## 1vnmea2023003

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### Real estate sector and corporate bond market turbulence
- Vietnam experienced a strong recovery in 2022: GDP grew at the historically high rate of 8 percent; average annual inflation registered at 3.2 percent; current account deficit reduced to 0.3 percent of GDP in 2022.
- Activity deteriorated starting late 2022: growth slowed to 3.7 percent y-o-y in the first half of 2023; exports contracted by 12 percent y-o-y in the first 6 months of 2023; unemployment remained low at 2.3 percent in June 2023.
- Corporate bond market build-up and freeze:
  - Outstanding bonds rose from 6.6 to 12 percent of total credit between 2018 and 2021.
  - Outstanding bonds rose from 8.6 to 15 percent of GDP between 2018 and 2021.
  - Issuances stopped in the last quarter of 2022 and defaults continued into 2023; bondholders—especially retail investors—have pressured underwriting banks to buy back bonds.
- Real estate developers:
  - 56 developers, including the second largest, defaulted on bond payments in the first 5 months of 2023 (over 70 percent of total defaulted value).
  - Majority of upcoming maturities are for developer-issued bonds, keeping rollover risks elevated.
  - Stock prices fell significantly more for most-leveraged developers.
- Spillovers and policy response:
  - Some banks highly exposed to real estate face deteriorating asset quality.
  - Authorities issued regulations aimed at facilitating funding access and reducing bankruptcy risks; these may provide temporary relief but could create future risks without further reforms.
  - SBV cumulative policy rate hikes reached 200 basis points in the fall of 2022; since March 2023, SBV has lowered its main policy rates by a cumulative 150-200 basis points.

### Financial stress, macro-financial implications, and scenarios
- Financial Stress Index (FSI) and GDP loss estimates:
  - Current FSI close to 2014 values (period of bad-debt clean-up) and far below Asian financial crisis peaks.
  - If FSI at 2023Q2 intensity: GDP loss estimated at 0.15 percent in 2023 and around 0.35 percent in each year 2024–2027.
  - If FSI reached 2014 peak: GDP loss could be around 0.3 percent in 2023 and around 0.7 percent in 2024–2027.
  - If FSI reached Asian financial crisis peak: GDP decline up to 1.4 percent in 2023 and around 3 percent in 2024–2027 — consistent with average annual growth in 2023–27 of 5.6 percent instead of 6.2 percent projected in the report.

### Banking sector vulnerabilities and reforms
- Key indicators and trends:
  - Combined non-performing loan (NPL) ratio reached 5.5 percent by end-March (including NPLs at banks, restructured loans and impaired loans at VAMC).
  - Aggregate loan-to-deposit ratio approached 100 percent (excluding government deposits).
  - Bank capitalization was 11.5 percent at end-2022.
- Financial soundness indicator snapshots (percent, 2018–2022 series preserved as reported):
  - Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets: 11.9, 11.8, 11., 11.3, 11.5
  - Regulatory Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets: 9.4, 9.4, 9., 5, 9.6, 10.1
  - Non-performing Loans Net of Provisions to Capital: 9.3, 7.5, 8., 0, 4.3, 9.1
  - Non-performing Loans to Total Gross Loans 1/2: 2.1, 1.8, 1., 9, 1.6, 1.9
  - Return on Assets: 1.2, 1.2, 1., 2, 1.5, 1.1
  - Return on Equity: 12.3, 12.4, 11., 9, 14.9, 13.9
  - Interest Margin to Gross Income: 70.0, 68.6, 68., 7, 67.0, 70.8
  - Liquid Assets to Total Assets: 11.3, 11.7, 11., 3, 10.3, 9.2
- Recommended institutional reforms:
  - Strengthen bank supervision and provisioning; increase SBV operational independence; improve coordination; enhance risk-based supervision; introduce consolidated supervision of banking groups.
  - Modernize the Law on Credit Institutions (LCI) to clarify SBV powers in early intervention and resolution; specify objectives for recovery planning and resolution regimes.
  - Establish a crisis and financial stability monitoring function at SBV with MOF consultation to monitor weaker banks, estimate losses and resolution costs, and run stress tests.

### Fiscal stance, revenue mobilization, and targeted support
- Fiscal outcomes and metrics:
  - Fiscal position improved to an estimated small surplus in 2022 from a deficit of 1.4 percent of GDP in 2021.
  - Public debt fell to an estimated 35 percent of GDP in 2022.
  - Capital spending reached 6 percent of GDP in 2022.
- State budget finances (percent of GDP, 2019–2024 series preserved): Revenue and grants: 19.4, 18.4, 18.7, 19.0, 18.4, 18.5; Expenditure: 19.8, 21.3, 20.1, 18.8, 19.6, 20.2; Net lending (+)/borrowing (-): -0.4, -2.9, -1.4, 0.3, -1.3, -1.7; Public and publicly guaranteed debt (end of period): 40.8, 41.1, 39.1, 35.3, 33.6, 32.3.
- Policy guidance:
  - Fiscal policy can take the lead given constraints on monetary policy; consider time-bound, budgeted, and targeted measures.
  - Possible measures include scaling up social safety nets, cash transfers, and targeted support to help viable real estate developers restructure.
  - Design principles: support should go through the budget, be temporary, and include safeguards to control contingent liabilities.
- Revenue mobilization priorities:
  - Reverse tax erosion; implement Tax System Reform Strategy 2021-2030 measures including reducing exemptions, broadening VAT base, raising environmental tax and excise duties, and introducing a unified property tax and land registry.
  - Prepare for global minimum tax (GMT) adoption in 2024 by improving the investment climate.

