millions USD): 2021 4,086; 2022 4,598; 2023 5,737; 2024 5,297; 2025 6,620; 2026 5,383
- Public debt dynamics (selected projections, percent of GDP):
  - Public sector gross debt: 2019 71.3; 2020 89.2; 2021 84.4; 2022 84.8; 2023 86.9; 2024 89.2; 2025 92.7; 2026 96.3
  - Public gross financing needs (percent of GDP): 2019 8.5; 2020 11.4; 2021 13.9; 2022 14.9; 2023 15.6; 2024 18.8; 2025 16.8; 2026 20.3
- Staff assessment:
  - Debt is on an unsustainable path absent strong consolidation measures.
  - A staff illustrative consolidation of about 4 percent of GDP over 2022–24 would help restore fiscal sustainability and could lead to public debt below 80 percent of GDP by end-2026.

### Fiscal adjustment options and public financial management reforms
- Menu of fiscal adjustment options (estimates in percent of GDP):
  - Revenue-side:
    - increase outdated excise taxes: ½ percent of GDP
    - align the VAT rate with LAC/regional averages: 1¼ percent of GDP
    - introduce a surcharge on CIT for large companies: ¼ percent of GDP
    - introduce taxes on capital gains: 0.1 percent of GDP
    - introduce taxes on streaming services: 0.1 percent of GDP
    - carbon tax based on CO2 emissions: 0.3 percent of GDP
    - additional considerations: property tax, repeal VAT and income tax exemptions
  - Spending-side:
    - realign wage bill and remove redundancies (including eliminating indexation rules/escalafones): 1¼ percent of GDP
    - better target subsidies (particularly fossil fuels): ¼ percent of GDP
    - savings from transfers to local governments (FODES): ½ percent of GDP
    - centralize purchases of goods and large investment projects: ¼ percent of GDP
- PFM and governance reforms recommended:
  - develop medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) and Medium-Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF); resume publication
  - implement program budgeting and SAFI 2 modules
  - resume and reform Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL)
  - prepare a public sector balance sheet and centralize inventory of trusts/extrabudgetary funds
  - strengthen investment project appraisal, PPP risk assessment, and transparency

### Financial sector, stability, and inclusion
- Key indicators:
  - Credit to the private sector: 62.1 percent of GDP in 2020; 57.6 in 2021; 56.3 in 2022
  - Broad money: 70.2 percent of GDP in 2020; 65.7 in 2021; 65.1 in 2022
  - Interest rate (time deposits): 4.1 percent in 2020; 3.9 percent in 2021
  - Bank capital adequacy: average capital adequacy ratio about 15.8 percent (system)
  - NPLs: 1.7 percent of gross loans in February 2020 to 2.3 percent in September 2021
  - COVID-19 portfolio share: 10¾ percent of total loans (end-September 2021); provisioning shortfall US$ 111.3 million
- Liquidity and reserve requirements:
  - Reserve requirement normalization target: reach 15 percent of deposits by June 2022
  - Two largest banks hold 40 percent of assets in the system
- Financial sector policy recommendations:
  - Monitor banks’ recovery strategies as pandemic measures unwind
  - Adopt a banking crisis resolution framework and deposit insurance law; strengthen ELA framework
  - Transition to forward-looking, risk-based supervision and IFRS migration (BCR expected adoption of IFRS in 2024)
  - Move to Basel III standards for LCR and NSFR by end-2023
  - Strengthen supervision of exposure to government securities (9 percent of total assets) and short-term debt holdings

### Bitcoin adoption, Chivo e-wallet, fiscal and financial risks
- Policy change and implementation timeline:
  - Bitcoin law adopted on June 8, 2021
  - Chivo fully implemented on September 7, 2021
- Operational and fiscal facts:
  - Chivo clients: 3.8 million, including 16,300 companies
  - FIDEBITCOIN trust fund endowed with US$150 million
  - Chivo expenditures as of October 28, 2021: estimated US$55 million (0.2 percent of GDP) for purchase of 1,120 Bitcoin, equivalent to US$69 million (¼ percent of GDP) at current market valuation
  - Short-term budgetary costs of Chivo and Bitcoin law implementation: 1 percent of GDP for 2021–2022
  - Expected near-term gains from Bitcoin adoption (staff estimate): up to ¼ percent of GDP per year
  - By October 2021 about 4 percent of remittance transfers occurred in Bitcoin
  - September 2021 surveys: at most 27 percent of the population willing to use Bitcoin along the U.S. dollar; 3.7 percent willing to use solely Bitcoin
- Staff and Directors’ concerns:
  - Bitcoin legal tender status entails large risks for financial and market integrity, financial stability, and consumer protection, and can create contingent liabilities
  - Public backstop for free convertibility creates contingent liability
  - Significant Bitcoin uptake could risk the dollarization regime as a nominal anchor
- Staff recommendations (core and prompt measures):
  - Narrow Bitcoin law’s scope, at minimum by removing Bitcoin’s legal tender status and make Bitcoin use strictly voluntary
  - Develop strict regulatory oversight for Chivo:
    - legally require segregation and ring-fencing of users’ funds in U.S. dollars and Bitcoin
    - restrict Chivo to electronic payments only and prohibit other financial services (e.g., lending, paying interest)
    - apply Court of Accounts audit treatment to Chivo as for FIDEBITCOIN
  - Contain budgetary costs:
    - make Chivo self-funded (charge fees)
    - end US$30 subsidy to each new Chivo user and liquidate FIDEBITCOIN—return unused funds to the Treasury
  - Safeguard financial stability and adapt banking regulation:
    - set legal limits on transactions and holdings in e-wallets
    - ban deposits denominated in Bitcoin; require capital and liquidity backing for Bitcoin exposures
    - consider high risk weights for Bitcoin exposure per Basel Committee proposals (1,250 percent risk weight referenced)
  - Strengthen AML/CFT coverage of all virtual asset providers and include VASPs in legal frameworks

### Structural reforms, governance, and social priorities
- Growth and inclusion priorities:
  - Reduce crime and corruption; Plan de Control Territorial aims to regain control over 17 high-crime municipalities
  - Cut red tape and modernize regulatory processes (one-window services)
  - Reduce electricity costs and diversify energy mix: public solar plants, first wind farm and Energía del Pacífico expected in 2022; US$1 billion LNG plant with 378 megawatt capacity noted
  - Increase infrastructure and social spending (education and health); one-laptop policy reached 70 percent of public students in grades 4–9 by end-2021
  - Foster economic diversification: manufacturing, tourism (Surf City), communications
- Governance and transparency measures:
  - Strengthen fiscal transparency, procurement transparency and beneficial ownership disclosure
  - Strengthen anti-corruption law alignment with UNCAC and AML/CFT frameworks
  - Publish fiscal risks analysis and prepare public sector balance sheet; limit extrabudgetary trusts; centralize project selection and PPP appraisal

### Risks to the outlook and stress-test outcomes
- Principal risks:
  - International: uncertainty about the pandemic, global economic and financial conditions, U.S. monetary policy normalization, de-anchoring of inflation expectations
  - Domestic: delays in fiscal consolidation, governance deterioration, gaps in oversight of Bitcoin and crypto-services
  - Market signals: external sovereign bond spread (basis points): 760 in 2020; 837 in 2021; EMBI spreads reached 1,400 basis points by early-December 2021; ten-year bond yields over 15 percent in late-2021
- Stress-test highlights:
  - Gross financing needs projected to peak at 20 percent of GDP in 2025 under baseline
  - Effective interest rate projections (percent): 2021 5.9; 2022 6.2; 2023 7.1; 2024 6.9; 2025 7.8; 2026 7.6
  - Contingent Liability Shock example: primary balance 2022 -8.7; effective interest rate 2022 6.7; debt ratios materially worsen
  - Under adverse shocks, debt-to-GDP ratios exceed 96 percent and gross financing needs breach 15 percent of GDP benchmark

### Social and macro vulnerability indicators
- Population (million, 2020): 6.3
- Per capita income (U.S. dollars, 2020): 3,799
- Percent of population below poverty line (2020): 26
- Gini index (2019): 35
- Transfers (net, percent of GDP): 24.2 in 2020; 26.1 in 2021; 26.5 in 2022
- Foreign direct investment (percent of GDP): -0.8 in 2020; -2.8 in 2021; -1.9 in 2022
- Net Foreign Assets of the Financial System (millions U.S. dollars): 3,046 in 2020; 3,303 in 2021; 3,836 in 2022
- Gross domestic investment (percent of GDP): 17.9 in 2020; 18.5 in 2021; 17.7 in 2022
- National savings (percent of GDP): 18.4 in 2020; 14.5 in 2021; 15.2 in 2022

### Key policy recommendations and priorities (condensed)
- Fiscal:
  - Implement fiscal consolidation of about 4 percent of GDP over 2022–24 starting in 2022 using high-quality revenue and spending measures
  - Improve medium-term fiscal framework, resume FRL, implement MTEF, program budgeting and SAFI 2
  - Strengthen fiscal risk management and transparency; publish fiscal risks analysis
- Financial sector:
  - Continue unwinding debtor-relief measures with intensified supervision and provisioning
  - Adopt banking crisis resolution and deposit insurance law; strengthen ELA framework
  - Transition to Basel III liquidity standards (LCR, NSFR) by end-2023 and adopt IFRS across the banking system
- Bitcoin and payments ecosystem:
  - Narrow Bitcoin law (remove legal tender status), strengthen regulation and supervision of Chivo, FIDEBITCOIN and VASPs
  - End universal subsidies (US$30), make Chivo self-funded, liquidate unused trust funds, require ring-fencing of user funds
  - Limit government exposure to Bitcoin and avoid using bond proceeds to buy Bitcoin
- Governance and AML/CFT:
  - Strengthen procurement transparency, beneficial ownership disclosure, align illicit enrichment law with UNCAC, approve and implement revised AML legislation incorporating FATF recommendations
- Structural:
  - Reduce crime and extortion, prioritize infrastructure projects with robust appraisal, lower electricity costs, promote economic diversification, and increase targeted human capital investments

*Italic: Source — IMF staff report content unit 1slvea2022001 (El Salvador) as provided in the supplied content.*

### 7.9 percent in 2020 and is projected to grow by about 10 percent in 2021 and 3.2 percent in

### 1slvea2022001 - 7.9 percent in 2020 and is projected to grow by about 10 percent in 2021 and 3.2 percent in

### Economic outlook and projections
- Real GDP growth: -7.9 percent in 2020; 10.0 percent in 2021; 3.2 percent in 2022.
- Consumer price inflation (average): -0.4 percent in 2020; 3.5 percent in 2021; 2.8 percent in 2022.
- Terms of trade, percent change: 6.0 in 2020; -5.4 in 2021; 3.4 in 2022.
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): 0.5 in 2020; -3.9 in 2021; -2.5 in 2022.
- Gross international reserves (mill. U.S. dollars): 3,083 in 2020; 3,510 in 2021; 3,980 in 2022.
- Nominal GDP (billions of U.S. dollars): 24.6 in 2020; 27.9 in 2021; 29.4 in 2022.

### Fiscal position and public debt vulnerabilities
- Overall balance (percent of GDP): -8.2 in 2020; -5.8 in 2021; -4.9 in 2022.
- Primary balance (percent of GDP): -3.8 in 2020; -1.1 in 2021; 0.0 in 2022.
- Tax revenue (percent of GDP): 18.5 in 2020; 20.4 in 2021; 20.9 in 2022.
- Public sector debt: 89.2 percent of GDP in 2020; 84.4 percent of GDP in 2021; 84.8 percent of GDP in 2022.
- Staff projection: Under current policies, public debt is expected to rise to about 96 percent of GDP in 2026 on an unsustainable path.
- Financing needs and drivers:
  - Persistent fiscal deficits and high debt service are leading to large and increasing financing needs.
  - Fiscal deficit projected at 5¾ percent of GDP in 2021 and about 5 percent of GDP in 2022.
- Policy recommendation:
  - Implement a fiscal consolidation starting this year based on high-quality revenue and spending measures to restore fiscal sustainability and put public debt on a firm downward trajectory.
  - Steps to modernize public financial management and assess fiscal risks are welcomed.

### Financial sector, stability, and inclusion
- Credit to the private sector: 62.1 percent of GDP in 2020; 57.6 in 2021; 56.3 in 2022.
- Broad money: 70.2 percent of GDP in 2020; 65.7 in 2021; 65.1 in 2022.
- Interest rate (time deposits): 4.1 percent in 2020; 3.9 percent in 2021.
- Directors' observations and recommendations:
  - Monitor banks’ recovery strategies as exceptional pandemic measures are unwound.
  - Introduce a banking crisis resolution framework and transition toward forward-looking, risk-based financial supervision.
  - Boost financial inclusion; digital means of payment such as the Chivo e-wallet could play a role, but require strict regulation and oversight.

### Bitcoin adoption, risks, and policy guidance
- Policy change: Since September 2021, the government has adopted Bitcoin as legal tender.
- IMF staff and Directors on Bitcoin:
  - Adoption of cryptocurrency as legal tender entails large risks for financial and market integrity, financial stability, and consumer protection, and can create contingent liabilities.
  - Directors urged authorities to narrow the scope of the Bitcoin law by removing Bitcoin’s legal tender status.
  - Strict regulation and supervisory oversight of Chivo and Bitcoin are emphasized to mitigate fiscal, financial integrity, and financial stability risks.
  - Some Directors expressed concern over risks associated with issuing Bitcoin-backed bonds.
- Staff advice summary:
  - Bitcoin should not be used as an official currency with legal tender status.
  - Narrowing the scope of the Bitcoin law and strict regulation will contain macroeconomic risks; remaining risks require supervisory mitigation.

### Structural reforms and governance
- Growth and inclusiveness:
  - Priorities: reduce crime, cut red tape, reduce electricity costs, increase infrastructure and social spending (including education and health), and foster economic diversification.
  - Better targeting social spending and prioritizing infrastructure projects to create fiscal space without increasing risks.
- Governance and transparency:
  - Directors welcomed publication of reports on the use of public funds for COVID-19 and Court of Accounts audits.
  - Recommendations: strengthen fiscal transparency and accountability, strengthen anti-corruption and AML/CFT frameworks in line with international standards, and upgrade the statistical framework.
- Other recommendations:
  - Advance reforms to boost inclusive growth and implement structural fiscal reforms to constrain medium-term growth constraints created by high and rising financing needs.

### Risks to the outlook
- International and domestic risks:
  - Sizeable risks stem from uncertainty regarding the course of the pandemic and global economic and financial conditions.
  - Domestic risks include delays in addressing fiscal policy, governance, and reforms to support inclusive growth, and gaps in oversight of Bitcoin that could undermine fiscal sustainability and financial stability.
- Market signals:
  - External sovereign bond spread (basis points): 760 in 2020; 837 in 2021.

### Key social and macro indicators
- Per capita income (U.S. dollars, 2020): 3,799.
- Population (million, 2020): 6.3.
- Percent of pop. below poverty line (2020): 26.
- Gini index (2019): 35.
- Transfers (net, percent of GDP): 24.2 in 2020; 26.1 in 2021; 26.5 in 2022.
- Foreign direct investment (percent of GDP): -0.8 in 2020; -2.8 in 2021; -1.9 in 2022.
- Net Foreign Assets of the Financial System (millions U.S. dollars): 3,046 in 2020; 3,303 in 2021; 3,836 in 2022.
- Gross domestic investment (percent of GDP): 17.9 in 2020; 18.5 in 2021; 17.7 in 2022.
- National savings (percent of GDP): 18.4 in 2020; 14.5 in 2021; 15.2 in 2022.

*EL SALVADOR STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2021 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION*

### 3.      President Bukele was elected in 2019 on an inclusive growth  and anti-co  rruption

### 3.      President Bukele was elected in 2019 on an inclusive growth  and anti-co  rruption agenda, marking a break from the two-party  system that  has dominated El Salvador politics since the end of the civil war in 1992.

