## 1. A Global Severe Downside Scenario: Implications for the UK Economy

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### Context and recent policy actions
- Government priorities since October 2022: tackle high inflation, high public debt, low economic growth, and long NHS waiting lists; Chancellor announced “4Es” economic strategy (Enterprise, Education, Employment, and Everywhere).
- Autumn 2022 budget (with full OBR input) aligned fiscal with monetary policy; BoE financial stability interventions followed the September 2022 ‘mini-budget’.
- Windsor Framework adopted in March 2023; draft MoU on regulatory cooperation in financial services published in May 2023; long-term decisions on equivalence and recognition for UK CCPs in the EU remain pending beyond mid-2025.
- Real wages and real household disposable incomes in 2022 declined respectively by 1.7 and 0.2 percent.

### Recent developments — real sector, prices, labor, and financial conditions
- Growth and shocks:
  - Post-pandemic recovery disrupted by an energy price shock linked to Russia’s war in Ukraine; economy contracted in 2022Q3 and resumed subdued growth in 2022Q4 and 2023Q1.
  - High frequency indicators point to further resilience in demand in 2023Q2.
- Inflation:
  - Headline and core inflation averaged 9.1 and 5.9 percent y/y, respectively, in 2022.
  - Headline inflation peaked at 11.1 percent y/y in October 2022.
  - Core inflation rose to 6.8 percent y/y in April 2023.
  - April 2022 energy price increases shifted into the base in 2023Q2; food price inflation remained higher.
- Labor market and wages:
  - Exceptionally tight labor markets with historically high vacancy-to-unemployment ratio; tightness has started to unwind with a recent influx of (non-EU) foreign workers.
  - Drivers of inactivity include increased long-term sickness post-pandemic.
- Financial conditions and housing:
  - Lending rates rose to more than double their end-2021 level by early 2023.
  - Mortgage arrears remain low; house prices have fallen since their all-time peak in 2022Q3.
  - Market specialists’ median expectation in May was for a fall by 3 percent in 2023 and a rise by 1 percent in 2024.
  - Gilt market liquidity remains a concern.
- External sector:
  - Current account deficit widened to 3.8 percent of GDP in 2022.
  - The CA gap worsened from 0 in 2021 to -0.8 percent of GDP in 2022, implying an external position broadly in line with fundamentals.
  - Goods trade with the EU in 2023Q1 still about 7 percent lower than 2019 averages.
  - UK completed negotiations to join the CPTPP in March 2023.

### Outlook — forecasts and medium-term path (selected projections)
- Near-term growth and labor:
  - Growth forecast to slow to 0.4 percent in 2023 from 4.1 percent in 2022.
  - Negative output gap of 1 percent by end-2023.
  - Mild increase in unemployment expected as labor market tightness unwinds.
  - Growth projected to pick up to 1 percent in 2024.
- Medium-term growth and scarring:
  - Growth would average 2.1 percent during 2025–26 as monetary stance and financial conditions ease.
  - Real GDP would gradually converge to pre-pandemic potential growth of about 1½ percent thereafter.
  - Output in 2028 projected to be about 5 percent below its pre-pandemic trajectory due to scarring from higher inactivity rates; weak investment growth since 2016; and TFP scarring.
- Inflation path:
  - Headline and core inflation expected to decline to 5.2 and 5.8 percent y/y by end-2023.
  - Headline inflation forecast to return to the 2 percent target by mid-2025.
  - Core inflation expected to remain above target until end-2025.
- Fiscal stance and assumptions:
  - Fiscal impulse assumed neutral in 2023 and negative thereafter.
  - Annual current expenditures assumed about 0.8 percent of GDP higher to account for public pay and service delivery pressures.
  - Public investment falls more slowly after 2025, assumed 0.7 ppts. of GDP higher than in the Spring budget by the end of the forecast period.

### Key numerical projections (selected entries from staff tables)
- Real GDP (percent change): 2022 4.1; 2023 0.4; 2024 1.0; 2025 2.2; 2026 2.0; 2028 1.5
- CPI, period average (percent): 2022 9.1; 2023 7.9; 2024 3.7; 2025 2.1
- CPI, end-period (percent): 2022 10.5; 2023 5.2; 2024 2.6; 2025 2.0
- Unemployment rate (percent): 2022 3.7; 2023 3.9; 2024 4.2; 2028 4.2
- Public sector net debt (percent of GDP): 2022 86.6; 2023 89.9; 2024 92.5; 2025 96.0; 2028 97.2
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2022 -3.8; 2023 -3.8; 2024 -3.7; 2028 -3.5
- Nominal GDP (billions GBP): 2023 2,635; 2024 2,765; 2028 3,222
- Bilateral rate (Apr 25, 2023): US$1 = £ 0.81

### Conditioning assumptions underlying staff’s baseline forecasts
- Energy prices: futures-implied paths indicating declining natural gas and electricity prices through 2023; retail energy prices projected to decline below the cap implied by the Energy Price Guarantee (EPG) in July 2023 and remain so until the EPG’s expiration at end-March 2024.
- Monetary policy: Bank Rate to increase by another 50–100 bps (in line with market expectations), followed by a sustained tight monetary stance through end-2024 and gradual loosening thereafter.
- Financial conditions: projected to evolve in line with the Bank Rate.
- Macroprudential policy: CCyB rate will increase to 2 percent in July 2023 and stay at that level throughout the forecast period.
- Fiscal policy: OBR’s fiscal projections accompanying the Spring 2023 budget, adjusted for staff’s macroeconomic forecast and excluding fuel duty uprate and expiration of capital investment allowance; annual current expenditures about 0.8 percent of GDP higher; public investment 0.7 ppts. of GDP higher by the end of the forecast period.

### Risks, downside scenarios, and staff-risk posture
- Overall uncertainty is high; risks are tilted to the downside for growth and upside for inflation.
- Key risk scenarios:
  - Global financial conditions tighten substantially, causing credit declines, asset repricing, and potential spillovers to the UK financial sector and housing market.
  - Greater persistence in price and wage-setting leading to higher inflation for longer and tighter demand-management policies.
  - Intensification of spillovers from Russia’s war in Ukraine and geo-economic fragmentation raising energy prices and disrupting supply chains.
- Staff view on monetary policy:
  - Monetary policy will need to be tightened further to keep inflation expectations well-anchored and bring inflation back to target.
  - Given substantial tightening already and high uncertainty, the Bank should continuously review the pace and magnitude of tightening and focus on services inflation and wage growth.

### Box 1 — Severe global tightening scenario: transmission and policy responses
- Scenario mechanics and UK transmission:
  - Severe tightening in global financial conditions exposes bank and NBFI fragilities, causing sharp declines in credit and asset prices, amplifying aggregate demand contraction and raising debt vulnerabilities.
  - Sterling depreciation magnitude depends on flight-to-safety into the US dollar, market perceptions of UK country risk, and relative monetary stances.
- Policy response (recommended measures):
  - Macroprudential: consider easing macroprudential policy (for example, releasing the CCyB) and complement with targeted liquidity provisions.
  - Targeted support: provide very targeted support to households on debt obligations, consistent with FCA recommendations; rely partly on still-high household savings.
  - Monetary policy: pause or ease if demand and expected inflation weaken substantially; if inflation persists (e.g., via sterling depreciation), maintain tight policy to anchor expectations and carefully communicate tool objectives.
  - Fiscal policy: allow automatic stabilizers to operate; deploy discretionary stimulus only if monetary policy cannot ease as needed; remain mindful of fiscal space and potential risk premium increases.

### Financial sector resilience, NBFI vulnerabilities, and regulatory recommendations
- BoE actions and QT:
  - BoE commenced QT in March 2022; between November 2022 and May 2023 reduced its gilt portfolio (excluding LDI-related interventions) by £26.9bn.
  - BoE fully offloaded its financial stability gilt purchases amounting to £19.2bn between September 28 and October 14, by January 2023.
  - Staff favors BoE’s incremental approach to shrinking its balance sheet while keeping Bank Rate as the key instrument; monitor gilt market pressures and be ready to provide liquidity via short-term Open Market Operations.
- NBFI sector priorities:
  - Strengthen liquidity regulation and management for NBFIs holding leveraged exposures in core markets; ensure preparedness for margin calls.
  - Support BoE/FCA consultation on MMF resilience; consider reducing MMFs’ liquidity transformation and mechanisms to ensure redemption costs fall on redeeming investors.
  - Complete the SWES for NBFIs with results available by mid-2024 to identify/quantify risks and close data gaps.
  - Consider allowing appropriately regulated, systemically important NBFIs access to BoE liquidity facilities under strict design principles (discretionary, penal rate, fully collateralized, solvent firms only).
- Bank resolution and depositor outcomes:
  - Consider options to improve depositor outcomes; FSAP recommendation that FSCS build up a prefunded deposit insurance fund.
  - Three reform areas to speed deposit payouts: online portal for alternative account details for FSCS transfers; improved continuity of bank services via transfer/redirection infrastructure; better operational support at receiving banks.
- Regulatory safeguards:
  - Preserve the primacy of the FPC’s financial stability objective; allow adequate consultation time on reforms; maintain robustness of SMCR and carefully weigh ring-fencing adjustments.

### Fiscal policy: saving windfalls, medium-term consolidation, and reform priorities
- Near-term fiscal strategy:
  - Any near-term fiscal overperformance should be saved to avoid complicating monetary policy and to rebuild fiscal buffers eroded after the pandemic and energy price shocks.
  - Strong case for saving all non-cyclical revenue windfalls; for 2024, strictly adhere to targets and avoid further loosening.
  - Ensure the EPG scheme expires as planned; any future support should be well-targeted.
  - Invest in data and IT systems to better target support to vulnerable households outside the welfare system.
- Medium-term fiscal risks and required measures:
  - Spring budget: relaxed the 2023 fiscal stance by about 0.5 ppts. of GDP, close-to-neutral for 2023 and contractionary thereafter; windfalls mostly spent on supply side measures.
  - Public sector net borrowing projected to decline from 6.2 percent of GDP in FY2022/23 to 3.2 percent of GDP in FY2027/28.
  - Public sector net debt (excl. BoE) projected to rise from 89 to 97 percent of GDP, stabilizing thereafter.
  - General government gross debt should stabilize in 2028 at 110 percent of GDP.
  - Revenue measures suggested: close income, capital gains, and social security tax loopholes; reform inheritance and property taxation; move toward a comprehensive, predictable, uniform, and higher carbon price.
  - Expenditure measures suggested: reform state pension indexation and structure (triple lock), consider ending the triple lock or bringing forward increases in state pension age; reallocate spending to health, social care, skills, innovation, and infrastructure.
- Strengthening the fiscal framework:
  - Require the OBR to produce forecasts for all major discretionary fiscal policy changes and provide early analysis of impacts of rule changes before parliamentary votes.
  - Better define escape clauses for current rules with clear suspension/reactivation conditions.
  - Consider adopting a framework anchored in the probability of debt stabilization (stochastic framework) to increase flexibility while preserving discipline.

### Energy security and structural reform priorities
- Energy security:
  - UK is a leading LNG hub with electricity interconnections but domestic gas production is declining; imports expected to exceed 80 percent of natural gas consumption by 2035 (from about half currently).
  - Natural gas storage capabilities are among the lowest in Europe; enhancing storage would help energy security.
  - Measures to raise energy efficiency and increase renewable and nuclear generation would limit vulnerability to supply shocks.
- Structural reform and green transition:
  - By 2022 real business investment slightly lower than in 2016; labor supply just reached pre-pandemic level; productivity growth anemic since the GFC.
  - Authorities’ measures: childcare support, capital investment allowance measures, Windsor Framework, Chancellor’s 4Es strategy, Returnships, and education measures (math to age 18).
  - Staff recommendations: permanent incentives for capital, public infrastructure investment to crowd-in private investment, liberalize planning, address long-term sickness and early retirement with health outlays, scale apprenticeships, fine-tune immigration, increase R&D support, widen ETS coverage, and expand green transition incentives.
  - Climate Change Committee estimate: additional public investment needed to meet Net Zero targets ~0.7 percent of GDP per year; other estimate cited ~£50 billion (2.1 percent of GDP) per year in additional investment to get to net zero by 2050 (of which 1/3 public, 2/3 private).

### External sector and external debt sustainability
- External position and CA:
  - NIIP: -11 percent of GDP in 2022 (improved from -15 percent in 2021).
  - CA: -3.8 percent of GDP in 2022; staff assess the CA gap midpoint at -0.8 percent of GDP for 2022.
  - IMF staff project CA will moderately decrease to –3½ percent of GDP over the medium term.
- External debt dynamics:
  - External debt peaked at 334 percent of GDP in 2020; projected under the baseline to decline to about 268 percent of GDP by 2028.
  - Historical scenario: external debt would rise to 321 percent of GDP by end-horizon.
  - Stress tests: interest-rate shock 271; historical scenario 321; CA shock 272; combined shock 288; real depreciation shock 317; growth shock 302 (all percent of GDP).
  - Gross external financing needs are large and short-term liabilities are substantial; policy implication is to uphold robust policy frameworks and structural reforms.

### Risk Assessment Matrix — high-likelihood risks and policy guidance (selected)
- High-likelihood risks:
  - Intensification of regional conflict(s): disrupt trade, remittances, FDI, and financial flows.
  - Surging energy prices: adverse terms-of-trade shock; policy recommendations include accelerating the green transition, improving targeting of energy support, and monetary tightening to anchor expectations.
  - Persistent high inflation / de-anchoring of expectations: may require stronger monetary policy and fiscal restraint; allow automatic stabilizers to operate.
  - Abrupt global slowdown or recession: coordinate monetary and fiscal responses; let automatic stabilizers operate.
- Medium-likelihood risks:
  - Systemic financial instability: recommended easing macroprudential policy (e.g., CCyB release), targeted liquidity provision, carefully calibrated monetary policy, and cautious fiscal responses.
  - Monetary policy miscalibration: adjust monetary policy as needed; let automatic stabilizers operate while avoiding fiscal stances that conflict with monetary objectives.
- Low-likelihood risks:
  - Problems with the Brexit transition: re-engage with the EU on financial regulatory cooperation and clarify retained EU laws.

### Staff overall appraisals (concise)
- Near-term macro outlook: subdued growth in 2023–24; activity stronger in 2025–26; inflation to target by mid-2025 under baseline but upside risks to inflation persist.
- Monetary policy: further tightening likely needed given inflation momentum and persistence; BoE should focus on services inflation and wage growth and continue QT as envisaged while monitoring gilt market liquidity.
- Fiscal policy: save near-term overperformance, avoid loosening in 2024, phase out EPG as planned, deploy additional measures (pension reform, tax base broadening, carbon/property/wealth taxes) to accommodate service and investment needs within the announced debt path.
- Financial sector and regulation: sector resilient but vigilance needed on NBFI risks, depositor behaviour, and bank liquidity; consider extending BoE liquidity backstops to systemically important NBFIs; strengthen resolution arrangements and FSCS prefunding.
- Structural reforms: ambitious, evidence-based reforms required to raise labor supply, investment, and productivity; accelerate green transition and clarify carbon pricing and ETS expansion.

*Source: 1gbrea2023001 - 1. A Global Severe Downside Scenario: Implications for the UK Economy (IMF staff report excerpt).*

### 1. A Global Severe Downside Scenario: Implications for the UK Economy ________________________ 13

### 1. A Global Severe Downside Scenario: Implications for the UK Economy

### Context
- Government priorities since October 2022: tackle high inflation, high public debt, low economic growth, and long NHS waiting lists; Chancellor announced “4Es” economic strategy (Enterprise, Education, Employment, and Everywhere).
- Autumn 2022 budget (with full OBR input) aligned fiscal with monetary policy and, together with BoE financial stability interventions, assuaged market stress after the September 2022 ‘mini-budget’.
- Windsor Framework adopted in March 2023 to resolve Northern Ireland Protocol disputes; new UK legislation will be needed to implement some elements. Draft MoU on regulatory cooperation in financial services published in May 2023; long-term decisions on equivalence and recognition for UK CCPs in the EU beyond mid-2025 remain pending.
- Real wages and real household disposable incomes in 2022 declined respectively by 1.7 and 0.2 percent.