### Corporate distress resolution and bond market governance
- Short-term and medium-term recommendations:
  - Promote swift restructuring of viable firms through out-of-court workouts and hybrid solutions; liquidate non-viable firms.
  - Consider targeted fiscal support for completion of critical ongoing real estate projects with safeguards and public-private burden sharing.
  - Strengthen debt enforcement and insolvency framework; introduce enhanced mechanisms for out-of-court restructuring, hybrid restructurings, and more effective liquidation processes.
  - Improve investor protection, transparency, rating agency capacity, and make bond listing procedures less cumbersome.
- Crisis preparedness gaps (summary):
  - Lack of master restructuring agreements, alternative dispute resolution, debtor-in-possession reorganization tools, and modern liquidation procedures.
  - Institutional gaps include limited insolvency court specialization, limited use of case management technologies, and regulation of insolvency representatives.

### Climate policy, PDP8, and ETS implications
- PDP8 and investment needs:
  - Goal of doubling electricity generation requires large expansion of renewable energy and easing transmission bottlenecks.
  - Renewable energy generation targets under PDP8 estimated to require investments averaging USD 12 billion per year between 2021 and 2030.
- ETS scenarios and energy price impacts by 2030 (percentage increases and price table preserved):
  - Percentage price increases by 2030 (High Reductions, Medium Reductions, Low Reductions):
    - Oil: 96%, 33%, or 7%.
    - Electricity: 80%, 50%, or 20%.
    - Coal: 443%, 207%, or 60%.
  - Table of projected fuel prices in 2030 (Baseline and scenarios):
    - Gasoline, US$ per liter: Baseline 0.84; High Reductions Scenario 1.15; Medium Reductions Scenario 0.95; Low Reductions Scenario 0.86.
    - Diesel, US$ per liter: Baseline 0.65; High Reductions Scenario 1.00; Medium Reductions Scenario 0.77; Low Reductions Scenario 0.68.
    - LPG, US$ per liter: Baseline 0.73; High Reductions Scenario 0.95; Medium Reductions Scenario 0.80; Low Reductions Scenario 0.74.
    - Kerosene, US$ per liter: Baseline 0.56; High Reductions Scenario 0.88; Medium Reductions Scenario 0.67; Low Reductions Scenario 0.58.
    - Oil, US$ per barrel: Baseline 56.9; High Reductions Scenario 111.8; Medium Reductions Scenario 75.9; Low Reductions Scenario 61.1.
    - Coal, US$ per gigajoule (GJ): Baseline 4.75; High Reductions Scenario 25.8; Medium Reductions Scenario 14.58; Low Reductions Scenario 7.60.
    - Natural gas, US$ per gigajoule (GJ): Baseline 8.89; High Reductions Scenario 15.42; Medium Reductions Scenario 11.15; Low Reductions Scenario 9.39.
    - Electricity, US$ per kwh: Baseline 0.10; High Reductions Scenario 0.18; Medium Reductions Scenario 0.15; Low Reductions Scenario 0.12.
- Fiscal revenues from full auctioning of permits in 2030:
  - High Reductions scenario: 6.9% of GDP.
  - Medium Reductions scenario: 3.9% of GDP.
  - Low Reductions scenario: 1.4% of GDP.
- Distributional and competitiveness considerations:
  - ETS is potentially regressive without compensation; targeted transfers using ETS revenues can more than compensate poorest households (Medium Reductions Scenario example: using 30 percent of carbon pricing revenues for transfers to bottom 40 percent leaves bottom two deciles better off).
  - Options to address competitiveness and leakage include Border Cost Adjustments, exemptions for export-dependent energy-intensive sectors, free allowances, tradeable permit systems, or recycling revenues to trade-exposed firms.

### Labor market dynamics and informality (Annex V)
- Worker flows and dynamism:
  - About 4.7 percent of the working-age population changed labor status each quarter (gross worker flows).
  - Quarterly gross worker flows (percentage of population aged 15+): Employment → Unemployment: 0.3; Employment → Inactivity: 1.2; Unemployment → Employment: 0.5; Unemployment → Inactivity: 0.2; Inactivity → Employment: 2.1; Inactivity → Unemployment: 0.3; Total: 4.7.
- Job-finding and informality:
  - Around 14 percent of the non-employed find a job quarterly; 88 percent of these jobs are informal.
  - Of those finding jobs, roughly 41 percent start as salaried workers and 59 percent are self-employed.
  - Only 12 percent of new entrants into employment from the non-employed pool obtain formal jobs.
- Churning and human capital implications:
  - Formal job exit rate around 10 percent quarterly; wage job → self-employment 4.8 percent; high turnover discourages firm investment in training.
- Policy priorities:
  - Improve active labor policies, job matching, vocational training, and incentives for firms to provide training to reduce skill mismatches and support formalization.