### Political context and sovereign risk developments
- President Bukele elected in 2019 on an inclusive growth and anti-corruption agenda; in his first two years of a five-year mandate he enjoyed approval ratings "over 85 percent, CID Gallup".
- Governing with limited support in the Legislative Assembly (LA): "11 out of 84 seats".
- May 2021: Nuevas Ideas gained a supermajority in the LA with agenda focused on social issues and “building a free El Salvador”.
- LA actions: "Dismissal of CC judges (May 1)"; overhaul of the judicial system; enacted legislation to adopt Bitcoin as legal tender.
- Policy uncertainty and rising gross fiscal financing needs starting in 2022 contributed to a rise in sovereign spreads:
  - EMBI spreads reached "1,400 basis points, by early-December 2021".
  - Ten-year bond yields "over 15 percent".
  - Moody’s downgraded the sovereign rating from "B3 (highly speculative) to Caa1 (substantial risk) in end-July 2021, with a negative outlook".

### Pandemic response, fiscal measures, and debt impact
- Authorities’ pandemic response described as "timely and effective".
- Immediate fiscal deterioration at pandemic onset created a sizable financing gap.
- Delays in LA approval for IADB and CABEI funds and RFI disbursement in April 2020 necessitated expensive market financing, elevating public debt by "almost 20 percentage points of GDP in 2020".
- Two fiscal packages approved and partially implemented in 2020 amounting to "US$3 billion, about 12 percent of GDP".
  - Only "about 5 percent of GDP was implemented, with the rest rescheduled to finance the 2021 budget."
- Large spending packages worsened the overall fiscal position by "about 5 percent of GDP (to 8¼ percent of GDP)".
- Public debt (including pensions) increased by "18 percentage points of GDP to 89 percent of GDP".
- Temporary financial measures:
  - Central Bank (BCR) reduced banks’ reserve requirements "by about 12 percentage points of deposits (to about 9 percent)" in March 2020.
  - Excess reserves increased by "more than US$2 billion", split roughly equally between lower reserve requirements and an increase in household deposits ("5.9 percent year-over-year in October 2021").
  - Banks used liquidity to increase credit to government and private sector and to strengthen external position (about "US$1 billion each").

### Health outcomes and economic impact of COVID-19
- As of December 15, 2021:
  - Recorded cases: "1,860 per 100,000 people".
  - Fatalities: "58 per 100,000 people".
- Vaccinations started in February 2021; "69 percent of population full vaccinated by December 13, 2021".
- Economy fully reopened at end-September 2020, six months after initial lockdown.
- 2020 shocks: strict lockdown, two tropical storms; exports and remittances plunged then recovered.
- 2020 real GDP contracted; current account swung into a small surplus for the year.
- IMF staff estimate: absent fiscal support and resilient remittances, the economy "could have contracted twice as much" as the recorded "7.9 percent" contraction in 2020.
- Gross international reserves declined by "US$1.4 billion (4¼ percent of GDP), to US$3 billion at end-2020".
  - Reserves at end-2020 remained above "3 months of imports" but were inadequate per IMF metric.

### 2021 recovery, labor, and financial sector
- Real GDP performance in 2021:
  - "2021Q1: 3.2 percent q-o-q".
  - "2021Q2: -0.9 percent q-o-q".
  - Real GDP expected to reach pre-pandemic levels in "2021Q3".
  - Annual 2021 growth expected to reach "10 percent" (carryover effect from 2020: "7 percent").
- Inflation rising: "5½ percent by October" 2021.
- Cumulative first nine months of 2021: nominal exports and remittances "recorded growth rates above 30 percent compared to 2020"; imports rising widening trade deficit.
- SDR allocation: "about US$390 million (SDR 275.3 million)" used to bolster reserves.
- Fiscal outturn 2021:
  - 2021 budget targeted "7½ percent of GDP NFPS deficit".
  - NFPS deficit projected to reach "about 5¾ percent of GDP in 2021".
  - Strong tax collection: "30 percent nominal increase y-o-y".
  - Debt-to-GDP ratio expected to decline to "85 percent of GDP" in 2021 due to nominal GDP increases outpacing debt increases.
- Banking sector:
  - NPLs increased from "1.7 percent of gross loans in February 2020 to 2.3 percent in September 2021".
  - Banks increased provisions "up 23 percent from last year".
  - Private sector credit growth reached "4 percent by September" 2021.
- Reserve requirement normalization: aim to reach "15 percent of deposits by June 2022".
- Short-term debt (LETES and CETES) placed in local banks reached "about 12 percent of GDP (tripling in two years)".

### Outlook and risks
- Staff growth forecast: "about 3.2 percent in 2022" on buoyant exports, resilient remittances, sound pandemic management and large increase in public investment.
- Medium-term under current policies:
  - Real GDP growth expected to reach "about 2 percent over the medium term".
  - Public debt expected to rise "to about 96 percent of GDP (including pensions) by 2026" on an unsustainable path, assuming market access.
  - Gross international reserves expected to dip below "3 months of imports".
- Uncertainty around projections described as "unusually large due to the rapidly changing policy landscape".
- Downside risks include:
  - Health risk: resurgence due to vaccine-resistant variants and low vaccination rates in some countries.
  - Financial risk: higher borrowing costs from investor flight to safety, domestic policy uncertainty, domestic policy slippages, or faster-than-envisaged U.S. monetary policy normalization.
  - Limited external financing or closed market access could force faster-than-planned adjustment with negative growth impact.
  - Gaps in oversight of Bitcoin-based providers, Bitcoin trading and financial disintermediation pose "significant macro-financial stability risks".
- Upside potential: gains from financial inclusion and improved payment system from a public wallet—conditional on addressing oversight gaps and vulnerabilities—could increase growth.

### Authorities’ views
- Authorities slightly more optimistic on growth by "about ¼ percent per year" citing sustained investment dynamism.
- Authorities expect investment driven by projects in energy and construction and major public infrastructure efforts.
- Authorities view pandemic resurgence risk as limited due to vaccination campaign reaching "the global goal of vaccinating 70 percent of adult population, including booster shots and vaccines for children" and increased public health capacity.
- Authorities indicated decision to start fiscal consolidation and willingness to tighten regulation and oversight of Bitcoin service providers to limit risks.

### Sustaining the recovery and raising potential output (policy priorities)
- Higher investment is needed to raise potential output; staff estimates:
  - Growth rates of "2¼ percent" are attainable in the medium term by removing financing constraints.
  - Higher actual output growth of "2½ percent" possible if productivity, human capital, and formal employment increase.
- Preconditions for higher investment and growth:
  - Further progress in reducing crime and corruption to improve returns on investment.
    - Despite reduction in homicides, extortion and organized crime remain widespread and adversely impact firms and population.
    - Authorities’ Plan de Control Territorial aims to: (i) strengthen military and police to regain control over "17 high-crime municipalities and weaken financially gangs", (ii) provide youth alternatives to joining gangs, (iii) provide modern equipment and technology to army and police.
  - Ensuring fiscal prudence and lowering political risk to support business confidence and FDI.
  - Improving infrastructure through strategically prioritized, well-planned, responsibly financed projects to increase returns to capital and labor and catalyze private investment.
- Sector-specific measures to support growth:
  - Reducing electricity costs:
    - Electricity cost high relative to peers due to limited production and expensive imports; "20 percent of electricity is imported from Guatemala".
    - Public energy company launched several solar plants; first wind farm and Energía del Pacífico expected in "2022" to diversify energy matrix and lower tariffs.
    - A US$1 billion liquified natural gas power plant with production capacity of "378 megawatt" is noted to meet "30 percent of the country demand".
  - Facilitating economic diversification to reallocate labor into higher productivity sectors (manufacturing, tourism, communications); promotion of a coastal tourism zone—Surf City.
  - Promoting safe digital financial inclusion and a widely used e-wallet with adequate safeguards to increase financial access, safe savings, competition, and speed of government-to-person transfers.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpt (text provided).*

### 23.      The authorities agreed with staff’s assessment on drivers of growth  and highlighted

### 1slvea2022001 - 23.      The authorities agreed with staff’s assessment on drivers of growth  and highlighted

### Growth drivers and recent measures
- Authorities agreed with staff’s assessment on drivers of growth and emphasized continued efforts to support inclusive economic expansion.
- Multi-year programs identified as critical: Plan de Control Territorial, Agenda Digital, Plan de Despegue Ecónomico.
- Progress highlighted on:
  - Launching Energía del Pacífico and other renewable sources energy plants.
  - Lowering electricity costs and creating high productivity jobs.
  - Cutting red tape (reducing waiting time for exporters/importers).
  - Modernizing education (providing laptops to students).
  - Infrastructure projects to improve roads and potable water access to Surf City, organization of several global surf tournaments, and strong public health efforts expected to boost tourism and diversify the economy while maintaining external balances.

### Continuing to support the recovery while ensuring fiscal sustainability
- Social spending plans:
  - Continued support for the health sector due to the pandemic not being over.
  - Non-pandemic support increases include:
    - subsidies for a 20 percent increase in the minimum wage, and a large increase in the minimum pension guarantee;
    - expansion of liquified gas subsidies for households’ and companies;
    - incentives for the use of Chivo, the government e-wallet;
    - support for the agricultural sector.
- 2022 budget and financing:
  - Proposed 2022 total budget includes higher expenditures by 7¼ percent compared to the 2021 approved budget, driven mainly by an 18 percent increase in public investment.
  - Increase in the wage bill due to the plan of doubling the size of the army by 2025.
  - Budget forecasts the NFPS deficit at 4½ percent of GDP, including 1½ percent of GDP yields from tax administration measures.
  - Some revenue measures and a cut in transfers to local governments (FODES)—both totaling about 1 percent of GDP—are planned as compensation for potential shortfalls.
  - Staff expects the 2022 NFPS deficit would be about 5 percent of GDP—an improvement of about 1 percent of GDP in the primary balance compared to 2021, coming from lower Bitcoin budget support.
  - Authorities seeking additional multilateral support; signed a share subscription with CAF on December 7, 2021.
  - Announced plans to issue structured “Bitcoin bonds” for US$1 billion, and bonds collateralized with future stream of revenues for two public companies for US$1.6 billion (5½ percent of GDP).

### Debt sustainability and projected financing gap
- Without consolidation measures, unidentified financing gap is large: cumulative 2022-26 about US$8 billion or 28 percent of GDP.
- Recurrent Eurobond amortization: about 2½ percent of GDP per year biannually, starting in January 2023.
- If filled with market sources, public debt will rise to about 96 percent of GDP (including pensions) by end-2026.
- Under current policies, public debt is on an unsustainable path.
- Staff illustrative consolidation:
  - A consolidation package of about 4 percent of GDP over 2022-24 would help restore fiscal sustainability and would lead to a decline in the public debt ratio below 80 percent by end-2026.
  - Implementing consolidation measures in 2022 and 2023 would help lower spreads and relieve financing constraints.
- Cautionary note: Relying on leverage and increasing public debt to invest in Bitcoin is not a permanent solution.

### Menu of fiscal adjustment options (evenly distributed between revenue and spending)
- Revenue-side options (estimates in percent of GDP):
  - increase outdated excise taxes on goods that generate negative externalities: ½ percent of GDP;
  - align the VAT rate with LAC and regional averages: 1¼ percent of GDP;
  - introduce a surcharge on CIT for large companies: ¼ percent of GDP;
  - introduce taxes on capital gains: 0.1 percent of GDP;
  - introduce taxes on streaming services: 0.1 percent of GDP;
  - carbon tax based on CO2 emissions: 0.3 percent of GDP;
  - additional considerations: introducing a property tax and repealing VAT and income tax exemptions.
- Spending-side options (estimates in percent of GDP):
  - realigning the wage bill and removing redundancies (including eliminating indexation rules/escalafones): 1¼ percent of GDP;
  - better targeting subsidies—particularly on fossil fuels: ¼ percent of GDP;
  - savings from transfers to local governments (FODES): ½ percent of GDP;
  - centralizing purchases of goods and large investment projects: ¼ percent of GDP.

### Medium-term fiscal framework and public financial management (PFM) reforms
- Current status:
  - El Salvador does not yet have a medium-term expenditure framework, and the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) is suspended.
- Staff recommendations to instill fiscal discipline:
  - strengthen execution control and quality of spending, including centralizing national planning to avoid dispersion of planning instruments;
  - improve preparation and implementation of the Medium-Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF), and resume its publication;
  - develop a medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF);
  - implement program budgeting aiming at progressing towards results-based budgeting;
  - implement the new Financial Management Information System (SAFI 2); authorities have advanced in development of some SAFI 2 modules.
  - resume the FRL in line with best practices, while restricting the scope of its exception and providing a clear path to a return to fiscal prudence; consider a comprehensive reform of the FRL.

### Pension system and contingent liabilities
- Background and risks:
  - Despite the 1998 privatization of the pension system, large transfers from the budget were needed to sustain it.
  - 2017 reform temporarily reduced budget burden by transferring liabilities to the Cuenta de Garantía Solidaria (CGS) funded by a 5 percent increase in contributions paid by employers.
  - Risk that the CGS balance could turn into a deficit faster than assumed, requiring budget support early.
- Interim measures to alleviate budget pressure (subject to actuarial analysis):
  - increase in the retirement age for women and further indexation to life expectancy for men and women;
  - reduction in fees charged by private administrators (AFPs);
  - better connection between pensions and contributions.

### Mitigating fiscal risks and transparency measures
- MoF has established a Macroeconomic and Fiscal Impact Analysis Unit and produced a comprehensive fiscal risks analysis using IMF, WB and IADB tools; staff recommends publication of the analysis and strengthening the unit’s capacity.
- Specific fiscal risk areas and recommended actions:
  - Assets and liabilities: prepare a public sector balance sheet including stock of debt, pension liabilities, and non-financial assets; limit creation of trust funds and extrabudgetary funds; generate a centralized and public inventory of trusts including balances and obligations.
  - Investment and PPPs: unify investment portfolio to prioritize projects based on pre-feasibility studies; ensure PPPs do not underestimate fiscal risks.
  - Municipalities: DOM regulations should establish transparent criteria for project selection and prioritization; MoF has assumed US$629 million of municipal debt that will be paid from savings from the cut in FODES—this entails materialization of risk; adjustments to the Municipal Debt Law are needed.
  - State-owned enterprises (SOEs): transfers to and from SOEs and their quasi-fiscal activities and guarantees should be recorded by the MoF; SOEs—including Chivo—should have a clear ownership policy and publish financial statements based on international standards.
  - Climate/natural risks: IADB estimates the economic impact of climate change could reach 7.2 percent of GDP by 2030; staff recommends integrating planning instruments related to climate change under the same framework, undertaking a Climate Macroeconomic Assessment in 2023, and working with the World Bank, UN agencies and IADB to increase resilience; authorities working on Financial Management Strategy for Disaster Risk, parametric insurance, green bonds, and other measures.

### Authorities’ views
- Authorities agreed on need for fiscal consolidation and the size of the proposed envelope.
- Actions and preferences noted by authorities:
  - some measures already approved by Congress, such as reduction in transfers to local governments;
  - working on revenue measures; prefer measures to increase progressivity of direct taxes rather than increases in indirect taxes;
  - efforts on tax administration including electronic invoicing and transfer pricing;
  - importance of streamlining across-the-board subsidies, with the need to develop proper targeting tools;
  - political consensus needed for some measures.
- PFM reforms and pension reform:
  - plan to adopt program budgeting in 2023 with pilot budget programs for ministries of finance, health, and education linked to national planning instruments;
  - emphasized need for a pension reform given low pensions paid by AFPs distorting labor markets and large/increasing pension obligations constraining infrastructure and social assistance capacity.
- Fiscal risks management:
  - authorities highlighted progress in establishing an institutional framework to identify and quantify fiscal risks and agreed on publication of the risks report;
  - DOM will prepare regulations related to transparency and selection of projects;
  - working with World Bank, UNDP and IADB on contingent loans, parametric insurance, green bonds, and other instruments to manage natural disaster risks.

