## 1turea2023001

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### Context and historical performance
- Türkiye achieved broad-based macroeconomic and structural gains in the early 2000s, supporting income catch-up, poverty reduction, and marked disinflation after decades of inflation around 70–80 percent.
- Over recent years, growth became increasingly dependent on externally-funded credit and demand stimulus as reforms waned and productivity gains slowed.
- Reliance on outsized stimulative monetary policy and rapid credit expansion contributed to low and falling reserves and increased dollarization.

### The Türkiye Economic Model (TEM) and policy measures
- TEM (adopted late 2021) targeted the current account deficit and dependence on capital flows; core elements were low interest rates plus regulatory measures to direct credit to selected sectors and promote “liraization.”
- TEM policies led to significant market pressure on the lira in late 2021; the war in Ukraine added to vulnerabilities.
- Authorities doubled down on TEM as growth slowed; policy rate cuts continued into the second half of 2022.
- Selected macroprudential and regulatory measures described:
  - Reserve requirements and securities maintenance: e.g., 10% RR on newly issued TRY commercial loans raised to 20% RR and finally to 30% SM; differentiated SM and RR tied to conversion rates.
  - Collateral management: increased weight of TRY fixed-rate securities; floors on TRY-denominated collateral; haircuts raised from 5% to 60%.
  - Macroprudential: one-week repo rate cut by 1,000 bps cumulatively; TRY FX-protected deposits introduced; FX surrender requirements for exporters set at 25% then 40%; loan bans for corporates with FX cash assets above TRY 15m (later adjusted); taxes on consumer loans increased from 5% to 10%.
  - Credit terms: reduced maturity caps for general purpose loans; increased minimum monthly payment for credit cards; differentiated LTV ratios for housing loans.
- Consequences: conversion of lira deposits into foreign exchange accelerated; lira lost half its value against the dollar in weeks following loosening; large FX intervention and FX-protected deposit scheme relieved immediate pressures.

### Recent developments: recovery, inflation, and external pressures
- Recovery and activity:
  - Output rebounded by more than 11 percent in 2021, driven by a large credit impulse in 2020, relaxed mobility restrictions, and robust external demand.
  - The output gap turned positive in 2021 and has since widened; capacity utilization and unemployment and labor force participation have more than fully recovered.
  - GDP is significantly above its pre-pandemic trend.
- Monetary policy and exchange rate:
  - CBRT policy rate cut from 19 to 14 percent between September and December 2021 despite growth and inflation of 20 percent (target 5 percent).
  - CBRT cut policy rate further to 9 percent in November 2022.
- War in Ukraine spillovers and external costs:
  - Higher energy import prices doubled Türkiye’s 2022 energy import bill to a projected 10 percent of GDP and contributed to a projected current account deficit of 6 percent of GDP in 2022.
- Inflation and distributional costs:
  - Inflation accelerated to a 24-year high of 85 percent (October).
  - High inflation attributed primarily to excessively loose monetary policy, exchange rate depreciation, and shifting inflation expectations.
  - High inflation imposes large economic costs, particularly on the poor.

### External sector, reserves, and external position
- Current account and financing:
  - 2022 current account deficit widened to a projected 6 percent of GDP, financed mostly by unidentified inflows (errors and omissions) and large foreign FX deposits related to the Rosatom nuclear power project.
  - Competitiveness gains from lira depreciation have been eroded by rising inflation; the non-energy goods current account balance has not improved.
  - Tourism exports surpassed pre-pandemic levels; gold imports increased.
- Reserves:
  - Gross reserves at end-November were around USD 123 billion or 88 percent of the Fund’s ARA metric.
  - CBRT’s “immediately available” hard currency reserves stood at around USD 37 billion.
  - A measure of “core” reserves that excludes all central bank foreign exchange liabilities remains deeply negative.
- Staff assessment:
  - Türkiye’s external position in 2022 is assessed to be weaker than the level implied by fundamentals and desirable policies.
  - Much of the gap would close if staff-recommended policy pivot—including an interest rate increase at its core—were implemented.

### Fiscal developments, execution, and risks
- Fiscal execution:
  - Central government registered a 1 percent of GDP deficit through October 2022, much lower than the Medium-Term Plan full-year deficit target of 3.4 percent of GDP.
  - Strong performance driven by contained spending and still-strong revenues.
- Public debt and contingent liabilities:
  - General government debt ratio declined to under 40 percent of GDP by Q2 2022, assisted by higher inflation.
  - Debt composition improved with longer maturities and lower reliance on domestic FX borrowing; foreign holdings of public domestic debt fell to under 1 percent of overall holdings.
  - Rising risks from contingent liabilities, quasi-fiscal operations, large exposure of public debt to FX risks, high external financing requirements, and large share of FX in public debt.
- Fiscal pressures and specific costs:
  - Government spending expected to pick up sharply from shovel-ready investment projects and financing of energy SOE losses.
  - BOTAS received a capital injection of 120 billion TL in 2022, equivalent to 0.8 percent of GDP, reflected in the budget.
  - Staff estimates every extra 10 percent depreciation would lead to an additional 0.4 percent of GDP cost in 2023 (FX-protected deposit schemes).

### Financial stability, banking sector vulnerabilities, and credit dynamics
- FX liquidity nexus and currency mismatches:
  - Strong FX liquidity nexus between CBRT and banks: deposit dollarization and limited demand for domestic FX loans led to a large currency mismatch on banks’ balance sheets.
  - Mismatch closed through FX swaps with CBRT and sizable bank FX deposits at CBRT.
  - More than half of banks’ FX liquid assets held at the CBRT; more than three quarters of CBRT’s reserve liabilities owed to domestic banks—a claim larger than CBRT’s total reserve assets.
- Regulatory forbearance and asset quality:
  - Reported NPL ratios have fallen and capital ratios have increased, but capital would be materially lower without regulatory forbearance (including fixed exchange rate in risk-weighted asset calculations).
  - Loans refinanced and recorded as performing after forbearance have higher default risk.
- Credit dynamics and consequences of measures:
  - Recent credit slowdown driven by increasingly distortionary measures; credit growth slowed in H2 2022, picked up more recently, remains positive in real terms for most segments, notably credit card and export loans.
  - Requirements to hold long-dated fixed-rate government securities when lending growth exceeds thresholds led to:
    - Government bond yields falling sharply.
    - Increase in share of short-term loans in new lending, worsening maturity mismatch.
    - New long-dated fixed-rate securities classified as “held to maturity,” compressing yields and potentially eroding bank profits if interest rates rise materially.
  - Weakening of link between interest rates and credit provision undermined policy rate as main monetary instrument.

### Non-financial corporations (NFCs): leverage, FX exposure, and asset use
- NFCs resilient through pandemic; highly levered with pockets of acute vulnerability in accommodation and food, transportation, and real estate/construction.
- NFC FX-denominated debt halved in nominal terms since 2018 peak but remains high relative to peers; recent real exchange rate depreciation increased real debt burden.
- Much of recent NFC borrowing was used to build assets—FX cash holdings and inventories—improving liquidity buffers but leaving high nominal debt stock.

### Outlook and staff baseline projections (Selected Economic Indicators, 2020–27)
- Staff baseline assumptions: policy settings expected to remain too loose; credit growth positive in real terms especially for targeted sectors; fiscal impulse expected to turn expansionary.
- Growth and inflation projections (Percent, percent change for GDP Growth):
  - GDP Growth (Percent change): 2020: 1.9; 2021: 11.4; 2022: 5.5; 2023: 3.0; 2024: 3.0; 2025: 3.0; 2026: 3.0; 2027: 3.0
  - Inflation (end year, Percent): 2020: 15; 2021: 36; 2022: 70; 2023: 36; 2024: 21; 2025: 20; 2026: 20; 2027: 20
  - Current account balance (Percent of GDP): 2020: -4.4; 2021: -0.9; 2022: -6.0; 2023: -3.4; 2024: -2.5; 2025: -2.2; 2026: -2.2; 2027: -2.2
  - Fiscal balance 1/ (Percent of GDP): 2020: -3.5; 2021: -2.7; 2022: -3.4; 2023: -4.2; 2024: -4.1; 2025: -4.1; 2026: -4.1; 2027: -4.3
  - Public debt (Percent of GDP): 2020: 39.7; 2021: 41.8; 2022: 35.6; 2023: 35.4; 2024: 36.6; 2025: 38.4; 2026: 39.8; 2027: 39.6
  - Note: 1/ Central government overall balance, headline or authorities’ definition, which includes items excluded from the IMF ‘program’ definition.
- Staff expects growth to fall to 3 percent in 2023 from 5.5 percent in 2022.
- Staff expects headline inflation to fall sharply to 47 percent on average over the coming year, but remain high and much higher than in peer countries.
- Current account deficit expected to narrow to around 3.5 percent of GDP following recent declines in energy prices, but remain high.

### Risk scenarios and skew
- Upside scenario:
  - Unexpected external financing (e.g., new swaps) could allow continuation of pro-growth policies, wider current account deficit, real policy rate remaining deeply negative for longer, looser credit and fiscal policies—boosting near-term growth but exacerbating vulnerabilities.
- Downside risks (larger and more likely):
  - Domestic: doubling down on pro-growth policies without external financing could fuel lira pressures, hurting bank and corporate balance sheets with public sector spillovers.
  - External: larger/faster tightening by advanced market central banks, escalating geopolitical tensions, higher commodity prices, higher global risk aversion, weaker global growth.
  - Health: another COVID-19 wave at home or abroad.
- Vulnerabilities acute given limited buffers: low reserve buffers and domestic banks’ large claims on CBRT’s FX reserves could amplify shocks.
- Regional spillovers possible via trade, remittances, portfolio flows, direct investment, and bank exposures; impacts on other emerging markets likely to remain contained.