### Macro projections and external sector highlights
- Output, inflation, and medium-term projections (selected series preserved):
  - Real GDP (percent change), 2019–2024: 7.4, 2.9, 2.6, 8.0, 4.7, 5.8.
  - CPI (period average), 2019–2024: 2.8, 3.2, 1.8, 3.2, 3.7, 3.5.
  - Real GDP (percent change), 2025–2028: 6.9, 6.8, 6.8, 6.8.
  - Public and publicly guaranteed debt (end of period), 2025–2028: 31.3, 30.7, 30.1, 29.5.
- External sector selected series:
  - Current account balance (percent of GDP), 2019–2028: 3.8, 4.3, -2.2, -0.3, 0.2, 0.7, 0.8, 1.0, 1.1, 1.1.
  - Gross international reserves (USD billions), 2019–2028: 78.5, 95.2, 109.4, 86.7, 98.7, 110.5, 122.7, 136.3, 151.5, 168.6.
- External assessment highlights:
  - Current account balance (CAB) in 2022: deficit of 0.3 percent of GDP.
  - Gross international reserves fell by 21 percent (USD 22.7 billion) in 2022 to USD 86.7 billion; reserves equivalent to 2.3 times short-term external debt and 65 percent of the ARA metric under a fixed exchange rate regime.
  - Staff assesses end-2022 reserves to be moderately below adequacy and expects reserves to reach adequate levels again in 2023.

### Debt sustainability and long-term risks
- Public debt trajectory (percent of GDP, selected years preserved):
  - Public debt 2022: 35.3; 2023: 33.6; 2024: 32.3; 2025: 31.3; 2026: 30.7; 2027: 30.1; 2028: 29.5; 2029: 28.9; 2030: 28.2; 2031: 27.6; 2032: 27.1.
- Gross financing needs and composition (percent of GDP, selected):
  - Gross financing needs 2022 actual: 2.1; 2023: 3.4; 2024: 4.2; 2025: 3.6; 2026: 3.4.
  - Debt service (percent of GDP): 3.4 (2022 actual), 3.0 (2023), 3.4 (2024), 2.5 (2025), 2.2 (2026).
- Long-term pressures:
  - Population aging implies sizable pension costs without reform; example adjustments: 3.74% of GDP for 50 years; 7.70% Until 2100; 10.73% for 30 years (pp of GDP per year).
  - Climate adaptation and mitigation will increase long-term financing needs; planned ETS (starting 2028) could generate revenues to help finance transition.

### Vulnerabilities, risks, and recommended policy responses (Risk Assessment Matrix highlights)
- Key domestic risks with likelihood and responses:
  - Slowdown in credit to the economy: Likelihood High; Time Horizon ST, MT; Impact Medium. Responses: establish crisis monitoring, modernize bank resolution and emergency liquidity frameworks, prevent contagion from troubled developers, strengthen regulation and insolvency frameworks.
  - Debt overhang and liquidity constraints: Likelihood Medium; Responses: target support to viable firms and vulnerable households; monitor asset quality; enhance provisioning; rebuild capital buffers.
  - Slow and inconsistent policy implementation: Likelihood Medium; Responses: enhance policy coordination; harmonize and consistently apply regulations.
  - Climate change: Likelihood High; Impact High. Responses: mitigation and adaptation, taxation of fossil fuels, invest in climate-resilient infrastructure.
- External risks include intensification of regional conflict(s) (Likelihood High), abrupt global slowdown (Likelihood Medium), and deepening geo-economic fragmentation (Likelihood High) with recommended policy responses focusing on exchange rate flexibility, targeted support, and structural reforms.

### Targeted, time-bound recommendations (summary)
- Contain immediate real estate and corporate bond market distress with time-bound measures while accelerating structural reforms to resolve legal and regulatory bottlenecks.
- Strengthen bank supervision, provisioning, and capital buffers; normalize loan classification and provisioning rules (full normalization effective January 1, 2024).
- Use targeted fiscal support to sustain demand rather than broad monetary loosening given constraints on monetary policy space; ensure support goes through the budget and is temporary with safeguards.
- Improve transparency, investor protection, and governance in the corporate bond market; enhance rating agency capacity and encourage institutional investor participation.
- Translate climate commitments into concrete action plans, secure financing (including USD 15.5 billion JETP estimate cited), and design ETS with compensation and leakage-mitigation measures.

*Source: IMF staff analysis in “1. Real Estate Sector and Corporate Bond Market Turbulence” and related chapters and annexes in 1vnmea2023003.*