### Maintaining financial stability
- Debtor-relief measures are being phased out to preserve financial stability.
- Share of banks' loan portfolio affected by Covid-19 and benefiting from exceptional regulatory treatment declined to 10.8 percent of total loans at end-September 2021 (from a peak of 51.9 percent in June 2020).
- Banking system indicators:
  - overall solvency sound with average capital adequacy ratio at 15.8 percent.
- Supervisory approach:
  - BCR allowing financial institutions to provision losses in the Covid-19 loans portfolio within a flexible timeframe to cushion termination of debtor-relief measures and the expected increase in NPLs.
  - A plan for finalizing the unwinding phase with tailored supervisory and regulatory actions should be prepared by the Financial Superintendency and BCR; monitoring of asset quality on each bank must be intensified.
  - To preserve transparency of banks' financial situation, periods for provisioning should be as short as possible; if needed, flexibility could be granted to banks to implement medium-term plans to restore capital.
- Provisioning shortfall: supervisory authorities indicate provisioning shortfall of banks that requested gradual provisioning represents less than 10 percent of their equity.

*Sources: National authorities and IMF staff calculations.*

### 37.      A gradual reversal of the reduction in reserve requirements is supporting financial

### 1slvea2022001 - 37.      A gradual reversal of the reduction in reserve requirements is supporting financial

### Reserve requirements and liquidity framework
- A gradual reversal of the temporary relaxation of reserve requirements is supporting financial stability.
- The temporary relaxation halved banks’ liquidity buffers, exacerbating vulnerabilities to liquidity shocks in the presence of dollarization and highlighting the need to address limitations of the emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) framework.
- The new level of reserve requirements, approved in June 2021, is based on the authorities’ stress-tests of banks’ deposits and is described as:
  - broadly consistent with adequate coverage based on deposit withdrawal episodes in dollarized countries in the region (see Annex VIII), and
  - sufficient if complemented with other elements suggested for strengthening the liquidity framework.
- Recommendation: Authorities should regularly review if the new level of reserve requirements remains sufficient.

### Banking crisis resolution, ELA, and supervision
- Adoption of a banking crisis resolution framework is crucial to safeguard financial stability.
  - Introducing a new banking resolution and deposit insurance law to the Legislative Assembly by end-2021, in line with IMF TA recommendations, is important to strengthen the financial safety net and support the liquidity management framework.
  - IMF technical assistance is being provided to improve the ELA framework.
- Enhancing supervision and regulation over the medium-term is essential:
  - Transition to IFRS standards, and forward-looking and risk-based supervision will gradually fill regulatory gaps with international best practice.
  - New liquidity requirements would provide sufficient liquidity buffers in banks, alleviating limitations of ELA under dollarization.
- Current compliance and transition needs:
  - The two largest banks, holding 40 percent of the assets in the system, already comply with Basel III.
  - Four banks would require a two-year transition period to comply with the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) indicator.
- Staff recommendation: Move to Basel III standards for the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) by end-2023.
- Additional supervisory considerations:
  - Calibrate regulatory boundaries to ensure adequate oversight of the overall financial sector, including customized supervisory strategies for public banks and cooperatives.
  - Monitor exposure to government securities (9 percent of total assets) and carefully weigh financial stability implications of increasingly relying on short-term debt purchased by banks.

### Authorities’ views on banking-sector measures
- Authorities broadly agreed with staff’s views on gradual exiting of debtor-relief measures and provisioning rules for COVID-19 portfolio losses.
  - They consider gradual provisioning, tailored for each entity by the financial supervisor, will ensure an adequate withdrawal of forbearance measures without compromising financial stability.
  - The COVID-19 portfolio represents only 10¾ percent of total loans and the provisioning shortfall for this portfolio is limited (US$ 111.3 million).
  - Conclusion drawn by authorities: The rising NPL ratio will not compromise the solvency of an adequately capitalized banking sector.

### Strengthening governance, anti-corruption, AML, and central bank safeguards
- Economic governance and anti-corruption:
  - To improve resource management, lower borrowing costs, and build public support for consolidation, economic governance should be strengthened.
  - In November 2021, the MoF published reports on the use of COVID-19 public funds with information until June 2021 and the Court of Accounts continues publishing audit reports of COVID-19 spending (Annex IX).
  - Staff recommends aligning legislation to the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) by amending the Act of Illicit enrichment of Public officials (see Annex IX).
  - Staff commends amendment of the “Pfizer” law in October 2021 to ensure immunity for public health related issues is not granted to people that have abused public funds.
  - Fiscal transparency recommendations: (i) improve transparency of procurement processes—including beneficial ownership of awarded contracts, (ii) strengthen reporting and accountability of the Civil Protection Fund for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (FOPROMID), (iii) strengthen fiscal transparency including use of COVID-19 funds, and (iv) define parameters to audit Chivo and FIDEBITCOIN.
- Anti-money laundering (AML):
  - Approving and implementing the revised AML legislation is critical.
  - The Special Law for the Prevention, Control, and Penalization of Money Laundering needs to be submitted to congress by end-2021 and implemented promptly within six months of approval to ensure it incorporates 40 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations and receive a positive evaluation by GAFILAT.
  - Laws should capture all virtual asset providers in all provisions to lower risks.
- Central bank safeguards:
  - Following a Safeguards Assessment in 2020, the BCR has started drafting amendments to the central bank law to strengthen autonomy and governance and adopted a policy to select and appoint external auditors.
  - BCR is taking initial steps to phase out quasi fiscal activities and prepare adoption of IFRS expected in 2024.
  - Staff will engage to speed up adoption of IFRS and settlement of the large debt from Treasury, which is not progressing as expected.
- Authorities’ views:
  - Authorities broadly agreed with advice on economic governance, AML, and central bank safeguards.
  - Ministry of Finance is implementing compilation and registration of beneficial owners through COMPRASAL and reforming the FOPROMID manual.
  - Attorney General indicated domestic legislation could be modernized and due process is followed in pending investigations.
  - On AML, authorities indicated willingness to refine the draft law in line with staff advice.
  - On safeguards, authorities noted amendments to central bank law and reiterated that without settlement of Treasury debt it would be difficult for the central bank to migrate towards IFRS.

### Bitcoin as legal tender and Chivo e-wallet: implementation, costs, and risks
- Legal and operational implementation:
  - El Salvador adopted Bitcoin as an official currency with legal tender status alongside the U.S. dollar via the “Bitcoin law” on June 8, 2021.
  - The law establishes the U.S. dollar as the reference currency for accounting purposes and mandates acceptance of Bitcoin by economic agents.
  - The law guarantees automatic conversion from Bitcoin to U.S. dollars through a trust fund.
  - Authorities adopted all Bitcoin regulations within 90 days and introduced the e-wallet Chivo, fully implementing the law on September 7.
- Chivo operation and government support:
  - Chivo operates by default in U.S. dollars but can accept Bitcoins at the time of each transaction and holds balances in U.S. dollars and Bitcoin.
  - Government provided a one-time endowment equivalent to US$30 in Bitcoins to every Salvadoran Chivo user and assumes all transaction fees.
  - Chivo amassed 3.8 million clients, including 16,300 companies, although it is unclear how many are using Bitcoin in transactions or holding Bitcoin balances.
  - Note: It seems that the vast majority was inactive by November 1st.
- FIDEBITCOIN trust fund and convertibility guarantee:
  - A trust fund, FIDEBITCOIN, endowed with US$150 million, was established to guarantee conversion; funds used primarily to finance Chivo launch.
  - Chivo provides automatic and free convertibility services by trading with the portfolio as needed.
  - If users receive Bitcoins, they are automatically converted into U.S. dollars unless user changes default; users who hold Bitcoins bear capital losses/gains.
  - Chivo functions as intermediary between users and wholesale Bitcoin exchange providers and bears costs and risks of exchanging/settling transactions at no cost to user.
  - Chivo uses valuation gains from Bitcoin to finance costs and discretionary projects chosen by authorities.
- Near-term budgetary costs and expected gains:
  - Staff estimates short-term budgetary costs are 1 percent of GDP for 2021-2022.
  - Staff’s preliminary analysis shows expected near-term gains may measure up to ¼ percent of GDP per year from expected increase in tourism arrivals and higher consumption, assuming lower remittance fees reach recipients.
  - Specific cost items noted:
    - Trust Fund (US$150 million ½ percent of GDP), “bono Bitcoin” (0.4 percent of GDP); crypto friendly promotion (0.1 percent of GDP).
    - As of October 28, 2021, Chivo spent an estimated US$55 million (0.2 percent of GDP) for a total purchase of 1,120 Bitcoin, which at current market valuation is equivalent to US$69 million (¼ percent of GDP).
  - By October 2021 about 4 percent of remittance transfers occurred in Bitcoin.
  - Surveys in September 2021 indicated at most 27 percent of the population were willing to use Bitcoin along the U.S. dollar, of which only 3.7 percent were willing to use solely Bitcoin in transactions (IUOP/UCA survey).
- Risks and IMF staff view:
  - IMF (GFSR 2021) view: Bitcoin use carries significant risks and should not be used as an official currency with legal tender status.
  - Crypto-technologies and digital payment systems like Chivo can make payments more efficient, enhance financial inclusion, and support growth, but Bitcoin’s price volatility makes it inefficient as means of payments, unit of account, or store of value.
  - Adopting Bitcoin as legal tender introduces risks to financial stability, financial and market integrity, and consumer protection.
  - A public backstop for free convertibility from Bitcoin into U.S. dollars creates a contingent liability.
  - Significant increase in Bitcoin use could risk the dollarization regime as a nominal anchor.

### Staff recommendations to address Bitcoin/Chivo risks
- Core recommendation: Narrow Bitcoin law’s scope, at minimum by removing Bitcoin’s legal tender status and making explicit its strictly voluntary nature for all types of transactions.
- Prompt corrective measures in three areas:
  1. Develop strict regulatory oversight for Chivo:
     - Implement stricter regulation and intrusive supervision to safeguard users’ data and funds and avoid indirect de-dollarization.
     - Legal requirements to back users’ holdings: Chivo should be legally required to (i) fully safeguard users’ funds in U.S. dollars and Bitcoin by segregating and ring-fencing from Chivo’s own funds liquid and diversified reserve assets (e.g., bank or central bank deposits for U.S. dollars; cold wallets or third-party custodians for Bitcoins), and (ii) provide only electronic payments and no other financial services such as lending or paying interest.
  2. Contain budgetary costs:
     - Make Chivo a self-funded company (charging fees for services provided).
     - End US$30 subsidy to every new Chivo user and liquidate FIDEBITCOIN—returning unused funds to the Treasury.
  3. Safeguard financial stability and adapt banking regulatory frameworks:
     - Set legal limits on transactions and holdings in e-wallets.
     - Adapt banking regulation to strengthen Bitcoin risk oversight and incorporate prudential safeguards, such as organizational segregation of Bitcoin services, banning deposits denominated in Bitcoin, and specific capital and liquidity requirements to fully back Bitcoin exposures.
     - Consider Basel Committee proposals where Bitcoins would be placed in the highest risk category, subject to a 1,250 percent risk weight (consultation referenced).
- Additional regulatory and enforcement actions recommended:
  - Strengthen legal requirements for all Bitcoin services providers—including Chivo—covering licensing, governance, capital requirements, AML/CFT, data protection, safeguards of funds, interoperability, transaction caps, and consistent interpretation of AML/CFT standards.
  - Better define regulatory perimeter and enforcement regime, including legal treatment for non-resident and cross-border transactions, sanctioning, inspection and enforcement regimes, and enhancing supervisory capacity.
  - Minimize tax compliance risks by preventing use of Bitcoin to hide taxable income and enforcing proper accounting and reporting rules.
  - Mitigate consumer protection and operational risks by adopting stronger consumer protection frameworks, informing consumers of Bitcoin risks, and requiring Bitcoin service providers to adopt comprehensive risk management frameworks covering operational resilience, reserve management and cybersecurity safeguards.
  - Manage and report fiscal risks from the crypto ecosystem in the fiscal risks statement.

### Key numeric facts and timelines (preserved exactly as in source)
- Two largest banks hold 40 percent of the assets in the system.
- Move to Basel III standards for LCR and NSFR by end-2023.
- COVID-19 portfolio represents only 10¾ percent of total loans.
- Provisioning shortfall for the COVID-19 portfolio: US$ 111.3 million.
- MoF published reports on COVID-19 public funds with information until June 2021 (latest report November 2021).
- BCR expected adoption of IFRS in 2024.
- Bitcoin law adopted on June 8, 2021; Chivo fully implemented on September 7, 2021.
- Chivo clients: 3.8 million, including 16,300 companies.
- FIDEBITCOIN trust fund endowed with US$150 million.
- Chivo expenditures as of October 28, 2021: estimated US$55 million (0.2 percent of GDP) for purchase of 1,120 Bitcoin, equivalent to US$69 million (¼ percent of GDP) at current market valuation.
- Short-term budgetary costs of Chivo and Bitcoin law implementation: 1 percent of GDP for 2021-2022.
- Expected near-term gains: up to ¼ percent of GDP per year.
- Trust Fund (US$150 million ½ percent of GDP), “bono Bitcoin” (0.4 percent of GDP); crypto friendly promotion (0.1 percent of GDP).
- By October 2021 about 4 percent of remittance transfers occurred in Bitcoin.
- September 2021 surveys: at most 27 percent of the population willing to use Bitcoin along the U.S. dollar; 3.7 percent willing to use solely Bitcoin.

*Source: IMF country report content unit 1slvea2022001 - 37.*

### 52.      The government’s use of funds and exposure to Bitcoin should be further monitored,

### 1slvea2022001 - 52.      The government’s use of funds and exposure to Bitcoin should be further monitored,

### Findings on government use of funds and exposure to Bitcoin
- The government’s use of funds and exposure to Bitcoin via FIDEBITCOIN and Chivo require further monitoring, reduction, and stronger accountability.
- FIDEBITCOIN and Chivo, as users of public funds, should transparently report operations, governance arrangements, costs, and all necessary data to properly track transactions in the fiscal accounts.
- Currently, FIDEBITCOIN can be audited by the Court of Accounts; staff recommends the same treatment be applied to Chivo.
- Announced plans to use proceeds of new sovereign bond issuances to invest in Bitcoin, and broader trading in Bitcoin through Chivo or FIDEBITCOIN, significantly expose the government to Bitcoin’s price volatility and risks.
- Staff recommends a very careful analysis of implications for, and potential risks to, financial stability and fiscal sustainability coming from these activities.

### Authorities’ views
- Authorities emphasize Bitcoin’s benefits to the economy: promoting financial inclusion, payments digitalization, and rebranding El Salvador to scale up gains from tourism and private investment.
- Chivo’s role in financial inclusion:
  - Allowed more than 3¾ million people to have access to the financial system in two months (60 percent of population).
  - Previously, only 23 percent of the population was banked after decades of unsuccessful initiatives.
- Authorities expect a broad reduction in remittance fees due to rapid uptake of Chivo, with optional use of Bitcoin in the Lightning Network offering additional cost-reduction opportunities.
- Authorities note synergies between promoting tourism and promoting Bitcoin, and highlight interest from Bitcoin mining investors in renewable energy opportunities in El Salvador.
- Authorities observed limited risks from using Bitcoin as legal tender and do not see an immediate need to narrow the scope of the Bitcoin law given limited observed risks.
- Authorities view the ecosystem as safe with respect to KYC and AML requirements, citing average small size of operations, limits on transactions, and monitoring of Bitcoin use.
- The authorities agreed regulation and oversight of Chivo and Bitcoin services can be strengthened and committed to continued monitoring and re-evaluating the Bitcoin law if needed.

### Statistical and reporting recommendations
- Upgrade the statistical framework: migrate from GFSM-1986 to GFSM-2014 with IMF Statistics Department and CAPTAC-DR support.
- Rationale: GFSM-1986 imposes severe limitations in recording complex operations and valuing financial assets and liabilities.
- Sectorization: create an NFPS sectorization comprising all extra-budgetary entities and special purpose vehicles, including Chivo.
- Revisit coverage and adequacy of public debt statistics as part of the comprehensive effort.
- Collect, classify, and separately report Bitcoin-related transactions to understand economic impacts, closely monitor risks, and enable future reclassification as international statistical rules and accounting standards evolve.
- Implement IFRS standards for the entire banking system.