### Recent developments — real sector, prices, labor, and financial conditions
- Growth and shocks:
  - Post-pandemic recovery disrupted by an energy price shock linked to Russia’s war in Ukraine; economy contracted in 2022Q3 and resumed subdued growth in 2022Q4 and 2023Q1.
  - High frequency indicators point to further resilience in demand in 2023Q2.
- Inflation:
  - Headline and core inflation averaged 9.1 and 5.9 percent y/y, respectively, in 2022.
  - Headline inflation peaked at 11.1 percent y/y in October 2022.
  - Core inflation rose to 6.8 percent y/y in April 2023.
  - April 2022 energy price increases shifted into the base in 2023Q2; food price inflation remained higher.
- Labor market and wages:
  - Exceptionally tight labor markets with historically high vacancy-to-unemployment ratio contributed to robust private sector wage growth; public sector wage growth accelerated after strikes.
  - Labor market tightness has started to unwind with a recent influx of (non-EU) foreign workers.
  - Drivers of inactivity include increased long-term sickness post-pandemic.
- Financial conditions and housing:
  - Financial conditions tightened since late 2021 in line with monetary policy tightening; lending rates rose to more than double their end-2021 level by early 2023.
  - Mortgage arrears remain low; house prices have fallen since their all-time peak in 2022Q3. Market specialists’ median expectation in May was for a fall by 3 percent in 2023 and a rise by 1 percent in 2024.
  - Gilt market liquidity remains a concern.
- External sector:
  - Current account deficit widened to 3.8 percent of GDP in 2022.
  - The CA gap worsened from 0 in 2021 to -0.8 percent of GDP in 2022, implying an external position broadly in line with fundamentals.
  - Goods trade with the EU in 2023Q1 still about 7 percent lower than 2019 averages.
  - UK completed negotiations to join the CPTPP in March 2023.

### Outlook — forecasts and medium-term path
- Near-term growth:
  - Growth forecast to slow to 0.4 percent in 2023 from 4.1 percent in 2022.
  - Projected negative output gap of 1 percent by end-2023.
  - Mild increase in unemployment expected as labor market tightness unwinds.
  - Growth projected to pick up to 1 percent in 2024.
- Medium-term growth:
  - Growth would average 2.1 percent during 2025–26 as monetary stance and financial conditions ease, supporting private consumption and investment.
  - Real GDP would gradually converge to pre-pandemic potential growth of about 1½ percent thereafter.
  - Output in 2028 projected to be about 5 percent below its pre-pandemic trajectory due to scarring from: (a) higher inactivity rates; (b) weak investment growth since 2016; and (c) TFP scarring from human capital and knowledge spillover losses during the pandemic, and elevated energy input costs.
- Inflation path:
  - Headline and core inflation expected to decline to 5.2 and 5.8 percent y/y by end-2023.
  - Headline inflation forecast to return to the 2 percent target by mid-2025.
  - Core inflation expected to remain above target until end-2025.
- Fiscal stance:
  - Fiscal impulse assumed neutral in 2023 and negative thereafter.
  - Annual current expenditures assumed about 0.8 percent of GDP higher to account for public pay and service delivery pressures.
  - Public investment falls more slowly after 2025, assumed 0.7 ppts. of GDP higher than in the Spring budget by the end of the forecast period.

### Risks and downside scenarios
- Overall uncertainty is high; risks are tilted to the downside for growth and upside for inflation.
- Key risk scenarios:
  - Global financial conditions tighten substantially, restraining credit and trading partner demand; contagion to the UK financial sector or housing market correction could amplify growth losses and curtail inflation via wider output gaps and lower global commodity prices.
  - Greater persistence in price and wage-setting could lead to higher inflation for longer, prompting tighter demand-management policies, potential re-pricing of long-term financial assets, and adverse macro-financial spillovers.
  - Intensification of spillovers from Russia’s war in Ukraine and geo-economic fragmentation could raise energy prices and disrupt supply chains, lowering growth and raising inflation; medium-term reconfiguration of trade and financial flows could reduce potential growth.

### Conditioning assumptions underlying staff’s baseline forecasts
- Energy prices: conditioned on futures-implied paths indicating declining natural gas and electricity prices through 2023, but only a partial reversal of the increase since mid-2021; retail energy prices projected to decline below the cap implied by the Energy Price Guarantee (EPG) in July 2023 and remain so until the EPG’s expiration at end-March 2024.
- Monetary policy: Bank Rate to increase by another 50–100 bps (in line with market expectations), followed by a sustained tight monetary stance through end-2024 and gradual loosening thereafter.
- Financial conditions: projected to evolve in line with the Bank Rate.
- Macroprudential policy: the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) rate will increase to 2 percent in July 2023 and stay at that level throughout the forecast period.
- Fiscal policy: OBR’s fiscal projections accompanying the Spring 2023 budget, adjusted for staff’s macroeconomic forecast and excluding fuel duty uprate and expiration of capital investment allowance; annual current expenditures about 0.8 percent of GDP higher; public investment 0.7 ppts. of GDP higher by the end of the forecast period.

*Source: 1gbrea2023001 - 1. A Global Severe Downside Scenario: Implications for the UK Economy.*

### Box 1. A Global Severe Downside Scenario: Implications for the UK Economy

### Box 1. A Global Severe Downside Scenario: Implications for the UK Economy

### The Scenario
- A severe tightening in global financial conditions could expose fragilities in bank and NBFI balance sheets in advanced economies, including the UK.
- Financial spillovers would affect the UK via a sharp decline in credit and by depressing equity and real estate prices, leading to:
  - sizable contractionary impact on aggregate demand and economic activity;
  - amplification through deterioration in household and business confidence and a decline in trading partner demand;
  - increased corporate and household debt vulnerabilities and higher credit losses.
- Asset repricing and changes in risk premia would raise mark-to-market losses and funding costs for banks, deteriorating capital ratios and leading to credit tightening.
- The shock could have sizable exchange rate effects; the extent of sterling depreciation would depend on flight-to-safety effects towards the US dollar, market perceptions of the UK’s country risk profile and the monetary policy stance relative to other advanced economies.

### Policy Response (recommended measures)
- Macroprudential:
  - Consider easing macroprudential policy (for example, releasing the CCyB) to avoid exacerbating the credit downturn.
  - Complement with targeted liquidity provisions to address financial stress in core markets.
- Targeted support:
  - Provide very targeted support to households on their debt obligations, consistent with recent FCA recommendations.
  - Rely partly on still-high household savings to mitigate negative macroeconomic and financial stability implications.
- Monetary policy:
  - Monetary policy tightening may have to pause (and there may even have to be some easing) if demand and expected inflation weaken substantially.
  - If inflationary pressures persist (for example because of sterling depreciation), monetary policy may need to remain tight enough to anchor inflation expectations; careful communication of differing objectives of policy tools is required (as during the LDI crisis).
- Fiscal policy:
  - Allow automatic stabilizers to operate.
  - Deploy discretionary stimulus only if monetary policy is unable to ease at the pace and magnitude necessitated by the deterioration in demand (i.e., due to transmission lags or a return to the effective lower bound).
  - Remain mindful of fiscal space and potential risk premium increases.

*For further details on this scenario, see IMF WEO, April 2023, Chapter 1: Global Prospects and Policies.*

### Authorities’ Forecasts and Staff Comparisons
- BoE growth forecast for 2023: 0.2 percent (May), revised up from -0.6 percent (February).
- IMF staff forecast for 2023 growth: 0.4 percent.
- OBR March 2023 forecast for 2023: -0.2 percent (close to staff’s contemporaneous April WEO forecast of -0.3 percent).
- BoE foresees anemic growth through 2025; OBR foresees acceleration in 2024 due to rebound in private consumption and investment.
- Unemployment: BoE, OBR, and staff see only a mild rise; unemployment rates peaking at about 4½ percent (authorities) versus staff’s forecast at 4¼ percent.
- OBR estimates Spring Budget measures will raise employment by 0.3 percent by 2027–28.
- Staff’s forecast of medium-term potential growth: 1½ percent; OBR forecast: 1¾ percent.

### Monetary Policy: Current Stance and Rationale
- Since December 2021 the BoE has:
  - raised Bank Rate by 440 basis points;
  - been the first G7 central bank to lift its policy rate in December 2021;
  - raised rates 12 times in a row to 4.5 percent in May.
- The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) noted risks to inflation are skewed significantly to the upside and further tightening would be required if inflationary pressures persist.
- Markets have priced in additional 100 bps rate hikes by end-2023, gradually easing to about 5 percent by end-2024.
- Staff estimates:
  - real shadow rate will increase from 150 bps in 2023Q1 to about 340 bps in 2024 (relative to an estimated real neutral rate of 70 bps), implying a fairly tight monetary stance.
  - a Bank Rate of 4.5 percent (at present) implies an ex-ante real rate of 0.8 percent based on staff's projection of one-year ahead inflation (3.7 percent average in 2024).
  - the ex-ante real rate would increase to around 3 percent next year, implying a restrictive monetary stance.
- Inflation momentum:
  - Annualized 3m/3m inflation rates were strong at 7¾ percent for both headline and core inflation in April.
  - Measures of underlying inflation—such as services inflation and firms' price and wage-setting expectations—around 5 percent in 2024, remain well-above the BoE’s 2 percent target.
- Staff conclusions:
  - Monetary policy will need to be tightened further to keep inflation expectations well-anchored and bring inflation back to target.
  - The BoE should focus on services inflation and wage growth and “see through” headline declines due to falling energy or food prices.
  - Given substantial tightening already in train and high uncertainty, the Bank should continuously review the pace and magnitude of tightening.

### Quantitative Tightening (QT) and Market Considerations
- BoE commenced QT in March 2022 by ceasing to re-invest maturing gilts and began active gilt sales in November 2022.
- November 2022 to May 2023: BoE reduced its gilt portfolio (excluding LDI-related interventions) by £26.9bn, roughly in line with the announced annual reduction target of £80bn (for the 12 months ending October 31, 2023).
- The BoE fully offloaded its financial stability gilt purchases, amounting to £19.2bn between September 28 and October 14, by January 2023.
- Staff view:
  - Shrinking the BoE's balance sheet helps reduce its footprint and preserve headroom for future asset purchases.
  - Staff favors the BoE’s incremental approach to shrinking its balance sheet while keeping Bank Rate as the key instrument.
  - The BoE should monitor gilt market pressures (yields and bid-ask spreads) and be ready to provide liquidity support through short-term Open Market Operations.

### Communication and Tool Coordination
- Clear communication is critical where markets perceive tensions between price and financial stability objectives.
- Normally monetary policy and macroprudential policy use separate tools; in crises the accompanying weakness in demand typically lowers inflation, requiring less monetary tightening.
- Tensions could arise where rising risks and high uncertainty exist about whether monetary tightening is creating serious financial stress.
- Reducing tensions:
  - quick and effective financial policy responses (e.g., liquidity provision complemented by CCyB release);
  - well-understood regulatory guidance on banks’ ability to run down liquidity buffers and expectations on subsequent replenishment.
- Any “tool overlap” must be clearly communicated as temporary and targeted (as during the LDI crisis).

### Fiscal Policy: Consolidation and Risks
- Autumn and Spring budgets aligned fiscal policy with monetary policy to fight inflation and set out a consolidation path to stabilize debt over the medium term.
- Spring budget:
  - relaxed the 2023 fiscal stance by about 0.5 ppts. of GDP, still implying a close-to-neutral stance for 2023 and a contractionary stance thereafter;
  - windfalls mostly spent on supply side measures.
- Composition and phasing of medium-term consolidation: revenue and expenditures contribute equally; expenditure reductions are backloaded.
- Staff fiscal projections and metrics:
  - Public sector net borrowing projected to decline from 6.2 percent of GDP in FY2022/23 to 3.2 percent of GDP in FY2027/28.
  - Public sector net debt (excl. BoE) projected to rise from 89 to 97 percent of GDP, where it would stabilize.
  - General government gross debt should stabilize in 2028 at 110 percent of GDP, third lowest among G7 economies.
- Sovereign stress assessment:
  - Risk of sovereign stress has risen since the last Article IV and is now assessed as moderate (rather than low in 2021), reflecting the energy price shock and policy responses.
  - Mitigating factors include:
    - very long maturity of general government debt (of about 14 years on average) that lowers GFNs and limits pass-through from higher yields to effective interest rates;
    - lack of foreign currency debt mitigating FX risks;
    - substantial market absorption capacity for gilts aided by the UK's large institutional investor base and the sterling's status as a global reserve currency.
  - Staff assesses overall risks of sovereign stress to be low.

*Source: Box 1, "A Global Severe Downside Scenario: Implications for the UK Economy," IMF staff report text provided.*

### 20.      Accordingly, staff recommends that  any near-term fiscal overperformance be saved to

### 20.      Accordingly, staff recommends that  any near-term fiscal overperformance be saved to

### Fiscal policy and rebuilding buffers
- Any near-term fiscal overperformance should be saved to avoid complicating the task for monetary policy and to rebuild fiscal buffers eroded after the pandemic and energy price shocks.
- Given the upgrade to 2023 growth relative to the assumptions underpinning the Spring budget, a small cyclical fiscal overperformance is likely to emerge by the time of the Autumn budget.
- Because this would likely reflect more resilient demand and inflation persistence, it would be appropriate to save the entirety of this overperformance to avoid adding to inflationary pressures and to rebuild fiscal buffers.
- Strong case for saving all non-cyclical revenue windfalls as well.
- For 2024, targets should be strictly adhered to and further loosening eschewed.
- Given recent easing in energy prices, ensure the EPG scheme expires as planned and any future support—if energy prices resurge—is well-targeted.
- Invest in data and IT systems to improve targeting and reach vulnerable households outside the welfare system.

### Medium-term fiscal risks
- Supply-side policies could take time to raise growth, and the impact might not be as large as envisaged (e.g., full rollout of new childcare provisions depends on overcoming childcare sector capacity constraints).
- The new three-year capital allowance regime, likely made permanent, is costed as temporary and its revenue-generating profile could be thinner over a longer period.
- Successive chancellors since 2011 have eschewed increasing fuel duty with inflation each year, implying a potential gap in revenue going forward.
- The green transition may lead to a decline in public revenues from existing emissions-related taxes (especially fuel duty) unless compensated by raising other climate-friendly revenues.
- Higher inflation and interest rates could imply higher debt service and bigger transfers to the BoE to cover losses arising from higher remuneration of BoE reserves and capital losses on QT.

### Spending needs and realism of medium-term plan
- The Spring budget maintains largely unchanged departments’ nominal expenditure plans from the 2021 spending review, effectively lowering real expenditure until 2025, and grows them at a modest 1 percent in real terms thereafter, with the public investment/GDP ratio falling.
- Risks to service delivery given announced spending cuts and without supporting measures, including:
  - Need to accommodate pay agreements amid ongoing industrial action (biggest public sector strikes in a decade).
  - Solving problems in the NHS and the social care system likely to require additional funding, with some experts’ estimates ranging between at least 0.5 and 1 percent of GDP annually.
  - To approach the OECD average public investment, investment in skills, innovation, and infrastructure would have to increase by 0.8 percent of GDP.
  - Additional public investment needed to meet the Net Zero targets by 2050 estimated by the Climate Change Committee to be around 0.7 percent of GDP per year.

### Revenue and expenditure measures to assure debt stabilization
- Revenue measures:
  - UK public revenues and tax-to-GDP ratios are still more than 3 percentage points below the G7 average and more than 8 points below the four largest euro area economies.
  - Scope to mobilize additional revenues in a manner that improves efficiency, is progressive, and greens the economy.
  - Options include closing income, capital gains, and social security tax loopholes; reforming inheritance and property taxation; and moving toward a comprehensive, predictable, uniform, and higher carbon price (including more rapid extension of the UK’s Emissions Trading System).
- Expenditure measures:
  - Reforming the state pension, which according to the OBR accounts for 42 percent of the total welfare bill, can yield savings.
  - Maintain indexation of state pensions with inflation, but eliminate the wage and floor components of the ‘triple lock’ which are judged excessively generous.
  - Ending the triple lock or increasing the state pension retirement age from 67 to 68 earlier than planned could cumulatively generate significant savings.