### 1. Real Estate Sector and Corporate Bond Market Turbulence____________________________________6

### 1. Real Estate Sector and Corporate Bond Market Turbulence

### Context and recent economic developments
- Vietnam experienced a strong recovery in 2022:
  - GDP grew at the historically high rate of 8 percent.
  - Average annual inflation registered at 3.2 percent.
  - Current account deficit reduced to 0.3 percent of GDP in 2022.
- Activity deteriorated sharply starting in late 2022:
  - Growth slowed to 3.7 percent y-o-y in the first half of 2023.
  - Investment recorded one of the worst performances in more than a decade.
  - Exports contracted by 12 percent y-o-y in the first 6 months of 2023.
  - Unemployment remained low at 2.3 percent in June 2023.
- Financial market liquidity and FX pressures in late 2022:
  - Capital outflows and FX reserve sales by the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) contributed to a decline in liquidity.
  - Sai Gon Joint Stock Commercial Bank (SCB) experienced a deposit run in October 2022 and was placed under SBV control.
  - After SBV actions, by early 2023 liquidity pressures in the banking sector had eased.
- Policy responses in late 2022–2023:
  - SBV cumulative policy rate hikes reached 200 basis points in the fall of 2022.
  - SBV raised the 2023 inflation target from 4 to 4.5 percent.
  - Headline inflation peaked at 4.9 percent in January 2023 and declined to 2 percent y-o-y in June 2023.
  - Core inflation fell from 5.2 to 4.3 percent over the same interval.
  - Since March 2023, the SBV has lowered its main policy rates by a cumulative 150-200 basis points.
  - Exchange rate stability and modest reserve accumulation resumed in 2023.

### Real estate sector and corporate bond market dynamics (Box 1)
- Rapid pre-2022 expansion of the corporate bond market:
  - Outstanding bonds rose from 6.6 to 12 percent of total credit between 2018 and 2021.
  - Outstanding bonds rose from 8.6 to 15 percent of GDP between 2018 and 2021.
- Market freeze and defaults beginning late 2022:
  - Issuances stopped in the last quarter of 2022 and market activity remains limited while defaults continue.
  - Bondholders, especially retail investors, have pressured underwriting banks to buy back bonds.
- Real estate developer distress:
  - Transaction activity slowed since late 2022 as demand weakened and new projects were delayed.
  - Delays attributed to uncertainty and inconsistent application of land and construction regulations.
  - Developers’ profitability declined due to higher financing and other costs; bond market freeze exacerbated funding pressures.
  - 56 developers, including the second largest, defaulted on bond payments in the first 5 months of 2023 (over 70 percent of total defaulted value).
  - Majority of upcoming maturities are for developer-issued bonds, keeping rollover risks elevated.
  - Market differentiation observed: stock prices fell significantly more for most-leveraged developers.
  - Medium-term demand prospects remain promising given low levels of urbanization and limited supply of affordable housing.
- Spillovers to banks and financial system:
  - Some banks highly exposed to real estate face deteriorating asset quality.
  - Authorities issued regulations aimed at facilitating funding access and reducing bankruptcy risks (Text Table 1), which may provide temporary relief but could create future risks without further reforms.

### Financial Stress and Growth implications (Box 2)
- Financial Stress Index (FSI) indicates rising turbulence but below past peaks:
  - Current FSI close to 2014 values (a period of bad-debt clean-up) and far below Asian financial crisis peaks.
- Estimated GDP losses from observed/tail FSI scenarios:
  - If FSI at 2023Q2 intensity: GDP loss estimated at 0.15 percent in 2023 and around 0.35 percent in each year 2024–2027.
  - If FSI reached 2014 peak: GDP loss could be around 0.3 percent in 2023 and around 0.7 percent in 2024–2027.
  - If FSI reached Asian financial crisis peak: GDP decline up to 1.4 percent in 2023 and around 3 percent in 2024–2027—consistent with average annual growth in 2023–27 of 5.6 percent instead of 6.2 percent projected in the report.

### Fiscal and other macro developments (context points)
- Fiscal outcomes and composition:
  - Fiscal position improved to an estimated small surplus in 2022 from a deficit of 1.4 percent of GDP in 2021.
  - Public debt fell to an estimated 35 percent of GDP in 2022.
  - Capital spending reached 6 percent of GDP in 2022.
- Labor market developments:
  - Some manufacturing firms reduced working hours and laid off workers, many moving to services with often informal status.
- Other notes:
  - In June 2023, Vietnam was placed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on its list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring for AML-CFT deficiencies.

### Key findings and vulnerabilities
- High private and developer leverage built up during low-growth pandemic years increased vulnerability to interest rate rises and sales declines.
- Corporate bond market freeze tightened funding channels for developers and increased rollover/default risk.
- Banking sector exposures to real estate heighten systemic risk through rising non-performing loans.
- Policy responses have eased short-term liquidity stress but may entrench longer-term risks without structural reforms.

### Policy recommendations stemming from the analysis
- Contain immediate real estate and corporate bond market distress with time-bound measures while accelerating structural reforms to resolve legal and regulatory bottlenecks.
- Strengthen bank supervision and provisioning to address asset-quality deterioration tied to real estate exposures.
- Use targeted fiscal support to sustain demand rather than broad monetary loosening given constraints on monetary policy space.
- Improve transparency and investor protection in the bond market to restore confidence and orderly market functioning.

*Source: IMF staff analysis in “1. Real Estate Sector and Corporate Bond Market Turbulence”*

### 16. Further fiscal support could be considered, especially if the economic recovery

### 16. Further fiscal support could be considered, especially if the economic recovery disappoints

### Fiscal support and short-term policy stance
- Given the slowdown and the constraints faced by monetary policy, fiscal policy can take a leading role in supporting aggregate demand.
- Possible measures:
  - Scale up social safety nets, and consider cash transfers to provide swift relief to poorer households.
  - Targeted support if turmoil proves more damaging, including to help real estate developers restructure.
- Design principles for support:
  - Any support should go through the budget, be temporary, and include mechanisms to control and monitor risk exposure from guarantees or other contingent liabilities.
- The strategy for 2021-26 sets a debt ceiling of 60 percent of GDP; budget deficits need to converge to below 3 percent of GDP.

