## 1uryea2023001

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### Impact of the drought: context, direct losses, and transmission
- Since September 2022, Uruguay is experiencing the most severe drought in the last forty years.
- Summer 2022-2023 precipitation was about 64 percent below the historical average.
- Temperatures were about 1.4°C above the historical average; the 2022-2023 summer was the driest and the second hottest in the last 42 years.
- Agriculture impacts:
  - Soybean cultivated areas suffered a 26 percent loss in yield (Ministry of Agriculture data as of January 2023).
  - Livestock affected by weight loss and lower calving rate with potential long-lasting effects.
  - Milk, corn, wine, fruit, and forestry also impacted.
- Preliminary direct losses estimated at almost US$1 billion or 1.4 percent of 2022 GDP (estimate as of end-January).
- Transmission channels and secondary effects:
  - Indirect effects anticipated in transportation and food processing.
  - Potential decrease in soil productivity in heavily affected areas.
  - Cattle-sector impacts may extend beyond the current year.

### Immediate relief measures and fiscal mitigation for vulnerable groups
- Financial and regulatory relief:
  - National Guarantee System activated to facilitate working capital loans for micro, small and medium-sized firms in affected sectors.
  - Banco Central del Uruguay (BCU) allowed banks to grant loan extensions up to 180 days without impacting debtor credit quality.
  - Energy subsidies for producers and other temporary measures deployed.
- Measures to mitigate high food and energy prices (fiscal impact, Box 2):
  - Bringing forward increase in wages and pensions: US$ million 120; percent of GDP 0.17
  - Increase in social transfers: US$ million 40; percent of GDP 0.06
  - Freeze on price of propane tank: US$ million 90; percent of GDP 0.13
  - Additional measures: US$ million 10; percent of GDP 0.01
  - Reduction in VAT of certain products: US$ million 5; percent of GDP 0.01
  - Reduction of import taxes for certain products: US$ million 5; percent of GDP 0.01
  - Streamlining import control: n.a.
  - Subsidy for new hires 30-44 years-old: n.a.
  - Total: US$ million 260; percent of GDP 0.4

### Recent macroeconomic developments (selected indicators)
- Real GDP growth: 4.9 percent in 2022; contraction in the second half of the year driven by global slowdown and the drought.
- Employment and poverty:
  - 40,000 new jobs created on average in 2022.
  - Unemployment hovered around 8 percent.
  - Poverty declined to 9.1 percent in 2022H2 from 11 percent in 2021H2.
- Inflation and monetary policy:
  - Inflation: about 8 percent (year-on-year) by end-2021; peaked at 9.95 percent in September 2022; declined to 7.3 percent in March 2023.
  - BCU policy rate: raised from 5.75 percent in December 2021 to 11.5 percent in December 2022; target range ceiling lowered from 7 to 6 percent effective September 2022.
- Exchange rate and fiscal metrics:
  - Peso appreciated by about 10 percent in nominal terms and by 18 percent in real effective terms in 2022; authorities did not intervene in FX market.
  - NFPS overall deficit (excluding cincuentones) was 2.7 percent of GDP in 2022, compared to 3.0 percent in 2021.
  - Gross NFPS debt: 59.3 percent of GDP at end-2022 (peak 68.1 percent of GDP in 2020).
- External sector:
  - Current account deficit increased to 3.2 percent of GDP in 2022.
  - Nominal and real exports grew by 17 and 11 percent respectively in 2022.

### Financial sector soundness and vulnerabilities
- Soundness and intermediation:
  - Low and stable non-performing loan ratios; high profitability (though declined in 2022); strong liquidity indicators.
  - Financial intermediation low: credit-to-GDP ratio 26 percent (end-2022).
- Dollarization and FX exposure:
  - High dollarization: about 75 percent for deposits and 50 percent for loans; about 75 percent of corporate sector debt denominated in foreign currency.
- State-owned banks:
  - Stronger capital ratios and high liquidity buffers than private banks; large presence calls for attention to maintaining competition.

### Outlook, inflation, and risks related to the drought
- Growth projections:
  - Real GDP growth projected at 2 percent in 2023 (high uncertainty due to drought), 3 percent in 2024, gradually converging to potential growth rate of 2.2 percent by 2028.
- Inflation outlook:
  - Expected to decline to 7 percent in 2023 and fall within the target range in 2024.
- Main macroeconomic risks:
  - Worsening external financial conditions, deterioration of international geopolitical tensions, and the severity and duration of the current drought.
- External sustainability:
  - External position broadly in line with fundamentals and desirable policies in 2022; limited risks to external sustainability though high share of FDI liabilities drives a widening primary income deficit.

### Fiscal policy implications, consolidation options, and staff debt-stabilizing estimates
- Near-term fiscal stance and measures:
  - Authorities’ 2023 plan consistent with achieving fiscal rule targets while safeguarding social cohesion; NFPS fiscal deficit projected at 3 percent of GDP in 2023.
  - Recently announced tax cut equivalent to 0.2 percent of GDP (implemented as increased deductions for IRPF and IASS, and tax cuts for micro and small businesses).
- Recommendations for rebuilding buffers:
  - Additional fiscal efforts recommended to put debt on a firm downward path and rebuild policy space.
  - Staff estimates for stabilizing gross NFPS debt by 2032:
    - A constant primary surplus of 0.6 would allow reaching a debt-to-GDP ratio of 55 percent by 2032.
    - A primary surplus of 1.1 percent of GDP would allow reaching a debt-to-GDP ratio of 50 percent by 2032.
  - Recommendation to incorporate a clearer link in annual fiscal reports to Parliament (“Rendición de Cuentas y Exposición de Motivos”) between calibration of the three pillars of the fiscal rule and efforts to stabilize debt-to-GDP.
  - Recommendation for a well-calibrated explicit debt anchor to help stabilize debt-to-GDP at a lower medium-term level.

### Fiscal consolidation constraints and policy options (Section 15)
- Constraints:
  - Relatively high tax rates and high spending rigidities limit available options for consolidation.
- Policy options and measures:
  - Rationalizing tax expenditures.
  - Reduction of the wage bill through attrition of public employment.
  - Better targeting of subsidies (in particular LNG).
  - Increasing efficiency of state-owned enterprises.
  - Continuing personalized VAT for recipients of social plans to reduce regressivity of VAT while increasing revenues.
  - Initiatives to reduce absenteeism of public employees and improve disability insurance efficiency.
- Safeguards:
  - Preserve capital spending and social programs, described as largely well-targeted.

### Monetary policy assessment, credibility, and de-dollarization
- Monetary stance:
  - Tight monetary policy stance appropriate and should be maintained until inflation and inflation expectations converge to target range in a sustained manner.
  - 12-month ahead inflation expectations around 7 percent.
  - Ex-ante real policy rates about 4.25 percent, significantly above neutral rate of 2 percent (contractionary stance).
- Guidance:
  - BCU should condition further easing on firm convergence of inflation and expectations; ready to tighten if additional inflationary shocks materialize.
- Strengthening BCU framework:
  - Since 2020, BCU adopted short-term interest rate as the monetary policy instrument, reducing benchmark volatility.
  - Recommendation: Strengthen de jure central bank independence (fixed, staggered terms for Board members; clearly outlined dismissal reasons).
- Exchange rate and FX intervention:
  - Continue allowing exchange rate to act as shock absorber; FX interventions limited to disorderly conditions.
  - Staff IPF analysis: costs of FX intervention outweigh benefits; improving monetary credibility and communication prioritized.
  - Continued exchange rate flexibility supports de-dollarization.
- De-dollarization complements:
  - Recalibrate macro-prudential policies and continue financial sector development measures.
  - Differential reserve requirements for domestic and foreign currency deposits cited as helpful.
  - High dollarization associated with lower financial development and lower credibility of monetary and prudential policies.

### Financial sector policy priorities and supervisory recommendations
- Progress made: updated supervisory framework and broad macroprudential toolkit implementation.
- Priorities and recommended actions:
  - Expand macroprudential toolkit to cover household sector.
  - Monitor corporate vulnerability and close large data gaps (cross-sectoral datasets, granular household indebtedness, unhedged corporate FX loans).
  - Incorporate enhanced solvency stress tests into risk-based supervision; link results to supervisory actions.
  - Address solvency risks for some private banks via Pillar 2 capital add-ons and dividend restrictions.
  - Redesign bank wealth tax to incentivize private banks to raise additional capital.
  - Update crisis management framework: overhaul government role in funding resolution, develop recovery and resolution planning, create an emergency liquidity provision facility.
- AML/CFT and virtual assets:
  - GAFILAT 2020 MER assessed Uruguay as having a moderately effective AML/CFT system with vulnerabilities in real estate, construction, and proceeds from organized crime.
  - Authorities expected to conclude and publish National Risk Assessment (NRA) by end of April; NRA will consider virtual assets/VA/VASPs and underpin an AML/CFT national action plan.
  - Special Prosecutor's office for ML/TF established in “Rendición de Cuentas”; proposed Law of Virtual Assets pending Congress approval.

### Structural reforms to boost medium-term growth
- Education and innovation:
  - Uruguay has high dropout rates and one of the lowest secondary graduation rates in the region.
  - Short-term priority: coordinated public-private on-demand training programs for ICT and high-skilled shortages.
  - Education reform “Transformación Educativa”: improve governance, reduce inequality, increase retention, modernize curricula; redesign covers children aged 4 to 14 and introduces “Marco Curricular Nacional”.
  - New teacher training programs approved in December 2022; further statutory changes needed.
- Trade policy:
  - New trade facilitation: one-stop shop for exports/imports; reduce average import tariff by 10 percent in 2023.
  - Pursuing CPTPP accession, assessing bilateral FTAs with China and Türkiye, extending zero tariffs on free-trade zone flows with Brazil.
- State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and pensions:
  - SOE efficiency measures: update electric meters, redesign LNG packing contracts, align domestic gasoline prices with international prices.
  - Recommendations: professionalize SOE management, cost-reflective tariffs set by independent regulators, transparent financing of social program costs.
  - Pension reform: new law extends retirement age progressively and unifies fragmented system to stabilize spending long-term.

### Climate, sustainability, and the Sovereign Sustainability-Linked Bond (Box 4)
- Climate context:
  - Uruguay achieved reduction in GHG emissions intensity while preserving food security and development.
  - Vulnerable to climate hazards: excessive rainfall, droughts, rising sea levels.
  - Decarbonization paths: electric mobility transition, green hydrogen, e-fuels, climate-smart agricultural and livestock practices, preserve grassland ecosystems and native forests.
- Sovereign SSLB issuance (October 2022):
  - A 12-year bond for US$ 1.5 billion.
  - Issuance more than 2-times oversubscribed; priced 170 bps above US Treasuries of similar maturities.
  - Attracted approximately 40 new investors.
- SSLB design and KPIs:
  - Two KPIs: (1) Reducing aggregate gross GHG emissions per real GDP unit; (2) Maintaining native forest area relative to reference year.
  - Coupon adjustment: one-time 15bps up (does not meet) or down (overperforms) per KPI; performance through 2025 affects coupons in 2027.
- Policy implications:
  - KPI-linked coupon adjustments create financial incentives tied to measurable environmental outcomes while proceeds unearmarked.
  - Continued market infrastructure reforms (benchmark yield curve, secondary market liquidity) recommended to deepen peso capital market.