### Strengthening the fiscal framework
- Lessons from the ‘mini-budget’ episode and the UK’s strong fiscal institutions suggest scope to enhance stability and flexibility of fiscal rules.
- Staff recommends:
  - Require the OBR to produce a forecast to accompany all major discretionary fiscal policy changes and provide an early analysis of the impact of any changes in rules before parliamentary votes.
  - Better define escape clauses to current rules with clear conditions for suspension and reactivation.
  - Consider adopting a framework anchored in the probability of debt stabilization (possibly nested in higher-level “fiscal standards”) to provide somewhat greater flexibility while maintaining fiscal discipline.

*Source: UNITED KINGDOM, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND*

### 34.      The BoE’s financial stability intervention during the LDI crisis helped restor  e orderly

### 34.      The BoE’s financial stability intervention during the LDI crisis helped restor  e orderly market conditions, and the authorities have taken further actions to strengthen the sector’s resilience.

### BoE intervention and immediate policy responses
- Timely market intelligence, close coordination among key stakeholders (including overseas regulators), reserve pricing for gilt purchases (to distinguish the operation from quantitative easing (QE)), and firm public communication on the temporary/targeted nature of the intervention were key factors in restoring orderly market conditions and curtailing moral hazard.
- The FPC recommended that the Pensions Regulator (TPR), in coordination with the FCA and overseas regulators:
  - Ensure that pension trustees can only invest in LDI funds that hold liquidity buffers that can withstand at least 250 bps rise in bond yields (compared with the 140 bps increase during the LDI crisis).
  - Have TPR’s remit take into account financial stability considerations.
- The FCA and TPR issued further guidance for LDI funds, including:
  - Realistic contingency planning.
  - Applying appropriately designed stress tests.
  - Ensuring clients can deliver collateral within five days.

### Staff assessment and recommended actions for the wider NBFI sector
- Staff supports the measures above and advises additional actions to identify and tackle vulnerabilities in the wider NBFI sector:
  - Strengthening NBFIs' liquidity regulation and management:
    - Leverage, liquidity mismatches, and concentrated positions were central to the LDI crisis and other NBFI-related market stress episodes (such as the 2020 "dash for cash").
    - Priority areas: enhance liquidity regulation of NBFIs holding leveraged exposures in core markets; ensure preparedness for margin calls; work with the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to strengthen the resilience of the open-ended fund sector.
    - Vulnerabilities in the money market fund (MMF) and hedge fund sectors require close monitoring; the forthcoming BoE/FCA consultation on resilience-enhancing measures for MMFs is timely.
    - Possible MMF measures (noted in staff commentary) could include: reducing MMFs’ liquidity transformation; mechanisms to ensure that the cost of redemption falls on redeeming investors; eliminating the cliff effect of liquid-asset thresholds; and policies to absorb losses.
  - Better understanding risks posed by NBFIs, including AML/CFT risks:
    - Staff supports the authorities' SWES for NBFIs—the first of its kind in the world for its wide reach—with results to be available by mid-2024.
    - The SWES will focus on key entities (banks and NBFIs, including those domiciled abroad) and core markets, help identify/quantify risks (including hidden leverage), channels of systemic risk propagation, and close some NBFI data gaps.
    - Effective and risk-based AML/CFT supervision remains important given the UK’s position as an international financial center.
  - Strengthening liquidity backstops for systemically important NBFIs:
    - As recommended by the FSAP, allowing appropriately regulated and systemically interconnected NBFIs access to at least some of the BoE’s liquidity facilities would widen policy options to counteract future market-wide stresses.
    - Design principles: lending at BoE’s discretion after other options exhausted; only to solvent firms; at a penal rate; fully collateralized; with more intrusive supervisory oversight; conditions on borrowers including a clear timeline to reestablish liquidity.

### Authorities’ views on NBFI vulnerabilities
- Authorities acknowledge remaining vulnerabilities in the NBFI sector that could crystallize with greater market volatility or tighter financing conditions.
- Urgent need for internationally coordinated reforms led by the FSB.
- The BoE, the FCA and HM Treasury are engaged in international programs to increase resilience of MMFs and OEFs, improve margin practices, and understand drivers of illiquidity (such as NBFI leverage) in core funding markets.
- The BoE considers its SWES exercise on NBFI risks and interconnections with banks and core markets an important pioneering initiative.

### Further strengthening the bank resolution regime
- Post-GFC banking resolution reforms have been helpful, but opportunities exist to strengthen the regime further.
- The Banking Act 2009 empowers the BoE to submit a failing bank to insolvency procedures or partially/fully transfer it to a private party; in SVB UK’s case a full sale was made to HSBC Bank UK plc protecting all depositors without public funds.
- Issues highlighted:
  - The current 7-day period to pay insured depositors could be disruptive for business customers that have concentrated cash with a single bank.
  - Some smaller banks’ inability to issue loss-absorbing capital (such as Additional Tier (AT) 1 or 2 bonds) could mean significant losses for uninsured depositors in a resolution, increasing susceptibility to runs and systemic vulnerability.
- Staff supports authorities’ consideration of options to improve depositor outcomes and broader reforms informed by careful analysis of depositor data.
- FSAP recommendation: the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) should build up a prefunded deposit insurance fund with an appropriate target level to expand financial firepower under its direct control.

### Authorities’ views on resolution arrangements
- The BoE agreed recent rapid deposit runs and the SVB UK resolution call for further work on resolution arrangements domestically and internationally.
- Three initial reform areas to support more timely payout of eligible deposits:
  - An online portal to enable depositors to provide alternative account details for electronic transfers by the FSCS.
  - Improved continuity of bank services via potentially utilizing existing infrastructure for transferring information on, and redirection of, payments to a new bank.
  - Better operational support and capacity at receiving banks.

### Regulatory safeguards for financial stability and integrity
- Regulatory reforms should preserve the primacy of financial stability, prudential safety, and soundness objectives.
- Staff stresses that proposed reforms should:
  - Safeguard the primacy of the FPC’s financial stability objective and strengthen focus on global financial standards and cross-border surveillance.
  - Allow adequate time for consultation to achieve balanced outcomes on stability vs. innovation, with competition and innovation mandates subordinate to financial stability.
  - Any adjustment to the ring-fencing regime for banks should be carefully weighed; the review of the Senior Managers and Certification Regime (SMCR) should maintain its robustness.
- Authorities’ actions:
  - PRA and FCA launched a discussion paper on the effectiveness, scope, and proportionality of the SMCR and potential improvements.
  - Government broadly accepted conclusions of the independent statutory review of ring-fencing in 2022, issued a Call for Evidence on aligning ring-fencing and resolution regimes, and intends short-term changes to address unintended consequences while maintaining stability safeguards.
  - The government currently plans to increase the deposit threshold to trigger ring-fencing requirements from £25 billion to £35 billion.

### Transnational aspects of corruption and financial integrity
- Staff supports authorities’ efforts to prevent laundering of foreign proceeds of corruption and bribery of foreign public officials.
- Key objectives in Economic Crime Plan 2: safeguard integrity of the UK financial system, limit abuse of UK corporate structures, increase effectiveness of the AML/CFT supervisory regime, and combat criminal use of crypto assets.
- Authorities are addressing remaining recommendations of the OECD Working Group to combat bribery of foreign public officials and will submit progress updates in June.
- Publication of a new anti-corruption strategy, effective implementation of global anti-corruption sanctions, and addressing professional enablers of corruption are expected to strengthen resilience.

### Policies to boost potential growth and advance the green transformation
- Recent performance:
  - By 2022, real business investment remained slightly lower than in 2016, in contrast to the 14 percent increase observed among other G7 economies.
  - Labor supply has just reached its pre-pandemic level and has been weaker than peers.
  - Productivity growth has been anemic since the GFC despite the UK ranking 4th in innovation performance and 10th in accumulation of productive knowledge (as of 2020).
- Authorities’ measures that may enhance medium-term outcomes:
  - Childcare support and capital investment allowance measures from the Spring budget.
  - “Windsor Framework” and measured approach to reviewing retained EU laws reduced Brexit-related uncertainty.
  - Chancellor’s 4Es strategy targets high-productivity growth areas (advanced manufacturing, life sciences, clean energy).
  - ‘Returnships’ program and pension tax reliefs to keep older workers in workforce; education measures include extending early childcare and making math compulsory until age 18.
- Staff recommendations to lift business investment, labor supply, and productivity:
  - Bolstering business investment:
    - Outline a permanent set of incentives for capital as part of a stable, long-term tax strategy.
    - Public infrastructure investment (including Net Zero Growth Plan) to crowd-in private investment.
    - Liberalize planning system and streamline approvals to reduce barriers to investment.
  - Increasing labor supply:
    - Address long-term sickness and early retirement; likely need increased health sector outlays to improve health outcomes and reduce inactivity.
    - Targeted healthcare interventions for the mentally ill, scale-up high-quality apprenticeships, devote resources to career counseling, flexible working schemes, coaching services to enhance female labor participation, and fine-tune immigration arrangements to address labor and skills shortages.
  - Reviving productivity growth:
    - Higher investment in education and training of young adults, promote upskilling and knowledge development.
    - Fund recurrent and infrastructure needs in healthcare to improve workforce productivity.
    - Consider unlocking pension and insurance savings for investment in higher-growth projects while being mindful of financial stability implications.
    - Potential for increasing R&D support for firms, including in context of a possible rejoining of the EU’s Horizon Europe Program.
- Net Zero objectives:
  - Spring budget measures included extension of the Boiler Upgrade Scheme to 2028, timelines for next stage of the Carbon Capture, Usage and Storage scheme, and support for port infrastructure for floating wind.
  - Government’s documents after a High Court ruling quantified measures that added up to 92 per cent of the emission reductions needed to meet the UK’s 2030 Paris Agreement goal, rising to 97 per cent of the emission reductions needed to meet the UK’s 6th Carbon Budget.
  - Recommended further actions: continue increasing carbon taxation, widen Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) coverage to more sectors (e.g., heat and buildings, road transport, and agriculture), expand incentives for the green transition (e.g., grants for low-income households’ heat pump installations and home insulation), remove supply bottlenecks, and set longer-term plans to attract private investment without burdening public finances.

*Source: 1gbrea2023001 - 34.      The BoE’s financial stability intervention during the LDI crisis helped restor  e orderly market conditions, and the authorities have taken further actions to strengthen the sector’s resilience.*

### 46.      Enhancing gas storage capabilities would help ensure energy security. The UK is   a

### 1gbrea2023001 - 46.      Enhancing gas storage capabilities would help ensure energy security. The UK is   a

### Energy security and gas storage
- The UK is a leading liquefied natural gas (LNG) hub, and electricity interconnections with neighboring countries bolster energy security.
- The UK remains vulnerable to a “twin shock” of unforeseen supply shortfalls (e.g., due to disruptions to electricity or pipeline gas inflows, or adverse weather conditions) and tight LNG markets (which would make it difficult to expedite additional gas imports).
- Domestic gas production is declining with the depletion of the North Sea basin; the share of imports is expected to rise to over 80 percent of natural gas consumption by 2035 from about half currently.
- The UK’s natural gas storage capabilities are currently among the lowest in Europe; enhancing storage would help enhance energy security.
- Measures to raise energy efficiency and increase renewable and nuclear energy generation would help limit vulnerability to supply shocks.

### Authorities’ views
- Authorities support further ambitious, evidence-based structural reforms to boost investment, productivity, and labor supply and cited the Chancellor’s 4Es strategy, the “Windsor Framework,” and Spring Budget measures to increase labor supply and business investment.
- They recognize the challenge from the recent rise in long-term illness affecting labor market participation.
- Authorities commit to facilitating innovation in key growth sectors and maintaining a competitive business taxation regime to unlock productive capital.
- On planning restrictions, authorities noted longstanding difficulties and agreed that absent serious reforms, planning will inhibit business dynamism; they pointed to a package of planning reforms announced for renewable energy, an action plan for Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects, and reforms to allow additional research space around a major University hub.
- The UK’s climate policy and targets are underpinned by a strong legal framework; the authorities referenced the March 2023 Net Zero Growth Plan and Energy Security Plan and expect to fully achieve Net Zero targets.
- Authorities agreed with staff recommendations on the rationale for carbon pricing in new sectors (currently subject to consultation) and noted that investment in the green transition will need to increase in the medium term while supply constraints may limit the speed of adjustments in some areas.
- On energy security, authorities emphasized the UK’s secure and diverse energy system and resilience during spells of cold weather in the winter of 2022–23.
- Authorities are undertaking a cost-benefit analysis regarding the future role of gas storage and other sources of flexibility, and plan to issue an update by the Autumn.

### Staff appraisal — near-term macro outlook
- The UK’s near-term growth outlook is subdued while inflation remains elevated.
- Growth is expected to remain positive but subdued in 2023 and 2024 as tighter monetary policy and financial conditions weigh on demand.
- Activity should be stronger in 2025–26, as the output gap closes, before converging to trend.
- Declining energy prices and tight fiscal and monetary policies should lower inflation to target by mid-2025.
- Significant upside risks to inflation exist, reflecting the possibility of greater persistence in wage- and price-setting than in baseline projections.
- Tighter-than-expected global financial conditions present the key downside risk to growth.
- The 2022 external position was broadly in line with fundamentals and desirable policies.

### Staff appraisal — monetary policy
- Monetary policy will need to be tightened further to keep inflation expectations well-anchored and bring inflation back to target.
- Given still-robust inflation momentum and signs of persistence, further monetary tightening will be needed, and rates may have to remain high for longer.
- Elevated uncertainty about inflation persistence and the macroeconomic outlook merits continuous review of the pace and magnitude of monetary tightening.
- The BoE should continue to focus on underlying measures of inflation—such as wage growth and services inflation—and see through base effects in headline inflation.
- The QT strategy should continue as envisaged.
- The BoE’s incremental approach to shrinking its balance sheet while relying on Bank Rate as the key monetary policy instrument is appropriate given uncertainty about system-wide reserve needs.

### Staff appraisal — fiscal policy and framework
- Fiscal policy should continue to support monetary policy in the fight against inflation in the near term, and address critical spending needs over the medium term.
- Staff assesses the authorities' planned consolidation—with a close-to-neutral stance for 2023 and contractionary stance thereafter—to be broadly appropriate as it keeps fiscal policy aligned with monetary policy.
- In the near term, the authorities should save any fiscal overperformance (including non-cyclical revenue windfalls) to help rebuild fiscal buffers after successive shocks.
- It is crucial to adhere to targets and avoid further loosening in 2024 and beyond; existing energy support programs should expire as planned, and any future support—in the event of resurgent energy prices—should be well-targeted.
- Over the medium term, the government needs to allocate significant additional resources to ensure high-quality public services (especially health and social care) and undertake public investments in skills, innovation, infrastructure, and the green transition to boost economic potential.
- Accommodating these needs within the announced debt path will require additional measures, notably pension reforms, strengthening of carbon, property, and wealth taxation, and closing tax loopholes.
- Enhancing the fiscal framework could bring greater stability and flexibility while preserving discipline: request the OBR to produce a forecast at every major discretionary fiscal event and mandate analysis of the impact of proposed changes to fiscal rules; adopt well-defined escape clauses; consider a framework anchored in the probability of debt stabilization.

### Staff appraisal — financial sector and regulation
- The financial sector appears resilient to shocks, but continued vigilance to financial stability risks and strong oversight of banks and NBFIs is warranted.
- Household and corporate balance sheets have been resilient thus far, but authorities should remain alert to financial stability risks arising from the corporate and real estate sectors.
- The speed of deposit outflows in recent bank stress episodes warrants continued close monitoring of liquidity positions of all banks and an in-depth study of depositor behavior to support policy work on the LCR.
- Efforts to understand and reduce NBFI vulnerabilities (including risks related to money laundering) should continue, focusing on closing data gaps, strengthening NBFI liquidity, and considering allowing the extension of BoE liquidity backstops to systemically important and adequately supervised NBFIs.
- Bank resolution frameworks could be strengthened; the FSCS could build up a prefunded deposit insurance fund.
- Ongoing financial regulatory reforms should preserve the primacy of financial stability, safety and soundness, and market integrity objectives, including addressing transnational drivers of corruption and illicit finance; allow adequate time for careful consideration of proposed modifications to existing rules (especially ring-fencing and the SMCR).