### Revenue mobilization and tax reform
- Medium-term need: reverse tax erosion trend and create space to bolster social spending and address infrastructure gaps.
- Observations:
  - Tax revenues have been eroded since their peak in the late 2000s, in contrast to regional peers (and despite Vietnam’s tax rates being close to peers’ average).
- Reform directions (Tax System Reform Strategy 2021-2030):
  - Reduce exemptions and rationalize preferential regimes for FDI firms.
  - Broaden the VAT base.
  - Raise environmental tax and excise duties.
  - Introduce a unified property tax and a land registry.

### Global minimum tax (GMT) and investment climate
- Adoption of the global minimum corporate tax (GMT) in 2024 will increase tax revenues but will require improvements to the investment climate.
- Issue:
  - Vietnam has often granted tax incentives to multinational enterprises that will be eroded by the GMT.
- Compensatory actions:
  - Improve the business environment, upgrade infrastructure, and enhance human capital.

### Fiscal framework and budget processes
- Strengthening fiscal framework and budget processes would increase transparency and enhance the quality and effectiveness of fiscal policy.
- Key weaknesses:
  - Budget process weakened by overly conservative revenue projections.
  - Scope and duration of permitted carryover spending could be more limited; ensure all spending is integrated in the budget process.
- Recommended actions:
  - Accelerate efforts to strengthen macro-fiscal capacity (projections, risk assessment, impact of fiscal measures).
  - Conduct expenditure reviews to identify priorities and improve quality of expenditures.

*Authorities’ views (fiscal)*
- Authorities reiterated objective of maintaining macroeconomic stability and confirmed fiscal structural reform agenda.
- They noted combined revenue and expenditure measures in 2023 will help boost demand and that there is fiscal space to provide further support if needed given past consolidation that reduced public debt.
- They are proposing revision of several tax laws and considering measures to limit negative impacts of the GMT consistent with international agreements.
- Authorities prefer conservative budgeting due to volatile revenue collection.

### Tackling distress in the real estate and corporate bond markets
- Problem:
  - Unaddressed corporate balance sheet problems, especially among real estate developers, could percolate throughout the economy and banking system.
- Ongoing work:
  - Intergovernmental taskforce working with local governments to identify and address legal and administrative delays preventing completion of real estate projects.
- Policy recommendations:
  - Short term: promote swift restructuring of viable firms through out-of-court workouts and hybrid solutions; liquidate non-viable firms.
    - Consider targeted fiscal support for completion of critical ongoing projects, subject to safeguards and appropriate public-private burden sharing.
    - If turmoil intensifies, consider subsidized financing or guarantees to banks for onward lending to viable developers.
  - Medium term: strengthen debt enforcement and insolvency framework to deal with debt overhang (including in real estate).
- Caution:
  - Temporary powers granted to banks until end-2023 to seize collateral (Resolution 42) have helped, but embedding such measures into the Law on Credit Institutions could enshrine unequal treatment of secured creditors and hinder effective debt enforcement and insolvency framework development.

### Restoring corporate bond market confidence and governance
- Reforms to strengthen governance and investor confidence:
  - Ensure investor protection and transparency principles are respected and all investors are treated equally when issuers use temporary measures.
  - Improve capacity of rating agencies.
  - Make the process for public listing of bonds less cumbersome to boost market durability.

### Crisis preparedness (summary of Box 3)
- Staff-developed crisis preparedness indicator shows several shortcomings in Vietnam’s insolvency and restructuring toolkit:
  - Lack of enhanced mechanisms for out-of-court restructuring and a legal framework conducive to restructuring (e.g., master restructuring agreements, alternative dispute resolution).
  - Hybrid restructurings not yet introduced.
  - Corporate reorganization proceeding largely untested; need improvements (debtor in possession reorganization, stay of creditor actions, treatment of executory contracts, post-petition finance, safeguards for dissenting creditors).
  - Liquidation framework does not provide rapid and significant recoveries; should allow sale as a going concern, allow secured creditors to enforce collateral, and use e-auctions and modern technologies.
  - Institutional gaps: limited specialization of courts on insolvency, limited use of modern technology for case management, regulation of insolvency representatives needs reforms.
- Real estate-specific challenges:
  - Collateral enforcement needs strengthening across actors and situations.
  - Pre-sales can expose buyers as unsecured creditors—may justify protection measures (preventive or reactive).
  - Facilitate additional financing in liquidation with adequate priority relative to existing secured creditors.

*Authorities’ views (real estate and bonds)*
- Authorities are resolving legal and regulatory bottlenecks (new land law to be presented to the National Assembly later this year).
- Affordable housing remains a priority; government approved a USD 5 billion credit package for social housing projects.
- On corporate bonds, authorities report improving signs and stabilized investor sentiment due to measures to stabilize the market; working to increase capacity of rating agencies and incentivize institutional investor participation.