### External sector assessment, NIIP, current account, and REER
- External position:
  - External position in 2022 broadly in line with medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
  - NIIP: –22.6 percent of GDP at end-2022.
  - Foreign assets: 116.0 percent of GDP (2022); Gross Liab.: 138 percent of GDP (2022).
  - Foreign direct investment large: 63 percent of liabilities.
- Current account:
  - CA deficit: -3.2 percent of GDP in 2022; projected -3.2 percent in 2023; medium-term convergence toward -2.2 percent of GDP.
  - Staff Gap (including COVID adjustments): -0.6 percent of GDP.
- Real exchange rate:
  - Peso appreciated 10 percent in 2022 (from 44.7 to 40.1 pesos per US dollar).
  - IMF staff CA gap implies a REER gap midpoint of 3.2 percent (range 0.5 to 5.8 percent).
- Capital flows and reserves:
  - Net financial account inflows around 3.2 percent of GDP in 2022; strong FDI inflows (4.6 percent of GDP).
  - Central bank reserves: US$15 billion at end-2022; forward operations with SOEs US$550 million or 0.8 percent of GDP.
  - Reserves adequate (around 160 percent of IMF reserve adequacy metric as of end-2022).
  - Policy advice: allow exchange rate to act as shock absorber; limit FX interventions to disorderly conditions.

### Annex findings: primary income balance drivers and external DSA highlights
- Drivers of primary income deficit:
  - High primary income deficits driven by IIP composition: large FDI liabilities (~80 percent of GDP) and lower-yielding FDI assets (~40 percent of GDP).
  - Strong co-movement between goods exports and primary income debit (correlation = 0.72).
  - Merchanting exports and FDI dynamics increase primary income debits; a one p.p. increase in FDI liabilities-to-GDP associated with 0.04 percent of GDP higher PID in preferred specification.
- External DSA key statistics and projections (selected):
  - External debt (percent of GDP): 2022 = 78.0; 2023 = 79.1; 2024 = 77.4; 2028 = 74.8.
  - Debt-stabilizing non-interest current account: 1.2
  - Gross external financing needs (percent of GDP): 2022 = 18.8; 2023 = 18.6; 2024 = 15.9; 2028 = 14.4
  - Stress-test outcomes (external debt percent of GDP): baseline ~76; CA shock = 80; combined shock = 83; one-off 30 percent real depreciation = 109 (short-term).
- Policy takeaways:
  - Lengthening sovereign debt maturity, higher fixed-rate and local-currency issuance reduce FX and refinancing risks.
  - Main external debt risk: exchange rate depreciation.

### Public sector DSA and public debt projections
- Gross NFPS debt: 2022 = 59.3 percent of GDP; projections: 2023 = 61.6; 2024 = 61.9.
- Public debt (public sector DSA projections): 2022 actual 59.3; 2023 projection 61.3; 2024 projection 61.5; extended projections show public debt around 60.8–61.2 percent of GDP by 2032 under baseline.
- Primary deficit path (selected): 2022 = 0.5; 2023 = 1.0; 2024 = 0.7; 2028 = -0.1 (percent of GDP).
- Gross financing needs (percent of GDP): 2022 = 4.3; 2023 = 5.6; 2024 = 5.5.

### Data, statistics, and institutional notes
- CPI:
  - National coverage; does not cover implicit rent or net acquisitions of owner-occupied dwellings.
  - Current weights based on 2016-2017 household survey; more frequent updates desirable.
- GFS:
  - Recorded on a modified cash basis; central administration, SOEs, and social security data disseminated regularly.
  - Local government above-the-line data not available.
- Monetary and financial statistics compiled per IMF manuals; participation in CDIS, CPIS, and FSI databases; some FSI gaps exist (nonfinancial corporations, households, market liquidity, real estate).
- Uruguay subscribed to SDDS in February 2004 and is in observance.

### Pension reform design highlights (Section 9)
- Reference wage:
  - New reference wage based on the best 20 years of covered earnings (instead of final 10 or 105 percent of best 20); past earnings revalorized with average wage growth.
- Accruals:
  - Accrual rates equalized at 1.5 percent per year at the normal retirement age.
  - Resulting roughly 4.8 percent penalty or bonus for early/late retirement respectively.
- Parental service credit:
  - Mothers credited with one year of additional service per child, up to five years.
- Minimum pension:
  - New minimum value 14000 pesos per month for those with virtually no own pension; maximum combined minimum and own pension 42000 pesos; minimum fully paid from general taxation.
- Policy implications:
  - Reform aligns reference-wage practice closer to OECD peers; accruals relatively high, with distributional and gender implications addressed via parental credits.

### Payments modernization and digital instant payments (Annex IX)
- BCU 2023-25 payments roadmap objectives:
  - Create inclusive instant-settlement payments 24/365, promote competition, preserve financial stability, and foster AML/CFT compliance.
  - Banks requested to introduce immediate transfers 24/7 starting June 2023.
- Benefits and metrics:
  - Current instant transfers: 2.5 percent of transfers.
  - Bank account ownership in 2021: 74 percent.
  - Example: Brazil’s Pix lowered digital payment fees from 2.5 percent to 0.2 percent.
- Preconditions:
  - IPET index: 65 pesos out of every 100 spent digitally.
  - Internet penetration high; more than 90 percent of adults have mobile phones.
  - Over 60 fintechs; near universal legal ID (Cédula de Identidad).
- Key policy choices:
  - Open access to payment system; tiered risk-based access for non-bank providers; safeguards for financial, fraud, AML/CFT risks; cybersecurity enhancements; integration considerations with regional systems (e.g., Pix).

*Source: IMF staff country report excerpt: "1. Impact of the Drought" (Uruguay) and accompanying chapters/annexes from the provided PDF excerpts.*

### 1. Impact of the Drought _________________________________________________________________________ 5

### 1. Impact of the Drought

### Context and shock description
- Since September 2022, Uruguay is experiencing the most severe drought in the last forty years.
- Summer 2022-2023 precipitation was about 64 percent below the historical average.
- Temperatures were about 1.4°C above the historical average; the 2022-2023 summer was the driest and the second hottest in the last 42 years.
- The drought has severely affected agriculture, in particular soybean production and cattle farming, and also impacted milk, corn, wine, fruit, and forestry.

### Direct agricultural impacts and estimated losses
- Soybean cultivated areas suffered a 26 percent loss in yield (Ministry of Agriculture data as of January 2023).
- Livestock has been impacted by weight loss and lower calving rate with potential long-lasting effects.
- Preliminary direct losses were estimated at almost US$1 billion or 1.4 percent of 2022 GDP (estimate as of end-January).

### Transmission to the broader economy
- The drought is likely to have indirect effects on sectors linked to agriculture, including transportation and food processing.
- The impact on cattle livestock could extend beyond this year due to weight loss and reduced calving rate.
- The drought may decrease soil productivity in heavily affected areas.

### Immediate policy relief measures for producers
- National Guarantee System activated to facilitate access to working capital loans for micro, small and medium-sized firms in affected sectors.
- Banco Central del Uruguay (BCU) allowed banks to grant loan extensions up to 180 days without impacting debtor credit quality.
- Energy subsidies for producers and other temporary measures were deployed.

### Box 2 — Measures to mitigate impact of high food and energy prices on vulnerable groups (fiscal impact)
- Bringing forward increase in wages and pensions: US$ million 120; percent of GDP 0.17
- Increase in social transfers: US$ million 40; percent of GDP 0.06
- Freeze on price of propane tank: US$ million 90; percent of GDP 0.13
- Additional measures: US$ million 10; percent of GDP 0.01
- Reduction in VAT of certain products: US$ million 5; percent of GDP 0.01
- Reduction of import taxes for certain products: US$ million 5; percent of GDP 0.01
- Streamlining import control: n.a.
- Subsidy for new hires 30-44 years-old: n.a.
- Total: US$ million 260; percent of GDP 0.4

### Recent macroeconomic developments (selected indicators)
- Real GDP growth: 4.9 percent in 2022, with contraction in the second half of the year driven by global slowdown and the effects of the drought.
- Employment: 40,000 new jobs created on average in 2022; unemployment hovered around 8 percent.
- Poverty: declined to 9.1 percent in 2022H2 from 11 percent in 2021H2.
- Inflation: about 8 percent (year-on-year) by end-2021; peaked at 9.95 percent in September 2022; declined to 7.3 percent in March 2023.
- BCU monetary policy: policy rate raised from 5.75 percent in December 2021 to 11.5 percent in December 2022; target range ceiling lowered from 7 to 6 percent effective September 2022.
- Exchange rate: peso appreciated by about 10 percent in nominal terms and by 18 percent in real effective terms in 2022; authorities did not intervene in FX market.
- Fiscal: NFPS overall deficit (excluding cincuentones) was 2.7 percent of GDP in 2022, compared to 3.0 percent in 2021.
- Gross NFPS debt: 59.3 percent of GDP at end-2022 (peak 68.1 percent of GDP in 2020).
- External: current account deficit increased to 3.2 percent of GDP in 2022; nominal and real exports grew by 17 and 11 percent respectively in 2022.

### Financial sector and vulnerabilities
- Financial sector sound: low and stable non-performing loan ratios, high profitability (though profitability declined in 2022) and strong liquidity indicators.
- Financial intermediation is low: credit-to-GDP ratio 26 percent (end-2022).
- High dollarization: about 75 percent for deposits and 50 percent for loans; about 75 percent of corporate sector debt denominated in foreign currency.
- State-owned banks have stronger capital ratios than private banks and high liquidity buffers; large presence implies attention to maintaining competition.

### Outlook and risks related to the drought
- Growth projections: Real GDP growth projected at 2 percent in 2023 (high uncertainty due to drought), 3 percent in 2024, and gradually converging to potential growth rate of 2.2 percent by 2028.
- Inflation outlook: expected to decline to 7 percent in 2023 and fall within the target range in 2024.
- Main macroeconomic risks: worsening external financial conditions, deterioration of international geopolitical tensions, and the severity and duration of the current drought.
- External sustainability: external position broadly in line with fundamentals and desirable policies in 2022; risks to external sustainability are limited but a high share of FDI liabilities drives a widening primary income deficit.

### Fiscal policy implications and recommendations
- Near-term fiscal policy: authorities’ 2023 plan is consistent with achieving fiscal rule targets while safeguarding social cohesion; NFPS fiscal deficit projected at 3 percent of GDP in 2023.
- Tax change: recently announced tax cut equivalent to 0.2 percent of GDP (implemented as increased deductions for IRPF and IASS, and tax cuts for micro and small businesses).
- Rebuilding buffers after drought: additional fiscal efforts recommended to put debt on a firm downward path and rebuild policy space.
- Staff estimates for stabilizing gross NFPS debt by 2032:
  - A constant primary surplus of 0.6 would allow reaching a debt-to-GDP ratio of 55 percent by 2032.
  - A primary surplus of 1.1 percent of GDP would allow reaching a debt-to-GDP ratio of 50 percent by 2032.
- Recommendation to incorporate, in annual fiscal reports to Parliament (“Rendición de Cuentas y Exposición de Motivos”), a clearer link between calibration of the three pillars of the fiscal rule and efforts to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio.
- A well-calibrated explicit debt anchor is recommended to help stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio at a lower level over the medium term.