### Staff appraisal — structural reforms and green transition
- Further ambitious, evidence-based reforms are needed to address long-term challenges of weak labor supply, investment, and productivity growth.
- The Chancellor’s 4Es strategy, the Spring budget’s childcare support and capital investment allowance measures, and reduced post-Brexit uncertainty should raise medium-term growth.
- Complementary measures include improving skills and education outcomes, better health and social care, permanent and wider capital investment allowances, easing planning restrictions, and accelerating catalytic public investments for the green transition and delivery of critical network and healthcare infrastructures.
- Authorities could consider fine-tuning the immigration system to alleviate labor and skill shortages and promote labor market flexibility.
- The green transition should be expedited to meet Net Zero objectives and enhance energy security.
- There is scope for more ambitious and consistent carbon pricing, including more rapidly extending the UK’s ETS and legally clarifying the phase-in of regulations.
- It would be desirable to provide more incentives for the green transition and remove existing bottlenecks, including by setting out longer-term plans to attract private investment.
- The transition to a greener energy mix offers opportunities to lower energy input costs and increase energy security.

*Source: 1gbrea2023001 - United Kingdom IMF report excerpt.*

### 57.      It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard

### 57. It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard 12-month cycle.

### Output and supply-side developments
- Supply chain disruptions have abated (figure header statement).
- Labor shortages are gradually unwinding (figure header statement).
- Economic inactivity remains high among older workers (figure header statement).
- Energy input costs have come down after surging due to Russia’s war in Ukraine (figure header statement).
- Recovery of transportation and distributive sectors remains incomplete (figure header statement).
- CBI Industrial Trends Survey: Stocks of Finished Goods — series scale shown from -25 to 115, latest marker "2023:Q1" (percent balance).
- Permanent Staff Placements by Sector (Index, 50+ = increase): IT&Computing; Hotel&Catering; Nursing&Medical Care; Accounting&Financial; Blue Collar; Construction — snapshot "May-23".
- Gross Value Added By Sector (2019Q4=100, SA, Mil.2019 GBP) — series covering 2019:Q4 to 2023:Q1.
- Economic Inactivity Decomposition by Age Group (Percent change relative to 2019Q4 Average) — age groups listed including "Aged 16 to 24" through "Aged 65 and Over"; reference date "Feb-23".
- UK Wholesale Natural Gas and Electricity Prices (Index, Jan 2021 = 100): Wholesale Nat Gas and Wholesale Electricity — reference "Apr-23".
- Overall Staff Availability (Seasonally adjusted, 50+ = increase) — S&P Global series, reference "May-23".

### Demand outlook
- Rising energy bills weighed on household balance sheets (figure header statement).
- Government transfers and pandemic-era savings provided a buffer that helped maintain real consumption (figure header statement).
- Energy costs also weighed on firms’ balance sheets, holding back business investment (figure header statement).
- Weakening trade partner demand contributed to investment headwinds (figure header statement).
- Retail Natural Gas and Electricity Prices (Index, 2019 Q4 = 100) — electricity and natural gas series through 2022Q4.
- Real Available Household Resources, Real Household Wage Income, Household Savings Rate (RHS) — index (2019Q4=100) and percent series through 2022Q4.
- Share Of Businesses Not Fully Trading (Percent within industry classification) — energy intensity scatter note from June/July 2022 BICS (source: ONS).
- Real Consumption (Index, 2019Q4=100): Public Consumption, Private Consumption, Real Consumption — reference "Mar-23".
- Real Fixed Investment (Index, 2019Q4=100): Business Investment, General Government, Private Sector Dwellings, Real Fixed Investment — reference "Mar-23".
- Trade Partner Demand Weighted by Exports (Y-o-y percent change) — series through 2023Q1.

### High-frequency indicators of economic activity
- Firms expect continued resilience in demand (figure header statement).
- Bank Rate hikes have started to weigh on planned investments (figure header statement).
- Labor demand is softening (figure header statement).
- Some impact on wage settlements (figure header statement).
- Expectation of Capital Expenditure Authorizations (Percent Balance, Over Next Year Vs. Last Year) — component series Buildings, Plant and Machinery; note "Jun-23".
- Labor Demand (Index, 50+ = increase): Index of Demand for Staff, Permanent Staff Demand, Temporary Staff Demand — series through May-23.
- Permanent Staff Salaries and Temp Staff Pay Rates (Index, 50+ = increase) — S&P Global series through May-23.
- Firms' Sales and Employment Expectations (Percentage growth rate): Expected Year-Ahead Sales Growth and Expected Employment Growth Over Next Year — Bank of England Decision Making Panel, "May-23".

### Inflation
- Headline and core inflation remain high; price pressures are broad-based (figure header statements).
- Inflation expectations remain anchored (figure header statement).
- The terms-of-trade shock has started to ease (figure header statement).
- CPI Trimmed Mean, Core CPI, Headline CPI (Y-o-y percent change) — series Jan-17 to Apr-23; 15% Trimmed Mean CPI shown.
- Inflation Expectations (Percent): 5y5y, 5y, 2y — derived from swaps linked to UK RPI, adjusted; series Jan-22 to May-23.
- Terms of Trade (Index, Dec-2017 = 100) — series 2017–2027 (WEO source).

### External sector developments
- The current account deteriorated in 2022, driven by goods imports (figure header statements).
- The current account was financed by portfolio investment instead of FDI, which was the main financing source in the past (figure header statement).
- The NIIP has improved, driven by valuation effects, including exchange rate depreciation (figure header statement).
- Current Account Balance (Percent of GDP) — series 2005–2022; components TB, Primary inc., Secondary inc., CA.
- Contributions to Growth from Trade (Percentage points) — Imports of Goods, Imports of Services, Exports of Services, Exports of Goods; series 2005–2022.
- Financial Account (Percent of GDP) — FDI, Equity, Debt, Derivatives, Reserve; series 2005–2022.
- NIIP and Effective Exchange Rates: NIIP (percent of GDP) and NEER/REER (index, rhs) — series 2005–2022.

### Fiscal developments
- Most additional fiscal space from [inflation] has been spent in a new labor activation package and in extension of energy support, which remains the largest package among peers (figure header statements).
- The UK’s public debt is below the median for G7 economies, but headroom vis-à-vis fiscal rules keeps shrinking (figure header statements).
- Debt service ratios have risen since COVID, reflecting a high share of inflation-indexed bonds and remunerated reserves (figure header statement).
- Successive Forecasts for Headrooms Against Fiscal Targets (£ Billion) — time series spanning "May2010-Jun2015" through "Oct2022-Average".
- Public Sector Net Borrowing: Changes Since November (Percent) — components for 2022-23 through 2027-28 including Labour market package, Receipts changes, Debt interest spending.
- Size of energy support package: comparison across countries with left axis "Percent of Gross Inland Consumption" and right axis "Percent of GDP"; UK (Mar 23) and UK (Nov 22) noted; sources OBR Economic and Fiscal Outlook, Mar 2023.
- Debt Interest Spending Relative to GDP and Revenues (Percent) — series for selected fiscal years 1955-56 through 2027-28.
- Composition of Central Government Wholesale Debt Stock (£Billion) — series 2004–2022 showing TBill, Gilts by maturities, Index-linked.

### Residential real estate developments
- Mortgage rates have declined since the peak after the 'mini-budget', yet they are about 100 bps above average 2022 levels (figure header statement).
- House prices have fallen since September 2022 (figure header statement).
- Higher interest rates have contributed to rising debt service burdens (figure header statement).
- House Price Indices (Index, Jan 2008 = 100): Halifax, Nationwide Building Society, Rightmove — series through May 2023.
- Housing Affordability (Debt Service Ratio of Households and NPISHs, percent) — series with reference "2022 Q4".
- New Mortgage Loans as % of Gross Advances: Loan to Value (Percent) — LTV 90% - 95% and LTV 95% series (Bank of England; Haver Analytics) — reference "2022Q4".
- New Lending to High-LTI Borrowers (Percent) — note on High LTV ratio definition; reference "2022Q4".
- Mortgage Arrears (Percent): Mortgage Loan Balances in Arrears as % of Total Loan Balances and Number of Loans in Arrears as % of Total Mortgage Loans — reference "2022 Q4".
- Mortgage Rates (Percent): UK pound 2y interest rate swap, UK pound 5y interest rate swap, Mortgage rate (2y 75% LTV fixed rate), Mortgage rate (5y 75% LTV fixed rate) — series through May-23.

### Banking sector
- UK GSIBs have strong capital and liquidity positions compared with other GSIBs in the EU and US (figure header statement).
- Bank equity prices and CDS have been stabilized, though CDS for some GSIBs remain elevated (figure header statement).
- Selected G-SIBs Equity Market Indices (Index, Jan 2 2023 = 100) — list of banks including HSBC, UBS, Barclays, NatWest, etc.; snapshot "May 30 2023".
- Selected G-SIBs CDS Spreads (Basis Points) — list of banks with Max:997; snapshot "May 30 2023".

### Key projections and selected indicators (tables)
- Table 1: Selected Economic Indicators, 2020–28 (Percentage change, unless otherwise indicated):
  - Real GDP: 2020 -11.0; 2021 7.6; 2022 4.1; 2023 0.4; 2024 1.0; 2025 2.2; 2026 2.0; 2027 1.8; 2028 1.5
  - Private final domestic demand: 2020 -13.2; 2021 6.2; 2022 6.4; 2023 -0.8; 2024 0.1; 2025 2.5; 2026 2.1; 2027 1.9; 2028 1.6
  - CPI, period average: 2020 0.9; 2021 2.6; 2022 9.1; 2023 7.9; 2024 3.7; 2025 2.1; 2026 2.0; 2027 2.0; 2028 2.0
  - CPI, end-period: 2020 0.6; 2021 5.4; 2022 10.5; 2023 5.2; 2024 2.6; 2025 2.0; 2026 2.0; 2027 2.0; 2028 2.0
  - Unemployment rate (in percent) 1/: 2020 4.6; 2021 4.5; 2022 3.7; 2023 3.9; 2024 4.2; 2025 4.2; 2026 4.2; 2027 4.2; 2028 4.2
  - Gross national saving (percent of GDP): 2020 14.0; 2021 16.4; 2022 15.8; 2023 13.9; 2024 13.7; 2025 14.2; 2026 14.4; 2027 14.3; 2028 14.3
  - Public sector overall balance (fiscal year, percent of GDP): 2020 -15.2; 2021 -5.2; 2022 -6.2; 2023 -4.9; 2024 -3.8; 2025 -3.7; 2026 -3.4; 2027 -3.3; 2028 -3.2
  - Public sector net debt 2/: 2020 82.8; 2021 80.3; 2022 86.6; 2023 89.9; 2024 92.5; 2025 96.0; 2026 96.8; 2027 97.1; 2028 97.2
  - Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2020 -3.2; 2021 -1.5; 2022 -3.8; 2023 -3.8; 2024 -3.7; 2025 -3.5; 2026 -3.5; 2027 -3.5; 2028 -3.5
  - Bilateral rate (Apr 25, 2023): US$1 = £ 0.81
  - Nominal GDP (billions GBP): 2023 2,635; 2024 2,765; 2025 2,883; 2026 2,997; 2027 3,112; 2028 3,222
  - Nominal GDP (billions USD): 2023 3,201; 2024 3,448; 2025 3,654; 2026 3,874; 2027 4,102; 2028 4,335

- Table 2: Medium-Term Scenario, 2020–28 (selected lines mirror Table 1 projections; Real GDP Q4/Q4 and output gap entries presented in table).
  - Q4/Q4 Real GDP 1/: 2020 -9.2; 2021 8.9; 2022 0.6; 2023 0.5; 2024 1.3; 2025 2.4; 2026 1.8; 2027 1.8; 2028 1.6
  - Output gap 4/: 2020 -3.6; 2021 0.5; 2022 1.8; 2023 -0.1; 2024 -0.7; 2025 -0.3; 2026 -0.1; 2027 0.0; 2028 0.0
  - Potential output (percent change): 2020 -8.4; 2021 3.2; 2022 2.8; 2023 2.2; 2024 1.7; 2025 1.7; 2026 1.7; 2027 1.7; 2028 1.5
  - Household saving rate 7/: 2020 15.9; 2021 12.6; 2022 8.5; 2023 8.9; 2024 9.0; 2025 7.9; 2026 6.9; 2027 5.8; 2028 5.0

- Table 3: Statement of Public Sector Operations, FY2020/21–2028/29 (Percent of GDP):
  - Revenue: 2020/21 38.0; 2021/22 39.3; 2022/23 40.6; 2023/24 41.2; 2024/25 40.7; 2025/26 40.7; 2026/27 40.7; 2027/28 40.9; 2028/29 41.1
  - Expenditure: 2020/21 53.3; 2021/22 44.5; 2022/23 46.8; 2023/24 46.1; 2024/25 44.5; 2025/26 44.4; 2026/27 44.4; 2027/28 44.3; 2028/29 44.3
  - Net lending/borrowing (overall balance): 2020/21 -15.2; 2021/22 -5.2; 2022/23 -6.2; 2023/24 -4.9; 2024/25 -3.8; 2025/26 -3.7; 2026/27 -3.6; 2027/28 -3.4; 2028/29 -3.2
  - Public sector net debt: 2020/21 104.9; 2021/22 96.9; 2022/23 100.7; 2023/24 102.9; 2024/25 103.1; 2025/26 100.5; 2026/27 99.8; 2027/28 99.4; 2028/29 99.4

- Table 4: Balance of Payments, 2020–28 (Percent of GDP):
  - Current account: 2020 -3.2; 2021 -1.5; 2022 -3.8; 2023 -3.8; 2024 -3.7; 2025 -3.5; 2026 -3.5; 2027 -3.5; 2028 -3.5
  - Trade in goods: 2020 -6.3; 2021 -7.5; 2022 -9.3; 2023 -9.2; 2024 -8.9; 2025 -8.6; 2026 -8.5; 2027 -8.4; 2028 -8.4
  - Exports (goods and services): 2020 14.6; 2021 14.3; 2022 16.6; 2023 17.7; 2024 17.9; 2025 17.9; 2026 17.8; 2027 17.6; 2028 17.6
  - Imports (goods and services): 2020 -20.9; 2021 -21.7; 2022 -25.9; 2023 -26.9; 2024 -26.8; 2025 -26.5; 2026 -26.2; 2027 -26.1; 2028 -26.0
  - Primary income balance: 2020 -2.2; 2021 0.5; 2022 0.6; 2023 0.4; 2024 -0.2; 2025 -0.5; 2026 -0.6; 2027 -0.7; 2028 -0.8

- Table 5: Net Investment Position, 2020–28 (Percent of GDP):
  - Net investment position: 2020 -18.2; 2021 -15.3; 2022 -10.9; 2023 -11.5; 2024 -12.0; 2025 -12.4; 2026 -12.8; 2027 -13.2; 2028 -13.6
  - Change in the net investment position (memorandum): 2020 -6.9; 2021 1.7; 2022 3.0; 2023 -1.2; 2024 -1.1; 2025 -0.9; 2026 -0.8; 2027 -0.9; 2028 -0.9
  - Current account balance (memorandum): matches Table 4 series.