### Policy recommendations — "a U-turn is needed"
- Macro stance: overall policy stance judged too loose—real policy rates deeply negative; credit growth remains high; fiscal impulse expected to turn more expansionary—misaligned with large positive output gap, multi-year high inflation, and large current account deficit alongside external constraints and low buffers.
- Core monetary recommendation:
  - Decisive tightening with a higher monetary policy rate at its center—moving towards achieving firmly positive real rates—to reduce inflation durably, lower external financing risks, underpin the lira, encourage sustained “liraization,” and allow reserves to be rebuilt over time.
  - Prompt, sizeable, and credible policy rate hikes are needed to lower inflation sustainably and re-anchor expectations.
  - Reinstating interest rates as primary monetary policy instrument and strengthening CBRT independence.
- Monetary institutional reforms recommended:
  - Restore earlier arrangements for senior appointments (including minimum qualifications).
  - Introduce transparent procedures for dismissal, backed by law.
  - Strengthen CBRT’s financial autonomy by reviewing rules governing profit transfers to the budget.
- Phase-out of macrofinancial and regulatory measures:
  - Carefully unwind FX-protected deposit schemes, restrictions on banks’ balance sheets and operations, tightening of export surrender requirements used as capital flow measures, and measures forcing increased bank holdings of government securities.
  - Sequence phase-out to minimize market dislocation and financial stability risks.
- FX intervention and reserves:
  - Limit FX intervention to most extreme exchange rate volatility; interventions should be undertaken only by the central bank (not state-owned banks).
  - Rebuild reserves over time, preferably through preannounced FX purchase auctions once conditions allow.
- Fiscal policy:
  - Tight fiscal stance with targeted assistance to the vulnerable; staff recommends capping fiscal deficit at 3 percent of GDP in 2023 (staff expects central government overall deficit of 4 percent of GDP for 2023 under current policies).
  - Better-targeted energy support measures could save about 1 percent of GDP.
  - Medium-term consolidation measures (Estimated Yield, Percent of GDP):
    - Revenue options:
      - (i) Personal Income Tax reform (collection, progressivity): 0.1
      - (ii) Streamline VAT exemptions, raise and unify reduced rates: 1.1
    - Expenditure options:
      - (i) Eliminate backward-looking wage indexation: 0.3
      - (ii) Contain net lending to public entities: 0.2
      - (iii) Rationalization of ad-hoc transfers/subsidies: 0.5
      - (iv) Rationalize investment incentives: 0.3
- Social and structural policy:
  - Near-term trade-offs require targeted support to the most vulnerable as tighter policies and some structural reforms will sacrifice near-term growth for stronger medium-term resilience.
  - Shift from demand stimulus to supply-side reforms: improve business/regulatory environment, labor market flexibility, quality of human capital, increase female labor force participation.
  - Priorities to boost female labor force participation: improve childcare supply and affordability; increase public spending on childcare and pre-primary education following cost-benefit analysis; optimize targeted childcare subsidies/transfers and tax allowances; assess personal income tax brackets; enhance gender-budgeting framework; reduce cost of employment to support formal job creation.
- Financial sector and prudential policy:
  - Phase out distortionary macrofinancial measures; strengthen prudential standards; phase out regulatory forbearance; enhance BRSA operational autonomy and resources.
  - Strengthen supervision, resolution frameworks, and AML/CFT governance; implement regulatory framework for crypto assets; address FATF grey listing.

### Authorities’ views (as reported)
- Authorities more sanguine than staff on outlook and reserve adequacy; emphasized TEM’s objective to support growth while reducing current account deficit and reliance on volatile capital inflows.
- Authorities argued monetary tightening can be implemented through an integrated set of tools and that focusing on interest rates alone is misleading.
- Authorities contend macrofinancial and regulatory measures have been effective in slowing credit growth and directing affordable lending to selected net exporting sectors.
- Authorities dispute the need to reduce the state’s role in credit allocation and to strengthen central bank independence; project materially higher growth and lower inflation than staff, and a smaller current account deficit.

### Inflation dynamics and risks of entrenchment
- Inflation inertia is high; longer persistence raises risk of entrenchment through indexation and wage-setting dynamics.
- The sooner inflation expectations are re-anchored, the lower the output and employment costs of future disinflation are likely to be.
- Policy recommendation: prompt, sizeable, and credible interest rate hikes accompanied by clear re-commitment to price stability.

### Boxes and special topics
- FX-Protected Deposit Scheme (design, scale, fiscal risk):
  - Introduced December 2021 to stem lira pressure; qualifying deposits fixed maturity up to a year; interest up to 300 basis points above CBRT policy rate.
  - Compensation mechanism if lira depreciates more than set interest rate; funded by MoTF or CBRT depending on scheme type; schemes benefit from attractive tax treatment.
  - Scale: FX-protected lira deposits rose to almost 1.5 trillion Turkish lira (original face value) by end-October, accounting for 37 percent of lira deposits and 17 percent of total bank deposits.
  - Fiscal cost estimates: annual cost (Treasury and CBRT) at 0.8 percent and 0.3 percent of GDP in 2022 and 2023 under baseline assumptions; extra 10 percent depreciation estimated to add 0.4 percent of GDP cost in 2023.
  - Staff recommends full dissemination of stock, flow, and cost data disaggregated by household/corporate and MoTF/CBRT schemes.
- Box 2. The Economic Costs of High Inflation:
  - Real wages fell steeply in 2022H1; lower real wage bill and negative borrowing costs boosted private sector profits and reduced labor share of GDP.
  - Inflation disproportionately hurts the poor due to rigid consumption baskets and limited wealth hedges; real returns on gold and FX deposits stronger than lira deposits.
  - High inflation distorts price signals and investment decisions; dispersion of consumer prices and higher prices for investment goods complicate resource allocation.
- Box 5. Crypto Assets in Türkiye:
  - Türkiye has 37 active centralized crypto exchanges, estimated 15 million client accounts; daily transaction volumes averaged close to USD 1-2 billion a day (outside December 2021 stress).
  - Turkish lira FX volumes have averaged USD 3-4 billion a day; Tether has outsized trading against the lira.
  - Risks: entrance of entities with weak controls, circumvention of capital flow measures, AML/CFT risks.
  - Official action: MASAK investigation related to FTX regional subsidiary; crypto asset service providers included in obliged parties list for AML/CFT; CMB working on regulation for crypto investment platforms.

### Annex I: External Sector Assessment (key figures and assessment)
- NIIP and external debt:
  - NIIP averaged –44 percent of GDP over 2017–21; NIIP increased to –27.5 percent of GDP in 2022Q3 driven largely by valuation effects.
  - External debt expected to slightly increase from 55 percent of GDP in 2021 to 58 percent of GDP in 2022.
  - About a third of external debt is short-term (remaining maturity basis).
- Balance-sheet snapshot (2022Q3, % GDP):
  - NIIP: –27.5
  - Gross Assets: 36.0
  - Debt Assets: 16.7
  - Gross Liab.: 63.5
  - Debt Liab.: 48.2
- Current account and REER:
  - CA: –6 (2022, % GDP)
  - Cycl. Adj. CA: –3.4
  - EBA Norm: –0.5
  - EBA Gap: -2.9
  - COVID-19 Adj.: -0.5
  - Staff Gap: -3.4
  - REER: staff assesses REER gap to be overvalued with a range of 9.3, 14.1 and a midpoint of 11.7 percent (using REER elasticity 0.29); EBA REER models suggest an undervaluation in 2022 by around 47 to 57 percent (high uncertainty).
- Gross external financing needs:
  - Annual gross external financing needs projected at about 24 percent of GDP on average over 2022–27 (26 percent of GDP in 2022).

### Stress tests, debt dynamics, and contingent liability scenarios
- Combined macro-fiscal shock:
  - Public debt would rise to around 78 percent of GDP over the medium term.
  - Gross financing needs would rise to about 19 percent of GDP over the medium term.
- Combined macro-fiscal-contingent liability shock:
  - Public debt would breach 79 percent of GDP in 2023, reaching above 95 percent of GDP by 2027.
  - Gross financing needs would increase to above 25 percent of GDP over the medium term.
- Other scenario outcomes (selected):
  - Real exchange rate shock (77 percent depreciation in 2023): public debt-to-GDP around 48 percent; public debt/revenues 184 percent in 2023; gross financing needs rise to 10 percent of GDP by 2027.
  - Interest rate shock: implicit average interest rate about 23 percent over the medium term; debt-to-GDP about 41 percent by 2027; gross financing needs climb to 11 percent of GDP.
  - Contingent liability shock modeled as increase in non-interest expenditures by 10 percentage points of GDP in 2022 combined with growth shock: debt-to-GDP about 49 percent; gross financing needs 11 percent of GDP by 2027. Scenario excludes contingent liabilities from FX-protected schemes (so estimates are a lower bound).

### Financial sector and FSAP recommendations (selected highlights)
- Systemic risk and macroprudential policies:
  - Rationalize heterodox/idiosyncratic policy measures; activate countercyclical capital buffer. (CBRT, BRSA) ST
  - Refocus systemic risk monitoring to ensure FSC clarity. ST
- Banking and insurance supervision and regulation:
  - Amend Banking Law to confirm financial stability as BRSA primary objective and enshrine independence/operational autonomy/resources. (MOTF, BRSA) MT
  - Restore/enhance standards for intrusive, effective supervision and align with international minimum standards. (BRSA) ST
- Systemic liquidity:
  - Strengthen CBRT operational autonomy; focus interest rate policy on inflation; implement interest rate corridor through interbank operations solely. (CBRT) ST
  - Limit FX interventions to most extreme volatility cases; define a volatility-based FX rule; build FX reserves over time. (CBRT) MT
- Financial integrity:
  - Exit FATF grey list by demonstrating effectiveness and addressing action plan areas. (MASAK, BRSA, CBRT) ST
  - Implement FATF Recommendation 15 to address virtual asset risks. (MASAK, CMB) ST
- Crisis management and resolution:
  - Introduce resolution planning and consider extending recovery planning to all banks; enhance SDIF resolution powers per FSB Key Attributes. (SDIF, BRSA, MOTF) ST

### Data, governance, and implementation notes
- Implementation of past Fund advice: progress characterized as "mixed"; staff noted departure from Fund advice on policy stance.
- Fund relations and data (as of October 31, 2022):
  - No outstanding Fund credit; membership since March 11, 1947.
  - Quota 4,658.60 (SDR Million); Fund holdings of currency 4,545.83; reserve position in Fund 112.78.
  - SDR net cumulative allocation 5,536.39; holdings 5,508.24.
- Statistical coverage: data broadly adequate for surveillance with shortcomings in national accounts and government finance statistics; Türkiye subscribes to SDDS since 1996.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpt (Republic of Türkiye).*

### 2022. The team consisted of Messrs. McGettigan (Head), Guzzo,

### CONTEXT—A NEW ECONOMIC MODEL

### Context and Historical Performance
- Türkiye achieved broad-based macroeconomic and structural gains in the early 2000s, supporting income catch-up, poverty reduction, and marked disinflation after decades of inflation around 70–80 percent.
- Over recent years, growth became increasingly dependent on externally-funded credit and demand stimulus as reforms waned and productivity gains slowed.
- The growth model reliance on outsized stimulative monetary policy and rapid credit expansion contributed to low and falling reserves and increased dollarization.

### The Türkiye Economic Model (TEM)
- TEM, adopted in late 2021, targeted the current account deficit and dependence on capital flows, and comprises low interest rates plus a set of regulatory measures to direct credit to selected sectors and promote “liraization.”
- TEM policies led to significant market pressure on the lira in late 2021 and were followed by the war in Ukraine, which added to existing vulnerabilities.
- The authorities doubled down on TEM policies; as growth slowed, interest rates were cut further in the second half of 2022 despite global tightening.

