## 1civea2023002 ## Source details **Canonical URL:** [1civea2023002](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2023/english/1civea2023002.pdf) ## Other formats - [Markdown version](/-/media/files/publications/cr/2023/english/1civea2023002.pdf.md) - [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/publications/cr/2023/english/1civea2023002.pdf.json) --- ### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY — Main purpose and scope - On-site visit dates: 6-24 June 2022. - Scope: assessment of AML/CFT measures in the Republique of Côte d’Ivoire; analysis of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and effectiveness of the AML/CFT system; recommendations for strengthening the system. ### KEY FINDINGS — Overview - Progress since 2012: adoption of AML/CFT Law in 2016; National Risk Assessment (NRA) drafted (May 2020); National Strategy (2020–2030) adopted; increased awareness-raising; PPEF established (operational since October 2020). - Structural challenges: prevalence of cash; informal sector size: “35 to 40 percent of the GDP”; porous borders; cross-border nature of offences; corruption. - Capacity and coordination gaps: FIU limited technical and human resources; national coordination exists (Coordination Committee) but does not fully involve supervisory authorities. - Use of financial intelligence: between 2017 and 2021 the FIU received 2,303 STRs, disseminated 148 (linked to 285 STRs), and provisionally classified 490; by end-2021, 1,528 STRs remained under analysis. - Judicial outcomes: PPEF opened 270 ML cases (of 404 total cases at PPEF), 52 ML sentencing decisions since 2020, confiscation orders in the majority of ML convictions; TF prosecutions: nine proceedings opened, no trials or convictions to date. *Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1civea2023002).* ### TERRORIST FINANCING (TF) — Investigations, prosecutions, TFS, NPOs, PF - TF investigations and prosecutions - Number of TF prosecutions initiated: 9. - Status: To date, no case brought to trial; no convictions obtained; three prosecutions closed; six ongoing. - TF prosecutions mostly initiated following terrorist attacks targeting Côte d’Ivoire. - Identified TF methods in investigations: sale of cattle; use of mobile money; cross-border physical transport; informal transfers. - Criminalization gap: “The financing of a terrorist organization, for any purpose whatsoever, is not criminalized.” - Targeted Financial Sanctions (TFS) — UNSCR 1267 / 1373 - Community-wide framework applies to banks and financial establishments only. - TFS are not implemented nationally due to lack of decisions by the WAEMU Council of Ministers; in practice the 1267, 1718, and 2231 Lists are applied voluntarily by the vast majority of banks and a significant number of other FIs. - DNFBPs do not implement TFS. - No freezing of funds or confiscation of assets occurred at the operational level under TF-related TFS. - Côte d’Ivoire has not proposed any designations to the 1267/1989 Committee. - Non-profit organizations (NPOs) - Registered associations as of end-December 2020: 8,630. - NRA conclusion for NPOs: “very high” risk related to religious NPOs; competent CFT supervisory authority for NPOs not designated by end of on-site visit. - No NPO has submitted an STR to the FIU. - Proliferation Financing (PF) TFS - Except for one entity designated in 2020 (Mansudae case: frozen amount 4,760,885 XOF), PF-related TFS are not implemented due to absence of Orders transposing the 1718 and 2231 Lists into national law. - No systematic identification/freezing of assets of targeted persons/entities in PF context. - Broader TF environment and effectiveness - NRA TF conclusion: TF exposure is high. - Observed TF vulnerabilities: significant informal cash flows; porous borders; low identification of TF cases beyond attacks against Côte d’Ivoire. - Effectiveness ratings noted: IO.9 – TF investigation and prosecution: Low; IO.10 – TF preventive measures and financial sanctions: Low; IO.11 – PF financial sanctions: Low. *Source: Sections on TF, TFS, NPOs, PF (1civea2023002).* ### NATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT (NRA) AND NATIONAL STRATEGY - NRA - Adopted: May 2020 (coordinated by Coordination Committee). - Main internal ML threats identified: corruption and bribery; illicit trafficking in drugs and psychotropic substances; tax offenses; environmental offenses; cybercrime. - TF assessment in NRA: “level of exposure to TF risks is high.” - Limitations: insufficient examination of financial/commercial flows linked to corruption; limited analysis of cross-border flows; limited TF typology/data. - National Strategy (2020–2030) - Objectives include: review of Community-wide preventive measures; integrated information-exchange system; designation of supervisory authorities for DNFBPs, NPOs, certain FIs; ensure implementation of confiscation sanctions. - Timing gaps in NS: enhanced due diligence for family members of PEPs planned from 2024; virtual assets measures planned for 2026. *Source: NRA and NS excerpts (1civea2023002).* ### FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT (FIU/CENTIF) — capacity, outputs, and limitations - Inputs and processing - STR counts (by year): 2017 234; 2018 364; 2019 631; 2020 506; 2021 568; TOTAL 2,303. - CTR counts (by year): 2017 00; 2018 74; 2019 144.145; 2020 385.388; 2021 345.663; TOTAL 875.270. - FIU staff: 36 technical and administrative staff; seven analysts in Analysis and National Cooperation Department (DACN); two individuals in Strategic Analysis Department (DRS). - IT/process limitations: manual receipt/processing of STRs (Word/PDF via encrypted email), obsolete computer system, absence of data-mining/analytical tools; large processing delays — by end-2021 many older STRs remained under analysis (80% of 2017 STRs; 70% of 2018; 81.8% of 2019). - Requests made by FIU (2017–2021): international information requests sent 132; national information requests sent 263; requisitions to LEAs 186; total national IRs and requisitions 449. - Output and use - Disseminations: 148 disseminations stemming from 285 STRs; most disseminations related to scamming: 52 percent; corruption-related disseminations: 8.8 percent; tax evasion: 6 percent; illicit drug trafficking: 1.3 percent; no TF-related disseminations. - Strategic analysis: few comprehensive strategic analyses and few typologies; recognized lack as strategic deficiency. - FIU operational achievements: disseminations contributed to notable ML convictions and confiscations; FIU received Egmont Best Case Award for one dissemination. - Recommendations specific to FIU - Update FIU IT system; invest in analytical tools and human resources. - Produce guidelines, typologies, and targeted red flags; provide feedback to reporting entities. - Ensure secure, dedicated channels for reception, communication, and dissemination. *Source: FIU sections and tables (1civea2023002).* ### INVESTIGATIONS, PROSECUTIONS, SPECIALIZED COURTS (PPEF) — ML and TF - PPEF (Economic and Financial Crimes Tribunal) - Operational since October 2020; specialized trial Chamber began October 2021; Law No. 2022-193 (11 March 2022) enshrined autonomy. - PPEF case statistics (as of May 27, 2022 / Oct 31, 2021 / referenced dates): - Total cases opened at PPEF: 404. - ML/TF cases opened: 270 (of 404). - Cases received from FIU: 112. - Cases referred to court: 163. - Cases adjudicated: 115 (as of data snapshot); number of acquittals: 9. - Conviction rate reported in adjudicated cases: 92% (some figures state 91% / 92% depending on table). - ML cases filed at PPEF: 270; ML cases opened following FIU dissemination: 112. - 52 ML sentencing decisions imposed since 2020. - ML investigations and prosecutions — findings - ML offense targeted in two thirds of PPEF cases for profit-generating offences but prosecuted as separate offense mainly for FIU-originated cases. - ML prosecutions largely self-laundering: Of 270 ML cases, 255 self-laundering, 15 laundering by third parties, 14 standalone ML investigations. - International aspects underutilized: 71 cases relate to predicates committed at least in part abroad (16%); only 11 mutual legal assistance (MLA) requests pursued in such cases. - Confiscation outcomes and practice - Out of 104 adjudicated PPEF cases since establishment, 56 led to confiscation measures. - In ML cases: confiscation orders issued in 44 of 52 adjudicated ML cases since 2020. - Cash seizures: between Oct 2020 and Oct 2021 PPEF cash seizures rose to over 8,571,000,000 XOF (13.7 million USD), with nearly 4 billion XOF subsequently returned. - Seized asset types: land parcels 15; real estate 59; vehicles 24; vessel 1; bank accounts 91; insurance policies 2; gold ingots recorded in coins and grams. - AGRAC established by decree of June 1, 2022 to manage recovery and recovery operations; not operational at time of on-site visit. - TF investigations — findings - Nine TF cases opened; majority launched after attacks; no cases brought to trial; no TF convictions/TF confiscations. - Investigative capacity and prioritization insufficient; lack of TF national strategy integration; criminalization gap (financing of a terrorist organization for any purpose not criminalized). - Recommendations for justice and investigations - Develop comprehensive criminal justice policy prioritizing ML and confiscation. - Increase use of parallel financial investigations and special investigative techniques; improve coordination under Public Prosecutor’s authority; train magistrates on MLA and asset recovery; operationalize AGRAC with safeguards. *Source: PPEF / IO.7 and IO.8 sections (1civea2023002).* ### CONFISCATION — Results, management, and international cooperation - Confiscation outputs and statistics - Of 104 PPEF-adjudicated cases: 56 led to confiscation measures. - In ML adjudications: 44 confiscation orders of 52 ML adjudicated cases. - Notable confiscation example (pyramid scheme): seizure of “a sum of just over 24,000,000,000 XOF (USD 38.4 million)”; sentences included 20 years’ imprisonment and fines up to “142 billion XOF”. - Seizure totals at airports (2017–2021): 4,748,000,000 XOF (USD 7.6 million). - Institutional arrangements - AGRAC created by decree 1 June 2022; mission: execute freezing/seizure/confiscation orders, recover assets, cooperate internationally; not operational at visit time. - AJE previously in charge of recovery and management; limited case management historically. - Cross-border confiscation and MLA - MLA use in confiscation matters minimal: only one MLA request reported by Côte d’Ivoire for confiscation and repatriation of assets; no asset repatriation processed by evaluation date. - Short pre-trial detention periods limit investigators’ ability to wait for MLA; recommendation to partition cases and run parallel financial investigations. - Recommendations on confiscation and asset recovery - Strengthen legal framework for confiscation (broaden scope, provisional measures, post-conviction investigations). - Increase MLA and informal cooperation and operationalize AGRAC with safeguards. - Improve management/storage of seized goods and restitution processes for victims. *Source: Confiscation sections (1civea2023002).* ### PREVENTIVE MEASURES, FIs, MVTS, DFS, EMIs, AND DNFBPs - Financial sector structure and materiality (selected figures) - Credit Institutions (CIs): 31 licensed (29 banks, 2 banking financial institutions); total CI capital: 599.7 billion XOF (USD 959 million) end-2021; CIs balance sheet total: 18,657 billion XOF (~USD 30 billion), ~52% of GDP. - Microfinance (June 2022): 46 licensed DFSs; outstanding credit: 440.8 billion XOF (USD 682 million); outstanding deposits: 450 billion XOF (USD 696.5 million). - Mobile money (2020): activity by 13 institutions; number of opened accounts: approximately 37.6 million (about one-third active); value of transactions: 13,752 billion XOF (USD 22 billion). - Insurance market (2020): total revenue 414.5 billion XOF (USD 663.7 million); Côte d’Ivoire’s share of CIMA zone: 30%; penetration rate: 1.58 percent. - Virtual asset sector: NRA reports six service points concentrated in Abidjan; VASPs active but not licensed/regulatory framework absent. - Understanding and implementation of AML/CFT by reporting entities - STRs by reporting-entity type (2017–2021 totals): - Banks: Total 1,341. - DFSs: Total 863. - Insurance companies: Total 60. - EMIs: Total 33. - DNFBPs: Total 3. - Total STRs (by year) 2017 232; 2018 364; 2019 631; 2020 506; 2021 567 — Total 2,300 (source table). - STRs do not align with main ML/TF risks: very few for TF, drug trafficking, corruption, environmental crime. - FIs in international/regional groups: more mature AML/CFT implementation; other FIs (EMIs, small DFSs, FX bureaus) show weak implementation and weak understanding of ML/TF risks. - MVTS/subagent vulnerabilities: banks and DFSs providing MVTS often rely on technical platforms and subagents; data related to MVTS subagents not systematically accessible to compliance departments. - DNFBPs and SRBs - SRBs designated (Ordinance No. 2022-237 of 30 March 2022) for: lawyers, notaries, public accountants (chartered accountants), judicial officers, justice commissioners — but had not started operations by end of on-site visit. - Supervisory authorities not assigned for: real estate agents and developers; DPMS (dealers in precious metals and stones); casinos and gaming establishments; business agents; service providers to corporations and trusts; auditors. - Business agents: approximately 500 (approx.); not subject to AML/CFT obligations. - Real estate sector: assessed High risk; no supervisory authority designated; law sets a maximum cash ceiling but implementing decree absent — cash payments remain frequent. - VASPs - VASPs present but “neither licensed, nor regulated, nor supervised” — legal framework absent; risks identified include facilitation of tax fraud, ML/TF, and other illegal activities. - Preventive measures weaknesses and recommended actions - Weak BO identification across FIs; BO identification largely limited to 25% shareholder test. - Need for sector-specific guidance, typologies, feedback from FIU, and strengthened risk-based supervision in cooperation with supranational authorities (BCEAO, BC/GSBC, CREPMF, CIMA/CRCA). - Priority actions include: strengthen legal framework (preventive measures, TF criminalization, TFS transposition), implement effective supervision of FIs and DNFBPs, designate supervisory authorities for all DNFBP categories, subject business agents to AML/CFT obligations, and define legal framework for VASPs. *Source: Preventive measures, sectoral data, and DNFBP mapping (1civea2023002).* ### TRANSPARENCY OF LEGAL PERSONS, BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP (BO), AND REGISTERS - Basic company and legal person counts (selected) - Partnerships: 160,456. - Commercial companies: 60,422. - Cooperatives: 5,844. - Joint-stock companies: 2,900. - Civil companies (including real estate companies): 1,053 (real estate companies: 773). - Associations: 834. - NGOs: 482. - Registers and BO access - RCCM (Trade and Personal Property Credit Register) capacity limited: estimated full online information available for ~20% of companies; only Commercial Court of Abidjan RCCM operationally capable covering ~80% registrations; other local registers not digitized. - DGI provides BO information upon demand “in a timely manner” (less than 48 hours when necessary); since 2020 DGI collects BO info at company creation but no mechanism ensured for updates. - Legal and factual gaps: no comprehensive assessment of ML/TF risks by category of legal persons; no mechanism ensuring regular updates and accuracy of BO registers; RCCM lacks sanctioning powers for failure to provide/update basic info. - Bearer shares: issuance prohibited since 2014; conversion deadline May 5, 2016 — authorities could not demonstrate conversion coverage or numbers. - Conclusions on legal persons and BO - IO.5 (Legal persons and arrangements): Low level of effectiveness. - Recommendations: assess ML/TF risks by legal person category; enhance RCCM resources and inspection powers; ensure timely access to BO information for authorities; establish effective sanctions and mechanisms to prevent misuse (nominee directors, bearer shares). *Source: Chapter on legal persons, RCCM, DGI (1civea2023002).* ### INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (IO.2) — MLA, extradition, FIU cooperation, asset recovery - MLA and extradition practice (2017–2021) - Incoming MLA requests (2017–2021): total 32 — Executed requests: 1 — Requests in progress: 31. - Yearly breakdown: 2017 02 (33/13 in FIU table), 2018 04, 2019 14, 2020 07, 2021 05. - Extradition requests received (2017–2021): total 14 — Executed: 6; Non-executed/other: 8. - Outgoing MLA requests by Côte d’Ivoire (2017–2021): total 11. - Observations: judicial authorities rarely request MLA despite transnational nature of major threats; when MLA requests received by Côte d’Ivoire they are often slow to process; many incoming MLA requests remained in progress for years. - FIU international cooperation - FIU outgoing requests (2017–2021): 132 sent to foreign FIUs; of these 82 were made as part of STR processing; FIU received 115 assistance requests and provided 92 responses (23 unanswered requests remained, mostly 2017–2018). - Exchanges primarily via Egmont Secure Web; FIU signed MOUs with 18 foreign FIUs. - Asset recovery and ARIN-WA - AJE acted as Permanent Secretariat for ARIN-WA; AJE received five ARIN-WA requests between Oct 2019 and June 2022 and responded to four between 2021 and June 2022. - MLA and asset-recovery cooperation in confiscation matters almost non-existent; only one MLA request for confiscation/repatriation noted. - Institutional and legal constraints - Extradition legal framework relies on French 1927 law; execution delays average three months despite 30-day statutory limit. - No operational follow-up mechanism for MLA requests; reliance on diplomatic channels reduces efficiency. - Recommendations on international cooperation - Develop framework legislation and procedural manuals for MLA/extradition; establish operational follow-up mechanism via DACP; strengthen FIU’s legal powers to exchange information beyond WAEMU; increase training and resources for investigating/prosecuting authorities to use MLA effectively. *Source: International cooperation sections, tables, and annexes (1civea2023002).* ### EFFECTIVENESS RATINGS AND TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE (selected) - Immediate Outcomes — Level of Effectiveness (Table summary) - IO.1 – Risk, policy, and coordination: Moderate - IO.2 – International cooperation: Low - IO.3 – Supervision: Low - IO.4 – Preventive measures: Low - IO.5 – Legal persons and arrangements: Low - IO.6 – Financial intelligence: Low - IO.7 – ML investigation and prosecution: Moderate - IO.8 – Confiscation: Moderate - IO.9 – TF investigation and prosecution: Low - IO.10 – TF preventive measures and financial sanctions: Low - IO.11 – PF financial sanctions: Low - Selected FATF 40 Recommendation technical compliance (as presented) - R.1 – PC - R.2 – PC - R.3 – LC - R.4 – PC - R.5 – PC - R.6 – NC - R.8 – NC - R.10 – LC - R.11 – PC - R.12 – PC - R.18 – PC - R.24 – PC - R.25 – PC - R.26 – PC - R.27 – PC - R.28 – NC - R.29 – PC - R.30 – NC - R.31 – LC - R.36 – LC - R.37 – PC - R.38 – PC - R.39 – LC - R.40 – PC *Source: Effectiveness and Technical Compliance summary (1civea2023002).* ### PRIORITY ACTIONS (selected) - Strengthen legal framework: preventive measures; criminalization of TF (including financing of a terrorist organization for any purpose); TFS transposition for UNSCRs; confiscation; international cooperation. - Deepen understanding of ML/TF risks: more typologies and sectoral analyses; focus on corruption and TF; real estate, NPOs, cross-border flows, informal economy. - Implement effective, risk-based supervision for FIs and DNFBPs; designate supervisors/SRBs for all DNFBPs (including business agents, real estate, DPMS, casinos); apply sanctions commensurate with violations. - Improve BO identification: effective mechanisms to access BO information and mitigate ML risks from corruption and PEPs. - Enhance FIU capacity: upgrade IT system; analytical tools; human resources; produce typologies, guidance, targeted red flags; provide feedback to reporting entities. - Criminal justice policy and international cooperation: establish criminal-justice policy prioritizing ML and confiscation; increase the use of MLA/extradition and informal cooperation for asset recovery; operationalize AGRAC. - CFT integration: integrate CFT into national counter-terrorism policy; implement TFS under UNSCR 1267 without delay; designate NPO supervisory authority and comprehensive NPO register; supervise high-risk NPOs. *Source: Priority Actions (1civea2023002).* _Italic: Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY and selected chapters/excerpts from IMF country report content unit 1civea2023002 — Côte d’Ivoire IMF report (on-site visit 6-24 June 2022)._ ### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY __________________________________________________________________________ 9 ### 1civea2023002 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - This report summarizes AML/CFT measures in the Republique of Côte d’Ivoire (Côte d’Ivoire) at the time of the on-site visit (6-24 June 2022). It analyzes the level of compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the effectiveness of Côte d’Ivoire’s AML/CFT system and provides recommendations on how the system could be strengthened. ### KEY FINDINGS - 1. Côte d’Ivoire has achieved progress in countering money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) since the 2012 mutual evaluation, particularly with the adoption of the AML/CFT Law in 2016, the drafting of a national risk assessment (NRA) and a national strategy, as well as awareness-raising among various actors regarding AML/CFT issues. The effects of this endeavor have begun to materialize, notably with the new impetus provided to judicial investigations and proceedings related to financial crime. As long as they are sustained, strengthened, and based on a deeper understanding of risks, these reforms should bear more fruit in the coming years. Nevertheless, certain structural elements, such as the prevalence of cash and magnitude of the informal sector to the country’s economy, the cross-border nature of offenses, as well as corruption, continue to challenge the effectiveness of the AML/CFT regime. - 2. The authorities have identified high risk sectors and key domestic ML/TF threats. However, they have failed to demonstrate a detailed understanding of ML and TF methods used in practice. This limitation relates to several key issues in the context of the country, notably cross-border financial flows, the financial sector, and corruption, and hampers the adoption of a risk-based approach. - 3. The authorities have taken measures in response to certain risks which are deemed high, particularly with regard to corruption or the real estate sector, but these measures are still recent and have only addressed the risks to a certain extent. National coordination is facilitated through interactions between the National Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and most authorities involved in AML/CFT or in vulnerable sectors, yet this coordination does not extend to supervisory authorities. - 4. Financial intelligence disseminated by the FIU has allowed the country to secure notable ML convictions and confiscations, even if the degree of sophistication of such disseminations remains to be improved. The absence of TF disseminations constitutes a strategic deficiency. The FIU develops few comprehensive strategic analyses, mainly due to limited technical and IT capacities, and a lack of human resources. - 5. The Economic and Financial Crimes Tribunal (PPEF) and some investigative authorities make use of financial intelligence and other information in an adequate manner, in order to develop evidence and identify criminal proceeds. Other investigative authorities, however, despite their strategic role in combating the main threats, make little use of financial intelligence to investigate on ML, predicate offenses and TF. Generally speaking, the PPEF and investigative authorities make a very limited use of the information they can obtain from the FIU and their foreign counterparts. - 6. The PPEF’s rapid rise has enabled judicial authorities to effectively take charge of ML cases. ML offenses are now targeted more systematically in predicate offense proceedings, yet there remains room for improvement. ML is not sufficiently prosecuted as an independent offense, which impedes the authorities’ ability to deepen the asset and financial components of their investigations, particularly in international cases. While the existence of transnational crime is well established, the international aspects of investigations are under-exploited. - 7. Prosecuted cases and confiscations are partially aligned with the most prominent threats identified. Cases linked to corruption have only led to a few prosecutions or convictions, despite the systemic nature of this crime. Other threats deemed as a priority, specifically environmental crime and tax fraud, are not sufficiently prosecuted. - 8. Imposed sentences are generally effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. - 9. Judicial authorities issue confiscation orders in the vast majority of ML cases, and in the majority of cases involving predicate offenses, despite the fact that public authorities do not assign priority to this topic. A certain number of decisions targeted complex confiscations, significant amounts and assets of varying nature, sometimes involving legal persons. The establishment of the Agency for the Management and Recovery of Criminal Assets (AGRAC) is a strong signal and the premise for increased effectiveness of confiscation mechanisms. There is significant room for improvement with regard to the confiscation of assets held abroad and the confiscation of cash at the border, which are not proportionate to transnational threats. *Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1civea2023002) — Côte d’Ivoire IMF report (on-site visit 6-24 June 2022).* ### 10. For the most part, TF prosecutions were launched following terrorist attacks, and ### 10. For the most part, TF prosecutions were launched following terrorist attacks, and the number of TF investigations remains low ### Terrorist financing (TF) investigations, prosecutions, and outcomes - Nine TF prosecutions have been initiated. - Prosecuted cases were, for the most part, initiated following terrorist attacks against Côte d’Ivoire. - To date, no case has been brought to trial; thus, no convictions have been obtained, and no confiscations have been ordered. - The identification of potential cases involving the financing of terrorist organizations, individuals, or activities outside of Côte d’Ivoire does not appear to be a priority. - Investigations have identified TF cases relating to the sale of cattle and the use of mobile money. - The financing of a terrorist organization, for any purpose whatsoever, is not criminalized, limiting the ability to effectively prosecute and sanction TF offenses. ### Targeted financial sanctions (TFS) and implementation gaps - The Community-wide legal framework for implementation of TFS under UNSCR 1267 only applies to banks and financial establishments. - TFS are not implemented by Côte d’Ivoire due to the lack of decisions by the WAEMU Council of Ministers, or of a national mechanism for bridging this gap. - The 1267 List and other sanctions lists (1718 and 2231) are applied by the vast majority of banks—and a significant number of other FIs—on a voluntary basis. - DNFBPs do not implement TFS. - The few national designations made under UNSCR 1373 were not implemented without delay and did not prove effective. - Côte d’Ivoire has not proposed any designations to the 1267/1989 Committee and has never called upon a third country to give effect to actions taken as part of its own freezing mechanisms. - No freezing of funds or confiscation of assets has occurred in the framework of TFS implementation at the operational level. ### Non-profit organizations (NPOs) and supervisory capacity - Authorities have not yet identified the totality of active NPOs in Côte d’Ivoire, nor the nature of threats posed by terrorist entities against NPOs. - Relevant awareness-raising efforts remain nascent. - Authorities have implemented some general supervisory activities, but those do not specifically target TF. - The TF supervisory authority for NPOs has not yet been appointed. ### Proliferation financing (PF) financial sanctions - With the exception of one entity designated in 2020, TFS related to PF are not implemented due to the absence of Orders aimed at transposing the 1718 and 2231 Lists into national law. - The 1718 and 2231 Lists are applied by the vast majority of banks, and a significant number of other FIs, on a voluntary basis. - No independent efforts have been demonstrated for identifying and freezing the assets of targeted persons and entities in the context of PF-related TFS. ### Broader ML/TF risk environment and preventive shortcomings - Côte d’Ivoire is exposed to a high TF risk and growing terrorist threats, notably in the northern border regions. - Recent trends show funds are being collected in the form of cash through criminal activity, such as the sale of stolen cattle, and informal channels are used to transfer the funds. - Possible links between TF and predicate offenses, such as drug trafficking and illicit gold mining, have been noted by the authorities. - The significance of the informal sector, where customer due diligence measures are not applied, impacts the general effectiveness of ML/TF prevention. - FIs have a limited understanding of ML risks, and an even more limited understanding of TF risks. - Reporting activity does not reflect major ML/TF risks in Côte d’Ivoire; STR distributions to the FIU show major discrepancies. - DNFBPs do not fulfill AML/CFT requirements and either do not yet have a designated supervisory authority or such authorities had not yet started their activity at the time of the on-site visit. - Virtual asset service providers (VASPs) are active but are neither licensed, nor regulated, nor supervised due to the absence of a relevant legal framework; as a result, they do not implement due diligence measures. ### Use of financial intelligence, international cooperation, and judicial practice relevant to TF - The FIU’s capacity to produce operational and strategic analyses in a timely manner is low due to inadequate technical resources and insufficient human resources. - The absence of TF-related disseminations from the FIU is regarded as a strategic deficiency. - Judicial authorities rarely request mutual legal assistance (MLA); proactive use of other forms of cooperation is insufficient, considering the transnational nature of most proceeds-generating offenses. - International aspects of investigations remain underutilized, except when investigations are launched by foreign authorities. - The ability to trace proceeds and pursue cross-border elements is greatly limited by very low use of information from foreign partners. ### Key deficiencies affecting TF effectiveness - Lack of a national counter-terrorism strategy incorporating TF investigations. - TF investigations remain few relative to the high TF risk profile. - Criminalization gaps: financing of a terrorist organization for any purpose is not criminalized. - Non-implementation of TFS at the national level and delayed/ineffective national designations. - Incomplete identification and supervision of NPOs with respect to TF risk. - Significant informal cash flows and porous borders increase vulnerability to TF. - Limited FI understanding of TF typologies and weak reporting on attempted/structured transactions. *Source: 1civea2023002 - 10. For the most part, TF prosecutions were launched following terrorist attacks, and* ### 49. Self-regulatory bodies (SRBs) have been designated for lawyers, notaries, public ### 49. Self-regulatory bodies (SRBs) have been designated for lawyers, notaries, public ### SRBs, DNFBPs, and supervision - SRBs have been designated for lawyers, notaries, public accountants, judicial officers, and justice commissioners towards the end of the on-site visit but had not commenced their operations. - Supervisory authorities for other DNFBPs (namely, real estate agents and brokers, DPMS, casinos and gaming establishments, business agents (agents d’affaires), service providers to corporations and trusts, and auditors) have not been assigned yet. - Efforts by the authorities to raise awareness among DNFBPs are commendable but are still at the embryonic stages. - Business agents are not subject to AML/CFT obligations. - The designation of supervisory authorities or SRBs for all DNFBPs is necessary (Priority Actions). ### VASPs - There are active VASPs in Côte d’Ivoire. - These VASPs are neither licensed, nor regulated, nor supervised, in the absence of a relevant legal framework. ### Transparency of legal persons and arrangements (Chapter 7 – IO. 5; R.24-25) - The authorities’ understanding of risks associated with legal persons remains quite limited and fragmented, despite the frequent use of legal persons for the concealment of criminal proceeds. - Côte d’Ivoire has not undertaken an assessment of ML/TF risks associated with the various categories of legal persons. - Basic information that is easily accessible and searchable remains fragmentary, in an economy where the informal sector plays a significant role. - Resources available to the Trade and Personal Property Credit Register (RCCM) do not allow it to perform proper inspections and ensure that such basic information is accurate and up to date. - The RCCM is not equipped to sanction any natural or legal person that fails to provide basic information on a legal person or keep such information up to date. - Authorities cannot rely on FIs and DNFBPs in accessing timely, accurate, and updated BO information. ### Beneficial ownership (BO) information and tax authority practices - The General Tax Directorate (DGI) provides, upon demand and in a timely manner, BO information kept in the legal persons registers. - Record-keeping in legal persons is not subject to regular and sufficient audits. - Since 2020, the DGI also collects information on the BO of legal persons at the time of their creation but has not demonstrated to what extent this facilitates access to such information. - There is no mechanism ensuring regular updates. - Tax authorities indicated that they have imposed ad hoc sanctions against legal persons that failed to fulfill their BO requirements; it could not be established that such sanctions are of an effective, proportionate, and dissuasive nature. ### International cooperation (Chapter 8 – IO. 2; R.36-40) - Judicial authorities rarely request MLA, despite the great threat posed by transnational crime to the country. - When they receive MLA requests, they do not provide constructive and timely mutual legal assistance. - Beyond MLA, with the exception of the FIU, competent authorities rarely cooperate with their foreign counterparts. - The proactive use of international cooperation is insufficient, considering the transnational nature of most predicate offenses. - Authorities only rarely exchange BO information with their foreign partners. - Priority Action: Put in place an operational follow-up mechanism for the effective processing and prioritization of MLA requests, in order to provide and request constructive, timely cooperation, and promote the capacity of the relevant authorities in general. ### Priority Actions (selected) - Strengthen the legal framework, particularly with regard to preventive measures, the criminalization of TF, TFS in relation to TF, confiscation, and international cooperation. - Deepen the understanding of ML/TF risks by authorities and reporting entities, including risks associated with legal persons. Major threats such as corruption and TF, and vulnerabilities in the real estate and non-profit sectors, as well as cross-border flows and the informal economy, must receive special attention. - Implement effective supervision for FIs and DNFBPs, in collaboration with supranational authorities where necessary. Supervisory strategies, controls, and sanctions must be based on a deeper understanding of the risks within various sectors and reporting entities. - Take measures aimed at mitigating ML risks emanating from corruption, including effective BO identification, as well as risk management measures in relation to PEPs. Make better use of financial intelligence and other information in judicial investigations, including information which can be obtained from foreign counterparts. - Update the FIU’s IT system and provide it with adequate human resources and analytical tools, in order to allow it to produce operational and strategic analyses, higher in number and sophistication. Issue guidelines, typologies, and targeted red flags in order to improve the reporting by covered entities, particularly in sectors where inherent ML/TF risk is high. Furthermore, the FIU should provide feedback to reporting entities. - Develop an overall criminal justice policy which gives priority to the countering of ML and confiscation as the main tools for countering all forms of serious crime and promote the international aspect of criminal investigations and the recovery of assets held abroad, through international cooperation, both formal and informal. - In order to promote complex ML investigations linked to major threats (corruption, organized crime, etc.), ensure timely access by authorities to up to date and accurate information on legal persons and their beneficial owners. - Integrate CFT into the counter-terrorism policy, and significantly increase the number of TF investigations, prosecutions, and convictions, mainly by building the capacities of investigative authorities. TFS under UNSCR 1267 must be implemented without delay, and authorities must consider imposing TFS at the national level. A national authority should be designated for maintaining a dedicated NPO register and monitor the latter with regards to TF issues in order to apply risk-based measures to NPOs at risk of being abused for TF and undertake appropriate supervision in this regard. - Reinforce recent efforts in relation to the collection of statistics, particularly through the establishment of the national AML/CFT/CPF statistics service. ### Effectiveness and Technical Compliance Ratings (selected) - Effectiveness level ratings (high, substantial, moderate, or low) — Table 1. Côte d’Ivoire: Level of Effectiveness: - IO.1 – Risk, policy, and coordination: Moderate - IO.2 – International cooperation: Low - IO.3 – Supervision: Low - IO.4 – Preventive measures: Low - IO.5 – Legal persons and arrangements: Low - IO.6 – Financial intelligence: Low - IO.7 – ML investigation and prosecution: Moderate - IO.8 – Confiscation: Moderate - IO.9 – TF investigation and prosecution: Low - IO.10 – TF preventive measures and financial sanctions: Low - IO.11 – PF financial sanctions: Low - Level of Technical Compliance — Table 2. Côte d’Ivoire: Level of Technical Compliance (selected entries preserved as in source): - R.1 – Assessing risks and applying and risk-based approach: PC - R.2 – National cooperation and coordination: PC - R.3 – Money laundering offense: LC - R.4 – Confiscation and provisional measures: PC - R.5 – Terrorist financing offense: PC - R.6 – Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism & terrorist financing: NC - R.8 – Non-profit organizations: NC - R.10 – Customer due diligence: LC - R.11 – Record-keeping: PC - R.12 – Politically exposed persons: PC - R.18 – Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries: PC - R.24 – Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons: PC - R.25 – Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal arrangements: PC - R.26 – Regulation and supervision of financial institutions: PC - R.27 – Powers of supervisors: PC - R.28 – Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs: NC - R.29 – Financial intelligence units: PC - R.30 – Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities: NC - R.31 – Powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities: LC - R.36 – International instruments: LC - R.37 – Mutual legal assistance: PC - R.38 – Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation: PC - R.39 – Extradition: LC - R.40 – Other forms of international cooperation: PC *Source: 1civea2023002 - 49. Self-regulatory bodies (SRBs) have been designated for lawyers, notaries, public accountants, judicial officers, and justice commissioners towards the end of the on-site visit but had not commenced their operations.* ### 2020. The Court of Audit, meanwhile, is the supreme State Audit institution. Below these courts of ### 1civea2023002 - 2020. The Court of Audit, meanwhile, is the supreme State Audit institution. Below these courts of ### Hierarchy in Ivorian law - The constitution - Duly ratified conventions and treaties - Laws and ordinances - Decrees - Orders - Circulars - Memoranda ### ML/TF threats and major predicate offenses - Major predicate offenses to ML in Côte d’Ivoire (independent public sources): corruption; environmental crimes; drug trafficking; counterfeiting; counterfeit medicine; fraud; scams. - Corruption manifestations: daily-level corruption (routine administrative procedures/controls) and higher-level corruption (misappropriation of public funds). - Estimated cost of corruption (Ministry of Good Governance and the Fight against Corruption): 1,300 billion XOF (USD 2.1 billion) per year, equivalent to 4 percent of GDP. - Environmental crimes: illegal gold mining; exploitation of protected forests; trafficking in protected wildlife. - Drug issues: local production/consumption of cannabis and methamphetamines; major transit country for cocaine trafficking. - Fraud and scams: tax, customs, and document fraud; insurance fraud; identity fraud; forgery and use of forged documents; cybercrime. - Terrorist-related threats: incursions and activity by groups such as Macina Liberation Front (affiliated with Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)), Islamic State, Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP); attacks in 2016, 2020, and 2021; presence near northern border regions. ### Geographic, regional, and sectoral exposure - Côte d’Ivoire’s position: important in regional economy, developed and open financial sector, major cross-border commercial and financial flows with regional partners and international financial centers in Europe and Asia. - Role in WAEMU: serves as a financial center for the WAEMU region; free movement of persons and goods in WAEMU exacerbates ML/TF risks. - Sectors with increased vulnerability: real estate sector; agricultural sector (coffee-cocoa subsector in particular); mining sector; banking sector. - Additional vulnerability factors: porous borders; lacking customs controls. ### ML/TF vulnerabilities and institutional capacity - Shortages in national AML/CFT capabilities (human, material, financial), notably FIU and AML/CFT Coordination Committee. - Corruption within investigative and prosecution authorities undermines AML/CFT effectiveness. - Gaps in authorities’ understanding of risks and infrequent dissemination of typology information affect reporting entities’ implementation of measures. - Large informal economy: constitutes 35 to 40 percent of the GDP. - Banking rate: around 26 percent in 2021 (higher than WAEMU average rate of 21.8 percent for the same year). ### Country Risk Assessment (NRA May 2020) - NRA completed May 2020 with World Bank technical assistance. - Main internal ML threats identified by the NRA: corruption and bribery; illicit trafficking in drugs and psychotropic substances; tax offenses; environmental offenses; cybercrime. - Other identified offenses with increased threats: illicit trafficking and counterfeiting of medicine; stolen property (livestock); breach of trust; theft; smuggling; extortion; scams; forgery and use of forged documents. - Sectors assessed as most exposed to ML threats: notaries; chartered accountants; real estate agents and developers; coffee-cocoa subsector. - NRA conclusion on TF: level of exposure to TF risks is high. ### Sectoral ML Risk Ratings (Table 1.1) - Banks: Medium- high - Shares and securities: Medium- high - Insurance: Medium to low - Other financial institutions: High - Notaries: Medium- high - Chartered accountants: Medium- high - Real estate agents and developers: High - Coffee-cocoa subsector: High - NPOs: Medium- high ### Observations on the NRA and data limitations - NRA relied on STRs, ML investigations, expert opinions; external threats determined from international cooperation cases. - Limitations noted: insufficient examination of financial and commercial flows linked to corruption; limited analysis of cross-border financial and commercial flows; limited data (low number of STRs and financial investigations), particularly for TF risks; TF risks not sufficiently distinguished from terrorism risks. ### Identification of higher- and lower-risk areas - Assessment focus: financial and commercial flows linked to corruption; cross-border flows; implementation of AML legislation by supervisory and law enforcement authorities; ML convictions; international cooperation requests; AML financial sanctions in banking sector; TF financing methods and response. - Higher-risk areas highlighted: ML from corruption; commercial and financial cross-border flows given Côte d’Ivoire’s regional economic weight (largest number of banks in WAEMU after Senegal; largest number of bank accounts in WAEMU; region’s largest economy). - Lower-risk areas identified (despite limited information): reinsurance; micro-insurance; to a certain extent, accountants. ### Materiality and financial sector structure - Informal economy: more than 35 percent of GDP. - Banking rate: 26 percent. - Financial institutions: 31 licensed Credit Institutions (CIs) and 7 financial companies; total amount of CIs’ capitals: 599.7 billion XOF (USD 959 million) at the end of 2021. - Composition of CIs: including 29 banks and 2 banking financial institutions; of these CIs, 23 are foreign (5 affiliated with international groups; 18 with regional groups). - Microfinance (June 2022): 46 licensed DFSs; outstanding credit of the microfinance sector: 440.8 billion XOF (USD 682 million); outstanding deposits: 450 billion XOF (USD 696.5 million). - DFS trends 2019–2020: outstanding deposits increased by 10.3 percent; outstanding credits increased by 4.78 percent. - Mobile money (2020): activity by 13 institutions (five banks; seven EMIs; one microfinance institution); number of opened accounts: approximately 37.6 million (around a third active accounts); value of performed transactions: 13,752 billion XOF (USD 22 billion). - Fast money transfer services: 24 services, 12 operate as subagents for banks and DFSs. - Insurance market (2020): total revenue 414.5 billion XOF (USD 663.7 million); market share in CIMA zone: 30 percent; life insurance share: 36.4 percent; life insurance revenue share: 44.3 percent. - WAEMU capital market (31 December 2021): capital raised on national primary market: 1,145.4 billion XOF (USD 1.8 billion); assets maintained by licensed actors: 6,856.45 billion XOF (USD 11 billion). - Virtual asset sector: exists despite non-recognition by BCEAO; NRA reports six service points concentrated in Abidjan; risks identified: facilitation of tax fraud, ML/TF, and other illegal activities. ### Structural and contextual elements - Political stability: relatively stable political system post-2011 despite disruptive events between 2002 and 2011. - Regional destabilizing factors: partial retreat of French troops in Mali (Operation Barkhane); arrival of foreign military trainers in Mali; recent military coups in neighboring Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso. - National coordination: Coordination Committee is authority in charge of coordinating AML/CFT policies. - WAMU community institutions: banking supervision competence of WAMU Banking Commission; financial market supervision assigned to Regional Council for Public Savings and Capital markets (CREPMF). ### Legal and institutional framework developments - New law: Law No. 2016-992 of November 14, 2016, related to countering ML and TF, pursuant to Directive No. 02/2015/CM/UEMOA of July 2, 2015 (referred to as “AML/CFT Law”). - Effects of AML/CFT Law: considerably strengthened the AML/CFT legal framework by introducing new preventive measures for all covered entities, aligned with FATF’s 2012 Recommendations, though many deficiencies remain (see Technical Compliance Annex). - Adoption of enforcement instruments: several enforcement instruments of the uniform Law adopted by regional (BCEAO, CREPMF) and national supervisory authorities. - Remaining systemic vulnerabilities: size of informal sector (35–40 percent of GDP); porous borders; corruption; absence of an AML/CFT supervisory authority for NPOs and certain DNFBPs. ### National AML/CFT strategy (2020–2030) - Strategy title: 2020–2030 Strategy against money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. - Highlighted objectives: - Review Community-wide legislation pertaining to preventive measures to ensure compliance with new FATF standards. - Management of migratory flows (persons and goods) by combining security cooperation and intelligence. - Adoption of an integrated information exchange system among all structures involved in AML/CFT. - Designation of the authority (or authorities) responsible for AML/CFT supervision of DNFBPs, NPOs, and certain financial institutions (FIs). - Ensuring implementation of confiscation sanctions through effective enforcement of court decisions. *Source: Excerpt from IMF country report content unit 1civea2023002 - 2020.