- Table 6: Monetary Survey, 2016–2022 (Billion GBP) and M4 growth:
  - M4 growth, percent: 2016 6.2; 2017 4.8; 2018 2.3; 2019 3.8; 2020 12.6; 2021 6.4; 2022 1.6
  - M4 lending to the private sector growth, percent: 2016 4.2; 2017 5.5; 2018 3.2; 2019 4.8; 2020 3.1; 2021 1.7; 2022 1.0

- Table 7: Financial Soundness Indicators, 2016–22 (selected lines):
  - Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets: 2016 20.6; 2017 20.7; 2018 21.4; 2019 21.3; 2020 21.6; 2021 22.1; 2022 21.4
  - Regulatory Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets: 2016 16.5; 2017 17.1; 2018 17.9; 2019 17.9; 2020 18.5; 2021 19.1; 2022 18.4
  - Non-performing Loans to Total Gross Loans: 2016 1.7; 2017 1.4; 2018 1.1; 2019 1.0; 2020 1.0; 2021 1.0; 2022 1.0
  - Return on Assets: 2016 0.3; 2017 0.3; 2018 0.5; 2019 0.3; 2020 0.2; 2021 0.5; 2022 0.5
  - Liquid Assets to Total Assets (Liquid Asset Ratio): 2016 26.4; 2017 30.7; 2018 34.5; 2019 31.3; 2020 30.9; 2021 37.5; 2022 34.0

### Anti-corruption efforts (authorities’ self-assessment)
- Corporate Transparency:
  - Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill (before Parliament) will reform Companies House and improve transparency for UK companies and partnerships.
  - August 2022: launched the Register of Overseas Entities requiring overseas companies owning or buying property in the UK to reveal real identities of owners (including trusts) to Companies House.
  - UK organized and participated in Beneficial Ownership Leadership Group events (December 2021, July 2022, December 2022) to promote publicly accessible beneficial ownership registers.
  - March 2023: published the Economic Crime Plan 2 with commitments to enhance domestic and international corporate transparency.
- OECD Working Group Recommendations:
  - UK last reported progress on outstanding recommendations from its Phase 4 Evaluation in June 2021.
  - UK has fully or partially implemented 37 out of 44 recommendations overall.
  - UK to report back on remaining recommendations in June 2023.
- International Anti-Corruption:
  - Developing a new Anti-Corruption Strategy with publication expected in 2023.
  - Anti-corruption provisions included in trade agreements with Australia and New Zealand (examples: anti-money laundering, confiscation of proceeds of corruption, measures to restrict entry of corruption actors).
  - Published Fifth National Action Plan for Open Government 2021–23 (NAP5); developing Sixth National Action Plan 2024–2025.
  - Continued use of sanctions powers, including Global Anti-Corruption sanctions regime; new wave of sanctions announced 9 December 2022; coordinated designation actions (10 February) alongside the US.
  - Supported G7 2022 commitment to establish 15 Beneficial Ownership registers in Africa and engaged multilaterally.
  - Participated in UN Convention Against Corruption Working Groups on Prevention and Asset Recovery.
  - Participated in the second US-led Summit for Democracy (29–30 March 2023); anti-corruption commitments from the first summit are on track or exceeded; engaged with the Financial Transparency and Integrity Cohort.

*UNITED KINGDOM  INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND*

### Annex I. Preliminary External Sector Assessment

### Annex I. Preliminary External Sector Assessment

### Overall Assessment
- The external position in 2022 was preliminarily assessed broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
- The CA deficit deteriorated in 2022, reflecting a sharp terms-of-trade shock triggered by Russia’s war in Ukraine.
- The CA deficit could temporarily stay high in 2023–24 due to the adjustment of income flows, before gradually narrowing over the medium term as the trade balance improves.
- Uncertainty around this assessment remains significant, due to measurement issues, the evolving effects of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, and the impact on capital flows of any final agreement between the EU and the UK on financial services.

### Potential Policy Responses
- Gradual fiscal consolidation, while preserving the quality of key public services and protecting the vulnerable, should:
  - improve net public savings and help offset the decline in net private savings as private investment slowly recovers;
  - help maintain the CA broadly in line with fundamentals and desirable policies.
- Over the medium term, implement structural reforms to boost international competitiveness, including:
  - upgrading the labor skills base to support labor reallocation to fast-growing sectors;
  - bolstering national savings to help finance increased investment needs, including in support of the climate transition.

### Foreign Asset and Liability Position and Trajectory
Background and key metrics (2022):
- NIIP: -11 percent of GDP (improved from -15 percent of GDP in 2021).
- Gross Assets: 563 (percent of GDP).
- Debt Assets: 283 (percent of GDP).
- Gross Liabilities: 574 (percent of GDP).
- Debt Liabilities: 293 (percent of GDP).

Findings:
- A positive valuation effect led to an improvement of the NIIP despite the wider CA deficit.
- Composition: about three-fifth of gross assets and liabilities is accounted for by other investment (221 percent of GDP in assets and 207 percent in liabilities) and portfolio investment (128 percent of GDP in assets and 132 percent in liabilities).
- Geographic concentration: three-fourth of gross assets and liabilities are accounted for by the United States, other European countries, and Japan.
- External liabilities have a larger share denominated in pounds than do external assets.
- IMF staff project that the NIIP will moderately decrease over the medium term, in line with projected (small) CA deficits; however, large and volatile valuation effects make these estimates particularly uncertain.
- Since 2016, CA flows (negative) have not explained changes in the NIIP (largely positive) mainly due to:
  - valuation gains from the pound’s depreciation;
  - retained earnings on portfolio equity (not recorded in the income balance);
  - inflation compensation on debt interest (not recorded in the income balance).
- Fluctuations in large gross stock positions (both gross assets and gross liabilities exceed 500 percent of GDP) could be a potential source of vulnerability.
- Large short-term debt liability positions are sensitive to changes in market sentiment.
- Exchange rate flexibility and a net liability position in domestic currency offer some insurance against external crises.

### Current Account
Key metrics (2022):
- CA: -3.8 (percent of GDP).
- Cycl. Adj. CA: -2.2 (percent of GDP).
- EBA Norm: -1.0 (percent of GDP).
- EBA Gap: -1.2 (percent of GDP).
- COVID-19 Adj.: -0.3 (percent of GDP).
- Other Adj.: 0.7 (percent of GDP).
- Staff Gap: -0.8 (percent of GDP).

Background and findings:
- The CA deficit widened from 1.5 percent of GDP in 2021 to 3.8 percent of GDP in 2022 due to a widening trade deficit from the negative terms-of-trade shock from surging energy prices following the war in Ukraine.
- Net private savings declined from 6.8 percent in 2021 to 2.5 percent in 2022, more than offsetting lower net public borrowing from 8.3 percent in 2021 to 6.2 percent in 2022.
- Gross savings declined, while investment increased.
- IMF staff project that CA will moderately decrease to – 3½ percent of GDP over the medium term.

Assessment details:
- The EBA CA model estimates a norm of –1.0 percent of GDP and a CA gap of –1.2 percent of GDP.
- Adjustments to EBA estimates include lingering COVID-19 impact totaling (–0.3 percent of GDP): travel services (– 0.4 percent of GDP) and transport balances (+0.1 percent of GDP).
- Unrecorded income adjustments: retained earnings on portfolio equity (0.2 percent of GDP) and inflation compensation on debt interest (0.5 percent of GDP) contributed to an underestimation of the underlying CA.
- IMF staff assess the CA gap in the range of –1.8 to 0.2 percent of GDP, with a midpoint of –0.8 percent of GDP.

### Real Exchange Rate
Key movements:
- The pound depreciated in real effective terms in 2022 by 1.4 percent relative to its average level in 2021, driven entirely by nominal depreciation largely due to the surge in the dollar.
- Overall, the pound has depreciated in real terms by about 3.4 percentage points since mid-2016, reflecting market expectations of more restricted access to the EU market under post-Brexit trade arrangements.
- As of the end of April 2023, the REER had appreciated by 1.1 percent compared to the 2022 average.

Assessment:
- IMF staff CA gap implies a REER gap of about 2.9 percent in 2022 (applying an estimated elasticity of 0.28).
- The EBA REER level and index approaches suggest a gap of 2.3 and –8.4 percent, respectively, for 2022.
- Consistent with the staff CA gap, the IMF staff assess the REER gap to be about 2.9 percent, in a range of –0.7 to 6.4 percent.

### Capital and Financial Accounts: Flows and Policy Measures
Flows (2022, percent of GDP):
- CA deficit: 3.8 percent of GDP (financing need).
- Net portfolio investment: 3.5 percent of GDP (financing).
- Financial derivatives and other investment: 2.8 percent of GDP (financing).
- FDI: -3.8 percent of GDP (net outflow).
- Errors and omissions: 1.3 percent of GDP.

Assessment:
- Given the UK’s role as an international financial center, portfolio investment and other investment are key components of the financial account.
- Large fluctuations in capital flows are inherent and present a potential source of vulnerability, mitigated by sound financial regulation and supervision and a healthy financial sector.
- An additional risk: financial account flows may decelerate due to changes in the trade relationship with the European Union and the shift of some financial services to the European Union.

### FX Intervention and Reserves Level
- The pound has the status of a global reserve currency.
- Sterling’s share of global reserves stands at about 4.6 percent (no material change since 2015).
- Reserves held by the United Kingdom are typically low relative to standard metrics, and the currency is freely floating.

---

### Annex II. External Debt Sustainability Analysis

### Summary Assessment
- External debt peaked at 334 percent of GDP in 2020 (denominator effects during the Covid crisis) and is projected under the baseline to decline to about 268 percent of GDP over the medium term.
- In historical scenarios (including the Covid crisis), external debt would increase significantly (to 321 percent of GDP by the end of the forecast horizon).
- With more than ¼ of external debt denominated in foreign currency, a real depreciation would also lead to a sizable increase of external debt; however, a net asset position in foreign currency suggests that external debt is sustainable.
- Structural reforms to increase productivity and preservation of strong policy frameworks would help contain external vulnerabilities as the country adjusts to the post-Brexit trade regime.

### Background and Key Findings
- External debt peaked at 334 percent of GDP in 2020, mainly due to pandemic-induced contraction in nominal GDP; pre-pandemic external debt had stayed at around 300 percent of GDP since 2013.
- Composition: almost half of external debt comprises short-term bank liabilities; public debt accounts for a tenth.
- Despite sizable external debt, NIIP has averaged about -10 percent of GDP since 2000 because positive valuation gains have tended to offset current account deficits.

### Projections and Scenario Results
Baseline projections:
- External debt projected to gradually decline to about 268 percent of GDP by 2028 as economic recovery and the non-interest current account induce positive dynamics.

Scenario outcomes:
- Historical scenario: external debt climbs to 321 percent of GDP by the end of the forecast horizon (based on average of past ten years, including Covid shock and sizeable pound depreciation).
- Growth shock scenario (standardized shocks calibrated to ½ standard deviation for interest rates, growth, and the current account): external debt rises to 302 percent of GDP.
- Depreciation shock: external debt rises to 317 percent of GDP.
- Gross debt assets at about 283 percent of GDP and a net assets position in foreign currency provide some insurance against shocks.
- Short-term liability positions at twice the value of GDP increase sensitivity to market sentiment.
- Policy implication: uphold robust policy frameworks and implement appropriate structural reforms to preserve sustainability.

### Table 1 highlights (selected figures)
- Baseline external debt trajectory: 2018: 300; 2019: 290; 2020: 334; 2021: 321; 2022: 293; 2023: 285; 2024: 279; 2025: 275; 2026: 272; 2027: 270; 2028: 268 (percent of GDP).
- Change in external debt (2018–2028): 0.1, -10.0, 44.8, -13.7, -27.7, -8.3, -5.8, -4.1, -3.0, -2.4, -1.8 (percent of GDP).
- Identified external debt-creating flows (2018–2028): -9.0, -4.1, 13.2, -22.5, -11.8, 3.0, 1.2, -2.1, -1.3, -0.7, -0.1 (percent of GDP).
- Current account deficit, excluding interest payments (2018–2028): -1.3, -2.9, -0.8, -2.0, -5.8, -5.7, 0.3, -0.1, 0.0, 0.0, -0.4 (percent of GDP).
- Exports (2018–2028): 31.2, 31.3, 29.2, 28.8, 32.7, 33.9, 34.5, 34.6, 34.5, 34.4, 34.3 (percent of GDP).
- Imports (2018–2028): 32.8, 32.9, 28.9, 30.1, 36.2, 37.3, 37.1, 36.7, 36.4, 36.2, 36.1 (percent of GDP).
- Gross external financing need (in billions of US dollars, selected): 574, 162, 185, 916, 638, 670, 1469, 807, 667, 446, 777, 881, 628, 566 (as reported across projection rows).

### Stress test figures (selected)
- Baseline: 268 (external debt, percent of GDP).
- Interest-rate shock: 271.
- Historical scenario: 321.
- CA shock: 272.
- Combined shock: 288.
- Real depreciation shock (one-time real depreciation of 30 percent occurs in 2021): 317.
- Growth shock: 302.

### Key macroeconomic assumptions (selected)
- Real GDP growth (selected years): 2018: 1.7; 2019: 1.6; 2020: -11.0; 2021: 7.6; 2022: 4.1; 2023: 1.6; 2024: 4.8; 2025: 0.4; 2026: 1.0; 2027: 2.2; 2028: 2.0 (percent).
- Nominal external interest rate (selected): 2018: 1.9; 2019: 1.9; 2020: 1.3; 2021: 1.2; 2022: 2.9; 2023: 1.7; 2024: 0.5; 2025: 3.4; 2026: 1.3; 2027: 1.4; 2028: 1.4 (percent).
- Growth of exports (US dollar terms, selected): 2018: 9.3; 2019: -0.7; 2020: -11.4; 2021: 13.7; 2022: 12.0; 2023: 2.4; 2024: 8.3; 2025: 7.7; 2026: 9.5; 2027: 6.4; 2028: 5.6 (percent).
- Growth of imports (US dollar terms, selected): 2018: 9.4; 2019: -0.5; 2020: -16.8; 2021: 20.1; 2022: 18.9; 2023: 3.3; 2024: 11.4; 2025: 7.0; 2026: 7.1; 2027: 5.0; 2028: 5.2 (percent).

Final policy implication:
- Although external debt is sustainable under the baseline, vulnerabilities remain (high gross and short-term liabilities, exposure to real depreciation). Preserving sustainability requires robust policy frameworks and structural reforms to boost productivity.

*Source: IMF staff Annex I (Preliminary External Sector Assessment) and Annex II (External Debt Sustainability Analysis).*

### Annex III. Risk Assessment Matrix

### Annex III. Risk Assessment Matrix

### High-likelihood risks, expected impacts, and recommended policies
- Intensification of regional conflict(s) (Relative likelihood: High)
  - Expected impact:
    - "Escalation of Russia’s war in Ukraine or other regional conflicts and resulting economic sanctions disrupt trade (e.g., energy, food, tourism, and/or critical supply chain components), remittances, refugee flows, FDI and financial flows, and payment systems."
  - Policy recommendations:
    - (none explicitly listed under this entry in the source text)

- Surging energy prices (Relative likelihood: High)
  - Expected impact:
    - "Surging energy prices impose an adverse terms of trade shock, raising inflation while worsening the growth outlook. Export competitiveness of UK firms is adversely affected, which slows down activity. High energy prices have an adverse impact on already stretched vulnerable households, leading to lower domestic demand."
  - Policy recommendations:
    - "Accelerate the green transition."
    - "Extend energy support schemes but improve targeting and provide a timetable for sunsetting."
    - "Monetary policy might need to tighten to keep inflation expectations well-anchored and return inflation to target in a reasonable timeframe."

- Persistent high inflation / de-anchoring of expectations (Relative likelihood: High)
  - Expected impact:
    - "High inflation remains sticky, leading to de-anchoring of inflation expectations, and raising core yields and risk premia. Persistence in wage and price-setting, and supply-side constraints and shocks keep inflation at elevated levels and push medium-term expectations upwards."
    - "Inflation remains higher for longer, prompting the BoE to tighten monetary policy more to return inflation to target. A period of below trend output growth and potentially a recession would follow. Highly leveraged elements of the private sector would face refinancing and solvency problems, activating macro-financial feedback channels that would deepen the recession."
  - Policy recommendations:
    - "Adjust monetary policy as needed to anchor inflation expectations and return inflation to target in a reasonable timeframe."
    - "Fiscal policy should let automatic stabilizers operate, while avoiding a stance that conflicts with monetary policy objectives."

- Abrupt global slowdown or recession (Relative likelihood: High)
  - Expected impact:
    - "Global and idiosyncratic risk factors combine to cause a synchronized sharp growth downturn, with recessions in some countries, adverse spillovers through trade and financial channels, and markets fragmentation."
    - Specific channels: "In the U.S., amid tight labor markets, supply disruptions and/or commodity price shocks, inflation remains elevated, prompting the Fed to keep rates higher for longer and resulting in dollar strengthening, a more abrupt financial and housing market correction, and 'hard landing'. In Europe, intensifying fallout from the war in Ukraine, worsening energy crisis and supply disruptions, and monetary tightening exacerbate economic downturns and housing market corrections."
    - UK-specific: "Lower trading partner growth weigh on net exports and growth. While rising economic slack would exert downward pressure on inflation, there could also be increased price pressures if the pound depreciates due to tighter-than-anticipated Fed policies."
  - Policy recommendations:
    - "Adjust monetary policy as needed to keep inflation expectations anchored and return inflation to target in a reasonable timeframe, while accounting for changes in the outlook for demand and inflation."
    - "Fiscal policy should let automatic stabilizers operate, while avoiding a stance that conflicts with monetary policy objectives."