### Staff appraisal — macroeconomic context and risks
- Pandemic response:
  - El Salvador’s public health measures and vaccination campaign helped save lives and cushion the 2020 economic contraction.
  - The economy is projected to grow by about 10 percent in 2021 and 3.2 percent in 2022, with most indicators at or exceeding pre-pandemic levels in Q3 2021.
  - The RFI disbursement: (US$389 million) approved in April 2020 supported fiscal packages.
- Fiscal vulnerabilities:
  - Public debt (including pensions) is projected to have increased by 14 percentage points of GDP, to about 85 percent of GDP by the end-2021.
  - An increasingly high share of debt is short-term domestic debt (tripled since 2019, to 12 percent of total debt).
  - Rising gross fiscal financing needs and policy uncertainty pushed up sovereign spreads and borrowing costs.
- Medium-term outlook:
  - Real GDP growth is expected to converge to 2 percent by 2026.
  - Absent strong policy measures, public debt will grow beyond 96 percent of GDP (including pensions) by 2026.
  - Gross fiscal financing needs expected to be elevated as regular biannual Eurobond repayments start in January 2023.
  - Uncertainty about medium-term projections is unusually high.
- Growth potential:
  - Higher medium-term growth—around the historical average real GDP growth of 2¼ percent—is possible by removing financing constraints and sustaining investment.
  - Increasing productivity, private investment, and improving human capital could allow for growth of about 2½ percent.
- Financial sector:
  - Banking system appears resilient, liquid, and solvent.
  - Staff supports unwinding exceptional financial sector interventions, completing projected increases in reserve requirements, improving Emergency Liquidity Assistance framework, and transitioning to forward-looking, risk-based supervision.
  - Development of a banking crisis resolution framework should continue.

### Policy recommendations and priorities
- Bitcoin and payments ecosystem:
  - Given Bitcoin’s high price volatility, staff’s view is that Bitcoin should not be used as a legal tender.
  - Staff recommends narrowing the scope of the Bitcoin law.
  - Strengthen regulation and supervision of the new payment ecosystem (Chivo, FIDEBITCOIN, and related services).
  - Require transparent disclosure of fees, including exchange rates applied when converting U.S. dollars and Bitcoins, marketing practices, customer services, and complaint mechanisms.
  - Consider banning cross-selling of other services such as loans.
  - Apply Court of Accounts audit treatment to Chivo as for FIDEBITCOIN.
  - Conduct careful analysis of implications for financial stability and fiscal sustainability from government Bitcoin activities.
- Fiscal consolidation and public finance:
  - Implement a fiscal consolidation package based on high quality measures amounting to about 4 percent of GDP over the next three years—starting in 2022—to restore fiscal sustainability and place public debt on a downward path.
  - Incorporate additional consolidation measures in the 2022 budget; measures should be fast-yielding and permanent.
  - Implement measures supporting pension scheme sustainability and modernize public financial management.
  - Strengthen capacity to design strategies to address fiscal risks.
  - Improve targeting of social spending, prioritize infrastructure projects, and strengthen economic governance to create fiscal space without increasing risks.
- Governance, transparency, and AML:
  - Further strengthen fiscal transparency and accountability in line with international standards by improving transparency of public procurement processes, limiting use of extra-budgetary funds, and aligning domestic legislation to the UNCAC.
  - Continue strengthening the effectiveness of the AML framework and support the central bank’s efforts to comply with the 2020 safeguards assessment.
- Statistics and reporting (actions reiterated):
  - Migrate to GFSM-2014, implement IFRS across the banking system, sectorize NFPS including Chivo, and appropriately report Bitcoin-related transactions.

### Key numeric figures (as stated)
- More than 3¾ million people gained access to the financial system via Chivo in two months (60 percent of population).
- Previously banked population: 23 percent.
- Chivo transfer limits (while not legally required): 3,000 U.S. dollars per day and 24,000 U.S. dollars per month.
- RFI disbursement: (US$389 million) approved in April 2020.
- Economy projected growth: about 10 percent in 2021 and 3.2 percent in 2022.
- Public debt increase: 14 percentage points of GDP, to about 85 percent of GDP by the end-2021.
- Short-term domestic debt: tripled since 2019, to 12 percent of total debt.
- Real GDP expected to converge to 2 percent by 2026.
- Public debt projected to grow beyond 96 percent of GDP (including pensions) by 2026.
- Fiscal consolidation package recommended: about 4 percent of GDP over the next three years—starting in 2022.
- Historical average real GDP growth: 2¼ percent.
- Potential higher medium-term growth with reforms: about 2½ percent.
- Regular biannual Eurobond repayments start in January 2023.

*Source: IMF staff report (El Salvador) excerpt provided in the content unit.*

### 65.      It is proposed that the next Article IV consultation with El Salvador takes place on a

### 1slvea2022001 - 65.      It is proposed that the next Article IV consultation with El Salvador takes place on a

### Article IV consultation timing
- It is proposed that the next Article IV consultation with El Salvador takes place on a 12-month cycle in accordance with the Decision on Article IV Consultation Cycles.

### Long-term growth, poverty, and social context
- Pre-pandemic the country experienced solid economic growth.
- Inequality described as low (Gini coefficients: table/figure references; Gini for GTM and NIC are as of 2014).
- Poverty:
  - El Salvador poverty line covers percent of population lacking household income required to access a basket of goods and services needed to achieve adequate living conditions.
  - Poverty numbers: as of 2014 for GTM and 2016 for PAN, NIC and DOM (figure notes).
  - National Poverty Rate (Percent of Households) shown in series 2010–2020.
  - Poverty expected to rise because of the pandemic.
- Crime and migration:
  - Pre-pandemic crime declined but remained high; contributed over time to outward migration.
  - Homicides per 100,000 people (2018) plotted against GDP per capita, current PPP dollars (2018).
  - Total Migrant Population in the United States: charted as percent of origin-country population.

### Balance of Payments developments (selected points and exact figures)
- 2021 current account balance expected to turn to a deficit amid rising oil imports due to higher prices and a widening non-oil goods trade deficit.
- Remittances continued to surge in 2021.
- Capital inflows increased on the back of stronger foreign direct investment.
- Reserves remained broadly stable.
- Table 3a (millions of U.S. dollars) — Current Account and components:
  - Current Account: 2015 -754; 2016 -550; 2017 -465; 2018 -859; 2019 -165; 2020 121; 2021 -1,098; 2022 -727; 2023 -812; 2024 -1,039; 2025 -1,316; 2026 -1,454.
  - Merchandise trade balance: 2015 -4,970; 2016 -4,654; 2017 -4,845; 2018 -5,640; 2019 -5,711; 2020 -5,204; 2021 -8,000; 2022 -8,355; 2023 -8,855; 2024 -9,394; 2025 -9,957; 2026 -10,464.
  - Remittances (workers' remittances credits): 2015 4,257; 2016 4,544; 2017 4,978; 2018 5,373; 2019 5,631; 2020 5,911; 2021 7,273; 2022 7,811; 2023 8,155; 2024 8,468; 2025 8,770; 2026 9,061.
  - Gross international reserves (millions of U.S. dollars): 2015 2,693; 2016 2,787; 2017 3,238; 2018 3,567; 2019 3,569; 2020 4,446; 2021 3,083; 2022 3,510; 2023 3,980 (Table 3a notes: 2021 data preliminary and corresponds to first half of the year only).
- Table 3b (percent of GDP) — Current Account: 2015 -3.2; 2016 -2.3; 2017 -1.9; 2018 -3.3; 2019 -0.6; 2020 0.5; 2021 -3.9; 2022 -2.5; 2023 -2.7; 2024 -3.3; 2025 -4.0; 2026 -4.3.

### Fiscal developments (selected points and exact figures)
- COVID-19 response caused a large hike in spending, mainly to strengthen the social safety net using unconditional transfers.
- Taxes were remarkably resilient, but large spending needs caused significant deterioration in the fiscal balance.
- Interest bill continues to rise amidst an unprecedented increase in public debt.
- Table 1 (selected indicators, percent of GDP unless noted):
  - Overall balance (Nonfinancial Public Sector): 2014 -4.0; 2015 -3.6; 2016 -3.1; 2017 -2.5; 2018 -2.7; 2019 -3.1; 2020 -8.2; 2021 -5.8; 2022 -4.9 (Table 1).
  - Primary balance: 2014 -1.3; 2015 -0.9; 2016 -0.2; 2017 0.7; 2018 0.9; 2019 0.6; 2020 -3.8; 2021 -1.1; 2022 0.0.
  - Public sector gross debt 2/: 2014 65.3; 2015 67.0; 2016 68.8; 2017 70.5; 2018 70.4; 2019 71.3; 2020 89.2; 2021 84.4; 2022 84.8.
- Table 5a (Nonfinancial Public Sector, percent of GDP, selected lines):
  - Revenue: 2016 24.4; 2017 25.2; 2018 24.6; 2019 24.1; 2020 24.5; 2021 26.7; 2022 27.1; 2023 27.5; 2024 27.5; 2025 27.5; 2026 27.5.
  - Taxes: 2016 17.2; 2017 17.6; 2018 18.0; 2019 17.7; 2020 18.5; 2021 20.4; 2022 20.9; 2023 21.3; 2024 21.3; 2025 21.3; 2026 21.3.
  - Expenditure: 2016 27.5; 2017 27.8; 2018 27.3; 2019 27.2; 2020 32.7; 2021 32.4; 2022 32.1; 2023 32.6; 2024 32.7; 2025 33.7; 2026 33.7.
  - Interest (percent of GDP): 2016 2.9; 2017 3.2; 2018 3.6; 2019 3.7; 2020 4.4; 2021 4.6; 2022 4.9; 2023 5.8; 2024 5.7; 2025 6.6; 2026 6.6.
  - Net lending/borrowing: 2016 -3.1; 2017 -2.5; 2018 -2.7; 2019 -3.1; 2020 -8.2; 2021 -5.8; 2022 -4.9; 2023 -5.1; 2024 -5.2; 2025 -6.2; 2026 -6.2.
- Table 6 (Public Sector Financing Requirements and Sources, projections, selected):
  - Gross Financing Requirements (millions USD): 2017 2,517; 2018 2,018; 2019 3,059; 2020 3,847; 2021 4,086; 2022 4,598; 2023 5,737; 2024 5,297; 2025 6,620; 2026 5,383.
  - Overall deficit (millions USD): 2017 632; 2018 704; 2019 825; 2020 2,018; 2021 1,610; 2022 1,447; 2023 1,569; 2024 1,643; 2025 2,024; 2026 2,071.

### Financial sector developments (selected points and exact figures)
- Banks' capital buffers remain high amid a rise in nonperforming loans caused by the unwinding of debtor-relief measures.
- Increased provisioning strained banks' profitability despite widening interest margin.
- Deposit growth begins to slow and credit to the private sector begins to recover while credit to the central government increased.
- Table 4/Table 7 (selected indicators):
  - Bank capital (percent of risk-weighted assets): around 10–20 series by year; El Salvador statutory level referenced in figure.
  - Nonperforming loans (percent of total loans): El Salvador 2011–2021Q2 series; latest values show increases (figure noted).
  - Credit to the private sector (percent of banks' assets): series shown; Table 7 shows Credit to the private sector (end stocks, millions USD): 2015 11,193; 2016 11,790; 2017 12,438; 2018 13,280; 2019 14,063; 2020 14,370; 2021 14,968; projections to 2026 up to 17,355.
  - Deposits to private sector (millions USD): Table 7 deposits: 2015 10,599; 2016 10,975; 2017 12,145; 2018 12,831; 2019 14,286; 2020 15,704; 2021 16,739; projected to 2026 20,310.

### Medium-term outlook and macro projections (selected exact figures)
- Table 2 (selected lines, percent changes and percent of GDP):
  - Real GDP growth: 2019 2.6; 2020 -7.9; 2021 10.0; 2022 3.2; 2023 2.3; 2024 2.2; 2025 2.0; 2026 2.0.
  - Inflation (average): 2019 0.1; 2020 -0.4; 2021 3.5; 2022 2.8; 2023 1.6; 2024 1.6; 2025 1.5; 2026 1.4.
  - Overall fiscal balance (percent of GDP): 2019 -3.1; 2020 -8.2; 2021 -5.8; 2022 -4.9; 2023 -5.1; 2024 -5.2; 2025 -6.2; 2026 -6.2.
  - Public sector gross debt (percent of GDP): 2019 71.3; 2020 89.2; 2021 84.4; 2022 84.8; 2023 86.9; 2024 89.2; 2025 92.7; 2026 96.3.
  - Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2019 -0.6; 2020 0.5; 2021 -3.9; 2022 -2.5; 2023 -2.7; 2024 -3.3; 2025 -4.0; 2026 -4.3.

### Key indicators and vulnerability metrics (selected exact figures)
- Table 1 (selected social and economic indicators):
  - Population (million, 2020): 6.3.
  - Per capita income (U.S. dollars, 2020): 3,799.
  - Life expectancy at birth in years (2019): 73.
  - Percent of pop. below poverty line (2020): 26.
  - Gini index (2019): 35.
- Table 9 (Selected Vulnerability Indicators, percent of GDP or specified):
  - Overall balance of the nonfinancial public sector: 2019 -2.7; 2020 -8.2; 2021 -5.8.
  - Primary balance of the nonfinancial public sector: 2019 0.9; 2020 -3.8; 2021 -1.1.
  - Gross public sector financing requirement: 2019 9.2; 2020 10.1; 2021 7.8.
  - Public sector debt (gross): 2019 70.5; 2020 89.2; 2021 84.4.
  - Gross international reserves (millions USD): 2018 3,567; 2019 3,569; 2020 4,446; 2021 3,083.

### Risk Assessment Matrix — risks, likelihood, impact, and policy responses (verbatim items)
- Global Risks:
  - Subpar and volatile growth in countries prone to Covid-19 outbreaks.
    - Likelihood: Low; Impact: Medium.
    - Policy response: Continue providing vaccination, testing and containment measures.
  - Disorderly transformations (global value chains adjustments).
    - Likelihood: Medium; Impact: High.
    - Policy response: Adopt bankruptcy resolution frameworks. Facilitate trade in the region and with the new markets. Ensure remaining membership in CAFTA.
  - De-anchoring of inflation expectations in the U.S. leads to rising core yields and risk premia.
    - Likelihood: High; Impact: High.
    - Policy response: Implement fiscal consolidation to reduce fiscal financing needs, improve debt dynamics and fiscal buffers. Improve financial sector liquidity buffers.
- Domestic Risks:
  - Deterioration in the quality of political institutions.
    - Likelihood: High; Impact: High.
    - Policy response: Focus efforts and prioritize measures that will deliver growth, sustainability of public finances and financial stability. Increase transparency and accountability; allow broader participation from society; predictable policies to build credibility to consolidation plans.
  - Domestic policy slippages (weakened socio-political consensus around fiscal adjustment).
    - Likelihood: High; Impact: High.
    - Policy response: Forge consensus in the Legislative Assembly and with the private sector. Accelerate implementation of transparency and governance agenda.
  - Weakening social support for bold reforms.
    - Likelihood: Medium; Impact: Medium/High.
    - Policy response: Ensure a broad-based policy dialogue to support macroeconomic stability. Stronger checks and balances and maintain role of free press.
  - Natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, droughts, hurricanes).
    - Likelihood: Medium; Impact: Medium/High.
    - Policy response: Ensure fiscal buffers (including official loans) are adequate; prepare and assess enrollment in insurance schemes against natural disasters.
  - Bitcoin-related risks (gaps in oversight, extreme price volatility).
    - Likelihood: Medium; Impact: Medium/High.
    - Policy response: Strengthen banks’ Bitcoin risk oversight and incorporate prudential safeguards. Limit government’s exposure to Bitcoin. Narrow the scope of the Bitcoin law and strengthen oversight of Chivo and ecosystem.

*Italic: Source — Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador, Ministry of Finance, Financial Superintendency, and IMF staff estimates and projections as presented in the supplied content.*

### Box 1. Resilient Remittances

### Box 1. Resilient Remittances

### Overview and recent dynamics
- After an initial decline in 2020, remittances rebounded strongly.
- The collapse in remittances in April 2020 of 40 percent year-on-year mirrored the sharp increase in the US Hispanic unemployment rate.
- As the US Hispanic unemployment rate started recovering, remittances recovered and then rebounded beyond what was expected from U.S. Hispanic unemployment developments (reaching triple digits growth in 2021 Spring).
- The continuously elevated growth in remittances is due to both an increase in the number of transactions and an increase in the average value of remittances.