* ### 93. The legal and institutional AML/CFT framework in Côte d’Ivoire consists of ### The legal and institutional AML/CFT framework in Côte d’Ivoire consists of ### Community-wide and national instruments - The WAMU has the authority to issue supranational AML/CFT standards, applicable in all of its member States. - Adopted standards include WAMU uniform laws, regulations, and directives, BCEAO instructions, Banking Commission circulars, and CREPMF instructions; these are binding either directly (regulations) or by transposition into national law (directives and other Community-wide instruments). - Uniform laws, including the 2015 Uniform Law for the countering money laundering and terrorist financing in WAMU member States, require transposition into national law to become applicable in member States. - The transposition of the uniform law in Côte d’Ivoire led to the adoption of the AML/CFT Law of 2016. - From a hierarchical standpoint, Community-wide legislation supersedes national standards. - Cross-reference: Directive No. 02/CM/WAEMU and Article 2 of Decision No. 26 of 02/07/2015/CM/WAMU on the adoption of the uniform draft law for the combating of money laundering and terrorist financing in West African Monetary Union (WAMU) member States. ### AML/CFT responsibilities of major WAEMU bodies - WAMU Council of Ministers: - Adopts Community-wide standards, including regulations directly applicable in member States and directives which must be transposed into national law before entering into force. - Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO): - Drafts supranational, Community-wide directives and standards (notably, the Banking Law and the Uniform AML/CFT Law). - Issues instructions and circulars applicable to FIs, specifically banks, financial establishments, and DFSs operational throughout Union territory. - Ensures, jointly with the WAMU BC/GSBC, supervision of banks, financial establishments, EMIs and FX bureaus. - In practice, WAMU BC ensures supervision of reporting entities (financial companies, banks, banking financial institutions, large DFSs, and EMIs). - Responsible for imposing administrative sanctions against financial sector reporting entities. - WAMU Banking Commission (BC) / General Secretariat of the Banking Commission (GSBC): - Regulating, supervising, and issuing administrative and disciplinary sanctions against financial companies, banks, banking financial institutions, EMIs, and large DFSs. - Inter-African Conference on Insurance Markets (CIMA): - Responsible for AML/CFT regulation in the insurance sector; drafted CIMA Regulation No. 0001/CIMA/PCMA/PCE/SG/2021 in relation to AML/CFT in the insurance sector. - CIMA Regional Commission for Insurance Supervision (CRCA): - Supervision and control of the insurance and reinsurance sectors; supervision and issuing of administrative and disciplinary sanctions. - Regional Council for Public Savings and Financial Markets (CREPMF): - WAMU body responsible for regulation of capital markets; issues instructions applicable to capital market actors and holds sanctioning powers ensured by relevant legal texts. - Note: The CREPMF was renamed to The WAMU Financial Market Authority (AMF-UMOA) as of October 1, 2022; the report maintains the name in use at the time of the onsite visit. ### National AML/CFT/CPF competent authorities — Coordination Body - AML/CFT Policy Coordination Committee: - Designated authority for coordinating national AML/CFT/CPF policies. ### Ministries with AML/CFT prerogatives - Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF): - Oversees the FIU and the AML/CFT Policy Coordination Committee. - Ensures follow-up on AML/CFT policies (NRA, National Strategy) and spearheads economic governance, foreign financial relations, and monetary policy. - Ministry of the Interior and Security: - Responsible for protection of persons and property, institutional security, compliance with the law, and maintenance of peace and public order. - Supervises associations in general, which NPOs are part of, and recognizes public welfare associations. - Ministry of Justice and Human Rights: - Ensures implementation and follow-up of government policy in relation to justice and human rights. - Receives mutual legal assistance requests through its Directorate of Civil and Criminal Affairs (DACP). - Ministry of Mines and Geology: - Grants licenses for search and exploitation of mineral resources and coordinates response to Mining Code violations. - Ministry of Defense: - Serves as an umbrella for the CROAT, which produces intelligence for combating terrorism and terrorist financing, and for the research unit at the National Gendarmerie. - May solicit the MEF for all freezing requests related to countering TF and PF. - Ministry of Construction, Housing, and Urban Planning: - Grants licenses for real estate developers or sellers of property to be constructed, upon recommendation by the licensing commission. - Ministry for the Promotion of Good Governance, Capacity Building, and the Fight against Corruption: - Promotes a culture of transparency and denial of corrupt practices, including through a whistleblowing platform launched in April 2022. ### Operational and criminal justice agencies - National Financial Intelligence Unit (CENTIF / FIU): - Mandate to receive and analyze STRs and other information related to ML and TF and disseminate results of analysis. - Economic and Financial Police Directorate (DPEF): - Seeks and records offenses of economic and financial nature; centralizes information related to illegal events in economic and financial areas; centralizes information related to trafficking and smuggling of all forms (except child and drug trafficking). - Criminal Police Directorate (DPC): - Organizes, coordinates, and supervises judicial police activities; combats serious and transnational crime; strengthens police cooperation at the judicial police level. - Narcotic and Drug Police Directorate (DPSD): - Investigates and identifies violations of legislation on narcotics and drugs. - Forest Police and Water Directorate: - Investigates offenses related to forestry, wildlife, and water resources as determined by dedicated laws. - Anti-Mining Code Violations Squad (BRICM) and Task Force to Combat Illegal Gold Mining (GS-LOI): - Tasked with combating illegal gold mining and Mining Code violations; GS-LOI established in July 2021 to dismantle illegal gold mining sites nationwide. - National Gendarmerie Research Unit: - Identifies criminal law violations, gathers evidence, searches for perpetrators, and carries out tasks delegated by investigative courts. - High Authority for Good Governance (HABG): - Conducts investigations into corruption and similar offenses; agents enjoy prerogatives and means of investigation comparable to Judicial Police Officers (JPOs) though HABG is not a law enforcement authority. - Airport Counter-Trafficking Unit (CAAT): - Established in July 2021; provides information for strategies and policies countering drug trafficking, human trafficking, trafficking in precious metals and stones, currency, documents, protected species, transnational organized crime, terrorism, and other illicit trafficking. - Directorate of Information Technology and Technological Tracing (DITT) and Counter-Cybercrime Platform (PLCC): - Combat offenses linked to new technologies; assist national police, gendarmerie, customs, and FIU with extraction and analysis of digital evidence; contribute to adoption of IT systems required for police and Ministry activities. - General Directorate of Maritime and Port Affairs: - Organizes maritime and inland waterway transport policy; ensures maritime and port security and safety; handles maritime cooperation and coordinates coast guard activities regionally. - Counter Transnational Crime Unit (UCT): - Special investigation and examination unit affiliated with Ministry of the Interior; investigates illicit drug trafficking, human trafficking, trafficking in diamonds and protected species, organized transnational crime, and other illicit trafficking to gather evidence for judicial proceedings. ### Law enforcement and judicial authorities - Economic and Financial Crimes Tribunal (PPEF): - Operational since October 2020; strengthened by creation of a special financial crimes Court in May 2021. - Specialized judicial body for investigation and prosecution of economic and financial offenses, including ML, of particular seriousness and complexity (notably transnational or involving large financial flows). - Special Unit for Enquiries, Investigations, and Combating Terrorism (CSEILT-LCT): - Exclusively tasked with preliminary investigations and judicial procedures into cases of terrorist acts. - General Tax Directorate (DGI): - Drafts and implements tax legislation; Audits and Investigations Directorate handles tax audits and strategy for combating tax fraud and evasion. - General Customs Directorate (DGD): - Through Customs Regulation Directorate and Customs Investigations Directorate, drafts and implements customs legislation, collects taxes and duties, and implements customs instruments ratified by Côte d’Ivoire. - State Judicial Agency (AJE) and Agency for the Management and Recovery of Criminal Assets (AGRAC): - AJE was in charge of recovery and management of criminal assets at time of onsite visit. - AGRAC established by June 1, 2022 decree, placed under Ministry of Justice, imbued with broad powers for recovery and management of criminal assets and international cooperation. - Note: AGRAC was not operational at the time of the onsite visit. ### Financial sector competent authorities - General Directorate of the Treasury and Public Accounting (DGTCP): - Organizes and performs financial supervision of public institutions, State owned companies, and State funds. - Directorate of Monetary and Financial Affairs: - Supervises banks and financial institutions; follows up on currency, credit, and foreign exchange matters. - Directorate of Insurance: - Implements CIMA Code provisions and drafts/implements legislative, regulatory, and administrative provisions in the insurance sector; follows up with insurance cooperation bodies. - Directorate for the Regulation and Supervision of Decentralized Financial Systems (DRSSFD): - Oversees implementation of regulations governing decentralized financial systems; examines licensing requests for DFS activity; provides institutional support; monitors microfinance institutions. - Directorate of Credit Institutions and External Finance (DECFinEx): - Shares prerogatives with BCEAO regarding issuance of licenses and supervision of FIs; in practice, main AML/CFT responsibility is supervision of FX bureaus. - Deposits and Consignments Fund (CDCI): - Secure storage and management of public and private funds. ### Inter-ministerial and other coordination bodies - Inter-Ministerial Anti-Drug Committee (CILAD): coordinates agencies countering narcotics. - Inter-Ministerial Committee for State Action at Sea: coordinates State missions at sea and inland waters; drafts and evaluates national sea strategy effectiveness. - National Anti-Human Trafficking Committee (CNLTP): counters human trafficking and illicit trafficking of migrants. - National Anti-Counterfeiting Committee (CNLC): combats counterfeiting and prevents introduction of pirated or counterfeit goods. - National Anti-Small Arms Committee: combats illicit proliferation and circulation of small arms and light weapons. - National Central Bureau – INTERPOL: coordinates INTERPOL activities at national level. - Consultative Commission on Administrative Freezing (CCGA): identifies designation targets for implementing targeted financial sanctions under relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. ### Financial Institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs — Financial sector structure (as of June 2022 unless specified) - Financial sector composition: - Credit institutions (CIs): banks and banking financial institutions. - Financial companies, insurance companies and brokers, decentralized financial systems (DFS), capital market actors, licensed foreign exchange bureaus, EMIs. - MVTSs provided by banks and DFSs via partnership agreements using technical platforms of foreign money transfer companies (unlicensed, platform providers only). - Key statistics and supervisory mapping: - Banks: 29; Total Balance sheet 19,713.008 (in billions of XOF, June 2022); Total Balance sheet 31.7 (in billions of USD, June 2022); Subject to AML/CFT supervision: Yes; AML/CFT supervisory authority: BCEAO/MEF. - Financial establishments: 2; Total Balance sheet 0.085 (in billions of XOF, June 2022, as of 31 December 2021); Total Balance sheet 0.000136 (in billions of USD, June 2022, as of 31 December 2021); Subject to AML/CFT supervision: Yes; AML/CFT supervisory authority: BCEAO/MEF. - Licensed foreign exchange bureaus: 109; Total Balance sheet Not available; Total Balance sheet Not available; Subject to AML/CFT supervision: Yes; AML/CFT supervisory authority: MEF (TREASURY/DECFinEX) - BCEAO. - Fast money transfer companies: 21; Total Balance sheet 18.8 (received transfers) / 2,3 (sent transfers) (in billions of XOF, June 2022); Total Balance sheet 0.3 (received transfers) / 0,04 (sent transfers) (in billions of USD, June 2022); Subject to AML/CFT supervision: Yes; AML/CFT supervisory authority: MEF (TREASURY/DECFinEX) - BCEAO. - Decentralized financial systems: 46 (including 35 large DFSs subject to BCEAO supervision, others subject to DRSSFD supervision); Total Balance sheet 640.8 (in billions of XOF, June 2022; approximate data since balance sheet not available for some DFSs); Total Balance sheet 1.02 (in billions of USD, June 2022); Subject to AML/CFT supervision: Yes; AML/CFT supervisory authority: MEF (DRSSFD) / BCEAO. - Life insurance: 12; Total Balance sheet 205 (in billions of XOF, June 2022); Total Balance sheet 0.3 (in billions of USD, June 2022); Subject to AML/CFT supervision: Yes; AML/CFT supervisory authority: CIMA. - Mobile money institutions: 7; Total Balance sheet 13,751.8 (issuance) (in billions of XOF, June 2022); 835, 3 M transactions (22 (issuance) — as presented); Subject to AML/CFT supervision: Yes; AML/CFT supervisory authority: BCEAO/MEF. - Management and intermediation companies: 14; Total Balance sheet Not Provided (NP); Subject to AML/CFT supervision: Yes; AML/CFT supervisory authority: CREPMF. - UCITS: 12; NP; Subject to AML/CFT supervision: Yes; AML/CFT supervisory authority: CREPMF. - Business introducers: 12; NP; Subject to AML/CFT supervision: Yes; AML/CFT supervisory authority: CREPMF. - Custodian banks: 7; NP; Subject to AML/CFT supervision: Yes; AML/CFT supervisory authority: CREPMF. - Debt securitization mutual funds: 2; NP; Subject to AML/CFT supervision: Yes; AML/CFT supervisory authority: CREPMF. - Wealth management companies: 1; NP; Subject to AML/CFT supervision: Yes; AML/CFT supervisory authority: CREPMF. - Stock market investment advisors: 1; NF; Subject to AML/CFT supervision: Yes; AML/CFT supervisory authority: CREPMF. - Notes associated with table: - 1/ As of June 2022, unless specified otherwise. - 2/ Ministry of Economy and Finance. - 3/ As of 31 December 2021. - 4/ As of 31 December 2021. - 5/ Including 35 large DFSs subject to BCEAO supervision, while others are subject to DRSSFD supervision. - 6/ Approximate data since balance sheet is not available for some DFSs. ### Financial sector size, ownership, and distribution (as of June 2022 / December 31, 2021 data) - Côte d’Ivoire’s financial center comprised 29 banks and two financial establishments as of June 2022, including: - Five subsidiaries of banks established outside the African continent. - 18 subsidiaries of subregional banks. - Four national banks. - Total amount of CI capital: 599.7 billion XOF (USD 959 million). - Ownership of CI capital: 96 percent owned by natural persons (of which 1.2 percent are non-nationals) and 4 percent by legal persons (of which 0.8 percent are foreign). - Balance sheet total for CIs: 18,657 billion XOF (approximately USD 30 billion), equivalent to around 52 percent of Côte d’Ivoire’s GDP. - Market concentration: - The five international banks controlled approximately 28 percent of banking sector assets. - Subsidiaries of regional banking groups controlled approximately 25 percent. - Local private banks controlled approximately 20 percent. - WAEMU context: - At the WAEMU zone level, six out of the ten biggest banks in terms of balance sheet in 2021 were Ivorian, with the top two being subsidiaries of international banks. - Financial companies: seven in Côte d’Ivoire as of June 2022. - Data source note: These statistics — except for the number of banks — are those compiled as of December 31, 2021, as shown in the 2021 Annual Report by the WAMU Banking Commission. ### ML/TF risk assessments and sectoral prioritization - Banking sector: - According to the conclusions of the NRA, the banking sector has a moderately high ML/TF risk, although it is one of the most regulated sectors. - The financial sector is significant in volume and diversity of products and services, with international, regional, and subregional connections; given great importance in the assessment. - Foreign exchange and money transfer activities: - Despite relatively lower weight in the financial sector, foreign exchange and money transfer activities are poorly regulated and difficult to trace due to large volume of informal activity; considered important in the assessment. - Capital market: - Côte d’Ivoire’s capital market is the most developed in the WAEMU zone. - Actors perform account and securities management on behalf of third parties, provide counsel and guidance on sale/purchase of securities. - Country holds 49 actors including 14 management and intermediation companies (MICs), 12 UCITS, 12 business providers, seven custodian banks, two mutual debts (securitization fund management companies), one asset management company (AMC), and one stock market investment advisor. - Despite development, capital market remains of medium importance: market capitalization for stocks and bonds still significantly lower than outstanding loans and deposits in banks and DFSs; sector given moderate importance in the assessment. *International Monetary Fund — content unit 1civea2023002 (excerpt).* ### 103. The insurance market in Côte d’Ivoire ranks first in the CIMA zone, with a 30 percent ### The insurance market in Côte d’Ivoire ranks first in the CIMA zone, with a 30 percent share of the regional market, and a penetration rate of 1.58 percent. ### Financial sector: Insurance, DFS, and Mobile Money - Insurance - Côte d’Ivoire ranks first in the CIMA zone with a 30 percent share of the regional market. - Penetration rate: 1.58 percent. - In 2020, there were 12 insurance companies offering life insurance and capitalization contracts, and 20 offering property and liability insurance contracts. - Balance sheet total for life insurance: approximately USD 300 million. - Given the relatively low balance sheet total, life insurance activity is considered of low importance in the context of this assessment. - Decentralized Financial Systems (DFSs) - Number of licensed DFSs in 2021: 46. - Total balance sheet of DFSs in 2021: 640.8 billion XOF (approximately USD 1.02 billion). - Sector importance: medium (institutions do not conduct international transfers; products limited to deposit collection of relatively modest amounts). - Mobile Money / Electronic Money Institutions (EMIs) - Providers in 2021: 13 institutions (including seven EMIs, five banks in partnership with telecommunications operators or technical service providers, and one DFS). - EMIs had around 40,753,792 opened accounts in the books as of 2021. - Value of performed transactions in 2021: 16,812 billion XOF (USD 27 billion). - Role: promotes financial inclusion; EMIs apply low thresholds to cumulative transactions, extendable on demand after verification. - Vulnerabilities noted: insufficient training of agents; non-compliance with AML/CFT measures; customer identity checks described as almost non-existent at many points of sale. - Risk assessment: subsector vulnerability rated moderately high in the NRA; overall sector considered of medium importance given low transaction amounts and limited evidence of exposure to TF risks. ### Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) - Overall classification and importance - Real estate agents and developers, notaries, and dealers in precious metals and stones, followed by gambling service providers, are deemed particularly important due to large cash activity, prevalent illegal practices (DPMS), and acute exposure to ML/TF risks. - Lawyers, justice commissioners, legal representatives, business agents, and chartered accountants are considered less important, given lower activity volume and/or lower exposure to ML/TF risks. - Inventory as of December 31, 2021 (selected entries) - Chartered accountants: 217 chartered accountants and 134 firms — Subject to AML/CFT supervision; AML/CFT Supervisory Authority: Council of the Order of Chartered Accountants. - Notaries: 249 — Yes; Chamber of Notaries. - Lawyers: 550 — Yes; Bar association. - Justice commissioners: 413 — Yes; National Chamber of Justice Commissioners. - Judicial representatives: NP — Yes; National Supervisory Commission for Judicial Representatives. - Business agents: 500 (approx.) — No designated authority. - Real estate companies, real estate agents, rental agents: 195 — No designated authority. - Gambling service providers, casinos, gaming establishments, national lottery: 1 gambling service provider, 4 casinos, 1 national lottery — No designated authority. - Dealers in precious metals and stones: 36 (including 27 purchasing offices and 9 authorization holders) — No designated authority. - Real estate developers: 157 (1/ In 2017.) — No designated authority. - Corporate and trust consultancy providers: NP (activity mainly conducted by lawyers) — No designated authority. - Auditors: NP — No designated authority. - Supervisory designations and gaps - SRBs for lawyers, notaries, public accountants, justice commissioners, and court administrators have been designated as AML/CFT supervisory authorities per Ordinance No. 2022-237 of 30 March 2022 (published June 16, 2022), but had not started activities at the time of the on-site visit. - Casinos and gaming establishments, real estate agents and developers, dealers in precious metals and stones, auditors, and company and trust consultancy providers do not have an AML/CFT supervisory authority to date. ### Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) - Legal form and oversight - NPOs are a sub-category of associations governed by Law No. 1960-315 of September 1960. - Associations that meet the definition of NPO are subject to the AML/CFT Law and additional obligations. - Numbers and risk assessment - Number of registered NPOs as of end-December 2020: 8,630. - NRA conclusion: “very high” risk related to religious NPOs’ activities and potential abuse for TF purposes. - Limitations: nature of threats from terrorist entities and modes of abuse not examined; no proven case documented. - Overall sector importance in context of assessment: moderate. - By end of on-site visit: no competent authority had been designated for supervision of NPOs to combat TF. ### Preventive measures, legal framework, and targeted financial sanctions - AML/CFT Law - The AML/CFT Law transposes Directive No. 02/2015/CM/UEMOA of July 2, 2015. - Law outlines obligations of reporting entities, preventive measures, and sanctions. - BCEAO instructions and other instruments (all dated 25 September 2017 unless otherwise specified) - Instruction No. 007/09/2017: rules of implementation of the Uniform AML/CFT Law by FIs in WAEMU member States. - Instruction No. 008/09/2017: threshold for declaration of cash and bearer negotiable instruments (BNIs) transported across the border. - Instruction No. 009/09/2017: threshold for payment of debt using cash or BNIs. - Instruction No. 010/09/2017: threshold amount for reporting of cash transactions to the FIU. - Other sector-specific instruments - Mobile money: Instruction No. 008-02-2015 governs terms and conditions for mobile money issuers. - Financial market actors: Instruction No. 59/2019/CREPMF of 30 September 2019. - Insurance sector actors: Regulation No. 0001/CIMA/PCMA/PCE/SG/2021. - Targeted financial sanctions (TFS) - Governed by the AML/CFT Law, Decree No. 2018-439 of May 3, 2018, Order No. 2018-214 of May 9, 2018, and Inter-Ministerial Order No. 2022-278 of March 8, 2022. - FIs under BCEAO supervision are governed by Regulation No. 14/2002/CM/UEMOA on the freezing of funds and other financial resources in countering terrorist financing, specifically for implementing Resolution 1267. ### Legal persons and arrangements - Applicable law - Categories established under the revised OHADA Uniform Act related to commercial companies and EIGs (Law of January 30, 2014). - Company types and auditor requirements - Public limited liability companies (PLLC): minimum share capital 10 million XOF (USD 16,000) — auditors required if of a certain size. - Limited liability companies (LLC): capital of at least 1 million XOF (USD 1,600) — auditors required if of a certain size. - Simplified joint-stock companies (simplified JSCs): free and variable capital — auditors required if of a certain size. - PLLC, Simplified JSC, and LLC can be formed by a single associate. - Foreign legal arrangements - Legal arrangements created abroad have legal effect and are subject to the AML/CFT Law when holding assets in Côte d’Ivoire, though they are not listed by authorities to date. - Legal and accounting professionals subject to AML/CFT measures are required to identify beneficial owners (BOs) and parties behind such legal arrangements when managing assets. - Main categories of legal persons (as of 27 May 2022) - Partnerships: 160,456 - Commercial companies: 60,422 - Cooperatives: 5,844 - Joint-stock companies: 2,900 - Civil companies: 1,053 (Including real estate companies: 773) - Associations: 834 - NGOs: 482 - Joint ownerships: 326 ### Institutional supervision and control mechanisms - Supervisory responsibilities for FIs - AML/CFT supervision handled by several institutions, notably the WAMU Banking Commission. - BCEAO, BC/GSBC, and MEF (by delegation) supervise banks, financial companies, banking financial institutions, and EMIs. - For banks: BC is main supervisory authority per Article 1 of the 2007 WAMU Convention; BC may delegate supervision to the Central Bank or MEF under Article 21 of the 2017 Annex. - FX bureaus: subject to BCEAO and MEF supervision, but no authority has AML/CFT jurisdiction. - DFS supervision - Under Article 44 of the law regulating DFSs and Central Bank Instruction No. 007-06-2010: Central Bank and Banking Commission supervise DFSs with activity level of two (2) billion XOF in outstanding deposits or loans after two consecutive fiscal years (equivalent to USD 3.2 million). - MEF DRSSFD oversees small DFSs. - Other supervisory authorities - CREPMF supervises capital market actors. - CIMA, through CRCA and MEF’s Insurance Department, supervises insurance companies and brokers. - Table summary (institutional roles) - Credit institutions: Regulatory/Licensing Authority: BCEAO; Supervisory/Monitoring Authority: BC/GSBC, BCEAO, Minister of Finance. - Financial companies: BCEAO; CB/SGCB; BC/GSBC; BCEAO; Minister of Finance. - Capital market actors: Minister of Finance; CREPMF. - Insurance: Minister of Finance (DA); CRCA; Minister of Finance (Directorate of Insurance) (DA); CRCA. - Microfinance institutions (DFS): Minister of Finance (DRSSFD); BCEAO; BC/GSBC. - Licensed foreign exchange bureaus: Minister of Finance; BCEAO. - Fast money transfer companies: Banks and DFSs (Mandate); BCEAO; Minister of Finance. - Mobile money institutions: BCEAO; BCEAO; BC/GSBC. - Postal financial services: Minister of Finance; Ministry of Finance. - DNFBPs and NPOs supervision at AML/CFT level - Ordinance No. 2022-237 of March 30, 2022 designates SRBs of DNFBPs (where available) as AML/CFT supervisory authorities; covers lawyers, notaries, court administrators, judicial representatives, and chartered accountants. - Casinos and gaming establishments, real estate agents and developers, dealers in precious metals and stones, auditors, and company and trust consultancy providers lack AML/CFT supervisory authority. - No competent authority designated by the end of the on-site visit for NPO supervision to combat TF. ### International cooperation - Cross-border position and threats - Côte d’Ivoire ranks first in the WAEMU zone, with significant financial flows to and from WAEMU States and outside the subregion. - Faces threats from criminal activities such as scams, including online scams. - Recent significant pressure from terrorist groups active in West Africa seeking new sources of supply. - France, Spain, and Mali identified among the biggest international cooperation partners. - Cooperation mechanisms and feedback - Comments from seven countries: generally positive on quality of information provided, but assistance from Ivorian authorities often slow. - Formal cooperation channeled through the Directorate of Civil and Criminal Affairs (DACP) within the Ministry of Justice. - Informal cooperation via INTERPOL-like central channels, the FIU, or HABG. ### National AML/CFT policies, coordination, and key findings - Key findings - Authorities have a good understanding of main ML/TF vulnerabilities and share perceptions of major ML threats, including corruption and drug trafficking, but lack sufficient statistical data. - Perception of threats is not based on systematic analysis of criminal activities and proceeds, limiting estimation of actual threat levels. - Insufficient understanding of external ML threats despite Côte d’Ivoire’s central regional position. - Identified ML typologies (e.g., real estate) but lack understanding of materiality of methods used; obstacles to adopting a risk-based approach include limited analysis of legal persons, financial sector, DNFBPs, and cross-border flows. - TF risk perceived as high due to porous borders and large informal economy; limited data means TF risk is not sufficiently distinguished from terrorism risk; analytical efforts focus almost exclusively on financing of terrorist acts against Côte d’Ivoire. - Response to high-priority risks (corruption, real estate sector, porous borders, informal sector) is recent; national AML/CFT strategy and action plan adopted with some initial measures implemented. - Establishment of the PPEF strengthened enforcement; targeted TF indicator training provided to sector representatives. - NRA has not been used to adapt preventive measures for accountable sectors nor guide supervisory activities. - Coordination Committee achieved strategic-level coordination; operational ML coordination facilitated by interactions between FIU and most authorities, but mechanisms not fully used and coordination does not extend to all relevant actors, particularly supervisory authorities. - NRA communications and awareness workshops increased awareness among reporting entities and DNFBPs, though practical impact limited by absence of typology analyses. - Recommendations (Côte d’Ivoire should) - Bolster recent efforts related to the collection of statistics, notably by operationalizing the national AML/CFT/CPF statistics service provided for by an Order dating from 2018. - Develop understanding of tangible ML risks through typological analyses to grasp the materiality of ML methods employed, specifically accounting for Côte d’Ivoire’s central regional position and the business agents (agents d’affaires) sector; build upon NRA, PPEF analytical work, and strengthen future sectoral assessments. - Integrate analysis of financial flows and AML objectives into strategies aimed at combating predicate offenses identified as ML threats (including illegal gold mining, drug trafficking, and corruption). - Improve understanding of TF risks by leveraging counter-terrorism intelligence and addressing other forms of TF beyond financing of terrorist acts targeting Côte d’Ivoire. - Ensure implementation of planned preventive measures responding to ML/TF priority risks, including those linked to corruption. - Strengthen measures to mitigate ML risks in the real estate sector (e.g., designate a supervisory authority and set a ceiling for cash use), address ML/TF risks related to porous borders (for instance, computerization and linkage of border police stations), and target the informal sector. - Further involve supervisory authorities in national coordination, ensuring more substantive exchanges between these authorities and the FIU regarding the effectiveness of the suspicious activity reporting system. - Promote and increase cooperation and collaborative approaches among competent authorities involved in CFT (including intelligence services, investigative authorities, and criminal prosecution authorities). - Leverage understanding of risks to define the scope of exemptions, simplified measures, and enhanced measures. *International Monetary Fund — Côte d’Ivoire country assessment excerpts (content unit provided).* ### 126. The authorities adopted their first NRA in May 2020. This was coordinated by the ### 1civea2023002 - 126. The authorities adopted their first NRA in May 2020. This was coordinated by the ### NRA development, process, and data limitations - The National Risk Assessment (NRA) was adopted in May 2020 and coordinated by the National Policy Coordination Committee for the Fight against ML, TF, and PF (Coordination Committee), created in 2014 with the mandate to identify, assess, understand, and mitigate relevant risks. - The NRA process was inclusive, involving the majority of competent authorities and private-sector representatives; certain authorities (Registry of the Commercial Court of Abidjan, Center for Development and Investment (CDI)) were not involved. - A questionnaire drawn up by the National Statistics Institute was used, but the overall response rate was low due to lack of sufficient quantitative data. - Authorities recognize the absence of systematic data as a shortcoming and have taken steps (workshops with the National Institute of Statistics) to promote statistic keeping in two high-risk areas: TF and environmental crime. - Provided initiatives are implemented and extended, they should improve the availability of reliable AML/CFT statistics, bolstering comparative analysis and prioritization of risks. ### Money laundering (ML) risk findings and gaps - Authorities share a common perception of ML threats linked to predicate offenses committed in Côte d’Ivoire; identified main threats: corruption and embezzlement, drug trafficking, tax offenses, cybercrime, and environmental offenses. - The NRA results are reasonable given available information but are not based on systematic and statistical analysis of offenses, proceeds generated, or consequences; actual levels of various ML threats cannot be estimated. - Limited understanding of external ML threats despite Côte d’Ivoire’s prominent regional economic status; identification of external threats relies mainly on requests received by the NCB - INTERPOL (most often theft, followed by fraud and breach of trust). - Analysis lacks complementary sources to assess risks from neighboring countries despite porous borders and free movement; threat from funds derived from corruption in subregional countries is not taken into account. - Authorities identified multiple factors affecting capacity to deal with financial crime, including supervisory framework weaknesses, size of the informal sector, and potential corruption of public officials within investigative authorities and the judiciary. - Sectoral analyses identified risks in some sectors (real estate) but understate risks in other important sectors (banking sector) because vulnerability assessment emphasized regulatory framework over implementation and lacked materiality analysis. - ML risks were examined for non-FIs/DNFBPs such as the coffee-cocoa sector and transportation sector due to cash payment prevalence; NPO sector and foundations flagged for potential exploitation by PEPs. - Business agents’ sector was not identified as exposed to ML risks despite activities (managing others’ property, facilitating transactions) that expose them to ML and absence of explicit inclusion under the AML/CFT Law. - Authorities have not demonstrated an understanding of the materiality of laundering methods: limited detail on how proceeds of major threats are laundered, extent of vulnerability exploitation, role of legal persons, FIs, DNFBPs (particularly notaries), and cross-border flows. - Corruption: authorities identify sectors exploited for ML (mainly reinvestment in real estate) but lack detailed typologies (types of transactions, stages of flows, most exposed reporting entities, types of land/buildings, extent of funds channeled abroad and methods used). - Illegal gold-mining: no developed understanding of associated financial flows despite estimates that its turnover is probably close to that of formal gold exploitation. - No systematic and coordinated analysis of STRs received by the FIU or adjudicated ML cases to identify national-level trends or typologies; PPEF carried out a preliminary study on legal persons in ML cases it handled. ### Terrorist financing (TF) risk findings and gaps - Authorities perceive TF risk as high, based on factors that may contribute to terrorism: inter-community conflicts, circulation of arms from post-conflict situation, porous borders, and overcrowded prisons. - Terrorist groups considered most direct threat to Côte d’Ivoire: Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), particularly AQIM and the Macina Liberation Front. - Knowledge of concrete TF risks is limited due to lack of reliable data; available intelligence indicates some terrorist actors are self-financing while others resort to theft and sale of livestock (significance unknown beyond specific case). - Assumptions regarding other TF methods (including illegal goldmining or exploitation of NPOs) exist but could not be confirmed. - Analytical efforts focus almost exclusively on financing of terrorist acts targeting the country and insufficiently consider financing of terrorist groups from Côte d’Ivoire that act mainly abroad, including in neighboring countries. - To improve TF understanding, Coordination Committee and FIU held a TF risk indicators training workshop for EMIs, FX bureaus, and MVTSs; a Coordination Committee–National Institute of Statistics workshop focused on TF-related data. ### National Strategy (NS), implementation, and sectoral measures - Following the NRA, the Coordination Committee drafted a ten-year National Strategy (NS) with an action plan and an adaptation mechanism based on ML/TF trends; timetable corresponds to priority level of most identified risks. - Timing gaps in NS: strengthening due diligence obligations applicable to family members of PEPs planned starting 2024; measures to address lack of regulatory framework for virtual assets planned for 2026 (NRA notes crypto currencies “could facilitate tax evasion, ML, TF and illegal trafficking of all types due to the anonymous nature of transactions and the lack of regulation”). - Key institutional and prosecutorial reforms: - PPEF (Prosecutor/Chamber specialized in financial crime) established and in operation since October 2020 (initially within the Court of First Instance of Abidjan). - Specialized trial Chamber began activities in October 2021. - Law no. 2022-193 of March 11, 2022 enshrined autonomy of the PPEF as a standalone court. - Initial results of the PPEF are described as encouraging. - Sectoral measures and outreach: - AML/CFT training sessions held for FX bureaus, DFSs, and their supervisory authorities; AML/CFT standards compliance guides developed for these sectors. - Legal reform strengthened LONACI’s control and monopoly over online gaming and betting; online gambling sites prohibited from operating without a license from LONACI, and online bettors must open non-anonymous accounts; FIU conducted sensitization of FIs to ML risks in online gaming and betting. - Measures targeting predicate offenses (Airport Counter-Trafficking Unit (CAAT) established in 2021; Task Force to Combat Illegal Goldmining (GS-LOI) set up in 2022) focus on reducing proceeds of crime rather than improving understanding of associated ML/TF financial flows. - Real estate sector initiatives: - Awareness-raising and guidelines prepared; two one-stop shops established (construction permit processing; land management) with agents sensitized to ML. - Gaps remain: law sets a maximum ceiling for cash transactions but lacks an implementing decree specifying the amount; cash payments remain frequent in real estate. No supervisory authority designated for real estate agents (also applies to other DNFBPs without SRBs: casinos, dealers in precious stones, dealers in precious metals). - Anti-corruption measures and challenges: - Establishment of the Ministry for the Promotion of Good Governance, Capacity Building, and the Fight against Corruption in 2021; the Ministry conducted a "punch operation" leading to legal or disciplinary proceedings against 70 public officials accused of corruption in the health and transportation sectors and created a platform for anonymous citizen reporting. - Institutional overlap and unclear relationship between the Ministry and the pre-existing High Authority for Good Governance undermine effectiveness. - Other proposed anti-corruption measures were dropped or deprioritized (example: whistleblower bill abandoned after workshops; existing law deemed sufficient though protections were not demonstrated to be effectively implemented or communicated). - Other ML risks identified (porous borders, informal sector) have not been sufficiently addressed; additional measures are being developed to secure borders and encourage informal actors to adopt entrepreneurial status. ### Use of NRA for risk-based measures, exemptions, and guidance - Authorities did not use NRA results to justify exemptions or enhanced or simplified measures. - Legislation provides situations requiring enhanced due diligence based on FATF Recommendations (banking correspondence, business relationships with PEPs), but the risk assessment was not used to expand the list of situations requiring enhanced measures. - Reporting entities are required to have policies, procedures, and controls to respond to national ML/TF/CPF risks (AML/CFT Law, art. 11, para. 3), but this obligation was not supplemented by guidelines specifying when reinforced measures are necessary in light of the risk understanding. - The AML/CFT Law defines circumstances in which certain preventive measures do not apply; these exemptions are not based on a risk assessment because the AML/CFT Law predates the NRA. *Source: IMF mission report text (excerpts).* ### 155. Certain exemptions are likely to promote financial inclusion. In that sense, mobile ### 155–175: Exemptions, Institutional Roles, Coordination, and Conclusions on IO.1 ### Exemptions and Financial Inclusion - Certain exemptions are likely to promote financial inclusion; mobile money operators are authorized to offer limited services (particularly by virtue of a monthly ceiling) to customers who are not capable of identifying themselves. - The exemption for mobile money appears to be based on a low-risk assessment, although authorities have not provided the assessment. - The NS provides for the integration of simplified AML/CFT measures into the national financial inclusion strategy. - Other exemptions are extremely broadly defined and could not be linked to a risk assessment: - Covered entities are not subject to due diligence obligations provided for in Articles 19 and 20 of the AML/CFT Law when there are no suspicions of ML or TF and that the customer - or, where applicable, the BO of the business relationship - is in Côte d’Ivoire, another WAEMU Member State, or a third-party state imposing equivalent obligations to combat ML and TF. - This exemption does not appear to be applied by FIs in practice; its confusion undermines a risk-based approach and weakens supervisory and sanctioning mechanisms. ### Law Enforcement Authorities - Distribution of ML investigations largely reflects threats identified by the NRA. - No criminal justice policy exists to prioritize prosecution of offenses corresponding to main threats and associated ML. - As a result, ML related to threats viewed as significant has resulted in few prosecutions or convictions, or none in the case of environmental crime. - The creation of the PPEF is intended to address the mismatch regarding corruption. ### Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) - FIU prioritization partly aligns with understood risks but overlooks certain major threats: - Prioritized STRs: TF, religious NPOs, public officials, PEPs, cybercrime, and individuals subject to at least two STRs. - Insufficient consideration: environmental crime, drug trafficking, and vulnerabilities in sectors such as real estate and agriculture. - Little effort to improve match between identified threats and STRs highlighted by reporting entities. - FIU has undertaken awareness activities on TF indicators. - FIU has not published typologies on risks related to the majority of threats, particularly corruption and certain vulnerable sectors. - FIU does not make sufficient use of systematic cash transaction reports (CTRs) despite cash being a major vulnerability in sectors like real estate and the coffee-cocoa sector. ### Supervisory Authorities - Supervisory authorities generally do not sufficiently take ML/TF risks into account when defining activities, prioritizing entities, or choosing supervisory measures—largely due to insufficient understanding and identification of these risks. - Post-NRA initiatives: - Authorities began supervising FX bureaus and small DFSs. - DECFinEx developed supervisory procedures and guidelines in 2021 and used them to supervise 30 FX bureaus and 6 small DFSs in November 2021. - Selection of these entities was based on turnover and participation in awareness workshops, not on risk level. - DECFinEx had not yet been clearly designated as the supervisory authority in charge of FX bureaus at time of those initiatives. ### International Cooperation - Authorities’ recourse to international cooperation is generally not aligned with the transnational nature of main identified threats. - FIU international activities: - Exchanges information with foreign counterparts. - Launched a joint operation in environmental control recognized by the Egmont Group in 2020. - Investigative authorities recorded recent successes in drug trafficking cases with substantial international cooperation. - Overall level of international cooperation does not match transnational threats and reflects limited understanding of external ML threats, despite Côte d’Ivoire’s prominent regional economic status. ### National Cooperation and Coordination - Coordination Committee: - Provides a permanent framework for strategic consultations (see R.2). - Coordinated the NRA and development of the NS, bringing together over 180 actors from different sectors. - Relies on technical support staff including economists, lawyers, and statisticians. - Monitors implementation of the NS priority action plan and produced a summary document highlighting status of each recommendation. - Cooperation among investigative services is generally good, but coordination is insufficient to resolve jurisdictional conflicts: - Friction noted between the Narcotic and Drug Police Directorate (NDPD) and the Counter Transnational Crime Unit (UCT). - Coordination meetings between investigative services are held on an ad hoc basis for high-importance cases. - The public prosecutor does not hold periodic meetings for systematic coordination between ML/TF investigative services. - Operational coordination is facilitated by bilateral exchanges between the FIU and most authorities; a network of correspondents exists though not fully utilized by the FIU. - Investigative authorities do not make sufficient use of their power to request information from the FIU, per provided statistics. - FIU cooperation with sectoral authorities: - Works with the Ministry of Mines, Petroleum, and Energy and the General Directorate of Mines and Geology (GDMG). - FIU carried out financial investigations on applicants for authorization/licensing for the purchase and sale of gold and rough diamonds: following FIU advice on 138 dossiers, 13 were rejected between 2019 and 2021. - GDMG decided to extend this consultation procedure to all licensing requests it receives. - FIU makes little use of information it receives to advance its own analyses. - Participation of supervisory authorities in national coordination is limited: - FIU and supervisory authorities exchange quarterly lists of received STRs and follow-up information but do not exchange information on quality of STRs or implementation deficiencies. - No discussions between FIU and supervisors on emerging ML/TF trends. - Cooperation agreements: - Agreements between FIU and the BCEAO, and between FIU and the CREPMF, were signed at the beginning of 2022. - DECFinEx cooperates ad hoc with customs on ML risks linked to cash use; cooperation not yet formalized. - Supervisory authorities cooperate for some aspects (e.g., authorizations) but not to develop better understanding of risks. - Operational cooperation against TF is less developed: - Financial aspects of anti-terrorism investigations have been bolstered. - Counter-terrorism intelligence is not fully exploited to support CFT efforts, including designation of terrorists or FIU typology development. - CCGA: - Acts as operational coordination mechanism for proposing designations for targeted financial sanctions. - Has been used once for TF and once for PF; effectiveness of coordination cannot be verified and the two designations have not proven effective. ### Private Sector Awareness of Risks - Authorities communicated NRA results to reporting entities via professional associations and organized workshops for FIs and DNFBPs. - Vast majority of stakeholders attended workshops and are aware of relevant conclusions. - Targeted workshops were held for higher-risk sectors: foreign exchange bureaus, EMIs, and DFSs; these workshops covered sector vulnerabilities, obligations of reporting entities, AML/CFT management, and internal control procedures. - Awareness activities improved understanding among certain sectors, particularly DNFBPs. - Due to limitations of the NRA (e.g., low number of typologies), impact of workshops is more limited in sectors that already had basic knowledge of vulnerabilities and threats. ### Conclusions on IO. 1 - Authorities have identified high-risk sectors and the major domestic ML/TF threats. - Authorities did not demonstrate a detailed understanding of money laundering and TF methods used in practice, notably regarding cross-border financial flows, the financial sector, and corruption. - Authorities adopted an ambitious National Strategy and have implemented some measures: - PPEF was strengthened and obtained encouraging results. - Outreach was conducted to several categories of DNFBPs with poor understanding of AML/CFT obligations. - Shortcomings and required improvements: - Understanding of risk was not used to adapt preventive measures required of reporting sectors, nor to regulate cash use in the real estate sector. - Understanding of risk did not guide actions of financial sector supervisory authorities or SRBs (SRBs had only been designated during the on-site visit). - Significant improvements are required to implement a risk-based approach. *Source: content unit 1civea2023002 (pages 155–175).