*Source: IMF staff country report excerpt: "1. Impact of the Drought" (Uruguay).*

### 15.      Relatively high tax rates and high spending rigidities limit available options for

### 1uryea2023001 - 15.      Relatively high tax rates and high spending rigidities limit available options for consolidation.

### Fiscal consolidation: constraints and options
- Relatively high tax rates and high spending rigidities limit available options for consolidation; a combination of measures is needed to generate savings to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio to a lower level over the medium term.
- Policy options discussed:
  - Rationalizing tax expenditures.
  - Reduction of the wage bill through attrition of public employment.
  - Better targeting of subsidies (in particular LNG).
  - Increasing the efficiency of state-owned enterprises.
  - Continuing personalized VAT for recipients of social plans to reduce regressivity of VAT while increasing revenues.
  - Recent initiatives to reduce absenteeism of public employees and improve the efficiency of disability insurance to allow for a better allocation of resources.
- Preserve capital spending and social programs, which are described as largely well-targeted.

### Authorities’ views on fiscal policy
- Authorities reiterated resolute commitment to conducting prudent fiscal policy and adhering to the targets of the fiscal rule while protecting the most vulnerable.
- They noted that recently announced tax cuts were incorporated in last year’s fiscal report to Parliament (“Rendición de Cuentas”).
- Authorities stressed compliance with the three pillars of the fiscal rule for a third year in a row and restoring fiscal credibility, reflected in the lowest EMBI spreads in Latin America.
- They did not support amending the existing fiscal rule with an explicit debt anchor, arguing the current rule was deliberately designed to target a specific debt-to-GDP ratio and enabled debt reduction even under testing circumstances, including the pandemic.
- Current focus: building a strong compliance track record with the targets of the current rule and maintaining the objective of keeping the debt-to-GDP ratio stable, while continuing to assess alternative medium-term debt-to-GDP objectives.

### Monetary policy: stance and credibility
- Key assessments:
  - The tight monetary policy stance is appropriate and should be maintained until inflation and inflation expectations converge to the target range in a sustained manner.
  - 12-month ahead inflation expectations are at around 7 percent.
  - Ex-ante real policy rates are about 4.25 percent, significantly above the neutral rate of 2 percent, making the monetary policy stance contractionary.
- Guidance:
  - The BCU should closely monitor inflationary pressures and make any further monetary easing conditional on firm convergence of inflation and inflation expectations to the target range.
  - If additional inflationary shocks materialize, the BCU should stand ready to tighten monetary policy.

### Strengthening central bank framework
- Since 2020, the BCU adopted the short-term interest rate as the monetary policy instrument, providing reference interest rates and reducing benchmark volatility.
- Improvements in communication have facilitated convergence of inflation expectations to the target band, but inflation expectations remain anchored outside the target range.
- Recommendation: Strengthening de jure central bank independence would further improve credibility. Specific legal design suggestions:
  - BCU Board members should have fixed and staggered terms (not overlapping with the general electoral cycle).
  - Reasons for dismissal during their term should be clearly outlined in the law to insulate monetary policy decision making from the political cycle.

### Exchange rate policy and FX intervention
- The exchange rate should continue to act as a shock absorber with FX interventions limited to disorderly market conditions.
- BCU has not intervened in the FX market as part of upgrading the monetary framework; the peso has been allowed to float and act as a shock absorber.
- Staff analysis based on the Integrated Policy Framework (IPF) finds costs of conducting FX intervention outweigh benefits; improving monetary policy credibility and communication should remain the highest priority.
- Continued exchange rate flexibility, especially when the exchange rate is allowed to appreciate, would contribute to de-dollarization.

### De-dollarization: diagnosis and policy complements
- High dollarization increases FX credit risk for banks, government, and unhedged corporates, and hampers monetary policy transmission.
- BCU’s 2021 de-dollarization strategy includes improving the monetary framework and developing local currency debt markets.
- Staff suggests complementary policies:
  - Recalibrating macro-prudential policies.
  - Continuing financial sector development measures.
  - Differential reserve requirements for domestic and foreign currency deposits have been particularly helpful in reducing deposit dollarization (citing regional successful experiences).
- Staff analysis finds higher dollarization is associated with structural factors: lower financial development, lower credibility of monetary policy and prudential policies.

### Authorities’ views on monetary policy and de-dollarization
- Authorities agree the monetary policy stance is appropriate and that inflation will converge to the target range, noting moderation of international inflationary pressures will help slow domestic inflation.
- They concur that the exchange rate should act as a shock absorber and FX intervention should be limited to disorderly market conditions.
- Authorities highlighted progress in their de-dollarization strategy, committing to continue implementing key elements:
  - (i) strengthening the monetary policy framework to ensure low and stable inflation,
  - (ii) developing the peso capital market,
  - (iii) addressing cultural dollarization (such as pricing in US dollars in real estate markets and for durable goods),
  - (iv) recalibrating existing prudential and fiscal tools.

### Financial sector policies: resilience and supervisory priorities
- Progress made in strengthening financial sector supervision; further efforts needed in line with recent FSAP recommendations.
- Actions taken: updated supervisory framework and implementation of a broad range of macroprudential tools, strengthening banking resilience and reducing dollarization risks.
- Priorities and recommendations:
  - Further enhance the macroprudential framework, especially expanding the toolkit to cover the household sector.
  - Monitor corporate sector vulnerability to shocks closely.
  - Close large data gaps to assess system-wide FX liquidity risk and recalibrate de-dollarization measures (including cross-sectoral datasets, granular household indebtedness, and extent of unhedged corporate FX loans).
  - Incorporate enhanced solvency stress tests into risk-based supervision and link results to supervisory actions.
  - Address solvency risks for some private banks via Pillar 2 capital add-ons and restrictions on dividend distribution.
  - Redesign the bank wealth tax to incentivize private banks to raise additional capital.
  - Update crisis management framework: overhaul role of government in funding bank resolution, develop recovery and resolution planning framework, and create an emergency liquidity provision facility.

### AML/CFT and virtual assets
- According to GAFILAT’s 2020 Mutual Evaluation Report (MER), Uruguay was assessed as having a moderately effective AML/CFT system; the MER highlighted vulnerabilities to illicit capital placement, particularly in real estate and construction sectors and proceeds from organized crime.
- Authorities are expected to conclude and publish a National Risk Assessment (NRA) by the end of April, which will consider new risks such as virtual assets/virtual asset service providers (VA/VASPs). The NRA will serve as basis for an AML/CFT national action plan.
- “Rendición de Cuentas” established a Special Prosecutor's office for ML/TF. A proposed Law of Virtual Assets (an amendment of the Organic Law of the Central Bank and the Securities Law) is pending approval by Congress.

### Authorities’ views on financial sector
- Authorities emphasize the financial sector remains sound and resilient: banking system profitability remains high, with strong liquidity indicators and low and stable non-performing loans.
- They welcomed FSAP acknowledgement of progress and concur on importance of further enhancing supervision and regulation.
- Resolution planning framework and emergency liquidity facility will be incorporated into BCU’s and SSF’s workplans.
- Authorities are reviewing the macroprudential framework, including mandate and transparency, and recognize redesigning the bank wealth tax requires careful calibration to avoid negative revenue impacts.
- They noted significant progress in strengthening AML/CFT framework and commitment to implement recommendations from the 2020 GAFILAT MER and FSAP; they expect the Special Prosecutor's office to be a valuable tool.

### Structural policies to boost sustainable growth
- Structural reforms are critical to increase productivity, educational attainment, investment, and growth to sustain the welfare state and social safety net.
- Authorities’ focus areas include:
  - Education and Innovation:
    - Uruguay has high dropout rates and one of the lowest secondary graduation rates in the region; test scores compare unfavorably with OECD economies.
    - Youth unemployment remains high; shortages of high-skilled workers in ICT are apparent.
    - Short-term priority: coordinated public-private on-demand training programs to bridge skills gap.
    - The recently launched Innovation Hub could attract international startups and open laboratories.
    - Education reform (“Transformación Educativa”) aims to improve governance, reduce inequality, increase retention, modernize curricula, and improve teacher training; initial redesign covers children aged 4 to 14 and introduces a national curriculum plan “Marco Curricular Nacional”.
    - New teacher training programs approved in December 2022; further steps needed to transform teachers’ statutes and better integrate primary and secondary education.
  - Trade Policy:
    - New trade facilitation measures include promoting a one-stop shop for exports and imports and reducing in 10 percent its average import tariff in 2023.
    - Authorities are pursuing trade agreements, exploring CPTPP accession, assessing bilateral free trade agreements with China and Türkiye, and extending zero tariffs on free-trade zone flows with Brazil.
  - State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs):
    - Recent initiatives to improve efficiency include updating electric meters to reduce losses and redesigning contracts for LNG packing.
    - Progress since 2020 to align domestic gasoline prices with international prices should be reinvigorated as global energy prices moderate.
    - Recommendations: SOEs should be professionally managed, tariffs cost-reflective and set by independent regulators, and social program costs transparently financed from the budget instead of cross-subsidies.
    - State-owned banks should be subject to the same resolution arrangements and corporate governance rules as private banks.
  - Pension Reform:
    - A new law was recently approved extending retirement age progressively and unifying a fragmented system; the reform will largely stabilize spending in the long-term to ensure sustainability, intergenerational equity, and space for other spending priorities.

### Climate and sustainability
- Uruguay has achieved a commendable reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions intensity without endangering food security and economic development.
- Uruguay is a low producer of GHG emissions but vulnerable to climate hazards: excessive rainfall, droughts, and rising sea levels.
- The successful issuance of a sustainability-linked bond showcases commitment to environmentally sustainable policies and emphasis on institutional coordination and transparency.
- To achieve carbon dioxide neutrality by 2050, decarbonization efforts should focus on:
  - Transition to electric mobility, supported by green hydrogen production and e-fuels initiatives already underway.
  - Promoting climate-smart agricultural and livestock practices to raise food production while reducing methane and nitrous oxide emissions intensity, preserving grassland ecosystems, and protecting native forests.

*Based on the provided IMF chapter text.*

### Box 4. The Sovereign Sustainability-Linked Bond

### Box 4. The Sovereign Sustainability-Linked Bond

### Overview and design
- In October 2022, Uruguay became the second country to issue a sovereign sustainability-linked bond (SSLB).
- SSLB characteristics:
  - Unlike green bonds, whose proceeds are linked to specific projects, SSLB are not earmarked to a specific use but rather compensate investors in case its targets are not met.
  - The SSLB framework is the result of the coordinated work of 5 ministries and articulates in a consistent manner Uruguay’s commitment to climate change.
  - Bonds under this framework contain two key performing indicators (KPIs) and feature a step-up or step-down coupon depending on performance on each KPI.
- KPIs:
  - KPI 1: Reducing aggregate gross GHG emissions per real GDP unit.
  - KPI 2: Maintaining the native forest area with respect to reference year.
- Coupon adjustment mechanics:
  - Depending on whether Uruguay meets, does not meet, or overperforms in each indicator, there will be a one-time 15bps adjustment up (does not meet) or down (overperforms) in the coupon of the bond.
  - Based on performance through 2025, the adjustments would be applied to the coupon payments in 2027.