### Medium- and low-likelihood risks, expected impacts, and recommended policies
- Systemic financial instability (Relative likelihood: Medium)
  - Expected impact:
    - "Sharp swings in real interest rates, risk premia, and assets repricing amid economic slowdowns and policy shifts trigger insolvencies in countries with weak banks or non-bank financial institutions, causing markets dislocations and adverse cross-border spillovers."
    - "Higher funding costs and a shift in risk sentiment lead to bond repricing and financial tightening, a reduction of credit growth and strains on leveraged corporates and households. Insolvencies increase, resulting in rapid deterioration of bank balance sheets and profitability. Tightening of financial conditions strain some weaker financial institutions and lead to housing market corrections. Growth declines sharply, while sterling depreciates."
  - Policy recommendations:
    - "Ease macroprudential policy (for example, releasing the CCyB rate) to avoid exacerbating the credit downturn, accompanied with targeted liquidity provisions to address financial stress in core markets."
    - "Monetary policy tightening may have to pause (and there may even have to be some easing) if demand and expected inflation weaken substantially. However, should inflationary pressures persist, for example because of sterling depreciation, monetary policy would need to remain tight enough to anchor inflation expectations and would need to carefully communicate the different objectives of their policy tools."
    - "Fiscal policy should allow automatic stabilizers to operate, but discretionary stimulus should only be deployed if monetary policy is unable to loosen at the pace and magnitude necessitated by the deterioration in demand and remain mindful of exhausting fiscal space and exacerbating increases in risk premia."

- Monetary policy miscalibration (Relative likelihood: Medium)
  - Expected impact:
    - "Amid high economic uncertainty and volatility, major central banks slow monetary policy tightening or pivot to loosen monetary policy stance prematurely, de-anchoring inflation expectations and triggering a wage-price spiral in tight labor markets."
    - "Inflation remains higher for longer, prompting the BoE to tighten monetary policy more to re-anchor inflation expectations and return inflation to target. A period of below trend output growth and potentially a recession would follow. Highly leveraged elements of the private sector would face refinancing and solvency problems, activating macro-financial feedback channels that would deepen the recession."
  - Policy recommendations:
    - "Adjust monetary policy as needed to anchor inflation expectations and return inflation to target in a reasonable timeframe."
    - "Fiscal policy should let automatic stabilizers operate, while avoiding a stance that conflicts with monetary policy objectives."

- Problems with the Brexit transition (Relative likelihood: Low)
  - Expected impact:
    - "Lack of equivalence decisions for financial services by the EU, and more importantly, lack of clarity about the path forward with the EU on financial services. Lack of clear and feasible plan on the retained EU laws."
    - "Market fragmentation increases the cost of financial services and the continuing uncertainty about the adjustment path and future regulatory framework leads to a decrease in business investment and weighs on growth."
  - Policy recommendations:
    - "Re-engage with the EU to complete the framework for cooperation on financial regulatory issues."
    - "Clarify the plan for the retained EU laws."

### Other high-likelihood risks and policy guidance
- Deepening geo-economic fragmentation (Relative likelihood: High)
  - Expected impact:
    - "Broader and deeper conflict(s) and weakened international cooperation lead to a more rapid reconfiguration of trade and FDI, supply disruptions, technological and payments systems fragmentation, rising input costs, financial instability, a fracturing of international monetary and financial systems, and lower potential growth."
    - "Trade barriers and supply disruptions lead to shortages in crucial inputs, higher inflation and production bottlenecks that reduce economic activity—albeit with uneven sectoral effects—and weaker confidence. These amount to an adverse supply shock in the near term and lower potential growth over the medium term."
  - Policy recommendations:
    - "Diversify energy production and secure supply chains to avoid shortages of critical raw materials."
    - "Adjust monetary policy as needed to anchor inflation expectations and return inflation to target in a reasonable timeframe."
    - "Fiscal policy should let automatic stabilizers operate, and provide targeted support to the vulnerable, while avoiding a stance that conflicts with monetary policy objectives."

- Social discontent (Relative likelihood: High)
  - Expected impact:
    - "Supply shocks, high inflation, real wage drops, and spillovers from crises in other countries worsen inequality, trigger social unrest, and give rise to financing pressures and damaging populist policies."
    - "Social tensions around economic adjustments cause disruptions and erode trust in policy makers. The resulting political instability complicates reaching political consensus on policies, including to fight inflation. Labor strikes escalate, further complicating challenges with public service delivery and impacting economic activity."
  - Policy recommendations:
    - "Expand support to the most vulnerable households."
    - "Re-engage with social partners to de-escalate the situation."

### Key fiscal and debt assessments (Annex V excerpts)
- "Under the baseline scenario, the primary fiscal deficit declines below 2 percent of GDP as temporary fiscal support measures are unwound, and a gradual fiscal consolidation takes place in accordance with the medium-term fiscal plans set out in Spring Budget 2023."
- "General government gross debt continues to rise through 2026, stabilizing at 110 percent of GDP at the end of the projection horizon (well-above pre-crisis projections), in part reflecting less favorable automatic debt dynamics."
- "Gross financing needs (GFNs) average 13 percent of GDP over 2023–28 (compared to pre-pandemic levels at 9 percent), reflecting increased debt service costs."
- "While high GFNs and quantitative tightening by the BoE is expected to increase the supply of gilts, domestic banks appear to have sufficient residual absorption capacity once likely NBFI demand is accounted for."
- Staff view on risks: "Moderate risk from debt non-stabilization and high gross financing needs are mitigated by the UK’s long debt maturity, lack of foreign currency debt and substantial market absorption capacity for gilts aided by the UK's large institutional investor base and the sterling's status as a global reserve currency."
- Background context:
  - "The decline in the public debt-to-GDP ratio continued in 2022 despite the energy price shock, as high inflation lifted the denominator."
  - "Credibility in the fiscal framework was restored by the Autumn Statement in November 2022, which set out medium-term fiscal consolidation plans, and returned gilt yields to levels consistent with broader monetary and financial conditions."
- Fiscal baseline assumption:
  - "Staff’s baseline is built on the medium-term fiscal framework contained in Spring Budget 2023, which entails a decline in the fiscal deficit in 2024 as energy support measures are phased out and GDP growth picks up, and sustained structural restraint thereafter maintaining the primary deficit at less than 2 percent of GDP in FY25–28."

### Selected policy proposals and fiscal measures (from annexes)
- Autumn Statement 2022 and Spring Budget 2023 measures (selected; comments summarized in source)
  - Income tax increases and business rate relief.
  - "Increase in the effective rate and coverage of windfall taxes on energy suppliers."
  - "Introduction of an energy price cap (Energy Price Guarantee Scheme)."
  - "New round of targeted energy and cost-of-living support" for means-tested and disability benefits recipients and pensioners; social benefits, state pensions and the National Living Wage were to increase with inflation.
  - "Confirmation of the increase in the corporation tax rate from 19 to 25 percent and improvement to capital investment allowance."
  - Replacing the Energy Bill Relief Scheme with the Energy Bills Discount Scheme (on average "around 80 percent less generous").
  - Rollout of expanded childcare (staged: from April 2024, September 2024, September 2025 as detailed in source).
  - "Introduction of a 3-year capital investment allowance."

- Staff recommendations for high-quality measures (selected)
  - "Close tax loopholes" across corporate, personal income, and social security tax bases.
  - "Reform property taxation" to deliver a fairer council tax and rebalance away from stamp duty.
  - "Increase carbon taxation."
  - "Reform the tax system more broadly."
  - "Ensure that resources are being deployed in the most efficient and impactful manner (including enhancing performance-budgeting and taking forward the Procurement Bill)."
  - "Eliminate the ‘triple lock’ on pensions and/or bring forward the delay in state pension age." (Background: "The state pension age is due to rise from 66 to 67 by 2028. The next increase, to 68, is not due to happen until between 2044 and 2046.")
  - "Increase in public pay spending to address ongoing public sector strikes and maintain high quality services and retain public sector workers."
  - "Increase public investment for the green transition." (CCC estimate: "about £50 billion (2.1 percent of GDP) per year in additional investment is required to get to net zero by 2050, of which they expect 1/3 to be public and 2/3 private.")

*Source: Annex III. Risk Assessment Matrix; Annex IV and Annex V excerpts from the provided IMF content.*

### 4. Risks and mitigating factors. The Debt Fanchart and GFN Financeability modules both

### 4. Risks and mitigating factors. The Debt Fanchart and GFN Financeability modules both signal moderate risk

### Risk assessment and mitigating factors
- Debt Fanchart and GFN Financeability modules both signal moderate risk (Figure 7 / Figure 6).
- Debt fanchart drivers:
  - High uncertainty, as indicated by the fanchart width.
  - High probability of debt non-stabilization but moderate end-projection debt levels when adjusted for institutional quality.
- GFN Financeability drivers:
  - Moderately high average GFNs under baseline projections.
  - In a generalized stress scenario (increased deficits, inflation, lower growth, shortening of debt maturities):
    - GFNs exceed 25 percent of GDP.
    - Needed (residual) absorption of government debt by domestic banks increases further owing to limited rollover of external private financing and continued QT by the BoE.
    - Cumulative absorption reaches only 12 percent of sterling-denominated bank assets by end-horizon, owing to the current very low level of government exposure of the banking sector (at about 2½  percent of sterling-denominated assets).
- Mitigating factors cited by staff:
  - Very long debt maturity (of about 14 years on average) that smoothes GFNs and limits pass-through from higher yields to effective interest rates.
  - Lack of foreign currency debt that mitigates FX risks.
  - Substantial market absorption capacity for gilts aided by the UK's large institutional investor base and the sterling's status as a global reserve currency, which mitigate liquidity risks.
- Staff overall assessment: overall risks of sovereign stress are assessed to be low.

*Key numeric risk indicators (as presented in the source)*
- Fanchart width45.50.7
- Probability of debt not stabilizing (pct)88.40.7
- Terminal debt level x institutions index25.60.6
- Debt fanchart index...2.0
- Average GFN in baseline12.94.4
- Bank claims on government (pct bank assets)2.60.9
- Chg. in claims on govt. in stress (pct bank asset11.73.9
- GFN financeability index...9.2
- Prob. of missed crisis, 2023-2028 (if stress not predicted): 18.2 pct.
- Prob. of false alarm, 2023-2028 (if stress predicted): 26.1 pct.

### Debt coverage, structure, and disclosures
- Coverage in the SRDSA is general government; most debt is issued by the central government.
- Subsector inclusion in baseline:
  - Budgetary central government: Yes
  - Extra budgetary funds (EBFs): No
  - Social security funds (SSFs): Yes
  - State governments: Yes
  - Local governments: Yes
  - Public nonfinancial corporations: No
  - Central bank: No
  - Other public financial corporations: No
- Commentary on structure:
  - Debt is predominantly in domestic currency and marketable.
  - All public debt is governed by domestic law.
  - Debt is mostly long-term; residual maturity: 13.8 years.
  - Share held by the central bank rose with successive rounds of QE and has started to decline with QT in 2022.
  - Remainder of debt predominantly held by NBFIs and external private creditors; domestic banking sector estimated to hold only about 5 percent of public debt.

### Baseline scenario (selected series; percent of GDP unless indicated)
- Public debt (est. and projections):  
  - Est. 2022: 103.8  
  - 2023: 106.7  
  - 2024: 108.5  
  - 2025: 109.4  
  - 2026: 110.5  
  - 2027: 110.2  
  - 2028: 110.2  
  - 2029: 110.2  
  - 2030: 110.2  
  - 2031: 110.2  
  - 2032: 110.2
- Change in public debt: -1.4 (2022); 2.9 (2023); 1.8 (2024); 0.9 (2025); 1.1 (2026); -0.3 (2027); 0.0 (2028–2032)
- Contribution of identified flows: 0.6 (2022); 2.7 (2023); 1.6 (2024); 0.7 (2025); 1.0 (2026); -0.5 (2027); -0.1 (2028); -0.2 (2029–2032)
- Primary deficit: 2.0 (2022); 2.3 (2023); 1.3 (2024); 1.1 (2025); 1.2 (2026); 1.5 (2027); 1.3 (2028–2032)
- Noninterest revenues: 39.3 (2022); 39.6 (2023); 39.3 (2024); 39.4 (2025); 39.5 (2026); 39.6 (2027); 39.8 (2028–2032)
- Noninterest expenditures: 41.4 (2022); 42.0 (2023); 40.7 (2024); 40.5 (2025); 40.8 (2026); 41.1 (2027–2032)
- Automatic debt dynamics: -3.5 (2022); -1.8 (2023); -1.9 (2024); -1.4 (2025); -0.8 (2026); -0.5 (2027); -0.2 (2028); -0.1 (2029); -0.1 (2030); 0.0 (2031–2032)
- Real interest rate and relative inflation (and Real interest rate): -1.8 (2022); -1.3 (2023); -0.5 (2024); 1.0 (2025); 1.2 (2026); 1.4 (2027); 1.4 (2028); 1.5 (2029); 1.6 (2030); 1.6 (2031); 1.7 (2032)
- Real growth rate: -1.7 (2022); -0.5 (2023); -1.4 (2024); -2.4 (2025); -2.0 (2026); -1.9 (2027); -1.6 (2028–2032)
- Other identified flows: 2.1 (2022); 2.1 (2023); 2.1 (2024); 1.1 (2025); 0.6 (2026); -1.5 (2027); -1.2 (2028); -1.4 (2029); -1.4 (2030); -1.5 (2031–2032)
- Contribution of residual: -2.0 (2022); 0.2 (2023–2032 each year except 2026 = 0.1)
- Gross financing needs: 11.6 (2022); 11.6 (2023); 14.2 (2024); 12.2 (2025); 12.1 (2026); 13.5 (2027); 14.1 (2028); 12.5 (2029); 14.3 (2030); 15.0 (2031); 14.8 (2032)
- Of which: debt service: 10.8 (2022); 9.2 (2023); 12.9 (2024); 11.1 (2025); 10.9 (2026); 12.0 (2027); 12.8 (2028); 11.2 (2029); 12.9 (2030); 13.7 (2031); 13.5 (2032)
- Foreign currency GFNs: 0.00 (all years listed)

- Memo:
  - Real GDP growth (percent): 1.6 (2022); 0.5 (2023); 1.3 (2024); 2.3 (2025); 1.9 (2026); 1.7 (2027); 1.5 (2028–2032)
  - Inflation (GDP deflator; percent): 6.5 (2022); 4.9 (2023); 3.5 (2024); 1.9 (2025); 2.0 (2026–2032)
  - Nominal GDP growth (percent): 8.2 (2022); 5.3 (2023); 4.8 (2024); 4.2 (2025); 3.9 (2026); 3.7 (2027); 3.6 (2028); 3.5 (2029–2032)
  - Effective interest rate (percent): 4.6 (2022); 3.6 (2023); 2.9 (2024); 2.8 (2025); 3.1 (2026); 3.2 (2027); 3.3 (2028); 3.4 (2029); 3.5 (2030); 3.5 (2031); 3.6 (2032)

- Staff commentary: Public debt will rise through 2026 but then stabilize as the economy recovers and primary deficits remain restrained. Other transactions include government interest revenues, which follow OBR projections through 2027, and grow at the same pace as nominal GDP thereafter.

### Realism of baseline assumptions
- Realism analysis findings:
  - Large forecast errors for medium-term primary deficit, exchange rate and output gap projections, indicating an optimistic bias.
  - Smaller errors for the public debt to GDP ratio and r-g projections.
  - Projected fiscal adjustment and debt reduction are within historical norms; maximum adjustment over any three years is above the threshold, reflecting the unwinding of energy support measures.
  - Public debt creating flows reflect increased real interest rates as tight monetary policy brings down inflation.
- Residual note: Laubach (2009) rule mentioned as a linear rule assuming bond spreads increase by about 4 bps in response to a 1 ppt increase in the projected debt-to-GDP ratio.