* ### 176. Côte d’Ivoire is rated as having a Moderate level of effectiveness for IO.1. ### 176. Côte d’Ivoire is rated as having a Moderate level of effectiveness for IO.1. ### LEGAL SYSTEM AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES — Key Findings - Immediate Outcome 6 - The timely production of financial intelligence by the FIU features several deficiencies due to: the uneven distribution and completeness of STRs, an entirely manual information collection and analysis process, an obsolete computer system, the absence of an analytical tool, and the lack of human resources. - The PPEF and some investigative authorities use financial intelligence and other information appropriately to develop evidence and trace the proceeds of crime. Other investigative authorities, however, despite their strategic role in combating the main threats, make little use of financial intelligence and other relevant information to investigate ML, predicate offenses, and TF cases. - Generally speaking, the PPEF and investigative authorities make little use of the information they can proactively obtain from the FIU and their counterparts abroad to investigate ML, predicate offenses, and TF cases. - The PPEF, which is the main recipient of disseminations by the FIU, views the latter as a valuable source of information, and the aforementioned disseminations have enabled it to deliver significant results in terms of ML convictions and confiscations. However, the absence of disseminations of financial intelligence relating to TF and other major threats in Côte d’Ivoire constitutes a strategic deficiency. Moreover, the financial analyses conducted by the FIU are generally not sophisticated enough to trigger or support complex ML investigations. - The FIU produces limited elaborate strategic analyses. Targeted typologies that can support the different categories of reporting entities in identifying suspicions, consistent with the ML/TF risks specific to their activities, are rare. - The FIU pays special attention to the physical protection of its data, but its reception, communication, and dissemination channels are not specifically secured. - Immediate Outcome 7 - A modern legal framework provides Côte d’Ivoire with a solid basis for prosecuting offenses, and since the PPEF was created in 2020, the ML offense has been prosecuted and judged in a more systematic manner within a court which now enjoys nation-wide jurisdiction for these offenses and for predicate offenses of particular seriousness or complexity. - 270 ML cases have been filed at the PPEF, 52 sentencing decisions for ML have been imposed since 2020, and about as many are pending. - The authorities responsible for public policies have not really played their role of defining and driving criminal justice policy on ML/TF. - Out of a number of investigative services that have jurisdiction over ML investigations, it is the DPEF that is most often tasked with criminal investigations by the judicial authorities, as well as the UCT. These services have extensive judicial police powers but make very little use of the special investigative techniques authorized by law, with the exception of certain electronic surveillance operations. - Statistics show a certain match between prosecuted cases and threats identified by the NRA; however, cases related to corruption have until recently given rise to very few prosecutions or convictions, despite the systemic nature of this crime. The establishment of the HABG, which is in charge of investigations in this area but has only referred nine cases to the prosecution since its establishment, has not had the expected effects. Other offenses identified as priority threats - such as those relating to environmental crime and tax evasion - are insufficiently prosecuted. - The ML offense is now targeted in two thirds of the cases filed at the PPEF for profit-generating offenses but is prosecuted as a separate offense only in the case of reports from the FIU, when the predicate offense could not be identified. The prosecution's public policy does not seek to open parallel investigations for ML, especially since the cases prosecuted are mostly self-laundering cases. This policy may impact the effectiveness of prosecutions and the ability to pursue financial and asset-related aspects of investigations. - Investigations rarely look for international ramifications of ML offenses and predicate offenses or the existence of proceeds of crime abroad. Despite the existence of well-established transnational crime, the international aspects of the investigations are under-exploited, except in cases where investigations were initiated by foreign investigative services. - The prosecution and sentencing rate is high, with a large majority of investigations launched in the PPEF leading to prosecutions, and the sentences issued by the PPEF’s trial court are for the most part effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. On a number of occasions, the court issued ML convictions in cases where proof of the predicate offense could not be provided. - Criminal proceedings were initiated against legal persons in 46 cases concerning 70 legal persons, and four convictions were handed down. - Immediate Outcome 8 - Judicial authorities have well integrated the provisions relating to confiscation and have made confiscation a priority focus of their actions, by issuing such decisions in the vast majority of ML convictions. Confiscation orders of equivalent value and complex confiscation orders have been issued as well as confiscation of assets of legal persons. - The confiscation orders issued target a wide variety of assets such as hotels, bank accounts, lands, a vessel and even insurance policies, and in some cases involve very large amounts. - The establishment of the AGRAC and PPEF is a strong signal from government authorities. Although the latter have not made the seizure and confiscation of proceeds of crime a priority in their criminal justice policy, the judicial authorities, on the other hand, have made them the core of their action. The renewed legal framework of the AML/CFT Law broadly provides for seizure and confiscation. The possibility of confiscating the instruments of the offenses is limited to ML and predicate offenses identified as the most serious threats. - The AGRAC, which was established at the beginning of the on-site visit, will be a valuable tool to support the efforts of judges and will promote the use of confiscation. Until 2021, this function was carried out by the Judicial Treasury Agency within the framework of the provisions regarding the fight against corruption, but it has not proved its effectiveness, with the number of cases managed by the aforementioned institution having remained limited when compared to the total number of seizures and confiscations. - More systematic reliance on international cooperation in matters of confiscation would be likely to give a very broad scope to the action of the PPEF. Despite the transnational nature of most cases entrusted to the PPEF, Côte d’Ivoire makes very little use of MLA in matters of seizure or confiscation of proceeds from ML or predicate offenses with a foreign element. This impacts the efficiency of the judicial system given the limited duration of investigations in the event of pre-trial detention and the judges’ lack of familiarity with formal and informal mechanisms of judicial cooperation. - Cash confiscations at the border are not really proportionate to the risks associated with cash circulation in an economy largely geared towards cash payments, despite the large confiscations that were made occasionally. - The confiscations ordered are commensurate with the major threats identified, apart from the proceeds of certain criminal activities that are rarely prosecuted, such as tax evasion, or environmental offenses, which are rarely the subject of confiscation orders. - No confiscations have been issued on TF, given the absence of cases brought to trial, and therefore of convictions, in this area. ### LEGAL SYSTEM AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES — Recommendations - Immediate Outcome 6 (Financial Intelligence) - Conduct a comprehensive update of the FIU’s IT system in order to fully secure the receipt of STRs, their processing - including the collection of information - and the dissemination of financial intelligence. - Invest in analytical tools for the FIU and provide the unit with sufficient human resources to allow it to make up for the delay in processing STRs, improve the complexity of its financial analyses, and place a greater focus on strategic analysis. - Ensure that all investigative authorities systematically prioritize the use of financial intelligence and other information in their investigations of ML, predicate offenses, and TF and better incorporate in their investigations financial intelligence that they may obtain from the FIU and their foreign counterparts including in the development of evidence, as well as the search for the proceeds of crime. - Ensure that the FIU invests in feedback to reporting entities and develops guidelines, typologies, and targeted red flags to correct inequalities in the distribution and completeness of STRs, particularly for sectors where inherent ML/TF risk is high. - Ensure that disseminations and exchanges by the FIU are carried out in a completely secure manner. - Immediate Outcome 7 (Investigations and Prosecution) - Promote a comprehensive criminal justice policy to combat ML and ensure its consistent and systematic implementation by the Public Prosecutor for all offenses generating criminal profits identified by the NRA, particularly corruption, environmental offenses, and tax evasion. This policy must materialize through the development by both the Ministry of Justice and the Public Prosecutor of policy circulars, guidelines, or practical guides on the priorities, coordination, and supervision of investigative services, the legal aspects of investigation, prosecution, and sentences, and through a training policy for all actors. - Develop and implement an ambitious and voluntary policy to prosecute and convict the perpetrators of corruption. This policy should better articulate the roles and responsibilities of various agencies and judicial authorities, make a more systematic use of parallel financial investigations, utilize the full spectrum of special investigative techniques to improve the search for evidence - such as image capture and electronic surveillance - and implement proactive investigative techniques. - Place the ML offense at the heart of the fight against organized crime by making it the engine of investigations against profit-generating offenses, particularly by deepening the asset-related aspect of investigations, systematizing investigations and prosecutions against legal persons used for the commission of offenses and developing the use of independent ML investigations. Increase the number of standalone investigations and parallel financial investigations. - Allocate the necessary means to the investigation, prosecution, and adjudication authorities to allow them to deal with the extension of the PPEF’s jurisdiction, and provide training, including related to parallel financial investigations, to all relevant actors. The number of PPEF judges and staff should be commensurate with the evolution of their workload, and suitable premises should be allocated to them. - Make the coordination of investigative agencies more effective under the Public Prosecutor’s authority. Regular meetings must be held, criminal intelligence must be promoted through mechanisms allowing the systematic exchange and analysis of information between investigative services. - Raise the awareness of PPEF magistrates and train them in international mutual criminal assistance in order to significantly increase the number of international investigations, through formal or informal international cooperation, by separating the case where necessary to launch a parallel financial investigation on international aspects. - Immediate Outcome 8 (Seizure and Confiscation) - Improve the legal framework to correct certain deficiencies identified in the provisions on confiscation and align the legal framework for seizure and confiscation as a whole with the AML/CFT Law in order to apply it to all profit-generating offenses, to extend it to the instrumentalities of the offense and clarify provisions on confiscation of corresponding value. The new law could define the cases and conditions for the seizure of assets with a view to confiscation and include innovative provisional measures such as restraint or freezing orders, and provide for post-conviction investigations to locate confiscated assets and follow up on MLA requests for the purpose of confiscation. - Promote a comprehensive criminal justice policy to support the NRA’s findings through a general circular on the implementation of these measures. Clarify conditions for seizure and confiscation in guidance intended for investigation, prosecution, and adjudication authorities. Implement an ambitious training policy with continuous updates. - Increase the number of seizures and confiscations abroad by systematically seeking the existence of proceeds of crime outside the national territory in all investigations that give reason to believe that assets may be located abroad, by resorting to informal cooperation followed by requests for mutual legal assistance. Informal judicial cooperation must rely on the resources of the FIU, INTERPOL, the CARIN asset recovery network, or liaison judges. Requests addressed to Côte d’Ivoire must be processed without delay, and judges must be better trained in mutual legal assistance. - Strengthen the management and recovery of criminal assets through the AGRAC. The judicial authority must entrust all seized and confiscated funds to this Agency. Funds from confiscations should be allocated on a priority basis towards bolstering the capabilities of investigation, prosecution, and adjudication agencies, as well as AGRAC. Safeguards must be put in place to ensure that seized or confiscated assets allocated to State services are not subject to abuse or misappropriation. - Strengthen cash confiscations at the border by relying on financial or criminal intelligence and the appropriate technical means. These efforts should extend to all air, land and sea borders, and data must be collected at the national level to ensure oversight and monitoring. ### Immediate Outcome 6 — Financial Intelligence: Use of Financial Intelligence and Other Information - The FIU - The FIU has access to a wide range of information. The sources of information that are directly accessible are systematically consulted upon receipt of STRs and Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs). - The IT system does not allow the FIU to automatically integrate the received reports into its database or to consult directly accessible sources of information in a consolidated manner. - The reception, collection, and processing of data are performed manually, which considerably increases the operational workload of the FIU and causes significant delays in the processing of received STRs. - Between 2017 and 2021, the FIU received 2,303 STRs, disseminated 285, and had provisionally classified 490. - By the end of 2021, 1,528 of the STRs that were received were still being analyzed, including: - 80 percent of STRs received in 2017, - 70 percent of STRs received in 2018, - 81.8 percent of STRs received in 2019, - 35.3 percent of STRs received in 2020, - 67.4 percent of STRs received in 2021. - It is concerning that the large majority of STRs received in 2017, 2018 and 2019 were still being analyzed by end-2021 and during the on-site visit in June 2022. - The FIU may obtain – upon request or requisition – information from law enforcement authorities (LEAs), the Treasury, the General Tax Directorate (DGI) and its Registration, Land Conservation, and Stamp Department (DECFT), the Côte d’Ivoire Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (ARTCI), the National Civil Status and Identification Office (ONECI), and commercial courts. - The number of requests and requisitions submitted to national authorities remains modest compared to the number of received STRs. For instance, 186 requisitions were sent to LEAs over a period of five years. - A majority of the 263 information requests submitted to administrative authorities were addressed to the DGI and DECFT; recourse to information from other agencies is limited. - Authorities indicate response times from national authorities can easily go up to one month, and 243 requests and requisitions (about 54.1 percent of requests and requisitions submitted) remained pending at the time of the on-site visit. In emergencies, the FIU can obtain a response generally within 24 hours. - Over the past five years, the unit made 132 requests to its foreign counterparts, 82 of which were made as part of the processing of STRs, while the other 50 were made at the request of other competent authorities. - Table 3.1. Côte d’Ivoire: Information Requests and Requisitions Submitted to Other Competent Authorities and Foreign Counterparts, and Information Requests Received by the FIU (Source: FIU) - Year — International information requests sent — National information requests sent — Requisitions sent to LEAs — Total national IRs and requisitions — Information requests received (International / National) - 2017 — 32 — 33 — 13 — 46 — 33 / 13 - 2018 — 13 — 20 — 14 — 34 — 24 / 10 - 2019 — 24 — 64 — 50 — 114 — 34 / 39 - 2020 — 37 — 92 — 60 — 152 — 15 / 55 - 2021 — 26 — 54 — 49 — 103 — 8 / 56 - Total — 132 — 263 — 186 — 449 — 114 / 173 - The PPEF - The PPEF has access to a wealth of financial intelligence and other information. It has access - upon request or requisition - to information held by national authorities and can use judicial warrants to obtain information held by private sector entities, which cooperate in a satisfactory manner with the PPEF. The collection of information from DNFBPs is almost non-existent. - The PPEF relies on the FIU as an important source of financial intelligence. Each dissemination from the FIU systematically leads to the opening of a ML investigation. - By the end of May 2022, out of the 270 ML cases registered with the PPEF, 112 were opened following a dissemination by the FIU. - The FIU has made 148 disseminations and has clarified that one dissemination can involve several STRs, and notably that 285 STRs have been disseminated. Available data does not allow to ascertain whether the 112 cases recorded by the PPEF correspond to the 148 disseminations made by the FIU. It is possible that the PPEF did not receive all disseminations made by the FIU to the Public Prosecutor, before the PPEF started its activities in October 2020. - Table 3.2. Côte d’Ivoire: Cases Opened by the PPEF Following FIU Disseminations - Total cases opened based on FIU disseminations: 112 - Cases being processed: 38 - Cases referred to Correctional Police (ORPC) including: 63 - Adjudicated cases: 50 - Cases involving asset confiscation: 40 - Cases under appeal: 1 - Cases currently being adjudicated: 13 - Dismissed cases: 11 *Source: 1civea2023002 - 176. Côte d’Ivoire is rated as having a Moderate level of effectiveness for IO.1.* ### 182. The FIU’s disseminations generally include a summary or an overview of the main ### 1civea2023002 - 182. The FIU’s disseminations generally include a summary or an overview of the main ### FIU disseminations and content - Disseminations generally include a summary or an overview of the main transactions on the accounts identified in the report and are often accompanied by account statements ready for use. - Disseminations contain information obtained from national authorities to facilitate collection of additional information where necessary. - Disseminations consulted rarely include identification of transaction counterparts and generally lack elaborate financial analysis. - Of the 148 disseminations of financial intelligence stemming from 285 STRs, most disseminations related to scamming (52 percent). Disseminations related to corruption and similar offenses were 8.8 percent, tax evasion 6 percent, and illicit drug trafficking 1.3 percent. No disseminations submitted to the PPEF were linked to TF or environmental crime. ### Use of financial intelligence by investigative authorities - Usage is uneven across investigative authorities: - DPEF and SRG regularly request financial intelligence and other information to support investigations. - HABG and UCT make little use of financial intelligence obtainable (via judicial warrants) from the private sector. - HABG submitted 54 requests to banks over 2017–2021; UCT submitted 33 over the same period. - Investigative authorities often prefer sending requests for information to the FIU to collect information from FIs rather than using their privileged powers to request directly from the FIU. - Of 173 requests for information sent by national authorities to the FIU between 2017 and 2021, 138 were sent by the DGMG as part of a DNFBP activity approval/authorization procedure. - Investigative authorities make little proactive use of exchange of information and financial intelligence with foreign counterparts despite transnational nature of major threats. - Use of financial intelligence in combating TF remains very limited despite TF being viewed as a high threat. ### Tax authorities and financial intelligence - Tax authorities (DGI) use a dedicated service for collection and analysis of financial intelligence and benefit from privileged access to banking information. - DGI is authorized only to apply administrative measures and does not have competence to deal with ML investigations related to tax offenses. - Authorities consider levied administrative sanctions sufficiently dissuasive and generally do not refer cases to the Public Prosecutor for parallel criminal proceedings; this explains limited ML investigations and prosecutions stemming from tax evasion. ### STRs and CTRs: volumes and reporting entity behavior - The FIU receives two report types: “subjective” STRs and “objective” CTRs based on thresholds. All STRs and CTRs require manual entry into the FIU’s database. - Since 2016, FIs are obligated to submit information on fund transfers in cash or mobile money; lack of a BCEAO instruction on conditions and modalities has prevented implementation. - Reporting implementation remains imperfect and almost non-existent for DNFBPs. The FIU has never received STRs from a large majority of FIs and nearly all DNFBPs. - Banking sector accounts for 58.3 percent of STRs in recent years (improvement noted). - Almost all STRs from the DFS sector (37.5 percent of STRs) originated from a single DFS, many due to misunderstanding the difference between STRs and CTRs. - Table: Number of STRs and CTRs (Source: FIU) - STRs: 2017 234, 2018 364, 2019 631, 2020 506, 2021 568, TOTAL 2,303 - CTRs: 2017 00, 2018 74, 2019 144.145, 2020 385.388, 2021 345.663, TOTAL 875.270 ### Nature of suspicions reported (STRs) — received totals by type (Table 3.4) - Money laundering: 139, 34, 50, 198, 163 — TOTAL 654 - Terrorist financing: 3, 3, 3, 2, 1 — TOTAL 12 - Drug trafficking: 0, 1, 3, 1, 1 — TOTAL 6 - Scamming: 17, 20, 16, 6, 7 — TOTAL 66 - Tax fraud: 3, 17, 22, 26, 103 — TOTAL 171 - Credit card fraud: 0, 0, 1, 0, 0 — TOTAL 1 - Fraud: 0, 0, 9, 26, 29 — TOTAL 64 - Corruption and embezzlement: 0, 1, 3, 0, 6 — TOTAL 10 - Cybercrime: 32, 35, 71, 16, 18 — TOTAL 172 - Sums or transactions resulting from an offense or misdemeanor: 6, 243, 435, 219, 228 — TOTAL 1,131 - Forgery and use of false documents: 4, 1, 10, 11, 6 — TOTAL 32 - Fraudulent financial arrangements: 30, 0, 0, 0, 0 — TOTAL 30 - Misuse of corporate assets: 0, 0, 7, 1, 6 — TOTAL 14 - Unlawful recycling of funds into share capital: 1, 0, 0, 0, 0 — TOTAL 1 - Unlawful recycling of funds in real estate: 1, 0, 0, 0, 0 — TOTAL 1 - Wildlife trafficking: 0, 2, 0, 1, 0 — TOTAL 3 - Human trafficking: 0, 0, 1, 0, 0 — TOTAL 1 - Questionable business practices: 0, 7, 0, 0, 0 — TOTAL 7 - Questionable bank guarantee and Fraudulent checks: 0 across years — TOTAL 0 - Total STRs by year and overall: 2017 236, 2018 364, 2019 631, 2020 507, 2021 568 — TOTAL 2,306 ### Quality, feedback, and engagement with reporting entities - FIU considers received STRs of good quality but notes deficiencies and inadequacy to main threats (very few STRs for drug trafficking, corruption, environmental crime; very limited TF-related STRs). - Majority of reporting entities expressed need for more frequent and targeted engagement with the FIU. - FIU has not yet implemented a feedback strategy on quality and usefulness of STRs, nor produced typologies dedicated to supporting reporting entity categories. - FIU carried out awareness-raising actions following the NRA and provided occasional feedback to certain FIs. - FIU often requests additional information from banks; banks provide information promptly (one-week delay on average, less in emergencies). - Use of FIU’s legal power to liaise with DNFBPs is limited: 36 requisitions between 2017 and 2021 out of a total 2,143 requisitions. ### Requisitions and supervisory reporting - Requisitions sent by FIU to reporting entities (Table 3.5): - 2017 330 - 2018 223 - 2019 414 - 2020 747 - 2021 429 - Total 2,143 - Supervisory authorities do not make use of their ability to report to the FIU; breaches of obligation to report suspicions have not been communicated to the FIU. - Obligation on DGAT to report certain NPO donations to the FIU has not yet been implemented. ### Cross-border cash/BNI declarations and DGI reporting - FIU receives data on cross-border transportation of cash and BNIs made at Abidjan airport automatically and securely, but has not adequately used it for operational or strategic analysis; data does not extend to other checkpoints. - DGI receives quarterly information on international bank transfers exceeding 5 million XOF (USD 8,000) and on all accounts opened by a legal person or individual entrepreneur via FIs, but does not proactively use these transfers to detect irregularities or better understand associated risks. ### Operational capacity, processes, and delays - Processing of STRs, CTRs, and other information is completely manual due to lack of an advanced IT system, analytical tools, and sufficient human resources. - FIU organizational basics: - Headed by a President assisted by five statutory members forming the Members' Commission. - Statutory members delegated by Ministries of Justice (one), Security (two), Finance (one), and BCEAO (one). - Workforce totals 36 technical and administrative staff; seven employees dedicated to operational analyses (Analysis and National Cooperation Department - DACN); two individuals in Intelligence and Strategy Department (DRS) dedicated to strategic analyses. - FIU receives STRs in Word/PDF via encrypted e-mail and CTRs automatically. - Table: STRs processing and dissemination (Table 3.6) - Reports received: 2017 234, 2018 364, 2019 631, 2020 506, 2021 568 — TOTAL 2,303 - Reports under analysis: 2017 189, 2018 261, 2019 516, 2020 179, 2021 383 — TOTAL 1,528 - Reports provisionally classified: 2017 26, 2018 80, 2019 91, 2020 273, 2021 20 — TOTAL 490 - Reports disseminated (and linked STRs): 2017 19 (76), 2018 24 (34), 2019 30 (53), 2020 55 (82), 2021 20 (39) — TOTAL 148 (285) - Analytical process is long and complicated with referrals between departments; involvement of statutory members at each stage slows processing. - Prioritization criteria used by President and statutory members align largely with main ML/TF threats; priority given to TF, religious NPOs, public officials, PEPs, cybercrime, imminent or suspended transactions, and persons/entities subject of at least two reports. - All requested information is received in hard copy from private sector and other authorities, reducing speed and efficiency. - Without a data mining tool, CTRs are not adequately analyzed or used to maximize operational and strategic analysis. ### Use of special powers and outcomes - FIU exercised power to suspend execution of a transaction for a maximum of 48 hours 48 times between 2017 and 2021; all objections associated with disseminations and each followed by sequestration at judicial level. - Predicate offenses targeted by these 48 disseminations included illicit enrichment, scamming (including cybercrime), illicit betting over communication networks, and embezzlement of public funds. - FIU was able to disseminate financial intelligence in 148 instances; PPEF considers financial intelligence produced by FIU as a good basis for investigations. Disseminations contributed to convictions and confiscations. - FIU received the Egmont Best Case Award for one of its disseminations. ### Strategic analysis limitations - Lack of a data mining tool means STRs and CTRs are insufficiently exploited to support strategic analysis. - Ad hoc strategic analysis did not identify typologies; analysis of ML activities through legal persons was limited to quantitative statistics and did not produce typologies or indicators to aid authorities/reporting entities. - ML-related memos termed “strategic” were largely ad hoc notes to inform national authorities of large-scale fraud or scam schemes. *Source: 1civea2023002 - 182. The FIU’s disseminations generally include a summary or an overview of the main (PDF).* ### 205. The FIU has developed very few typologies to help FIs and DNFBPs identify ### 1civea2023002 - 205. The FIU has developed very few typologies to help FIs and DNFBPs identify ### FIU typologies, analysis capacity, and impact on preventive measures - The FIU has developed very few typologies to help FIs and DNFBPs identify suspicious transactions corresponding to the main ML/TF threats. - Example: a memo addressed to EMIs warned that their services are likely to be used for TF purposes but contained no description of modus operandi or concrete cases to assist detection. - Consequences of limited typologies: - Typologies, trends, and red flags would fill an important gap that weighs significantly on the effectiveness of preventive measures and prevents Côte d’Ivoire from taking full advantage of efforts made in recent years to raise private sector awareness on AML/CFT. - Lack of typologies reduces the FIU’s ability to strengthen the effectiveness of its operational analyses. - One-off production of strategic analysis does not establish useful typologies for operational needs of competent authorities and reporting entities, which weighs significantly on reporting entities’ implementation of preventive measures, including the identification of suspicions. ### Cooperation and exchange of financial information / confidentiality - The FIU constitutes a driving force for coordination and cooperation on AML/CFT; several initiatives facilitate cooperation and continuous dialogue among competent authorities. - FIU cooperation mechanisms and practice: - The FIU collaborates regularly with other competent authorities and has created a network of correspondents within these authorities. - Statutory members seconded to the FIU strengthen cooperation and facilitate access to information held by their original institutions, including informally. - The FIU indicated it did not encounter difficulties exchanging information with other national authorities; the latter reported being very satisfied with cooperation. - However, a majority of requests and requisitions submitted to national authorities have remained unanswered, raising doubts about the efficiency of cooperation to support the FIU’s analytical work. - Information exchange with supervisors and other authorities: - At the time of the on-site visit, the FIU and supervisory authorities had not exchanged information on the quantity and usefulness of STRs, nor on shortcomings in implementation of the obligation to report suspicions. - No discussion between the FIU and supervisory authorities on emerging ML and TF trends had taken place at the time of the on-site visit. - Cooperation agreements were signed in early 2022 between the FIU and the BCEAO, and between the Unit and the CREPMF. - Since those agreements, the FIU and the BCEAO have exchanged information mainly relevant to identification of bank accounts. - Data protection and secure channels: - The FIU’s physical protection measures: offices protected, server isolated in a highly secure room, STR information and documents kept in safes. - Exchange with foreign FIUs occurs via the secure network of the Egmont Group. - A system for secure transfer of data relating to reports on cross-border movements of cash and BNIs has recently been put in place. - Exchange of information with national competent authorities and dissemination to the Public Prosecutor are not carried out via dedicated and secure channels. - The assessment team identified memos related to scams that appear to have been addressed to the Minister of Finance, including a memo with a request for instructions on possible objections to be made by the FIU; repeated such actions risk compromising FIU autonomy. ### Conclusions on Immediate Outcome 6 (IO.6) - Use of financial intelligence by investigative authorities: - The PPEF and some investigative authorities use financial intelligence and other information appropriately to develop evidence and trace proceeds of crime. - Other investigative authorities with a strategic role in combating the main threats make little use of financial intelligence and other information to investigate ML, predicate offenses, and TF. - In general, the PPEF and investigative authorities do not make sufficient use of financial intelligence obtainable from the FIU and foreign sources. - Factors reducing FIU analytical capacity: - Uneven distribution and completeness of STRs. - Limited recourse to national authorities to enrich financial analyses. - Obsolete IT system. - Entirely manual reporting, analysis, and dissemination practices. - Insufficient human resources. - Impact and limitations of FIU disseminations: - The FIU has disseminated financial intelligence appreciated by the PPEF and other competent authorities and that enabled notable PPEF results in ML convictions and confiscations. - Disseminations only partially correspond to major ML/TF threats in Côte d’Ivoire; no TF-related financial intelligence was disseminated, constituting a strategic deficiency. - Disseminations do not include elaborate financial analysis and have generally not triggered complex ML investigations. - Cooperation limitations: - Majority of requests and requisitions submitted by the FIU to national authorities remain pending, raising doubts on the efficiency of cooperation to support analytical work. - At the time of the on-site visit, cooperation between the FIU and supervisory authorities remained very limited. - Overall effectiveness rating: - Côte d’Ivoire is rated as having a low level of effectiveness for IO. 6. ### Immediate Outcome 7 (Money Laundering Investigations and Prosecutions) — legal framework and institutional arrangements - Legal and institutional strengths: - The modern legal framework resulting from the uniform law provides a solid foundation for prosecution of ML/TF offenses (see R.3): broad definition of offenses and criminal profits, extensive investigative powers, and dissuasive sanctions. - Establishment of a specialized court for economic and financial crimes (PPEF) in October 2020 enhanced efficiency and coordination of ML/TF investigations and prosecutions. - Law No. 22-193 of March 11, 2022 reinforced PPEF powers; since March 2022 the PPEF has constituted an autonomous court with its own budget and national jurisdiction for all economic and financial offenses of particular gravity or complexity. - PPEF composition: six magistrates, including five investigating judges and a vice president of the Abidjan court of first instance who oversees it; prosecution headed by an assistant prosecutor with four substitutes; assisted by clerks and administrative assistants. - Specialized training provided by UNODC’s CRIMJUST project, OCWAR-M project-funded by the European Union, and a project led by Expertise France on complex ML/TF or corruption investigations and criminal asset seizure. - Investigative agencies and coordination: - The Economic and Financial Police Directorate (DPEF) and the Counter Transnational Crime Unit (UCT) are most involved in ML/TF investigations. - DPEF employs 13 investigators divided into three sections: the AML/CFT Section, the AML and Predicate Offenses Section, and the AML and Tax Fraud Section. - Other specialized agencies involved: DITT, Research Section of the National Gendarmerie, Drugs Unit of the National Gendarmerie, Criminal Police Directorate, Narcotic and Drug Police Directorate, HABG, Narcotic and Drug Brigade of Ivorian Customs, Customs Investigations Directorate, Anti-Mining Code Violations Squad, and since August 2021, the GS-LOI. - Choice of investigating agency is made by the prosecutor depending on case nature and importance. - Cooperation among specialized investigative agencies is generally good, but the PPEF Prosecutor’s Office does not sufficiently coordinate their action yet; regular coordination meetings are lacking. - Investigative practices and limitations: - Preliminary investigations average approximately three months; average duration of inquiry is 18 months according to authorities. - Preliminary investigations systematically give rise to opening of judicial investigations. - The Public Prosecutor exercises effective control of preliminary investigations; when a judicial investigation is opened, the investigating judge directs and controls the investigation. - Specialized police departments open asset investigations in all cases, but these are not separate parallel financial investigations; the Public Prosecutor usually keeps predicate and financial investigations within the same case. - This unified approach can strengthen proceedings but limits ability to identify and thoroughly investigate financing networks, particularly internationally. - Investigative agencies make little use of special investigation techniques due to lack of resources and training (technological means, electronic surveillance, image/sound capture, network infiltration); controlled delivery measures have been used in at least three successful cases. - Agencies can rely on technical support of DITT for electronic surveillance and related technical measures. - HABG performance: - HABG is empowered to investigate corrupt practices, identify alleged perpetrators, and initiate proceedings; can act on complaints, reports, or ex officio and forwards cases to the Public Prosecutor when justified. - HABG Investigations and Prosecutions Department received 780 cases since 2017, resulting in opening of 54 investigations; only nine cases have been transmitted to prosecution following fruitful investigations—a limited effectiveness record. - PPEF reports having received 3 cases from HABG, one of which was closed by a dismissal order. - Case management and trends: - Number of ML cases identified each year is relatively low compared to profit-generating offenses (NRA estimate: 48,688 between 2013 and 2018, averaging around 10,000 per year), but a clear positive trend has been noted in recent years. - 270 ML cases have been opened since 2017, averaging around 50 per year. - Most ML cases follow investigations into predicate offenses and do not give rise to parallel financial investigations. - Autonomous ML detections: 14 investigations opened following an FIU report or confiscation of cash of unknown origin. - Certain predicate offenses (notably drug trafficking) identified thanks to information from foreign investigative agencies; authorities did not report ML cases identified via international cooperation with foreign investigative agencies apart from FIU-to-FIU cooperation. ### Key statistics on cases (as of May 27, 2022) - Number of cases opened at the PPEF as of May 27, 2022: 404 - ML/TF cases opened (out of the above): 270 - Number of cases referred to court: 163 - Number of cases that have been the subject of a dismissal order: 37 - Prosecution rate (referred cases/number of cases closed): 81% - Number of cases awaiting trial: 41 - Number of adjudicated cases: 115 - Number of cases in which an acquittal decision was ordered: 9 - Conviction rate (number of convictions/total number of cases): 92% ### Origin of cases opened at the PPEF (as of May 27, 2022) - Total number of cases opened at the PPEF: 404 - Cases received from the FIU: 112 - Cases received from the Economic and Financial Police Directorate: 99 - Complaints with civil action: 75 - Cases received from Criminal Police: 31 - Cases received from the Research Section: 34 - Cases received from the DITT: 12 - Cases received from the DPSD: 11 - Cases received from Customs: 8 - Cases received from the UCT: 9 - Cases received from the HABG: 3 *Source: 1civea2023002 - 205. The FIU has developed very few typologies to help FIs and DNFBPs identify (IMF PDF).* ### 231. In conclusion, multiple efforts have been made to structure the agencies, with the ### 1civea2023002 - 231. In conclusion, multiple efforts have been made to structure the agencies, with the ### Structure, specialization, and resources - Establishment of sections or specialized services within investigative agencies, and new structures such as the UCT, the Task Force to Combat Illegal Goldmining (GS-LOI), and the PPEF. - These efforts have professionalized and specialized personnel. - Rapid rise in the number of opened ML investigations, with an “excellent dynamic” led by the PPEF. - Concern: “the scope of powers conferred by the new law to the PPEF risks saturating it quickly, unless there is a rapid and significant increase in its resources.” ### Consistency of ML investigations and prosecutions with threats and national AML policies - Authorities have not set national priorities in criminal justice policy to combat financial crime and ML/TF. - Minister of Justice may issue instructions via circulars to attorney generals and public prosecutors; “No criminal justice policy circulars have been issued on AML/CFT.” - Attorney General and the Prosecutor of Abidjan are responsible for determining priority for AML/CFT criminal justice action. - Lack of criminal justice policy guidelines undermines effectiveness and consistency with the country’s risk profile. - Investigators and magistrates lack tools such as practical guides on asset investigations. - Recommendation: Better coordination of investigation services by the Public Prosecutor’s Office through periodic public action meetings and increased awareness of legal and procedural aspects of ML/TF investigations. ### PPEF portfolio, case composition, and alignment with the NRA - At establishment in 2020, PPEF portfolio “hardly reflected the reality of the threats.” - As of May 2022, PPEF had been tasked with a total of 404 cases, including: - 86 cases of corruption and similar offenses, - 244 economic offenses (fraud, breach of trust, etc.), - 68 cybercrime cases, - 21 drug trafficking cases, - 8 environmental crime cases (illegal goldmining). - Of these 404 cases, 273 cases included ML, while five cases included TF. - Number of prosecutions targeting legal persons: 46 since 2020 concerning 70 legal persons. ### Case study: pyramid scheme (selected findings) - Between 2016 and 2017, companies promised returns of “around 200 to 500 percent” on investments in “turnkey” plantations. - Investigation steps: interviews, field investigations, information collection from Banks, Land Registry, QUIPUX, SICTA to identify bank accounts and assets. - Findings: companies operated no large plots, no distribution network; scheme operated as a PONZI pyramid. - Seizure: agricultural equipment, products, and “a sum of just over 24,000,000,000 XOF (USD 38.4 million)” placed under judicial control. - Sentences: two managers sentenced to 20 years in prison and fines of “24 billion and 142 billion XOF” respectively; confiscation of properties, bank accounts, vehicles; dissolution of two companies and closure of premises. ### Gaps: environmental crime, tax fraud, and corruption - Environmental crime prosecutions by PPEF focus on illegal goldmining; other predominant forms (trafficking of endangered species, illegal logging) are not reflected in ML investigations. - Authorities identified 28 cases of trafficking in protected species, including two since the on-site visit, but none were the subject of an ML investigation. - Tax fraud laundering cases: “No tax fraud laundering cases … have been referred to the Public Prosecutor’s Office by tax authorities since 2017.” - Tax authorities favor tax transactions or adjustments rather than criminal proceedings. - Referral of significant tax fraud to criminal justice could reinforce dissuasiveness and transparency. - Corruption (number one threat): investigations clearly insufficient despite improvement. - HABG forwarded nine cases to prosecution since creation, four relating to acts of corruption. - Out of 404 PPEF cases, two corruption cases concluded with a final conviction (at one point). - NRA data: out of 48,688 cases tied to predicate offenses investigated, only 125 related to corruption or misappropriation (i.e., 0.25 percent). - Latest PPEF stats showed 26 cases opened on account of corruption, and a total of 86 ongoing cases pertaining to corruption “and other similar offenses.” - Table: Number of Corruption Cases Opened Annually at the PPEF - 2020: 6 - 2021: 14 - 2022 (until May 27): 6 - Special investigative techniques (audio equipment, video recording, undercover investigations) are rarely used, though legal tools exist to systematize proactive investigations. ### Types of ML cases pursued - Of 270 ML cases opened at the PPEF: - 255 are self-laundering cases, - 15 involve laundering by third parties (usually family members; often corruption or drug trafficking). - ML as a standalone offense is rare: 14 cases opened solely on ML offenses without connection to predicate offenses. - These cases mainly originated from FIU reports or cash confiscations. - Cross-border aspects: - 71 cases handled by PPEF relate to predicates committed at least in part abroad (16 percent of PPEF cases). - Only 11 cases pursued mutual legal assistance; in others, international aspects were not pursued. ### Legal persons and case outcomes - 46 PPEF cases opened against legal persons: 16 in 2020, 15 in 2021, 15 in 2022 — involving a total of 70 legal persons. - Prosecuted concurrently with natural persons in 44 cases, as main perpetrators in 2 cases. - 32 cases prosecuted for ML and predicate offenses; 4 for ML alone; others for different offenses. - Ten cases dismissed, four led to conviction, others ongoing or awaiting judgment. ### Prosecution, conviction rates, and sanctions - Case disposition since PPEF establishment (October 2020): - Nearly half of referred cases closed to date: 200 cases, including 133 on account of ML/TF. - Referred to criminal court: 163 (81 percent), including 119 on account of ML/TF. - 104 cases judged, 14 appealed, 48 awaiting judgment. - Conviction rate reported: 91 percent (only nine acquittals recorded). - In cases submitted to the court, 103 defendants had detention warrants; 89 were provisionally released before trial; 139 placed under judicial supervision. - 52 cases judged on ML charges resulted in 46 convictions, including 44 with confiscation of property; ten cases were appealed. - Sentences and confiscations: - Prison sentences range from 12 months to 20 years. - Fines can amount to several billion CFA Francs; one case reached “50 billion XOF (USD 80 million).” - Example penalties: - For fraud and ML involving 7 million XOF: ML sentence of 3 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 21 million XOF. - For cybercrime involving 800 million XOF: 10 years’ imprisonment, fine of 2 billion XOF, deprivation of civil rights. - Confiscation issued in most ML convictions: in 52 ML-judged cases, 44 confiscation decisions issued (cash, bank accounts, buildings, and a dam in one case). - Of 46 prosecution cases against legal persons, only four led to sentencing with fines to the civil party of 1 billion XOF, 5 billion XOF, and 3 billion XOF respectively; other remedies included company dissolution, confiscation of bank account balances, and permanent closure of establishments. ### Use of alternative measures and prosecutorial strategy - No formal alternative measures to compensate for inability to prosecute ML; ML prosecutions often concurrent with predicate offense investigations. - Authorities report at least two decisions where defendants were acquitted of predicate offense but convicted of ML — an “inverted” alternative measure validating ML prosecution as a tool to disrupt criminal systems. ### Conclusions on IO.7 (Investigations and prosecutions) - ML prosecutions recently strengthened by AML/CFT Law and establishment of PPEF. - PPEF “helped improve the consistency of investigations and prosecutions.” - Rapid development of PPEF; magistrates familiar with legal tools. - Corruption undermines prosecutorial efforts and remains under-prosecuted. - Coordination among investigative agencies needs improvement; ML investigations as standalone offenses should be encouraged. - Sentences are “effective, proportionate, and dissuasive”; prosecution and conviction rate in investigated cases is high. - Overall rating: Côte d’Ivoire is rated as having a moderate level of effectiveness for IO. 7. ### Confiscation framework (opening of IO.8) - AML/CFT Law established a legal system facilitating seizure and confiscation: - Broad definition of assets liable to be confiscated. - Compulsory confiscation of proceeds of crime. - Optional general confiscation system facilitating proof of origin of assets. - Some special laws provide for general confiscation of convicted persons’ assets for certain predicate offenses representing major threats. - Authorities established illicit asset recovery unit within the AJE and the Agency for the Management and Recovery of Criminal Assets (AGRAC). - Priority not yet crystallized at highest state level: “no action plan or inter-ministerial impetus” and no circulars or criminal justice policy instructions on seizure and confiscation policy. - Investigative agencies and magistrates lack practical guides on seizure and confiscation. - No initiative to date to modernize the Criminal Code to extend AML/CFT Law provisions to other profit-generating offenses. *Source: IMF content unit 1civea2023002 (excerpts provided).