### Market outcome and investor response
- Issuance details:
  - A 12-year bond for US$ 1.5 billion.
  - The issuance was more than 2-times oversubscribed.
  - It priced just 170 bps above US Treasuries of similar maturities.
- Investor base:
  - The issuance attracted approximately 40 new investors interested in SSLBs who had not purchased Uruguay bonds in the past.

### Context within Uruguay’s policy agenda and IMF staff observations
- Climate and institutional context:
  - Authorities emphasize that balancing economic development with environmental sustainability is a national priority and highlighted strong political commitment to integrate climate change across public policy.
  - Uruguay intends to remain at the forefront of designing economic policies and financial instruments to address climate change and nature conservation, including mobilizing resources and producing better estimates of net carbon capture on greenhouse gas emissions.
- Related financial sector and reform context (staff observations directly connected to broader discussion in the source):
  - Financial inclusion and access to finance:
    - 74 percent of adults had a bank account in 2021.
    - 40 percent of firms reported access to finance as a major constraint.
  - Structural reform priorities relevant for sustaining growth and market development include social security, education, international trade reforms, professionalizing SOEs, and modernizing the payments system.
  - Staff notes that efforts to develop a benchmark yield curve and increase the liquidity of the secondary market would deepen the local currency bond market and nurture the peso capital market.
- Fiscal and macro-monetary context cited alongside the SSLB discussion:
  - NFPS fiscal deficit is projected at 3 percent of GDP in 2023.
  - IMF staff estimate that bringing NFPS debt to a range between 50-55 percent of GDP over the medium term would provide buffers to respond to shocks.
  - Staff recommends maintaining a tight monetary policy stance until inflation and inflation expectations have converged to the target range in a sustained manner.

### Policy implications and takeaways
- Design and credibility:
  - The SSLB framework’s KPI-linked coupon adjustments create direct financial incentives tied to measurable environmental outcomes, while proceeds remain unearmarked.
  - Coordinated inter-ministerial design and independent performance timelines (performance through 2025 affecting 2027 coupons) enhance clarity and accountability.
- Market development and investor diversification:
  - SSLB issuance can broaden the investor base, evidenced by the attraction of approximately 40 new investors.
  - Successful pricing (170 bps over US Treasuries) and oversubscription (more than 2-times) indicate market receptivity.
- Complementary reforms:
  - Continued progress on market infrastructure (benchmark yield curve, secondary market liquidity) and payment-system modernization would support deeper local-currency markets and sustained investor interest in sovereign instruments, including SSLBs.

*Source: Box 4. The Sovereign Sustainability-Linked Bond (excerpt).*

### 36.      Staff recommends that the next Article IV consultation take place on the standard 12-

### 1uryea2023001 - 36. Staff recommends that the next Article IV consultation take place on the standard 12-

### Article IV scheduling
- Staff recommends that the next Article IV consultation take place on the standard 12-months cycle.

### COVID-19 developments
- Vaccination campaigns, including boosters, reached most of the adult population.
- Uruguay suffered two big waves in 2021 and early 2022.
- Stringency of containment measures peaked in mid-2021 and was subsequently relaxed.
- Overall, total cases were relatively high, although death statistics compare favorably.
- Mobility kept increasing, reaching pre-pandemic levels by mid-2022.
- Charted indicators (selected):
  - Stringency Index: URY, USA, LA6 (Mar-20 to Jul-22).
  - Cumulative Cases (Per thousand inhabitants): URY, USA, LA6.
  - Cumulative Deaths (Per thousand inhabitants): URY, USA, LA6.
  - New COVID Cases (Daily, per thousand inhabitants): URY, USA, LA6.
  - Mobility Index (Google): URY, USA, LA6.
  - Vaccine Boosters administered (Per hundred inhabitants): URY, USA, LA6 (Aug-21 to Oct-22).

### Real sector and output
- The economy grew at a healthy pace in the first half of 2022, but growth turned negative at the end of the year.
- Growth dynamics:
  - Real GDP (percent change): 2021 = 5.3; 2022 = 4.9; projections 2023 = 2.0; 2024 = 3.0 (Table 1).
- Demand and production contributions:
  - Service sectors drove activity; contraction observed in the primary sector and in agricultural production.
- Real GDP scarring:
  - Real GDP remains below pre-pandemic trends.
- External demand and trade:
  - Exports contracted in the second half of 2022.
  - Gross travel exports (In millions of US dollars) increased driven mainly by the recovery in tourism revenues.
- Employment:
  - Employment losses during the pandemic were comparatively lower in Uruguay relative to peers (Last observation December 2022).

### Labor market
- Employment trends:
  - Employment is above pre-pandemic levels (Last observation December 2022).
  - Employment rate (percent) and weekly hours worked recovered substantially during 2022.
- Age and composition:
  - Young workers were disproportionately affected (Change in Employment by Age, 2019-21).
- Wages and productivity:
  - Losses in real wages have not fully recovered yet.
  - Labor productivity and real salaries indexed (Index: 100 = 2006Q1).
- Formality:
  - Informality, traditionally low, has declined further.
- Selected indicators:
  - Unemployment (in percent, pa): 2021 = 9.4; 2022 = 7.9; projections 2023 = 8.2; 2024 = 8.1 (Table 1).

### Inflation dynamics
- CPI inflation (year-on-year percent change):
  - Dec-18 to Dec-22 series show headline and exclusions (meat, energy).
- Recent pattern:
  - While remaining above the inflation target, inflation is slowing down.
  - Recent fluctuations mostly driven by tradable good prices.
  - Inflationary pressures were contained by the exchange rate appreciation (appreciation of the peso).
- Inflation expectations:
  - Inflation expectations remain above the target ceiling with heterogeneity across measures (Entrepreneurs' survey, Breakeven, BCU survey, Consensus Forecast).
- Energy and imported inflation:
  - Imported inflation from crude oil and oil products influenced CPI components (CPI: Natural gas; CPI: Gasoline).
- Selected numbers:
  - CPI inflation (in percent, end of period): 2021 = 8.0; 2022 = 8.3; projections 2023 = 7.0; 2024 = 5.7 (Table 1).

### External accounts
- Current account and trade:
  - The CA deficit increased towards the end of 2022, with a weaker trade balance surplus offset by a lower primary income deficit.
  - Current account (In percent of GDP, 4Q sum) trending toward larger deficits in 2022.
  - Trade balance (In percent of GDP, 4Q sum) softened in 2022Q4; services balance strengthened.
- Exports and prices:
  - In 2022, favorable agricultural prices and external demand underpinned historically high merchandise exports.
  - Export prices (Y/Y growth, 4Q sum) for Soybean, Livestock, Forestry showed strong contributions in 2022.
- Financial account and FDI:
  - Financial flows proved resilient, with portfolio outflows fully offset by large FDI inflows.
  - Direct investment supported by the large UPM pulp mill investment.
- Reserve and external metrics (Table 2 and Table 5 projections):
  - Gross official reserves (stock, US$ billions): 2021 = 17.0; 2022 = 15.1; projections 2023 = 16.1; 2024 = 16.3 (Table 2).
  - Current account (percent of GDP): 2021 = -2.5; 2022 = -3.2; projections 2023 = -3.2; 2024 = -3.0 (Table 1).

### Fiscal developments
- Public debt and fiscal balance:
  - Public debt declined following a large fiscal adjustment.
  - Gross debt NFPS (percent of GDP): 2021 = 63.4; 2022 = 59.3; projections 2023 = 61.6; 2024 = 61.9 (Table 1).
  - Primary balance NFPS (percent of GDP): 2021 = -0.6; 2022 = -0.5; projections 2023 = -1.0; 2024 = -0.7 (Table 1).
  - Overall balance NFPS (percent of GDP): 2021 = -2.6; 2022 = -2.5; projections 2023 = -2.9; 2024 = -2.7 (Table 1).
- Revenue and expenditure:
  - Revenues CG-BPS (A) (percent of GDP): 2021 = 27.0; 2022 = 27.1; projections 2023 = 26.1; 2024 = 26.5 (Table 1).
  - Primary expenditure CG-BPS (B) (percent of GDP): 2021 = 27.9; 2022 = 27.8; projections 2023 = 27.3; 2024 = 27.5 (Table 1).
  - Expenditure restraint, especially in wages and pensions, supported the fiscal adjustment.
- Public enterprises:
  - Balance of SOEs improved due to one-off events rather than structural change.
- Fiscal tables (selected):
  - Table 3 provides main fiscal aggregates 2019–28 showing revenues, taxes, primary expenditures, interest, overall balances, gross and net debt in both pesos and percent of GDP.

### Monetary policy and interest rates
- Policy actions:
  - The central bank progressively raised the policy rate; the short-term interest rate becomes the monetary policy instrument.
- Interest rates and transmission:
  - Average peso interest rates and yields on BCU paper issued in nominal pesos (Letras de Regulación Monetaria) rose through 2022 and into 2023.
  - Transmission to credit loan rates was gradual; transmission to deposit rates was more rapid.
  - Real interest rates were positive in short-term maturities.
- FX intervention:
  - Since the onset of the pandemic, the central bank has limited FX intervention.
  - FX purchases (2016-23) are charted in percent of GDP (Last observation Mar 2023).
- Yield curve and external influence:
  - Tightening of financial conditions led to an increase in domestic interest rates, mostly because of an increase in US Treasuries rates as spreads have remained low.
- Monetary aggregates (Table 4):
  - Base money (percent change): 2021 = 9.1; 2022 = 1.7.
  - M2 (percent change): 2021 = 16.2; 2022 = 1.7.
  - M3 levels and other monetary survey details provided for 2016–22.

### Credit and banking system
- Asset quality and provisioning:
  - Non-performing loans remained low amid increased provisioning.
  - Non-performing loans (In percent): low levels through 2022 with provisions (In percent of NPLs) increased.
- Profitability and liquidity:
  - Uruguayan banks remain highly liquid and profitable (Return on assets and Liquidity ratio charts).
- Credit composition:
  - Share of credit by economic sector, foreign currency (as of end-December 2022): Agriculture 32; Commerce 21; Manufacturing 22; Services 18; Construction 4; Households 3 (Percent).
  - Dollarization:
    - Foreign-Currency-Denominated Loans to Total Loans (percent): 2015–2022 series with 2022 = 51.2 (Table 6).
    - Foreign-Currency-Denominated Liabilities to Total Liabilities (percent): 2022 = 71.1 (Table 6).
  - Dollarization, especially for deposits, remains high.
- Market structure:
  - Securities market dominated by private sector certificates of deposits and public sector bonds.
  - State-owned banks maintain higher capital buffers than private banks (Reg. Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets: 2022).
- Financial soundness indicators (Table 6, selected):
  - Regulatory capital in percent of risk-weighted assets: 2022 = 16.9.
  - Non-performing loans in percent of total loans: 2022 = 1.4.
  - Return on assets: 2022 = 1.8.
  - Liquid assets to total assets: 2022 = 55.9.