### Recent Developments — Recovery, Inflation, and External Pressures
- Recovery:
  - Output rebounded by more than 11 percent in 2021, driven by a large credit impulse in 2020, relaxed mobility restrictions, and robust external demand.
  - The output gap turned positive in 2021 and has since widened; capacity utilization and rates of unemployment and labor force participation have more than fully recovered.
  - GDP is significantly above its pre-pandemic trend.
- Monetary policy and exchange rate:
  - The CBRT cut the policy rate from 19 to 14 percent between September and December 2021, despite growth and inflation of 20 percent (well above the 5 percent target).
  - Following the loosening, conversion of lira deposits into foreign exchange accelerated and the lira lost half its value against the dollar in weeks.
  - Large foreign exchange intervention and introduction of a scheme protecting lira term deposits (Box 1) relieved market pressures.
  - The CBRT cut the policy rate further to 9 percent in November 2022.
- Macroprudential and regulatory measures introduced (selected examples, as described):
  - Reserve requirements and securities maintenance: e.g., 10% RR on newly issued TRY commercial loans raised to 20% RR and finally to 30% SM; differentiated SM and RR tied to conversion rates.
  - Collateral management: increased weight of TRY fixed-rate securities; floors on TRY-denominated collateral; haircuts on various collateral raised from 5% to 60%.
  - Macroprudential: one-week repo rate cut by 1,000 bps cumulatively; TRY FX-protected deposits introduced; FX surrender requirements for exporters set at 25% then 40%; loan bans for corporates with FX cash assets above TRY 15m (later adjusted); taxes on consumer loans increased from 5% to 10%.
  - Credit terms: reduced maturity caps for general purpose loans; increased minimum monthly payment for credit cards; differentiated LTV ratios for housing loans.
- War in Ukraine spillovers:
  - Higher energy import prices doubled Türkiye’s 2022 energy import bill to a projected 10 percent of GDP and contributed to a projected current account deficit of 6 percent of GDP in 2022.
  - Rising energy and food import prices contributed to inflation; other spillovers were more limited.
- Inflation and economic costs:
  - Inflation accelerated to a 24-year high of 85 percent, among the highest across large EMs.
  - Türkiye’s idiosyncratically high inflation is attributed primarily to excessively loose monetary policy, exchange rate depreciation, and shifting inflation expectations.
  - High inflation imposes large economic costs, particularly on the poor (Box 2).

### External Sector and Reserves
- External imbalances:
  - The 2022 current account deficit widened to a projected 6 percent of GDP, financed mostly by unidentified inflows (errors and omissions) and large foreign FX deposits related to the Rosatom nuclear power project.
  - Competitiveness gains from lira depreciation have been eroded by rising inflation, especially at the producer level; the non-energy goods current account balance has not improved.
  - Tourism exports surpassed pre-pandemic levels; gold imports increased.
  - On a preliminary basis, Türkiye’s external position in 2022 is assessed to be weaker than the level implied by fundamentals and desirable policies; much of the gap would close if staff-recommended policy pivot (interest rate increase at its core) were implemented.
- Reserves and reserve measures:
  - Gross reserves at end-November were around USD 123 billion or 88 percent of the Fund’s ARA metric.
  - The CBRT’s “immediately available” hard currency reserves stood at around USD 37 billion.
  - A measure of “core” reserves that excludes all central bank foreign exchange liabilities remains deeply negative.
  - Exchange rate risk has shifted from the private to the public sector balance sheets.

### Fiscal Developments
- Fiscal execution:
  - Central government registered a 1 percent of GDP deficit through October 2022, much lower than the Medium-Term Plan full-year deficit target of 3.4 percent of GDP.
  - This under-execution resembles 2021 and supports staff’s projection of an expansionary fiscal stance for 2022 as a whole (¶38, Table 4).
  - The strong performance was driven by contained spending and still-strong revenues.
- Public debt and risks:
  - General government debt ratio declined to under 40 percent of GDP by Q2 2022, assisted by higher inflation.
  - Debt composition improved with longer maturities and lower reliance on domestic FX borrowing.
  - Foreign holdings of public domestic debt fell to under 1 percent of overall holdings.
  - Risks have increased from rising contingent liabilities, quasi-fiscal operations, large exposure of public debt to FX risks, high external financing requirements, and large share of FX in public debt.

### Staff Assessment and Key Vulnerabilities
- Main vulnerabilities identified:
  - High and rising inflation (85 percent).
  - Low “immediately available” hard currency reserves (around USD 37 billion).
  - Gross reserves around USD 123 billion (88 percent of ARA metric).
  - Widened current account deficit projected at 6 percent of GDP in 2022 and a doubled energy import bill projected at 10 percent of GDP.
  - Heavy reliance on errors and omissions and specific large FX deposits to finance external deficits.
  - Shift of exchange rate risk to public sector; increased contingent liabilities.
- Policy implication noted by staff:
  - The external position gap would narrow substantially if the staff-recommended policy pivot—including an interest rate increase at its core—were implemented.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpt (Republic of Türkiye).*

### 13.      But spending pressures and fiscal risks are rising. Government spending is expected to

### But spending pressures and fiscal risks are rising.

### Fiscal pressures and fiscal risks
- Government spending is expected to pick up sharply in the coming months, driven by shovel-ready investment projects and the financing of energy state-owned enterprise (SOE) losses.
- Broader fiscal risks have grown, including through contingent liabilities from FX-protected deposits, public private partnerships (PPPs), and state-owned banks.
- Main near-term risk to fiscal space: possible financing constraints.
- BOTAS had received a capital injection of 120 billion TL in 2022, equivalent to 0.8 percent of GDP, reflected in the budget.
- Staff estimates that every extra 10 percent depreciation would lead to an additional 0.4 percent of GDP cost in 2023 (see Box 1).

### Financial stability and banking sector vulnerabilities
- Strong FX liquidity nexus between the CBRT and banks: deposit dollarization and limited demand for domestic FX loans led to a large currency mismatch on banks’ balance sheets.
- The mismatch has been closed through FX swaps with the CBRT and through sizable bank FX deposits at the CBRT.
- More than half of banks’ FX liquid assets are held at the CBRT, and more than three quarters of the central bank’s reserve liabilities are now owed to domestic banks—a claim larger than the CBRT’s total reserve assets.
- Regulatory forbearance masks underlying asset quality problems: reported NPL ratios have fallen, capital ratios have increased, but capital would be materially lower and closer to regulatory limits without legacy regulatory forbearance (including a fixed exchange rate in risk-weighted asset calculations).
- Loans refinanced and recorded as performing after regulatory forbearance have a higher default risk than regular performing loans.

### Credit dynamics and regulatory measures
- Recent credit slowdown is welcome but driven by increasingly distortionary and costly measures.
- Despite sizeable interest rate cuts, credit growth slowed in the second half of 2022, picked up more recently, and remains positive in real terms for most segments, notably credit card and export loans.
- Measures include requirements for banks to hold long-dated fixed-rate government securities when lending growth exceeds certain thresholds.
- Consequences of measures:
  - Government bond yields fell sharply.
  - Share of short-term loans in total new lending increased, worsening maturity mismatch and adversely affecting longer-term investment.
  - New long-dated fixed-rate securities are mostly classified as “held to maturity”; artificially compressed yields would, over time, erode profits and weigh adversely on capital should interest rates increase materially.
  - Weakening of the link between interest rates and credit provision has seriously undermined the role of the policy rate as the main monetary policy instrument.

### Non-financial corporations (NFCs) and corporate vulnerabilities
- NFCs showed resilience through the pandemic, aided by strong rebound in activity, steady real wage bill, and government pandemic support.
- Turkish NFCs remain highly levered; pockets of vulnerability are acute in accommodation and food, transportation, and real estate/construction sectors.
- NFC FX-denominated debt has halved in nominal terms since its 2018 peak but remains high relative to emerging market peers; recent real exchange rate depreciation increased the real burden of this debt.

### Outlook and key macro forecasts (staff baseline)
- Policy settings are expected to remain too loose; under the baseline, staff assumes that policy rates remain low.
- Credit growth is expected to remain positive in real terms, especially for targeted sectors.
- Fiscal impulse (based on the cyclically-adjusted primary balance) is expected to turn expansionary as spending pressures from high energy prices and the electoral cycle increase.
- Growth and inflation projections (Selected Economic Indicators, 2020–27):
  - GDP Growth: 2020: 1.9; 2021: 11.4; 2022: 5.5; 2023: 3.0; 2024: 3.0; 2025: 3.0; 2026: 3.0; 2027: 3.0 (Percent change)
  - Inflation (end year): 2020: 15; 2021: 36; 2022: 70; 2023: 36; 2024: 21; 2025: 20; 2026: 20; 2027: 20 (Percent)
  - Current account balance (Percent of GDP): 2020: -4.4; 2021: -0.9; 2022: -6.0; 2023: -3.4; 2024: -2.5; 2025: -2.2; 2026: -2.2; 2027: -2.2
  - Fiscal balance 1/ (Percent of GDP): 2020: -3.5; 2021: -2.7; 2022: -3.4; 2023: -4.2; 2024: -4.1; 2025: -4.1; 2026: -4.1; 2027: -4.3
  - Public debt (Percent of GDP): 2020: 39.7; 2021: 41.8; 2022: 35.6; 2023: 35.4; 2024: 36.6; 2025: 38.4; 2026: 39.8; 2027: 39.6
  - Note: 1/ Central government overall balance, headline or authorities’ definition, which includes items excluded from the IMF ‘program’ definition.
- Staff expects growth to fall to 3 percent in 2023 from 5.5 percent in 2022.
- Staff expects headline inflation to fall sharply to 47 percent on average over the coming year, but to remain high and much higher than in peer countries.
- Current account deficit expected to narrow to around 3.5 percent of GDP following recent declines in energy prices, but remain high.

### Risk scenarios and skew
- Upside scenario: unexpected sources of external financing (e.g., new swaps with neighboring countries) could allow continuation of pro-growth policies, wider current account deficit, real policy rate remaining deeply negative for longer, and credit and fiscal policies turning looser—boosting near-term growth but exacerbating vulnerabilities.
- Downside risks are larger and more likely:
  - Domestically: doubling down on pro-growth policies without enough external financing could fuel pressures on the lira, hurting bank and corporate balance sheets, with spillovers to the public sector.
  - Externally: larger- or faster-than-expected tightening by advanced market central banks, escalating geopolitical tensions, higher commodity prices, higher global risk aversion, and weaker global growth.
  - Another COVID-19 wave at home or abroad is a risk.
- Vulnerabilities are acute given limited buffers; low reserve buffers and domestic banks’ large claims on CBRT’s FX reserves could amplify shocks.
- Any marked worsening in Türkiye could have regional spillovers through trade (Azerbaijan), remittances (Bulgaria, Montenegro), portfolio flows (Bahrain, Luxembourg, Malta), direct investment (Azerbaijan), and bank exposure linked to euro area institutions (Spain), though these risks are seen as manageable and impacts on other emerging markets likely to remain contained.