### Staff analysis of drivers
- Both home and U.S. factors related to the pandemic explain the increase in average value of remittances:
  - U.S. unemployment and relief:
    - An increase in the unemployment rate of Hispanics in the U.S. predicted a decline in remittances in 2020.
    - U.S. COVID-19 unemployment relief offset the effect of lost jobs, allowing migrants to continue sending remittances, and at a higher average amount.
  - Mobility constraints:
    - The negative impact of restricted mobility in U.S. states reflected both limited job opportunities for CAPDR migrants to earn an income and constraints these migrants faced to send remittances.
    - As a result, lower mobility predicted a lower average value of remittances.
  - Altruism motive and home conditions:
    - If the situation back home in El Salvador was difficult—represented by the new COVID-19 cases—Salvadorans in the U.S. continued to send higher remittances.
- Empirical basis:
  - Analysis is based on average remittances per transaction from 23 U.S. states and 14 Salvadoran departments, for the period from January 2017 to December 2020.1

### Historical comparison and outlook
- Historical context:
  - In historical terms, the recovery in remittances in 2020 was much stronger than in previous recessions.
  - Example: following the 2008 recession, job recovery to the pre-recession level in the construction sector—the most affected sector, and where about 17 percent of Salvadoran migrants work—took more than seven years.
  - In contrast, in 2020 total remittances to El Salvador reached the pre-recession level in half that period.
- Forward-looking expectations:
  - Strong growth in remittances is expected to be sustained, supported by the U.S. American Rescue Plan and recovery in the U.S. labor market.
  - By the end of 2021 many jobs had been recovered in the U.S., in many of the sectors where Salvadoran-born migrants work.

*Sources: National authorities and IMF staff calculations. 1/Based on the analysis of average remittances per transaction from 23 U.S. states and 14 Salvadoran departments, for the period from January 2017 to December 2020.*

### Box 5. Accounting for Bitcoin Transactions in Macro-Framework  Tables

### Box 5. Accounting for Bitcoin Transactions in Macro-Framework Tables

### Classification and general implications
- The IMF classifies Bitcoin as a nonfinancial asset given the absence of counterparty liability, and Bitcoin cannot be counted as international reserves.
- Currently Bitcoin transactions are not expected to have a significant impact on the macroeconomic projections, given the limited expected use and the way the Bitcoin system is implemented.
- If Bitcoin becomes more widely accepted as a medium of exchange, consideration could be given to its inclusion in a broader measure of liquidity, conditional on transactions remaining identifiable and traceable.

### Balance of Payments (BoP) treatment
- For analytical purposes, transactions in Bitcoin are presented as an “of which” item of goods (exports/imports) with a corresponding entry in net financial assets (inflows/outflows).
- Examples illustrating the treatment:
  - Resident purchases of Bitcoin from non-residents are recorded as an import of goods with a corresponding reduction in net financial assets (outflow). If the resident holds the Bitcoin, the BoP will register a deterioration of both the current account and the overall balance, and therefore a loss in international reserves.
  - Resident exchanges of Bitcoin for U.S. dollars with a non-resident are recorded as an export of goods with a corresponding increase in net foreign assets (inflow), and improvement in the current account, and an increase in international reserves. Thus, in the case where Bitcoin purchases are exchanged into US dollars with non-residents, the net impact on the BoP and reserves would be zero.
  - Bitcoin remittances are recorded as transfers in kind in the secondary income account, and as well as an imported good, but there is no corresponding increase in financial assets (in contrast to remittances sent in U.S. dollars). All things equal, receiving Bitcoin remittances does not have an impact on the BoP. However, if a resident receives a remittance in Bitcoin and immediately converts into US dollars with a non-resident, this would improve the current account and international reserves.
- Footnote on implementation: Currently, the Chivo e-wallet by default converts Bitcoin transactions into U.S. dollars in real time (and the user can change these default settings).

### Monetary statistics
- Bitcoin is recorded as a nonfinancial asset (akin to physical gold) and captured in the “other items net” line; therefore, it is not recorded in net foreign assets.
- Chivo wallet and Bitcoin could potentially lead to a reduction in deposits in banks, and impact money supply.

### Fiscal accounts and Trust Fund operations
- Bitcoin’s classification as a nonfinancial asset means that its acquisition is treated as (current) expenditure.
- Operations of the Trust Fund (exchanges from Bitcoin to U.S. dollars, or vice-versa) are not reflected in the fiscal accounts, since the Trust Fund is extrabudgetary.
- Transfers to the Trust Fund are recorded as expenditure, implying an increase in the fiscal deficit by the size of the Trust Fund (½ percent of GDP) in 2021.
- If the government received tax payments in Bitcoin, they would be offset by a corresponding increase in spending (acquisition of Bitcoin as nonfinancial asset) and therefore have no impact on the net lending position.
- If the Treasury holds Bitcoin positions, changes in its stock and valuation will change the net worth position of the public sector.

### El Salvador — currency and Fund operations
- While El Salvador adopted Bitcoin as a legal tender it continues to designate the U.S. dollar as its currency in transactions with the Fund.
- The US dollar will continue to be used as El Salvador’s local currency in financial transactions between El Salvador and the Fund, including purchases and repurchases under the Fund’s General Resources Account and payments of any future quota increases.
- El Salvador would be required to provide and withdraw its local currency in US dollars (in form of cash or a promissory note) to and from IMF accounts (held with Central Reserve Bank of El Salvador).

*Italicized source attribution retained in original: Box 5 content from the IMF chapter.* 

### Figures and illustrative findings on remittances, Bitcoin mining, and electricity (figure highlights)
- Remittances: 1/5 of Salvadoran families receive remittances; ⅔ of remittances are sent and received in cash by predominantly unbanked population.
- Remittances transaction-fee considerations: cash-to-cash remittances for small amounts are costly because of high KYC risks.
- Mobile/digital inclusion: Mobile ownership in SLV is high in the region, but accessibility is limited by infrastructure and coverage bottlenecks.
- Bitcoin mining and electricity:
  - Tightening Bitcoin regulation in China resulted in a shift in mining, with USA becoming the leader.
  - Majority of miners cooperate in pools; El Salvador mining was cited linked to Pooling (11 percent of market).
  - Bitcoin mining is limited and halved every four years.
  - At current rate of difficulty, the required energy cost of mining Bitcoin (at zero profit) is below the average geothermal energy price.
  - High Bitcoin prices lead to greater mining difficulty, which in turn drives up demand for electricity.

### Annex I — Increasing the employment contribution to growth: findings and policy directions

- Objectives and constraints:
  - To increase potential output in the medium term, the contribution of employment could be improved via increases in economically active population, labor force participation, and job creation.
  - Generating formal employment is crucial to provide opportunities to young people and to support the pension system.

- Crime reduction and economic impact:
  - Homicide rate declined from 52 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2018 to 19.7 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2020—a 62 percent drop. In 2020 El Salvador ranked as eighth country in Latin America and the Caribbean region. In 2021, the homicide rate remained low.
  - Crime’s indirect costs in El Salvador are estimated at 6.7 percent of GDP (IMF WP 20/02), consistent with a central bank (BCR) study. Other studies including direct costs find overall cost of crime between 12 and 18 percent of GDP.
  - IMF staff (WP/20/2) estimates that a 2.75 percent decline in crime, driven by better policing and stronger criminal justice, could increase output per capita by 1 percent.
  - Gang control is associated with worse educational attainment, worse dwelling conditions, and lower income for residents in gang-controlled areas.

- Plan de Control Territorial (2019)—scope and costs:
  - The plan has seven phases and aims at combatting crime and violence.
  - The first three phases require US$575.2 million through various sources over 2019-2021, out of which US$192.8 million were executed in 2019.
  - The plan aims to (i) strengthen military and police to regain control over 17 high-crime municipalities and financially weaken gangs, (ii) provide youth with alternatives to joining gangs, and (iii) provide modern equipment and technology to the army and police.
  - For youth alternatives, authorities have collaborated with EU and Spain to build infrastructure for Cubos (recreation centers) and with UNICEF for educational programs.

- Migration drivers and evidence:
  - Salvadoran-origin migrants in the U.S. increased from 0.5 million in 1990 (10 percent of Salvadoran population) to 1.4 million in 2019 (22 percent of Salvadoran population), of which about half are undocumented.
  - In FY2019 (October 2018 to September 2019), apprehended migrants at the U.S. border reached historically high levels (over 1 percent of all Salvadorans). In 2021, flows increased but remained below 2019 levels.
  - Analysis for 1994–2018 shows that traditional pull factors (higher wages and low unemployment for Hispanics in the U.S.) explain most migration since 1994, while since the early 2000s domestic push factors increasingly explain migration: (i) loss of livelihood from coffee due to a plunge in international coffee prices and disruptive weather, (ii) a rise in homicides especially after 2011, and (iii) natural disasters.

- Formal employment challenge and labor market metrics:
  - Despite average real GDP growth of 2½ percent over 2010-19, the share of informal employment declined only modestly and remains high at 49 percent (2019).
  - About 45,000 new jobs are needed annually to absorb entrants to the labor market; meanwhile only 14,055 formal jobs were created in 2019 (defined as all workers reported to the Salvadoran Social Security Institute).
  - The share of the working-age population is expected to peak at about 57 percent in 2040.
  - FDI generated 14.3 percent of formal employment in 2018.

- Authorities’ agenda (six major areas and measures):
  - Economic takeoff (infrastructure): Plan de Despegue Económico is a 5-year plan unveiled in early 2020 including projects like Aeropuerto de Oriente, Tren del Pacífico, Surf City, and a ferry connection to Costa Rica; complemented by Agenda Digital (a 10-year digital transformation plan).
  - International integration and cooperation: Integration agreement with Guatemala (including construction of a Salvadoran port on Guatemala’s Atlantic coast, “open skies”, free movement), and engagement with the U.S. and China; China pledged financing for several large infrastructure projects with non-reimbursable funds; a revived U.S. plan for Central America expected to bring increased grants.
  - Investment in human capital: Authorities increased the allocation of resources to health by 14.2 percent in the 2020 budget; allocation to education raised by 2.1 percent (new initiatives include school construction and tertiary scholarships). New initiatives include Plan Nacional de Salud and Política Nacional de Primera Infancia.
  - Cutting red tape: Overhaul of regulatory framework to shorten time and reduce steps for permits (e.g., access to electricity) and expedite registration for new businesses; introduction of one-window services (CIEX and SFCE) with help from FOMILENIO II for simplified electronic processing of export and import operations.
  - Diversification of the economy: PROESA is seeking FDI across sectors (pharmaceuticals, PPE, high-value apparel, renewable energy) expected to create 15 thousand new jobs.
  - Financial inclusion: Law to facilitate financial inclusion signed in September 2019 promotes digital products, including mobile money. Agenda Digital 2020-2030 intends to introduce digital identity and fintech solutions and builds on prior accomplishments (simplified bank accounts, digital signature, Transfer365, and Chivo wallet).

*Box 5 and Annex I content from the IMF chapter.*

### Annex II. Public Debt Sustainability Analysis

### Annex II. Public Debt Sustainability Analysis

### Summary assessment
- Debt is on an unsustainable debt path under current policies.
- Absent strong consolidation measures public debt is projected to be above 85 percent of GDP (including pension liabilities) at end-2021 and on an upward trajectory over the medium term.
- The debt stock at end-2020 was about 7 percent of GDP higher than expected at the time of the RFI disbursement (April 2020).
- Fiscal consolidation and structural reforms, including on governance and the fiscal sector, are essential to restore debt sustainability.

### Background and debt coverage
- Total public debt increased significantly in 2020 due to the impact of the pandemic and temporary spending measures, including below-the-line operations and subsidized financing to companies.
- The DSA is based on the nonfinancial public sector (NFPS) and includes:
  - General government and non-financial SOEs debt, both guaranteed and non-guaranteed.
  - Decentralized autonomous agencies such as FOVIAL.
  - Pension-related transfers resulting from the 1998 privatization and the Fideicomiso de obligaciones previsionales (FOP).
- FOP issues two types of securities (Certificados de inversión previsional-CIP): CIP-A and CIP-B; amortizations and interests for both series are paid from the budget and reported in fiscal statistics.
- Some securitizations (e.g., issued by subsidiaries of the Comisión Ejecutiva Hidroeléctrica de Río Lempa—CEL) and CIP-B are not fully reported in the authorities’ public debt stock; producing comprehensive public debt figures is ongoing as part of migration towards GFSM-2014.
- As of end-2020, the share of external debt stood at 59¼ percent of total public debt. Main creditors:
  - Bondholders: 39¾ percent.
  - Multilaterals: 19 percent.
- Public domestic debt is held mainly by institutional investors (AFPs) and the central bank.
- Short-term debt (LETES and CETES) is held by commercial banks.

### Key statistics and composition (from public sector debt tables)
- Nonfinancial Public Sector: 66.6 (percent of GDP)
- Reported debt: 89.2 (percent of GDP)
  - CIP series A: 22.5 (percent of GDP)
  - CIP series B: 8.6 (percent of GDP)
  - Bonds issued by Hencorp/LaGEO: 1.2 (percent of GDP)
- Unreported debt: 9.7 (percent of GDP)
- Public sector debt by creditor (in percent of GDP):
  - Long-term debt: 58.7
    - Investors: 35.4
    - Multilateral: 17.4
    - Bilateral: 1.5
    - Central bank: 2.9
    - Other: 1.4
  - Short-term debt: 8.0

### Changes since RFI and recent policy developments
- NFPS debt stock at end-2020 was higher than estimated at RFI due to:
  - Larger economic contraction.
  - Larger COVID-19 response including below-the-line operations.
  - Higher borrowing costs and increased use of expensive short-term debt.
- Parliamentary gridlock delayed multilateral funding, forcing issuance of Eurobonds and short-term bonds at record-high interest rates.
- The fiscal consolidation envisaged in the RFI report has not been implemented; additional permanent increases in expenditures were introduced, including:
  - Increased size of the armed forces.
  - Introduction/expansion of across-the-board subsidies (e.g., liquified gas subsidies).
  - Increase in the minimum pension guarantee.
  - Christmas bonuses exempted from personal income tax.
- Congress authorized contracting additional debt of about US$4 billion (13¼ percent of GDP), including funds for two new extra-budgetary trusts for agricultural projects.
- Subsidies to incentivize use of the government e-wallet "Chivo" were introduced using a favorable CABEI loan but required issuance of one-year CETES at expansive interest rate to fund the budget.
- CABEI operation used for Bitcoin implementation: 20-year loan with 5 years of grace period; interest rate was 6-month LIBOR plus 240 basis points.

### Baseline assumptions used in the DSA
- Baseline reflects authorities’ current policies and adjustment measures already announced.
- Projections: slow convergence towards potential starting in 2022 after rebound in 2021.
- Fiscal projections include about 1 percent of GDP in measures (compared with 4 percent of GDP proposed by staff).
- Gains/costs from pension reform are not included because the authorities have not yet made public their reform proposal.
- Scenario assumes external financing would be obtained at current spreads.
- As a result, interest payments are expected to remain high amid high gross financing needs and expected tightening of global financial conditions by the end of the projection period.

### Debt dynamics and financing needs (baseline projections)
- After an initial decline in 2021 (driven by the strong rebound in nominal GDP), the debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to increase until it reaches about 96 percent of GDP by the end of the projection period.
- Increase is driven by a primary deficit well above the debt-stabilizing primary balance.
- Gross financing needs would peak at 20 percent of GDP in 2025—above the 15-percent threshold for emerging economies—and remain elevated due to regular biannual repayments of Eurobonds starting in January 2023.
- Effective interest rate (Table projections):
  - 2021: 5.9 (percent)
  - 2022: 6.2 (percent)
  - 2023: 7.1 (percent)
  - 2024: 6.9 (percent)
  - 2025: 7.8 (percent)
  - 2026: 7.6 (percent)
- Nominal gross public debt (percent of GDP) by year (Table 1):
  - 2019: 65.3
  - 2020: 71.3
  - 2021: 89.2
  - 2022: 84.4
  - 2023: 84.8
  - 2024: 86.9
  - 2025: 89.2
  - 2026: 92.7
- Public gross financing needs (percent of GDP) by year (Table 1):
  - 2019: 8.5
  - 2020: 11.4
  - 2021: 13.9
  - 2022: 14.9
  - 2023: 15.6
  - 2024: 18.8
  - 2025: 16.8
  - 2026: 20.3

### Risks and stress tests
- Risks remain elevated:
  - Debt exceeded the debt distress threshold of 70 percent of GDP in 2020 and is projected to stay above that level for the forecast horizon.
  - Change in stock of short-term debt now signals a risk (red signal) due to increased use of short-term debt.
  - Macro-fiscal stress tests show adverse GDP shocks would result in debt-to-GDP ratios above 96 percent.
  - Gross financing needs would breach the 15 percent of GDP benchmark only under the adverse GDP shock.