### Medium-term risk analysis (summary)
- Combination of Debt Fanchart and GFN indices yields a moderate medium-term risk signal.
- Moderate financing risk due to moderately high average GFNs and moderate increases in sovereign exposure of domestic banks under stress (limited external rollover, increased deficits, continued QT).
- Offset factors: very low initial sovereign exposure of domestic banks.

### Reforms to further strengthen the UK’s fiscal framework (Annex VI, summary)
- Rationale: Fiscal rules and fiscal councils strengthen fiscal frameworks, promote debt sustainability, and increase credibility of fiscal policy. Optimal rules combine flexibility, simplicity and enforceability.
- International experience:
  - About 90 percent of countries with Balance Budget Rules (BBR) saw deficits exceed rule limits in 2020; median positive deviation about 4 percent of GDP.
  - Over half of countries with Debt Rules (DR) had debt exceeding limit/anchor levels with median deviation of 50 percent of GDP for advanced economies and 26 percent of GDP for emerging market and developing economies.
- Strengths of the UK fiscal framework:
  - Highly capable Treasury; empowered fiscal council (Office for Budget Responsibility, OBR); binding 3-year nominal ceilings for departments; independent National Audit Office; strong parliamentary accountability; culture of fiscal transparency.
- Role of the OBR (Box 1):
  - OBR scrutinizes and certifies costings of announced policy measures, produces economic and fiscal forecast used by the Treasury, and assesses compliance with existing fiscal rules.
  - OBR is not mandated to assess appropriateness of policy measures or the resulting fiscal stance.
  - OBR produces an annual fiscal risks and sustainability report and provides on-the-record briefings to the Treasury Select Committee.
- Issues identified from UK experience and the ‘mini-budget’ episode:
  - Over two decades the UK has had 10 sets of rules (including 2 changes in the last 2 years), reflecting a tendency to change rules with leadership changes and reluctance to invoke escape clauses — undermining perceived credibility.
  - Approving new rules at the 2022 Autumn Statement instead of activating escape clause may have been justifiable given market stress, but the new rules are described as far from optimal (e.g., debt must be falling in the 5th year of forecast instead of the 3rd; deficit threshold of below 3 percent of GDP instead of current balance), and do not take initial debt level into account.
  - OBR’s potential is under‑utilized: currently not mandated to present analysis on (i) whether shocks are sizeable enough to invoke escape clauses; or (ii) pros and cons of alternative fiscal rules before they are voted upon. The recent stress episode suggests an expanded OBR mandate on these points might have been helpful.

*United Kingdom: International Monetary Fund (selected section content).*

### 5. Staff sees options to strengthen the fiscal framework that would allow more space for

### 5. Staff sees options to strengthen the fiscal framework that would allow more space for

### Recommended options to strengthen the fiscal framework
- All major fiscal policy changes should be accompanied by a full set of macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts by the OBR, unless the OBR assesses that such a forecast is not necessary. (Draws on experience of the ‘mini-budget’ stress episode.)
- Escape clauses for fiscal rules should be better fleshed out:
  - Define clear conditions under which rules could be suspended and when they should be reactivated to avoid the loss of credibility associated with permanent discretionary changes to the rules.
  - The OBR could assess whether an escape clause could be invoked in response to a specific shock, with the final decision resting with the government.
  - Establish a mechanism for the OBR to provide to parliament an analysis of the impact of any proposed changes in the fiscal rules before these are voted upon.
  - These additional functions would require minimal modifications to OBR’s remit, while preserving objectivity and neutrality.
- Consider a stochastic framework that reports the full probability of debt stabilization, rather than rules based on point-estimate projections:
  - This stochastic approach would take better account of uncertainty and could be nested within a higher-level “fiscal standard” that is stabler than numerical fiscal rules, providing greater flexibility while preserving fiscal discipline.
  - The probability of debt stabilization is a concept at the center of the new IMF Sovereign Risk and Debt Sustainability Framework (SRDSF).

### Fiscal standards (Box 2): concept and implications for the UK
- Conceptual distinction:
  - Standards are qualitative prescriptions that leave room for judgement (example: “do not drive at excessive speed” vs “do not drive faster than 55 miles an hour”).
  - Standards require stronger enforcement mechanisms and tools for judgement.
- Adapting the UK framework to a fiscal standard would require:
  - A higher-level objective (example provided: “debt should be sustainable with a high probability”) that is seen as sensible and prudent by stakeholders and the public, making it harder to change.
  - Development of specific tools for judgement: e.g., debt fancharts, and risk scenarios for standard or climate related shocks to assess compliance with the standard.
  - An independent assessor to determine if the standard has been met, with capacity to activate corrective mechanisms (which could include modification of budget proposals and/or delay of budget plans assessed as inconsistent with the standard).
- Rationale for the UK:
  - The UK’s strong fiscal institutions and established culture of fiscal transparency position it well to adopt fiscal standards.
  - A fiscal standard anchored in prudent debt sustainability could provide governments more flexibility to apply optimal fiscal policy while maintaining discipline, and could be more politically costly to change than numerical rules.

### Links to recent experience and frameworks
- The recommendation to require OBR forecasts for major fiscal changes draws directly from the ‘mini-budget’ stress episode, where the September 23, 2022 ‘mini-budget’ with nearly £45 billion unfunded tax cuts was delivered without an OBR assessment and contributed to acute market dysfunction (pound plunging to 1.03, dysfunction in the 30-year gilt market).
- The stochastic probability-of-debt-stabilization concept aligns with the IMF’s SRDSF (see Staff Guidance Note on the Sovereign Risk and Debt Sustainability Framework for Market Access Countries (2022)).

*Source: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND*

### Section 166 Skilled Person Reviews. Consistent with the FSAP 2021 report’s findings, the PRA’s

### Section 166 Skilled Person Reviews

### Section 166 Skilled Person Reviews and supervisory tools
- Review identified opportunities to better leverage a handful of specific tools available to supervisors.
- PRA introduced new internal requirements, training, and guidance to:
  - remove the internal barriers to use of Section 166 Skilled Person Reviews
  - make greater use of the Senior Managers & Certification Regime for accountability of key risks
  - better influence firms in adjusting variable remuneration where supervisory priorities have not been implemented appropriately by the responsible Senior Manager
- These tools will be especially prominent in supervisory workplans for the largest firms and firms with risk profiles that are out of the PRA’s risk tolerance.

### International supervisory cooperation for Lloyd’s of London
- PRA is establishing an international platform for supervisory cooperation with overseas regulators for Lloyd’s of London to facilitate the sharing of supervisory information.
- The first meeting is planned for Q4 2023.
- PRA is working with Lloyd’s to identify an appropriate list of overseas regulators to invite (based on the materiality of Lloyd’s presence overseas, e.g. by GWP written in different jurisdictions).

### AML/CFT coordination
- The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) remains the lead UK regulator for managing money laundering (AML) and terrorist financing (CFT).
- The PRA will continue to consider both topics in its prudential assessment of firms and co-operate closely and share information with the FCA and other AML/CFT authorities.

### Cyber risk and ICT/change management
- In 2022, the UK Authorities (PRA/FCA/Bank) completed preliminary exploratory work assessing the need of further regulatory guidance and on expectations for cyber risk management and cyber resilience (including international gap analysis, identification of key drivers and possible proposal).
- A proposal will be progressed and a plan of implementation will be discussed in 2023.
- The UK authorities have recently extended the scope of exploratory work to include IT and change management, which has delayed the original timeline for implementation.
- Status: Somewhat behind.
- Activities and progress:
  - Regulatory framework review and supervisory approach review are in progress; some IMF recommendations have been addressed.
  - In 2022, the PRA increased number of cyber specialist and their supervisory support and, alongside the FCA, completed a review of the Cyber Questionnaire (CQUEST).
  - In 2023, the PRA and FCA will progress the review of their approach including confirming the adoption of new testing tools for small medium firms, exploring holistic supervisory cyber assessment and piloting a new concept of testing for advanced firms and threats.
  - The Bank completed the 2022 Cyber Stress Test and took an active role in international forums on cyber resilience.
  - Through CMORG, the Bank supported sector cyber resilience capabilities including:
    - enhanced framework for supporting firm reconnection following a data integrity incident
    - a cloud control framework to support consistent adoption of controls and practices between firms and cloud service providers (CSPs)
    - an initiative to support firm and sector resilience improvements following the Log4j incident
  - Consideration of cybersecurity control verification activities to complement CBEST security testing. (BOE/PRA, and FCA)

### Beneficial ownership transparency and Companies House reform
- Objective: Improve verification of beneficial ownership information on the PSC Register and augment support to Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories in operationalizing similar registers. (HMT, BEIS/Companies House, and FCDO)
- Legislative development:
  - The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill introduced in September 2022 includes measures to reform the role of Companies House and improve transparency over UK companies.
- Reforms include:
  - Introducing identity verification for new and existing directors, beneficial owners and those who file information with Companies House
  - Broadening the Registrar’s powers so that the Registrar becomes a more active gatekeeper over company creation and custodian of more reliable data concerning companies and partnerships
  - Improving the financial information on the Register so that the Register is more reliable, complete and accurately reflects the latest advancements in digital technology
  - Providing Companies House with more effective investigation and enforcement powers and introducing better cross-checking of data with other public and private sector bodies, and enabling proactive sharing with law enforcement on higher risk corporate bodies or anomalous filings
  - Enhancing the protection of personal information and addresses provided to Companies House
  - Broader reforms to clamp down on misuse of corporate entities
- Status: On track.
- Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies:
  - All CDs and OTs have committed to introducing publicly accessible registers of company beneficial ownership; Gibraltar’s public register is now live.
  - CDs and six OTs with global financial centres share beneficial ownership information with UK law enforcement agencies (within 24 hours, or 1 hour in urgent cases) under the Exchange on Notes arrangements (put in place in 2017).
  - All CDs and OTs with financial centres have committed to the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard.

### LIBOR transition and legacy exposures
- Objective: Encourage conversion of remaining legacy LIBOR exposures of U.K. regulated firms and support foreign efforts to migrate from non-Sterling LIBOR.
- Status: NT (Near Term).
- Key facts and timelines:
  - 29 of the 35 LIBOR settings have now ceased permanently, and the FCA have announced end dates for all the remaining settings.
  - Overnight and 12-month US dollar LIBOR will cease at end-June 2023.
  - 3-month synthetic sterling LIBOR will cease at end-March 2024.
  - The 1-, 3 - and 6-month US dollar LIBOR settings will continue on a synthetic basis from end-June 2023 to end-September 2024.
  - The Bank now estimates that, across all asset types, less than 0.1% of the total sterling LIBOR legacy stock remains.
- Policy and coordination:
  - Bank and FCA facilitate public-private partnerships for market-led transition.
  - Working Group on Sterling Risk-Free Reference Rates revised objective to focus on non-sterling LIBOR transition in UK markets and active transition of any legacy contracts using synthetic sterling LIBOR.
  - FPC Record on 23 March 2023 covered LIBOR transition and judged that financial stability risk associated with sterling LIBOR had effectively been mitigated.
  - Bank and FCA work closely with international authorities and are involved in the FSB OSSG; FCA is a co-chair of the OSSG.
  - IOSCO launched a one-time review of ‘credit sensitive rates’ (CSRs) and SOFR term rate alternatives to USD LIBOR; IOSCO’s review is expected to be finalized by June 2023.

### Recovery and resolution planning for CCPs, insurers, and banks
- Objective: Prepare for diverse failure scenarios; eliminate rules that may constrain the bank resolution regime; accelerate and expand recovery and resolution planning for insurers and CCPs. (HMT, BOE/PRA, FCA, and FSCS)
- Status: MT (Medium Term) overall, with component statuses:
  - CCPs: On track.
  - Insurance: On track.
  - Banks: On track.
- CCPs:
  - July 2022: UK Government introduced proposed legislation to Parliament including extensive enhancement of the UK’s CCP resolution regime (see Schedule 11 of the Bill).
  - Enhancements will make the UK regime fully consistent with FSB standards.
  - Bank is progressing CCP resolution planning and enhancing operational capacity; arrangements will be subject to testing in 2023 and 2024.
  - Bank has commenced development of a CCP RAF program, with intended implementation in 2024.
- Insurance:
  - Work on updating s377 of FSMA to give the PRA an additional tool to deal with a failing insurer is close to completion.
  - HMT have consulted on establishing an Insurance Resolution Regime (IRR) and are considering timescale for introducing legislation.
  - PRA planning a Consultation Paper towards the end of 2023 which will expand on the requirements for all insurers to plan for orderly exit.
- Banks:
  - UK’s bank resolution regime in place since 2009; Bank continues to prepare HCF execution materials for diverse failure scenarios, including cyber, and use of multiple tools concurrently.
  - Bank is working with HMT on updates to the Code of Practice and considering lessons learned from SVB US / UK and CS failures.

### Institutional safeguards, mandates, and objectives
- Preserve primacy of FPC’s financial stability objective and strengthen focus on global standards and cross-border surveillance. (HMT, BOE, PRA, and FCA)
  - Status: I (Immediate).
  - 2022 Remit letter from the Chancellor underscores primacy of FPC’s financial stability objective and recommends support for international work to address vulnerabilities.
  - FPC emphasises that UK resilience should be at least as great as post-GFC international baseline standards, and in some cases greater.
  - FPC stresses importance of alignment with international standards within PRA and FCA’s new secondary objectives.
  - PRA’s September 2022 discussion paper noted it will remain at the forefront of efforts to strengthen international standards.
  - Status: On track.
- Preserve primacy of PRA and FCA objectives of safety and soundness and market integrity over any secondary objectives and ad hoc policy priorities. (HMT and FPC)
  - Status: I (Immediate).
  - FSM Bill preserves primacy of safety and soundness and policyholder protection; competitiveness and growth is a secondary objective.
  - PRA has publicly re-committed its approach in its Discussion Paper on the PRA’s future approach to policy and in a speech by PRA’s CEO in October 2022.
  - New secondary objective will require PRA to facilitate the UK economy’s international competitiveness and its growth over the medium to long term, subject to alignment with international standards; secondary objectives cannot be advanced independently of the primary objective.
  - Status: On track.

### PRA/FCA/BOE capacity, resourcing, and accountability
- Review and estimate expected workload and align BOE/PRA and FCA capacity and resources. (HMT, BOE/PRA, and FCA)
  - Status: NT (Near Term).
  - PRA increased funding, re-deployed resources and set up a flexible resource hub.
  - In 2022, the PRA materially increased its funding levy (by around 8 percent) to support the recruitment of 100 additional staff (7% of staffing level).
  - Second part of the PRA 2026 strategy includes transformation of capabilities around solvent exit planning for small to mid-tier firms and deployment of advanced technology to support supervision.
  - PRA expects to:
    - build capability in orderly exit planning for smaller-to-mid-tier firms
    - deploy new technology – including machine learning – to support supervisory activities
  - Introduction of new technology intended to drive efficiencies enabling more staff to be deployed to orderly exit planning.
- Ensure final accountability and transparency mechanisms under FRF review safeguard regulatory independence and pose no constraints for operational and oversight effectiveness. (HMT, PRA, FCA with other agencies)
  - Status: NT.
  - FSM Bill includes measures to enhance regulators’ transparency, accountability and scrutiny while preserving operational independence.
  - Measures such as HMT powers to require reviews of specified rules or oblige rule-making will require close ongoing cooperation.
  - New accountability and transparency mechanisms are being created for the Bank’s supervision of CCPs and CSDs, including a statutory committee for FMIs; being introduced with new Bank rulemaking powers in this sphere.
  - Status: On track.