* ### 257. Despite the absence of a global political impetus on confiscation, judicial authorities ### Confiscation of Criminal Assets in Côte d’Ivoire (Sections 257–271) ### Confiscation outcomes and case statistics - Out of the 104 cases adjudicated by the PPEF since its establishment, 56 have led to confiscation measures. - In ML cases, judges issued confiscation orders in 44 of the 52 cases adjudicated since 2020. - No TF cases were adjudicated; therefore no confiscation orders in that area. - The amount of cash seizures by the PPEF rose between October 2020 and October 2021 to over 8.5 billion XOF (USD 14 million), but nearly 4 billion XOF (USD 6 million) were subsequently returned. - Table 3.12 — Summary of Seized Assets in PPEF Cases (as of October 31, 2021): - Land parcels: 15 - Real estate: 59 (including two rental buildings) - Vehicles: 24 (including one tractor and one tractor-trailer) - Vessel: one - Speedboats: four - Pirogues: eight - 1 112 coins of gold ingot - 962 coins of gold ingot (weight of 100 437.33 grams of gold) - 3 317.08 grams of gold - Bank accounts: 91 - Insurance policies: two - Amount in XOF: 8 571 000 000 (or 13.7 million USD) - Jewelry for a value of 174 968 264 FCFA (about 280,000 USD) - Two business assets (pizza store and hotel) ### Legal framework and judicial practice - Ivorian law does not have a civil or administrative non conviction-based confiscation regime in ML/TF matters. - Optional confiscation of all or part of the convicted person’s assets – even those of lawful origins – is possible in ML/TF matters and for some predicate offenses (AML/CFT Law, art. 117, al. 9 and art. 122, al. 9, Criminal Code, art. 59). - The PPEF trial court handles confiscation procedure well; complex cases include joint properties, plots of land, insurance policies, a hotel, business assets, a ship, and a dam. - Jurisprudence appears to have extended the scope of value confiscation (Article 129 of the AML/CFT Law), correcting a legislative imperfection by applying value confiscation to ML offenses. ### Confiscation case study: "I.O.U." (Box 2) - Arrest: 2017; individual found with 10 million XOF (USD 16,000) and foreign currency. - Conviction: sentenced to 20 years in prison and a fine of 100 million XOF. - Confiscation order included: - A 50-room hotel - His personal residence - Two buildings - Six vehicles - All proceeds of the offense, instruments of the offense, and income derived from assets generated from the offense. - Additional penalties: deprived of civil rights for 10 years; banned from the territory for 5 years. ### Asset management and institutional arrangements - An illicit asset recovery unit was set up in 2013 under HABG then AJE; since 2017 the unit handled only 14 cases and has lacked effectiveness. - Seized goods are stored when possible; no systematic management measures are taken, particularly for buildings. - No procedure exists for restitution of confiscation proceeds to victims, only restitution of assets owned by victims. - AGRAC (Agency for the Recovery and Management of Seized and Confiscated Assets) created by decree of June 1, 2022: - Placed under the authority of the Minister of Justice. - Mission: execute freezing, seizure, and confiscation orders; recover frozen, seized or confiscated property; cooperate with foreign authorities for identifying/locating criminal assets. - Responsible for centralizing seized sums and assigning seized assets to State services upon request. - As of the evaluation date, AGRAC had not been operationalized; effectiveness not yet assessed. - Recommendation noted: safeguards should be put in place to prevent abuse or misappropriation when allocating seized/confiscated property to State services. ### International cooperation and mutual legal assistance (MLA) - Lack of recourse to MLA in seizure and confiscation matters is an obstacle to effectiveness; almost one in five cases has an international component. - Authorities indicated only one request for mutual legal assistance had been sent by Côte d’Ivoire for confiscation and repatriation of assets; no asset repatriation case had been processed by the evaluation date. - No statistics provided on MLA requests sent to Côte d’Ivoire; a FATF member country reported unanswered requests from its investigative services (number not specified). - Very short periods of pre-trial detention discourage issuing international letters rogatory; investigating magistrates fear delays will prevent attaching foreign responses to the procedure. - Suggested operational approach: partition the case and open a parallel financial investigation to try the predicate offense within detention limits and continue asset identification/recovery in parallel. - Use of informal cooperation methods is rare; magistrates have contact with the French liaison magistrate or traveled for liaison meetings but have never requested joint investigation teams or used embassy liaison officers. Further training in MLA procedures recommended. ### Cross-border cash confiscations - Confiscations of cash by customs at Abidjan airport range between seven and 20 confiscations per year since 2017 (mainly at exit). - Total amounts at airport range between 26 million XOF (USD 41,000) and 3.1 billion XOF (USD 50 million), with a record confiscation in 2019 of 3.9 million euros and USD 533,000 in one traveler’s luggage. - Total confiscated between 2017 and 2021 at airports: 4.748 billion XOF (USD 7.6 million). - No statistics provided for land or sea borders; land border porosity complicates controls. - An IT tool (SYDEF) developed by the FIU and Customs now collates border seizure statistics, but authorities could not provide national-level statistics and it was put in place a few weeks before the on-site visit. - Low volume of confiscations may reflect use of “hawala” informal transfer techniques and false import declarations; cross-checks raised suspicions about nearly 5,000 international transfers lacking proof of actual imports. ### Consistency of confiscation results with ML/TF risks and AML/CFT priorities - Offenses leading to many seizures/confiscations (drug trafficking, fraud, corruption and related offenses) are consistent with identified threats; tax offenses and environmental crimes are lacking. - NRA statistics (2013–2018) on value of assets seized/confiscated: - Embezzlement of public funds, corruption, and misappropriation: 24 billion XOF (or USD 38 million) - Environmental offenses: 22 million XOF (or USD 35,000) - Participation in a criminal group and smuggling: 5 million XOF (or USD 8,000) - Drug trafficking: 2.3 million XOF (or USD 3,700) - More recent statistics for drug trafficking show cash confiscations totaling over one billion XOF (USD 1.6 million) plus various assets (buildings, lands, luxury vehicles, jewelry) without estimates. - Statistical breakdown by predicate offense provided by authorities shows: - Fraud: 35 cases (greatest value of confiscated property) - Illicit betting: 17 cases - Corruption-related offenses: 11 cases - Recent increase in seizures related to clandestine gold mining: three cases - Environmental crimes (trafficking in protected species) led to no seizures or confiscations. - Tax offenses are not listed among offenses that have led to confiscation. - Mutual criminal assistance in seizure/confiscation matters is almost non-existent and inconsistent with the transnational nature of main threats. ### Key conclusions and policy implications - Recent PPEF efforts have resulted in more systematic implementation of confiscation, ordered in a large majority of ML cases. - The PPEF trial court is effective in handling confiscation, including complex and in-kind equivalent confiscation orders. - Judicial authorities have made confiscation a principal tool against organized crime and ML. - Identified needs and recommendations: - Back efforts with an overall government policy to apply the AML/CFT Law provisions to all predicate offenses and ensure effective implementation by all State agencies. - Increase systematic recourse to formal and informal international cooperation to strengthen confiscation of proceeds of crime. - Significantly increase efforts to confiscate illegal cross-border cash movements given the risk. - Operationalize AGRAC with appropriate safeguards to prevent abuse or misappropriation. - Improve seizure/confiscation management (storage and management of seized goods, restitution procedures for victims’ proceeds). - Provide further training to magistrates on MLA procedures and informal cooperation methods. - Use case partitioning and parallel financial investigations to mitigate short pre-trial detention constraints on international evidence collection. *Italic: Extracted content from sections 257–271 of the source content provided.* ### 272. Côte d’Ivoire is rated as having a moderate level of effectiveness for IO. 8. ### 1civea2023002 - 272. Côte d’Ivoire is rated as having a moderate level of effectiveness for IO. 8. ### Key Findings (Terrorist Financing and Proliferation Financing) - Immediate Outcome 9 - Côte d’Ivoire has launched nine proceedings for TF. Most of the prosecuted cases were opened following terrorist attacks that targeted the country. - No case has been brought to trial to date, and therefore, no convictions have been obtained. - The number of investigations into TF cases remains low and does not correspond to the country’s high TF risk profile. - Identification of potential cases of financing from Côte d’Ivoire to organizations, individuals, or terrorist activities outside the country does not appear to be a priority for investigative authorities. - Côte d’Ivoire does not have a national counter-terrorism strategy that includes TF investigations, but a coordinated operational approach has recently integrated TF investigations into those relating to terrorist attacks. - The non-criminalization of the financing of a terrorist organization for any purpose limits the ability to effectively prosecute and sanction TF offenses. - Authorities did not effectively use alternative measures when a TF conviction was not possible. - Immediate Outcome 10 - The regional legal framework to implement Targeted Financial Sanctions (TFS) under UNSCR 1267 only applies to banks and financial institutions and is not implemented in Côte d’Ivoire due to lack of decisions by the WAEMU Council of Ministers (CM). - The 1267 List is applied voluntarily by the vast majority of banks and a number of other FIs; TFS are not implemented by DNFBPs or the general public. - Adoption and implementation of TFS under UNSCR 1373 have not proven effective. - Authorities have not identified all active NPOs; identification of the most vulnerable NPOs is hampered by absence of an assessment of TF threats to NPOs. - No funds were frozen under TFS and no funds were confiscated at the operational level. - Côte d’Ivoire has not proposed any designations to the 1267/1989 Committee and has not proposed joint national designations or asked a third country to give effect to its freezing mechanisms. - Immediate Outcome 11 - With the exception of one entity designated in 2020, TFS linked to PF are not implemented due to lack of decrees to transpose lists 1718 and 2231 into domestic law. - Lists 1718 and 2231 are applied voluntarily by the vast majority of banks and some FIs, but not by DNFBPs or the general public. - No efforts were observed to identify and freeze assets of targeted persons and entities; with the exception of a single case, authorities have not reported seizure or freezing of funds and assets following UNSCR 1718 or 2231 designations. - Banks and FIs in international groups have a more mature understanding of PF sanctions; other reporting entities, including most DNFBPs, have very limited understanding. - Reporting entities are not subject to supervision relating to implementation of TFS pertaining to PF. ### Immediate Outcome 9 — Prosecutions, Convictions, and Case Progress - Prosecution/Conviction summary - The low number and inadequacy of TF prosecutions and the absence of convictions do not match the high-risk profile of the country. - At present, no TF case has gone to trial in Côte d’Ivoire to date. - The TF threat is largely transnational; a group operating in the north has camps across borders with recruitment, training, logistics, and financing carried out on both sides of the border. No prosecutions have targeted these transnational threats. - Case statistics and characteristics - Authorities have opened nine judicial inquiries for TF: three cases have been closed, while six are still ongoing. - Types of activities in cases: collection and use of funds for terrorist purposes; transport of funds suspected of being intended for TF; use of foreign currencies; transfer of funds through informal networks; a drug trafficking case with indictment for TF and illegal possession of weapons; a lawsuit for ML and TF linked to Al Shabaab following a fundraising campaign and establishment of an illicit coal production company. - Several proceedings resulted in dismissal orders due to insufficient evidence or poor qualification of the TF offense (example: dismissal order dated March 19, 2021; partial dismissal following December 2018 indictment). - High rate of dismissals reflects poor quality of TF cases and insufficient evidence gathering by investigative authorities. - Ongoing prosecutions are mainly directed towards financing tied to attacks in Côte d’Ivoire and do not extend to financing of terrorist groups for activities outside the country. - Case timelines and procedural challenges - Proceedings initiated in 2018 and 2019 were still in progress in 2022, indicating TF casefiles are not dealt with expeditiously. - Delays attributed to lack of human, material, and technical resources, limited specialized training for magistrates and investigators, and pending responses to letters rogatory. - No prioritization of TF cases guaranteeing rapid action; absence of instructions, circulars, or dispatches to investigative services and prosecutor’s offices; insufficient training and lack of practical guidelines. - Institutional actions - In March 2022, Côte d’Ivoire expanded the powers of the PPEF to include TF. The PPEF is responsible for investigating, prosecuting, and judging TF and related offenses, but no results have been posted to assess its effectiveness. ### Table: TF Prosecutions in Progress (as provided) - Case 1 - Number: 1 - Year: 2018 - Offenses: Terrorist financing, illegal possession of class 1 firearms - Case Status: Procedure completed. Case pending communication to the Public Prosecutor’s Office for final settlement - Case 2 - Number: 2 - Year: 2019 - Offenses: Illegal possession of class 1 firearms and association of criminals with a view to preparing or committing terrorist acts - Case Status: Ongoing inquiry, pending the execution of the international letter rogatory issued on 31/01/2020 - Case 3 - Number: 3 - Year: 2020 - Offenses: Acts of terrorism, affiliation with a terrorist group, terrorist financing, and kidnapping in BOUNA - Case Status: Ongoing inquiry - Case 4 - Number: 4 - Year: During the year 2020 - Offenses: Terrorist acts, recruitment of persons to join an organized criminal group in order to participate in the commission of terrorist acts, provision or collection of funds in connection with terrorism, deliberate organization of travel for the purpose of participating in the commission, the organization, or the preparation of acts of terrorism, membership in an association or participation in an arrangement with a view to preparing or committing terrorist acts, provocation of a terrorist act or incitement of its commission - Case Status: Ongoing inquiry - Case 5 - Number: 5 - Year: During the year 2021 - Offenses: Terrorist acts, recruitment of persons in order to participate in the commission of terrorist acts, collection of funds in connection with terrorism, membership in an association or participation in an arrangement with a view to preparing or committing terrorist acts, attempt and complicity in the aforementioned acts - Case Status: Ongoing inquiry - Case 6 - Number: 6 - Year: 2022 - Offenses: Collection of funds in connection with terrorism, deliberate organization of travel for the purpose of participating in the commission, the organization, or the preparation of acts of terrorism, membership in an association or participation in an arrangement with a view to preparing or committing terrorist acts, provoking a terrorist act or inciting its commission - Case Status: Ongoing inquiry ### Case study: Dismissal in a TF Procedure (Box 3) - Facts - Arrest of a foreign national by the airport unit; Customs noted inscriptions in Arabic on scraps of paper stuck on packages containing currencies in euros and dollars estimated at approximately 2,851,803,000 XOF (USD 4.6 million), all packed in suitcases destined for a foreign country. - Investigations alerted the investigating judge to potential TF offense. - Outcome - A dismissal was issued over the TF facts, demonstrating that facts had not been sufficiently identified during the investigation phase. ### Recommendations (Immediate Outcomes 9, 10, 11) - Immediate Outcome 9 (TF investigations and prosecutions) - Complete legislation to criminalize all TF offenses, including financing of a terrorist organization for any purpose, to enable effective prosecution. - Fully integrate TF investigations into the national counter-terrorism strategy. - Strengthen capacities of investigation and criminal prosecution authorities, particularly the CSEILT and the PPEF, via training and increased human, material, and technical resources to build solid TF cases and obtain convictions consistent with the country’s high TF risk level. - Ensure law enforcement investigates and prosecutes TF cases not tied to attacks in Côte d’Ivoire and identify potential funding from Côte d’Ivoire to terrorist actors abroad. - Ensure prosecution authorities prioritize and guarantee rapid action against main TF threats and impose effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions upon convicted persons. - Ensure competent authorities regularly coordinate and exchange information to take alternative measures to hinder TF when criminal convictions are impossible. - Immediate Outcome 10 (TFS related to UNSCRs 1267 and 1373) - Address shortcomings under Recommendation 6, including supplementing the uniform law so national designation criteria and asset-freezing scope align with FATF standards and establish a national legal framework extending TFS to non-bank FIs, DNFBPs, and the general public. - Post updates of the 1267 List and the national list on the FIU website in a timely manner, expand the FIU distribution list to include all reporting entities, and adopt electronic dissemination. - Issue guidelines for implementation of TFS related to UNSCRs 1267 and 1373 and establish a mechanism to provide real-time assistance to reporting entities and the general public. - Increase outreach on TFS implementation, beginning with non-banking FIs and DNFBPs most at risk. - Identify all associations that meet the FATF definition of NPOs, develop specific risk indicators and best practices, and integrate this analysis into awareness-raising efforts. - Designate the competent authority to keep a dedicated register of NPOs and initiate appropriate CFT supervision in accordance with Articles 41 to 43 of the AML/CFT Law. - Ensure investigating and prosecuting authorities notify the CCGA when a dismissal decision in a TF case suggests reasonable grounds to consider persons or entities meet UN or national designation criteria. - Immediate Outcome 11 (TFS related to UNSCRs 1718 and 2231 / PF) - Supplement the AML/CFT Law so the scope of asset freezing aligns with FATF standards. - Adopt Lists 1718 and 2231 and ensure implementation of future amendments without delay. - Post updates to the 1718 and 2231 Lists on the FIU website in a timely manner, expand the FIU distribution list to include all reporting entities, and adopt electronic dissemination. - Issue guidelines for implementation of TFS related to UNSCRs 1718 and 2231 and establish a mechanism to provide real-time assistance to reporting entities and the general public. - Increase outreach efforts on TFS implementation, beginning with non-banking FIs and DNFBPs most at risk. - Ensure effective cooperation and coordination among the CCGA, supervisory authorities, SRBs, and other competent authorities, including Customs, to identify and seize or freeze funds and assets of persons and entities designated under UNSCRs pertaining to PF. - Ensure supervisory authorities and SRBs systematically monitor and ensure implementation by reporting entities of obligations pertaining to TFS linked to UNSCRs 1718 and 2231. *Source: Excerpt from Côte d’Ivoire assessment (IMF/assessment document).* ### 282. Competent investigative authorities do not use special investigative tools and ### 1civea2023002 - 282. Competent investigative authorities do not use special investigative tools and ### Findings on identification, investigation, and use of information - Competent investigative authorities do not use special investigative tools and techniques at their disposal to identify and investigate TF cases. - Coordination mechanisms exist (Intelligence Coordination, CROAT, CSEI-LCT) allowing intelligence services and investigative and criminal prosecution authorities to work together on TF cases, but their effectiveness has not been demonstrated; the positive impact on identification of TF cases could not be demonstrated. - Competent authorities do not make use of relevant financial intelligence and other information at their disposal in a relevant and timely manner to identify cases of TF. - STR statistics: - Out of eight STRs received between 2014 and 2018, five were processed and closed, while three are still being processed. - Detection capacities through STRs have not been strengthened since the end of the NRA and the implementation of its action plan. - Several investigations have been conducted and transmitted to criminal prosecution authorities; nearly all TF investigations were opened following terrorist attacks or as part of interceptive activities against an armed terrorist group affiliated with the Macina Liberation Front. - The National Gendarmerie initiated most TF investigations that resulted in cases being sent to prosecution authorities. - Identified funding mechanisms in investigations: - Self-financing. - Cross-border physical transport. - Informal transfers. - Mobile money. - Very few TF cases are identified and very few investigations conducted. Contributing factors include: - Recency of collaborative approach by competent authorities. - Limited understanding of the TF risk. - Low identification rate of TF cases. - Lack of understanding of the legal framework. - Low capacity for building cases by investigating authorities. - Insufficient recourse to international cooperation. - Difficulty identifying TF methods of groups operating in remote areas with a prevalent informal economy. ### Scope of investigations and priority issues - Identifying and investigating financing of organizations, individuals, or terrorist activities outside Côte d’Ivoire does not appear to be a priority. - Low number of surveys indicative of lack of resources (material, human, technical) or skills; specialized training was insufficient. - Sufficient measures in policy orientation and definition of priorities do not appear to have been taken since the end of the NRA. - Some investigations have identified TF schemes and roles of persons financing terrorism, but these cases are ongoing and effectiveness remains to be confirmed by sentences or designations. - Two seizures of livestock owned by individuals suspected of being part of a terrorist organization were carried out. - Overall, recency and low number of TF investigations as a terrorism mitigation strategy hinder effectiveness. ### Integration of TF investigations with national counter-terrorism strategy - Côte d’Ivoire provided information indicating it has a document outlining its counter-terrorism strategy; the document could not be reviewed by the assessment team. - TF investigations and prosecutions have not been integrated into this official strategy as a means of combating terrorism; in practice, integration has been recent and incomplete. - Example: Grand-Bassam terrorist attack (May 2016) — no TF investigation was integrated into the main investigation. - Since July 2020 attacks in the north-east, law enforcement adopted an approach associating TF investigations and prosecutions with terrorism investigations and prosecutions. - Data show TF linked to two terrorism prosecutions in connection with attacks in the northeast. - Some funding mechanisms uncovered (funding from the Katiba Liberation Front; funding through sale of cattle owned by families of certain terrorist individuals). - Authorities adopted a proactive approach using TF investigations to hinder activities of the armed terrorist group. - Despite these steps, the recency and low number of TF investigations limit effectiveness. ### Cooperation with private sector and DNFBPs - Apart from reporting and denunciation obligations, Côte d’Ivoire does not have cooperation mechanisms between investigative authorities and the private sector for terrorism and TF investigations/prosecutions. - No reported cases where investigative authorities and intelligence services proactively exchanged information with FIs to encourage spontaneous FI reporting on operations or individuals tied to TF. - DNFBPs: - No evidence of voluntary implementation of TFS by DNFBPs or the general public. - DNFBPs are not subject to Regulation No. 14/2002/CM/UEMOA and are not currently recipients of communications from the FIU. - Some DNFBPs remain unaware of UN or national sanctions regimes; some expressed willingness to implement TFS pending dissemination of applicable lists. ### Effectiveness, proportionality, and use of sanctions and alternative measures - Legal framework provides sanctions theoretically effective and dissuasive; proportionality questioned because minimum sentence of 10 years in prison does not sufficiently take into account the least serious TF cases. - Prosecutions and convictions: - Nine TF cases were prosecuted, three of which were dismissed, while the rest are still under investigation. - Côte d’Ivoire did not obtain any convictions for TF; therefore, no sanctions were pronounced. - Alternative measures where conviction not possible: - Of three dismissed cases, alternative measures were taken in only one case. - National designations have not been effectively used as alternative measures; one designation procedure took two years to complete after a case was dismissed, rendering it ineffective. - Except for the one cited case, Côte d’Ivoire has not resorted to alternative measures such as revoking NPO status, banning travel/adding names to no-fly lists, barring entry/residency, or using extradition powers. - Preventive/socioeconomic measures: - Social plan for northern and north-eastern regions and socio-professional integration of youth: - Endowed with the sum of 32 billion XOF (USD 51 million). - To be invested over 3 years for thousands of young people. - Launched in January 2022 and includes an awareness component. - Characterized as a general preventive measure rather than a targeted deradicalization program for high-risk individuals. - Overall, no concrete or effective disruption measures are implemented when a conviction cannot be obtained. ### Conclusions on IO.9 - Ivorian authorities have recently made efforts to identify, investigate, and prosecute TF cases, but have yet to obtain a conviction for TF. - Initiated investigations and prosecutions remain very weak and do not correspond to the country’s TF risk profile. - In the absence of a conviction, penalties provided by law have never been pronounced, preventing assessment of proportionality or dissuasiveness. - TF investigations are not systematically integrated into national counter-terrorism efforts. - Alternative measures are not used consistently and effectively to disrupt TF when conviction is not possible. - Côte d’Ivoire is rated as having a low level of effectiveness for IO.9. ### Implementation of Targeted Financial Sanctions (TFS) related to TF - Legal/institutional responsibilities: - Ivorian banks and financial institutions are required to implement TFS under UNSCR 1267 only following and on the basis of action by the WAEMU Council of Ministers (CM), which is responsible for drawing up the list of persons and entities whose funds must be frozen pursuant to this Resolution. - Minister of Finance may designate at the national level any individual or entity that “is a terrorist” or that finances terrorism by virtue of a decision made upon the CCGA’s suggestion. - CCGA responsibilities: suggest names for possible inclusion on the 1267 List, examine requests for easing freezing measures, carry out due diligence for publication and dissemination of freeze/release decisions. - FIU (president a member of CCGA) distributes lists of individuals/entities whose funds/assets must be frozen and receives declarations of freezing. - Implementation weaknesses: - Implementation of TF-related TFS is not effective, suffering from lack of action at regional level and shortcomings in applicable legal framework. - WAEMU CM does not appear to be taking action to implement UN TFS related to terrorism/TF at the community level; no copy or list of orders issued by the CM was provided. - Any CM orders would not apply to certain natural/legal persons in Côte d’Ivoire: non-banking FIs, DNFBPs, and the general public, including the informal financial and non-financial sectors. - Côte d’Ivoire has not outlined a national legal framework or mechanism to fill gaps or address shortcomings of the community-wide framework, nor attempted alternative procedures (e.g., national designation of 1267 List persons). - Communication and timeliness: - CCGA and FIU are responsible for national dissemination of UNSCR 1267 lists; FIU has provided such disseminations to Ivorian FIs since 2018, sporadically. - These communications are non-binding because the obligation to freeze stems exclusively from WAEMU CM orders (List 1267) and/or Minister of Finance decisions (National List). - Disseminations only reach FIs (via physical mail) and do not occur within 24 hours of each update to the 1267 List. - In practice, implementation of TFS in accordance with UNSCR 1267 is voluntary and lacks strict legal basis domestically. - FI and DNFBP screening practices: - With the exception of FX bureaus and a few insurance companies, FIs seem to have filtering software to identify customers likely subject to UN TFS; some screen in real time, others daily or monthly. - Effectiveness of FI filtering efforts remains to be demonstrated. - FIs did not report any proven cases concerning the 1267 List, except homonymy cases handled internally. - No evidence of voluntary implementation of TFS by DNFBPs or the general public; some DNFBPs await dissemination of lists from FIU to implement TFS. ### National designations — summary of cases - Legal framework for national designation is insufficiently used. - Box 4. National Designation Cases: - Case 1: - On May 27, 2020, a third country provided CCGA information regarding Amir Muhammad Sa’id Abdal-Rahman al-Salbi, alias al-Mawla, then the leader of Daesh, designated on the 1267 List the previous week. - FIU analysis presented to CCGA; CCGA issued an advisory opinion favorable to designation on September 24, 2020. - Minister of Finance issued Order No. 236 (2022) to designate al-Mawla nationally on June 17, 2022. - Case 2: - In 2020, after an investigating judge dismissed an investigation into 11 Somali nationals allegedly involved in financing Al Shabaab through production and illicit export of biological charcoal in Côte d’Ivoire, his cabinet informed the FIU. - FIU disseminated information gathered during the judicial investigation to the Ministry of Economy and Finance on March 19, 2020. - Ministry informed CCGA; CCGA issued an advisory opinion in favor of designation on September 24, 2020. - Minister of Finance issued Order No. 236 (2022) to designate them at the national level on June 17, 2022. - Case 3: - In 2020, a third country requested designation of an individual residing in Côte d’Ivoire. - CCGA collected available information and concluded he was a political opponent with no ties to terrorism; CCGA issued an advisory opinion against designation on November 06, 2020. *Source: 1civea2023002 - 282. Competent investigative authorities do not use special investigative tools and* ### 312. As confirmed by the cases above, Côte d’Ivoire has the will and ability to impose TFS ### 1civea2023002 - 312. As confirmed by the cases above, Côte d’Ivoire has the will and ability to impose TFS ### National Targeted Financial Sanctions (TFS) and designations - Côte d’Ivoire has the will and ability to impose TFS at the national level; CCGA members are aware of making designations under UNSCR 1373 and understand the criteria of proof the Minister of Finance must apply. - Practical implementation issues and delays: - The first national designation subject died during the nearly two-year delay between a favorable CCGA advisory opinion and the signing of the June 17, 2022, decree by the Minister of Finance. - The June 17, 2022, decree was not posted online and had not been disseminated or notified to reporting entities in the week following issuance. - Decrees for cases 1 and 2 included only names without other identifying elements such as date of birth or country of nationality. - Côte d’Ivoire has not asked another country to give effect to actions taken under its freezing mechanisms. - Awareness and guidance: - The awareness campaign targets reporting entities and remains nascent. - No guidelines regarding implementation of TFS related to UNSCRs 1267 and 1373 have been issued. - No hotline or real-time assistance mechanism for reporting entities, financial and non-financial informal sectors, or the general public has been established. ### Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs): legal framework, identification, and supervision - Legal and registry context: - All associations are governed by Law No. 1960-315; NPOs (as defined in Article 1 of the AML/CFT Law) take the legal form of associations and are designated as reporting entities under the AML/CFT Law. - NPOs do not yet have a designated CFT supervisory authority; declared NPOs are subject depending on activities to general supervision by DGAT or DGC (both under the Ministry of Interior and Security). - NPOs are required by the AML/CFT Law to register on a dedicated national register managed by a competent authority, but this authority has not yet been designated and the register is non-existent. - Identification and numbers: - DGAT calculated there were 8,630 associations declared in Côte d’Ivoire, including 16 recognized as being of public utility in accordance with Law No. 1960-315. - The 8,630 figure may over- or under-estimate NPOs because it includes associations not meeting the FATF definition and/or no longer in existence, and excludes newly established or informal NPOs. - Risk assessment and information base: - A baseline NRA analysis of NPO TF risks was conducted, involving competent authorities and sector representatives. - The analysis relied on limited information: eight STRs (submitted mainly by banks), three exchanges of information (between the FIU and counterparts abroad over 2014-2018), and two regional studies (one in 2013 by GIABA and FATF; one in 2016 by GABAC with FATF). - The NRA indicates donations from religious (or cultural) NPOs, including some “with a link to high-risk or non-cooperative jurisdictions,” are among non-criminal sources of TF in Côte d’Ivoire. - The NRA concluded a “very high” risk associated with cultural NPOs regarding exploitation for TF purposes but did not provide in-depth analysis nor differentiate risk by categories of religious NPOs. - No proven cases of NPO abuse for TF purposes have been identified. - Outreach, guidance, and capacity-building: - Authorities and the FIU organized awareness-raising workshops for NPOs on five occasions: (i) July 25, 2016; (ii) August 20 to 22, 2019; (iii) December 21, 2019; (iv) July 27, 2021; and (v) December 22, 2021. - Workshops that included NPO participation for DNFBPs occurred on: (vi) September 13 to 15, 2018; (vii) February 8, 2020; (viii) November 22, 2021; (ix) January 18 to 20, 2022; and (x) May 17 to 18, 2022. - About 33 associations in total participated in these ten workshops; the FIU met with the DGC on March 21, 2022, to draw attention to high-risk NPO categories identified by the NRA. - Supervision, compliance, and sanctions: - CFT supervision of NPOs does not occur in practice; no authority has been designated to provide “appropriate supervision” under the AML/CFT Law. - Registered associations remain subject only to general supervision under Law No. 1960-315 by decentralized structures (DGAT, DGC). - Unregistered associations, including informal NPOs, are not subject to supervision. - Compliance with AML/CFT obligations by NPOs is very low; specific obligations include: (i) update and inform the competent authority on object and purpose of activities; (ii) annually publish financial statements with income/expenditure breakdown; (iii) equip themselves with mechanisms to counter ML/TF; and (iv) record donations ≥ 500,000 XOF (or approximately USD 875) in the future national register. - No NPO has submitted an STR to the FIU yet. - No administrative or criminal sanctions have been imposed upon NPOs for breaches related to CFT because the competent authority has not been designated. - Planned legal and institutional changes: - Authorities plan to amend and complete the legal framework, including considering amending Law No. 1960-315 and adopting a draft ordinance on designation, attributions, and powers of AML/CFT supervisory authorities in charge of NPOs. ### Deprivation of terrorist financing (TF) assets and instrumentalities - Freezing and seizures: - No funds or other assets have been frozen in Côte d’Ivoire as a result of TFS related to terrorism or TF; authorities have not been informed of freezing measures under UNSCR 1267 or 1373. - It is possible some individuals targeted by TFS saw bank or Mobile Money account openings or transfers denied at financial institutions without being declared under laws, decrees, orders, and regulations in force. - The FIU has not received any STRs directly or indirectly linked to freezing measures. - In criminal proceedings, investigative authorities and judges have seized a few instrumentalities linked to TF offenses (firearms, a vehicle, cell phones), but no TF cases have gone to trial and no convictions or TF-related confiscations have been issued. - Authorities reported one military/intelligence operation: on August 28, 2021, use of military intelligence by CROAT enabled field teams to seize livestock at Port Bouet slaughterhouse owned by individuals linked to an identified terrorist group. - Explanations for limited deprivation actions: - Parallel financial investigations are not systematically carried out when opening terrorism-related investigations (see CI.9.3), due to absence of a clear policy and limited human resources. - Authorities lack sufficient human and financial resources to investigate TF effectively (see CI.9.2). - Border controls and vulnerabilities: - Efforts to make borders less permeable are noted, but porosity and shortcomings in implementing cash and BNI cross-border declaration obligations (see Chapters 2 and 3) remain major vulnerabilities. - Strengthened patrols in border areas targeted by terrorist acts are a sign of progress. ### Consistency of measures with the TF risk profile - National risk context: - Côte d’Ivoire has experienced terrorist violence multiple times; the NRA indicates overall TF risk is high. - Authorities take the terrorist threat seriously and have made significant security efforts. - Gaps and inconsistencies: - Use of TFS within CFT framework is inconsistent with the country’s risk profile: - Insufficient community-level efforts to implement UN sanctions on TF. - Inapplicability of Regulation No. 14/2002/CM/WAEMU to non-banking FIs, DNFBPs, and the general public (including informal sectors) leaves significant gaps without a national system to fill them. - Côte d’Ivoire has never proposed designations to the UN 1267 Committee, despite individuals posing immediate threats suspected of being members of UN-designated groups. - Authorities have not considered joint national designations with neighboring countries or asking a third country to give effect to its freezing mechanisms, although neighboring territories are believed to serve as bases for terrorist groups. - Deficiencies regarding NPOs (identification, awareness, control) are not in line with the increased perceived risk of exploitation for TF purposes. - No ongoing legal investigation into abuse of an NPO for TF purposes; absence of investigations and CFT control programs highlights insufficient effort relative to the risk profile. ### Conclusions, effectiveness rating, and Proliferation Financing (PF) TFS - Conclusions on IO.10: - Apart from two recent cases, CFT TFS are not implemented in Côte d’Ivoire, and TF risks in the non-profit sector are not effectively mitigated. - The 1267 List is not implemented (applied by some FIs on a “voluntary” basis); Côte d’Ivoire has never proposed designations to the 1267/1989 Committee. - The legal framework for national designation is insufficiently used; the few practical cases have not proven effective. - Côte d’Ivoire has not asked a third country to give effect to actions taken under its freezing mechanisms. - To date, no funds or other assets have been frozen under terrorism or TF-related TFS; investigative authorities have made only a few seizures of instrumentalities linked to TF offenses. - As for the non-profit sector, authorities have not identified all NPOs, nor the nature of threats or exploitation modalities; outreach is nascent and no CFT oversight is occurring. - With respect to IO.10, authorities’ efforts and results are not in line with the country’s risk profile. - Côte d’Ivoire is rated as having a low level of effectiveness for IO.10. - Immediate Outcome 11 (PF) and implementation status: - Trade relations with Iran are modest; with North Korea almost non-existent. Diplomatic relations exist with both countries; no North Korean embassy in Côte d’Ivoire and no Ivorian embassy in North Korea. - None of the UN TFS pertaining to countering PF are implemented without delay in Côte d’Ivoire. - The Minister of Finance is required to order “the freezing without delay of the assets, funds, and other financial resources of individuals or entities designated by the United Nations Security Council, under the Resolutions relating to the countering PF.” - Authorities reported one ministerial decision in this area: an order issued in 2020 designating a North Korean company on the National List three years after its designation on the 1718 List (the Mansudae case). - Box: The Mansudae Case (summary) - August 5, 2017: Mansudae Overseas Project Group designated on the 1718 List. - 2019: UN panel of experts informed Côte d’Ivoire that a company operating on its territory was in business with Mansudae; FIU launched an investigation and asked the Central Bank to check bank account registers in the WAEMU zone. - The Central Bank’s research revealed an account in the name of Mansudae in a local bank. - The FIU blocked any movement of funds on this account for 48 hours and reported to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, which informed the CCGA. - June 11, 2020: CCGA issued an advisory opinion recommending designation of Mansudae and its director, Mr. HAN Hun II. - August 19, 2020: Minister of Finance signed an order designating Mansudae and Mr. HAN Hun II on the National List. - As a result, the bank froze 4,760,885 XOF (approximately USD 7,600) in Mansudae’s account. *Source: 1civea2023002 - 312. As confirmed by the cases above, Côte d’Ivoire has the will and ability to impose TFS (PDF chapter).