### Realism of baseline assumptions and forecast track record
- Forecast track record figures:
  - Real GDP growth forecast error median: -0.18 (percent), percentile rank: 57%
  - Primary balance forecast error median: 0.55 (percent of GDP), percentile rank: 76%
  - Inflation (deflator) forecast error median: -1.05 (percent), percentile rank: 20%
- Assessments indicate varied realism across growth, primary balance, and inflation projections relative to historical forecast errors.

### Policy implications and recommendations (implied by analysis)
- Strong fiscal consolidation is required to restore debt sustainability.
- Structural reforms, including on governance and the fiscal sector, are essential.
- Reduce reliance on expensive short-term market debt to lower rollover risks.
- Finalize and implement a comprehensive approach to producing and reporting public debt statistics (migration towards GFSM-2014) to ensure full coverage of CIP series and other securitizations.

*IMF staff.*

### Annex II. Figure 4. El Salvador: Public Debt Sustainability Analysis - Stress Tests

### Annex II. Figure 4. El Salvador: Public Debt Sustainability Analysis - Stress Tests

### Macro-fiscal stress tests: scenarios and headline assumptions
- Scenarios presented: Baseline; Primary Balance Shock; Real GDP Growth Shock; Real Interest Rate Shock; Real Exchange Rate Shock; Combined Shock; Contingent Liability Shock (Nonfinancial contingent / Natural disaster).
- Key underlying macro-fiscal assumptions (by year as presented):
  - Real GDP growth: 2021 10.0; 2022 3.2; 2023 2.3; 2024 2.2; 2025 2.0; 2026 2.0
  - Inflation: 2021 2.8; 2022 2.4; 2023 1.4; 2024 1.3; 2025 1.2; 2026 1.0
  - Primary balance (baseline path in table rows; year-by-year values shown for shocks where provided):
    - Baseline primary balance (row labelled Primary balance): 2021 -1.1; 2022 -0.7; 2023 -0.1; 2024 0.5; 2025 0.4; 2026 0.5
    - Primary Balance Shock: 2021 -1.1; 2022 -1.1; 2023 -1.6; 2024 0.5; 2025 0.4; 2026 0.5
    - Combined Shock: 2021 -1.1; 2022 -1.9; 2023 -2.4; 2024 0.5; 2025 0.4; 2026 0.5
    - Contingent Liability Shock: 2021 -1.1; 2022 -8.7; 2023 0.7; 2024 0.5; 2025 0.4; 2026 0.5
  - Effective interest rate (baseline and shock paths where provided):
    - Baseline effective interest rate: 2021 5.9; 2022 6.2; 2023 7.2; 2024 7.0; 2025 7.9; 2026 7.6
    - Real GDP Growth Shock: 2021 5.9; 2022 6.2; 2023 7.3; 2024 7.3; 2025 8.1; 2026 7.8
    - Real Interest Rate Shock: 2021 5.9; 2022 6.2; 2023 7.5; 2024 7.5; 2025 8.6; 2026 8.5
    - Real Exchange Rate Shock: 2021 5.9; 2022 6.2; 2023 7.1; 2024 6.9; 2025 7.8; 2026 7.6
    - Combined Shock: 2021 5.9; 2022 6.2; 2023 7.6; 2024 7.6; 2025 8.7; 2026 8.7
    - Contingent Liability Shock: 2021 5.9; 2022 6.7; 2023 7.8; 2024 7.2; 2025 8.1; 2026 7.9

### Stress-test outcomes (debt and financing indicators shown)
- Gross Nominal Public Debt presented in multiple charts:
  - Gross Nominal Public Debt (In percent of GDP) time series for 2021–2026 shown across baseline and shocks (charts plotted to 500+ percent of GDP in some panels).
  - Gross Nominal Public Debt (In percent of Revenue) time series for 2021–2026 shown (scales up to 30 percent of revenue).
- Public Gross Financing Needs:
  - Public Gross Financing Needs reported in charts (In percent of GDP) for 2021–2026; scales illustrated up to at least 25 percent of GDP in some panels.
- Additional stress-test panel highlights:
  - Contingent liability (Nonfinancial contingent / Natural disaster) shock produces a large one-year deterioration in primary balance (2022 value -8.7) and raises effective interest rates (2022 6.7; 2023 7.8).
  - Combined macro-fiscal shock amplifies debt-service costs and debt ratios (effective interest rate rises to 8.7 in 2025 and 2026 under combined shock).

### Risk-assessment framework and indicators (Annex II Figure 5 notes)
- Color-coding and thresholds (as described in notes):
  - Debt burden benchmark: 70 percent (cell highlighted green if debt burden benchmark of 70% is not exceeded under specific shock or baseline; yellow if exceeded under specific shock but not baseline; red if benchmark is exceeded under baseline; white if stress test not relevant).
  - Gross financing needs benchmark: 15 percent (cell green if not exceeded under specific shock or baseline; yellow if exceeded under specific shock but not baseline; red if benchmark exceeded under baseline).
  - Risk-assessment indicator thresholds (lower and upper benchmarks) cited:
    - Bond spreads: 200 and 600 basis points
    - External financing requirement: 5 and 15 percent of GDP
    - Change in the share of short-term debt: 0.5 and 1 percent
    - Public debt held by non-residents: 15 and 45 percent
    - Share of foreign-currency denominated debt: 20 and 60 percent
- Market perception and indicator snapshot (values shown in figure annotations):
  - Bond spread (in basis points) example values annotated: 948 bp (boxed)
  - External Financing Requirement (in percent of GDP) annotated values: 12; benchmarks 5 and 15
  - Annual Change in Short-Term Public Debt (in percent of total) annotated values: 0.5; benchmarks 0.5 and 1
  - Public Debt in Foreign Currency (in percent of total) annotated value: 21%; benchmarks 20 and 60
  - Public Debt Held by Non-Residents (in percent of total) annotated value: 43%; benchmarks 15 and 45

### Creditor composition of public debt stock (Annex II. Table 2, 2020)
- Total public debt: 100.0 percent of total; 89.2 percent of GDP
- External debt: 48.9 percent of total; 43.6 percent of GDP
  - Multilateral creditors: 19.6 percent of total; 17.4 percent of GDP
    - IMF: 1.9 percent of total; 1.7 percent of GDP
    - IADB: 10.1 percent of total; 9.0 percent of GDP
    - World Bank: 3.6 percent of total; 3.2 percent of GDP
    - Other multilaterals: 4.0 percent of total; 3.6 percent of GDP
      - o/w: CABEI 1.6 percent of total; 1.4 percent of GDP
      - o/w: IFAD 0.2 percent of total; 0.2 percent of GDP
  - Bilateral creditors: 1.7 percent of total; 1.5 percent of GDP
    - Paris Club: 0.0 percent of total; 0.0 percent of GDP
    - Non-Paris Club: 1.7 percent of total; 1.5 percent of GDP
      - o/w: Japan 0.7 percent of total; 0.6 percent of GDP
      - o/w: Germany 0.6 percent of total; 0.5 percent of GDP
  - Eurobonds: 27.6 percent of total; 24.6 percent of GDP
  - Commercial lenders: 0.0 percent of total; 0.0 percent of GDP
- Domestic debt: 51.1 percent of total; 45.6 percent of GDP
  - Held by residents, total: 51.1 percent of total; 45.6 percent of GDP
  - Held by non-residents, total: 0.0 percent of total; 0.0 percent of GDP
  - T-bills: 8.9 percent of total; 8.0 percent of GDP
    - Held by central bank: 0.0 percent of total; 0.0 percent of GDP
    - Held by local banks: 8.9 percent of total; 8.0 percent of GDP
    - Held by local non-banks: 0.0 percent of total; 0.0 percent of GDP
    - Non-residents: 0.0 percent of total; 0.0 percent of GDP
  - Bonds: 35.7 percent of total; 31.8 percent of GDP
    - Held by central bank: 3.2 percent of total; 2.9 percent of GDP
    - Held by local banks: 0.0 percent of total; 0.0 percent of GDP
    - Held by local non-banks: 32.5 percent of total; 29.0 percent of GDP
    - Non-residents: 0.0 percent of total; 0.0 percent of GDP
  - Loans: 6.5 percent of total; 5.8 percent of GDP
    - Held by central bank: 0.0 percent of total; 0.0 percent of GDP
    - Held by local banks: 6.5 percent of total; 5.8 percent of GDP
    - Held by local non-banks: 0.0 percent of total; 0.0 percent of GDP
    - Non-residents: 0.0 percent of total; 0.0 percent of GDP

### External debt outlook and gross external financing needs (Annex III highlights)
- External debt projection summary:
  - Gross external debt rose by about 10 percent of GDP to 74.5 percent of GDP in 2020.
  - Under the baseline, external debt is projected to peak at 78 percent of GDP in 2025 and start to gradually decline thereafter.
  - Under the historical scenario, external debt would rise above 80 percent of GDP after 2023, driven by public sector debt.
  - Expansion in public sector debt partially offset by a reduction in private sector external debt (passthrough of elevated sovereign risk premium to private firms and banks).
- Gross external financing needs:
  - Projected to remain elevated in the next five years, in the 20-23 percent of GDP range, peaking in 2023 and 2025 as US$800 million Eurobonds mature in each of these years.
  - Under a scenario of significant deterioration in the non-interest current account deficit, gross external financing needs could rise to about 28 percent of GDP.
  - The implications of recently announced plans to use proceeds of a new sovereign bond issuance to purchase Bitcoin and fund infrastructure investment do not form part of this assessment.

### External debt sustainability framework (selected table entries, Annex III Table 1)
- Baseline external debt (percent of GDP): 2016 67.4; 2017 66.0; 2018 64.0; 2019 64.7; 2020 74.5; 2021 68.6; 2022 70.3; 2023 71.6; 2024 74.6; 2025 77.6; 2026 75.0
- Change in external debt: 2016 1.3; 2017 -1.4; 2018 -1.9; 2019 0.7; 2020 9.7; 2021 -5.9; 2022 1.8; 2023 1.2; 2024 3.0; 2025 3.0; 2026 -2.5; (final 2026 column shows 0.0 in identified flows)
- Identified external debt-creating flows (4+8+9): 2016 -1.2; 2017 -3.8; 2018 -2.5; 2019 -3.8; 2020 4.6; 2021 -5.4; 2022 -1.9; 2023 -1.2; 2024 -0.4; 2025 0.7; 2026 0.9; debt-stabilizing non-interest current account -0.8
- Gross external financing need (in billions of US dollars): historical and projected entries include: 2016 44.1; 2017 5.3; 2018 5.5; 2019 6.5; 2020 5.1; 2021 5.9; 2022 5.8; 2023 7.4; 2024 7.0; 2025 8.2; 2026 7.7
- Gross external financing need (in percent of GDP): annotated values include 17.1; 21.3; 21.1; 24.1; 20.8; 10-Year and other panel labels shown (selected percent series: 21.1; 19.8; 24.4; 22.0; 25.1; 22.9) as presented.

_Source: IMF staff._

### 1.3  percent. Net FDI flows decreased to 0.8 percent of GDP, resting below the three-year average rate of 3.1 percent.

### 1slvea2022001 - 1.3 percent. Net FDI flows decreased to 0.8 percent of GDP, resting below the three-year average rate of 3.1 percent.

### Capital Flows and External Position
- Net FDI flows decreased to 0.8 percent of GDP, resting below the three-year average rate of 3.1 percent.
- Net resident capital flows (excluding errors and omissions) slightly increased to 0.5 percent of GDP.
- Net capital outflows continued in 2021, with FDI inflows offset by portfolio and other investment net outflows.
- Drawdowns in reserves and IFI financing covered the gap resulting from large reversals in other investments following deterioration in global trade and the Covid-19 shock.
- Assessment:
  - Traditionally, El Salvador’s capital inflows have been dominated by FDI flows.
  - In the near-term, the BoP gap would deem IFI financing critical for El Salvador.
  - The implications of recently announced plans to use proceeds of a new sovereign bond issuance to purchase Bitcoin and fund infrastructure investment have not been assessed by staff.
- Structural features mitigating vulnerabilities:
  - Relatively long average debt maturity (about 11 years) of existing debt.
  - Diversified creditor base.
  - About half of the debt is owed to multilateral/bilateral creditors and private pension funds.
  - The banking sector is well capitalized and liquid.
- Fiscal debt-service pressures:
  - Non-financial public sector (NFPS) interest bill reached 4½ percent of GDP in 2020 and is forecast to reach 5 percent of GDP by 2026 due to the issuance of expensive Eurobonds and the programmed increase in pension bonds’ interest.
- Policy recommendations:
  - Besides envisaged fiscal consolidation, the authorities should strengthen relations with investors by creating a specialized unit at the Treasury.
  - Consideration could be given to smoothing the amortization profile though market-friendly liability management operations.

### Reserves Level and Reserve Adequacy
- Gross international reserves (GIR) fell significantly—by about US$ 1.4 billion—in 2020.
- At year-end, reserves amounted to US$ 3. billion or 58.8 percent of the IMF’s metric for Assessing Reserve Adequacy (ARA metric) for countries with fixed exchange rates.
- Traditional reserve metrics:
  - The 3-month import and broad money coverage of the end-2020 stock of international reserves—although diminished—are adequate.
  - The metric on reserve coverage of short-term debt rests below the benchmark.
- 2021 outlook:
  - Despite the recent SDR allocation, the ratio of reserves to GDP is expected to remain at 2020 levels, but with reserve coverage dipping below 3-months of imports by year end.
- Assessment:
  - It is expected that the level of international reserves by end-2021 (12.6 percent of GDP) continues to be below the adequate level implied by the adjusted risk-weighted adequacy (ARA) metric.
  - Against the backdrop of the Covid-19 shock in 2020, reserves have fallen below the adjusted ARA benchmark for fixed exchange rate regimes (benchmark at 21 percent of GDP) and the level determined adequate by the authorities’ metric (benchmark at 22 percent of GDP).