### Climate and energy
- Emissions and energy mix:
  - GHG emissions per capita (In tCO2e): URY and peer comparisons; Uruguay higher in per capita terms but lower per GDP unit relative to peers.
  - GHG emissions are concentrated in agriculture.
  - Most of Uruguay's electricity production comes from renewable sources.
  - Electric Generation by Source (In Percent of 2022 Generation): Hydro 39%; Wind 32%; Biomass 17%; Fossil fuel 9%; Solar 3%.
  - Wind energy production has grown rapidly (Wind Energy Production series Jan-11 to Jul-21).
- Emissions by sector (2019, In MtCO2e):
  - Agriculture and Livestock 22.6; Energy 6.5; Waste 1.2; Industrial Processes 0.7; LUCF -11.5 (Table/figure notes).
- Net GHGs per GDP unit:
  - 0.3 thousands of tCO2e/mln $GDP (INGEI 2019) noted in figure notes.

### Medium-term projections and macro framework
- Key projections (Table 5 and Table 1):
  - Real GDP (percent change): 2023 = 2.0; 2024 = 3.0.
  - CPI inflation (end of period): 2023 = 7.0; 2024 = 5.7.
  - Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2023 = -3.2; 2024 = -3.0.
  - Gross NFPS debt (percent of GDP): 2023 = 61.6; 2024 = 61.9.
  - Unemployment rate (percent): 2023 = 8.2; 2024 = 8.1.
- Medium-term outlook:
  - Output gap narrows modestly but remains slightly negative through projections.
  - Gross international reserves (US$ billions) projected to be 16.1 in 2023 and 16.3 in 2024 (Table 2 / Table 5).

*Source: IMF staff report content as provided in the supplied PDF excerpts.*

### Annex I. External Sector Assessment

### Annex I. External Sector Assessment

### Overall Assessment
- The external position in 2022 was broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
- The CA deficit is expected to remain at 3.2 percent of GDP in 2023, as the impact of the drought would offset the normalization of the services balance, particularly led by the recovery of tourism and the reduction of transportation costs.
- The CA balance is forecasted to converge to a deficit of about 2.2 percent of GDP in the medium term, driven by a positive goods and services balance and a negative primary income balance.
- Potential Policy Responses:
  - Maintain fiscal consolidation into the medium term.
  - Implement structural reforms to raise potential growth, improve competitiveness and boost investment to maintain the savings-investment balance.
  - Allow the exchange rate to continue to act as shock absorber; limit FX interventions to respond to disorderly market conditions.

### Foreign Asset and Liability Position and Trajectory
- Background:
  - Uruguay’s NIIP was –23 percent of GDP at the end of 2022, modestly stronger than the 2017–21 average (–25.1 percent of GDP) stemming from higher GDP growth and the appreciation of the peso.
  - Foreign assets in 2022 were mostly comprised of direct investment (47 percent of GDP) while international reserves accounted for 21 percent of GDP.
  - Foreign direct investment accounted for almost 63 percent of the country’s liabilities.
  - Over the medium term, as real GDP growth converges to its potential and the current account stabilizes around its norm, the NIIP is projected to hover around –31 percent of GDP.
- Assessment:
  - While Uruguay’s NIIP is negative, the composition of its liabilities (mainly FDI) and low sovereign risk spreads create favorable conditions.
  - Over the medium term, underpinned by a strong institutional framework and a prudent macroeconomic management, the NIIP-to-GDP ratio is expected to remain broadly stable.
  - Vulnerabilities arise from financial dollarization and relatively large share of foreign-currency public debt.
- Key statistics (2022, % GDP):
  - NIIP: -22.6
  - Gross Assets: 116.0
  - Debt Assets: 81.8
  - Gross Liab.: 138
  - Debt Liab.: 78.8

### Current Account
- Background:
  - The CA deficit reached 3.2 percent of GDP in 2022, widening compared to 2021.
  - A recent data revision increased the current account deficit to 2.5 percent in 2021 from 1.8 percent previously reported, reflecting newly available survey data from large corporations.
  - Despite two years of historically high goods exports, imports have also rebounded strongly while the services balance has deteriorated owing to subdued tourism proceeds and increased maritime freight costs.
  - From 2018 to 2022, the current account has also widened on the back of stronger FDI payouts, with a primary income balance shifting from –5.6 to –8.8 percent of GDP during that period.
  - In 2023, the drought will weigh on exports, offsetting partially the benefits from the recovery of tourism to pre-pandemic levels and declining transportation costs, leaving the CA deficit unchanged at 3.2 percent of GDP.
  - Over the medium term, the CA deficit is expected to gradually converge to about 2.2 percent of GDP.
- Assessment:
  - The EBA model estimates a cyclically adjusted CA norm of –2.2 percent of GDP in 2022, implying an EBA CA gap of -1.4 percent of GDP (range: -1.9 to -0.9 percent of GDP).
  - Staff adjustments for the transitory impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath: travel (-0.5 percent of GDP) and transportation services (-0.3 percent of GDP).
  - Including these adjustments, staff assesses the midpoint CA gap at -0.6 percent of GDP, with a range of -1.1 to -0.1 percent of GDP.
- Key statistics (2022, % GDP):
  - CA: -3.2
  - Cycl. Adj. CA: -3.6
  - EBA Norm: -2.2
  - EBA Gap: -1.4
  - COVID-19 Adj.: 0.8
  - Other Adj.: 0.0
  - Staff Gap: -0.6

### Real Exchange Rate
- Background:
  - In 2022, the peso appreciated 10 percent, decreasing from 44.7 to 40.1 pesos per US dollar.
  - After a cumulative 7 percent real depreciation between 2018 and 2021, the REER in 2022 appreciated on average by about 9.6 percent compared with the 2021 average, mostly driven by a nominal appreciation.
- Assessment:
  - The IMF staff CA gap implies a REER gap of 3.2 percent of GDP (applying a semi-elasticity of 0.19).
  - The EBA REER level and index models estimate an overvaluation of 30.4 percent and of 12.9 percent, respectively, in 2022.
  - The IMF staff’s overall assessment, based on the CA gap, is a REER gap in the range of 0.5 to 5.8 percent, with a midpoint of 3.2 percent.

### Capital and Financial Accounts: Flows and Policy Measures
- Background:
  - In 2022, Uruguay recorded net financial account inflows around 3.2 percent of GDP, slightly larger than 2021 (2.6 percent of GDP).
  - Net capital inflows were mainly originated from foreign direct investment (4.6 percent of GDP) and the drawdown of reserve assets (2.2 percent of GDP) held by the central bank.
  - These movements were partially offset by portfolio and other investments.
- Assessment:
  - Lengthening of sovereign debt maturity, high share of fixed-rate debt and the increasing share of debt issued in local currency are positive steps toward reducing exposure to FX depreciation and refinancing risks.
  - The FDI nature of more than half of the country’s liabilities limits the risk of capital flows reversal.
  - The banking sector maintains ample liquidity buffers; the central government’s precautionary credit lines with multilaterals provide financial backstop.

### FX Intervention and Reserves Level
- Background:
  - Uruguay has a floating exchange rate.
  - Following the 2020 enhancement of the monetary policy framework, which switched to the short-term interest rate as the main policy instrument, the exchange rate has gradually been allowed to act as shock absorber.
  - In 2022, the central bank did not conduct FX interventions in the spot market, while reserves remained high at US$15 billion.
  - The central bank conducted forward operations with SOEs in the amount of US$550 million or 0.8 percent of GDP.
- Assessment:
  - Reserves are adequate relative to various criteria, including the IMF’s reserve adequacy metric (around 160 percent as of the end of 2022) and serve as insurance against external shocks.
  - The exchange rate should continue to act as a shock absorber and FX interventions should be limited to respond to disorderly FX market conditions.

---

### Annex II. Drivers of the Primary Income Balance

### Overview and Key Findings
- The income balance (IB) is a key component of Uruguay’s current account balance (CAB). In net terms, the IB deficit has offset trade balance surpluses and explains the negative CAB in most years since 2012.
- Uruguay’s relatively high primary income deficit is explained by the composition of its International Investment Position (IIP), underpinned by high FDI liabilities with higher yields than those from FDI foreign assets.
- The large share of exports related to FDI and the rising importance of net exports sold under merchanting explain the correlation between goods exports and income debits.

### Detailed Findings
1. Current account fluctuations (2012–2022)
   - Persistent goods trade surpluses have been offset by recurrent deficits in the primary income balance.
   - Gross flows of goods exports, goods imports and primary income debit are the most important components behind CA variability between 2012 and 2022.
   - Co-movement between goods exports and primary income debit (PID) is strong (correlation = 0.72).
   - Services balance has been, on average, positive but relatively small; primary income credit and secondary income gross flows have been negligible in explaining CAB variations.
2. IIP composition implications
   - IIP liabilities dominated by FDI; IIP assets more balanced between FDI, portfolio, and other investment assets.
   - Average stock of FDI liabilities around 80 percent of GDP; FDI assets around 40 percent of GDP.
   - FDI returns are the PID account's dominant component; FDI inflows/stock liabilities explain variations in the IB.
3. FDI yields
   - Implicit returns on FDI liabilities have increased since 2021.
   - Both PID and FDI liabilities have risen strongly since 2021; PID rose faster than FDI liabilities, resulting in higher FDI yields (as a percent of the stock of FDI net liabilities).
   - FDI yields of Uruguayan investments abroad (FDI net assets) have been consistently lower than those of foreigners investing in Uruguay, exacerbating the primary income deficit.
4. Link between exports and PID
   - Increase in FDI yields and PID appears driven by the recent strong performance of goods exports.
   - High correlation between exports of goods and PID likely reflects the large share of FDI companies in export activities.
   - Government reports: in 2018, 70 percent of the total exports of goods were related to foreign capital companies (increased from 24 percent in 2003).
   - Stock of FDI liabilities captures the quantity (extensive) margin on FDI implicit returns; flows of goods exports act as a proxy for the intensive margin.
5. Merchanting
   - Exports of goods related to merchanting transactions have gained relevance in the last decade, growing faster and being more volatile than non-merchanting exports.
   - Since 2012, merchanting-related IIP liabilities have nearly doubled (percent of GDP), while non-merchanting IIP liabilities have stayed almost flat.
6. Incorporation into projections
   - Cointegration analysis finds a robust long-term relationship between PID, composition of goods exports, and FDI liabilities.
   - Preferred specification (PID expressed as percent of GDP) results:
     - Merchanting and non-merchanting exports of goods, separately, increase PID.
     - A one p.p. increase in the stock of FDI liabilities to GDP ratio is associated with a 0.04 percent of GDP higher PID.
   - Association between exports of goods and PID is stronger than between the stock of FDI and PID.
   - These findings have been incorporated into the staff’s macroframework projections.