### Policy recommendations — a U-turn is needed
- The overall policy stance is too loose: real policy rates are deeply negative, credit growth remains high, and fiscal impulse is expected to turn more expansionary—at odds with a large positive output gap, multi-year high inflation, and a large current account deficit alongside external financing constraints and low buffers.
- Tight policies are needed to rein in inflation and reduce vulnerabilities:
  - Decisive tightening with a higher monetary policy rate at its center—moving towards achieving firmly positive real rates—would help reduce inflation durably, lower external financing risks, underpin the lira, encourage sustained “liraization,” and allow reserve buffers to be rebuilt over time.
  - Coordination across monetary, fiscal, and financial policies is crucial.
- Prompt tightening would contain adjustment costs, support competitiveness, and support medium-term growth by helping re-anchor inflation expectations and curbing competitiveness losses.
- Prompt tightening would allow careful unwinding of complex macrofinancial and regulatory measures; prolonged use of these measures increases the cost of unwinding and the medium-term growth costs.
- Shift from demand stimulus towards supply-side reforms to increase growth potential:
  - Priorities: improve the business and regulatory environment, labor market flexibility, quality of human capital, increase size of labor force through higher female participation.
  - Reforms could help strengthen resilience to climate change and facilitate transition to a low-carbon economy.
- Near-term trade-offs require targeted support to the most vulnerable as tighter policies and some structural reforms will sacrifice some near-term growth for stronger medium-term resilience and reduced exposure to downside risks.

### Authorities’ views and monetary policy stance
- Authorities argued policies were on the right track and were more sanguine than staff on the outlook, emphasizing TEM’s objective to support growth while reducing the current account deficit and reliance on volatile foreign capital inflows.
- Authorities view: monetary policy tightening implemented through a set of tools in an integrated framework; focusing on interest rates as a measure of policy stance is misleading.
- Authorities contend macrofinancial and regulatory measures have been effective in slowing overall credit growth while directing affordable lending towards selected net exporting sectors.
- Authorities stress fiscal discipline and do not expect fiscal policy to turn expansionary ahead of elections; they dispute the need to reduce the state’s role in credit allocation and to strengthen central bank independence.
- Authorities project materially higher growth and lower inflation than staff’s baseline and a smaller current account deficit.
- IMF staff recommendation (monetary policy): Prompt, sizeable, and credible policy rate hikes are needed to lower inflation sustainably, stop high inflation from becoming entrenched, underpin the lira, and allow reserves to be rebuilt over time; this tightening should be accompanied by moves to reinstate interest rates as the primary monetary policy instrument and to strengthen central bank independence.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpt.*

### 30.      High inflation is in danger of becoming entrenched. While inflation is expected to fall, it

### High inflation is in danger of becoming entrenched.

### Inflation outlook and risks
- Inflation is expected to fall but is projected to remain high, and inflation expectations are expected to remain far more de-anchored than in peer countries.
- Inflation inertia in Türkiye is high; the longer inflation remains elevated, the greater the risk it becomes entrenched through more extensive indexation and shorter gaps between wage agreements.
- Türkiye’s long history of high inflation—brought to single digits only in the mid-2000s and only for a brief period—aggravates the entrenchment risk.
- The sooner inflation expectations are re-anchored, the lower the output and employment costs of future disinflation are likely to be.

### Monetary policy: need for prompt and sizeable interest rate hikes
- Prompt, sizeable, and credible interest rate hikes are needed to lower inflation sustainably.
- Integrated Policy Framework (IPF) policies are not suitable to achieve disinflation when the monetary policy stance is not consistent with well-anchored inflation expectations.
- Macrofinancial and regulatory measures have helped contain credit growth but are no substitute for interest rate hikes.
- Türkiye’s deeply negative real interest rates:
  - Discourage savings, especially in lira, and encourage moves towards FX, equity markets, and real assets (gold, real estate).
  - Add to pressures on the lira and fuel inflation.
- A prompt and sizeable increase in interest rates, accompanied by a well-communicated and credible re-commitment to the central bank’s price stability target, would:
  - Increase incentives to hold the lira.
  - Have a powerful effect on inflation dynamics via inflation expectations and the exchange rate channel.
- The more credible and prompt the tightening, the less sizeable it would need to be.

### Strengthening central bank independence and financial autonomy
- Rate hikes should be complemented with policies to strengthen central bank independence.
- Recommended measures for the CBRT include:
  - Restoring earlier arrangements for senior appointments (including minimum qualifications).
  - Introducing transparent procedures for dismissal, backed by law.
  - Strengthening the CBRT’s financial autonomy by reviewing rules governing profit transfers to the budget.

### Phasing out macrofinancial and regulatory measures
- Higher interest rates should be accompanied by careful phase-out of macrofinancial and regulatory measures, reinstating interest rates as the primary monetary policy instrument.
- If policy rates are increased credibly, the following could be phased out carefully:
  - FX-protected deposit schemes.
  - Restrictions on banks’ balance sheets and operations.
  - Tightening of export surrender requirements (an existing capital flow measure) which has served as a substitute for warranted macroeconomic adjustment.
  - Recent measures aimed at increasing bank holdings of government securities should also be phased out to minimize risks to bank balance sheets and distortions that weigh on long-term investment.
- Phasing out should be carefully sequenced to minimize market dislocation and financial stability risks.

### Foreign exchange reserves and intervention policy
- Scarce FX reserves should be preserved and gradually rebuilt over time.
- FX intervention to support the lira should be limited to the most extreme cases of exchange rate volatility and undertaken only by the central bank itself (not state-owned banks).
- Once monetary policy tightening is firmly underway, and as conditions allow, policies should aim at replenishing reserves over time, preferably through preannounced FX purchase auctions.

### Authorities’ views on inflation and policy
- Authorities were more sanguine than staff on the inflation outlook and on reserve adequacy.
- They agreed high inflation was primarily driven by sharp lira depreciation but attributed late-2021 depreciation to supply shocks and FX market dysfunction rather than interest rate cuts.
- Authorities emphasized global inflationary pressures from supply disruptions and energy and commodity price spikes.
- Authorities argued the TEM contained FX market dysfunction and that recent interest rate cuts had not led to pressures on the lira.
- Authorities’ inflation forecasts were more optimistic than staff’s, relying on inflation expectations falling sharply as inflation falls.
- Authorities disputed the need for interest rate hikes, arguing:
  - Broader financial conditions had been tightened through macroprudential and regulatory measures despite interest rate cuts.
  - Directing credit and keeping it under control was preferable to raising policy rates.
  - The IPF-consistent framework being used would avoid the volatile capital inflows historically associated with interest rate hikes.
  - Interest rate hikes are a demand-management tool and would be ineffective where inflation is driven by large external supply shocks.
  - Policy rates were high compared to peers and neither debt monetization nor central bank financing of the fiscal deficit were features of Türkiye’s economy.
- Authorities did not expect to unwind macroprudential and regulatory measures in the short term and disputed the need for central bank institutional reforms.

### Fiscal policy: tight stance with targeted support
- Türkiye’s public debt burden remains low with some fiscal space, but rising spending pressures, higher contingent liability, debt exposure to FX shocks, and quasi-fiscal risks (including new liabilities from FX-protected deposit schemes) are eroding fiscal space and could undermine investor confidence.
- A tight fiscal stance, combined with targeted measures to support the vulnerable, would:
  - Preserve fiscal space for future shocks.
  - Contain domestic demand.
- Staff expects a modestly higher central government overall deficit of 4 percent of GDP for 2023 than the MTP’s 3.5 percent of GDP target, driven by:
  - Spending pressures from higher energy prices.
  - Lagged inflation adjustments (e.g., to civil servant wages).
  - Broader election-related spending pressures.
  - Staff’s more conservative revenue assumptions.
- Staff’s projections imply a modestly positive fiscal impulse; staff recommends capping the fiscal deficit at 3 percent of GDP in 2023, which would:
  - Imply a modestly negative impulse.
  - Help contain domestic demand.
  - Preserve investor confidence.

### Delivering a tight fiscal stance and medium-term consolidation
- Several options exist to deliver a tight fiscal stance while supporting the most vulnerable.
- Better-targeted energy support measures would provide an estimated fiscal saving of about 1 percent of GDP.
- Recommended medium-term consolidation measures (Estimated Yield, Percent of GDP):
  - Revenue options:
    - (i) Personal Income Tax reform (collection, progressivity): 0.1
    - (ii) Streamline VAT exemptions, raise and unify reduced rates: 1.1
  - Expenditure options:
    - (i) Eliminate backward-looking wage indexation: 0.3
    - (ii) Contain net lending to public entities: 0.2
    - (iii) Rationalization of ad-hoc transfers/subsidies: 0.5
    - (iv) Rationalize investment incentives: 0.3

### Energy subsidies and targeting
- Natural gas prices for households are heavily subsidized; the draft 2023 budget allocates around 2.5 percent of GDP to energy subsidies.
- Energy subsidies are:
  - Expensive.
  - Inequitable (most benefits accrue to wealthier households who consume more energy).
  - Inefficient (price signals needed to spur energy savings are blunted).
- Recommendation: phase out these subsidies and replace them with better-targeted measures such as block pricing (where consumption is subsidized only up to a certain subsistence level).

### Public debt management and fiscal risks
- Public debt management should focus on lengthening borrowing maturities and limiting domestic FX borrowing, but through more durable means rather than temporary macrofinancial measures.
- Fiscal risks to mitigate and manage:
  - Phasing out FX-protected deposit schemes should be a priority given potentially unbounded fiscal liabilities in the event of a sharp lira depreciation; phasing out should proceed carefully and only once policy and other conditions allow.
  - Energy-related spending is an important source of contingent liabilities if energy prices increase materially.
  - PPP-related contingent liabilities should continue to be carefully monitored.
  - Risk of another recapitalization of state-owned banks has increased as their lending practices are driven by non-commercial objectives.

### Fiscal governance improvements
- Strengthen oversight and management of PPPs, including:
  - Publishing regular PPP monitoring reports.
  - Finalizing the draft 2019 PPP legislation to manage PPP risks centrally.
- Improve transparency by regular timely publication of fiscal risk statements and comprehensive consolidated information on quasi-fiscal operations of all SOEs (including state-owned banks and BOTAS).
- Integrate investment and borrowing by the Türkiye Wealth Fund into the budget and have its financial statements audited by the Court of Accounts.
- Strengthen budget execution, including introducing supplementary budgets when needed rather than bypassing budget targets.

### Financial policies: phasing out distortionary measures and strengthening supervision
- Complex macrofinancial and regulatory measures should be phased out to minimize price formation and capital allocation distortions.
- Priorities:
  - Strengthen prudential standards.
  - Phase out regulatory forbearance.
  - Closely monitor systemic FX liquidity risks at an economy-wide level.
  - Implement an effective regulatory framework for crypto assets.
  - Continue improving Türkiye’s AML/CFT governance framework to address the FATF grey listing.
- Recent slowdown in credit growth is welcome but driven by increasingly distortionary policies (macroprudential policies, banking regulations, systemic liquidity-management measures).
- These measures have:
  - Distorted price formation and capital allocation.
  - Increased risks for banks: operational, compliance, governance, and interest rate risks.
  - Requirements to hold government securities on bank balance sheets have led to significant shortening in the maturity of new loans as banks try to minimize maturity mismatch.