### Wage Bill Reform — Key Findings and Recommendations
- Context and magnitude:
  - Total general government expenditure remained stable at around 25 percent of GDP from 2012 to 2019, higher than the regional comparators (average of 21.5 percent in Central America in 2019).
  - The government wage bill accounted for 36.9 percent of total expenditure, or 12.4 percent of GDP in 2020 (and is budgeted to be 41 percent of total expenditure in 2021).
- Cross-country comparison:
  - Wage bill as percent of government expenditure: 40.1 percent in 2018 for El Salvador versus averages of 29.6 percent in LAC countries and 28.3 percent in EMEs for the same year.
- Sectoral drivers:
  - Education, health and justice and social security sectors together account for around 4.4 percent of GDP in central government wages.
  - From 2009 to 2020, nonfinancial public sector employment increased by 33 percent, while the total wage bill increased by 77 percent—indicating large wage and benefit increases beyond employment growth.
- Public-private wage premium:
  - El Salvador is an outlier with public sector wages 70 percent higher than the private sector.
  - The health sector pay scale is a major contributor to wage inequality; its parameters date from the early 1990s.
  - The average annual wage increase is 8 percent, while inflation has averaged 0.4 percent since 2013.
- Past FAD recommendations (2016 TA):
  - Identified short-term options that could have generated savings of more than 2 percentage points of GDP by 2020; these remain valid.
  - Three key areas: contain wage increases; contain job growth; strengthen budgetary processes.
- Key developments since 2014:
  - From 2014 to 2020, average annual increase of government positions was 1.4 percent, whereas the average annual increase in the wage bill was 4.1 percent.
  - The wage bill was not cut during 2020; bonuses were given to health workers and other bonuses were granted in 2019.
  - With a contracting nominal GDP, compensation of employees rose by 2 percent of GDP.
- Areas for further analysis:
  - Reassess fiscal impact of 2016 recommendations with updated data.
  - Provide follow up technical assistance for a comprehensive public sector review and standardization of compensation and benefits.
- Potential measures and quantified savings:
  - Short-term temporary measures:
    - Implement hiring freeze whereby vacant posts are eliminated as employees retire, which could generate savings up to 0.4 percent of GDP in total over 2023-2025.
    - Suspend the established pay scales in the health, education and justice sectors, which could save up to 0.3 percent of GDP in total over 2023-2024.
  - Longer-term structural measures:
    - Comprehensive functional review of the public sector to identify superfluous positions and overlapping functions; propose consolidation of ministries and functions to be implemented from 2023.
    - Draft and enact a public sector employment law to standardize compensation and benefits among different public entities; regulate wage increases and bonuses from 2024, with expanded coverage over temporary contractual positions.
- Annex V. Table 2 (summary of potential savings, baseline scenario):
  - Maximum saving of total measures: 0.5, 1.1, 4.1, 1.9, 2.3 (table shows multiple-year impacts and combinations; individual measure impacts are calculated relative to the baseline and are not additive).
  - Baseline scenario assumptions: each year the number of positions increases by one percent and wages by two percent, in addition to the pay scales. Nominal GDP grows four percent per year (2 percent real growth and 2 percent inflation).

### Pension System — Structure and Fiscal Implications
- System design:
  - The pension system is managed by private companies (Administradoras de fondos de pensiones, AFPs) following 1998 privatization of the public PAYG system.
  - Individual capitalization accounts were created; transitional costs remained a fiscal obligation.
- Historical fiscal burden:
  - At the time of privatization, the actuarial deficit of the PAYG was about US$9 billion but actuarial reserves were only US$0.3 billion.
  - Transitional cost was financed mainly by placing Eurobonds in the international market.
- Three types of liabilities created by privatization:
  - Cost of paying entitlements to the social security administration’s pensioners and their survivors and workers close to retirement at the time of privatization.
  - Cost of pension recognition bonds—issued to AFPs to reimburse contributions paid to the old public PAYG.
  - Minimum pension guarantee (MPG): the state guarantees a minimum pension; the Treasury pays the gap when AFP funds are insufficient.
- Reforms to manage pension burden:
  - In 2006 a trust fund—Fideicomiso de obligaciones previsionales (FOP)—was created to contain drawdown of budget resources for pension transfers.
  - FOP issues securities—Certificados de inversión previsional (CIP)—mandated for AFP purchase: CIP-A to pay entitlements and CIP-B to pay pension recognition bonds.
  - Proceeds from these bonds are transferred to the social security administration to pay obligations to beneficiaries of the old pension system.
- Path of liabilities:
  - As the public system is closed, liabilities stemming from it will decrease over time.
  - Obligations from the minimum pension guarantee (MPG) will increase over time as each year new pensioners do not reach the MPG with their own AFP funds, and over time MPG is increased.
- Key statistic:
  - Actuarial deficit of the pension system: 66.3 percent of GDP (breakdown: Cuenta de Garantía Solidaria 34.1, Other liabilities 32.2, of which entitlements 20.0 and pension recognition bonds 4.9).

*International Monetary Fund — El Salvador country report content provided in the source PDF.*

### 4. The 2017 reform tried to address the

### 4. The 2017 reform tried to address the

### Increasing cost of liabilities from the Minimum Pension Guarantee (MPG) and the Cuenta de Garantía Solidaria (CGS)
- In 2017 the authorities created the Cuenta de Garantía Solidaria (CGS) to cover the financial burden of the MPG and other payments.
- Funding of the CGS: contribution rates increased to 15 percent (from 13 percent), of which 5 percentage points are earmarked to the CGS.
- Actuarial projection: the last actuarial report from the Bank superintendency estimates that the CGS will be in deficit again in 2028.
- Main driver of liability growth: low returns from AFPs investments due to large exposure to sovereign risk.

### CIPs held by private entities and public debt accounting
- Authorities include only the CIP-A bonds into the nonfinancial public sector (NFPS) debt.
- CIP-A bonds amount to 23 percent of GDP in 2020, doubling in size since 2013.
- Estimated stock of CIP-B (based on AFPs’ balance sheets) was about 8½ percent of GDP as of end-2020.
- Implication: the presence of pension debt within the NFPS debt stock is relevant for international comparisons, particularly with countries where the pension system is public. Other Latin American countries with privatized pension systems report debt owed to AFPs as part of public debt.

### Future pension obligations and policy changes
- Without structural reforms, pension obligations are expected to rise due to:
  - Increasing number of AFP pensioners.
  - Financial impact of a long period of subpar rates on fixed income securities.
  - The MPG effectively translating into a growing government obligation despite AFPs receiving relatively low interest rates on CIPs.
- Legislative change: the Legislative Assembly approved an increase in the minimum pension guarantee from $207 to $304 in December 2020—47 percent increase.
- Feedback loop described:
  - Pension infrastructure concentrates AFP investments on government securities with low rates → low returns for AFPs → pensioners do not reach the MPG → Treasury obligations to pay the MPG increase.

### Reform options and distributional concerns
- Reform spectrum: ranges from parametric adjustments to an overhaul of the system.
- Immediate adjustment candidates: retirement age (noted as well below the recommended 65 years, especially for women).
- Equity issue: current design is largely regressive.
- Coverage gap: two thirds of the labor force do not have access to any social security coverage.
- Recommendation on targeting: a progressive spending strategy should target the informal population to guarantee some basic social safety net; currently a large part of the budget is appropriated to pay subsidies benefiting AFP’s affiliates.

### Annex VII — Fostering domestic market development and reducing sovereign risk
- Elevated public debt risks:
  - Stock of T-bills (LETES) increased to US$1.5 billion by end-January 2021.
  - 1-year CETES of US$ 0.7 billion.
  - Eurobonds dominate external debt issuance and pose refinancing risk due to elevated yields.
  - Non-marketable government liabilities held by pension funds pose future liquidity risks due to non-tradability.
- Medium-term debt strategy recommendations:
  - Define government debt management objective: raise required financing at minimum cost while giving due regard to risk and supporting domestic debt market development.
  - Adopt a credible debt management strategy with clear targets and proactive investor relations.
- Domestic market development benefits:
  - Develop a domestic bond yield curve to diversify financing sources, extend average maturity, and provide pricing benchmarks for private debt instruments.
  - Improve asset valuation practices and support financial system soundness.
- Strategy elements:
  - Announce an annual borrowing plan consistent with the MTDS and adhere to a published quarterly calendar for LETES; avoid frequent auction cancellations and minimize large deviations from published indicative amounts.
  - Standardize LETES and domestic government bonds; regularly issue standardized instruments—LETES, and 2- and 3-year bonds—to create benchmark securities and build the domestic yield curve. LETES tenors should be standardized across maturities such as 3, 6, 9 and 12 months.
  - Avoid inter-year debt accumulation in LETES; consider limits on share of short-term borrowing and regularly issue 2–3 year domestic bonds to extend average maturity, with decisions based on cost-risk analysis and financing availability.
  - Promote small investors and corporate access (e.g., through investment funds) to diversify investor base and increase primary and secondary market activity.

### Annex VIII — Liquidity management and emergency liquidity assistance (ELA)
- Bank liquidity buffers:
  - Reserves in the Central Bank declined from 25 percent of liabilities in end-2019 to 14 percent of liabilities in end-2020.
  - Statutory requirements declined to 9 percent of liabilities in 2020; excess reserves remained elevated at 5 percent of liabilities.
  - In 2021 reserves increased up to 16 percent of liabilities after gradual restoration of liquidity requirements.
  - External assets increased from 3 percent of liabilities to 9 percent of liabilities.
  - Operational liquidity (cash) remained at 3 percent of liabilities.
  - Liquid assets subject to funding constraints doubled from 6 percent of liabilities to 12 percent of liabilities by end-2020.
- First-line liquidity access:
  - Banks can borrow in the interbank market or access required reserves deposited at the BCR (against collateral) in three sequential tranches:
    - First tranche: 25 percent of total bank reserves at no cost.
    - Second tranche: 25 percent at LIBOR plus a penalty.
    - Third tranche: 50 percent at no cost but subject to approval by the Superintendence of Financial System (SSF) upon submission of a regularization plan.
- Central bank ELA tools and limits:
  - Central bank can provide bilateral ELA to a solvent bank that has exhausted traditional facilities, up to 100 percent value of the required capital of an individual bank under stress.
  - Authorized ELA tools: (i) repurchase agreements using appropriate capital, (ii) temporal acquisition of banks’ investments portfolio, (iii) liquidity credits to banks.
- Vulnerabilities and reform suggestions:
  - Gradual restoration target: statutory reserves to 15 percent of liabilities by June 2022 judged adequate, but potential large liquidity shocks remain a concern.
  - Vulnerabilities include: (i) absence of additional layers of liquidity buffers (e.g., liquidity fund as in Ecuador), (ii) delays in finalizing and approving bank resolution law and framework, (iii) incomplete funding of deposit insurance fund with a remaining two thirds expected to be filled, (iv) absence of sufficient foreign reserves for injection in stress times.
  - Authorities should continuously reevaluate adequate reserve requirement levels.
  - Strengthening recommendations:
    - Increase capital of the central bank (BCR) by removing central bank ownership of quasi-fiscal activities to augment ELA contingent credit line (would allow borrowing more than the currently possible US$200 million against higher capital).
    - Advance bank resolution legal framework and strengthen deposit insurance fund.
    - In medium-term, retain some elements of prudential reserve requirements within a forward-looking Basel III liquidity risk-management framework.
    - Improve communication tools, incorporate stress-tests in financial stability reports, and introduce early-warning system indicators.
- Fiscal implication noted: to implement some safeguards recommendations BCR would need about US$400 million to exit quasi-fiscal activities, in addition to recapitalization needed to transition to IFRS.

### Annex IX — Governance, anti-corruption, and AML/CFT frameworks
- Governance priority: strengthening economic governance remains a top priority.
- Anti-corruption measures:
  - Administration (2019) advanced an anti-corruption agenda focused on prevention and prosecution.
  - In 2020 government relied on the International Commission Against Impunity in El Salvador (CICIES) of the OAS to audit the July 2020 Eurobond issue and COVID-19 spending.
  - CICIES coordinated with the Court of Accounts (CoA); both reported findings to the Attorney General.
- COVID-19 audits:
  - CoA prepared a special plan and published eight audit reports covering approximately US$596 million of COVID-19 funds (69% of resources assigned to the pandemic response; 2¼ percent of GDP) executed by six of the 12 implementing agencies up until September 2020.
  - Authorities plan to publish CoA recommendations, authorities’ responses, and summary of legal follow-up actions.
  - Government invited CICIES to embed a team of 30 multidisciplinary professionals into implementing agencies to audit COVID-19 funds in real time; the cooperation agreement was terminated in June 2021 without publication of the CICIES report.
- Legal framework enhancements needed:
  - Amend the Act of Illicit enrichment of Public officials and civil servants to align with UNCAC (El Salvador signatory since 2010).
  - Required measures include: (i) update definition of offences and penalties, (ii) protocols for prosecution, (iii) establish annual asset declarations with clear timelines and transparency, (iv) establish investigative techniques (eg. unexplained wealth orders), (v) debar offenders from public office, (vi) typify offences for trading of influence, obstruction of justice, role in preparation to commit a corruption offence, interference in production of evidence, lifting the corporate veil related to third parties in bribery offences and the private sector, (viii) criminalize all categories of corruption offences in line with UNCAC including criminal responsibility for legal persons, (ix) seizure of corruption proceeds.
- Financial integrity progress:
  - In 2019 the government rejoined the Egmont Group.
  - El Salvador has a relatively sound regulatory AML/CFT framework; international standards applied for entities supervised by the Superintendency via the Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist Financing Risk Management Standard (AML, CFT), including procedures aligned with the FATF Forty Recommendations and controls for due diligence on PEPs.

*Source: 1slvea2022001 - 4. The 2017 reform tried to address the (PDF chapter).*

### 5. There are further plans to strengthen the AML/CFT framework through the Special

### 1slvea2022001 - 5. There are further plans to strengthen the AML/CFT framework through the Special

### AML/CFT framework reforms and status
- The Special Law for the Prevention, Control, and Penalization of Money Laundering:
  - Presented to the LA in 2019.
  - Incorporates 40 FATF recommendations.
  - Authorities submitted a draft for public consultation and in preparation for submission to the LA by the end 2021, and its implementation six months thereafter, to comply with FATF recommendations.
- Interim measures:
  - Financial intelligence Unit Directive of October 27, 2021, applicable to all AML/CFT obliged entities, including Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs).
  - Directive covers: role and function of compliance officers, customer due diligence, record keeping, measures for politically exposed persons and for Non-Profit organizations.
- Outstanding actions and priorities:
  - Ensure AML framework meets international standards.
  - El Salvador applied to the Latin American (GAFILAT) for membership, leaving the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF); next mutual evaluation will likely be carried out through GAFILAT.
  - To avoid negative results from the GAFILAT mutual evaluation that could pressure correspondent banking relationships, effectiveness should be stepped-up across all areas of the AML/CFT framework including:
    - risk-based supervision,
    - compliance with AML/CFT preventive measures and availability of beneficial ownership,
    - overall enforcement against money laundering and confiscating ill-gotten proceeds.
  - Authorities are actively building capacity to address AML/CFT risks from increased VASPs activity.
  - Priority pending measures include:
    - regulations to fully incorporate DNFBPs into the AML/CFT framework,
    - issuance of reporting forms to implement threshold reporting on Bitcoin transactions.
  - Legal definitions and enforcement related to virtual assets:
    - the definition of virtual asset providers needs to include persons exercising safekeeping and/or administration of instruments,
    - law should contain powers for law enforcement agencies to investigate and sanction unlicensed Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs).

### Fiscal and regulatory governance — main weaknesses and reform recommendations
- Fiscal governance — main weaknesses and suggested measures:
  - Weaknesses relate to revenue outcomes due to high informality and low compliance, despite efforts under Plan Anti-Evasion.
  - Fiscal transparency: room to improve accountability, reporting and spending controls, including on procurement issues.
  - With IMF technical support (provided in April 2021), the MoF is working to improve reporting guidelines and mechanisms.
  - Recommendations:
    - publish on-line procurement contracts and beneficial ownership information in all government contracts, which will require amendments to the law establishing the FOPROMID.
    - measures should cover budgetary and extra-budgetary funds, such as FOPROMID and other trust funds.
    - improve the legal framework and system enabling the use of the e-procurement system (CompraSal) for procuring and publishing purchases, including with extra-budgetary funds, and a change in the Civil Code.
- Regulatory framework — recommendations to support business activity and tax collection:
  - Ease of doing business has improved in recent years.
  - Staff recommends:
    - promptly implement electronic invoicing to make it easier to conduct business activities and improve tax collection through Anti-Evasion Plan, and other measures under the program,
    - implement one-stop shop digital application for permits (including for government agencies to be able to share information).

### Access to external credit, public access to information, and open government
- Legal environment and recent legislative proposals:
  - Access to information law (2010) granted controlled access to public information, including asset declarations.
  - July 2021: a set of reforms to the Access to Information Law were introduced in the LA that would:
    - increase the deadline to respond to information requests,
    - reserve the right to not disclose public officials’ asset declarations,
    - expand government discretionary powers over the Institute for Access to Public Information.
  - November 2021: a Foreign Agents Law was introduced in the LA proposing to tax 40 percent of revenues of organizations that receive funds from abroad (affecting foreign funded civil society organizations).
    - The 40 percent tax is proposed on revenue rather than operational profit, and it is punitive, since it is comparably higher than taxes levied for general income topped at 30 percent, with the possibility of applying deductions.
  - Neither law has passed nor been withdrawn; both remain under consideration in the LA.
- Implications for external cooperation and credit:
  - The proposed reforms have invited reservations from international cooperation in El Salvador’s quest for external credit.
  - El Salvador needs to renew membership to the multilateral Open Government Partnership (OGP) after being placed under procedural review for falling below minimum eligibility criteria, considering:
    - lack of an active national action plan,
    - significant delays in implementation of commitments.
  - The last active national action plan covered 2018-20.