### Protecting financial stability and banking sector reforms
- SBV actions in 2022:
  - Took control of SCB in October 2022 using the special control regime and provided it with secured and unsecured funding.
  - Implemented temporary forbearance on bank loans and allowed (unlisted) bond buybacks by banks.
- Financial indicators and risks:
  - Combined non-performing loan (NPL) ratio reached 5.5 percent by end-March. (This ratio is composed of the NPLs at the banks, restructured loans and impaired loans at VAMC.)
  - Aggregate loan-to-deposit ratio approached 100 percent (excluding government deposits) as loans have been outgrowing deposits for several years.
  - Some banks highly exposed to the ailing real estate sector.
  - Bank capitalization was 11.5 percent at end-2022; some banks actively raising capital, but further efforts may be needed.
- Need for improved crisis prevention and coordination:
  - Establish a crisis and financial stability monitoring function at SBV, in consultation with MOF, involving all relevant actors.
  - Functions could include: consistent identification and monitoring of weaker banks and remedial actions; estimating losses and resolution costs (including fiscal) and contingency plans; monitoring forbearance and improving balance sheet transparency; conducting bank solvency and liquidity stress tests; data sharing and communications strategies.

### Law on Credit Institutions (LCI) and bank resolution frameworks
- Ongoing revision of the LCI is a timely opportunity to modernize bank resolution and emergency liquidity frameworks.
- Current issues:
  - Resolving banks has been complex and overly lengthy; SBV still working on resolution of banks placed under special control in 2015.
- Suggested LCI amendments and powers:
  - Reinforce role and responsibilities of SBV (including in early intervention regime).
  - Clarify decision-making procedures and offer legal protection to SBV staff.
  - Include option to transfer parts of a bank under special control to a viable bank.
  - Specify objectives and elements of recovery planning, early intervention, and resolution regimes.
  - Exercise caution and safeguards when requiring other parties (Deposit Insurance of Vietnam, banks) to support restructuring of a bank in early intervention.

### Additional financial sector resilience reforms
- Priorities include:
  - Strengthening bank regulation and supervision (increase SBV operational independence; improve coordination; enhance risk-based supervision; introduce consolidated supervision of banking groups).
  - Fully disclosing ownerships and related party lending.
  - Enhancing securities markets oversight and implementing risk-based supervision of securities market participants.

*Authorities’ views (financial stability)*
- Authorities recognize risks and are taking measures: SBV intensified bank monitoring, taken measures to address rising NPLs, established a steering committee to identify policy options.
- Revising the LCI to enhance SBV intervention powers and expressed interest in CD to support the process.
- Authorities intend to progress on Basel II implementation and develop fintech regulation.

### Fintech, payments, and financial inclusion
- Non-cash payments rose rapidly: transactions through most non-cash payment channels doubled in 2022 compared to 2021.
- Mobile money:
  - More than 2.8 million mobile money accounts were opened in 2022, of which 70 percent were in rural, remote, and isolated areas.
  - Growth has boosted financial inclusion but increased identity theft and fraud, calling for SBV oversight.
- Priority regulatory actions:
  - Operationalize the regulatory sandbox.
  - Improve regulatory framework and supervision of payment service providers.
  - Increase data collection and analysis on all fintech service providers.

### Climate and structural policies
- To achieve medium-term growth and climate goals, accelerate reforms to improve business environment, critical infrastructure, and human capital.
- Key constraints and needs:
  - Legal uncertainty (complex and sometimes inconsistent laws) undermines investment.
  - Weaknesses and delays in public infrastructure implementation—including ensuring reliable energy supply—pose risks.
  - Further investment in education would help spur productivity and reduce the dual economy.

*Italicized source: IMF staff report excerpt on Vietnam (content unit 1vnmea2023003).*

### 33. The newly approved Power Development Plan 8 (PDP8) and the planned Emissions

### 33. The newly approved Power Development Plan 8 (PDP8) and the planned Emissions

### PDP8, ETS, and the energy transition
- The authorities are committed to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050.
- Vietnam’s power sector is currently highly reliant on coal; the PDP8 and the planned Emissions Trading System (ETS) aim to shift electricity generation to a lower carbon, more sustainable mix while improving energy security and accessibility.
- The goal of doubling electricity generation will require large expansions of renewable energy and alleviating current transmission bottlenecks.
- Renewable energy generation targets under PDP8 are estimated to require investments averaging USD 12 billion per year between 2021 and 2030.
- Most of this investment is envisaged to be private and therefore requires a clear legal and regulatory framework that promotes appropriate incentives (including on pricing mechanisms).

### ETS design, impacts, and complementary measures
- The planned ETS could be a cost-effective method of achieving emissions reductions targets but will require careful design of accompanying policies (Annex VI).
- The ETS creates market incentives to promote energy efficiency and shift supply towards more sustainable sources by making carbon-intensive fuels like coal more expensive.
- The ETS can increase firms’ costs, with larger increases in more energy-intensive sectors, and raise energy prices for households.
- Part of the substantial revenues generated by the ETS can be used to fund measures (such as cash transfers to households) to limit these impacts.
- The success of the transition will depend on the ability to scale up renewable energy to replace coal and other carbon-intensive fuels to sustain economic development goals.