### Regression Results (Selected)
- Method: FMLS, Dep. Var: PID or PID/GDP
- Key coefficients (specification highlights):
  - Exports of Goods (merchanting): 0.63; 0.46; 492 (various specs) — significance levels indicated in table.
  - Exports of Goods (excl. merchanting): 0.19; 0.34; 2,681 (various specs).
  - FI inc. of Liabilities-IIP (merchanting, lagged): 0.05; 0.05; 13,436 (various specs).
  - Exports of Goods as % of GDP (merchanting): 0.6; Excl. merchanting: 0.33.
  - FI inc. of Liabilities-IIP as % of GDP (merchanting, lagged): 0.04.
- Observations: 41 (or 43); R-squared: 0.7, 0.81, 0.73 across specifications.

---

### Annex III. External Sector DSA

- External debt developments:
  - External debt in Uruguay reached 78 percent of GDP in 2022 after peaking in 2020.
  - In 2022, the economic recovery and fiscal consolidation contributed to bringing down the level of debt.
  - About 42 percent of the external debt is owed by the public sector.
- Projections:
  - Gross external debt is forecasted to slightly increase in 2023, leveling at around 79.1 percent of GDP.
  - Over the medium term, external debt is projected on a downward trend owing to favorable automatic debt dynamics as well as narrower fiscal and current account deficits.
  - Gross external financing requirements are expected to gradually converge to 14 percent of GDP, underpinned by a stronger non-interest current account surplus and stable amortizations of longer-term debt.
- Stress test results:
  - Standard non-interest current account and interest rate shocks would have a limited impact on external debt.
  - Shocks to growth and a combined shock to the real interest rate, growth and current account would have a greater, but still moderate, impact.
- Main risk:
  - Exchange rate depreciation is the main risk to Uruguay’s external debt sustainability.
  - A one-off 30 percent exchange rate depreciation would increase the external debt-to-GDP ratio to 114.8 percent of GDP in the short-term, while stabilizing in the medium-term around 109 percent of GDP.

*Source: IMF staff calculations and assessments contained in Annex I–III of the External Sector Assessment.*

### 6.      Overall, the outlook for external debt sustainability has improved on the back of

### 6.      Overall, the outlook for external debt sustainability has improved on the back of

### Overview
- Outlook improved on the back of stronger macroeconomic performance, fiscal consolidation and favorable debt dynamics.
- Despite an external context marked by higher interest rates, under the baseline scenario, medium-term external debt is lower by almost 10 percentage points compared to the previous external DSA in 2021.
- Uruguay’s external liabilities are mainly foreign direct investments; the country maintains sizeable gross international reserves and fiscal liquidity buffers, so risks to external debt sustainability remain limited.

### External Debt Sustainability Framework: Key statistics (2016–2028)
- External debt (percent of GDP) by year:
  - 2016: 70.2
  - 2017: 65.0
  - 2018: 66.0
  - 2019: 72.8
  - 2020: 87.7
  - 2021: 79.4
  - 2022: 78.0
  - 2023: 79.1
  - 2024: 77.4
  - 2025: 76.1
  - 2026: 75.7
  - 2027: 75.0
  - 2028: 74.8
- Debt-stabilizing non-interest current account: 1.2
- Change in external debt (percent of GDP) by year:
  - 2016: -5.0
  - 2017: -5.2
  - 2018: 1.0
  - 2019: 6.8
  - 2020: 14.9
  - 2021: -8.4
  - 2022: -1.4
  - 2023: 1.1
  - 2024: -1.7
  - 2025: -1.3
  - 2026: -0.4
  - 2027: -0.7
  - 2028: -0.2
- Identified external debt-creating flows (percent of GDP) by year:
  - 2016: -12.0
  - 2017: -9.1
  - 2018: 2.5
  - 2019: 4.6
  - 2020: 9.7
  - 2021: -4.4
  - 2022: -6.9
  - 2023: 4.0
  - 2024: 1.4
  - 2025: 0.7
  - 2026: 0.4
  - 2027: 0.2
  - 2028: 0.5
- Current account deficit, excluding interest payments (percent of GDP) by year:
  - 2016: -3.0
  - 2017: -1.9
  - 2018: -1.7
  - 2019: -3.5
  - 2020: -1.7
  - 2021: 0.5
  - 2022: 1.2
  - 2023: 1.1
  - 2024: 0.7
  - 2025: 0.2
  - 2026: -0.2
  - 2027: -0.5
  - 2028: -0.7
- Deficit in balance of goods and services (percent of GDP) by year:
  - 2016: -5.3
  - 2017: -5.3
  - 2018: -5.0
  - 2019: -6.0
  - 2020: -4.5
  - 2021: -7.3
  - 2022: -5.5
  - 2023: -3.9
  - 2024: -4.0
  - 2025: -4.6
  - 2026: -4.8
  - 2027: -5.0
  - 2028: -5.1
- Exports (percent of GDP) by year:
  - 2016: 26.9
  - 2017: 25.9
  - 2018: 26.4
  - 2019: 27.8
  - 2020: 25.7
  - 2021: 31.6
  - 2022: 31.8
  - 2023: 28.3
  - 2024: 28.9
  - 2025: 29.4
  - 2026: 29.8
  - 2027: 30.0
  - 2028: 30.2
- Imports (percent of GDP) by year:
  - 2016: -21.6
  - 2017: -20.5
  - 2018: -21.4
  - 2019: -21.8
  - 2020: -21.2
  - 2021: -24.3
  - 2022: -26.3
  - 2023: -24.4
  - 2024: -24.9
  - 2025: -24.9
  - 2026: -25.0
  - 2027: -25.0
  - 2028: -25.1
- Net non-debt creating capital inflows (negative, percent of GDP) by year:
  - 2016: -3.2
  - 2017: -3.1
  - 2018: -1.1
  - 2019: 2.2
  - 2020: 1.8
  - 2021: 2.7
  - 2022: 4.4
  - 2023: 2.8
  - 2024: 2.4
  - 2025: 1.9
  - 2026: 1.1
  - 2027: 1.0
  - 2028: 1.0
- Automatic debt dynamics (percent of GDP) by year:
  - 2016: -5.8
  - 2017: -4.0
  - 2018: 5.4
  - 2019: 5.9
  - 2020: 9.6
  - 2021: -7.7
  - 2022: -12.5
  - 2023: 0.0
  - 2024: -1.7
  - 2025: -1.4
  - 2026: -0.5
  - 2027: -0.4
  - 2028: 0.2
- Contributions to automatic debt dynamics (percent of GDP), example components:
  - Contribution from nominal interest rate (selected years): 2016: 1.9; 2023: 2.1; 2028: 2.9
  - Contribution from real GDP growth (selected years): 2016: -1.1; 2023: -1.5; 2028: -1.6
  - Contribution from price and exchange rate changes (selected years): 2016: -6.6; 2022: -11.2; 2028: -1.1
- Residual, incl. change in gross foreign assets (percent of GDP) by year:
  - 2016: 6.9
  - 2017: 3.9
  - 2018: -1.6
  - 2019: 2.2
  - 2020: 5.2
  - 2021: -3.9
  - 2022: 5.5
  - 2023: -2.9
  - 2024: -3.1
  - 2025: -2.1
  - 2026: -0.8
  - 2027: -0.8
  - 2028: -0.7
- External debt-to-exports ratio (in percent) by year:
  - 2016: 260.7
  - 2017: 251.2
  - 2018: 249.5
  - 2019: 262.4
  - 2020: 341.7
  - 2021: 251.3
  - 2022: 245.7
  - 2023: 279.7
  - 2024: 268.2
  - 2025: 258.5
  - 2026: 253.8
  - 2027: 250.2
  - 2028: 247.8
- Gross external financing need (in billions of US dollars) by year:
  - 2016: 11.1
  - 2017: 10.0
  - 2018: 9.9
  - 2019: 8.4
  - 2020: 9.7
  - 2021: 11.5
  - 2022: 11.5
  - 2023: 14.3
  - 2024: 12.8
  - 2025: 13.3
  - 2026: 13.3
  - 2027: 13.7
  - 2028: 13.8
- Gross external financing need (in percent of GDP) by year:
  - 2016: 19.1
  - 2017: 17.4
  - 2018: 15.3
  - 2019: 12.9
  - 2020: 15.6
  - 2021: 21.5
  - 2022: 18.8
  - 2023: 18.6
  - 2024: 15.9
  - 2025: 15.8
  - 2026: 15.1
  - 2027: 14.9
  - 2028: 14.4

### Key macroeconomic assumptions underlying baseline (selected)
- Real GDP growth (in percent) by year:
  - Historical and projections: 1.7 (historical average), 0.2 (standard deviation), then 0.7, -6.3, 5.3, 4.9, 1.2, 3.8, 2.0, 3.0, 2.8, 2.5, 2.3, 2.2
- GDP deflator in US dollars (change in percent) sample values: 9.6; 7.5; -4.7; -6.0; -3.0; 6.7; 16.5; 3.8; 8.5; 0.7; 2.3; 2.5; 1.9; 2.1; 1.5
- Nominal external interest rate (in percent) sample values: 2.8; 3.1; 3.4; 3.2; 2.9; 2.6; 2.9; 3.0; 0.3; 2.8; 3.1; 3.5; 3.8; 3.9; 4.0
- Growth of exports (US dollar terms, in percent) sample values: -6.7; 8.6; 2.4; -0.2; -20.0; 40.8; 16.5; 5.9; 19.2; -4.2; 7.4; 7.1; 5.6; 4.8; 4.8
- Growth of imports (US dollar terms, in percent) sample values: -13.5; 7.4; 4.5; -3.4; -15.9; 31.2; 25.6; 5.1; 18.1; -0.2; 7.2; 5.1; 4.7; 4.3; 4.4
- Current account balance, excluding interest payments sample values: 3.0; 1.9; 1.7; 3.5; 1.7; -0.5; -1.2; 1.4; 1.7; -1.1; -0.7; -0.2; 0.2; 0.5; 0.7
- Net non-debt creating capital inflows sample values: 3.2; 3.1; 1.1; -2.2; -1.8; -2.7; -4.4; -0.5; 3.0; -2.8; -2.4; -1.9; -1.1; -1.0; -1.0

### Stress Tests and Scenario Results
- Baseline and shock outcomes (external debt in percent of GDP, selected):
  - Baseline average: 76 (presented in figures)
  - Interest rate shock scenario: 76 (with labeled "i-rate shock" in figure)
  - CA shock scenario: 80
  - Combined shock scenario: 83
  - Real depreciation (one-time 30 percent in 2023): 109
  - Growth shock scenario: 84
- Notes on stress tests:
  - Individual shocks are permanent one-half standard deviation shocks.
  - Permanent 1/4 standard deviation shocks applied to real interest rate, growth rate, and current account balance in some tests.
  - One-time real depreciation of 30 percent occurs in 2023 for the real depreciation shock.