### Role of the state in credit provision and state-owned banks
- The state should reduce its outsized role in credit provision.
- The growing set of measures impairs banks’ ability to allocate credit on a fully commercial basis and should be phased out carefully as conditions allow.
- Non-commercial operations of state-owned banks should be better defined and limited to areas of clear market failure, accompanied by strengthened risk management and direct budget compensation for losses from such operations.
- Provision of state guarantees through the Credit Guarantee Fund should be limited to clear cases of market failure (e.g., small firms lacking collateral).

### Strengthening prudential standards and transparency
- Re-align regulatory and accounting practices with Basel and other international standards.
- Reforms needed:
  - Phase out regulatory forbearance and ensure timely recognition of loan losses by drawing on capital buffers as needed.
  - Strengthen operational autonomy and resources of the BRSA.
  - Enhance monitoring of restructured loans and consider an independent third-party asset quality review to assess and improve confidence in bank asset quality.
- Specific issues noted:
  - Restructured stage 2 loans can be reclassified as performing after a short 3-month probation period.
  - Refinancing through the Credit Guarantee Fund or state-owned banks allowed loans to retain performing status.
  - Use of a fixed exchange rate in risk weighted assets and zero-risk weights for FX-denominated government exposures result in overstated capital adequacy ratios.

### Türkiye: Main 2022 FSAP Recommendations (selected highlights)
- Systemic Risk and Macroprudential Policies:
  - Rationalize heterodox and idiosyncratic policy measures; activate countercyclical capital buffer. (CBRT, BRSA) ST
  - Refocus systemic risk monitoring framework to ensure clarity of financial stability as FSC’s primary objective. ST
- Banking and Insurance Supervision and Regulation:
  - Amend Banking Law to confirm financial stability as BRSA’s primary objective and enshrine policy independence, operational autonomy, and adequacy of resources. (MOTF, BRSA) MT
  - Restore/enhance standards for intrusive, effective supervision for all banks; align regulations with international minimum standards. (BRSA) ST
- Systemic Liquidity:
  - Strengthen CBRT’s operational autonomy, focus interest rate policy on inflation, implement interest rate corridor through monetary operations on the interbank money market solely. (CBRT) ST
  - Limit FX interventions to the most extreme cases of exchange rate volatility; define a volatility-based FX rule; build FX reserves over time. (CBRT) MT
- Financial Integrity:
  - Take steps to exit the FATF grey list by demonstrating effectiveness and addressing all areas in FATF’s action plan. (MASAK, BRSA, CBRT) ST
  - Implement FATF Recommendation 15 to address virtual asset risks. (MASAK, CMB) ST
- Crisis Management and Resolution:
  - Introduce resolution planning and consider extending recovery planning to all banks; enhance SDIF resolution powers in line with the FSB Key Attributes. (SDIF, BRSA, MOTF) ST

*Source: IMF staff analysis and recommendations as presented in the IMF Country Report excerpt provided.*

### 50.      Close monitoring of systemic FX liquidity risks remains critically important. As in the

### 1turea2023001 - 50.      Close monitoring of systemic FX liquidity risks remains critically important. As in the

### Financial stability and systemic FX liquidity
- Close monitoring of systemic FX liquidity risks at an economy-wide level remains critically important; staff recommends focusing on economy-wide interconnectedness of FX liquidity when formulating policies, designing bank liquidity stress tests, and assessing liquidity coverage ratios, with the Financial Stability Committee (FSC) coordinating.
- Enhanced crisis management frameworks and contingency planning across regulatory agencies are recommended given potential systemic implications.
- Macrofinancial and regulatory measures should be phased out carefully; prudential standards should be strengthened and regulatory forbearance unwound to reduce distortions and reinstate interest rates as the primary monetary policy instrument.
- The role of the Credit Guarantee Fund and the scope of non-commercial activities of state-owned banks should be scaled back.

Key statistics and risks noted
- Inflation reached 85 percent in October.
- Growth was more than 11 percent in 2021.
- Gross reserves remain below the IMF's recommended range; "core" reserves are deeply negative after all central bank FX liabilities, including swaps, are factored in.
- Growth projected to fall to around 3 percent in 2023.
- Every extra 10 percent depreciation of the lira is estimated to lead to an additional 0.4 percent of GDP cost in 2023 for the FX-protected deposit schemes, everything else equal.
- Large gross external financing needs and low international reserves increase vulnerability to shocks.

Policy recommendations (monetary, fiscal, regulatory)
- Prompt, sizeable and credible interest rate hikes are needed to lower inflation; these should be combined with reforms to strengthen central bank independence.
- FX intervention should be kept to a minimum and reserves replenished in a transparent manner as conditions allow.
- Tight fiscal stance with targeted assistance to the vulnerable and fiscal governance reforms to improve transparency and manage quasi-fiscal activities and contingent liabilities.
- Gradually replace natural gas subsidies with better-targeted mechanisms.
- Strengthen regulatory, supervisory, resolution, and AML/CFT frameworks.

### Crypto assets, AML/CFT, and data gaps
- Integrate crypto assets into the supervisory framework and close data gaps; adoption of crypto assets has gained pace in Türkiye, raising consumer protection, capital flow circumvention, and AML/CFT concerns.
- Although regulations prohibit banks from directly holding crypto assets, improved policies could enhance oversight, risk-management, regulation, and supervision and reduce overall attractiveness of crypto assets.
- Priorities: enhanced prudential standards, tackling data gaps and standardization issues, more effective legal and regulatory frameworks, and approving the law on crypto assets.
- Continued implementation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) action plan remains necessary; Türkiye was grey listed by the FATF in October 2021 and needs to introduce enforceable legal measures and guidance for politically exposed persons and continue to implement targeted financial sanctions without delay.
- Authorities should closely monitor the impact of bilateral foreign sanctions against third countries (even if not legally applicable in Türkiye) to mitigate reputational risk.

Authorities’ actions and views (crypto/AML)
- Ongoing collaboration among supervisory agencies and implementation of international prudential standards; crypto asset service providers recently included in the obliged parties list for AML/CFT purposes.
- Capital Markets Board working on a new regulation for crypto investment platforms to strengthen investor protection.
- Authorities made a high-level commitment to strengthen the effectiveness of the AML/CFT system; FATF acknowledged further steps taken.

### Structural policies — female labor force participation and climate
- Focused structural and governance reforms needed to shift from demand stimulus to supply-side policies to achieve durable growth and reduce vulnerabilities.
- Priority reforms to boost female labor force participation:
  - Improve supply, targeting, and affordability of childcare services.
  - Increase public spending on childcare and pre-primary education (following a cost-benefit analysis).
  - Optimize targeted childcare subsidies, transfers, and tax allowances/credits for low-skilled mothers.
  - Assess impact of personal income tax brackets on female labor force participation.
  - Enhance Türkiye’s gender-budgeting framework.
  - Reduce the cost of employment to support formal job creation benefiting women.
- Climate strategy:
  - Staff presented a mitigation strategy with a carbon price rising progressively to USD 75 a ton by 2030 to make progress towards the net zero target.
  - Revenues from the carbon price could be used to address distributional effects through targeted support to low-income families, lower labor taxes, and higher public investment.
  - Türkiye committed to reach net zero emissions by 2053 and announced at COP27 an updated Nationally Determined Contribution pledging to reduce emissions growth between 2020 and 2030 from around 70 percent (business-as-usual) to roughly 30 percent; this is a bigger commitment than the previous target which aimed at reducing emissions growth to 50 percent.
  - Staff noted the need to adapt to the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism.

### Macroeconomic assessment, outlook, and vulnerabilities
- Türkiye’s recovery from the pandemic was notable: positive growth in 2020, more than 11 percent growth in 2021, and strong momentum in 2022 driven by stimulative policies.
- TEM (Türkiye Economic Model) introduced late 2021 relied on interest rate cuts and complex macrofinancial/regulatory measures to reduce dollarization and direct lending to selected sectors.
- Interest rate cuts, however, led to significant depreciation pressure on the lira; the lira fell by half against the US dollar in a matter of weeks in late 2021, relieved transiently by heavy FX intervention and an FX-protected deposit scheme.
- The war in Ukraine delivered a large negative terms-of-trade shock, widening the current account deficit and adding to inflation; the poor were affected most.
- Risks:
  - Upside near-term growth risks from unexpected external financing allowing more aggressive pro-growth policies.
  - Downside medium-term growth risks from rising distortions, misallocation of resources, constrained private credit, weakened bank balance sheets, faster-than-expected tightening by advanced market central banks, escalating geopolitical tensions, higher global risk aversion, weaker global growth, and potential COVID-19 waves.
  - Risk of high inflation becoming entrenched given limited central bank credibility and no effective monetary anchor.
- Staff view: Tight monetary and fiscal policies, careful normalization of macrofinancial and regulatory policies, and targeted structural reforms are required to restore stability and durable growth.

### Box: FX-Protected Deposit Scheme (summary of design, scale, and fiscal risk)
- Design:
  - Introduced in December 2021 to stem lira pressure and support depositor confidence; supported by large central bank FX interventions.
  - To qualify, deposits must have fixed maturity of up to a year and earn interest paid by banks set at up to 300 basis points above the CBRT policy rate.
  - If the lira depreciates over the deposit term by more than the set interest rate, the depositor receives compensation equal to the margin between the depreciation rate and the interest rate, paid by either the MoTF or CBRT.
  - MoTF covers schemes funded by lira deposits; CBRT covers schemes funded by FX deposit conversion; schemes benefit from attractive tax treatment.
- Scale:
  - FX-protected lira deposits rose to almost 1.5 trillion Turkish lira (original face value) by end-October, accounting for 37 percent of lira deposits and 17 percent of total bank deposits.
  - The share of lira deposits (inclusive of FX-protected lira deposits) in total bank deposits rose from 36 percent at end-2021 to 47 percent.
- Fiscal risk and transparency:
  - Staff estimates the annual cost, total for the Treasury and CBRT, at 0.8 percent and 0.3 percent of GDP in 2022 and 2023 under baseline assumptions.
  - The cost is highly uncertain and could rise significantly if the lira depreciates more than expected; an extra 10 percent depreciation estimated to add 0.4 percent of GDP cost in 2023.
  - Staff recommends disseminating all relevant data (stock, flows, costs) with a breakdown between household and corporate deposits split by MoTF and CBRT deposit schemes to improve transparency and assess contingent liabilities accurately.