### Data gaps on NBFI activities and flow-of-funds
- Recommendation: Accelerate efforts to close data gaps on NBFI activities, including Sterling asset holdings and data to improve management of liquidity demands by fund managers; improve flow-of-funds data including cross-border NBFI exposures. (FPC, BOE/PRA, and FCA)
  - Status: MT (Medium Term); overall progress noted as Somewhat behind.
  - Actions and progress:
    - Bank has undertaken a comprehensive survey of available data on banks’ exposures to NBFIs and is considering further data requests.
    - ONS investigating if and how overseas NBFI counterparties can be captured into the who-to-whom data; updating Financial Services Survey (FSS) to encompass a wider range of institutions and integrating FSS data into the National Accounts.
    - Bank exploring gilt market structure and collating data on Sterling asset holdings from multiple sources and coordinating with system-wide exploratory stress scenario team on data collection.
    - Bank participating in FSB Open-End Fund Assessment project, which in 2023 will include a data pilot to explore data requirements for monitoring liquidity risks for fund managers.
    - FCA and Bank participating in multiple international workstreams on regulatory reporting adequacy and gaps (commodity markets, leverage in hedge funds/family offices/long-term investors, IOSCO’s FSEG).
    - Domestically, FCA evolving reporting requirements under EMIR for more granular information on underlying commodity types.

### Cross-border information sharing and mixed financial groups
- Strengthen information sharing with relevant third-country authorities and review approach to monitor and supervise hybrid cross-border transactions, private market activities, and internationally active mixed financial groups. (FPC, BOE/PRA, and FCA)
  - Status: MT (Medium Term) with element status On track.
  - Progress and cooperation:
    - Good cooperation and information sharing with third country authorities; working arrangements tested over 2022 and early 2023 and found strong.
    - PRA enhanced trilateral relationship with FRB and ECB; identified a 12–18-month agenda for common work on CTPs, climate, Crypto products, use of DLT and NBFIs.
    - PRA undertook several joint reviews with FRB and ECB SSM on crystallised and emerging risks (Archegos, nickel, fixed income financing, crypto products) and will participate in upcoming qualitative Federal Reserve CCAR.
    - PRA worked closely with FINMA, FRB and ECB in handling failures of SVB and Credit Suisse, bolstering supervisory relationships.
    - Joint firm monitoring calls with FRB and SSM conducted in response to market volatility to assess firms’ risk profile changes.
    - In December 2022, FPC welcomed FSB's proposed 2023 workplan on NBFIs and announced plans for an exploratory scenario exercise focused on NBFI risks; in March 2023 FPC confirmed intention to publish more information in Q2.
    - Developing a quantitative data collection template on NBFI exposures alongside ECB and FRB to consider counterparty-credit risk on a group-wide basis and as a starting point for future Trilat working group templates.
    - Developing models to examine channels through which sectors propagate stress and impact aggregate liquidity in the non-bank financial system.

### Post-Brexit cooperation with the EU and CCP regulatory status
- Maintain the United Kingdom’s commitment to mutual cooperation with the EU, including intensifying regulatory dialogue to support financial stability and mitigate market fragmentation risks, including the regulatory status of UK CCPs. (HMT, BOE, and FCA)
  - Status: I (Immediate).
  - Progress:
    - PRA has signed and implemented 34 Memoranda of Understanding with EU institutions and member states since beginning of 2021.
    - PRA and FCA strengthened regulatory dialogues with EU institutions, European Supervisory Authorities and National Competent Authorities.
    - HMT welcomes renewed commitment to signing the financial services Memorandum of Understanding and is ready to operationalise the forum.
    - HMT granted the EU a package of equivalence decisions in November 2020, including a decision on CCP equivalence; recognition decisions for individual CCPs are ongoing while EU CCPs can continue providing services through the Temporary recognition regime.
    - Equivalence and recognition are unilateral decisions; EU placed time-limited decisions for UK CCPs until mid-2025.
    - FSM Bill introduces a requirement for the Bank not to discriminate on the basis of location, and heightened rules for UK CCPs, including the Senior Managers and Certification Regime.
    - Enhanced CCP resolution regime will make UK regime fully consistent with FSB standards; Bank developing policy options on second skin in the game (SSITG) and engaging with international counterparts (e.g., CPMI-IOSCO).

*Source: Section 166 Skilled Person Reviews (excerpts) from 1gbrea2023001.*

### Annex X. The Strong and Simple Framework for Smaller Banks

### Annex X. The Strong and Simple Framework for Smaller Banks

### Background and objectives
- The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) initiated a "strong and simple" framework in 2021 to simplify the prudential framework for non-systemic domestic banks and building societies, while maintaining their resilience.
- Objective: mitigate the "complexity problem" that can arise when the same prudential requirements are applied to all firms by applying a simpler but robust set of prudential rules to eligible small banks.
- Future plans include proposals on capital-related prudential requirements (planned in 2024) and options for wider application of any simplifications once the simpler-regime has significantly progressed.

### Development timeline and key milestones
- April 2022: PRA proposed a definition of a "Simpler-regime Firm" to be subject to a simpler set of prudential rules in the future.
- November 2022: In proposing implementation of the remaining Basel III standards ("Basel 3.1 standards"), the PRA modified the criteria for a "Simpler-regime Firm" and allowed qualifying firms to choose between a transitional regime or implementing Basel 3.1 standards.
- February 2023: PRA set out proposals for liquidity and disclosure requirements for Simpler-regime Firms.
- Planned: Proposals on capital-related prudential requirements (planned in 2024) and consideration of wider application of simplifications later.

### Definition of a Simpler-Regime Firm — criteria and application
- Purpose: capture small banks that are (i) focused on deposit-taking and lending activities domestically; and (ii) not systemically important.
- Size
  - Total assets ≤ £20 billion*
  - Calculated using a three-year average
  - Based on the financial reporting framework (FINREP) definition of total assets
- Trading activity
  - Trading book business ≤ 5 percent of total assets and ≤ £44 million*
  - Overall net foreign exchange position ≤ 2 percent of own funds*
  - No commodities positions
- No IRB
  - No internal ratings-based (IRB) approvals
  - A firm could develop and submit an IRB application while remaining a Simpler-regime Firm
- Clearing & Settlement
  - No provision of clearing, settlement, custody, or correspondent banking services to another bank or building society, except services provided within its group and in pound
  - Does not operate a payment system
- Domestic activity
  - ≥ 85 percent of the firm's credit exposures must be to obligors located in the UK*
  - Based on the common reporting framework (COREP) data
- Level of application
  - A firm, the consolidation group, and all firms in the group, need to meet the criteria
  - Firms that are part of foreign groups need to apply for a waiver or modification

### Implementation details and calibration
- PRA modified the asset threshold in response to feedback:
  - The asset threshold was revised up from £15 billion to £20 billion and smooth application was provided around several thresholds in CP16/22 – Implementation of the Basel 3.1 standards.
- Data and reporting bases specified:
  - Total assets: FINREP definition, three-year average
  - Domestic exposure criterion: COREP data

*Source: Bank of England*

### 1. The Chancellor has set out a 4Es strategy to deliver long-term prosperity for the UK,

### 1. The Chancellor has set out a 4Es strategy to deliver long-term prosperity for the UK,

### Overview of the 4Es strategy
- Objective: deliver long-term prosperity through four pillars—enterprises, education, employment, and everywhere.
- Focus areas for enterprise attraction: clean energy, life sciences, digital, creative industries, and advanced manufacturing.
- Policy levers: competitive tax system, flexible regulatory environment, incentives for business investment to promote productivity.
- Education reforms aimed at internal labor upskilling and reducing dependence on migration by:
  - enhancing young people’s basic English and math skills;
  - improving opportunities for life-long learning.
- Labor market policies aim to return employment to pre-pandemic levels, addressing:
  - inactivity of working-age adults (students and the early-retired);
  - re-entry barriers for people with long-term conditions or mental illness.
- "Everywhere" pillar focuses on completing the leveling up agenda to deliver equal opportunities and benefits across the UK.

### Pillar-specific policy proposals and budget allocations
- Enterprises
  - Tax simplification for small businesses.
  - R&D benefits for SMEs, in particular life sciences and technology companies.
  - Full expensing (100% FYA) permanent as soon as fiscally feasible and Annual Investment Allowance with 100% first-year deduction for investments up to £1mn p.a.
  - Increase public capital spending.
  - Budget allocations and fiscal impacts:
    - £500mn in tax reduction (0.02% of GDP)
    - £500mn in R&D benefits for SMEs (0.02% of GDP)
    - Full expensing represents a £27bn corporation tax cut for the three years it is in place (1% of GDP)
    - £600bn of planned public sector gross investment over the next five years (about 4% of GDP annually)
- Education
  - School funding and skills programs expansion.
  - Expert guidance to the government in introducing maths and education to 18.
  - Budget allocations:
    - £2.3bn to enable school leaders to continue to invest in high quality teaching and tutoring, taking total funding in FY2024/25 to £58.8bn (2% of GDP).
- Employment
  - Increase labor supply.
  - Reduce childcare costs and enhance wraparound childcare.
  - Budget allocations:
    - £7bn in labor market package (0.3% of GDP)
    - £5bn in childcare provisions (0.2% of GDP)
    - £0.3bn in wraparound childcare (0.01% of GDP)
- Everywhere
  - Develop 12 high potential knowledge-intensive growth clusters across the UK.
  - Budget allocation:
    - £80mn over 5 years, subject to proposals meeting specific conditions (0.003% of GDP)

### Macroeconomic and monetary context (selected staff report points)
- Inflation developments and BoE response (supplementary information, June 29, 2023):
  - May inflation outturn exceeded expectations.
  - Core inflation rose to 7.1 percent from 6.8 percent in April.
  - 3m/3m core inflation momentum increased to around 9 percent from 7.7 in April.
  - The headline inflation out-turn was 0.3 ppt. higher than both the Bank of England’s expectations at the time of the May Monetary Policy Report and the consensus forecast.
  - Retail energy prices will fall by 17 percent in July when regulated energy prices adjust.
- Bank Rate decision:
  - On June 22, the BoE’s Monetary Policy Committee – by a 7-2 majority – raised Bank Rate by 50 bps to 5 percent.
  - Staff recommendation alignment: staff recommended a 50-100 bps increase in 2023 (also staff’s conditioning assumption).
  - Staff view: with significant tightening in train, a meeting-by-meeting approach for further rate hikes is appropriate; the policy rate will need to stay higher for an extended period to durably lower inflation and keep inflation expectations anchored.
- BoE forecasting review:
  - In response to successive upside inflation surprises and under-predictions of wage growth and inflation, the BoE will undertake a review of its forecasting approach, supported by the BoE’s Independent Evaluation Office.

### Data, statistical, and surveillance notes (selected)
- Data adequacy: Data provision is broadly adequate for surveillance.
- National Accounts: ONS compiles national accounts in line with ESA 2010; monthly GDP released around the 10th of each month; second quarterly estimate published around 90 days after the reference quarter.
- Price statistics: Official monthly consumer price index (CPI) available on a timely basis; CPI and CPIH reference year is 2015. PPI compiled monthly and available within 6 weeks; current reference period 2015.
- Government Finance Statistics: ONS compiles GFS in line with SNA 2008 and ESA 2010; quarterly data compliant with the 2014 GFSM included in the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics database; Whole of Government Accounts published annually on an IFRS basis.
- Monetary and financial statistics: Bank of England has not yet reported to the Fund using the Standardized Report Forms (SRFs) for IFS publication; some data are reported using old forms with supplementary breakdowns; UK does not report data on non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs).
- Financial Sector Indicators: BoE reports all core FSIs and 11 encouraged FSIs for deposit takers; frequency improved from semi-annual to quarterly, but timeliness needs improvement.
- External sector statistics: ONS compiles detailed quarterly balance of payments and International Investment Position (BPM6) since September 2014; balance of payments published quarterly 90 days after the reference period.
- Data standards: The UK subscribes to SDDS and is working towards eventual adherence to SDDS Plus.

*UNITED KINGDOM—STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2023 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION—INFORMATIONAL ANNEX*

### 4.      In response to rising mortgage concerns, UK banks have agreed to give mortgage

### 1gbrea2023001 - 4. In response to rising mortgage concerns, UK banks have agreed to give mortgage

### Mortgage market measures and near-term risks
- Cumulative policy rate increase of 490 bps since December 2021 is expected to have a significant impact on the mortgage market.
- About half of mortgages are expected to reprice significantly higher over the next 18 months.
- Although repossession rates and mortgage arrears remain at historic lows, UK banks reached an agreement with the chancellor on June 23 to grant a 12-monthly delay on home repossessions.
- Agreement features:
  - Mortgage holders may lock in a new rate up to six months in advance.
  - Mortgage holders may switch to an interest-only mortgage or extend the current term for six months without an affordability check or affecting credit scores.
- These measures complement the Financial Conduct Authority's (FCA) earlier recommendations that banks communicate with and provide tailored solutions to consumers needing support to meet their contractual debt obligations.

### Inflation and monetary policy
- Priority: sustainably bringing down inflation to the 2% target.
- Context:
  - Russia’s invasion of Ukraine contributed to record wholesale energy prices and headline UK inflation peaking at just over 11% in October 2022, the highest level in 40 years.
  - The Bank of England was the first G7 central bank to raise interest rates in December 2021 and has continued to tighten subsequently.
- Recent MPC action:
  - The MPC voted to raise Bank Rate by a further 50 basis points at its meeting ending on 21 June.
  - The MPC will adjust Bank Rate as necessary to return inflation to the 2% target sustainably in the medium term.
- Staff note: if evidence of more persistent inflationary pressures appears (including tight labor market conditions, wage growth, and services price inflation), further tightening in monetary policy would be required.
- Government measures supporting inflation fight:
  - Energy Price Guarantee among other measures.
  - Fiscal policy is described as aligned with monetary policy in the fight against inflation.

### Growth and productivity policies
- Government priorities to address productivity: employment, education, enterprise and everywhere.
- Noted policy measures:
  - Actions to enhance labor participation and boost business investment.
  - A targeted package to boost labor supply focused on: the long-term sick and disabled, older workers, welfare recipients and parents.
  - Measures in the Spring Budget: tailored employment support for mental health and musculoskeletal health, a new “Returnerships” offer for the over-50s, and expanding free childcare to 30 hours a week for children aged between nine months and four years.
  - Pilots and evaluations to assess effectiveness of schemes to address inactivity and improve labor market outcomes.
  - Full expensing capital allowance announced initially for three years, with government intention to make it permanent when economically responsible.
- Net zero and energy security:
  - UK reduced emissions faster than any G7 country between 1990 and 2021.
  - Legal framework: 2008 Climate Change Act and 2021 Environment Act; target of net zero emissions by 2050.
  - Requirement to set legally binding, five-year caps on emissions (carbon budgets) twelve years in advance and publish plans for meeting those budgets.
  - March 2023 publications: Net Zero Growth Plan and Energy Security Plan refining energy security and net zero plans.

### Debt and fiscal policy
- Government commitment to fiscal responsibility:
  - Fiscal rules announced in November 2022 require that debt falls as a share of the economy over the forecast period while providing space for recovery.
  - Fiscal rules are designed for the length of a Parliament and work with multi-year spending settlements to guide policy decisions supporting macroeconomic objectives.

### Financial stability and regulatory developments
- IMF assessment: “the UK financial system has weathered the recent global banking stress well.”
- Financial Policy Committee view: UK banks are resilient and strong enough to support households and businesses.
- Bank of England interventions highlighted:
  - Financial stability intervention that restored market functioning during the pension funds’ liability-driven investment disruption.
  - Use of resolution powers in March 2023 to facilitate the sale of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) UK, fully protecting all SVB UK depositors and limiting risks to the taxpayer.
- Ongoing regulatory work:
  - Prudential Regulatory Authority’s Strong and Simple initiative for small banks.
  - Government’s Edinburgh Reforms.
  - Financial Services & Markets Bill.
- Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs):
  - Authorities emphasize building NBFI resilience domestically and internationally.
  - Bank of England launched a system-wide exploratory scenario exercise to enhance understanding of risks to and from NBFIs and interactions with banks in stress.

### Conclusion and international engagement
- UK commitments:
  - Support for the rules-based international order and multilateralism.
  - Over £4.7bn in economic support for Ukraine, plus guarantees through the World Bank and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development that enabled those institutions to provide hundreds of millions of dollars of additional support for Ukraine.
  - Significant UK support at the IMF to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust and to the Resilience and Sustainability Trust.
- Authorities express intent to continue close engagement and constructive dialogue with IMF staff on domestic and international macroeconomic challenges.

*Statement by Shona Riach, Executive Director for the United Kingdom; Matt Trott, Alternate Executive Director; and Tommy Chrimes, Advisor to the Executive Director. July 6, 2023.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2023/english/1gbrea2023001.pdf_