### Risk Assessment and Policy Advice (Annex IV, selected)
- External Risks:
  - Systemic financial instability: Likelihood Medium; Impact Medium; Horizon ST.
    - Policy advice: Continue monitoring the financial sector; improve financial sector resilience in line with FSAP recommendations.
  - Monetary policy miscalibration: Likelihood Medium; Impact Medium; Horizon ST.
    - Policy advice: Tighten monetary policy to anchor inflation expectations; fiscal policy should remain neutral while supporting the most vulnerable; allow exchange rate to act as a shock absorber.
  - Abrupt global slowdown or recession: Likelihood Medium; Impact High; Horizon ST.
    - Policy advice: Provide fiscal-monetary mix to bring inflation expectations within target while supporting the economy and protecting the vulnerable, within limits of the fiscal rule; allow exchange rate to adjust.
- Structural Risks:
  - Extreme climate events: Likelihood Medium; Impact High; Horizon ST,MT.
    - Policy advice: Continue implementation of climate change strategies focused on mitigation and adaptation.
- Domestic Risks:
  - Insufficient fiscal adjustment: Likelihood Low; Impact Medium; Horizon ST,MT.
    - Policy advice: Recalibrate plans to introduce a credible adjustment plan with concrete measures to regain macroeconomic stability.
  - Delayed progress in structural reforms: Likelihood Medium; Impact Medium; Horizon ST,MT.
    - Policy advice: Implement envisaged structural reforms (education, labor market, business environment, SOEs) to raise potential growth.

### Public Sector DSA and Public Debt Projections
- Public debt (percent of GDP) selected actuals and projections:
  - 2022 actual: 59.3
  - 2023 projection: 61.3
  - 2024 projection: 61.5
  - 2025 projection: 61.5
  - 2026 projection: 61.8
  - 2027 projection: 61.9
  - 2028 projection: 62.0
  - Extended projection through 2032 shows public debt around 60.8–61.2 range in later years.
- Change in public debt (percent of GDP), 2022–2032 (selected):
  - 2022: -4.1
  - 2023: 2.0
  - 2024: 0.2
  - 2025: 0.0
  - 2026: 0.3
  - 2027: 0.1
  - 2028: 0.1
- Primary deficit (percent of GDP) sample path:
  - 2022: 0.5
  - 2023: 1.0
  - 2024: 0.7
  - 2025: 0.5
  - 2026: 0.3
  - 2027: 0.1
  - 2028: -0.1
- Gross financing needs (percent of GDP) in baseline (selected years):
  - 2022: 4.3
  - 2023: 5.6
  - 2024: 5.5
  - 2025: 5.9
  - 2026: 6.8
  - 2027: 6.8
  - 2028: 6.7
- Memo (selected):
  - Real GDP growth (percent): 4.9 (actual 2022), 2.0 (2023), 3.0 (2024), 2.8 (2025), 2.5 (2026), 2.3 (2027), 2.2 (2028)
  - Inflation (GDP deflator; percent): 4.4 (2022), 4.6 (2023), 5.8 (2024), 5.4 (2025), 4.4 (2026), 4.3 (2027), 4.4 (2028)
  - Nominal GDP growth (percent): 9.6 (2022), 6.7 (2023), 9.0 (2024), 8.4 (2025), 7.0 (2026), 6.7 (2027), 6.7 (2028)
  - Effective interest rate (percent): 0.8 (2022), 4.2 (2023), 4.2 (2024), 4.0 (2025), 3.9 (2026), 3.8 (2027), 4.0 (2028), 4.5 (2029), 4.8 (2030), 5.2 (2031)

### Medium- and Long-term Risk Analysis and Modules
- Medium-term analysis:
  - Debt fanchart width: 64.1
  - Probability of debt not stabilizing (pct): 18.4
  - Average GFN in baseline: 6.2
  - GFN financeability index: 13.5
  - Bank claims on government (pct bank assets): 3.6
  - Change in claims on government in stress (pct bank assets): 30.6
  - Conclusion: Risks increase but remain moderate; non-negligible probability that debt will not stabilize; GFNs expected to remain relatively stable but rollover risks exist.
- Long-term modules (demographics, pensions, health, climate):
  - Pension permanent adjustment needed (pp of GDP per year) to keep pension assets positive:
    - 4.72%: 50 years
    - 6.82%: Until 2100
    - 9.47%: 30 years
  - Charts show projected increases in pension financing needs and health and climate-related GFN-to-GDP ratios over long horizons under various scenarios.

*Source: IMF staff country report content provided in the supplied PDF excerpt.*

### Annex VI. Anchoring of Inflation Expectations: Considerations for

### Annex VI. Anchoring of Inflation Expectations: Considerations for Uruguay

### Overview
- Following the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, inflation and inflation expectations increased globally; in Uruguay both increased by significantly less than in other countries (advanced economies and emerging markets).
- Strong anchoring of inflation expectations in Uruguay has been observed, but anchored above the inflation target range.

### Methodology
- Analysis period and data: 2000-2022 quarterly and monthly inflation expectations from the Continuous Consensus Survey and observed annual CPI inflation for a sample of AEs and EMs.
- Sample countries include: Armenia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Egypt, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Mexico, Moldovia, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
- Estimated relationship (OLS with robust standard errors) for each horizon j:
  - Δ피_t(π_τ+ j) = α_j + β_j Δπ_t + ε_t
  - Δ피_t(π_τ+ j) are changes in inflation expectations at horizon j between periods t-1 and t.
  - Δπ_t are changes in CPI inflation between periods t-1 and t.
- Robustness checks: market-based inflation compensation and inflation surprises using analysts’ expectations do not alter main conclusions.
- Modified specification to study deviations from inflation target π_t^∗:
  - 피_t(π_τ+ j) − π_t+ j^∗ = α_j + β_j(π_t − π_t^∗) + ε_t
  - In a scenario where agents expect the central bank to achieve the target over horizon j, both α_j and β_j would be zero.

### Passthrough Findings
- Short-term passthrough from inflation to expectations in Uruguay is comparable to other emerging market economies (EMEs).
- Uruguay’s short-term passthrough decreased from its peak following the 2002 crisis (when the exchange rate peg was abandoned) and has remained relatively stable since 2005 (when inflation-targeting was adopted).
- No evidence that agents in Uruguay adjust inflation expectations in a fundamentally different way than in other countries.
- Figure-based observation: passthrough coefficients reported for 3-month changes in inflation and end-of-year inflation expectations (robust to different horizons).

### Anchoring and Target Deviations
- Uruguay shows a combination of a relatively small β_j and a large α_j in the deviations-from-target regression, implying:
  - Inflation expectations are relatively well-anchored (low responsiveness β_j).
  - Agents do not expect the central bank to stabilize inflation close to the mid-range point of the target (large α_j).
- This pattern departs from the hypothetical zero α_j and β_j that would indicate expectations centered on the target.

### Historical Track Record (2008–2022)
- Inflation has been outside the inflation target band almost 90 percent of the time between 2008 and 2022 in Uruguay.
  - Comparator: average emerging market (EM) frequency outside target is 60 percent of the time.
- Inflation expectations have been outside the inflation target range more than 60 percent of the time (end-of-year, 2008–2022), higher than other EMs and regional peers.
- The high frequency of being outside target may have undermined the central bank’s credibility over the long term.

### Implications for Inflation Dynamics and Monetary Policy
- Strong anchoring of inflation expectations (albeit above target) helps explain:
  - Uruguay’s relatively low inflation volatility despite a comparatively high inflation level versus other countries.
  - Why the increase in inflation in Uruguay over the last two years was more muted than in other countries.
- Policy implication: strong anchoring of expectations outside the target range poses challenges—bringing inflation within the target range will require a stronger and more durable effort compared to central banks in countries where expectations are already anchored within the target range.

### Recent Monetary Framework Improvements and Recommendations
- Since 2020, Banco Central del Uruguay (BCU) improvements:
  - Moved to using a short-term rate as the monetary policy instrument (instead of monetary aggregates), providing reference interest rates to market participants.
  - Improved communication strategy, providing clarity on objectives of monetary policy and helping better anchor inflation expectations recently.
- Further recommended improvements:
  - Enhance de jure central bank independence to continue building credibility and facilitate convergence of inflation expectations to the target.

*Source: Annex VI. Anchoring of Inflation Expectations: Considerations for Uruguay, IMF.*

### 9.      The length of the period considered for the reference wage is increased and accrual is

### 1uryea2023001 - 9.      The length of the period considered for the reference wage is increased and accrual is adjusted.

### Pension reform design and parameters
- Reference wage:
  - New reference wage based on the best 20 years of covered earnings, instead of the current final 10 (or 105 percent of the best 20).
  - Past earnings remain revalorized with average wage growth.
- Accrual rates:
  - Accrual rates are equalized at 1.5 percent per year at the normal retirement age.
  - This 1.5 percent per year is equal to the current 45 percent accrual for the first 30 years of contributions; however, it is higher for subsequent years.
  - Different rates will be applied to early and late retirement, resulting in a roughly 4.8 percent penalty or bonus respectively.
- Parental service credit:
  - Mothers will be credited with one year of additional service for each child, with a maximum of five years.
- Survivor benefits and minimum pension:
  - Permanent survivor benefits would be received from the age of 45 with temporary benefit for younger widow(er)s.
  - The new minimum value would be 14000 pesos per month (roughly the amount of the social pension) for those with virtually no own pension.
  - This amount is slowly withdrawn against own income, reaching a maximum of 42000 pesos combined minimum and own pension.
  - The minimum pension will be fully paid from general taxation.

### Comparative context and effective accrual implications
- Reference-wage international practice:
  - The majority of OECD countries with PAYGO DB pension systems use lifetime earnings for the reference wage.
  - Among those with shorter reference wages, using the best 25 years is not uncommon.
- Relative accruals and indexing:
  - While the reference wage slowly moves in the direction of OECD countries, the accrual rate will be high compared to OECD countries.
  - Effective accrual rates for someone who earns the average wage for a full career will only be higher in a number of OECD countries, all of which index their pension benefits to prices or some combination of wages and prices.
- Charts and measures referenced (no numerical projection values provided in text):
  - Effective Accrual Rates and Reference Wage (Percent) — calculation: someone who earns the average wage for a full career from age 22 to the normal retirement age.
  - Projected Spending with and without Reform (Percent) — only earnings related pensions shown; years displayed include 2021, 2030, 2040, 2050, 2060, 2070 with “Without reform” and “With reform” series.

### Key policy implications for the pension system
- Benefit adequacy versus fiscal sustainability:
  - Equalizing accruals at 1.5 percent per year and lengthening the reference wage to best 20 years raises accruals for later-career contributors relative to the current system, while aligning reference-wage practice more closely with many OECD peers.
- Distributional and gender considerations:
  - Mothers receive up to five additional credited years (one per child), which will affect pensions for women with children and could partially offset career breaks.
- Interactions with indexing regimes:
  - Countries with higher effective accruals tend to index pensions to prices or combinations of wages and prices, a relevant consideration for Uruguay given the relatively high accrual rate.