* ### 339. The FIU is not specifically responsible for disseminating the 1718 and 2231 Lists, and ### 1civea2023002 - 339. The FIU is not specifically responsible for disseminating the 1718 and 2231 Lists, and ### TFS implementation under UNSCRs 1718 and 2231 - The FIU is not specifically responsible for disseminating the 1718 and 2231 Lists and has never done so; dissemination would only be for information purposes because freezing becomes legally enforceable only by a decision of the Minister of Finance, officially notified to liable persons and the general public (including the informal financial and non-financial sectors). - Any implementation of TFS under UNSCRs 1718 and 2231 in Côte d’Ivoire is effectively voluntary and lacks, stricto sensu, a legal basis. - With the exception of FX bureaus and a few insurance companies, all FIs are making “autonomous” efforts to implement TFS in the fight against PF (see CI.10.1); effectiveness of these efforts remains to be demonstrated. - The amount of 4,760,885 XOF (approximately 7,600 USD) which should have been frozen in 2017 (when the 1718 List was updated) was only frozen in 2020, when Mansudae and its director were designated on the National List. - No funds or other assets have been frozen to date under UNSCR 2231. - FIs have not reported any (other) proven cases relating to the 1718 and 2231 Lists – apart from internal disambiguation cases – and authorities have not received a report attesting to the application of a continuing prohibition of assets or transactions of a designated person or entity in the fight against PF. - There is no evidence of voluntary implementation of TFS by Ivorian DNFBPs or by the general public, including the informal financial and non-financial sectors. ### Identification of assets and freezing procedures - Efforts to identify funds or other assets of designated persons/entities vary by reporting entity. - Most FIs (except FX bureaus and a few insurance companies) operate filtering software that incorporates the 1718 and 2231 Lists (among others) to detect potentially prohibited or suspicious transactions; the vast majority of reporting entities, such as FX bureaus, some insurance companies, and DNFBPs, do not operate filtering software and monitor customers and transactions manually. - Filtering appears not to occur outside the formal financial sector. - Procedure after identification: the person/entity holding funds must freeze them and make a report to the FIU. In practice this is treated as an STR given the lack of a specific form for TFS. The FIU informs the CCGA and conducts analysis to (i) determine whether frozen funds could be of illicit origin; and (ii) identify additional funds and other assets to seize or freeze. - Apart from the Mansudae case, authorities (including the DGD) have not reported seizure or freezing of funds and other assets after a designation under UNSCR 1718 or 2231. - The CCGA, the only national mechanism for operational coordination in this area, does not include supervisory authorities or the DGD among its members and does not regularly exercise its functions in the fight against PF. ### Effectiveness, risk profile, and outreach - The single concrete freezing case is consistent with the country’s NRA conclusion that the risk of PF is low, though the NRA’s analysis may be overly positive about the adequacy of the legal framework to implement TFS. - An awareness campaign addressing TFS among other AML/CFT obligations has been launched but remains nascent; participation has included FX bureaus, EMIs, DNFBPs (real estate agents and developers, chartered accountants), and NPOs, but the campaign has not reached the majority of FIs or reporting entities. - Large FIs generally understand TFS obligations (freezing assets, imposing continued bans, reporting all frozen assets) but do not know who to contact for real-time assistance and assume the FIU would advise them (not CCGA or the General Secretariat of the BC (GSBC)). - Other reporting entities (DNFBPs, FX bureaus, some insurance companies) do not understand their TFS obligations; some confuse freezing with seizure or with enhanced due diligence measures. They expect dissemination of “blacklist(s)” they must consult and are not sufficiently aware of the obligation to declare all frozen assets. ### Supervisory and regulatory gaps - The supervisory authority for the banking sector and large DFSs (the BC) does not ensure implementation of TFS under UNSCRs 1718 and 2231. - The GSBC has a detailed methodology to ensure compliance by credit institutions, but it is not applied in practice because, apart from Order No. 124 (2020) designating Mansudae and Mr. HAN Hun II (which was not forwarded to the BC), no list of persons/entities targeted by TFS in connection with PF is in force. - The GSBC has not indicated that its inspectors received training on TFS. - Non-banking FI supervisors (CIMA, CREPMF, DECFinEX, DRSSFD) have only a basic understanding of TFS, sometimes confusing them with FIU orders or judicial seizures; they state they cannot monitor or ensure implementation of sanction lists they have never received and do not know how to access. - AML/CFT supervisory authorities for certain DNFBPs were only designated at the time of the on-site visit and no supervisory measures appear to have been taken; no supervisory authority has been designated for other DNFBPs (business agents, real estate agents and developers, casinos and gaming establishments, dealers in precious metals and stones). - VASPs are active but are not licensed, regulated, or supervised due to lack of a legal framework. ### IO.11 conclusions and overall effectiveness rating - With the exception of a single case in 2020, proliferation-related TFS are not implemented in Côte d’Ivoire, and reporting entities are not subject to relevant supervision. - The 1718 and 2231 Lists are applied by certain FIs on a voluntary basis; the effectiveness of efforts to identify funds/assets of designated persons/entities varies among reporting entities, which receive no support from the CCGA. - Only the assets of a single entity in Côte d’Ivoire designated under UNSCR 1718 have been frozen. - Côte d’Ivoire is rated as having a low level of effectiveness for IO. 11. ### Key preventive-measures findings (selected) - The importance of the informal sector, where due diligence measures are not implemented, affects overall ML/TF prevention effectiveness. - FIs have limited understanding of ML risks and very limited awareness of TF risks. - FIs part of international or regional groups and national banks implement customer identification and verification; implementation is less successful for e-money issuers, FX bureaus, and small DFSs. - Majority of FIs use commercial lists to identify PEPs; these lists mainly include foreign PEPs rather than national ones. - Reporting activity does not reflect main ML/TF risks; suspicions are generally reported late and the number of STRs for attempted transactions is very limited. - DNFBPs generally have limited understanding of ML/TF risks and, with few exceptions, have never filed STRs. - VASPs are active but not licensed, regulated, or supervised and consequently do not implement AML/CFT measures. ### Recommendations (selected) - Strengthen the legal framework of due diligence measures so FIs and DNFBPs understand AML/CFT requirements and fulfill them based on comprehensive, clear, and intelligible regulations. - Develop and publish explanatory documents (guidelines) for implementation of due diligence requirements and internal procedures and controls, targeting sectors most prone to ML risks derived from corruption and drug trafficking (banks, notaries, real estate agents). - In cooperation with supranational supervisory authorities, disseminate guidance on how and when to submit an STR, typologies, and targeted risk and alert indicators; the FIU should provide systematic feedback and personalized assessments to reporting entities to increase exhaustivity, quantity and quality of STRs. - Publish specific guidelines for MVTS activities and conduct outreach to EMIs on legal thresholds and TF risks. - Facilitate access to information required to identify national PEPs and issue guidelines on PEP identification and handling, including when a beneficial owner of a legal person is a PEP. - Subject business agents to AML/CFT requirements and ensure their understanding of risks and preventive measures. - Define a legal framework dedicated to VASPs in accordance with FATF Recommendations. *Source: 1civea2023002 - 339. The FIU is not specifically responsible for disseminating the 1718 and 2231 Lists, and* ### 360. FIs (banks and DFSs) providing MVTS, in partnership with companies that provide ### 1civea2023002 - 360. FIs (banks and DFSs) providing MVTS, in partnership with companies that provide ### Understanding of ML/TF Risks and AML/CFT Requirements - FIs (banks and DFSs) providing MVTS in partnership with companies supplying the technical platform do not understand the ML/TF risks these activities are exposed to, and it is not established that such risks are subject to a risk analysis classifying exposures or examining risks from cash use and reliance on subagents. - TF risks associated with cross-border transactions or border regions where terrorist groups are active are not understood by FIs; porous borders and flows of persons (workers joining illegal mining sites, cattle farmers) are neither identified nor evaluated. Mobile money product vulnerabilities to TF stem from absence of information on TF trends and typologies in Côte d’Ivoire. - Understanding of AML/CFT requirements: - More mature in FIs that are part of international groups; lacking in other FIs. - Very weak in the MVTS, microfinance (DFS), and foreign exchange sectors. - Recent and basic understanding in microfinance and FX sectors driven by post-NRA awareness/training. - Banks do not sufficiently understand their responsibility in AML/CFT implementation within MVTS partnership systems. - Specific conceptual weaknesses across many FIs: - PEPs and BOs understanding is deficient and harmful to effectiveness. - Many FIs (apart from those in international groups) do not appreciate that attempted suspicious sanctions falls within transactions to be reported to the FIU. - The notion of BO is mainly associated with shareholders owning more than 25 percent of capital or voting rights, without considering other means of control; in some sectors (FX bureaus, small DFSs) the notion is not grasped at all. ### DNFBPs (Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions) - Very limited understanding of ML risks and AML/CFT requirements; TF risks are not understood. - Notaries, lawyers, and real estate agents/developers are aware of ML risks but do not take measures to identify/assess them; notaries have not demonstrated adequate understanding of requirements. - Gaps mainly relate to BOs and PEPs despite their role in company creation and real estate transactions. - Other DNFBPs show non-existent understanding of ML risks and requirements; no measures implemented to assess/identify TF risks sector-wide. ### Implementation of Risk Mitigation Measures — Financial Institutions - Measures implemented by FIs to mitigate ML/TF risks are generally ineffective due to insufficient understanding of these risks. - FIs part of international/regional groups (except DFSs) implement mitigation measures but they are not commensurate with risks; risk ratings and unusual-transaction detection tools exist but remain ineffective given inadequate risk understanding. - Mitigation of corruption-related laundering focuses on PEP identification and cash monitoring; deficiencies in BO understanding and PEP information access limit effectiveness. Other laundering techniques and risks related to reliance on legal persons are not identified or mitigated. - Microfinance (DFS) in rural areas do not implement measures to identify operations potentially linked to illegal mining and environmental crimes. - Banks providing MVTS rely mainly on monitoring systems established by the technical platform provider and do not systematically implement commensurate due diligence measures. - Implementation of due diligence for TF risks is almost non-existent; few FIs define proportionate measures for cross-border/country-of-origin risks except FIs in international groups. Some FIs refuse relationships with NGOs considered vulnerable to TF risks. - Perception by EMIs and supervisory authorities of a generalized low risk in mobile money sector prevents implementation of mitigation measures despite TF presence. ### Implementation of Risk Mitigation Measures — DNFBPs - Apart from some categories that partly implement due diligence or keep transaction records, DNFBPs do not implement measures dedicated to ML/TF risk mitigation. ### Customer Due Diligence (CDD) and Record-Keeping — Financial Institutions - Identification and identity verification measures are implemented by FIs in international/regional groups (except DFSs) and national banks, including MVTS; less so in small DFSs and FX Bureaus. - EMIs are not strict enforcing monthly transaction threshold of 10 million XOF (USD 16,000) and mobile money balance limit of 2 million XOF or USD 3,200 per customer, leaving customers and BOs whose transactions exceed legal limits undetected. - Due diligence on purpose and nature of relationship is limited to basic elements and not risk-adjusted; non-existent in small DFSs and FX Bureaus. - BO identification is challenging across all FIs; majority restrict to the by-laws 25 percent shareholder test and do not consider other control means; lack of access to BO information sources on Ivorian legal persons hampers BO identification. - Only FIs in international/regional groups (apart from DFSs) report that customer profile determines frequency of KYC and BO updates; elsewhere updates are not systematic. - Transaction monitoring: apart from FX bureaus and small DFSs who do not monitor, most FIs rely on IT solutions but effectiveness limited by risk-understanding deficiencies. GSBC supervision finds effective IT filtering still an important gap except for banks backed by international groups. Ongoing risk-based due diligence is non-existent in small DFS and FX Bureaus. No measures by FX bureaus to identify customers who, by transaction frequency, may have a business relationship. - Data related to MVTS operated by subagents is not systematically accessible to compliance departments of banks acting on whose behalf they act; GSBC investigations identified recurrent deficiencies in banks’ monitoring of transactions executed by subagents. - FIs in international/regional groups (except DFSs) implement refusal to establish business relationships when identification/verification or purpose/nature information cannot be obtained, often via IT blocking features; only those FIs consider issuing an STR when relationship cannot be concluded, but usually such a measure is not taken. ### Customer Due Diligence and Record-Keeping — DNFBPs - DNFBPs do not implement CDD and AML/CFT record-keeping measures generally. Some regulated professions (notaries, lawyers, chartered accountants, real estate agents) implement identification, identity verification, and record-keeping as part of professional practice, not specifically for AML/CFT. ### Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) Measures — Financial Institutions - FIs (apart from FX bureaus and small DFSs) consider PEPs high-risk and rely on external databases; only FIs in international/regional groups (apart from DFSs) demonstrate measures for detecting PEPs during the business relationship and identifying relatives of PEPs. Life insurance sector does not implement measures to detect/identify PEPs as beneficiaries or BOs of beneficiaries. - Deficiencies in customer and BO identification reduce PEP detection effectiveness; many FIs report difficulties accessing information on national PEPs not present on commercial lists. GSBC investigations confirm recurring deficiencies in PEP risk management systems. - Correspondent banking: some regional banks offer cross-border banking correspondence services and implement specific measures (collecting info on beneficiary bank AML/CFT controls and obtaining management approval), but effectiveness limited by limited understanding of risks associated with banking correspondence, including flows with WAEMU countries identified by GIABA as presenting strategic AML/CFT deficiencies. - New technologies: many institutions launch digital products (mobile phone software offers) without including ML/TF risks in pre-launch analysis; suspension of marketing for serious fraud is possible but suspension for ML/TF risks is hypothetical and not demonstrated. - Risky third-country measures: perception of risks varies; countries on the list of States/jurisdictions subject to a call for counter measures are generally considered in risk mapping, but FIs (except those in international groups) do not impose systematic risk-commensurate due diligence for countries identified by FATF or GIABA as presenting strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, especially in WAEMU zone. Regional actors often consider FIs in such countries as low-risk by virtue of FI status. TF risks of certain States are not adequately monitored for cross-border transfers. - Wire transfers: FIs in international/regional groups (except DFSs) generally ensure payment messages include exact originator/beneficiary information; outside these FIs, implementation of wire-transfer requirements is limited and FIs have not demonstrated rejecting cross-border transfers for incomplete payment-message data. - TFS: apart from FX bureaus and small DFSs, FIs have filtering software to identify persons/entities subject to TFS even absent national legal requirements; except for international/regional group FIs (apart from DFSs), it is not established that customer databases are filtered at every new publication to identify customers/BOs subject to TFS. ### Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) Measures — DNFBPs - DNFBPs do not implement enhanced or specific measures. ### Reporting Obligations, Tipping Off, and STR Activity - RCM actors and FX bureaus have never filed STRs; number of STRs filed by EMIs is very limited. This is inconsistent with ML/FT risks these FIs represent. - STRs received by the FIU by reporting-entity type (2017–2021 totals, Source: FIU): - Banks: 126, 178, 324, 327, 386 — Total 1,341 - DFSs: 94, 174, 292, 167, 136 — Total 863 - Insurance companies: 4, 1, 6, 6, 43 — Total 60 - EMIs: 8, 10, 9, 6, 0 — Total 33 - DNFBPs: 00, 1, 00, 00, 2 — Total 3 - Total: 232, 364, 631, 506, 567 — Total 2,300 - Between 2017 and 2021 the STRs were mainly filed by banks (an average of 58.3 percent) and DFSs (an average of 37.5 percent); almost all DFS STRs derive from one large entity, and authorities clarified the majority stem from confusion between STRs and CTRs. - Sectoral variation in STR implementation is large and not justified by market shares; significant differences among banks appear due to deficiencies in risk and alert scenarios, limited ML/TF risk understanding, and incomplete data from weak due diligence/record-keeping. Some banks’ scenarios focus narrowly on sanctions/PEP/high-risk-jurisdiction lists without including other risk/warning factors, negatively impacting STR obligation effectiveness, which is considered generally moderate. *Source: Excerpt from the provided IMF document content.* ### 386. STRs filed to the FIU, in all FI categories, have little in common with ML/TF risks ### 386. STRs filed to the FIU, in all FI categories, have little in common with ML/TF risks ### Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) — main findings - STRs filed to the FIU have little in common with ML/TF risks that Côte d’Ivoire is prone to, which limits their usefulness and the FIU’s analytical capability. - Very few STRs filed are in connection with TF, a threat identified as high. - Very few STRs are in connection with high-risk predicate offenses including drug trafficking, corruption, and environmental crime. - Almost all STRs have been filed late; suspicions are mainly identified based on a posteriori filtering and automation of transactions. - Staffing shortages in compliance departments generally lead to delays in the analysis of generated alerts, and therefore in the submission of STRs. - The obligation to report attempted transactions is generally not understood by FIs (except for FIs backed by international groups); only seven STRs related to a transaction attempt were filed between 2017 and 2021. - Many FIs simply refuse to establish a business relationship or execute a transaction in case of suspicion and do not file STRs, considering it irrelevant if the transaction was not completed; confidentiality concerns are frequently cited as a reason not to file. - FIs generally understand risks associated with tipping-off, but apart from FIs belonging to an international or regional group, the existence of procedures and the implementation of practical measures to prevent tipping-off were not demonstrated. ### DNFBPs — main findings - Apart from some notaries who reported suspicious activity in three instances, DNFBPs have never filed STRs, inconsistent with the ML/TF risk profile of these professions. - All but one DNFBP reported that they have never faced a situation that should have led to filing an STR. - DNFBPs often refuse business relationships rather than file STRs; some would not file an STR if a potentially suspicious transaction was performed by a bank, assuming the bank already conducted due diligence. - Concerns about confidentiality of information in the reporting process persist for some DNFBPs; others indicate past confidentiality problems no longer arise. - The majority of DNFBPs have not demonstrated an understanding of risks associated with tipping-off and do not appear to have specific procedures in place for preventive purposes. - DNFBPs do not have compliance procedures nor internal control measures dedicated to the implementation of AML/CFT requirements. ### Internal controls and implementation across Financial Institutions (FIs) - With the exception of DFSs and FX Bureaus, FIs have defined procedures dedicated to the implementation of due diligence and internal control measures; however, these procedures have not been designed nor implemented based on risk. - Limited understanding of risks and requirements affects the implementation of procedures by FIs. - With the exception of DFS and FX Bureaus, FIs have a dedicated AML/CFT department, allocate resources for compliance, and have an independent internal audit function. - Effectiveness of procedures and internal control measures is generally impacted by an insufficient number of staff and a lack of training. - FIs part of international groups (except for DFSs) systematically implement an annual AML/CFT supervisory plan. - Implementation of internal control measures and procedures is very limited for large DFSs and almost inexistent for small DFSs and FX bureaus. - Only FIs that are part of international groups (except for DFSs) frequently implement training programs that cover all the AML/CFT staff, including senior management. - Banking and financial groups implement internal control procedures and measures, but effectiveness is limited by deficiencies in understanding of risks and implementation of requirements. - Diverging interpretations exist regarding information exchange on STRs within a group: some FIs exchange such information, others consider STR confidentiality prohibits this practice. ### Conclusions on Immediate Outcome 4 (IO.4) - FIs that are part of international or regional groups (apart from DFSs) represent around half of the banking sector and have taken measures to comply with AML/CFT requirements, yet the effectiveness of these measures is hampered by an insufficient understanding of ML/TF risks. - Gaps in understanding and implementation of requirements related to BOs, PEPs, and monitoring of cross-border transactions, particularly those crossing the subregion, represent major limitations. - Implementation of due diligence measures in smaller FIs exposed to significant AML/CFT risks is nascent and suffers from a very weak understanding of ML/TF risks and limited resources. - DNFBPs do not implement any due diligence measures dedicated to AML/CFT; deficiencies in notaries and real estate agents and developers significantly impact effectiveness given prevalent ML threats from corruption and drug trafficking. - Some DNFBPs implement customer identification, identity verification, and record-keeping in the framework of regulated professional activities (accounting and legal professionals, lawyers, notaries, real estate agents and developers, and dealers in precious metals and stones). - Reporting activity is very uneven, does not reflect major ML/TF risks, suspicions are generally reported late, and STRs for attempted transactions are very limited. - Côte d’Ivoire is rated as having a low level of effectiveness for IO. 4. ### Supervision — key findings - Fit-and-proper checks for executives and shareholders are mainly based on the absence of criminal sanctions in the candidates’ country of citizenship; verifications can be improved. - Supervisory authorities have not defined a supervisory strategy adapted to ML/TF risks. - Supervisory authorities acting at national and supranational levels are not cooperating with each other and do not exchange information with other competent authorities to better understand risks. - Authorities have not defined a strategy nor implemented effective methods to detect activities carried out without licensing, despite the significant size of the informal sector, particularly in the FX and MVTS sectors. - Implementation of risk-based supervision remains to be completed in all sectors. - The BC has acquired AML/CFT dedicated tools and means, but effectiveness is impacted by shortcomings in its supervisory strategy. - National supervisory authorities have recently taken steps to supervise AML/CFT measures in the foreign exchange and small DFS sectors; effectiveness remains quite limited. - Follow-up measures and sanctions after inspections do not reflect the severity of violations and do not yield the desired effect on compliance levels, despite more repressive guidance by the BC/GSBC. - Promotion of better understanding by FIs of their AML/CFT requirements and risks is not yet established satisfactorily by supervisory authorities, apart from a few outreach activities and bilateral meetings. - SRBs have been designated for lawyers, notaries, justice commissioners, court administrators, and chartered accountants, but since designation occurred at the end of the on-site visit, no supervisory measure seems to have been taken and no assessment of actions was possible. - No supervisory authority/SRB has been designated for other DNFBPs (casinos and gaming establishments, dealers in gold and precious metals, real estate agents and developers, business agents, service providers to companies and trusts, and auditors); efforts to raise awareness among DNFBPs remain nascent. - VASPs are active in Côte d’Ivoire but not licensed, regulated, nor supervised due to lack of a legal framework. ### Supervision — recommendations (national level, in collaboration with supranational authorities where necessary) - Ensure all supervisory authorities define (or strengthen, in the case of the BC/GSBC) their AML/CFT supervisory strategy based on ML/TF risks and incorporate national actions to understand and mitigate ML/TF risks into supervisory strategies. - Strengthen cooperation and information exchange with supervisory authorities to enhance understanding of risks and consider the level of effectiveness of supervision, including supranational supervision, in the national AML/CFT strategy. - Ensure supervisory authorities integrate ordering of sanctions commensurate with the severity of violations into their risk-based supervisory strategy to bolster dissuasive nature and effectiveness. - Ensure supervisory authorities develop, document, and update understanding and identification of ML/TF risks at sectoral and individual levels; determine or complete information to be collected from FIs to develop risk profiles including relevant data on risks. - Ensure supervisory authorities have a comprehensive and clear documentary and on-site supervisory methodology (or supplement BC/GSBC with data on risks) to guide risk-based inspections and oversee corrective measures. - Focus training efforts on AML/CFT requirements and ML/TF risks for inspection officers within all supervisory authorities, particularly the CRCA, the CREPMF, and national authorities. - Improve quality of feedback to FIs by publishing guidelines on AML/CFT requirements, enhancing supervisory reports, and improving quality and consistency of feedback regarding implementation of AML/CFT requirements. - Take measures to combat illegal exercise of activities subject to licensing by devising a dedicated strategy and prioritizing high-risk sectors (e.g., foreign exchange or MVTS). - Strengthen integrity and competency checks for executives and BOs by clarifying checks to be carried out in relevant texts or procedures, requiring submission of a larger range of accurate information, and cross-checking information with other sources. - Designate AML/CFT supervisory authorities and/or SRBs for casinos and gaming establishments, dealers in gold and precious metals, real estate agents and developers, service providers to companies and trusts, and business agents; equip them with appropriate means to perform AML/CFT supervisory tasks. - Provide supervisors and/or SRBs with sufficient means to mitigate risks linked to activities involving informal actors, particularly in gambling and gold sectors, and activities by dealers in gold and precious metals. - Define conditions of access to the business agent profession to ensure satisfactory integrity and probity checks. - Define a legal framework for VASPs in accordance with FATF Recommendations. ### Immediate Outcome 3 (Supervision) — introduction and licensing context - Supervision of AML/CFT implementation by FIs is ensured by several authorities at national and supranational levels: - The WAEMU Banking Commission and the GSBC supervise credit institutions (banks and banking financial institutions), financial companies, large DFSs, and EMIs. Large DFSs include those with an activity level reaching the threshold of 2 billion XOF (USD 3.2 million) in outstanding deposits or loans by the end of two consecutive years. - The DRSSFD, under the MEF, supervises small and medium-sized DFSs (meaning all DFSs apart from the aforementioned large DFSs). - The DECFinEX under the MEF supervises FX bureaus. - CIMA, integrated into the CRCA, and the DA under the MEF supervise insurance companies and insurance intermediaries (brokers). - The CREPMF supervises RCM actors (management and intermediation companies, asset management companies, custodian banks, UCITS, securitization funds, companies for wealth management and stock exchange investment advisors). - SRBs have been designated to oversee AML/CFT requirements for certain DNFBPs: - The Bar Association Council for lawyers. - The Order of Chartered Accountants for chartered accountants. - The Chamber of Notaries for notaries. - The National Chamber of Justice Commissioners for justice commissioners. - The National Commission for the Supervision of Judicial Officers for judicial officers. - SRBs had not started activities by the end of the on-site visit; no supervisor had been designated for other DNFBP categories (dealers in precious metals and stones, business agents, real estate agents and developers, casinos, and gaming establishments). Consequently, no specific analysis of DNFBPs under core issues CI 3.2 to 3.6 was undertaken. - The assessment team assigned higher weighting to effectiveness of supervision for banks, FX bureaus, MVTS; moderate weighting for DFSs and regional capital market actors; low weighting for insurance sector actors. The absence of supervisory measures for DNFBPs negatively impacted the assessment, especially given high risks associated with real estate agents and developers, notaries, and dealers in precious metals and stones. ### Licensing, registration, and controls to prevent entry by criminals and associates - Supranational supervisory authorities (BCEAO/GSBC, CIMA/CRCA, CREPMF) and national supervisory authorities (DRSSFD, DECFinEX, DA) share responsibilities in supervision of AML/CFT compliance by FIs, including during licensing. - All FIs must receive authorization from a competent authority before initiating activities, except MVTS subagents who operate under supervision of banks and DFSs. The MF and supranational supervisory authorities are responsible for granting authorizations and licenses. - During licensing: the absence of a criminal sentence against executives and shareholders holding more than 10 percent of the capital and voting rights is verified via a judicial record extract issued within the past three months. For foreign nationals, an equivalent document in foreign law must be submitted. - Supervisory authorities do not verify other information sources that would further verify absence of criminal record abroad for Ivorian candidates, or any past administrative/professional sanctions. - Notarized statements of wealth are systematically requested from shareholders, but their added value is questionable as they are not preceded by verifications of lawful origin of funds by the notary; such notarized statements are given overriding probative value, which is a source of concern given shortcomings in notarial sector understanding of ML/TF requirements and risks. *Source: 1civea2023002 - 386. STRs filed to the FIU, in all FI categories, have little in common with ML/TF risks* ### 409. Furthermore, the BCEAO does not systematically consider cooperating with other ### 1civea2023002 - 409. Furthermore, the BCEAO does not systematically consider cooperating with other ### Licensing, integrity, and probity checks (BCEAO, MF, EMIs) - The BCEAO does not systematically consider cooperating with other national or regional authorities to verify the integrity and probity of shareholders or the competencies of executives; this option is not provided for by authorities’ procedures, though it was implemented once by the BCEAO. - A single implementation by the BCEAO: an information request allowed for the suspension of a licensing request, without necessarily leading to its rejection, despite serious charges against the prospective executive (prohibition from the exercise of executive functions issued following identification of shortcomings in the AML/CFT system of the FI under their management). - The FIU was consulted by the MEF in the context of small DFS licensing in rare cases; the principle and modalities of such consultation are not set up under a procedure to make it a sustainable practice. One consultation identified elements of incompatibility that led to rejection of a licensing request. - It has not been demonstrated that rejections by the MF and the BCEAO are linked to concerns surrounding the integrity or probity of BOs or executives; file incompleteness appears to be the most frequent reason for rejection. - For EMIs: - Absence of a criminal record for executives/managers is verified using the judicial record, yet no other measure appears to be taken in practice. - Major shareholders are requested to provide a judicial record, but the persons targeted by the verification process are not mentioned and do not cover BOs. - Some EMI managers are illiterate; it is not proven that employees they recruit are subject to verifications of integrity and probity, nor of their competencies. - During the life of the company: - Post-licensing follow-up of CIs seems implemented in practice, but scope and effectiveness of verifications were not analyzed due to lack of information. - For EMIs, FX bureaus, and DFSs, integrity and probity checks for BOs and managers during the life of the company appear to be non-existent. - Table 6.2. Côte d’Ivoire: Number of Licensing Requests [Credit Institutions] Processed by the BCEAO (Source: BCEAO/GSBC) - Year — Number of Processed Licensing Requests — Number of Rejections - 2017 — 1 — 1 - 2018 — 1 — 0 - 2019 — 2 — 1 - 2020 — NP — NP - 2021 — 1 — 1 ### CREPMF (Capital market actors): licensing, verifications, and statistics - CREPMF measures during licensing: - Verifies absence of criminal sanctions in judicial records of executives and managers. - Applies same measures to shareholders owning more than 10 percent of capital or voting rights. - Supervises competencies of managers based on CVs. - Limitations: - Definition of BOs refers to shares above threshold of 10 percent, which does not specifically target BOs nor include control by means other than direct ownership or voting rights. - No demonstration that cooperation with other relevant or foreign authorities has been used when needed. - Inspections leading to rejection of some license requests; lack of details on scope/nature of verifications during life of company—appear to apply to MICs only, but not demonstrated. - Table 6.3. Côte d’Ivoire: Licenses and Approvals Granted by the CREPMF Between 2017 and 2021 (Source: CREPMF) - Management and intermediation companies (SGI): 2017 — 3; 2018 — 0; 2019 — 0; 2020 — 0; 2021 — 1 - Asset management companies (AMC): 2017 — 0; 2018 — 0; 2019 — 0; 2020 — 0; 2021 — 0 - OPC management companies (SGO): 2017 — 2; 2018 — 2; 2019 — 2; 2020 — 1; 2021 — 0 - Variable capital investment companies (SICAV): 2017 — 0; 2018 — 0; 2019 — 0; 2020 — 0; 2021 — 0 - Custodian banks (BTCC): 2017 — 1; 2018 — 0; 2019 — 2; 2020 — 0; 2021 — 0 - Business introducers (AA): 2017 — 0; 2018 — 3; 2019 — 2; 2020 — 3; 2021 — 0 - Stock market investment advisors (CIB): 2017 — 0; 2018 — 0; 2019 — 1; 2020 — 0; 2021 — 0 - Rating agencies (AN): 2017 — 0; 2018 — 0; 2019 — 0; 2020 — 0; 2021 — 0 - Listing Sponsors (LS): 2017 — 0; 2018 — 0; 2019 — 1; 2020 — 4; 2021 — 0 - TOTAL: 2017 — 6; 2018 — 5; 2019 — 8; 2020 — 8; 2021 — 1 - Table 6.4. Côte d’Ivoire: Number of License Requests Processed by the CREPMF [FI Categories not Specified] (Source: CREPMF) - Category — In Progress as of 31/12/20 — Received in 2021 — Granted in 2021 — Postponed in 2021 — Closed as of 31/12/2021 — In progress as of 31/12/2021 - License requests — 3 — 23 — 7 — 1 — 8 — 10 - Change in shareholders — 3 — 9 — 8 — 3 — 0 — 1 - Total — 7 — 43 — 15 — 4 — 11 — 11 ### Insurance sector (CRCA/MF) - Integrity and probity verification for insurance company managers and brokers: - Based on a declaration of integrity signed by the Public Prosecutor. - Copy of the judicial record less than three months old required. - Competencies verified based on candidates’ CVs. - Results of such checks were not provided to the assessment team. ### Illegal exercise of activity in the FI sector - Supervisory activities have not defined or implemented an effective strategy for detection of illegal activity in any sector, despite presence of such phenomena, especially in foreign exchange and MVTS sectors. - “Hawala”-type mechanisms exist in Côte d’Ivoire of undetermined proportions; authorities have not implemented measures to identify such activities. - Illegal exercise of foreign exchange activities is significant per the NRA; a reporting mechanism for licensed FX bureaus to report persons operating without a license was in the process of deployment during the on-site visit; results limited (one case of illegal exercise identified). ### Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) - Lawyers, chartered accountants, and notaries: - Access based on competencies and integrity; dependent on relevant university degree requirements and absence of criminal convictions. - Inspections carried out in practice; scope not analyzed due to lack of data on numbers, rejections, justifications. - Bar Association Council rejected one registration at the bar due to doubts about probity without detailing measures taken. - Court administrators and justice commissioners: conditions of access not described. - Real estate agents and developers: - Ministry of Housing verification measures insufficient to prevent criminals from becoming BOs or accessing managerial positions. - Managers, individual professionals, and BOs are not required to submit a judicial record extract at licensing or during life of company. - A “tax compliance” verification is implemented but limited to legal persons, not natural persons. - Number of licensing requests, rejections, and justifications not provided to assessment team; lack of criminal-record verification is a source of concern for ML risks. - No strategy devised or implemented to detect illegal activities despite presence of phenomenon. - Business agents: - Part of DNFBP category but not subject to access conditions guaranteeing integrity and probity. - Conditions of access determined by Law No. 75-352 of May 23, 1975; appointed by order of the Minister of Justice. - Access is not precisely defined, not subject to testing, nor to integrity conditions similar to lawyers. - Numbers increased from around 30 persons in 1970 to more than 500 in 2021; no legal text defining integrity and competency verification process adopted. ### Casinos, gaming, and online gambling - Regulatory changes: - Law No. 2020-480 of May 27, 2020 established a regulatory authority for gambling; powers stipulated in Decree of June 16, 2021, including combatting illegal exercise of activity, especially online. - Online gambling had grown outside prior legal framework; until Law No. 2020-480, gambling was prohibited unless special authorization granted. - Assessment team could not assess performance of new authority; texts defining authorization process had not yet been adopted at time of on-site visit. - Existing casino oversight: - Only four casinos had been officially authorized under prior law. - Managers subject to morality investigations, including criminal record searches in National Police databases and INTERPOL requests for foreign nationals; investigations carried out by Directorate of General Intelligence, which verifies lawful origin of funds. - Detection and enforcement: - Detection mechanisms allowed authorities to detect casinos operating without a license; two fraudulent casinos closed in 2021 (they had submitted license requests and started activities without waiting for license), leading to judicial investigations. - Effectiveness more limited for online gambling. ### Dealers in precious metals and stones (DGMG / FIU interaction) - DGMG grants licenses for trading in gold and precious metals. - In the license granting process, integrity and probity controls are in place, but not demonstrated to apply to all managers or BOs. - Authorization process seems to systematically include information requests submitted to the FIU, particularly regarding shareholders’ origin of funds; the FIU carries out necessary checks. - Table 6.5. Côte d’Ivoire: Number of Licenses Requested for the DPMS Profession (Source: FIU) - License for raw gold purchase and sale offices — 51 - Authorization for the purchase and sale of raw gold — 73 - Authorization for processing — 8 - Authorization for the refining of precious metals — 2 - License for the sale, import, and export of raw diamond — 2 - Authorization for the purchase and sale of raw diamond — 2 - Between January 23 and June 16, 2022, 138 files were submitted to the FIU for consideration, including 75 files for authorization to buy and sell raw gold and diamond; out of these 138 files, eleven have been rejected following FIU consideration. - Table 6.6. Côte d’Ivoire: Number of Authorization Applications Submitted to the FIU - Year — Number of applications submitted to the FIU for consideration — Authorization requests rejected upon FIU advice - 2019 — 22 — 9 - 2020 — 44 — 1 - 2021 — 45 — 1 - 2022 — 27 — 0 - TOTAL — 138 — 11 - FIU intervention appears to have a positive impact on processing authorization requests for trading in gold and precious metals, although motives for rejection and nature of verifications were not comprehensively detailed. - Despite interventions, number of licenses and subsequent inspections remain very limited compared to scale of illegal mining activity, whose volume is equivalent to formal sector production; registered actors represent only a small proportion of sector due to prevalence of illegal mining. ### Supervisors’ understanding and identification of ML/TF risks - The NRA drafting has allowed supervisory authorities to become aware of major predicate offenses and some sectoral vulnerabilities (lack of AML/CFT implementation in foreign exchange and small DFS sectors). - Limitations in supervisors’ understanding: - Involvement in the NRA did not significantly enhance supervisors’ understanding of risks; supervisory authorities have not demonstrated understanding of ML/TF methods nor scale in each subsector. - Cross-border flows were not perceived as likely to pose ML/TF risks by supervisory authorities, including banks and capital market actors. - Customer base of legal persons not considered more vulnerable to ML. - Low perceived risk of mobile money activities by supervisory authority is inconsistent with presence of TF risks in sector. - Hypothesis of overall low risk in capital market sector due to banking intermediation or customer base is not based on specific assessment or on information exchange among bank supervisory authorities; inconsistent with GIABA mutual evaluation results. - Risk integration and information exchange: - National and supranational authorities have not integrated risks into supervisory strategy. - Authorities exchange no information to understand sectoral risks outside of the NRA; supranational authorities do not exchange any information with the FIU and other relevant authorities on ML/TF risks and trends. - Understanding of risks at sectoral level is weak for ML and very weak for TF. - Risk assessments by supervisors: - Supervisory authorities do not systematically conduct risk assessments for FIs under their supervision, except the BC/GSBC. - BC/GSBC has not integrated risks specific to each country, including those of Côte d’Ivoire, into its risk assessment system. - BC/GSBC risk profiling (SNEC-UCMOA rating system): - BC/GSBC establishes risk profiles for CIs, including banks, using several modules assessing credit, concentration, operational, liquidity risks, and risks linked to AML/CFT regime, internal supervision, and governance; an overall rating and sub-rating for AML/CFT are defined. - Sub-rating for ML/TF risks based on: - Compulsory annual AML/CFT reports from FIs, - Responses to a one-off AML/CFT survey, - Semi-annual reports by internal audit functions, - Results of previous inspections. - Annual internal AML/CFT controls report outline defined under Instruction No. 007-09-2017 (art.12). - Dedicated AML/CFT surveys sent in 2019 and 2021. - Information collected does not include, apart from number of STRs filed by the FI, appropriate ML/TF risk indicators (e.g., number of customers at risk including PEPs, real estate business customers/notaries, volume of cross-border flows). - Data collected does not consider prevalent threats in Côte d’Ivoire. - FIU’s information and assessments regarding reporting activity of FIs are not used to assess quality, quantity, or adequacy of STRs submitted by FIs in view of prevalent threats. - Table 6.7. Côte d’Ivoire: ML/TF Risk Ratings of Ivorian Banks (Source: BCEAO/GSBC) - Legend: - 1/ “Acceptable risk” means that the bank has a solid money laundering and terrorist financing risk management system. - 2/ “Medium risk” refers to a situation that is overall satisfying, but marked by minor shortcomings in the ML/TF risk management system. - 3/ “High risk” refers to situations characterized by several deficiencies in the bank’s ML/TF risk management system. - 4/ “Very high risk” refers to very critical situations, characterized by a deficient risk management system in banks, presenting significant ML/TF risks, which justifies the adoption of measures by the supervisory authority against concerned banks. - 2018 — Acceptable Risk: 5 — Medium Risk: 9 — High Risk: 8 — Very High Risk: 1 — Total: 23 - 2019 — Acceptable Risk: 4 — Medium Risk: 10 — High Risk: 6 — Very High Risk: 4 — Total: 24 - 2020 — Acceptable Risk: 2 — Medium Risk: 14 — High Risk: 6 — Very High Risk: 4 — Total: 26 - 2021 — Acceptable Risk: 2 — Medium Risk: 17 — High Risk: 6 — Very High Risk: 2 — Total: 27 *Source: IMF staff based on the Côte d’Ivoire assessment text provided.* ### 433. In 2020 and 2021, most banks were assessed as having medium or acceptable risks. ### 1civea2023002 - 433. In 2020 and 2021, most banks were assessed as having medium or acceptable risks. ### Overall risk assessment and institutional effectiveness - In 2020 and 2021, most banks were assessed as having medium or acceptable risks. - This assessment only modestly reflects the significant gaps identified in the implementation of AML/CFT requirements in the banking sector (see Chapter 5, CI 4.1 and 4.6). - Observations indicate an incredibly limited effectiveness of the institutional risk management system. ### Gaps in institutional risk identification across FI types - EMIs and large DFSs: it is not demonstrated that the BC/GSBC assess or identify risks related to these FIs. - MVTS activities: - The BC/GSBC does not collect any information allowing particular evaluation of risks associated with MVTS activities or which banks and DFSs are exposed when providing such services (see Criterion 14.4, TCA). - Risks linked to reliance on subagents are not identified. - Banking groups: no indication that banking groups, especially financial companies which are parent companies to banking groups, are subject to supervision dedicated to AML/CFT (see Chapter 1). - DECFinEX and DRSSFD (FX bureaus and small DFSs): mechanisms for identifying institutional risks by supervisory national authorities are non-existent, although the DECFinEX has taken some preliminary supervisory steps. - Insurance sector (MF/CRCA): - Implementation of measures for assessment of institutional risks is non-existent, although a questionnaire was sent between June 11, 2020, and August 31, 2020, by the DA to establish a risk profile for insurance companies. - The questionnaire was not sent to brokers, does not allow establishment of a risk profile for each insurance company, contains very limited data, and does not include risk indicators. - The DA initiative appears exclusively national; the CRCA did not integrate the ML/TF risk assessment into its supervisory strategy, nor participate in its development. - CREPMF: has not conducted an ML/TF risk assessment of FIs subject to its supervision. ### Risk-based supervision of FIs: BC/GSBC practices and limitations - Due to lack of sufficient understanding and adequate identification of risks, the BC/GSBC is unable to effectively target inspections based on ML/TF risks. - AML/CFT supervisory strategy is based on the results of the risk assessment process described elsewhere; the overall rating of risks from the SNEC/UMOA system guides on-site inspections, including AML/CFT inspections. - Weighting of ML/TF risks and integration into inspection guidelines are insufficient (see CI 3.2). - For large DFSs and EMIs, BC/GSBC lacks a solid risk-based basis to guide supervisory activities in absence of an institutional risk assessment. - Off-site inspections: annual AML/CFT reports and results of questionnaires (which only cover Cis) are analyzed; results of these off-site inspections have not been detailed to the assessment team. - The AML/CFT desk-based inspection methodology is set out in an inspection manual and eight thematic inspection forms; sampling for customer-file analysis uses the SCAN-R Application with criteria based on volume of transactions or FI categorization of high-risk customers—criteria judged to have little relevance given shortcomings in understanding of risks by FIs. - BC/GSBC inspection types: - General inspections: cover totality of FI operations; AML/CFT is one supervisory item. - Specific inspections: focus on several priority areas; may include AML/CFT if deemed high-risk for the targeted FI. - Thematic inspections: cover one area of interest, such as AML/CFT. ### Inspection activity statistics (as reported) - Credit Institutions (general on-site inspections): - 2017: Number of Active FIs 30; Number of General On-site Inspections 4 - 2018: Number of Active FIs 29; Number of General On-site Inspections 5 - 2019: Number of Active FIs 29; Number of General On-site Inspections 4 - 2020: Number of Active FIs 30; Number of General On-site Inspections 6 - 2021: Number of Active FIs 30; Number of General On-site Inspections 10 - Large DFSs (general on-site inspections): - 2017: Number of Active FIs 19; Number of General On-site Inspections 1 - 2018: Number of Active FIs 21; Number of General On-site Inspections 2 - 2019: Number of Active FIs 23; Number of General On-site Inspections 1 - 2020: Number of Active FIs 24; Number of General On-site Inspections 0 - 2021: Number of Active FIs 35; Number of General On-site Inspections 5 - 2022 (until June): Number of Active FIs 2; Number of General On-site Inspections 35 - EMIs (general on-site inspections): - 2017: Number of Active FIs 3; Number of General On-site Inspections 0 - 2018: Number of Active FIs 3; Number of General On-site Inspections 0 - 2019: Number of Active FIs 5; Number of General On-site Inspections 0 - 2020: Number of Active FIs 7; Number of General On-site Inspections 1 - 2021: Number of Active FIs 7; Number of General On-site Inspections 0 - 2022 (until June): Number of Active FIs 6; Number of General On-site Inspections 1 - Specific and thematic AML/CFT inspections carried out (country: Côte d’Ivoire): - 2018 total number of on-site inspections (excluding general inspections): 5 (Specific inspections with an AML/CFT component: Cis 0, DFSs 2, EMIs 0; Thematic AML/CFT inspections: Cis 5, DFSs 0, EMIs 0) - 2019 total: 2 (Specific: Cis 3, DFSs 1, EMIs 1; Thematic: Cis 0, DFSs 0, EMIs 0) — total numbers from table: 7 - 2020 total: 6 (Specific: Cis 6, DFSs 0, EMIs 1; Thematic: Cis 1, DFSs 0, EMIs 0) — total numbers from table: 7 - 2021 total: 16 (Specific: Cis 10, DFSs 5, EMIs 1; Thematic: Cis 0, DFSs 0, EMIs 0) — total numbers from table: 16 ### Effectiveness and coverage concerns - For Credit Institutions, number of on-site inspections is not excessively low relative to number of FIs, but does not demonstrate risk-based targeting given shortcomings in risk identification and understanding. - Doubling of the number of general on-site inspections in 2021 demonstrates BC/GSBC efforts, but effectiveness limited by insufficient understanding of risks and ineffective risk identification. - For large DFSs, pace of on-site inspections appears slower and insufficient given increase in number of actors (from 19 in 2019 to 35 in 2021) and sector exposures (informal sector, remote/border areas, TF, environmental crime including illegal gold mining). - For EMIs, between 2017 and 2021 only one EMI was subject to an inspection of its AML/CFT system; this is not consistent with increase in e-money circulation and exposure to TF risks. - MVTS: it has not been demonstrated that MVTS activities are subject to risk-adapted supervision; banks relying on technical platform providers are not always aware they remain responsible for AML/CFT implementation; risks from use of subagents where banks lack control over due diligence are not addressed by supervisors. - The team could not consult accurate data on training campaigns and therefore could not determine the number of persons dedicated to AML/CFT or whether staff benefited from trainings. ### DECFinEx and DRSSFD (FX bureaus and small DFSs): supervisory detail - No risk-based inspections for FX bureaus and small DFSs. - AML/CFT inspections by DECFinEX and DRSSFD are very recent and rudimentary. - Documentary supervision requires annual internal controls report similar to that submitted to BC/GSBC; in practice these reports are not submitted systematically and there are no sanctions for non-submission. - On-site inspections initiated in 2021: - 30 out of 140 licensed FX bureaus were inspected between June 15 and November 16, 2021. - 6 DFSs were inspected between October 26 and November 30, 2021, out of 11 licensed small DFSs. - Inspections focus mainly on formal presence of system/procedures and designation of an officer; lack of training for officials limits effectiveness. - Efforts are being made to formalize a supervisory methodology; drafting of a first supervisory methodology represents significant progress though requiring improvement. ### CREPMF and capital markets supervision - No risk-based approach has been put in place; AML/CFT inspections are almost non-existent. - Frequency of on-site inspections theoretically fixed at a 3-year interval as CREPMF has not established an ML/TF risk profile. - CREPMF can review supervisory program frequency if a high-risk situation is identified but has not demonstrated use of this ability. - CREPMF off-site supervision: annually receives internal controls reports; out of 97 actors, 76 submitted reports in 2021 — submission rate 78.35 percent. - Nature and accuracy of information submitted have not been demonstrated to allow identification of deficiencies. - CREPMF has an on-site inspection methodology covering AML/CFT but is very lacking; AML/CFT is broadly referred to as “the internal AML/CFT system” without details; adjustment of inspections based on risk has not been demonstrated. - Number of AML/CFT inspections of MICs (CREPMF): - 2017: Number of MICs (in Côte d’Ivoire) 15; Number of desk-based inspections exclusively dedicated to AML/CFT 1; Number of on-site inspections exclusively dedicated to AML/CFT 6 - 2018: Number of MICs 14; desk-based 1; on-site 3 - 2019: Number of MICs 14; desk-based 1; on-site 2 - 2020: Number of MICs 14; desk-based 1; on-site 2 - 2021: Number of MICs 15; desk-based 2; on-site 1 - Although inspections occurred, effectiveness is not demonstrated due to lack of detailed methodology and risk-based approach; supervisory strategy does not integrate ML/TF risks. ### Insurance sector supervision (CRCA/DA) - CRCA does not take ML/TF risks into consideration in guiding its inspections; ML/TF risks cannot impact inspection program development unless the DA sends a report when a high-risk situation is detected — this ability is not stipulated by legal text and has never been implemented in practice. - DA administered an AML/CFT questionnaire in 2021 aiming to establish a risk profile; considered a positive step but CRCA integration into supervisory strategy is not established. - Number of general on-site inspections with an AML/CFT component (Life and Non-Life Insurance Companies) (DA): - 2018: Number of Active FIs 33; Number of On-site Inspections 18 - 2019: Number of Active FIs 33; Number of On-site Inspections 12 - 2020: Number of Active FIs 33; Number of On-site Inspections 28 (This number includes a questionnaire administered in a time constrained by the pandemic.) - 2021: Number of Active FIs 33; Number of On-site Inspections 12 - Life and Non-Life Insurance Brokers (DA): - 2018: Number of Active FIs 283; Number of On-site Inspections 0 - 2019: Number of Active FIs 315; Number of On-site Inspections 0 - 2020: Number of Active FIs 323; Number of On-site Inspections 26 - 2021: Number of On-site Inspections 14 - AML/CFT inspections as part of general inspections seem undertaken by the DA, but choice of entities to inspect and depth of inspections are not guided by ML/TF risks and effectiveness not demonstrated. ### Supervision of Targeted Financial Sanctions (TFS) - The 1267 List has not been transposed into Community law (see Chapters 3 and 4); BC/GSBC is not capable of closely monitoring its implementation in Côte d’Ivoire. - BC/GSBC methodology for credit institutions: during examination of “asset freezing measures”, inspectors confirm that the “list” (of persons and entities targeted by TFS, drafted by credit institutions or integrated into business filtering systems) is in line with the list applicable in Côte d’Ivoire. - In absence of transposition of the 1267 List into Community law, BC/GSBC may not be capable of issuing or imposing sanctions against credit institutions which do not implement TFS. - Supervisory activities over non-banking FIs do not include implementation of the 1267 List as there are no corresponding legal obligations; Regulation No. 14/2002/CM/UEMOA applies to “banks and credit institutions” only. - Outside banking sector, supervisory authorities for FIs have only a basic understanding of TFS and sometimes confuse it with objections by the FIU and/or seizures ordered by a judge. - Unclear extent to which supervisory authorities ensure implementation of the National List; no formal mechanism to disseminate updates to the National List to supervisory authorities of the financial sector. ### Remedial actions and sanctions (BC/GSBC findings and measures) - 2021 major shortcomings identified by BC/GSBC investigations in banks: - Customer identification and profiling - Monitoring of transactions and STR requirements - Mapping of risks - Deficiencies in implementation of due diligence requirements - Non-formalization of certain banking and due diligence procedures - Non-compliance with record-keeping obligations relating to customers and transactions - Incompleteness of account opening records, customer profiling, or KYC forms - Measures available to BC/GSBC to remedy violations are stipulated in Articles 29 to 31 of the Annex of the Convention governing the WAEMU BC and include warnings, reprimands, requests for remedial actions, fines, mandatory publication of the violation committed, suspension, prohibition from performing all transactions (or certain types), and revocation of the license in extreme cases. - Decisions made by the Supervisory College with regard to deficiencies identified during inspections (Banks, EMIs, and Large DFSs): - Decisions made following inspections exclusively dedicated to the implementation of AML/CFT obligations: - 2018: 3 - 2019: 0 - 2020: 0 - 2021: 0 - Decisions made following inspections partly dedicated to the implementation of AML/CFT obligations: - 2018: 0 - 2019: 1 - 2020: 0 - 2021: 4 *Source: 1civea2023002 - 433. In 2020 and 2021, most banks were assessed as having medium or acceptable risks.