*Source: Content unit 1turea2023001 - 50.*

### Box 2. The Economic Costs of High Inflation

### Box 2. The Economic Costs of High Inflation

### Real income and labor share
- Real wages, across all broad industrial sectors, "have fallen steeply in 2022H1" as inflation erodes workers’ pay.
- Real wages are likely to recover with a lag as workers demand higher nominal pay rises; this adjustment "will only further entrench inflation persistence, increasing the cost of inflation normalization."
- The lower real wage bill, combined with deeply negative borrowing costs and stimulus-induced growth, has boosted private sector profits and "significantly reduc[ed] the labor share of GDP."
- Index baselines and reference periods used in accompanying charts:
  - Average hourly real wages: Index, 2015=100.
  - Real total compensation of employees: 2017=100.
  - Real lira return on assets: Index: Jan 2010=100.
  - Timelines referenced include 2022Q2 and Sep-22.

### Poverty and distributional effects
- Inflation hits the poor through two channels:
  - A relatively rigid consumption basket dominated by essential goods—such as food and housing—reduces the scope for expenditure switching as prices rise; because these essential goods are difficult to substitute away from, any increase in prices can lead to large welfare losses.
  - The poor are often less able to hedge wealth against price rises, leading to erosion of economic buffers during inflation.
- Macrofinancial and regulatory constraints can prevent savers from switching to assets that better hedge inflation, worsening outcomes for low-income households.
- In Türkiye:
  - There is no data on the size or composition of wealth by income group in the source.
  - Low-income households are likely to hold less wealth and to hold the limited wealth they have in cash or lira deposits, which "historically have performed poorly in real terms."
  - In contrast, the real return on gold and FX deposits "has been much stronger in Türkiye."
  - More recently, real house prices "have also risen dramatically, increasing the net wealth of property owners, but generating affordability problems for new buyers."
- Household consumption by income (2019) is presented by quintile, with the CPI basket dominated by food and housing for lower quintiles (chart references in the source).

### Distorted price signals and investment implications
- High inflation distorts important business decisions on capital investment, hiring, and contract negotiation.
- Since late 2021, the dispersion of consumer prices "has grown significantly," making it harder for businesses to distinguish relative from general price changes and complicating resource allocation across products.
- The price of investment goods "has also grown by significantly more than consumer goods," further complicating investment decisions.
- Accompanying indicators and chart references:
  - Inflation dispersion shown as year-on-year percent change with 5th to 95th percentiles of individual CPI items (Sep-22).
  - Real house price gaps and residential housing price misalignment indices are presented with various baselines and periods in the source.

*Source: Box 2. The Economic Costs of High Inflation (as provided in the supplied IMF content).*

### Box 5. Crypto Assets in Türkiye

### Box 5. Crypto Assets in Türkiye

### Crypto asset activity: scope and trends
- Türkiye has 37 active centralized crypto exchanges, with an estimated 15 million client accounts, and the largest share of crypto asset trading application adoption across advanced and emerging economies.1
- Outside the period of market stress in December 2021 (when crypto trading escalated), daily transaction volumes have averaged close to USD 1-2 billion a day.
- By comparison, Turkish lira FX volumes have averaged USD 3-4 billion a day.
- Some assets have seen outsized trading against the lira; Tether—the largest stablecoin—has seen especially strong demand, with outsized trading against the lira compared to other EM currency trading. This likely reflects Turkish lira volatility in recent years.
- Following the failure of crypto asset exchange FTX, Türkiye’s Financial Crimes Investigation Agency (MASAK) initiated an investigation into the institutions related to FTX’s regional subsidiary and noted it had been monitoring FTX’s activities in accordance with the country’s AML laws.

### Market links with the lira and recent dynamics
- Daily crypto transaction volumes (close to USD 1-2 billion) are material relative to FX activity in lira (USD 3-4 billion average).
- Chart evidence in the source highlights a strong share of Tether trading volumes against the Turkish lira (Turkey (Lira) series) and a relationship between USD/TRY exchange rate movements (lhs) and Turkish lira crypto volumes on exchanges (Millions USD, rhs).

### Risks and channels of concern
- The increased role of crypto raises risks that warrant careful monitoring, including:
  - Possible entrance of new entities with weak controls.
  - Potential for crypto to circumvent capital flow measures.
  - Possible AML/CFT risks.

### Official action and monitoring
- MASAK has initiated an investigation related to FTX’s regional subsidiary and had been monitoring FTX activities under Türkiye’s AML laws.
- The box highlights the need for continued close monitoring of crypto activity given its scale, cross-border elements, and potential for regulatory arbitrage.

### References cited in the box
- November 2022 BIS Working Paper, Crypto trading and Bitcoin prices, evidence from a new database of retail adoption.1
- 2022 IMF Fintech Note on Capital Flow Management Measures in the Digital Age: Challenges of Crypto Assets and October 2021 IMF GFSR Chapter 2: The Crypto Ecosystem and Financial Stability Challenges.2

*Source: Box 5. Crypto Assets in Türkiye (from the provided IMF chapter content).*

### Annex I. External Sector Assessment

### Annex I. External Sector Assessment

### Overall Assessment
- On a preliminary basis, the external position in 2022 is assessed to be weaker than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
- Large uncertainties over energy prices and the drivers of large net error and omissions and their impact on Türkiye’s external imbalances.
- Assessment supported by other components: low level of reserves, large external financing needs, and the size and composition of the NIIP, all contributing to external vulnerabilities.
- The current account deficit widened significantly in 2022, reflecting the sharp increase in imported energy prices.
- Türkiye’s negative NIIP position, while remaining large, narrowed significantly as a result of a steep decline in equity liabilities due to valuation effects.
- Türkiye’s vulnerability to shocks remains high amid still-elevated gross external financing needs.
- Over the medium term, the CA deficit is projected to narrow as the REER undervaluation feeds through and as commodity price pressures ease.
- The final assessment for 2022 will be presented in the 2023 External Sector Report.

### Potential Policy Responses
- Strengthen the policy framework to underpin external sustainability.
- Tighten monetary and fiscal policy stance and rebuild policy credibility to:
  - Contain demand and reduce imports, improving the current account.
  - Support capital inflows and liraizaton.
  - Allow for a needed buildup of reserves over time.

### Foreign Asset and Liability Position and Trajectory
Background and key figures:
- Türkiye’s NIIP averaged –44 percent of GDP over 2017–21.
- The NIIP increased to –27.5 percent of GDP in 2022Q3, driven largely by a marked decrease in equity liabilities in dollar terms.
- External debt is expected to slightly increase from 55 percent of GDP in 2021 to 58   percent of GDP in 2022.
- Almost 53 percent of Türkiye’s external debt is held by the private sector, while the public sector (General Government and Central Bank) holds the remaining 47 percent.
- About a third of external debt is short-term (on a remaining maturity basis).

Assessment and projections:
- Size and composition of gross external liabilities, coupled with low reserves, increase vulnerability to liquidity shocks, sudden shifts in investor sentiment, and any global upswing in interest rates.
- FX exposure of nonfinancial corporations is high but has improved; the short-term net FX position is positive, providing some liquidity buffer.
- NIIP is expected to stabilize over the medium term because of a projected improvement in the current account balance and hover around –28 percent of GDP through 2027, but unwinding of recent valuation effects could negatively affect the NIIP trajectory.
- External debt is sustainable over the medium term but subject to risks, particularly from a large REER depreciation.

Exact balance-sheet snapshot (2022Q3, % GDP):
- NIIP: –27.5
- Gross Assets: 36.0
- Debt Assets: 16.7
- Gross Liab.: 63.5
- Debt Liab.: 48.2

### Current Account
Background:
- The current account deficit widened from 0.9 percent of GDP in 2021 to a projected 6 percent of GDP in 2022.
- Higher commodity prices resulting from the war in Ukraine have significantly weakened the energy current account balance.

Assessment and model results:
- The preliminary EBA CA model norm for Türkiye is estimated at –0.5 percent of GDP, with an estimated standard error of ±0.7 percent of GDP.
- The CA deficit of 6 percent of GDP in 2022 narrows to a deficit of 3.4   percent of GDP after cyclical and terms of trade adjustments are made.
- Resulting EBA current account gap: -2.9 percent of GDP relative to the CA norm.
- Adjusting for temporary pandemic-related shocks (transport:-0.5) results in an IMF staff assessed CA gap in the range of -4.1 to -2.7, with a midpoint of -3.4.
- Large uncertainty from net errors and omissions and energy prices creates major uncertainties about the size of cyclical adjustments and the EBA CA assessment.

Exact figures (2022, % GDP):
- CA: –6
- Cycl. Adj. CA: –3.4
- EBA Norm: –0.5
- EBA Gap: -2.9
- COVID-19 Adj.: -0.5
- Other Adj.: -0.0
- Staff Gap: -3.4

### Real Exchange Rate
Background:
- The REER depreciated by an annual average of 9.4 percent over 2017–21.
- The average REER depreciated by 10.2 percent in 2021, with an average nominal depreciation against the US dollar of 27 percent.
- As of October 2022, the REER was 8.2 percent below the 2021 average.

Assessment:
- Staff assesses the REER gap to be overvalued with a range of 9.3, 14.1 and a midpoint of 11.7 percent (applying an estimated REER elasticity of 0.29) based on staff’s CA model estimates.
- In contrast, as the non-energy CA continues to adjust, the EBA REER models suggest the REER is undervalued in 2022 by around 47 to 57 percent, although uncertainty is exceptionally large and the explanatory power of the models is very weak for Türkiye.
- The gap between PPI and CPI has widened to historic highs in Türkiye; a PPI-based measure would give a very different outcome.
- The REER would be broadly fairly valued if far more weight is placed on the EBA CA model, but uncertainty about such an assessment remains exceptionally high.

### Capital and Financial Accounts: Flows and Policy Measures
Background:
- Net capital inflows rebounded in 2022, but mainly on account of one-off flows, including large positive net errors and omissions of USD 24.9 billion.
- Positive net inflows were also driven by FDI, while net portfolio inflows weakened further over the year.
- In early 2022, a new requirement for exporters to convert 25 percent of their export earnings within 180 days was introduced, later increased to 40 percent.

Assessment:
- While net capital inflows continued to rebound in 2022, much of these were of unknown origin.
- Annual gross external financing needs projected at about 24   percent of GDP on average over 2022–27 (26   percent of GDP in 2022), leaving Türkiye vulnerable to adverse shifts in global investor sentiment.
- Capital flow measures (CFMs) should be phased out as conditions improve to increase market liquidity and support de-dollarization.

### FX Intervention and Reserves Level
Background:
- The de jure exchange rate is classified as free floating.
- Following the sudden depreciation of the lira in 2021Q4, gross reserves decreased sharply, falling to about 100 billion US dollars in 2022Q2.
- Gross reserves recovered somewhat during 2022Q3 and were around USD123 billion at end of November 2022. This increase is partly explained by inflows of the Russian State Nuclear Energy Corporation, Rosatom, for the construction of a new power plant.
- Pressures on the lira were relieved by large foreign exchange interventions and the introduction of a scheme protecting lira term deposits against currency depreciation in December 2021.