### National climate commitments, financing, and public financial management
- The National Strategy for Climate Change until 2050, issued in 2022, sets strategic direction but needs translation into concrete actions and plans.
- In its 2022 Nationally Determined Contribution, Vietnam made an unconditional commitment to reduce emissions by 15.8 percent below business-as-usual levels by 2030.
- Vietnam also committed to reach Net Zero emissions by 2050.
- Large financing needs imply mobilizing external funding and private sector involvement, including through the Just Energy Transition Partnership (estimated at USD 15.5 billion).
- Updating Public Financial Management practices to include climate considerations and ensuring appropriate financial market regulation would facilitate the issuance of green bonds.

### Infrastructure investment, public investment management, and social spending
- Improving the quality of infrastructure investment and social spending is crucial to support development goals and the climate agenda.
- The Public Investment Law was revised in 2019 and the new Public-Private Partnership Law was issued in 2020, but progress in implementing the PPP Law has been slow.
- Competitive bidding in procurement is planned, but project selection and appraisal effectiveness remain to be improved.
- It would be useful to conduct a Public Investment Management Assessment (PIMA) update together with a Climate-PIMA to identify further reform priorities.
- Improvements to the social protection system are warranted to address incomplete coverage and fragmented delivery, especially given the high share of informal workers.

### Macro-structural reforms: labor, product markets, and governance
- Product and labor market reforms are crucial to unlock Vietnam’s medium-term potential by fostering technological diffusion and reducing economic dualism.
- Strengthening interactions between FDI and domestic firms (e.g., through dense local supplier networks) would boost productivity.
- Increasing human capital levels and reducing skill mismatches would further improve growth prospects.
- Evidence of potentially excessive labor market churning (Annex V), partly underpinned by pervasive informality, deters firms from investing in upskilling.
- Sustaining gains in reducing corruption requires continued efforts to strengthen governance, including development of the national database on asset and income and making laws and administrative processes clearer, simpler, and more transparent.
- Addressing shortcomings on AML/CFT (including those identified by FAFT) will require increasing risk understanding and risk-based supervision, improving domestic coordination and international cooperation, identifying ultimate beneficial owners, and enacting other amendments to bring the current framework closer to best international practices.

### Data gaps and fiscal/external transparency
- Addressing data gaps would increase transparency and better inform policy making and risk management.
- On the fiscal front, lengthy delays in compiling final accounts, sizeable discrepancies, and lack of spending details in budget reports hamper timely monitoring and effective fiscal policy.
- The magnitude of errors and omissions in the balance of payments in 2022 (over 7 percent of GDP) reduces the ability to assess the external position.
- Other key weaknesses include the lack of publication of a property price index and related real-estate indicators (reflecting the lack of a land registry), and the absence of data on job vacancies, informal sector-related trackers, and on the international investment position.
- A unified and collaborative data sharing system between the central and local governments as well as among government agencies is crucial to support comprehensive economic surveillance.
- A first-step solution is compiling cash budget execution data from the Treasury and Budget Management Information System (TABMIS).

### Authorities’ views and staff appraisal highlights
- The authorities reiterated commitment to climate goals and structural reforms, noting challenges and the need for joint international efforts, including financial and capacity building support.
- Staff appraisal: Vietnam should translate climate goals into specific actions swiftly; implementation of PDP8 and the ETS will transform the energy sector but requires enhancing the legal and regulatory framework, developing a compensation scheme for those most impacted, and securing funding including international support.
- Macro priorities at the current juncture include consolidating macro-financial stability: fiscal policy should take the lead in supporting economic activity given risks from further monetary easing and policies to boost credit growth.
- Economic growth averaged 7 percent between 2014-2019, slowed to 2.7 percent during the pandemic, and rebounded strongly in 2022 before facing further shocks.
- FX reserves were assessed at below what standard metrics would suggest as appropriate at end 2022 but the SBV is already rebuilding its buffers.
- Recommendations to strengthen financial stability include establishing a crisis and financial stability monitoring function, strengthening resolution and emergency liquidity frameworks, and considering restrictions on dividend payments at weaker institutions to bolster capital buffers.
- Short-term focus on deploying out-of-court and hybrid solutions for debt restructuring to address problems in the real estate and corporate bond markets; medium-term reforms include developing efficient insolvency frameworks and bolstering institutions.
- Further actions to enhance anti-corruption frameworks, close governance gaps, and improve data reliability are recommended.
- It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard 12-month cycle.