### Implementing Fund’s policy advice — summary of Annex X (selected findings from 2019 Article IV and 2020 RFI)
- Fiscal policy advice and implementation status:
  - Implement a fiscal adjustment:
    - Advice: allow the temporary 2020 crisis measures to lapse; 3 percent of GDP over 2021-24.
    - Status: Partially implemented — temporary 2020 measures allowed to lapse, but no comprehensive fiscal adjustment announced. ½ percent of GDP on fiscal savings expected from cutting transfers to local governments. Given the pandemic and permanent-effect measures increasing the deficit, a consolidation of 4 percent of GDP over 2022–24 is needed.
  - Comprehensive fiscal reform to eliminate distortions and expand tax base: Not implemented. Technical work on price transfers and electronic invoicing completed; corresponding draft laws to be submitted to Congress. TA on tax policy received in 2021, but advice not implemented.
  - New public sector initiatives should identify funding sources: Not implemented — new expenditure initiatives financed through additional debt.
  - Pension reforms to be budget neutral and fiscally sustainable: Not implemented. Authorities announced a forthcoming structural reform proposal aimed at increasing the replacement rate in the private pension scheme; details not provided.
  - Strengthen the FRL: Not implemented — FRL currently suspended to implement COVID-19 relief measures.
  - Support financial market development and strengthen public debt management: Not implemented, though TA received.
- Financial sector measures — implementation status:
  - Temporary relaxation of bank lending standards to be monitored: Implemented — BCR introduced gradual phaseout of temporary relaxation with timeline and restored risk classification.
  - Strict criteria for acceptable loan restructuring: Implemented — SSF monitors bank restructuring and risk classification per phaseout rules.
  - Impact assessment and individual bank liquidity/recapitalization plans: In course of implementation — BCR required depository corporations to report COVID-19 impacted loan portfolio to SSF; SSF conducts regular bank-level stress-tests on liquidity and capital buffers.
  - Build liquidity buffers: Implemented — BCR exited temporary relaxation of liquidity buffers and introduced gradual increase in reserve requirements to 15 percent of deposits by June 2022. Public ELA facility signed a credit-line agreement with CABEI. Authorities working to improve the ELA framework with IMF TA.
  - Adopt bank resolution and crisis management framework: In course of implementation — BCR submitted revised draft law to the Ministry of Economy for formal submission to the Legislative Assembly following IMF TA.
  - Enhance financial inclusion: Implemented — law to facilitate financial inclusion signed September 2019, promotes digital products including mobile money. Chivo e-wallet platform launched in September 2021; associated risks need mitigation.
  - Safeguards Assessment, MoU BCR and MoF, and external auditors reports: Implemented — authorities need to follow up on safeguards recommendations.
- Governance and anti-corruption advice — implementation status:
  - Maintain sound AML/CFT standards: Implemented — authorities enhanced AML/CFT by establishing a high frequency monitoring system of capital flows and maintain international cooperation with the U.S. Department of Treasury.
  - Enhance governance and anti-corruption frameworks (harmonize laws, align with UNCAC): Not implemented.
  - Increase fiscal transparency of the budget law: Not implemented — fiscal transparency weakened; publication of the 2022 budget bundle was delayed and does not properly show total unidentified financing.
  - Transparency and accountability of use of COVID-19 funds: Partially implemented — after significant delays publication of use of COVID-19 funds occurred and 69 percent of COVID resources have been audited.
  - Implement electronic invoicing: In course of implementation.
  - Strengthen audit of fiscal operations: Not implemented.
  - Establish better spending controls: Not implemented — continued use of trust funds to speed up spending execution at the cost of weakening transparency.
- Business environment and competitiveness:
  - Continue to improve security: Implemented — Plan Control Territorial reduced organized crime in 2020 and 2021; efforts needed to reduce kidnapping and extortions.
  - Increase investment in public infrastructure: Partially implemented — Plan de Despegue Económico (2020) includes projects such as Aeropuerto de Oriente, Tren del Pacífico, Surf City, and a ferry connection to Costa Rica; financing needed; delivering on Surf City started.
  - Investment in education: Partially implemented — authorities supplied school-age children with computers and tablets; UNICEF and donors assisted with teachers’ digital training.
  - Enhance business environment: Implemented — over 200 procedures optimized, halving time for registering new businesses.
  - Reduce barriers to trade: Partially implemented — improvements in logistics infrastructure and launch of single window for export-import operations.
  - Advance regulatory simplification to reduce red tape: Implemented.

### Statistical and data issues (as of November 30, 2021)
- Overall adequacy: Data provision has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance.
- National accounts:
  - CRBS disseminates annual and quarterly national accounts following 1993 SNA, incorporating key 2008 SNA recommendations.
  - Series available for 2005-18, benchmark year 2005; Supply and Use Tables for 2014-16; Input-Output Tables for 2005 and 2014.
  - Monthly index of economic activity (IVAE) consistent with quarterly/annual accounts; rebased national accounts and monthly IVAE published March 23, 2018.
- Price statistics:
  - Consumer Price Index weights based on 2005-06 Household Income and Expenditure Survey.
  - Broad PPI with base year 2009 compiled and disseminated on the Central Reserve Bank website.
- Government Finance Statistics:
  - Public sector data reported on cash basis but comprehensive and timely; flow and stocks published monthly for NFPS.
  - Public debt statistics presented as NFPS but with gaps: not all government securities held by private pension funds reported; securities issued by subsidiaries of CEL holding missed.
  - Treasury produces information; Central Bank disseminates it.
  - Authorities plan to migrate fiscal statistics towards GFSM-2014 under a regional CAPTAC-DR program; exact timelines not available.
- Monetary, financial, and financial sector statistics:
  - CRBS compiles and disseminates MFS broadly in line with MFSM 2000; uses standardized report forms based on accounting data for Fund reporting.
  - CRBS regularly reports monthly FSIs to IMF for publication: reports all core and 5 encouraged FSIs; plans to compile remaining encouraged FSIs.
  - Financial sector data coverage broadly adequate, but gaps remain for household and corporate balance sheets and housing prices.
- External sector statistics:
  - Central Bank compiles and reports key ESS datasets except CPIS; authorities expressed interest in CPIS dissemination in 2019.
  - CDIS incomplete: inward direct investment reported; limited outward direct investment coverage.
  - Further work needed to improve coverage of nonfinancial private sector transactions and granularity of external debt statistics.
  - Data on the use of Bitcoin is needed; remittances in Bitcoin have started to be published.
- Additional notable data points:
  - As of September 7, 2021, El Salvador uses Bitcoin as an official currency with legal tender status alongside U.S. dollar.

*Source: 1slvea2022001 - Extract from IMF staff report and Annex X (January 3, 2022).*

### 1998. El Salvador is taking a flexibility option for

### 1998. El Salvador is taking a flexibility option for

### Data reporting and metadata
- El Salvador will continue to publish annual labor market and wages/earnings data with a timeliness of one quarter after the end of the reference year.
- A data ROSC was published in December 2004.
- Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance (As of November 30, 2021) — selected entries:
  - International Reserve Assets and Reserve Liabilities of the Monetary Authorities: Date of Latest Observation Oct-2021; Date Received Nov-2021; Frequency of Data M; Frequency of Reporting M; Frequency of Publication M.
  - Reserve/Base Money: Oct-2021; Nov-2021; M; M; M.
  - Broad Money: Oct-2021; Nov-2021; M; M; M.
  - Central Bank Balance Sheet: Oct-2021; Nov-2021; M; M; M.
  - Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Banking System: Oct-2021; Nov-2021; M; M; M.
  - Interest Rates: Nov-2021; Nov-2021; W; W; W.
  - Consumer Price Index: Oct-2021; Nov-2021; M; M; M.
  - Revenue, Expenditure, Balance and Composition of Financing — General Government: Sept-2021; Oct-2021; M; M; M.
  - Revenue, Expenditure, Balance and Composition of Financing — Central Government: Sept-2021; Oct-2021; M; M; M.
  - Stocks of Central Government and Central Government-Guaranteed Debt: Sept-2021; Oct-2021; M; M; M.
  - External Current Account Balance: June-2021; Sept-2021; Q; Q; Q.
  - Exports and Imports of Goods: Oct-2021; Nov-2021; M; M; M.
  - Exports and Imports of Services: June-2021; Sept-2021; Q; Q; Q.
  - GDP/GNP: June-2021; Sept-2021; Q; Q; Q.
  - Gross External Debt: June-2021; Sept-2021; Q; Q; Q.
  - International Investment Position: June-2021; Sept-2021; Q; Q; Q.

### Context and recent macroeconomic developments
- Pre-pandemic averages (2016–2019):
  - Economic growth: 2.5 percent (average).
  - Yearly average inflation: 0.4 percent.
  - Fiscal deficit: 2.9 percent of GDP (moderate).
  - Current account deficit: 2.0 percent of GDP.
  - Debt-to-GDP ratio at end-2019: 71.3 percent (included significant liability from private pension scheme).
- Pandemic impact and debt dynamics:
  - GDP fell by 7.9 percent in 2020.
  - Debt-to-GDP ratio increased by an estimated 17.9 percentual points in 2020.
    - 37.6 percent of the debt increase explained by expenditures to fight the pandemic.
    - 36.5 percent explained by the economic contraction.
    - 25.8 percent explained by other factors (natural growth of pension liabilities and interest service, and the one-time purchase of computers for students), according to Central Bank estimates.

### COVID-19 response, vaccination, and health outcomes
- By December 2021:
  - 71 percent of the population over six years old was fully vaccinated (with two doses), surpassing the authorities’ target of 70 percent.
  - 17.2 percent of the population over the age of six years had already received the booster vaccine.
- Authorities assured vaccine supply, including boosters in the first half of 2022.
- Preventive measures maintained: face masks, social distancing, hand-sanitary measures.

### 2021 rebound and 2022 outlook
- Authorities’ forecast for 2021:
  - Economic growth: 10.3 percent in 2021.
  - Remittances: 26.6 percent increase year over year to December 2021.
  - Investment: expected to increase 9.2 percent.
  - Exports: expected to rise 26.5 percent.
  - Imports: expected to grow 25 percent year on year.
  - Public consumption: expected to grow 7 percent in real terms.
  - Imports of goods composition: 44 percent intermediate and maquila goods; 18.1 percent capital imports.
- Authorities’ 2022 estimate:
  - Growth: 4 percent, expected to exceed potential growth.
- Policy measures supporting recovery:
  - Tourism promotion (e.g., Surf-City).
  - Cutting red tape and facilitating external trade and commerce.
  - Trust FIREMPRESA to provide financing to small and medium-sized enterprises.
  - Minimum wage increase in mid-2021 supporting consumption.

### Fiscal sustainability and revenue mobilization
- Tax revenues increased 17.3 percent through December 2021 compared to the same pre-pandemic period of 2019.
- Anti-evasion and anti-smuggling plan includes weekly reporting to the specialized unit of the General Attorney; memorandum of understanding signed in May 2021 between the Ministry of Finance and the General Attorney.
- Overall fiscal deficit:
  - 2021: -5.8 percent of GDP.
  - 2017–2019 average: -2.8 percent.
  - 2020: -10.1 percent.
- Expenditure increases driven by health spending and resources to reduce crime and insecurity.
- Measures for fiscal consolidation and debt trajectory:
  - Reduction of transfers from central government to municipalities approved by Congress in November 2021.
  - Creation of a specialized entity to support municipalities in larger investment and infrastructure projects (started operations in January 2022).
  - Continued anti-evasion and anti-smuggling efforts and assessment of additional revenue and expenditure measures.
  - Measures to strengthen public financial management framework and agreement to publish risk reports.

### Financial resilience and inclusion
- Banking system structure and soundness (as of November 2021):
  - Foreign-owned banks account for 86.4 percent of the banking system (total assets).
  - Domestic deposits finance 88.3 percent of total loans.
  - Nonperforming loans (NPLs): 2 percent by November 2021.
  - Provisioning: around 159 percent of NPLs and 3.2 percent of total loans.
  - COVID loan portfolio decreased to 9.2 percent of total loans by November 2021.
    - Composition of COVID portfolio: 27.7 percent consumption portfolio; 16.9 percent micro and small enterprises.
  - Banks’ solvency: 14.9 percent by end-November 2021 (above local regulatory minimum of 12 percent).
  - Banks have constituted voluntary provisioning for a large part of the COVID portfolio.
- Financial inclusion initiatives and digital payments:
  - Financial Innovation Office launched in December 2021 (Central Bank and Superintendence of the Financial System) with Interamerican Development Bank support.
  - New public Automated Clearing House (ACH) started operations in June 2021:
    - Reached average weight of 27.7 percent of total retail payments in seven months since start (30.4 percent by number of operations and an equivalent of 25 percent of 2021 GDP).
    - Facilitates real-time retail transfers 24/7.
  - Financial access statistics:
    - Only 23 percent of the population had a bank account in 2016 (Central Bank survey).
    - 49.1 percent of total employment in urban areas was in the informal sector by 2020 (Households and Multiple Purposes Survey).
    - One-quarter of households received remittances in 2020.
    - Remittances accounted for 25 percent of GDP in 2021.
    - 94.1 percent of total households had access to mobile phones in 2020.
    - 26.9 percent of households had access to the internet in 2020.
  - Chivo app (launched September 2021):
    - Facilitates transfers and payments in US dollars (default) or Bitcoins; Bitcoin made legal tender while dollars remain the unit of account.
    - Government provided a one-time transfer of USD $30 to each Salvadoran that downloaded the app.
    - Chivo increased participation in the retail market of payments with transactions equivalent to an average of 17.3 percent of the total number of operations in both ACH systems between October and December.
    - Chivo channeled $44 million in familiar remittances in the first three months of operation with much lower or no fees.
    - AML/CFT considerations: Chivo requires phone number, electronic copy of national IDs, and a face picture; transactions are traceable and identifiable.
    - Authorities commit to continued monitoring and strengthening regulation and oversight of Chivo and Bitcoin as the system evolves.

### Structural reforms and productivity
- Energy and infrastructure:
  - Private-investment power plant estimated at USD1.2 billion will start operations in 2022, generating energy with natural gas.
  - Geothermal energy exploration investments ongoing; new geothermal energy expected in next few years.
  - In 2021, 82.1 percent of domestically generated energy originated from renewable sources on average.
  - Imported energy accounted for 18.9 percent of total energy supply.
  - Authorities expect renewable share to rise to 100 percent by 2023.
- Education and digitalization:
  - One laptop per public school student policy:
    - By end-2021, 70 percent of all public sector students in grades 4th to 9th had benefitted.
    - Gap for 4th–9th grades and 1st–3rd grades expected to be closed in 2022.
    - Policy covers approximately 1.3 million public sector students; described as a one-time expenditure in the 2021–2022 budget.
- Security and business environment:
  - “Plan de Control Territorial” contributed to reduced crime and insecurity.
    - Homicide rate reduced in 2021 by 67 percent of what was the rate in 2019, according to official statistics.
  - Authorities committed to improving competitiveness, governance, AML/CFT, and anti-corruption frameworks.
    - Draft law to include virtual assets within AML/CFT scope expected to pass Congress in second half of the year.
    - Early January agreement among Ministry of Finance, General Attorney, Superintendent of Financial System, and Ministry of Security to strengthen cooperation against AML and tax crimes.
  - Central Bank action plan to implement strengthening measures following the Safeguards Assessment of 2020.

### Fund engagement and capacity development
- El Salvador has engaged in Fund technical assistance on fiscal and customs efficiency, revenue mobilization, and financial regulation and supervision.
- Authorities value Fund capacity development as instrumental for technical capacity building and shaping policy proposals.
- Authorities express appreciation for close and permanent dialogue with the Fund.

*Statement by Mr. Moreno, Executive Director and Mr. Cartagena, Senior Advisor to Executive Director on El Salvador — January 24, 2022*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2022/english/1slvea2022001.pdf_