Assessment:
- Gross reserves remain at 88 percent of IMF’s ARA metric as of end-November 2022, still below the floor of the recommended 100 to 150 percent range.
- Quality of reserves remains an issue, with non-SDR basket currencies continuing to account for a large share of the central bank’s FX reserves.
- Once monetary policy tightening is firmly underway, significant non-borrowed accumulation of reserves is needed over time, as conditions permit.
- FX intervention to support the lira should be limited to the most extreme cases of exchange rate volatility, undertaken only by the central bank itself (not state-owned banks).

### Annex II. Public Debt Sustainability (selected highlights from text)
- Türkiye’s public debt ratio increased modestly to around 42 percent of GDP at end-2021, from 40 percent at end-2020.
- Public debt is projected to decline to around 36 percent of GDP in 2022, driven by higher nominal GDP growth, but is expected to increase over the medium term to nearly 40 percent of GDP, as are gross public sector financing needs.
- Public DSA suggests debt vulnerabilities are rising in Türkiye, even though public debt remains below vulnerability benchmarks over the medium term under the baseline.
- Public debt has become more sensitive to external shocks because of contingent liabilities such as the FX-protected deposit schemes.

Baseline and realism of projections (selected points):
- Debt-to-GDP ratio: 42 percent at end-2021; staff projects decline to around 36 percent of GDP by end-2022, before rising to nearly 40 percent of GDP by 2027.
- Share of FX-denominated debt increased, reaching nearly two-thirds of total debt at end-2021.
- For the central government, share of fixed-rate and floating-rate bonds for domestic debt is roughly equal; fixed-rate debt accounts for more than 80 percent of external debt.
- Growth: real GDP expected to moderate to around 3 percent in the medium term.
- Sovereign yields: effective interest rate expected to rise to 13 percent in the near term from 9.5 percent in 2021, then gradually decline to 10 percent over the medium term.
- Fiscal policy: structural primary deficit of the general government is projected to be 3.4 percent of GDP in 2022 and expected to stabilize at about 1.7 percent of GDP over the medium term.
- Maturity and rollover: maturity of domestic borrowing fluctuated in 2022; declined from 48 months (at end-2021) to 29 months by end 2022Q1, then lengthened to almost 62 months by August; recent rollover rates just short of 100 percent in August.
- Debt profile risks: external financing requirements and shares of FX-currency in public debt have risen compared to the last DSA assessment and now rank high relative to peers; fiscal exposure to currency risk through the FX-protected deposit schemes compounds vulnerabilities.

*Source: Annex I. External Sector Assessment (and selected text from Annex II) from the provided IMF content unit.*

### 8. Interest rate, real exchange rate, and contingent liability shocks lead to a significant

### 8. Interest rate, real exchange rate, and contingent liability shocks lead to a significant increase in public debt while the primary balance shock does not affect the debt dynamics substantially

### Key findings on shock impacts and stress-test outcomes
- Combined macro-fiscal shock
  - Public debt would rise to around 78 percent of GDP over the medium term.
  - Gross financing needs would rise to about 19 percent of GDP over the medium term.
- Combined macro-fiscal-contingent liability shock
  - Public debt would breach 79 percent of GDP in 2023, reaching above 95 percent of GDP by 2027.
  - Gross financing needs would increase to above 25 percent of GDP over the medium term.
- Primary balance shock
  - A 1 standard deviation deterioration in the primary balance for 2 years starting in 2022 would increase public debt only moderately over the medium term.
  - Sovereign borrowing costs are raised by 25 basis points for each 1 percentage point of GDP worsening in the primary balance.
  - Impact on gross financing needs increases to about 10 percent of GDP over the medium term.
- Growth shock
  - Real GDP growth rates are lowered by 1 standard deviation (5.7 percentage points) for 2 years starting in 2022.
  - Primary balance initially deteriorates (to 4.3 percent of GDP by 2024) then recovers as shocks phase out.
  - By 2027, the debt-to-GDP ratio would reach around 43 percent of GDP.
  - Gross financing needs will rise to about 11 percent of GDP by 2027.
- Interest rate shock
  - The government’s interest bill is projected to reach an implicit average interest rate of about 23 percent over the medium term under the shock scenario.
  - By 2027, the debt-to-GDP ratio would increase gradually to reach about 41 percent.
  - Gross financing needs would climb to 11 percent of GDP from 35 percent and 7 percent in 2022, respectively.
- Real exchange rate shock
  - The real exchange rate is assumed to depreciate by 77 percent in 2023 under the shock scenario.
  - Public debt-to-GDP rises to around 48 percent of GDP.
  - Public debt as a ratio of revenues increases to 184 percent in 2023.
  - Gross financing needs rise to 10 percent of GDP by 2027.
- Contingent liability shock
  - Modeled as materialization of contingent liabilities from financial sector (including state-owned banks’ lending), PPPs, and non-financial SOEs.
  - Assumed to increase non-interest expenditures by 10 percentage points of GDP in 2022 and combined with a real GDP growth shock (1 standard deviation for 2 years).
  - Sovereign borrowing costs are pushed up (25 basis points for each 1 percent of GDP worsening in the primary balance) while inflation declines (0.25 percentage points per 1 percentage points decrease in GDP growth).
  - Debt-to-GDP ratio would rise to about 49 percent of GDP; gross financing needs increasing to 11 percent of GDP by 2027.
  - Estimated impacts are a lower bound because the scenario excludes contingent liabilities from FX-protected schemes; any unexpected lira weakness would increase fiscal costs and add to public debt and gross financing needs.

### Baseline and projected debt dynamics (high-level)
- Under the baseline and alternative scenarios, stress-test results point to substantial vulnerability to large macro-fiscal and contingent liability shocks, with combined extreme scenarios producing debt paths that materially exceed debt burden benchmarks (see scenario outcomes above).
- Gross financing needs and debt-to-revenue ratios can spike sharply under exchange rate, interest rate, and contingent liability scenarios (examples provided above).

### Public debt composition and market indicators (selected observations)
- The share of non-resident holdings in public debt rose in 2021 but has since fallen sharply (chart noted; paragraph 12 referenced).
- Market perception indicators cited include EMBIG and CDS spreads used in the DSA stress assessments (EMBIG referenced in the DSA figures).

### Health of Non-Financial Corporations (Annex III) — implications for fiscal risk
- NFC operating profits reached a record high in 2021.
- NFC real gross value added increased by 21 percent, yoy, in 2021.
- Real dividend payments remained unchanged in 2020 as firms enhanced buffers; real interest payments declined in 2020 and rose in 2021.
- Despite higher operating profits and gross saving, NFCs increased real investment and built inventories, resulting in higher net borrowing.
- Average equity buffer of NFCs was around 25 percent of total assets in 2021.
- NFC leverage remains high relative to OECD peers and the significant negative net FX position (while declining recently) remains a major vulnerability to NFC balance sheets.
- Pockets of acute vulnerability exist in accommodation and food, transportation, and real estate/construction industries.

*Source: IMF staff.*

### 4. Much of the recent NFC borrowing was used to build assets, especially cash holdings.

### 4. Much of the recent NFC borrowing was used to build assets, especially cash holdings.

### Recent borrowing and asset buildup
- After stagnating in 2018 and 2019, real lending to NFCs increased significantly in 2020 and 2021, consistent with economy-wide monetary and credit trends.
- Much of the borrowing was used to build assets, rather than to cover pandemic-related losses:
  - FX cash holdings and inventories increased significantly, improving NFC liquidity indicators, providing an inflation hedge and building an important buffer against temporary cash flow and exchange rate shocks.
- Data source: CBRT Company Accounts database, which covers more than 930,000 firms, across 17 sectors, over 2009-21.
- Note on leverage measure: Leverage = non-equity liabilities/total assets using the CBRT company accounts database.

### NFC vulnerabilities by sector
- Some industries show heightened vulnerability:
  - Transportation, real estate, and accommodation and food sectors: leverage jumped significantly, with average equity buffers near zero as of end-2021.
  - Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR) remains problematically low for these sectors.
  - A strong tourism season and modest recovery in real estate output likely reduced vulnerabilities somewhat in 2022, but high nominal debt stock means widescale corporate distress could quickly lead to financial stability problems.
- Leverage and ICR indicators:
  - Leverage computed as non-equity liabilities/total assets (CBRT company accounts).
  - Change in ICR, 2019-21 and ICR, 2021 presented with bubble sizes proportional to nominal debt (figures in source).

### Foreign currency exposure and FX deleveraging
- As of 2022Q2:
  - Half of NFC debt (loans and bonds) was FX-denominated.
  - FX-liabilities (including imports payable) represent around one-quarter of total liabilities.
- Over the last 4 years:
  - NFC sector underwent significant nominal FX deleveraging, cutting the net FX position by around one-half.
- However:
  - The recent REER depreciation has undone much of the progress of recent years, implying a continuing real FX burden on NFCs.
  - Sector-wide liquidity risk is mitigated by a positive short-term net FX position, which has increased by 40 percent since the beginning of 2020.
- Peak nominal FX burden (March 2018): -US$197bn.

### External debt sustainability (summary of Annex V)
- Baseline assessment:
  - External debt is assessed to be sustainable over the medium term but is high and sensitive to shocks.
  - External debt expected to decline from about 55 percent of GDP at end-2021 to 46 percent of GDP by 2027, as the real exchange rate appreciates.
  - External debt is expected to reach about 58 percent of GDP by the end of 2022.
- Short-term and financing risks:
  - The share of short-term debt is set to increase, driven by the private sector: short-term debt expected to grow from 27 percent of total external debt at the end of 2021 to about 37 percent of total external debt by 2027.
  - Longer-term non-debt creating inflows, mostly FDI, have slowed and are expected to remain below the long-term average of 1½ percent of GDP.
  - Türkiye’s gross external financing needs of about USD179 billion (22 percent of GDP) in 2021 will remain elevated, with GEFNs averaging 24 percent of GDP over the projection period, creating both funding and rollover risks because of the rising share of the short-term debt component.
- Sensitivity to depreciation shocks:
  - Standard stress tests: a permanent lira depreciation of 30 percent over the baseline would push the external debt stock temporarily to around 76 percent of GDP by end-2022, before subsequently falling to 60 percent of GDP by the end of the projection period.
- Additional background facts:
  - External debt has slightly increased from about 53 percent of GDP in 2017 to 55 percent in 2021.
  - The private sector owes about half of external debt.

*Source: Excerpt from “4. Much of the recent NFC borrowing was used to build assets, especially cash holdings.” (CBRT company accounts database; IMF staff calculations; Annex V: External Debt Sustainability) — material provided in the supplied content unit.*

### Annex VI. Implementation of Past Fund Advice

### Annex VI. Implementation of Past Fund Advice

### Recent Fund Advice and Policy Assessment
- Fund advice in the 2021 Article IV staff report focused on risks associated with externally-funded credit and demand stimulus.
- Staff noted Türkiye’s recovery from the pandemic was buoyed by:
  - large interest rate cuts,
  - rapid credit provision by state-owned banks,
  - extensive liquidity support.
- Staff cautioned these policies "had also exacerbated pre-existing vulnerabilities and reduced buffers."
- Staff recommended:
  - strongly committing to, and delivering, a firm monetary policy stance to bring inflation towards target,
  - strengthening central bank independence.
- Current policies at time of report:
  - centered around low policy rates despite inflation well above target and a positive output gap,
  - have further departed from Fund advice.