* ### 463. The eight decisions are broken down as follows: ### 1civea2023002 - 463. The eight decisions are broken down as follows: ### Sanctions and supervisory actions (banking, EMI, DFS, insurance, CREPMF) - 2018: three banks were subject to reprimands accompanied by orders to take remedial actions. - 2019: one EMI was subject to a reprimand accompanied by an order to take remedial actions. - 2021: four FIs (including three banks and one large DFS) were subject to reprimands and monetary penalties (for a cumulative amount of 656,000,000 XOF, equivalent to approximatively USD 328,000), along with orders to take remedial actions. - Violations sanctioned by the BC/GSBC included: - incomplete identification of the customer upon the opening of account, or of occasional customers; - insufficient follow-up on PEPs; - gaps in the IT system (incomplete databases); - lack of implementation of internal audits; - insufficient implementation of enhanced due diligence requirements in the framework of correspondent banking relations; - systematic non-application of requirements related to suspicious transactions reports; - a bank was sanctioned for not submitting the annual internal controls report. - The BC/GSBC has not sanctioned banks for violations pertaining to BO identification, due diligence applicable to PEP customers, or subpar risk assessments — identified as structural and significant deficiencies. - Observations on sanctions: - Prior to 2021 most sanctions mainly targeted banks; one sanction was imposed upon an EMI in 2019, and another upon a large DFS in 2021. - Monetary sanctions adoption is a milestone but the meager amounts impede dissuasiveness. - The supervisory authority has not taken measures ensuring the publishing of sanctions, even in anonymized form, undermining deterrence. ### DECFinEx / DRSSFD supervision of FX bureaus and small DFSs - Supervisory activities with regard to FX bureaus and small DFSs remain nascent; no sanction has been imposed upon FIs whose level of compliance is weak. - Earliest AML/CFT inspections carried out in 2021 highlighted absence of AML/CFT systems but have so far led only to recommendations and requests for remedial actions. - The assessment team reviewed one AML/CFT inspection report for an FX Bureau out of 23 Bureaus inspected between June 15 and November 16, 2021; the report’s very concise conclusions did not allow identification of shortcomings and violations. - Effectiveness of inspection process suffers from: - lack of training for inspection staff; - information to supervised FIs not always detailed and accurate enough to support remedial actions. ### CRCA/MF (insurance and brokerage supervision) - To date, no sanctions have been imposed upon an insurance company or a broker for violating AML/CFT obligations; all inspections since 2018 have resulted in recommendations. - Inspections in 2020 and 2021 highlighted serious violations, particularly in the brokerage sector. - Of 11 licensed brokers, only one (backed by an international group) had an AML/CFT system in place, yet no brokers have been sanctioned. ### CREPMF enforcement - The CREPMF has imposed three sanctions for non-compliance with AML/CFT regulations; these were issued in procedures including other violations unrelated to AML/CFT. - While AML/CFT was considered in enforcement, it has not been demonstrated that such sanctions are effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. ### Private sector perceptions and overall dissuasiveness - Private sector representatives did not report supervisory actions by the BC as effectively dissuasive, and even less so for other subsectors. - Shift towards a more repressive banking-sector approach noted in 2021 (BC), but deficiency of sanctions and lack of rigorous follow-up on remedial actions reduce effectiveness, proportionality, and dissuasiveness. ### Impact of supervisory actions on FIs’ compliance - Weak sanctions and remedial actions (injunction, reprimand, warning) do not guarantee sufficient deterrence to compel FIs to fulfill AML/CFT obligations. - BC/GSBC: low number of sanctions means actions do not appear to be a significant dissuasive factor; imposition of financial sanctions starting 2021 is a positive development. - Remedial measures requested following inspections receive attention from FIs, but their effectiveness in improving risk management cannot be demonstrated. - Remedial requests are generic, focus on adopting missing elements rather than deploying risk-based mechanisms. - Supervisory authorities’ deficiencies in understanding risks prevent drafting remedial requests capable of improving risk-based implementation. - Small DFSs and FX bureaus: - Recent inspections led to designation of an AML/CFT officer in some FIs. - Information communicated to FIs is not detailed/accurate enough to enable remedial measures. - After training/awareness and early supervisory actions, 11 FX bureaus and 10 DFSs designated their correspondents before the FIU and initiated first AML/CFT procedures, but implementation effectiveness remains limited. - Insurance sector: measures after inspections with AML/CFT components are mainly recommendations, inconsistent with seriousness of violations observed in brokerage; lack of sophisticated follow-up mechanisms. - CREPMF: no demonstrated impact on compliance levels of supervised FIs. ### Promoting understanding of AML/CFT obligations and ML/TF risks - NRA drafting informed FIs and DNFBPs on major predicate offenses in Côte d’Ivoire but did not reach satisfactory level of understanding of ML/TF risks due to non-dissemination of typologies and risk indicators. - Lack of cooperation between supervisory authorities and the FIU hinders promotion of adequate risk understanding and risk-based implementation. - Understanding of risks in FI and DNFBP sectors mainly relies on NRA dissemination and supervisory awareness actions. - Supranational FI supervisory authorities have not sufficiently integrated promotion of risk understanding into supervisory strategy; exchanges with FIs are usually bilateral and post-inspection. - GSBC organizes an annual bilateral conference with bank CEOs and key associations including AML/CFT issues, but bilateral approach limits dissemination of expectations and good practices. - Foreign exchange and small DFS sectors received awareness activities; understanding improved but remains basic. - Insurance and capital market supervisors have not taken steps specifically dedicated to raising AML/CFT awareness. - No supervisory authority for FIs has published guidance or documents on best practices. - Some DNFBPs (notaries, chartered accountants) have been sensitized post-NRA but lack adequate understanding to manage risks and obligations. ### Conclusions on Immediate Outcome (IO).3 - Fit and proper verification for managerial or controlling individuals in FIs suffers from deficiencies in range and scope of checks. - Supervisory authorities lack adequate risk identification mechanisms at institutional and sectoral levels; risk-based supervision is not implemented in any sector. - Measures against illegal exercise of licensed activities are insufficient given prevalence of informal economic activity. - Recent measures (notably by the BC) have limited effectiveness due to lack of AML/CFT and risk training for staff. - AML/CFT supervision of FX bureaus and small DFSs is nascent and not risk-based. - Measures following inspections are not commensurate with seriousness of shortcomings nor dissuasive. - No supervisory authority has published guidance dedicated to AML/CFT implementation. - SRBs have been designated for lawyers, notaries, chartered accountants, judicial representatives, and court administrators, but not for other DNFBPs (dealers in precious metals and stones, business agents, casinos and gaming establishments, and real estate agents and developers); designated SRBs have not started activities. - Côte d’Ivoire is rated as having a low level of effectiveness for IO. 3. ### Legal Persons and Arrangements — Key findings and recommendations - Key findings: - Public access: information on establishment and types of commercial companies is easily and directly accessible; information on other legal persons (civil associations and companies, especially in real estate) is only partially accessible. - Authorities’ understanding of legal-person risks is very limited and fragmented; no assessment of ML/TF risks by category of legal persons has been carried out. - Preventive measures against misuse of legal persons/arrangements for ML/TF are insufficient and limited in scope; role of intermediaries (including notarial sector) has not been assessed. - No mechanisms to prevent misuse of nominee directors; nominees recognized as instrumentalities in ML schemes. - Bearer shares: since 2014 companies no longer may issue new securities to bearers; securities issued before 2014 were to be converted and registered before May 5, 2016, but authorities have not taken specific measures to implement registration within deadlines. - Proportion of basic information easily accessible remains fragmentary amid a prominent informal sector. - RCCM lacks resources to carry out proper inspections and ensure accuracy of basic information. - DGI provides, upon request and in a timely manner, BO information from registers, but information is not subject to regular/sufficient checks; since 2020 DGI collects BO information at establishment but could not demonstrate facilitation of access or updates. - FIs and DNFBPs are not considered reliable means for accessing accurate and updated BO information timely. - Foreign trusts/legal arrangements with trustees/administrators operating from Côte d’Ivoire are required to register and provide BO information to tax administration, but authorities have not demonstrated implementation. - RCCM lacks sanctioning powers for non-provision or non-updating of basic legal-person information; tax authorities indicated ad hoc sanctions against legal persons failing BO requirements but effectiveness/proportionality/dissuasiveness not demonstrated. - Recommendations (Côte d’Ivoire should): - Assess ML/TF risks by category of legal persons to identify instrumentalities/channels (including intermediaries), draw typologies, disseminate results, conduct awareness activities focused on high-risk sectors, and take targeted mitigation measures. - Implement a mechanism to ensure collected basic information is accurate and updated timely; provide RCCM with human/technical resources (file linking), means to conduct effective inspections, including sanctioning powers. - Ensure authorities can access RCCM basic information in a timely manner regardless of place or year of incorporation; ensure information is complete and digitized and accelerate integration of informal sector. - Ensure all competent authorities have access to BO information for all legal persons/arrangements regardless of establishment date, including DGI-collected data, and that such information is accurate and up to date. - Carry out inspections/checks to ensure legal persons fulfill BO requirements and impose effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions on non-compliant entities. - Ensure swift public access to information on establishment and all forms of legal persons, including civil associations and companies (particularly real estate companies), and on legal arrangements. - Take measures to prevent misuse of legal persons via nominee directors. - Implement measures to reduce risk associated with bearer shares still in circulation (e.g., deadline after which bearer shares are unusable, or ensure such securities are no longer in circulation). - Take specific and proactive sectoral measures to ensure legal-arrangement requirements are implemented and accurate/updated BO information is made available timely. ### Immediate Outcome 5 — Public availability of information on legal persons and arrangements - Company counts: - Limited liability companies: 46,816 - One-person limited liability companies: 13,568 - Cooperatives: 5,844 - OHADA membership: company establishment governed by OHADA Uniform Act; commercial companies and EIGs must be registered within the RCCM and cooperatives in the cooperatives register; foreign companies with branches/representative offices in Côte d’Ivoire must request RCCM registration. - Information on establishment of commercial companies is easily and directly accessible to the public via OHADA Uniform Act texts available online and published in the official gazette; also available in the Civil Code and the General Tax Code. - The National Center for Legal Documentation (CNDJ) oversees compilation, conservation, archiving, and dissemination of legislative and regulatory texts. *Source: 1civea2023002 - 463. The eight decisions are broken down as follows:* ### 490. The Center for Development and Investment (CEPICI) publishes information related ### 490–514. The Center for Development and Investment (CEPICI) publishes information related to the characteristics and establishment of commercial companies ### Publication, access, and outreach - CEPICI is a one-stop shop for investment, tasked with the centralization and facilitation of company establishment, modification, and dissolution procedures. - Access to CEPICI information: either upon written request or on the CEPICI website. - In 2020 and 2021, the authorities organized awareness campaigns for both new and already registered companies, including training workshops for notaries, legal counsels, business agents, and lawyers. - QR code measure: since April 2020 a QR code has been introduced into registration forms for new companies to allow verification of authenticity for companies established since 2020. ### Accessibility of information on other legal persons and legal arrangements - Information on civil associations and companies is only partially accessible to the public. - The 1960 Law on the statute of associations is public (Law No. 60-315 of 1960). - No central publication or comprehensive information has been made available on establishment and obligations of associations or non-profit companies (notably OPCs used for management and transfer of real estate). - Legal arrangements (e.g., trusts): legal texts do not provide for their establishment in Côte d’Ivoire; persons residing in Ivorian territory may act as trustees or manage foreign trusts, but authorities have not published obligations of such arrangements except via the tax annex within the official gazette and DGI analysis. - Authorities indicated that no legal arrangements have initiated reporting procedures but could not prove the absence of such arrangements operating on the territory. ### Identification, assessment, and understanding of ML/TF risks of legal entities - Côte d’Ivoire has not conducted an assessment of ML/TF risks associated with different categories of legal persons established on Ivorian soil; the NRA does not specifically cover legal persons. - NRA highlighted vulnerabilities: NPO sector exposure to exploitation by PEPs for ML purposes; vulnerabilities associated with cash deposits in the banking sector made on behalf of legal persons; difficulty obtaining information on depositors and beneficial owners (BOs); limited availability of reliable identification infrastructures to mitigate forgery risks (including forgery of incorporation documents). - FIU study (2017–2021 STRs): initiated to measure involvement of legal persons in ML; preliminary and quantitative only; suffers from uneven distribution and completeness of STRs; predicate offenses in STRs (tax fraud, scamming, forgery and use of forged documents, cybercrime) only partially reflect major ML/TF threats; corruption offenses ranked second; drug trafficking and environmental crime remain marginal. - PPEF analysis: confirms frequent involvement of OPCs in ML schemes and involvement of some intermediaries including notaries; study is purely quantitative, ongoing, not disseminated widely, and has not produced typologies. - Reports and studies were not circulated broadly; FIU and PPEF analyses not used to produce customized typologies for each legal person type or predicate offense. - Authorities have not assessed risks associated with other legal persons, NPOs, civil real estate companies, or the role of intermediaries (notaries, chartered accountants, lawyers, business agents), despite evidence of notary involvement in PPEF cases and ongoing proceedings. - Overall: understanding of ML risks associated with legal persons is limited and fragmentary; better understanding exists within FIU, PPEF, and DGI (in relation to tax fraud or false customs declaration schemes) but remains incomplete. ### Mitigating measures to prevent misuse of legal persons and arrangements - OHADA Uniform Act provides for company transparency measures but implementation is limited. - Information collected at establishment is transferred to the Clerk who registers and maintains it within the RCCM; legislation requires a judicial record extract for the applicant and allows the Chief Clerk to reject registration on that basis, but the Clerk has never received an application including a disqualifying criminal record, and no registration at the RCCM has been refused. - RCCM operational coverage: only the Commercial Court of Abidjan has been operational since 2020 (covers around 80 percent of registrations); local RCCM files outside Abidjan are kept by courts of first instance, are not digitized, and not very usable. - Online RCCM information since 2020 remains fragmentary; authorities estimate complete information is available for around 20 percent of companies; RCCM cannot differentiate between active and dissolved legal persons. - Digitization efforts and reforms to integrate registers outside Abidjan into RCCM have been initiated but with no tangible national impact yet; no sensitization by the Clerk’s Office in the past three years regarding registration and update requirements. - CEPICI voluntary single-file project (since 2015) to create a unique identifier (UID) for companies based on DGI records (132,000 allegedly active companies): - Only 14,000 companies have received a UID. - Project aims to cover 80 percent of the targeted population by the end of 2023. - Project results limited to companies registered in Abidjan between 2015 and 2018; companies outside Abidjan only “invited” to submit UID requests; sensitization outside Abidjan remains nascent. - Initiative suffers from non-binding nature; information received upon granting UID is not used to update RCCM information. - Targeted measure in gold mining sector: licensing procedures include investigations into shareholder structures and managers using National Gendarmerie services and upon FIU advice; between 2019 and 2021, 138 files were submitted to competent authorities for investigation, 13 of which were rejected following unfavorable FIU opinion due to ML/TF suspicions. - DNFBPs and intermediaries: - The role of intermediaries in creation and management of legal persons has not been assessed; DNFBPs are not subject to AML/CFT supervision. - Service providers to trusts do not constitute an organized profession. - Despite some STRs and ongoing proceedings involving intermediaries (including notary offices), no measures taken to limit their contribution to ML/TF facilitation. - Preventive measures regarding legal persons are not implemented by DNFBPs. - Bearer shares: since 2014 companies cannot issue new bearer shares; shares issued before 2014 should have been converted and registered before May 5, 2016; authorities cannot identify number of entities which converted and registered bearer shares and have not implemented measures to enforce conversion; holders of non-converted bearer shares may claim rights without specified deadline; authorities cannot confirm if bearer shares remain in circulation or estimate their numbers or sectors using them. - Nominee directors: Côte d’Ivoire does not have a mechanism to prevent legal persons from having directors acting on behalf of a third person (“nominee directors”), though use of nominees is recognized as an ML tool. - Legal arrangements registration before DGI: provisions requiring registration have not proven effective; authorities indicated no legal arrangement has initiated reporting procedures; absence of proactive procedures does not reassure that such arrangements do not exist. ### Timely access to adequate, accurate, and current basic and beneficial ownership information on legal persons - Authorities obtain basic company information through the RCCM or directly from legal persons. - Clerk’s Office of the Commercial Court of Abidjan provided 91 requests received between 2020 and 2022 from the following: - FIU: 59 - HABG: 2 - Civil protection and security services: 4 - DPEF: 16 - Gendarmerie: 1 - Judicial officers: 4 - Investigating judges: 7 - Timeliness: - Timely access is compromised by incomplete and fragmentary RCCM data for companies registered outside Abidjan. - For companies registered in Abidjan, the Clerk’s Office can generally fulfill requests in a timely manner (within 48 hours approximately). - Abidjan RCCM information may be accessed by foreign competent authorities when published online, but the Clerk’s Office indicated inability to provide information to foreign authorities outside the OHADA zone. - Accuracy and currency: - RCCM basic information is not necessarily accurate or up to date due to lack of inspections and checks; legal framework lacks mechanisms to ensure accuracy and updates. - Fictitious or false addresses and use of forged registration documents have been noted. - Enforced obligation to regularly update RCCM information is not adequately monitored; some legal persons ceased to exist or underwent changes not reflected in RCCM. - RCCM resource constraints: - Resources do not allow proactive inspections; compliance monitoring is limited to submitted records without proactive checks. - RCCM tools rely on historical database records and compulsory pre-registration documents from tax authorities; lack of linkage with other administrations’ databases (notably tax departments) prevents ongoing updates. - Staffing and training: RCCM resources dedicated to these functions are limited to 10 persons covering around 16,061 companies registered in 2021; staff has not received training on ML risks associated with legal persons. - The Clerk does not have sanctioning powers except to refuse registration formalization; the Office has not filed any suspicious reports to the FIU or complaints before prosecutorial authorities. - Basic information on non-profit associations and civil non-profit companies: - Public-benefit or simple associations are considered non-profit as per legislation. - AML/CFT Law defines NGOs and provides for their registration in a dedicated register, but the competent authority has not been designated and the register is non-existent. - Associations must be declared before the prefecture or administrative district where their head offices are located. - Civil non-profit companies (mainly OPCs for real estate management and asset transfer) are not subject to RCCM registration but are requested to register before the tax authorities, which will have access to this information. *Source: Excerpt from the cited IMF country report chapter (paragraphs 490–514).* ### 515. With regard to BO information, authorities rely on the DGI which can access, upon ### 1civea2023002 - 515. With regard to BO information, authorities rely on the DGI which can access, upon ### Access to Beneficial Ownership (BO) Information via the DGI - Since 2019, tax legislation compels legal persons, whatever their form and activity, to maintain at the disposal of tax authorities their BO register updated with all relevant changes. - Authorities rely on the DGI which can access, upon request and in a timely manner, registers maintained by legal persons. - The DGI has demonstrated its ability to obtain BO information upon request and exchange it in a timely manner (less than 48 hours if necessary) in response to requests by investigative authorities or the FIU. - In practice: - The FIU and law enforcement authorities (Gendarmerie and the PPEF) regularly request information from the DGI, but cannot demonstrate to what extent these requests are specifically linked to BOs. - Requests from the DPC or the HABG remain anecdotal. - Authorities very rarely exchange BO information with foreign partners. ### Quality, Updating, and Verification of BO Registers - Keeping of registers by legal persons is not subject to regular and sufficient checks to ensure access to satisfactory, accurate, and updated information in a timely manner. - Although there is an obligation to keep the register updated without delay, the provisions do not provide mechanisms to ensure legal persons are aware of changes in their BOs. - Verification of BO registers is not subject to systematic inspection during tax inspections; targeted inspections remain quite random. - Tax authorities indicated having issued ad hoc sanctions against legal persons which did not fulfill record-keeping obligations, but could not differentiate statistics related to these sanctions from statistics related to remedial actions — making it impossible to assess frequency or whether sanctions are effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. - The DGI collects information on BOs of new legal persons, but has not demonstrated the scope or form of this collection process, nor the update of this information (e.g., by maintaining a register). - New legal persons are requested to submit BO information upon establishment, but the DGI does not provide such information to authorities except upon request and there is no mechanism to facilitate access by competent authorities. - The DGI has not demonstrated that information received from new legal persons since 2020 has been updated. - Legal persons are not required to inform the DGI of changes to their BO structure after their establishment. ### FIs, DNFBPs, and BO Information Availability - Authorities cannot rely on FIs and DNFBPs to access satisfactory, accurate, and updated BO information in a timely manner. - FIs and DNFBPs do not effectively fulfill their BO identification obligations (see IO.4). - Even when competent authorities have powers to access BO information held by FIs and DNFBPs, the information obtained is generally absent or deemed unsatisfactory and must undergo additional checks to be usable in investigations (see IO.6). - FIs and DNFBPs often refer back to their customers, lengthening timeframes and raising confidentiality issues for ongoing investigations. ### Legal Arrangements (Basic and BO Information) - The tax administration before which legal arrangements are required to register has not demonstrated its ability to ensure timely access by other authorities to basic information and BOs of legal arrangements. - Authorities indicated that no legal arrangement had initiated reporting procedures, but absence of specific and proactive procedures does not confirm their absence from the territory. - No measure has been taken to prevent the misuse of legal arrangements for ML/TF purposes. ### Sanctions: Effectiveness, Proportionality, Dissuasiveness - Article 2 of Law No. 2017-727 of November 9, 2017, on sanctioning offenses provided for by the uniform acts of the OHADA Treaty, stipulates criminal sanctions against managers of legal persons who ignore their reporting obligations. To date, effectiveness cannot be assessed in the absence of court decisions imposing the sanctions. - The RCCM does not have the ability to impose sanctions based on non-compliance with obligations related to dissemination or update of basic information. - Tax authorities reported ad hoc sanctions against legal persons failing BO requirements, but the DGI could not isolate statistics relevant to these sanctions from general remediation statistics — preventing assessment of frequency and nature of sanctions. ### Conclusions on Immediate Outcome 5 (IO.5) - Measures taken by Côte d’Ivoire are insufficient for preventing the misuse of legal persons and arrangements for ML/TF purposes. - Information related to the establishment of commercial companies is accessible to the public; information on other forms of legal persons is only partially accessible. - Côte d’Ivoire has not conducted an assessment of ML/TF risks associated with various types of legal persons; understanding of risks associated with legal persons remains very limited. - Timely access to basic information is compromised by incomplete and fragmented information collection, and by absence of inspections and sanctions. - Authorities have access to BO information via the DGI, but the mechanism does not ensure that information is satisfactory, accurate, and up to date. - Inspections do not ensure legal persons fulfill BO register or update requirements at creation. - Introduction of provisions establishing a registration requirement for legal arrangements has not demonstrated effectiveness. - Côte d’Ivoire is rated as having a low level of effectiveness for IO. 5. ### International Cooperation — Key Findings (selected from subsequent section) - MLA and extradition granted by Côte d’Ivoire have been appreciated by some requesting countries, but are not made in a timely manner; most requests submitted to Ivorian authorities were still in progress years after reception. - Judicial authorities rarely seek MLA and extradition despite transnational crime threats. - Most MLA requests issued by Ivorian authorities have not received a response; authorities lack an effective mechanism to follow up on these requests. - Beyond MLA, other types of cooperation with counterparts abroad occur but proactive use is insufficient given the transnational nature of many income-generating offenses. - The FIU adopted the Egmont Group’s principles for information exchange, which set confidentiality and reciprocity as essential conditions. - Ivorian legal framework limits, in principle, the scope of information the FIU may exchange outside the WAEMU zone, though this deficiency does not seem to have materialized in practice. - Exchange of basic and BO information related to legal persons is very rare. ### International Cooperation — Recommendations (selected) - Develop framework legislation on international mutual assistance in criminal matters and extradition to respond effectively to foreign requests and give full effect to MLA conventions to which the country is a party. - Amend legal framework to provide the FIU power to exchange, within and outside WAEMU, all information it has access to at the national level, including information from reporting entities, whether they have issued an STR or not. - Establish an operational mechanism through the DACP and judicial authorities to ensure effective follow-up and prioritization of legal assistance requests for timely responses. - Raise awareness and strengthen training of judicial authorities on using MLA when required. - Provide judicial authorities with material and technical resources, including a procedures manual, to request and provide MLA and extradition in a timely manner. - Ensure competent authorities understand the importance of actively seeking other forms of international cooperation through training, procedure manuals, and a system to regularly assess effectiveness. - Strengthen investigative authorities’ international cooperation to identify and track criminal proceeds and counter criminal networks and enablers outside Côte d’Ivoire. ### Example Case: “The Spaghetti Connection” (operational cooperation/joint investigation) - Key dates and facts: - September 17, 2018: Brazilian authorities seized 1,195 kilograms of cocaine hidden in rollers of six tractor-type construction vehicles (DYNAPAC and CATERPILLAR) destined for the Autonomous Port of Abidjan. - September 26, 2018: Regional anti-drug liaison officer in Accra/Ghana sought Ivorian judicial assistance to identify, locate, and interview perpetrators and accomplices. - Ivorian investigation led by the Counter Transitional Crime Unit (UCT) under the Public Prosecutor, lasting over nine months, collaborating with multiple local units and receiving operational support from multiple foreign authorities and technical consultants. - Foreign operational support participants included investigators from Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Burkina Faso; seven French police officers; international technical consultants from the WAEMU zone; and three Italian agents from the ‘Guardia di Finanza’ of Genoa and Como State Police. - Outcomes: - Arrest of 11 persons (9 Italians, 2 Ivorians). - Seizures included: - Eight handguns (pistol, revolver, and a submachine gun) of several brands; - 90,785 EUR; - 7,572,000 XOF (approx. USD 12,000 USD); - USD 6,508; - Tens of luxury watches and several high-end cars. - Investigations established that arrested persons were part of a large, structured network importing machines likely to contain cocaine from Brazil to Côte d’Ivoire several times per year. - Documents identified the consignee of the concealed goods as “NDRANGHETA”. ### MLA Requests Received (2017–2021) — summary figures - Total incoming MLA requests (2017–2021): 32 - Executed requests: 01 - Requests in progress: 31 - Year-by-year summary (from Table 8.1): - 2017: Number of Requests 02; Number of Requesting States 01; Executed Requests 00; Requests in Progress 02 - 2018: Number of Requests 04; Number of Requesting States 02; Executed Requests 01; Requests in Progress 03 - 2019: Number of Requests 14; Number of Requesting States 07; Executed Requests 00; Requests in Progress 14 - 2020: Number of Requests 07; Number of Requesting States 05; Executed Requests 00; Requests in Progress 07 - 2021: Number of Requests 05; Number of Requesting States 04; Executed Requests 00; Requests in Progress 05 - Offenses targeted by incoming MLA requests included extortion of property, counterfeit, scams, crimes against humanity, ML, extortion, participation in a criminal organization, online scams, sexual abuse, breach of trust, fraud, cybercrime, kidnapping, robbery, assassination, threats. - Between 2017 and 2021: - 6 incoming requests are linked to ML (constituting around one request per year or 20 percent of incoming requests) and came from France, Equatorial Guinea, Monaco, and Belgium. - No TF requests were received. - Côte d’Ivoire reported never being requested to provide MLA for the purpose of confiscation, recovery and repatriation/sharing of criminal assets. *Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2023/english/1civea2023002.pdf* ### 531. As part of its national AML/CFT strategy, Côte d’Ivoire did not implement specific ### 1civea2023002 - 531. As part of its national AML/CFT strategy, Côte d’Ivoire did not implement specific ### Capacity for International Cooperation (general findings) - No specific measures implemented under the national AML/CFT strategy to strengthen capacity to cooperate (reorganization of activities, capacity building in relation to trainings and material and technical resources). - No practical guides or procedures manuals designed for relevant international cooperation stakeholders. - No satisfactory human, technical, and material resources to receive, manage, and coordinate incoming cooperation requests and fulfill them in a timely manner. ### Extradition — findings and statistics - Applicable legal framework for extradition primarily derives from a French law dating back to 1927, introduced post-independence without amendment or adaptation to current needs. - Extradition not provided in a timely manner; despite Article 18 of the 10 March 1927 Law stipulating extradition shall be provided within a maximum of 30 days, execution occurs within an average delay of three months (between a month and a half and four months). - Côte d’Ivoire states it has never refused to execute an extradition request and has never been confronted with being required to try its nationals for refusing extradition. Extradition Requests Received (2017–2021) — Table 8.2 - 2017: Number of Requests 4; Number of Requesting States 1; Relevant Offenses: Conspiracy, robbery, concealment, scams; Requests Executed 4; Non-Executed and Other Requests 0 - 2018: Number of Requests 4; Number of Requesting States 2; Relevant Offenses: Robbery, breach of trust; Requests Executed 1; Non-Executed and Other Requests 3 - 2019: Number of Requests 2; Number of Requesting States 2; Relevant Offenses: Breach of trust, issuing of bounced checks; Requests Executed 0; Non-Executed and Other Requests 2 - 2020: Number of Requests 3; Number of Requesting States 3; Relevant Offenses: Scams, death threats, physical violence; Requests Executed 1; Non-Executed and Other Requests 2 - 2021: Number of Requests 1; Number of Requesting States 1; Relevant Offenses: Affiliation with an armed terrorist organization; Requests Executed 0; Non-Executed and Other Requests 1 - Total: 14 - 6 8 Additional extradition observations - DACP received 14 extradition requests between 2017 and 2021 from Europe, Asia, and Africa; requests involved organized scams, breach of trust, armed robbery, and association with an armed terrorist group; no extradition request linked to ML or TF. - No centralized mechanism within the DACP for prioritization of incoming extradition requests. - Most extradition requests, including those received in 2018, were still in progress by the end of the on-site visit; Ivorian authorities did not demonstrate that requests in progress were incomplete or for which additional information had been requested. - Extradition requests drafted by Côte d’Ivoire have not been successful over the reviewed period. Extradition Requests Sent (summary) — Table 8.4 - Over the past five years (2017–2021) Côte d’Ivoire submitted four extradition requests to judicial authorities of various African and European countries; none of these requests led to extradition and reasons for non-execution were not communicated. (Table shows: All requests sent 2 2) ### Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) — use, effectiveness, and statistics - International treaties and conventions to which Côte d’Ivoire is party allow the country to request MLA and extradition when judicial proceedings require. - Côte d’Ivoire indicates it requests MLA when required; between 2017 and 2021, 11 mutual legal assistance requests were filed by the country to other African and European countries. - MLA requests are usually sent through diplomatic channels. - Offenses targeted by Côte d’Ivoire’s outgoing MLA requests include: harm to the public economy, terrorism, TF (one), ML (five), concealment, corruption and associated offenses, scams, fraud, forgery, drug trafficking, and misuse of corporate assets. - Scams, corruption, and associated offenses are the most frequent in letters rogatory sent abroad, reflecting major threats identified by the NRA. - Despite organized cross-border criminal activity and cross-border nature of TF threat, the limited number (11) of MLA requests sent is not consistent with ML/TF risks in the country. - Capacity-building measures for judicial actors have been undertaken but have not resulted in an increase in MLA requests. Outgoing MLA — Table 8.3 (figures preserved as presented) - All requests sent 5 2 2 2 11 - Footnotes: 1/ E: executed requests 2/ NE: non-executed requests - Authorities indicated most requests never received a response and could not demonstrate effective follow-up and feedback mechanisms (e.g., investigator/prosecutor visits to recipient countries). - Exclusive use of diplomatic channels, despite conventions providing simplified mechanisms, likely reduces the chance of receiving feedback. - Institutional framework deficiencies and absence of an effective follow-up mechanism, plus limited material and technical resources, hinder MLA effectiveness. ### Use of Extradition and MLA to Pursue ML/TF and Predicate Offenses - Extradition requests drafted by Côte d’Ivoire have never been successful; this does not demonstrate optimal use of extradition to combat financial crime. - Côte d’Ivoire appears not to use extradition optimally due to limited number of outgoing requests and absence of an effective follow-up mechanism. ### Cooperation between Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) - The FIU is an Egmont Group member and adheres to its principles but has not established specific procedures for drafting MLA requests. - The FIU is not required to sign bilateral agreements to cooperate, but has signed memoranda of understanding with 18 foreign FIUs. - Exchange of information mainly conducted through Egmont Secure Web (ESW). - Between 2017 and 2021, the FIU sent 132 requests to foreign FIUs and received responses to almost all requests. - Of the 132 requests: 50 involved indirect information exchange; 82 aimed at supporting operational analysis; only one of the 132 was linked to TF. - Most requests were sent to FIUs of the subregion and Europe. FIU incoming assistance requests and responses - Between 2017 and 2021, the FIU received 115 assistance requests from counterparts and provided 92 responses; 23 unanswered requests remained (mostly from 2017–2018). - Main reason for unanswered requests: FIU did not receive answers from other relevant national authorities it had to consult to fulfill the requests; authorities indicated this problem had been solved. - Legal framework limits scope of information the FIU may exchange with counterparts outside the WAEMU zone (see R.40), but the FIU stated it did not distinguish between WAEMU and non-WAEMU counterparts when responding. - FIU indicated response times vary by urgency and complexity; if interrogation of reporting entities or other competent authorities required, overall response time could reach 45 days, or more. FIU can respond more swiftly for urgent requests. - Spontaneous support by the FIU: seven occasions in 2019, two in 2020, and none since. Case study (spontaneous dissemination to counterpart FIU) — extracted figures and chronology - February 25, 2019: Mr. X (a PEP from an African country) sought services of an Ivorian bank to open a current account for company DELTA, capital 100,000,000 XOF (USD 160,000). - Three days later: DELTA’s account credited with one billion (1,000,000,000) XOF (USD 16 million) from a bank account in his country of origin. - Mr. X indicated intention to withdraw this amount in cash and expected a second withdrawal of ten billion (10,000,000,000) XOF within a week. - March 6, 2019: Mr. X requested opening of a second account for another company OMEGA with capital 15 billion (15,000,000,000) XOF (USD 24 million). - April 16, 2019: Mr. X requested provision of twenty-five million (25,000,0000) XOF (USD 40,000) to benefit of national Y. (text preserved as presented) - April 24, 2019: upon request of Mr. X, the bank transferred 775,022,000 XOF (USD — text ends in source). Operational support from FIU to judicial authorities - FIU supported investigations and proceedings by providing information received from foreign counterparts to judicial authorities and police. - One case was recognized by the Egmont Group as an exemplary case of international cooperation receiving the Egmont Best Case Award in 2018. Procedural concerns affecting FIU cooperation - The assessment team did not obtain clarifications about the type of information requested by certain authorities when the Minister for the Promotion of Good Governance, Capacity Building, and the Fight Against Corruption initiated requests; such practices are not compliant with international Standards and could negatively impact FIU credibility and timeliness in obtaining information from counterparts. ### Cooperation among Investigative Authorities and Other Agencies - Apart from DGT, investigative authorities have not demonstrated that requesting information internationally is considered a key investigation element; HABG (established 2013) has not requested information from foreign counterparts. - DPEF, OCRGDF, DPC provided limited examples of international cooperation in investigations (cybercrime, scams, organized ML, forgery, international drug trafficking and ML). - Overall, proactive international cooperation by investigative authorities is insufficient given transnational nature of most income-generating offenses. - DGD (customs) is the only investigative authority demonstrating active international cooperation via World Customs Organization and CEN, leading to several seizures and a cooperation case with Cameroonian customs resulting in interception of a passenger with a large cash amount. ### Asset Recovery and ARIN-WA / AJE - Côte d’Ivoire is part of the Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network for West Africa (ARIN-WA) established in 2014; the AJE acts as Permanent Secretariat on behalf of Côte d’Ivoire. - At the time of the on-site visit, AJE had not requested assistance through ARIN-WA or other means to identify, freeze, seize, and confiscate assets. ### Tax and Supervisory Cooperation - DGI (tax administration) sent only two international cooperation requests between 2017 and 2021 (one to a WAEMU member country, one to a European country), a level not consistent with tax fraud and illicit flight of capital threats identified by the NRA. - Supervisory authorities of the financial sector do not use international cooperation effectively for FI monitoring, supervision, and regulation activities. - WAMU BC and BCEAO indicated they have requested ML/TF information from counterparts via supervisory Colleges or bilateral cooperation; BC received information from Central African Banking Commission following AML/CFT sanctions elsewhere. CREPMF cited an assistance request in the context of a licensing request in Côte d’Ivoire. - Other supervisory authorities did not provide information demonstrating cooperation requests to foreign counterparts. ### Key policy-relevant implications and gaps - Institutional and legal shortcomings (outdated extradition law from 1927; limitations on FIU information exchanges outside WAEMU) and practical deficiencies (insufficient human, technical, and material resources; absence of practical guides and prioritization mechanisms) hinder timely and effective international cooperation for AML/CFT. - Exclusive reliance on diplomatic channels and lack of effective follow-up mechanisms reduce effectiveness of outgoing MLA and extradition requests. - Limited use of extradition, MLA, tax cooperation, and supervisory cooperation is inconsistent with the transnational character of ML/TF risks identified in the NRA. - FIU operational cooperation with foreign counterparts shows strengths (132 outgoing requests with responses to almost all; 115 incoming requests with 92 responses), but timeliness and procedural safeguards require attention. *Source: Excerpt from IMF assessment content (Côte d’Ivoire) provided in content unit 1civea2023002.