---

### Annex IX — A Modern Instant Digital Payments System in Uruguay: objectives and initial considerations
- BCU roadmap and operational shift:
  - The Central Bank of Uruguay (BCU) 2023-25 payments roadmap aims to create an inclusive payment system with instant settlement of payments 24/365, promote competition among providers, preserve financial stability, and foster AML/CFT compliance.
  - The BCU has requested banks to introduce immediate transfers within the banking system 24/7 instead of only during working hours starting from June 2023.
- Core benefits highlighted:
  - Instant settlement 24/365 via smartphone, website, or card; current system: only 2.5 percent of transfers are made instantly.
  - Simplified financial planning and liquidity management; enhanced economic resilience.
  - Potential reduction in fees for individuals and merchants. Current Uruguay fees: debit or credit card fees reach 1 and 3 percent, respectively.
  - Example: in Brazil, Pix lowered digital payment fees from 2.5 percent to 0.2 percent.
  - Enhanced financial inclusion: bank account ownership in Uruguay in 2021 was 74 percent (below 96 percent in high-income countries).
  - Increased access to credit through digital transaction histories.
  - Provision of high-frequency data on consumption and sales to policymakers.
- Preconditions and market structure:
  - IPET index: 65 pesos out of every 100 spent by consumers are paid digitally.
  - Internet penetration is high; more than 90 percent of adults have mobile phones.
  - Uruguay has more than 60 fintech companies and a near universal legal ID (Cédula de Identidad) that serves as a digitally enabled ID facilitating digital wallets and e-KYC.
- Key policy choices for success:
  - Access and competition:
    - Securing a critical mass of large banks and opening the system to smaller payment companies is important for rapid adoption and competition that reduces fees.
    - The BCU is committed to guarantee open access to the payment system.
  - Requirements on capital and liquidity management:
    - Granting access to non-bank payment service providers should depend on potential benefits and risks.
    - Smaller participants should be able to contribute to credit and liquidity management arrangements and meet financial requirements set by the system (such as a minimum level of capital).
    - A tiered risk-based access system could allow lower capital requirements for smaller providers.
  - Safeguards:
    - Establishing a safeguards framework to clarify main risks and mitigation (financial, payment fraud, AML/CFT) and to ensure system operator and participants manage these risks, with regulator oversight.
    - Authorities are enhancing cybersecurity and fraud-prevention by fortifying regulatory structure and information exchange.
  - Integration with other systems:
    - Integration with Brazil’s Pix or other regional systems could yield benefits but requires legal alignment, clear governance, and agreements on information access.
    - The G20 roadmap for enhancing cross-border payments is relevant guidance.
- Implementation considerations:
  - Calibrating access and financial requirements is non-trivial due to limited data on risk distributions; experiences from Brazil, the UK, India, and others are useful reference points.
  - Current RTGS operated by the BCU is not available to non-bank payment service providers.

*Italic: Source — IMF staff report excerpts (pension reform section and Annex IX on digital payments) from the provided content.*

### 100. The CPI has national coverage, and it does not cover either the implicit rent or the net

### 1uryea2023001 - 100. The CPI has national coverage, and it does not cover either the implicit rent or the net

### Price statistics and producer prices
- CPI:
  - Has national coverage.
  - Does not cover implicit rent or net acquisitions of owner-occupied dwellings.
  - Current weights are based on the 2016-2017 household income and expenditure survey.
  - Weights and composition were unchanged for several years prior to the recent reselection; more frequent updates are desirable.
- Producer Price Indices (March 2010 =100):
  - Available for national products.
  - Do not cover utilities, construction, services, and exported output.

### Government finance statistics (GFS)
- Recording and coverage:
  - Statistics are on a modified cash basis.
  - Official data on the central administration, the state-owned enterprises and the social security system are disseminated regularly and on time.
  - Above-the-line data (revenue and expenditure) for local governments are not available.
- Dissemination:
  - Monthly financing data and quarterly debt data for the central government and total public sector are disseminated on the BCU website from 1999 onwards.
  - No information from these series is reported for publication in the International Financial Statistics (IFS).
  - Annual information submitted for the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook covers the consolidated central government (budgetary central government plus social security funds) and consolidated general government.
  - COFOG is not reported.
  - Local governments information belong to financing operations only; consolidated general government covers only operations and stocks on financial assets and liabilities.

### Monetary and financial statistics
- Preparation and reporting:
  - Prepared in accordance with the IMF's Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual (2000).
  - Authorities report monetary data for the central bank, other depository corporations, and other financial corporations (OFCs) using standardized reporting forms (SRFs).
  - Data for OFCs are limited to off-shore financial institutions.
  - A 2020 technical assistance mission assisted the authorities to expand institutional coverage of OFCs and compile the SRF for insurance companies, pension funds and credit administration companies.

### Financial sector surveillance and indicators
- Participation and reporting:
  - Authorities participate in the CDIS, CPIS, and FSI databases.
  - Only annual FSIs data for deposit-takers and other financial corporations are reported.
  - FSIs for nonfinancial corporations, households, market liquidity, and real estate markets are not available.
- Domestic dissemination:
  - The BCU disseminates FSIs for individual banks on a monthly basis and generates banking-system FSIs by weighting individual bank FSIs by asset share.
- Financial inclusion:
  - Uruguay reports several Financial Access Survey (FAS) series including:
    - Commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults.
    - ATMs per 100,000 adults.
  - These two indicators are adopted by the UN to monitor Target 8.10 of the SDGs.

### External sector statistics
- Compilation and dissemination:
  - Balance of payments and international investment position statistics are compiled and published quarterly.
  - Data are compiled following the recommendations of the sixth edition of the Balance of Payments Manual.
  - Uruguay disseminates the international reserves and foreign currency liquidity data template.
  - Submits quarterly external debt statistics to the World Bank’s QEDS database.
  - Participates in CPIS and CDIS.

### Data standards, ROSC, and reporting to STA
- Uruguay subscribed to the SDDS in February 2004 and is in observance.
- Data ROSC published on October 1, 2001.
- A data reassessment ROSC on CPI, PPI and NA was published in February 2014.
- Reporting to STA:
  - Consumer and wholesale price indices are reported regularly and timely for publication in IFS.
  - Trade price and volume indices are not provided for publication in IFS.
  - Annual GFS are regularly reported to STA for the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook; no high-frequency GFS are reported for publication in IFS.
  - Uruguay reports balance of payments and IIP data for publication in the IFS and the Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.

### Fiscal performance, policy framework, and debt management
- Recent fiscal outcomes:
  - Central Government fiscal deficit: 3.2 percent of GDP (improvement of 0.9 percentage point of GDP compared to 2021).
  - Gross debt of the Central Government: 57.3 percent of GDP as of December 2022.
  - Net debt: 53.2 percent of GDP as of December 2022 (reductions of 2.6 and 2.1 percentage points of GDP, respectively, compared to 2021).
- Fiscal rule compliance (2022):
  - Structural deficit: 2.5 percent of GDP (below 2.6 percent GDP target).
  - Real primary spending growth: 0.5 percent (below 2.1 percent target cap).
  - Central government’s net indebtedness: USD 1.8 billion (below legally binding limit of USD 2.1 billion for 2022).
- Debt management and funding in 2022:
  - Main source of funding: bond issuance in local and international markets.
  - 62 percent of 2022 funding was raised in domestic bond markets and denominated in local currency.
  - Share of debt coming due during 2023: 4.4 percent of the total debt stock.
  - Average time to maturity of the debt portfolio: 12.3 years.
- Policy orientation:
  - Authorities intend to continue solidifying compliance with the fiscal framework and make the current debt anchor more explicit rather than introducing a new debt-stock pillar.
  - Emphasis on risk analysis around debt forecasts.

### Economic outlook and labor market
- Growth:
  - GDP growth: 5.3 percent in 2021; 4.9 percent in 2022.
  - Authorities expect real output growth of around 2 percent for 2023.
- Drivers and shocks:
  - 2022 growth led by exports, private consumption, and private investment.
  - Economic activity dropped in H2 2022 owing to global slowdown and a severe drought affecting agriculture in Q4 2022.
- Labor market:
  - More than 40,000 net jobs created in 2022 relative to 2021.
  - Unemployment rate for 2022: 7.9 percent (down 1.5 percentage points from 2020).
  - Labor market informality: 20.9 percent on average in 2022 (down from 24.9 percent in 2019).
  - Real wages are in a recovery phase.
- Inflation:
  - Inflation decelerated after peaking in September 2022 and stood at 7.3 percent in March 2023.

### Monetary and exchange rate policy
- Central bank action:
  - BCU increased policy rate from 5.75 percent in December 2021 to 11.5 percent at end-2022.
  - Following gradual decline in inflation since October 2022, BCU reduced policy rate by 25 basis points to 11.25 percent in April 2023.
  - Future policy rate movements conditioned on the evolution of inflation expectations.
- Policy objectives and tools:
  - Primary focus: working towards low and stable inflation; critical component of de-dollarization agenda.
  - BCU recognizes de-dollarization is gradual and involves policy tools and financial education.
  - Enhanced monetary policy framework and participation in IMF’s Central Bank Transparency Review (CBT) pilot in 2022.
  - BCU has not intervened in the foreign exchange market since August 31st, 2021.
  - International reserves at end-December 2022: 22.1 percent of GDP.

### Financial sector soundness and payments modernization
- Banking system indicators (end-December 2022 unless stated):
  - Return on assets: 1.1 percent.
  - Return on equity: 11.7 percent.
  - General delinquency of credit: peaked at 3.4 percent in April 2020; fluctuated between 1.6 percent and 2.1 percent during 2022; closed 2022 at its lowest value.
  - Ratio of liquid assets to total assets: 58.1 percent.
- Regulatory and supervisory progress:
  - Updates to supervisory framework in line with international standards.
  - Enhanced macroprudential policy framework, strengthened banking sector resilience, and reduced dollarization risks.
  - Follow up on FSAP recommendations is underway.
- Payments system modernization:
  - BCU’s 2023-2025 payments roadmap aims to create an efficient, integrated, and accessible payment system while preserving financial stability and complying with AML/CFT regulations.
  - Emphasis on fostering innovation, openness, and inclusion.

### Structural reforms
- Pension reform:
  - Parliament passed a pension system reform in April 2023.
  - Context: Without changes, public spending on pensions was 11.1percent of GDP in 2019 and projected to reach 13.5 percent by 2070.
  - Reform aims to provide sustainability and includes a solidarity supplement for lower income groups.
- Education reform:
  - “Transformación Educativa” implemented in March 2023 for primary and secondary education.
  - Objectives: improve learning and retention, reduce inequities, increase student retention, modernize curriculum, and improve teacher training.
- Other reforms:
  - Reforms target increased potential GDP growth and include improving efficiency of state-owned enterprises, embracing openness, and trade.

### Harnessing financial innovation for climate action
- National climate ambitions and developments:
  - Uruguay aims to become net CO2-zero by 2050.
  - Leading producer of clean energy and wind energy; pursuing green hydrogen and electric mobility.
  - Developing sustainable livestock production to reduce methane intensity.
- Sovereign funding innovation:
  - October 2022: issuance of a global Sovereign Sustainability-Linked Bond linking coupon to climate and nature conservation targets with a two-way step-up/step-down interest-rate structure.
  - Authorities are working with the World Bank on an innovative loan instrument that reduces interest if economy-wide environmental targets under the Paris Agreement are met (reducing cattle greenhouse-gas emission intensity and enhancing native forest conservation).
- Policy implications:
  - Connecting debt funding to climate objectives enhances accountability and climate transparency to investors, civil society, and the global environmental community.

*Source: 1uryea2023001 - 100. The CPI has national coverage, and it does not cover either the implicit rent or the net*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2023/english/1uryea2023001.pdf_