### Progress Relative to the 2016 FSAP
- Progress summarized as "mixed."
- Partial progress made on:
  - financial sector oversight,
  - regulation,
  - macroprudential policy.
- Specific improvements:
  - methodology for conducting risk assessments and inspections of the banking sector has been broadened,
  - corporate governance rules and enforcement of regulations have improved,
  - macroprudential policies to lower economy-wide FX risks have been implemented.
- Remaining deficiencies and insufficient actions:
  - systemic liquidity risk management remains a key deficiency,
  - little improvement in emergency liquidity capacity of the CBRT,
  - reserves still below the Fund’s Assessment of Reserves Adequacy metric,
  - no action taken on coordinating arrangements in the event of a cross-border bank failure.
- Further details referenced in "2022 FSAP Appendix II."

### Fund Relations and Financial Position (Data as of October 31, 2022)
- There is no outstanding Fund credit.
- Membership Status: Türkiye became a member of the Fund on March 11, 1947.
- General Resources Account (SDR Million / Percent Quota):
  - Quota 4,658.60 100.00
  - Fund holdings of currency 4,545.83 97.58
  - Reserve position in Fund 112.78 2.42
- SDR Department (SDR Million / Percent Allocation):
  - Net cumulative allocation 5,536.39 100.00
  - Holdings 5,508.24 99.49
- Outstanding Purchases and Loans: None.

### Latest Financial Arrangements (listed in millions of SDRs)
- Stand-By 05/11/05–05/10/08 Amount Approved 6,662.04 Amount Drawn 6,662.04
- Stand-By 02/04/02–02/03/05 Amount Approved 12,821.20 Amount Drawn 11,914.00
- Stand-By 12/22/99–02/04/02 Amount Approved 15,038.40 Amount Drawn 11,738.96
  - Of Which: SRF 12/21/00–12/20/01 Amount Approved 5,784.00 Amount Drawn 5,784.00
- Projected Payments to the Fund (In millions of SDRs; based on existing use of resources and present holdings of SDRs):
  - Forthcoming 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
  - Principal -- -- -- -- --
  - Charges/Interest 0.13 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77
  - Total 0.13 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77

### Safeguard Assessments, Exchange Rate, and Consultations
- Safeguard assessment of the central bank’s safeguards framework completed on June 29, 2005; no material weaknesses uncovered; recommendations implemented.
- Exchange Rate Arrangement:
  - Currency: Turkish lira (replaced the new Turkish lira on January 1, 2009).
  - De jure arrangement: free floating; de facto arrangement: floating.
  - Türkiye accepted obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4 as of March 22, 1990.
- Article IV Consultations:
  - Board discussion of last Article IV staff report took place on May 27, 2021.
  - Article IV staff report (IMF Country Report No. 21/110) published on June 11, 2021.
- FSAP:
  - Financial stability assessments under FSAP are mandatory every five years.
  - Three FSAP missions to Türkiye took place in 2022; Aide Memoire presented to authorities.
  - FSAP findings summarized in the accompanying Financial System Stability Assessment (FSSA) to be discussed with the 2022 Article IV staff report.
- Resident Representative:
  - IMF resident representative office in Ankara.
  - Mr. Azim Sadikov senior resident representative since December 2021.

### ROSCs and Standards Assessed (dates as listed)
- Fiscal Transparency June 27, 2000
- Corporate Governance December 11, 2000
- Data ROSC March 14, 2002 Country Report No. 02/55
- Fiscal ROSC November 25, 2003 Country Report No. 03/363
- Fiscal ROSC March 24, 2006 Country Report No. 06/126
- FSSA and related ROSC November 9, 2007 Country Report No. 07/361
- Data ROSC September 3, 2009 Country Report No. 09/286
- FSSA and related ROSC September 7, 2012 Country Report No. 12/261
- BCP March 7, 2014 N/A
- IAIS March 7, 2014 N/A
- FSSA and related ROSC February 3, 2017 Country Report No. 17/35
- BCP February 8, 2017 Country Report No. 17/46
- CPMI IOSCO February 8, 2017 Country Report No. 17/45
- IAIS February 8, 2017 Country Report No. 17/47

### Recent Technical Assistance (Dept. and Timing highlights)
- MCM February 2012 Stress testing framework for the financial sector supervisor
- FAD September 2012 G–20 budget institutions
- MCM October 2012 Early warning system and stress testing
- FAD November 2012 Measurement of structural fiscal balances
- STA January 2013 National account statistics
- MCM December 2013 Stress testing
- STA December 2013 Monetary and financial statistics
- STA March 2014 Government finance statistics
- STA March 2014 National accounts statistics
- FAD April 2014 Performance-based budgeting
- FAD May 2014 Tax revenue modeling
- STA May 2014 Financial sector accounts
- STA July 2014 Government finance statistics—public sector debt statistics
- STA April 2015 National accounts statistics
- FAD June 2015 Fiscal transparency evaluation
- STA January 2016 Compilation system for independent annual estimates of GDP
- STA April 2016 Government finance statistics—GFSM2014 and ESA10
- FAD December 2017 Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)
- FAD January 2018 VAT Policy Issues
- MCM September 2018 Stress testing (follow up)
- STA November 2019 Commercial Property Price Index
- STA November 2019 Consumer Price Index

### Relations with the World Bank Group (high-level points)
- Country Partnership Framework (CPF) originally FY18–21, updated and extended to include FY22–23 via Performance and Learning Review in 2020; aligned with 11th Development Plan (2019–2023) and New Economic Program (launched in 2021).
- IBRD portfolio: 24 active operations for US$8.5 billion.
- CPF proposed IBRD financing for FY17–23 at US$7-10.5 billion; almost US$8.5 billion delivered to date.
- WBG FY23 program supports mobilizing climate financing and implementation of Türkiye’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDCs).
- WBG support includes human capital, vulnerable youth and women, pandemic preparedness, and firm-led job creation in refugee-impacted regions.
- Facility for Refugees in Türkiye (FRiT): EU-funded total US$650 million managed by WBG; first tranche US$205 million (education, employment, entrepreneurship); second tranche US$395 million supported socio-economic and municipal services.
- ASA portfolio includes Programmatic Public Finance Review, Pandemic Preparedness and Response, Country Green Growth; new Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) under preparation expected March 2023.

### IFC and MIGA Engagements
- IFC:
  - Own-account investment program US$3,813 million between FY17 and FY22.
  - Mobilized cumulative US$2,000 million in same period.
  - Long term finance commitments total $5,811 between FY17 and FY22 (FY17: US$1,348m; FY18: US$1,127m; FY19: US$222m; FY20: US$973m; FY21: US$1,062; FY22: US$1,079).
  - Committed cumulative US$4.2 billion (FY17-FY22) to Turkish banks under Global Trade Finance Program (GTFP).
  - IFC exposure to Türkiye around US$4 billion at end FY22, its 3rd largest country exposure globally.
- MIGA:
  - Türkiye largest country by gross exposure, about 9 percent of MIGA’s gross portfolio.
  - As of end-FY22, gross exposure in Türkiye totaled about US$2.235 billion across 16 projects.
  - Portfolio: six infrastructure, four financial sector, six services sector projects.
  - About two-thirds stems from non-honoring guarantees to state-owned enterprises and sub-sovereigns.

### Statistical Issues and Data Adequacy (As of October 31, 2022)
- General: Data provision broadly adequate for surveillance, with shortcomings in national accounts and government finance statistics.
- National Accounts:
  - Published data for 1998 onwards adheres to 2008 SNA/ESA 2010.
  - TURKSTAT compiles comprehensive national accounts series including quarterly GDP at current prices and chain-linked volume terms.
  - December 2016 rebased national accounts (reference year 2009, benchmark year 2012) led to significant upward revision of GDP.
  - Quarterly national accounts published within 2 months after reference period; annual GDP published within 9 months after reference period.
- Price Statistics:
  - CPI base year 2003; weights based on annual Household Budget Survey.
  - PPI compiled for mining, manufacturing, utilities; separate PPI for agriculture.
- Government Finance Statistics:
  - Budget coverage largely complete.
  - Some fiscal operations through extra budgetary funds available only with lags.
  - Fiscal analysis complicated by quasi-fiscal operations of state banks and SEEs and consolidation issues between cash-based and accrual-based accounts.
  - Quarterly general government accrual data reported for publication in International Financial Statistics (IFS).
- Monetary and Financial Statistics:
  - CBRT reports monetary statistics for central bank, other depository corporations, and other financial corporations using standardized report forms (SRFs) aligned with IMF Manual.
  - CBRT reports key Financial Access Survey indicators including commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults and ATMs per 100,000 adults.
  - BRSA reports all 12 core FSIs and nearly all encouraged FSIs quarterly.
- External Sector Statistics:
  - CBRT compiles and disseminates BOP and IIP statistics monthly broadly conforming with BPM6.
  - CBRT participates in IMF coordinated surveys on direct and portfolio investments and reports data template on international reserves and foreign currency liquidity and currency composition of the IIP (beginning with 2016 data).
- Türkiye has subscribed to the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) since 1996.
- Latest Data ROSC published September 2009.

### Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance (As of October 31, 2022) — Selected entries
- Exchange Rates: Date of latest observation Oct 2022; Date received 10/31/2022; Frequency of data D; Frequency of reporting D; Frequency of publication D.
- International Reserve Assets and Reserve Liabilities of the Monetary Authorities: Date of latest observation Sep 2022; Date received 10/20/2022; Frequency W W W.
- Reserve/Base Money (narrow definition): Sep 2022; 10/31/2022; W/M W/M W/M.
- Consumer Price Index: Sep 2022; 10/03/2022; M M M; Data Quality – Methodologic soundness O, LO, O, LO; Data Quality Accuracy and reliability O, O, O, O, O.
- Revenue, Expenditure, Balance and Composition of Financing – General Government: Sep 2022; 9/30/2022; Q Q Q; Data Quality – Methodologic soundness O, LO, O, O; Data Quality Accuracy and reliability O, O, LO, O, LO.
- GDP/GNP: 2022Q2; 8/31/2022; Q Q Q; Data Quality – Methodologic soundness O, LO, O, O LO; Data Quality Accuracy and reliability LO, O, LO, O, LO.
- Gross External Debt: 2022Q2; 9/30/2022; Q Q Q.
- International Investment Position: Aug 2022; 10/18/2022; M M M.

*Source: Annex VI. Implementation of Past Fund Advice (Staff report material for the 2022 Article IV Consultation, prepared by European Department, December 21, 2022).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2023/english/1turea2023001.pdf_