* ### 1.2 million) to another account in his country of origin. ### International cooperation and exchange (IO.2) ### Cooperation Among Investigative Authorities - Very little accurate information was made available to the assessment team on the effectiveness of assistance by investigative agencies to foreign counterparts. - None of these agencies has internal guidelines on the processing and prioritization of incoming requests. - The DGD stated having provided assistance to other customs administrations via the CEN of the WCO (see CI.2.3), enabling seizures by foreign authorities; the Directorate supported this with statistics and one case study. - Over the past two years, the UCT received 12 assistance requests, including 9 from a single WAEMU Member State. - Except for one case received from the HABG, authorities (besides the DGD) did not provide details on the scope of assistance provided outside letters rogatory, nor on the timeliness of responses. - Investigative authorities could not demonstrate providing timely cooperation or providing to foreign counterparts, for intelligence or investigative purposes, information they have access to in the framework of national investigations (see R.40). ### Informal Cooperation by the AJE for the Identification, Freezing, Seizure, and Confiscation of Assets - The AJE received five requests between October 2019 and June 2022, and responded to four of them between 2021 and June 2022. - Requests were received as part of ARIN-WA’s activities (see CI.2.3) and were linked to information searches regarding assets (real estate, bank accounts, vehicles, etc.), identity, criminal record, and relations of prosecuted or tried individuals. - The AJE referred requests to relevant Ivorian authorities for provision of information and follow-up. - Responses were not provided in a timely manner due to communication delays by other Ivorian authorities. ### Tax Cooperation - Despite some restrictions in its legal basis for broad cooperation (see R.40), the DGI demonstrated ability to provide adequate assistance upon request of foreign tax authorities. - During the 2017-2021 period, the DGI received 19 requests: three from a WAEMU Member State, and 16 from European countries. - The information communicated generally related to tax and financial status of legal persons, identification of geographic coordinates, identification of real estate assets and potential related revenue, presence of banking accounts, tax domiciliation, statutes of companies, and the tax regime. - It took six months on average to fulfill requests. - Requests received in 2017 and 2020 were still in progress at the time of the on-site visit; these two requests were not accounted for in the calculation of the six-month average. - Conclusion: the DGI was generally unable to provide timely assistance. ### Supervisory Cooperation - Information submitted by supervisory authorities does not allow determination of whether adequate and timely assistance was provided. - The BC stated it mostly received requests from counterparts for joint inspection purposes, including an AML/CFT component, with French, Nigerian, and Moroccan counterparts, and counterparts from the Economic Community of Central African States, without further details. - Other supervisory authorities did not provide information in this context. ### International Exchange of Basic and Beneficial Ownership Information of Legal Persons and Arrangements - Legal persons are used, to a considerable extent, for money laundering purposes (see IO.5 and IO.7). - Competent authorities formulate very few requests for identification and exchange of basic information and information on beneficial owners (BOs) of legal persons; exchange of information on legal arrangements and their BOs is non-existent. - Investigative judges of the PPEF respond to foreign cooperation requests for identification of BOs of legal persons. Example: to enforce a letter rogatory from France, the investigative judge referred to the Chief Clerk of the Commercial Court of Abidjan and CEPICI to identify the BO of an LLC and obtain incorporation documents; the RCCM database indicated a sole shareholder, concluded to be the BO in absence of contradictory information. - The constructive character of this cooperation is questionable because, pursuant to Ivorian legislation in place since 2019, BO information is maintained by the DGI, not by the RCCM or CEPICI; RCCM and CEPICI were unable to provide credible BO information because they did not have it. - The HABG responded within eight months to two requests related to identification of shareholders and BOs within legal persons, collecting information from RCCM and CEPICI to fulfill requests submitted by a subregional counterpart. - The FIU provides foreign counterparts with information on legal persons by obtaining basic information from the RCCM or CEPICI, or by contacting reporting entities for BO information. - Between 2017 and 2021, the FIU received a total of 18 requests for basic information on legal persons, to which it responded within an average timeframe of 45 days. - The FIU responded to two requests for information on BOs in 2017 and 2020, without mentioning the timeframe for completion. - Competent authorities submitted very few information requests on legal persons and BOs to foreign counterparts. - Investigative judges of the PPEF submitted two information requests via international letters rogatory to authorities in the United Kingdom and France to search for and identify BOs of legal persons suspected of involvement in fraud and ML; no information was provided regarding follow-up. ### Conclusions on IO.2 - Côte d’Ivoire cooperates with other countries, formally and informally, yet the mutual legal assistance (MLA) it offers to requesting States is not provided in an adequate and timely manner. - Judicial authorities have not taken measures to request legal assistance and extradition effectively and in accordance with the ML/TF risks in Côte d’Ivoire, and have not adopted measures to follow up on these requests and ensure their execution. - Cooperation of competent authorities for the exchange of financial information and information on supervision and criminal proceedings with counterparts for AML/CFT purposes is neither given nor requested in an appropriate and timely manner. - The exchange of basic information and information on the BOs of legal persons is weak, and the exchange of information on legal arrangements is non-existent. - Rating: Côte d’Ivoire is rated as having a low level of effectiveness for IO. 2. *Source: Excerpt from the provided IMF assessment content.* ### Annex I. Technical Compliance ### Annex I. Technical Compliance ### Overview - Provides a detailed analysis of Côte d’Ivoire’s compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations, focusing on technical criteria for each Recommendation. - Should be read in conjunction with the Detailed Assessment Report. - Where unchanged, analysis may refer to previous Mutual Evaluation material. ### Recommendation 1 — Assessing Risks and Applying a Risk-Based Approach - Rating: partially compliant. - Key findings: - Criterion 1.1 – (partly met): National Risk Assessment (NRA) conducted December 2018 to December 2019; outcomes adopted May 2020; scope covers all sectors subject to AML/CFT law and examines other vulnerable sectors (coffee-cocoa, cryptocurrency, certain public authorities). NRA analyzes threats (based on STRs, predicate offense statistics, expert opinions) and vulnerabilities (national capabilities and sectoral vulnerability analysis). NRA proposes mitigation measures. - Deficiencies: NRA does not examine financial flows related to corruption; does not consider extent to which cross-border flows contribute to ML risk. - Criterion 1.2 – (met): Coordination Committee appointed as competent NRA authority. - Criterion 1.3 – (met): NRA updated December 2020 to account for ML threats linked to environmental crime. - Criterion 1.4 – (met): NRA results disseminated to competent authorities, supervisors, FIs, DNFBPs, and NPOs; 2020-2030 AML/CFT NS adopted July 2021. - Criterion 1.5 – (met): 2020-2030 AML/CFT NS drafted in light of NRA with four axes and prioritized measures. - Criterion 1.6 – (not met): Articles 46–49 provide exemptions for FIs/DNFBPs not based on criterion conditions; exemptions are not risk-based. - Criterion 1.7 – (partly met): Reporting entities must have policies/procedures/controls but not specific requirements for enhanced measures addressing NRA-identified risks or integration into risk assessments. - Criterion 1.8 – (mostly met): Simplified due diligence permitted when ML/TF risk is low (Article 46 para. 1) with supervisory notification and justification; lacks explicit condition tying reductions to NRA. - Criterion 1.9 – (partly met): Insurance sector inspection powers exist (CIMA Regulation No. 001/CIMA/PCMA/SG/2021, art. 25); other sectors lack supervisory inspection scope for R.1 requirements. - Criterion 1.10 – (mostly met): Reporting entities must assess ML/TF risks (AML/CFT Law, art. 11) and document and update assessments; not required to have mechanisms to communicate risk assessment information to competent authorities. - Criterion 1.11 – (met): Reporting entities must have policies/procedures/controls authorized at high management level and enhance CDD for high risk. - Criterion 1.12 – (mostly met): Simplified due diligence only permissible when ML/TF risk is low; Article 46 lacks explicit prohibition when ML/TF suspicion exists. - Weighting/Conclusion: moderate shortcomings linked to NRA gaps (corruption flows, cross-border flows) and non-risk-based exemptions. Rated partially compliant. ### Recommendation 2 — National Cooperation and Coordination - Rating: partially compliant. - Key findings: - Criterion 2.1 – (met): Coordination Committee developed the 2020-2030 AML/CFT NS; regularly reviewed. - Criterion 2.2 – (met): Coordination Committee established by Decree No. 2018-440; comprises 21 members public and private. - Criterion 2.3 – (partly met): Committee ensures policy coordination; meets quarterly; operational cooperation mechanisms (FIU and others) provided for by law (art. 75) but implementing decree not yet adopted; operational coordination among AML/CFT authorities not established. - Criterion 2.4 – (partly met): Same mechanisms apply to Proliferation financing. - Criterion 2.5 – (not met): Personal data protection authority exists (Law No. 2013-450; ARTCI) but cooperation/coordination with AML/CFT authorities not demonstrated. - Weighting/Conclusion: moderate shortcomings; operational cooperation and data protection coordination not established. ### Recommendation 3 — Money Laundering Offense - Rating: largely compliant. - Key findings: - Criterion 3.1 – (met): ML criminalization compliant with Vienna and Palermo Conventions (AML/CFT Law, art. 7). - Criterion 3.2 – (mostly met): ML targets proceeds from “a felony or misdemeanor”; AML/CFT Law defines designated categories including FATF categories and “any crime or misdemeanor”; insider trading and market manipulation are not criminalized. - Criteria 3.4–3.11 – (met): Broad definition of assets (art. 1, para. 13); proceeds defined as “any funds derived, directly or indirectly, from the commission of an offense” (art. 1, para. 44); no prior conviction required; extraterritoriality and liability provisions apply; penalties proportionate and dissuasive (imprisonment of 3 to 7 years and fine equal to three times value—art. 113); legal persons subject to higher fines (art. 124). - Weighting/Conclusion: minor shortcomings (insider trading and market manipulation not criminalized). ### Recommendation 4 — Confiscation and Provisional Measures - Rating: partially compliant. - Key findings: - Criterion 4.1 – (partly met): Confiscation regime broad (art. 128–129); mandatory confiscation for ML and TF; limitation: confiscation of instrumentalities for predicate offenses applies only when special laws provide it; confiscation of assets belonging to convicted person only excludes third-party holdings; corresponding value confiscation limited to TF, corruption, customs, WAEMU external financial relations. - Criterion 4.2 – (met): Authorities have powers to identify assets and implement provisional measures (freezing/seizure) and special investigative techniques (AML/CFT Law, arts. 93–99). - Criterion 4.3 – (partly met): Article 128 allows third-party reclaim if owner proves unawareness of fraudulent origin; room for abuse and restitution pathways limited for ML/predicate offense confiscations. - Criterion 4.4 – (met): AGRAC established by Decree No. 2022-349 (1 June 2022) to manage and recover criminal assets; not operational at time of on-site visit. - Weighting/Conclusion: moderate shortcomings re bona fide third parties, confiscation scope for predicate offenses and corresponding value. Rated partially compliant. ### Recommendation 5 — Terrorist Financing Offense - Rating: partially compliant. - Key findings: - Criterion 5.1 – (partly met): TF criminalized per TF Convention (AML/CFT Law, art. 8); not all acts in annexed conventions criminalized (gaps for certain aviation, maritime, hostage, nuclear protection conventions). - Criterion 5.2 – (partly met): Article 8 criminalizes financing of terrorist acts by organizations and individuals; financing of a terrorist organization “for any purpose whatsoever” not criminalized. - Criterion 5.2bis – (met): Financing travel to another State for terrorism or training criminalized (Law No. 2015-493, art. 4-1). - Criteria 5.3–5.9, 5.10 – (met/mostly met): TF covers funds of legal and illegal origin; offense committed whether or not the act occurs; intent/knowledge can be inferred; penalties include at least 10 years and fines (art. 119); corporate liability applies (art. 125); attempts and accomplices criminalized (art. 8); TF is predicate to ML (art. 1, para. 15); jurisdictional provisions apply extraterritorially. - Weighting/Conclusion: moderate shortcomings (partial criminalization of annexed convention acts; financing of terrorist organization for any purpose not criminalized). ### Recommendation 6 — Targeted Financial Sanctions related to Terrorism and Terrorist Financing - Rating: non-compliant. - Key findings: - Major deficiencies across sub-criteria; overall Criterion 6.1 rated (not met). - Criterion 6.1(a) – (met): Minister of Finance competent authority to propose names to UNSC Committees (Decree No. 2018-439, art. 3). - Criterion 6.1(b) – (mostly met): Identification of designation targets via Minister of Finance/CCGA but no mention designation proposals based on UNSCR criteria. - Criterion 6.1(c)/(e) – (not met): Evidence criteria for Minister’s designation proposals not specified; designation proposals not tied to criminal procedure. - Criterion 6.1(d) – (partly met): CCGA responsibility theoretically aligned to UN procedures but no legal provision or practical case. - Criterion 6.2 – mixed: designation processes exist but criteria unduly limited; deadlines (CCGA advisory opinion within 48 hours) not always respected; domestic designations may be based on “suspicion” but not formalized. - Criterion 6.4 – (not met): Implementation of UNSCR 1267 relies on WAEMU Community mechanism which has not issued orders during review period; 1267 implementation not timely or applied to all natural/legal persons; domestic list notifications/publications not performed within 24 hours. - Criterion 6.5 – (partly met): Freezing obligations uneven (WAEMU Regulation application limits, ambiguity in scope); freezing does not extend to entities owned/controlled by designated persons unless themselves designated; continued prohibition scope limited and ambiguous; dissemination mechanisms ineffective in practice. - Criterion 6.6 – (partly met/various): Appeal/delisting mechanisms exist for certain UNSCRs but not comprehensive; obligations to unfreeze on delisting not required; public access to laws and procedures met for some UNSCRs; facilitation of 1988 Committee reviews not provided. - Criterion 6.7 – (met): Minister of Finance procedures for easing freezing measures exist, with UN consultation where required. - Weighting/Conclusion: major deficiencies: UNSCR 1267 sanctions not implemented without delay; freezing requirement under 1267 not applied to all persons; freezing does not extend to funds/assets of persons acting on behalf of designated persons; designation criteria unduly limited. Rated non-compliant. ### Recommendation 7 — Targeted Financial Sanctions Related to Proliferation - Rating: non-compliant. - Key findings: - Criterion 7.1 – (not met): Minister of Finance orders freezing “without delay” (AML/CFT Law, art. 100, para. 4) and publication (art. 101), but “without delay” undefined; TFS related to countering proliferation not implemented within 24 hours. - Criterion 7.2 – (partly met): FIs and any other person must freeze assets (art. 100 para. 5); however ambiguity in definitions (e.g., “funds or other assets” undefined), limited dissemination and publication practices in practice, and absence of guidelines. - Criterion 7.3 – (not met): Supervisory authorities have powers but do not exercise them in practice for PF-related TFS; Lists 1718 and 2231 not incorporated into national law; VASPs unlicensed/unregulated. - Criterion 7.4–7.5 – (partly met): Appeal and delisting mechanisms exist in limited form; relaxation and continued prohibition provisions partially in place; treatment of income on frozen accounts and withdrawals under contract require authority authorization but lack express conditions. - Weighting/Conclusion: major shortcomings: TFS not implemented/implemented without delay; freezing measures do not extend to persons acting on behalf of designated persons; no supervisory monitoring for FIs, VASPs, DNFBPs regarding PF TFS. Rated non-compliant. ### Recommendation 8 — Non-Profit Organizations - Rating: non-compliant. - Key findings: - Criterion 8.1 – (not met): No standalone NPO TF risk analyses; NRA contains only limited NPO coverage (three paragraphs and limited STR analysis); no comprehensive identification of NPOs; dedicated register authority not yet appointed; large informal NPO presence. - Criterion 8.2 – (not met): NPOs required to publish financial statements and have mechanisms (art. 42) but virtually all NPOs do not comply and incur no sanctions; awareness-raising limited (10 workshops 2016–2022, around 33 NPOs participated); no best practices developed with NPOs. - Criterion 8.3 – (not met): Measures (registration, donation register for amounts ≥ 500,000 XOF approx. USD 875, account deposit requirements) are not risk-based and not implemented by most NPOs; no high-risk NPO measures. - Criterion 8.4 – (not met): Supervision exists in principle under Ministry of Interior and Security (Law No. 1960-315), but AML/CFT competent authority not appointed; no AML/CFT supervision enforced in practice; criminal sanctions exist but may not be effective/dissuasive. - Criterion 8.5 – (partly met/various): Supervisory authority for NPOs not identified; investigative powers against NPOs not demonstrated; JPO powers to obtain documents exist; reporting obligations exist but mechanisms and competent authority lacking. - Criterion 8.6 – (not met): No designated point of contact/procedures for international information requests on NPOs suspected of TF. - Weighting/Conclusion: major shortcomings: inability to identify totality of NPOs, absence of in-depth TF risk analysis for NPOs, lack of ongoing awareness, lack of risk-based supervision and sanctions. Rated non-compliant. ### Recommendation 9 — Financial Institution Secrecy Laws - Rating: largely compliant. - Key findings: - Criterion 9.1 – (mostly met): AML/CFT Law ensures professional secrecy does not hinder FATF implementation: professional secrecy cannot be invoked against judicial authorities or to refuse information to supervisors or the FIU (arts. 93, 96). Group-wide policies required for member FIs (art. 89). Some uncertainty whether wide range of operational information exchange mechanisms exist among all competent authorities; certain international information exchange limitations noted (arts. 76, 78, 86). - Weighting/Conclusion: minor shortcomings re operational-level information exchange mechanisms and international exchange limitations. ### Recommendation 10 — Customer Due Diligence - Rating: partially compliant. - Key findings: - Preliminary: AML/CFT Law lacks provisions addressing CDD for legal arrangements; law refers mainly to legal persons. - Criterion 10.1 – (met): Anonymous/fictitious accounts prohibited (art. 20 para. 2). - Criterion 10.2 – (mostly met): FIs must apply CDD when establishing business relationships; occasional transactions above 10 million XOF (approx. USD 16,000) trigger CDD (foreign exchange threshold 5 million XOF approx. USD 8,000). Note: 10 million XOF threshold higher than designated threshold (USD/EUR 15,000). - Criterion 10.3 – (partly met): Identification/verification requirements for natural persons and legal persons exist (arts. 18, 26–29) but no provisions for legal arrangements; exemptions for online payments (art. 48) inconsistent with FATF. - Criteria 10.4–10.7 – (mostly/partly met): Acting-on-behalf verification required (not for legal arrangements); BO identification required but definition has drafting issues referencing arrangements erroneously; supervisory authority to set list of information to collect not implemented (art. 19 not defined). - Criteria 10.8–10.11 – (not met/partly met): No provisions for legal arrangements; legal person identification incomplete (art. 28); BO identification covers threshold of more than twenty-five percent but lacks aspects (b) and (c) of criterion; no obligation to identify/verify BOs for legal arrangements. - Criteria 10.12–10.13 – (not met): Life insurance beneficiaries not covered by specified due diligence measures nor as a relevant risk factor. - Timing (10.14–10.15) – (partly met/not met): Verification may be postponed when ML/TF risk is low but conditions not fully specified; no risk management procedure for postponement conditions. - Existing customers (10.16) – (not met): No mechanisms specified for pre-existing relationships. - Risk-Based Approach (10.17–10.20) – (partly met/not met): FIs must intensify measures in high risk (art. 51) but obligations mainly apply to ongoing CDD and not pre-relationship enhanced measures; simplified measures allowed when low risk (art. 46) but limited; inability to identify BO requires termination of transaction limited in scope; no provision allowing FI to file STR instead of tipping-off CDD. - Weighting/Conclusion: moderate shortcomings: exemptions for online payments, incomplete CDD for legal persons and arrangements, insufficient BO identification measures, CDD for life insurance beneficiaries missing, incomplete risk-based approach. Rated partially compliant. ### Recommendation 11 — Record-Keeping - Rating: partially compliant. - Key findings: - Criterion 11.1 – (met): FIs must keep records and documents for 10 years after transaction execution (art. 35). - Criterion 11.2 – (partly met): Identification records must be kept 10 years after account closure; accounting books and certain reports kept 10 years; retention for confidential written reports (Article 32) not specified; record scope narrower than R.11 (does not extend to all CDD information, BOs, proxies, or results of analysis). - Criterion 11.3 – (not met): No explicit FI obligation to keep transaction records sufficient to recreate individual transactions for prosecution purposes. - Criterion 11.4 – (partly met): FIs must provide competent authorities with identification records upon request (art. 36), but transaction records not explicitly required to be readily available; scope of CDD information kept is limited. - Weighting/Conclusion: moderate shortcomings: record-keeping obligations limited in scope and restrict information available to authorities. Rated partially compliant. ### Recommendation 12 — Politically Exposed Persons - Rating: partially compliant. - Key findings: - Definition consistent with FATF Glossary (art. 1 item 43) but law requires persons to have held a prominent public position for at least one year to be PEP (reduced to 6 months for insurance sector) — not FATF-compliant. - Criterion 12.1 – (partly met): FIs must apply certain measures to foreign PEPs but authorization requirement is to “an appropriate level of the hierarchy” not necessarily senior management. - Criteria 12.1(a), (c), (d) – (mostly met): Risk-based procedures to identify PEPs required; source of wealth/origin of funds measures and ongoing enhanced monitoring required. - Criterion 12.1(b) – (partly met): Authorization prior to establishing relationship required but senior management authorization not specified; no obligation when existing customer becomes PEP. - Criterion 12.2 – (mostly met): National PEPs and international organization PEPs covered for items (a) and (b) with similar limitations. - Criterion 12.3 – (partly met): Family members and close associates covered for foreign PEPs but not for national PEPs or international organization PEPs. - Criterion 12.4 – (not met): No requirement to determine whether beneficiaries or BOs of life insurance policies are PEPs. - Weighting/Conclusion: moderate shortcomings regarding authorization level, coverage of family/associates for national/international organization PEPs, and one-year requirement. Rated partially compliant. ### Recommendation 13 — Correspondent Banking - Rating: largely compliant. - Key findings: - Criterion 13.1 – (mostly met): AML/CFT Law sets obligations (arts. 38, 53); deficiencies: lack of requirement to ascertain whether correspondent subjected to ML/TF supervisory measures/investigations; decision to enter relationship must be by executive body member or authorized person (not explicitly senior management); no explicit obligation to clearly understand respective AML/CFT responsibilities though communication methods required in agreement (art. 53 para. 4). - Criterion 13.2 – (mostly met): When correspondent accounts used by independent third parties, contracting CI must verify identity and CDD measures of those customers; however R.10 deficiencies affect effectiveness. - Criterion 13.3 – (met): Shell banks prohibited (art. 52); correspondents must ensure their correspondents do not permit shell banks to use accounts. - Weighting/Conclusion: minor shortcomings: lack of AML/CFT regime assessment of correspondent, decision-making authority nuance, and explicit responsibility clarity. Rated largely compliant. ### Recommendation 14 — Money or Value Transfer Services - Rating: partially compliant. - Key findings: - Criterion 14.1 – (met): Express money transfer activity carried out by banks and DFSs; subagents permitted; regulated by BCEAO Instruction No. 013-11-2015. - Criterion 14.2 – (not met): No measures to identify persons providing MVTS without a license or to apply proportionate/dissuasive measures against them. - Criterion 14.3 – (met): Supervisory authorities (BC, BCEAO, Ministry of Finance) can monitor subagents including AML/CFT aspects. - Criterion 14.4 – (partly met): Subagents not directly licensed; banks/DFSs must notify competent authorities of their subagents list no later than 30 days from end of calendar year (Instruction No. 013-11-2015). - Criterion 14.5 – (partly met): AML/CFT program applies to activities carried out by subagents but no obligation for banks/DFSs to monitor subagents’ compliance. - Weighting/Conclusion: moderate shortcomings: no measures to identify unlicensed MVTS providers; annual subagent notification only partially meets requirements; no monitoring obligation for subagents’ compliance. Rated partially compliant. ### Recommendation 15 — New Technologies (including Virtual Assets and VASPs) - Rating: Non-compliant. - Key findings: - Criterion 15.1 – (partly met): NRA did not specifically assess ML/TF risks linked to new technologies though FIs required to identify/assess risks when developing new products/technologies (art. 37). - Criterion 15.2 – (met): Risk assessment must occur prior to launch of new products/business practices (art. 37 para. 1). - Criteria 15.3–15.11 – (not met): No assessment of ML/TF risks from virtual assets/VASP activities; no provisions relating to virtual assets and VASPs; presence of unlicensed providers. - Weighting/Conclusion: major deficiencies—NRA lacks new technology/VASP risk assessment and no legal/regulatory framework for virtual assets/VASPs. Rated non-compliant. ### Recommendation 16 — Wire Transfers - Rating: partially compliant. - Key findings: - Context: WAEMU union treats intra-union transfers as domestic; Ivorian law does not distinguish cross-border vs domestic transfers. - Ordering FIs: - Criterion 16.1 – (met): Cross-border transfers must include required originator and beneficiary information (art. 33 paras. 1–3). - Criterion 16.2 – (not met): No obligation ensuring batch-file bundled transfers are fully traceable within recipient jurisdiction. - Criteria 16.3–16.4 – (not applicable): No minimum threshold; Article 33 applies to all wire transfers. - Criterion 16.5 – (met): Domestic transfers must include originator information as per 16.1. - Criterion 16.6 – (partly met): Records and documents on identification required on request but not explicitly transaction records; law enforcement may order submission with potential execution delay. - Criterion 16.7 – (met): Record-keeping obligation of 10 years (art. 35). - Criterion 16.8 – (not met): No provision preventing ordering FI from executing transfer if requirements unmet. - Intermediary FIs: - Criterion 16.9 – (not met): No explicit obligation that intermediary FIs ensure originator/beneficiary information remains attached. - Criterion 16.10 – (not met): No provision on technical limitations preventing submission of information. - Criterion 16.11 – (partly met): No explicit end-to-end reasonable measures requirement but Article 34 provides measures for receiving transfers with incomplete originator information (does not cover beneficiary). - Criterion 16.12 – (partly met): Receiving FIs must seek missing originator information and refrain from executing if not obtained and inform FIU; lack of required risk-based policies; incomplete beneficiary information not covered. - Beneficiary FIs: - Criterion 16.13 – (partly met): No explicit obligation to take reasonable measures to identify transfers lacking required info, though Article 34 implies this for originator only. - Criterion 16.14 – (not met): No obligation to verify beneficiary identity for cross-border transfers of USD/EUR 1,000 or more when beneficiary not previously identified. - Criterion 16.15 – (partly met): See 16.12. - MVTS operators: - Criterion 16.16 – (met): MVTS operators subject to AML/CFT Law; (sub)agents required to have internal procedures (BCEAO Instruction No. 013-11-2015). - Criterion 16.17 – (not met): Requirements for incomplete originator information exist but not for incomplete beneficiary information; filing STR obligations limited to Côte d’Ivoire FIU. - Implementation of TFS: - Criterion 16.18 – (partly met): Deficiencies in TFS application (see R.6.5(b)(iv))—freezing does not extend to persons acting on behalf of designated persons unless designated. - Weighting/Conclusion: moderate shortcomings: no prohibition on ordering FI executing non-compliant transfers; lack of required risk-based policies; intermediary and beneficiary FI obligations incomplete; no beneficiary verification threshold of USD/EUR 1,000. Rated partially compliant. ### Recommendation 17 — Reliance on Third Parties - Rating: non-compliant. - Key findings: - Criterion 17.1 – (not met): FIs may rely on third parties for CDD (art. 56) but scope in law exceeds permitted reliance (includes ongoing CDD); no requirement to ensure third party can provide identification information upon request without delay; supervisory conditions for access undefined. - Criterion 17.1(a–c) – (not met): No explicit obligations for FIs to ensure third parties can provide copies of identification documents promptly, are subject to supervision/monitoring, or have taken measures to fulfill CDD/record-keeping obligations. - Criterion 17.2 – (not met): No requirement to consider country risk level for third parties in WAEMU or third countries; DNFBPs may be business-introducing third parties without specific safeguards. - Criterion 17.3 – (not met): No requirements fulfilling items (a)–(c) on agreements, documentation, and supervision in reliance arrangements. - Weighting/Conclusion: major shortcomings—third parties can be entrusted with obligations beyond permitted scope, and FIs are not required to ensure third parties’ ability to provide timely CDD information. Rated non-compliant. ### Recommendation 18 — Internal Controls and Foreign Branches and Subsidiaries - Rating: (partial assessments: mostly met / partly met as noted). - Key findings: - Criterion 18.1 – (mostly met): FIs must develop ML/TF prevention programs proportionate to risks and size (arts. 23–25); requirements include: - 18.1(a) – (met): Internal controls and appointment of compliance officer at management level (art. 24). - 18.1(b) – (partly met): No explicit requirement for high-standard staff selection across all FIs; CIMA Regulation addresses insurance sector staff recruitment (art. 10). - 18.1(c) – (met): Regular staff training required (arts. 23–24); BCEAO, CREPMF, CIMA extend training obligations (BCEAO Instruction No. 007-09-2017; Instruction No. 59/2019/CREPMF; Regulation No. 001/CIMA/PCMA/PCE/SG/2021). - 18.1(d) – (mostly met): Internal controls and independent audit function required; for CIs, EMIs, DFSs, FX bureaus, audits at least once per month (BCEAO Instruction No. 007-09-2017); for other FIs, audit requirement applies “when appropriate considering size and nature” (AML/CFT Law, art. 11 para. 4). - Criterion 18.2 – (partly met): Group-level AML/CFT policies/procedures required (art. 89 para. 1) for branches/subsidiaries in member/third states but not explicitly required to adapt policies to branches/subsidiaries; requirements in items (a) and (c) of criterion not fully aligned; item (b) not met. - Weighting/Conclusion: mostly met for internal controls in many respects; gaps in staff selection, audit applicability across all FIs, and adaptation/requirements for branches and subsidiaries. ### 1. partly met: FIs that are part of a group must implement policies and procedures, at the ### 1. partly met: FIs that are part of a group must implement policies and procedures, at the ### Findings - 1. partly met: FIs that are part of a group must implement policies and procedures, at the group level, in relation to the sharing of information within the group for AML/CFT purposes (AML/CFT Law, art. 89, para. 1). These provisions do not specify that the exchange of information should focus on the information required for CDD purposes; - 2. not met: Branches and subsidiaries which are part of a group are not required to provide information related to customers, accounts, and transactions, when deemed important for AML/CFT purposes, to the compliance, audit, and/or AML/CFT functions at the group level. There is no obligation for the group-level compliance functions to provide branches and subsidiaries with such information when relevant and appropriate; *Source: 1civea2023002 - 1. partly met: FIs that are part of a group must implement policies and procedures, at the* ### 3. partly met: FIs must implement policies and procedures at the group level, for the protection ### 1civea2023002 - 3. partly met: FIs must implement policies and procedures at the group level, for the protection ### Key conclusions and overall ratings - Moderate shortcomings exist across multiple Recommendations due to gaps in legal requirements, supervisory scope, and implementation. - Summary of notable country ratings (as reported): - Recommendation 18: partially compliant. - Recommendation 19: partially compliant. - Recommendation 20: partially compliant. - Recommendation 21: largely compliant. - Recommendation 22: partially compliant. - Recommendation 23: partially compliant. - Recommendation 24: partially compliant. - Recommendation 25: non-compliant. - Recommendation 26: partially compliant. - Recommendation 27: partially compliant. - Recommendation 28: non-compliant. - Recommendation 29: largely compliant. - Recommendation 30: compliant. - Recommendation 31: largely compliant. - Recommendation 32: partially compliant. - Recommendation 33: partially compliant. - Recommendation 34: partially compliant. - Recommendation 35: partially compliant. ### Group-level AML/CFT policies and information sharing (Recommendation 18) - Findings: - FIs must implement policies and procedures at the group level for the protection of personal data, but obligations do not explicitly require upholding non-disclosure of data, confidentiality of STRs, and the use of information for AML/CFT purposes (AML/CFT Law, art. 89). - Criterion 18.3 (partly met): FIs with representative offices, branches, or subsidiaries in third States where AML/CFT requirements are less strict must apply obligations in force in Côte d’Ivoire, including personal data protection, to the extent permitted by host State law (AML/CFT Law, art. 89, para. 2). - Where host country laws prevent implementation of Côte d’Ivoire measures, FIs must take additional measures to address ML/TF risks and inform Ivorian supervisory authorities (AML/CFT Law, art. 89, para. 4), but this requirement is limited to group information-sharing policies and procedures for AML/CFT purposes. - Weighting and conclusion: FIs are not compelled to implement selection procedures to ensure recruitment based on high standards; policies for branches/subsidiaries are not explicitly required to be adapted; group members are not required to provide customer/account/transaction information to group-level compliance/audit/AML/CFT functions when necessary. Rating: partially compliant with R.18. ### Higher-risk countries (Recommendation 19) - Findings: - Criterion 19.1 (partly met): AML/CFT Law lacks a provision requiring FIs to apply EDD for persons from FATF-identified countries. Regulation No. 001/CIMA/PCMA/SG/2021 and Instruction No. 59/2019/CREPMF contain limited sectoral provisions for insurance and RCM actors. - Criterion 19.2 (partly met): AML/CFT Law does not permit compelling FIs to apply countermeasures when called for by the FATF. BCEAO can extend reporting obligations by Instruction (AML/CFT Law, art. 79, para. 6) but has not issued such an Instruction. - Criterion 19.3 (partly met): FIU provided ad hoc notifications to FIs (March and August 2020) about jurisdictions identified by FATF/European Commission, but no systematic mechanism to inform FIs when lists are updated. - Weighting and conclusion: AML/CFT Law lacks mandatory EDD and inability to compel proportionate countermeasures when called by FATF. Rating: partially compliant with R.19. ### Suspicious transaction reporting (Recommendation 20) - Findings: - Criterion 20.1 (partly met): - FIs must report amounts/transactions they suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect derive from ML or TF to the FIU, per a reporting model (AML/CFT Law, art. 79, para. 1). - Reporting obligation is limited to ML/TF and does not include proceeds of criminal activity that are predicate offenses to ML, except for tax fraud that meets regulatory criteria (art. 79, para. 2). Those regulatory criteria are not yet defined; FIs are not required to report tax fraud suspicions at present. - AML/CFT Law does not stipulate that reports be made immediately; only Instruction No. 59/2019/CREPMF (RCM actors) binds immediate reporting (art. 17, para. 2). - Criterion 20.2 (met): No reporting threshold; FIs must report all suspicious transactions regardless of amount. Reporting model (MEF/FIU 391, October 30, 2017) requires specification of transaction status, including attempted transactions. - Weighting and conclusion: Moderate shortcomings due to limitation to ML/TF (exclusion of predicate proceeds except limited tax fraud scope) and lack of immediate reporting obligation. Rating: partially compliant with R.20. ### Tipping-off and confidentiality (Recommendation 21) - Findings: - Criterion 21.1 (met): FIs, directors, and employees protected from civil/criminal liability for breaching disclosure restrictions when reporting suspicions in good faith to the FIU even without precise knowledge of the underlying offense (AML/CFT Law, art. 83 and 97). - Criterion 21.2 (mostly met): Prohibition on tipping-off owners/authors of transactions or third parties about STR submission or FIU follow-up (AML/CFT Law, art. 82, para. 1 and 2). Wording does not specify that prohibition is not intended to obstruct sharing of information in line with R.18. - Weighting and conclusion: Minor shortcomings from tipping-off provision wording. Rating: largely compliant with R.21. ### DNFBPs — CDD and other measures (Recommendations 22–23) - Recommendation 22 (Customer Due Diligence): - Findings: - Business agents (legal professionals) are not classified as DNFBPs; AML/CFT Law preventive measures do not apply to them—affects criteria 22.1(d) and 22.2–22.5. - Criteria 22.1(a)–(e) (casinos, real estate, dealers in precious stones/metals/antiques/works of art, lawyers/notaries/accountants, trust and company service providers): designated as DNFBPs in AML/CFT Law (art. 1, item 23) and subject to certain Titles II/III obligations, but numerous deficiencies mirror gaps identified in R.10 (e.g., criteria 10.2–10.5, 10.7–10.11, 10.16–10.18). AML/CFT Law lacks provisions imposing criteria 10.4, 10.9, 10.19, 10.20 on DNFBPs. - Criterion 22.2 (partly met): Record-keeping provisions do not extend to DNFBPs generally; casinos must maintain transaction registers for 10 years (AML/CFT Law, art. 44). OHADA requires accounting records for 10 years (art. 24) but not swift availability (criterion 11.4). - Criterion 22.3 (partly met): DNFBPs must have risk management to identify PEPs (AML/CFT Law, art. 22) and apply Article 54 measures where necessary; R.12 deficiencies apply. - Criterion 22.4 (not met): No requirement for DNFBPs to comply with R.15 (new technologies). - Criterion 22.5 (not met): No requirement for DNFBPs to comply with R.17 (reliance on third parties). - Weighting and conclusion: Moderate shortcomings; business agents excluded; record-keeping, R.15 and R.17 not applied; rating: partially compliant with R.22. - Recommendation 23 (Other Measures): - Findings: - Criterion 23.1 (partly met): DNFBPs required to report suspicious transactions (AML/CFT Law, art. 79) but R.20 deficiencies apply. - Criterion 23.2 (partly met): DNFBPs must have policies/procedures/controls (AML/CFT Law, art. 11, para. 3) but do not include all elements of criterion 18.1; staff training and internal audit specifically required but internal audit coverage is narrower than for FIs. - Criterion 23.3 (not met): No requirement for DNFBPs to implement measures for higher-risk countries (R.19). - Criterion 23.4 (partly met): Tipping-off/confidentiality rules apply to DNFBPs except business agents (art. 82, 83, 97), but R.21.2 deficiencies carry over for DNFBPs in groups. - Weighting and conclusion: Moderate shortcomings; DNFBPs reportable but suffer R.20/R.21 deficiencies; no higher-risk country measures; business agents not covered. Rating: partially compliant with R.23. ### Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons (Recommendation 24) and legal arrangements (Recommendation 25) - Recommendation 24: - Findings: - Criterion 24.1 (partly met): Company types prescribed by OHADA; registration with RCCM required (Uniform Act, art. 35). CEPICI publishes establishment/basic information on its website. No confirmation of a mechanism making BO information accessible to the public via CEPICI or tax administration. Associations and NPOs lack public-access mechanisms for establishment/basic/BO information. - Criterion 24.2 (not met): No ML/TF risk assessment for all types of legal persons. - Criterion 24.3 (partly met): Basic company information kept at RCCM/Clerk’s Office and Abidjan Commercial Court website; basic information on other jurisdictions and other legal person types not fully publicly accessible. - Criterion 24.4 (partly met): No requirement to keep basic information at a location in Côte d’Ivoire notified to RCCM; tax law requires registers to be made available to tax administration but not specified as kept in Côte d’Ivoire. - Criterion 24.5 (partly met): Changes to RCCM registration must be communicated within 30 days; no requirement to inform RCCM for amendments not affecting registration form (e.g., changes in associates/shareholders) except for LLCs. No mechanism ensuring accuracy of publicly available basic information. OHADA texts do not specify retention period. - Criterion 24.6 (partly met): Since 2020, tax law requires declaration of BOs at registration using administrative form (Tax Annex to Law No. 2019-1080, art. 71, para. 1). Legal persons must maintain a beneficial ownership registry (PLF, art. 49, ter) accessible on request by tax administration. FIs/DNFBPs relied upon for BO access but R.10 deficiencies affect availability. - Criterion 24.7 (not met): No time limit for updating BO registers; no requirement for BOs to notify companies; no mechanism ensuring registers are accurate/up-to-date; supervisory authorities (except CIMA) have not provided reference lists for updating; DNFBP supervisory authorities not appointed for several sectors. - Criterion 24.8 (not met): No requirement for legal persons to designate a natural person/company/DNFBP authorized to communicate BO/basic information and assist competent authorities. - Criterion 24.9 (partly met): Tax law requires retention of books/records for ten years (LPF, art. 33); OHADA practice maintains RCCM information indefinitely. AML/CFT Law record-keeping for FIs does not extend to BO information; no requirement for DNFBPs to keep CDD documents. - Criterion 24.10 (met): Competent authorities, including law enforcement, have powers to access basic and BO information timely (AML/CFT Law, art. 36 and 93); BO information held by tax authorities accessible to other competent authorities. - Criterion 24.11 (mostly met): Bearer shares issuance stopped since 2014; conversion deadline May 5, 2016; tax law requires bearer shares registry; authorities cannot cite conversion numbers or measures to ensure conversion/registration. - Criterion 24.12 (partly met): No mechanism to prevent misuse of legal persons with “nominee directors”, but OHADA provisions allow identification of actual owners in by-laws and registers (Uniform Act art. 315, 396, 853-3; art. 746-1, 746-2; LPF art. 49 bis). - Criterion 24.13 (mostly met): OHADA fines XOF 100,000 to 1 million and/or imprisonment 3 months to 3 years for non-compliance; LPF provides fines including XOF 5 million for failing to maintain BO registers. - Criterion 24.14 (mostly met): Abidjan RCCM basic information may be accessed by foreign authorities; scope/rapidity of access for other local files unclear. - Criterion 24.15 (not met): No evidence that FIU follows up on quality of basic/BO information received from other FIUs based on objective assessment. - Weighting and conclusion: Moderate shortcomings: no ML/TF risk assessment for types of legal persons; incomplete public availability of basic information; no mechanisms ensuring BO registries’ accuracy/updating; rating: partially compliant with R.24. - Recommendation 25 (Legal arrangements / trusts): - Findings: - R.25 was previously not applicable because Ivorian law does not recognize trusts. Revised standards make minimum transparency requirements applicable even if trusts cannot be created domestically. - Criterion 25.1 (not met overall): Trusts cannot be established in Côte d’Ivoire; trusts established abroad are governed to some extent by Ivorian law when certain nexus tests are met (manager/administrator fiscal resident; settlor/beneficiary fiscal resident; assets located in Côte d’Ivoire). Lawyers, notaries, trust service providers are subject to AML/CFT Law but not AML/CFT supervision (see R.28). - Criterion 25.1(a) (mostly met): Natural/legal persons residing in Côte d’Ivoire acting as administrators/managers of a trust governed by Ivorian law must declare the required information to the Tax Administration (PLP, art. 54bis). - Criteria 25.1(b), 25.1(c), 25.2, 25.3 (not met): No obligation to keep basic information on regulated trust service providers/agents; retention for at least five years not required; trustees not required to declare status to FIs/DNFBPs when establishing relationships. - Criterion 25.4 (met): Nothing prevents trustees from providing competent authorities, FIs, or DNFBPs with information on trust/BOs/assets. - Criterion 25.5 (met): Competent authorities (FIU, tax, prosecution) have powers to access trustees' information within limits of available information (Article 36 para. 1 and 3; Articles 70 and 93; CPC arts. 63, 98, 188, 189). - Criterion 25.6 (mostly met): BO information on trusts held by Tax Administration, FIs, DNFBPs and may be exchanged; foreign authorities may access basic info held by Tax Administration (but no evidence on swift access). - Criterion 25.7 (not met): Supervisory authority with disciplinary powers may act for reporting entities, but lawyers/notaries/trust service providers are not subject to AML/CFT supervision in Côte d’Ivoire. - Criterion 25.8 (met): Penalties for default/late production of declarations: XOF 2,000,000 and XOF 500,000 per month delay respectively (LPF, art. 54, para. 3 and 4). - Weighting and conclusion: Major shortcomings—trustees required to keep information without necessarily maintaining/updating it; no requirement to declare trustee status to FIs/DNFBPs; trust service providers subject to AML/CFT Law but not supervised; rating: non-compliant with R.25. ### Regulation and supervision of Financial Institutions (Recommendations 26–27) - Recommendation 26: - Findings: - Criterion 26.1 (partly met): AML/CFT supervisory authorities appointed, but AML/CFT Law supervision limited to preventive measures (Title II) and does not extend to Title I (risk assessment), Title III (appointment of reporting officer, STR obligations, group due diligence), Title IV (TFS freezing) (AML/CFT Law, art. 86, art. 1). However, many supervisory authorities have broader powers under other laws. - Supervisory responsibilities by sector include: - Credit institutions: BC/GSBC and BCEAO (Convention art. 4(d); WAEMU Treaty; Law No. 2019-019). - DFSs: Minister of Finance delegating to BCEAO and BC (Law regulating DFSs, art. 43 and 44). - EMIs: BCEAO, BC/GSBC, MF (Instruction No. 08-05-2015, art. 36). - RCM actors: CREPMF (Instruction No. 59/2019/CREPMF, art. 29). - Insurance: CRCA and National Directorate of Insurance (CIMA Treaty, Insurance Code, Regulation No. 001/CIMA/PCMA/PCE/SG/2021). - FX bureaus: MF/DECFinEX (Order No. 035/MEF/DGTPE DEMO of 9 February 2017, art. 5). - Criterion 26.2 (mostly met): Licensing/registration required across FI categories; detailed licensing authorities and references provided for each category. - Criterion 26.3 (partly met): Supervisory authorities must set criteria for ownership/control but gaps exist in fit-and-proper checks for BOs, thresholds and identification of BOs, and post-licensing verification; fit-and-proper checks often target shareholders with thresholds (5 percent, 10 percent) without identifying BOs. - Criterion 26.4 (mostly met): Supervisory authorities required to ensure group-level measures are applied to foreign branches/subsidiaries to the extent permitted by local laws (AML/CFT Law, art. 86, item 6). Consolidated supervision exists for credit institutions but not consistently applied for RCM or insurance in practice. - Criteria 26.5–26.6 (partly/mostly met): Supervisory frequency/scope supposed to be risk-based for BC/GSBC and CREPMF; in practice, ML/TF risk profiling and risk-based inspection frequency/scope are not fully implemented across FI categories; updates performed annually (BC/GSBC and CREPMF) with semi-annual updates for banks but practical updating limited. - Weighting and conclusion: Moderate shortcomings—inspections’ frequency/scope not consistently risk-based; gaps in fit-and-proper and BO verification. Rating: partially compliant with R.26. - Recommendation 27 (Powers of supervisors): - Findings: - Criterion 27.1 (mostly met): Supervisory authorities’ roles/responsibilities set out in AML/CFT Law (art. 86 and 87) and sectoral laws/instructions; powers to supervise banks, EMIs, DFSs, RCM actors, insurance, FX bureaus described. - Criterion 27.2 (mostly met): Authorities can perform off-site and on-site inspections; some specific limits (types of inspections for DECFinEX unspecified). - Criterion 27.3 (mostly met): Authorities may access information held by FIs and require production of documents (AML/CFT Law, art. 92 and 96 d; Convention art. 25; sectoral laws/instructions). - Criterion 27.4 (partly met): Supervisory authorities have administrative/disciplinary sanction powers for violations of Titles II and III (AML/CFT Law, art. 112) but not Title I (risk assessment). Sectoral instruments provide additional sanctioning powers; limitations exist for DECFinEX and to a lesser extent in EMI and FX bureau sectors. - Sanction examples and ranges: - OHADA fines: XOF 100,000 to 1 million and/or imprisonment 3 months to 3 years (Act No. 2017-727). - CREPMF monetary sanctions: XOF 51,000,000 to 150,000,000 (Decision CM/SJ/001/03/2016). - LPF penalty for failing to maintain BO registers: XOF 5 million. - BCEAO/Instruction-based EMI monetary sanctions up to 25 percent of minimum share capital (Instruction No. 008-05-2015, art. 38–40). - Weighting and conclusion: Moderate shortcomings relating to DECFinEX sanction limitations and sanctioning power limitations in EMI and FX bureau sectors. Rating: partially compliant with R.27. ### Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs (Recommendation 28) - Findings: - Criterion 28.1 (partly met): AML/CFT Law requires registration of DNFBPs (art. 88) but excludes business agents; supervision does not extend to Title I risk assessment; supervisory authorities not designated for many DNFBP categories. - Subcriteria: - 28.1(a) (met): Gambling operation regimes require concession/authorization and conditions (Law No. 2020-480). - 28.1(b) (partly met): Director and hires of gambling establishments require Minister of Interior approval (Decree No. 98-371), but procedures not demonstrated and BOs/operators not covered. - 28.1(c) (not met): Gaming Regulatory Authority’s remit to monitor AML/CFT implementation not clearly evidenced. - Criteria 28.2–28.5: SRBs designated for some professions (lawyers, notaries, chartered accountants, justice commissioners, judicial representatives) but supervisory authorities not designated for dealers in gold/precious metals, real estate, business agents, service providers to companies/trusts, auditors. Sanctioning powers of SRBs not demonstrated; casinos’ AML/CFT monitoring not evidenced. - Weighting and conclusion: Major shortcomings—lack of designated AML/CFT competent authorities/SRBs for key DNFBP categories; gaps in sectoral supervision and preventing criminals from becoming BOs/managers in gambling/real estate sectors. Rating: non-compliant with R.28. ### Financial Intelligence Unit (Recommendation 29) - Findings: - CENTIF (FIU) designated by AML/CFT Law (art. 59) to receive/analyze STRs and disseminate analysis (art. 60, 66, 67). Limitations in STR scope (ML/TF only) cascade through R.29 criteria. - Criterion 29.2: FIU receives STRs and CTRs (CTR threshold XOF 15,000,000). Reporting obligations for certain fund transfers by BCEAO instruction not yet implemented (AML/CFT Law, art. 79, para. 7). - Criterion 29.3: FIU can request information from reporting entities or any person and from foreign FIUs/public authorities (art. 60, para. 1, item 3; art. 67, para. 1). - Criterion 29.4: FIU conducts operational and strategic analysis, but limited by STR scope. - Criterion 29.5: FIU may disseminate analyses to Public Prosecutor, DGD, DGI, treasury, judicial police, specialized intelligence services, and tax administration; dissemination currently made in hard copy by a JPO (not via dedicated secure channels). Limitation on STR scope restricts FIU’s ability to disseminate predicate offense information on demand. - Criterion 29.6: Confidentiality and security measures exist (Code of Conduct/Ethics; FILTRAC database; secure premises, biometric access, CCTV, 24-hour static guard, safes) but FIU lacks written rules on data protection and perusal. - Criterion 29.7: FIU autonomy and resources assured (art. 59, 73); FIU may sign agreements with prior notification to Minister of Finance (art. 78). - Weighting and conclusion: Minor shortcomings—STR scope misalignment with R.20/R.23 impacts FIU effectiveness; dissemination channels not dedicated/secure; no written FIU data protection/perusal rules. Rating: largely compliant with R.29. ### Law enforcement responsibilities and powers (Recommendations 30–31) - Recommendation 30: - Findings: - Criterion 30.1 (met): Public Prosecutor directs judicial police; JPOs tasked with detecting criminal law violations and collecting evidence (CPC arts. 12, 23, 25, 56). Economic and Financial Criminal Hub (PPEF) established January 2020 (Decree No. 2020-124) under Abidjan Public Prosecutor with national jurisdiction for serious/complex economic/financial offenses. Law No. 2022-193 (March 11, 2022) introduced TF as economic/financial offense assigned to PPEF. - Criterion 30.2–30.5 (met): Law enforcement authorized for parallel financial investigations, tracing/seizing proceeds, specialized sections (HABG, DGD etc.) have investigative powers comparable to JPOs where applicable. - Weighting and conclusion: Côte d’Ivoire rated compliant with R.30. - Recommendation 31: - Findings: - Criterion 31.1–31.3 (met): Investigative/prosecutorial powers for ML/TF defined (AML/CFT Law art. 93–95, 108–109; CPC); powers include ordering sharing of records, searches, seizure, undercover/sting, interception, controlled delivery, IT access. - Criterion 31.4 (mostly met): Authorities may request FIU-held information (AML/CFT Law, art. 66, para. 2), but STR scope limitations reduce FIU’s ability to provide predicate offense information on request. - Weighting and conclusion: Minor shortcoming due to STR scope effects. Rating: largely compliant with R.31. ### Cash couriers and cross-border declarations (Recommendation 32) - Findings: - Criterion 32.1 (partly met): Travelers to/from non-WAEMU states must declare cash/BNIs >= XOF 5,000,000 (Instruction No. 008-09-2017). Travelers to/from WAEMU Member States are not required to declare—non-compliant with FATF standards. Export by post/courier subject to DGTCP authorization but not applicable to BCEAO banknotes. - Criterion 32.2 (partly met): Similar deficiencies as 32.1. - Criterion 32.4 (met): Authorities can request origin/use information on false/non-declaration. - Criterion 32.5 (partly met): Sanctions for false declarations exist and cash may be seized in full; limitation: BNIs not covered. - Criterion 32.6 (partly met): DGD must seize non-declared cash and refer to FIU, but obligation does not extend to BNIs—no requirement to inform FIU about non-declared BNIs. - Criterion 32.7 (met): FIU designated to coordinate investigations related to cash/BNI declarations. - Criterion 32.8 (partly met): Cash/BNIs may be seized/withheld up to 72 hours in ML/TF suspicion; powers limited where BNIs or predicate-offs related cases apply. - Criterion 32.9 (partly met): International cooperation mechanisms exist (art. 138–155) but data limitations constrain exchanges. - Criterion 32.10 (met): Declaration information covered by professional secrecy and data protection. - Criterion 32.11 (partly met): Criminal prosecution and confiscation possible for ML/TF-related cash/BNIs, but measures do not apply where cash/BNIs relate only to predicate offenses to ML; cascading deficiencies from R.5 impact this. - Weighting and conclusion: Moderate shortcomings—WAEMU intra-Union declaration gap; courier/freight rules do not cover BCEAO banknotes; BNIs not fully covered by seizure/information obligations. Rating: partially compliant with R.32. ### Statistics, guidance, feedback, and sanctions (Recommendations 33–35) - Recommendation 33 (Statistics): - Findings: - Criterion 33.1 (partly met): Order No. 125 (May 9, 2018) addresses national statistics service jurisdiction. Authorities provided various AML/CFT figures (STRs, ML investigations, asset seizures, ML/TF convictions, MLAs issued/received) but data not organized to evaluate efficiency/effectiveness. National AML/CFT/CPF statistics service, once operational, should address gaps. - Weighting and conclusion: Moderate shortcomings due to incomplete/coherent data for assessing AML/CFT effectiveness. Rating: partially compliant with R.33. - Recommendation 34 (Guidance and Feedback): - Findings: - Criterion 34.1 (partly met): AML/CFT Law requires supervisory authorities to issue instructions/guidelines (art. 86, para. 2). FIU must provide feedback on STRs it disseminates to Public Prosecutor (art. 71) and share ML/TF information with FIs/DNFBPs and supervisors (art. 92). CREPMF, CIMA, and DECFinEX have issued some guidance; BCEAO and BC have not. FIU has not developed guidance to strengthen STR implementation; typologies/red flags limited in number and scope. FIU does not provide systematic feedback to reporting entities on quantity/completeness/usefulness of STRs. DNFBP guidance/ manuals not issued at time of on-site visit. - Weighting and conclusion: Moderate shortcomings—BCEAO/BC and FIU have not issued guidance or systematic feedback. Rating: partially compliant with R.34. - Recommendation 35 (Sanctions): - Findings: - Criterion 35.1 (partly met): - Criminal sanctions for non-compliance differ by ML/TF contexts: - Freezing measures non-compliance: imprisonment 1 to 2 months and/or fine XOF 360,000 (Decree No. 2018-439, art. 16). - Unintentional ML-related non-compliance by natural persons: fine XOF 50,000 to 750,000 (AML/CFT Law, art. 116, para. 2) — does not cover several obligations (R.12, 13, 17 and some R.19 obligations). - Unintentional TF-related non-compliance: fine XOF 100,000 to 1.5 million (AML/CFT Law, art. 121, para. 2). - Intentional non-compliance with R.20 and R.21: imprisonment 6 months to 2 years and/or fine XOF 100,000 to 1.5 million (AML/CFT Law, art. 116, para. 1); doubled in event of TF. - Legal persons fined at rate equal to five times fine for natural persons (art. 124, 125). - Administrative/disciplinary sanctions vary by sector and may include warnings, suspension, prohibition, revocation of license, and monetary sanctions up to XOF 150,000,000 for central market structures. AML/CFT Law permits supervisory sanctions for severe due diligence/internal control failures (art. 112). Insurance Code lacks parallel provision. - Weighting and conclusion: Partial compliance with R.35 due to varying coverage, omitted obligations, and limited evidence of enforcement/proportionality historically. *Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2023/english/1civea2023002.pdf* ### Conclusion on the proportionate and dissuasive nature of applicable sanctions ### Conclusion on the proportionate and dissuasive nature of applicable sanctions ### Overall finding - For certain violations, the range of available sanctions includes criminal sanctions (both for natural and legal persons) as well as several types of administrative sanctions such as warnings, monetary sanctions, or a revoking of the license. This range allows for the implementation of proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. - Other violations are punishable by a reduced range of sanctions, which limits the possibility to impose proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. - Criminal sanctions do not apply to violations of the obligations issued under Recommendations 12, 13, 17, and 19. - Applicable criminal sanctions in the event of non-compliance with freezing obligations are not greatly dissuasive. - Non-compliance with obligations set forth by R.8 is only criminally punishable if unintentional, and cannot be sanctioned administratively. - No administrative sanctions are available in the event of non-compliance with freezing obligations in the insurance sector. - Criterion 35.2 – (partly met) ### Criminal sanctions - R. 6 - No criminal sanctions are applicable to managers in the event of non-compliance with imposed obligations in accordance with R.6. - R. 9-23 - FI and DNFBP executives are only criminally liable when they personally commit one of the offenses listed above (c.35.1). ### Administrative and disciplinary sanctions - R. 6 - In the event of non-compliance with freezing obligations, the only sanctions applicable to executives are those covered, where appropriate, by sectoral legal texts. - These sanctions may include suspension or prohibition from running, directing, or managing a reporting entity in the case of sectors under the purview of the BC (Annex to the Convention governing the WAEMU Banking Commission, art. 31), the insurance (Insurance Code, art. 312) or the DNFBP sectors (Ordinance No. 2022-237 of 30 March 2022 on the applicable AML/CFT administrative sanctions regime, art. 4). - The legal texts governing capital markets do not provide for sanctions applicable to officials. - The Insurance Code does not cover violations of freezing obligations. Therefore, for these two sectors, no sanctions are applicable to officials. - R. 9-23 - In the absence of direct involvement in the offense, disciplinary sanctions listed in the previous paragraph may apply to executives/officials based on either the AML/CFT Law (if the violation is the result of severely lacking due diligence or a deficient structure of internal control procedures within a reporting entity), or sectoral legal texts (except in the case of capital markets). *Source: Conclusion on the proportionate and dissuasive nature of applicable sanctions* ### Conclusion on the proportionate and dissuasive nature of applicable sanctions ### Conclusion on the proportionate and dissuasive nature of applicable sanctions ### Proportionate and dissuasive nature of sanctions — general finding - Depending on the level of their involvement in a violation, officials may be subject to a range of criminal or administrative sanctions, allowing for the application of proportionate and dissuasive sanctions. - This conclusion does not apply to all sectors nor to all violations; there are violations for which no sanction is applicable to officials. - Violations of freezing obligations in the insurance and capital market sectors are examples where sanctions may not apply. - Criminal sanctions do not cover non-compliance with all obligations provided by Recommendations 6 and 9 to 23, some of which are not fully implemented. - Obligations under R.8 are criminally punishable only if unintentional and cannot be sanctioned administratively. - The range of sanctions applicable to executives does not include all sectors and types of violations. - These factors constitute moderate shortcomings in the implementation of preventive measures in Côte d’Ivoire. - Overall rating: Côte d’Ivoire has been rated partially compliant with Recommendation 35. ### Recommendation 36 — International Instruments - Historical context: 2012 assessment rated Côte d’Ivoire partially compliant; deficiencies included incomplete accession to the Palermo Convention and incomplete application of the Vienna and Palermo Conventions. - Progress: legal framework strengthened since 2012 to address some shortcomings. Criterion 36.1 – (met) - Côte d’Ivoire is a party to: - The Vienna Convention signed on the 20th of December 1988 and ratified on the 25th of November 1991; - The Palermo Convention signed on the 15th of December 2000 and ratified on the 25th of October 2012; - The Merida Convention signed on the 10th of December 2003 and ratified on the 25th of October 2012; - The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism to which Côte d’Ivoire adhered on the 13th of March 2002. Criterion 36.2 – (partly met) - For the Vienna Convention: Law No. 88-686 on narcotics exists, but gaps remain in: - Definition of offenses, - Penalties and confiscations, - International cooperation procedures on drug trafficking matters. - Law No. 88-686 does not: - Take into account all offenses covered by the Vienna Convention, - Define covered offenses in accordance with Article 3 of the Convention, - Explicitly stipulate confiscation of drugs subject to trafficking as required by Article 5(1)(b). - For Palermo and Merida Conventions: enacted laws include the Criminal Code, the AML/CFT Law, Law No. 98-749 concerning arms, Law No. 2016-1111 on human trafficking, Law No. 2018-571 on countering migrant smuggling, Ordinance No. 2013-660, Law No. 2013-875, and Ordinance No. 2013-661, but shortcomings persist (noted under R.3, 4, 12, 20, 24 to 32, and 37 to 40). - For TF Convention: AML/CFT Law and Law No. 2018-864 enacted, but deficiencies remain (noted under R.5). Weighting and Conclusion - Moderate shortcomings: deficiencies in definition of offenses, penalties and confiscations, international cooperation in relation to drug trafficking and terrorist financing; gaps on PEP status and transparency of legal persons affecting fight against corruption and ML. - Overall rating: Côte d’Ivoire has been rated partially compliant on Recommendation 36. ### Recommendation 37 — Mutual Legal Assistance - 2012 rating: partially compliant due to CPC principle of dual criminality and absent penalization of certain predicate offenses; those offenses are now criminalized and CPC adopted in 2018 no longer contains dual criminality. Criterion 37.1 – (mostly met) - AML/CFT Law (art. 138 to 155) constitutes legal basis for MLA in relation to ML and TF. - MLA for predicate offenses is not explicitly provided by law; in practice MLA is possible within ML or TF investigations because the predicate offense is inseparable from ML. - Insider trading and market manipulation are not criminalized and thus cannot be the subject of MLA requests by Ivorian authorities. Criterion 37.2 – (partly met) - Competent authority: Civil and Criminal Affairs Department of the Ministry of Justice receives MLA requests (AML/CFT Law, art. 139). - Requests for transfer of proceedings are sent through diplomatic channels. - No procedure or case management system to prioritize and ensure effective execution of requests. Criterion 37.3 – (met) - Possibilities for refusing MLA restrictively set out by Article 140 of the AML/CFT Law; four cases align with Palermo Convention; Public Prosecutor may appeal refusal; requesting State informed without delay. Criterion 37.4 – (met) - Refusal for tax offenses is not included among limited refusal cases (AML/CFT Law, art. 140); tax offenses are included in predicate offenses list. - Professional secrecy cannot be invoked to refuse assistance (AML/CFT Law, art. 140, para. 2). Criterion 37.5 – (met) - Confidentiality of requests and produced documents ensured (AML/CFT Law, art. 141); confidentiality of investigations enshrined in Article 22 of the CPC. Criterion 37.6 – (mostly met) - Dual criminality requirement does not constitute a case of refusal under AML/CFT Law (art. 140), and no CPC provision imposes it; however absence of explicit exclusion leaves room for jurisdictions to apply dual criminality as a fundamental principle and refuse MLA. Criterion 37.7 – (mostly met) - Dual criminality is not required for accepting an MLA request in law; risk remains that courts and tribunals could establish it via jurisprudence. Criterion 37.8 – (partly met) - Investigative actions in c.31.1 are included in MLA measures (AML/CFT Law, art. 138, para. 3); list is not restrictive, but other powers required by R.31 (c.31.2 and c.31.3) are not specifically provided for; deficiencies in c.31.2 and c.31.3 cascade to c.37.8. Weighting and Conclusion - Minor shortcomings: absence of procedure/case management system for effective execution of requests; lack of explicit provision excluding dual criminality allows divergent interpretations. - Overall rating: Côte d’Ivoire has been rated largely compliant with Recommendation 37. ### Recommendation 38 — Mutual Legal Assistance: Freezing and Confiscation - 2012 rating: partially compliant due to lack of coordination mechanisms, inadequate provisions on equivalent value confiscation, absence of confiscated assets fund, and non-criminalization impacts. Criterion 38.1 – (partly met) - AML/CFT Law allows MLA in freezing, seizure, and confiscation (art. 148-151). - MLA for predicate offenses possible only in ML investigation context, except for corruption offenses (Ordinance No. 2013-660, art. 90) or offenses under the 1992 ECOWAS Convention among signatory States; reciprocity may allow other cases. - MLA applies to: - Laundered assets; - Proceeds of the offenses (art. 148 and 149); - Instrumentalities; - Instrumentalities intended to be used. - AML/CFT Law does not explicitly allow seizure requests targeting assets of equivalent value, though confiscation requests can include “the obligation to pay a sum of money of corresponding value to this asset” (art. 148, para. 2). - No provision for urgent execution of requests; provisional measures (art. 149) are the only “expedited action.” Criterion 38.2 – (mostly met) - AML/CFT Law (art. 150) gives effect to foreign final court decisions of seizure/confiscation “to the extent compatible with the legislation in force,” implying possible execution of non-conviction-based confiscation decisions if compatible; confiscation decisions by non-judicial authorities may not be subject to MLA. - Wording “compatible with the legislation in force” could limit execution, though courts/tribunals have not ruled restrictively to date. Criterion 38.3 – (Mostly met) - Côte d’Ivoire is party to UN Conventions against transnational organized crime (2002) and against corruption (2003), and the regional Convention on mutual legal assistance (Dakar, 1992). - No signed agreements with neighboring or other countries to coordinate seizure and confiscation. Criterion 38.4 – (met) - Côte d’Ivoire can enter into agreements to waive the rule on confiscated property devolving to the State and can share confiscated property with requesting State (AML/CFT Law, art. 151). Weighting and Conclusion - Moderate shortcomings: MLA for predicate offenses limited to ML investigation context (with noted exceptions); confiscation decisions by non-judicial authorities not eligible for MLA; lack of bilateral agreements to coordinate seizure/confiscation. - Overall rating: Côte d’Ivoire has been rated partially compliant with Recommendation 38. ### Recommendation 39 — Extradition - 2012 rating: partially compliant due to non-criminalization of terrorism, TF, migrant trafficking, and lack of statistics. Criterion 39.1 – (mostly met) - (a) Extradition of individuals prosecuted or convicted of ML or TF is possible regardless of the sentence (AML/CFT Law, art. 156). Extradition process governed by French extradition Law of 1927. - (b) No management system for extradition requests to allow prioritization and follow-up. - (c) No specific condition unduly restricts extradition; in case of refusal, case referred to national courts for trial (AML/CFT Law, art. 161). Criterion 39.2 – (met) - AML/CFT Law does not prohibit extradition of nationals; Article 161 provides for prosecution in national courts if extradition request rejected on such grounds. Criterion 39.3 – (met) - Extradition of persons prosecuted or convicted “for the offenses provided for in the present law” is possible (AML/CFT Law, art. 156); matching terminology or offense category is not required. Criterion 39.4 – (partly met) - A simplified extradition process for ML and TF is provided (AML/CFT Law, art. 157) in that requests are addressed directly to the competent public prosecutor and required documents are specified, but it does not specify which authority makes the decision nor the procedures; absent specific provisions, 1927 French Law terms apply and do not provide simplified measures such as consent to extradition. Weighting and Conclusion - Minor shortcomings: absence of a management system for extradition requests; shortcomings in simplified extradition procedures. - Overall rating: Côte d’Ivoire has been rated largely compliant with Recommendation 39. ### Recommendation 40 — Other Forms of International Cooperation - 2012 rating: partially compliant due to lacking utilization of AML/CFT cooperation framework by supervisory authorities and FIU restrictions on signing cooperation agreements without ministerial authorization. General context - Côte d’Ivoire has not yet designated competent authorities responsible for AML/CFT supervision and monitoring of DNFBPs; analysis excludes those authorities. Criterion 40.1 – (mostly met) - Competent authorities can grant widest possible international cooperation spontaneously and upon request in AML/CFT context and, in some cases, predicate offenses. - Certain DGI bilateral conventions limit exchange to convention implementation and do not extend to all relevant information or all persons. - Not demonstrated that all competent authorities can provide assistance in an expeditious manner. Criterion 40.2 – (partly met) - Legal basis for international cooperation exists. - No obstacles to using efficient means to cooperate. - FIU and INTERPOL NCB use clear and secure channels; not demonstrated that other competent authorities use secure channels. - Competent authorities lack clear procedures for prioritization and timely transmission/execution of requests. - AML/CFT Law contains provisions for FIU transmission to foreign FIUs (art. 78) but no defined procedures for protection of information received from foreign counterparts. - Authorities claimed data protection procedures exist for law enforcement and HABG exchanges but could not provide supporting examples. Criterion 40.3 – (mostly met) - FIU and tax administration have respectively signed 18 and 12 bilateral agreements/protocols; DGD has one multilateral and three bilateral agreements. - Number of agreements is limited; DGI requires agreements to exchange information; HABG started WAEMU negotiations and signed first agreement in October 2021. Criterion 40.4 – (partly met) - FIU provides timely feedback to foreign FIUs per Egmont Group Charter item 3; no information that other competent authorities provide similar feedback. Criterion 40.5 – (partly met) - No evidence of refusals or unreasonable exchange conditions by FIU and law enforcement for items (a), (b), and (d). - FIU indicated it could not provide assistance while criminal proceedings are underway, which is not in accordance with R.40 (assistance may be refused only when likely to obstruct ongoing investigation or proceedings). - No information provided about supervisory authorities’ practices. Criterion 40.6 – (partly met) - Except for law enforcement authorities, competent authorities did not demonstrate controls/protective measures to ensure exchanged information is used only for intended purposes or by authorized authorities. Criterion 40.7 – (met) - Competent authorities required to ensure appropriate confidentiality, complying with privacy and data protection obligations; information from foreign authorities is protected equally to national sources. Criterion 40.8 – (not met) - FIU may communicate, upon duly justified request of a WAEMU FIU, all information obtained following an STR at national level (AML/CFT Law, art. 76). - For an FIU outside WAEMU, FIU is authorized only to communicate information regarding sums or transactions likely related to laundering proceeds of criminal activity or TF. - FIU cannot obtain on behalf of a counterpart outside WAEMU information that would be obtainable domestically; other competent authorities’ powers not demonstrated. Exchange of Information between FIUs - Criterion 40.9 – (met): legal basis for cooperating with WAEMU FIUs (art. 76) and FIUs outside WAEMU (art. 78). - Criterion 40.10 – (met): FIU completes and returns the “feedback sheet” and informs sending FIU when disseminating information to Ivorian judicial authorities; relies on Egmont Group guidance. - Criterion 40.11 – (not met): See analysis of c.40.8. Exchange of Information between Financial Sector Supervisory Authorities - Criterion 40.12 – (met): AML/CFT Law requires supervisory authorities to cooperate and exchange information (art. 86); specific regulations (annex to Banking Commission Convention, Instruction No. 59/2019/CREPMF, Insurance Code art. 310-6) provide legal basis. - Criterion 40.13 – (partly met): Law does not specify that supervisory authorities may exchange all information they have at national level including FI-held information; CIMA, BC, and CREPMF have certain authorities to exchange information subject to reciprocity/confidentiality but content/practice of agreements not detailed. - Criterion 40.14 – (partly met): Insurance Code allows CIMA to exchange required information with third-country counterparts provided a cooperation agreement exists (art. 813); BC can form or participate in colleges of supervisors and exchange certain information subject to reciprocity/confidentiality, but details on item (c) information exchange unclear. - Criterion 40.15 – (partly met): CREPMF may conduct investigations on behalf of foreign counterparts (art. 28 and 29 annex); BC may participate in supervisor colleges; authorities have not shown CIMA or BC are authorized or practice conducting investigations on behalf of counterparts. - Criterion 40.16 – (not met): No information provided on how supervisory authorities can disseminate or use information obtained from foreign counterparts. Exchange of Information between Law Enforcement Authorities - Criterion 40.17 – (mostly met): Internal conventions and regional agreements permit international cooperation for intelligence, investigation, and prosecution; limitations in R.4 cascade. - Criterion 40.18 – (not met): Authorities claim law enforcement can obtain and share all information including special investigative techniques on behalf of foreign counterparts, but provided no documents or practical cases to confirm. - Criterion 40.19 – (partly met): JITs are provided for (AML/CFT Law, art. 142, para. 3); authorities indicated agreements within WAEMU, ECOWAS, and INTERPOL may lead to JIT establishment, but no confirming documents provided. Exchange of Information among Non-Counterparts - Criterion 40.20 – (mostly met): No legal obstacles prevent FIU, law enforcement, and DGI from exchanging information indirectly; HABG can enter diagonal cooperation with WAEMU FIUs and police via INTERPOL (Ordinance No. 2013-660, art. 91 and 92). - AML/CFT Law, Insurance Code, annexes authorize supervisory authorities to exchange certain information but not necessarily with non-counterparts. Weighting and Conclusion - Moderate shortcomings: FIU indicated inability to assist counterparts while criminal proceedings are underway; FIU not authorized to exchange with counterparts outside WAEMU all information obtainable domestically. - Some DGI bilateral conventions limit scope of exchanged information and persons; number of agreements is limited. - Supervisory authorities have not demonstrated they exchange all information covered under R.40 and are not empowered to exchange with non-counterparts. - Overall rating: Côte d’Ivoire has been rated partially compliant with Recommendation 40. *Source: 1civea2023002 - Conclusion on the proportionate and dissuasive nature of applicable sanctions* ### Annex II. Compliance with FATF Recommendations ### Annex II. Compliance with FATF Recommendations ### Recommendation-by-Recommendation Findings - 1. Assessing risks & applying a risk-based approach — PC - Deficiencies in the NRA which does not examine in detail financial flows linked to corruption, considered as one of the biggest ML threats, nor cross-border flows - The AML/CFT Law provides for exemptions which are not based on a risk assessment, and the scope of which is too broad - 2. National cooperation and coordination — PC - The existence of operational cooperation or coordination mechanisms for AML/CFT/CPF or even personal data protection, is not established - 3. Money laundering offense — LC - Neither insider trading nor market manipulation are criminalized by Ivorian law, and therefore cannot be considered as predicate offenses to ML - 4. Confiscation and provisional measures — PC - Moderate shortcomings related to bona fide third parties, the confiscation of assets resulting from predicate offenses to ML, and confiscation of corresponding value, which weaken the scope of provisions related to confiscation - Provisions on the possibility to rely on bona fide third parties do not apply to assets confiscated as part of ML or predicate offense proceedings - 5. Terrorist financing offense — PC - Moderate shortcomings related to the partial criminalization of acts cited in the conventions which constitute the annexes to the TF Convention - The financing of a terrorist organization for any purpose whatsoever is not criminalized - 6. Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing — NC - Sanctions emanating from UNSCR 1267 provisions are not implemented, or not implemented without delay, and the obligation to freeze the funds of persons and entities designated on the 1267 List does not apply to all natural and legal persons in Côte d’Ivoire - Neither freezing measures nor “ongoing prohibition” extend to (funds or other assets belonging to) persons and entities acting on behalf of or upon the instruction of designated persons and entities, and designation criteria are unduly limited - 7. Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation — NC - TFS are not implemented/implemented without delay, and freezing measures do not extend to the funds or other assets of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or upon instruction by, designated persons or entities - No supervisory authority or self-regulating body regulates and/or monitors compliance by FIs, VASPs, and DNFBPs, with their obligations (or even obligations they might have in the future) in relation to the implementation of TFS linked to the countering PF - 8. Non-profit organizations — NC - No identification of the totality of NPOs in Côte d’Ivoire, and no in-depth analysis of the risks of exploiting NPOs for TF purposes, or ongoing awareness-raising activities in TF matters - No targeted risk-based supervision or monitoring of NPOs, and no effective and dissuasive sanctions against the large number of NPOs which are unaware of their AML/CFT obligations - Lacking investigative powers in relation to NPOs suspected of exploitation for TF purposes - 9. Financial institution secrecy laws — LC - It could not be determined whether a wide range of mechanisms exists for the sharing of operational information among competent authorities - Limitations in relation to the sharing of information among competent authorities at the international level - 10. Customer due diligence — PC - Exemptions to the requirement to determine and verify the identity of permanent clients, for online payments - FIs are not required to understand the intended purpose and nature of the business relationship - Shortage of due diligence measures required for legal persons: limited identification requirements for corporate associates and executives, which do not extend to all relevant persons holding management positions in the legal person; unsatisfactory provisions for BO identification, in cases of doubt or absence of identification - There is no due diligence requirement for customers which are legal arrangements - Measures related to due diligence for the beneficiaries of life insurance contracts are not compliant, and the same goes for measures applicable at the time of verification - Incomplete risk-based approach and enhanced or simplified due diligence obligations - 11. Record-keeping — PC - Record-keeping obligations are limited to customer identity, and do not extend to all information obtained as part of the due diligence process, nor do they extend to BOs and representatives designated by the customer - Severely restricted nature of information that can be made available to competent authorities - 12. Politically exposed persons — PC - The law only requires authorization by “an adequate level of the hierarchy before entering into a business relationship with such customers” and not that of senior management - The definitions of national PEPs and PEPs from international organizations do not cover family members nor persons known to be closely associated with them - Persons having not held prominent public functions for a period of at least one year are not considered as PEPs (except in the insurance sector) - 13. Correspondent banking — LC - Lack of assessment of the AML/CFT system established by the institution - The decision to enter into a business relationship is not made by a member of the executive body - No requirement to understand the AML/CFT responsibilities of each institution - 14. Money or value transfer services — PC - Lack of measures aimed at identifying natural or legal persons providing money or value transfer services without a license - Measures requiring banks and DFSs to submit a list of their (sub)agents once per year only partially meet the requirements of this Recommendation - No requirement for banks and DFSs offering fast money transfer services and relying on (sub)agents to ensure compliance by such agents with AML/CFT programs - 15. New technologies — PC - No specific assessment of ML/TF risks linked to new technologies and resulting from virtual asset services or VASP transactions - No provisions have been issued for virtual assets and VASPs - 16. Wire transfers — PC - There is no provision indicating that ordering FIs must be authorized to execute wire transfers if they are non-compliant - The AML/CFT Law does not require FIs to have risk-based policies and procedures in place for the fulfillment of these obligations - There is no explicit requirement for beneficiary FIs to take reasonable measures with the aim of identifying cross-border wire transfers lacking the required information on the ordering or beneficiary FI - There is no provision requiring beneficiary FIs to verify, in the case of cross-border transfers of an amount equal to or greater than USD/EUR 1,000, the identity of the beneficiary which had not been previously identified - 17. Reliance on third parties — NC - For FIs relying on third parties, there is no legal text requiring them to take measures to ensure that the third party is able to provide, upon request and without delay, a copy of identification information and other relevant documents in relation to customer due diligence - The law permits FIs to rely on third parties which are DNFBPs, which is not in accordance with Recommendation 17 - 18. Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries — PC - FIs are not required to implement selection procedures which ensure the recruitment of staff according to strict criteria - It is not specified that policies and procedures FIs should implement at their branches and subsidiaries, must be adapted to these branches and subsidiaries - Branches and subsidiaries that are part of a group are not required to provide information on customers, accounts, and transactions, when needed for AML/CFT purposes, to the compliance, audit, and/or AML/CFT functions at the group level - 19. Higher-risk countries — PC - There is no provision requiring FIs to apply enhanced due diligence measures to natural and legal persons from countries for which the FATF calls to do so - There is no provision requiring FIs to apply countermeasures proportionate to risk when the FATF calls to do so - 20. Reporting of suspicious transactions — PC - The obligation to report suspicious transactions is limited to ML and TF violations, and makes no reference to the proceeds of criminal activities which constitute predicate offenses to ML, with the exception of tax fraud - There is no requirement to report suspicious activity immediately - 21. Tipping-off and confidentiality — LC - The wording of the provision related to tipping-off does not specify that this prohibition is not aimed at preventing the sharing of information under R.18 - 22. DNFBPs: Customer due diligence — PC - Deficiencies identified in relation to criteria 10.2, 10.3, 10.5, 10.7, and 10.16 to 10.18, also apply to criterion 22.1(a) - There is no provision which imposes the requirements of criteria 10.19 and 10.20 upon DNFBPs - There is no requirement for DNFBPs to maintain documents obtained in the framework of customer due diligence measures - There is no requirement for DNFBPs to comply with obligations under R.15 and R.17 - Business agents are not subject to due diligence obligations - 23. DNFBPs: Other measures — PC - Deficiencies identified in the analysis of R.20 and R.21 also apply to DNFBPs - There is no requirement for DNFBPs to adopt measures in relation to higher-risk countries established under R.19 - Business agents are not subject to the AML/CFT Law, and the measures in place do not apply to this profession - 24. Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons — PC - Côte d’Ivoire has not assessed ML/TF risks associated with the various categories of legal persons - Basic information recorded in certain files is not made available to the public - There is no requirement to inform the RCCM in the event of changes in associates or shareholders, and no mechanism to ensure that basic information is accurate and up to date - No mechanism which allow for ensuring that BO information held by legal persons or the tax administration, is accurate and up to date - No mechanism aimed at preventing the misuse of legal persons which can have managers acting on behalf of another person - 25. Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal arrangements — NC - No requirement for the trustees of a trust governed by Ivorian law to update and keep information on the identity of the settlor, trustee(s), protector, beneficiaries or the category of beneficiaries, and any other natural persons exercising final effective control over the trust - Trustees are not specifically required to declare their status to FIs and DNFBPs when entering to a business relationship or executing occasional transactions - Lawyers, notaries, and other trust service providers are subject to the AML/CFT Law, but are not subject to AML/CFT supervision - 26. Regulation and supervision of FIs — PC - The frequency of AML/CFT inspections is not determined based on risk for several FI categories - No supervisory authority for FX bureaus - Deficiencies in the inspections of changes in shareholders or management for several FI categories - 27. Powers of supervisors — PC - Limitations in relation to the DecFinEX’s supervisory and sanctioning powers with regard to FX bureaus - Shortcomings in relation to the sanctioning powers of competent authorities, particularly with regard to EMI managers and regional financial market actors - 28. Regulation and supervision of DNFBPs — NC - Lack of AML/CFT competent authorities or SRBs for certain DNFBP categories (dealers in precious metals and stones, real estate agents and developers, business agents) - The powers of the Gaming Regulation Authority do not extend to the AML/CFT supervision of casinos - Shortcomings in relation to the measures aimed at preventing criminals or their accomplices from holding or becoming the BOs of significant or controlling interest, or holding or becoming the BOs of managerial positions, particularly in the gambling and real estate agents and developers sectors - 29. Financial intelligence units (FIUs) — LC - The requirement for FIs and DNFBPs to report suspicious transactions is not in accordance with the requirements of R.20 and R.23, which has a cascading effect on several criteria within R.29 - The dissemination of information to the Public Prosecutor and other competent authorities is not ensured through dedicated, secure, and protected channels - The FIU has no written rules in relation to data protection and perusal - 30. Responsibilities of law enforcement and investigative authorities — C - All criteria are met - 31. Powers of law enforcement and investigative authorities — LC - The deficiency relating to the scope of STRs, as identified under c.20.1, c.23.1, and c.29.1, technically limits the FIU’s power to disseminate, upon request, predicate offense information to law enforcement and investigative authorities - 32. Cash couriers — PC - Travelers coming from or going to a WAEMU Member State are not required to make a declaration - The only rules applicable to transport by courier and freight do not cover imports or bank notes issued by the BCEAO - Competent authorities may seize the amount of non-declared cash in full, but not that of BNIs - 33. Statistics — PC - Lack of complete and coherent data which allows for assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of AML/CFT efforts - 34. Guidance and feedback — PC - Neither the BCEAO and BC nothe FIU have issued guidance or provided feedback - 35. Sanctions — PC - Criminal sanctions do not cover non-compliance with all obligations provided for by R.6 and R.9 to R.23, some of which have not been fully implemented. - Violations of the obligations imposed by R.8 are only criminally punishable provided they are unintentional, and cannot be sanctioned administratively. - The range of sanctions applicable to executive does not include all sectors and types of violations - 36. International instruments — PC - Deficiencies remain in relation to the definition of offenses, penalties, and confiscations, as well as international cooperation procedures with regard to drug trafficking and terrorist financing - Deficiencies in relation to the status of PEPs and the transparency of legal persons in the countering corruption and money laundering, also impact compliance with this Recommendation - 37. Mutual legal assistance — LC - There are no procedures or file management systems ensuring the effective execution of requests - No explicit provision which excludes the principle of dual criminality, which increases the risk of differing interpretation by courts and tribunals - 38. Mutual legal assistance: freezing and confiscation — PC - Mutual legal assistance for predicate offenses is only possible in the context of an ML investigation, except with regard to corruption offenses or all offenses covered by the 1992 ECOWAS Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance, but only in signatory States. - Confiscation decisions made by an authority other than the judicial authority cannot therefore be subject to MLA measures. - Côte d’Ivoire has not signed agreements with neighboring or other countries in order to coordinate seizure and confiscation - 39. Extradition — LC - Minor shortcomings, notably in relation to the absence of a management system for extradition requests which ensures follow-up and simplified extradition procedures - 40. Other forms of international cooperation — PC - The FIU may not provide assistance to counterparts while criminal proceedings are underway, and is not empowered to exchange with counterparts outside the WAEMU zone, information that it may exchange with counterparts within the WAEMU zone. - FI supervisory authorities have not demonstrated that they exchange all information covered by R.40, and are not authorized to exchange information with non-counterparts. *Annex II. Compliance with FATF Recommendations.* --- _Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2023/english/1civea2023002.pdf_