*Source: IMF staff summary of chapter.*

### 1. Fiscal Targets&Rules

### 1. Fiscal Targets&Rules

### Fiscal framework and public finances
- State budget finances (in percent of GDP):
  - Revenue and grants: 19.4, 18.4, 18.7, 19.0, 18.4, 18.5 (2019–2024)
  - Expenditure: 19.8, 21.3, 20.1, 18.8, 19.6, 20.2 (2019–2024)
  - Expense: 14.5, 14.3, 13.9, 12.8, 13.0, 13.2 (2019–2024)
  - Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets: 5.3, 7.0, 6.2, 6.0, 6.6, 7.0 (2019–2024)
  - Net lending (+)/borrowing (-): -0.4, -2.9, -1.4, 0.3, -1.3, -1.7 (2019–2024)
  - Public and publicly guaranteed debt (end of period): 40.8, 41.1, 39.1, 35.3, 33.6, 32.3 (2019–2024)
- Consolidated state budgetary operations (in trillions of dong, selected lines):
  - Total revenue and grants: 1496, 1479, 1587, 1810, 1914, 2124 (2019–2024)
  - Tax revenue: 1122, 1056, 1181, 1376, 1450, 1612 (2019–2024)
  - Oil revenues: 56, 32, 44, 78, 63, 63 (2019–2024)
  - Expenditure (total): 1527, 1710, 1708, 1762, 2044, 2316 (2019–2024)
  - Net lending (+)/borrowing (-) (trillions): -31, -23, 0, -12, 224, -131, -192 (table shows sequence across years)
- Memorandum budgetary metrics:
  - Net lending/borrowing including EBFs: 0.3, -1.8, -0.5, 1.1, -0.5, -1.0 (2019–2024)
  - Primary balance (% GDP): 1.0, -1.5, -0.2, 1.3, -0.3, -0.8 (2019–2024)

### Fiscal policy assessment and reforms (Annex I)
- 2022 Article IV recommendations summarized with actions since 2022:
  - Fiscal policy: balance between temporary targeted support and economic transformation; fiscal support in 2022 delivered through the Program for Recovery and Development (PRD) focused on investment in infrastructure and temporary tax cuts; 2023 budget includes large public investment increases.
  - Revenue mobilization: MOF assessed key tax laws and collected comments on amendments to raise revenue by strengthening tax administration (e-commerce and digital businesses), broadening VAT base, raising some excise taxes, and amending tax incentives.
  - Public financial management: comprehensive Treasury modernization program underway (budget execution, active cash management, internal audit, Charter of Accounts redesign, information system); weaknesses remain on fiscal accounting and reporting.
  - Pensions: ongoing CD assistance on social security fund reform to improve coverage; training on pension fund modeling to support VSS.

### Policy recommendations (from source)
- Fiscal policies should be agile given fluid economic conditions.
- Longer-term spending priorities should promote more inclusive growth.
- Revenue mobilization efforts are critical to accommodate higher development spending.
- Strengthen public financial management frameworks.
- Pension reforms are needed to address unfunded pension liabilities and improve coverage, adequacy, sustainability, and fairness.

---

### Financial sector developments

### Key developments and risks
- Bank profitability:
  - Return on Assets (ROA, Q2): system, SOCBs, private trends shown (chart reference). Text: "Bank profitability remained high in 2022, driven by strong credit growth and NIMs."
- Capital and liquidity:
  - "Capital adequacy remained weak, especially in SOCBs."
  - "Liquidity tightened sharply as lending grew faster than deposits."
- Nonperforming loans and bond risks:
  - "NPLs are picking up again since June 2022."
  - "Bond defaults could rise further as real estate developer issued bonds form the bulk of upcoming maturities."
  - "Share prices have fallen steeply for the most leveraged developers."

### Financial soundness indicators (percent, 2018–2022)
- Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets: 11.9, 11.8, 11., 11.3, 11.5
- Regulatory Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets: 9.4, 9.4, 9., 5, 9.6, 10.1 (table formatting indicates values by year)
- Non-performing Loans Net of Provisions to Capital: 9.3, 7.5, 8., 0, 4.3, 9.1
- Non-performing Loans to Total Gross Loans 1/2: 2.1, 1.8, 1., 9, 1.6, 1.9
- Return on Assets: 1.2, 1.2, 1., 2, 1.5, 1.1
- Return on Equity: 12.3, 12.4, 11., 9, 14.9, 13.9
- Interest Margin to Gross Income: 70.0, 68.6, 68., 7, 67.0, 70.8
- Liquid Assets to Total Assets: 11.3, 11.7, 11., 3, 10.3, 9.2
- Note: "1/ Excluding restructured and VAMC loans."

### Financial sector policy actions (Annex I)
- Close monitoring of banking risks; loan classification and provisioning rules normalized for loans restructured after January 1, 2023; full normalization of accounting and provisioning rules will take effect on January 1, 2024.
- Adoption of Basel II is continuing; amendments to the law on Credit Institutions are being debated.
- Macro-prudential measures introduced to limit risks from real estate and consumer loans and reduce maturity mismatches.
- AML-CFT law passed and came into effect in March 2023, but does not fully address identified shortcomings; implementing documents issued.
- Corporate bond market reforms: September 2022 rules for transparency and limits on retail participation; March 2023 decree delayed the credit rating requirement and the limits on retail investors to January 1, 2024.
- Digital transformation progress: more public services through e-government Portal, national personal identification introduced.

---

### Macroeconomic outcomes and projections

### Output and prices (real GDP and inflation)
- Real GDP (percent change): 7.4, 2.9, 2.6, 8.0, 4.7, 5.8 (2019–2024)
- Output Gap (percent of GDP): 0.4, -0.4, -1.9, -0.1, -1.1, -1.1 (2019–2024)
- CPI (period average): 2.8, 3.2, 1.8, 3.2, 3.7, 3.5 (2019–2024)
- Core inflation (period average): 2.0, 2.3, 0.9, 2.7, 4.2, 3.4 (2019–2024)

### Medium-term projections (selected)
- Real GDP (percent change), 2025–2028: 6.9, 6.8, 6.8, 6.8
- CPI (period average), 2025–2028: 3.5, 3.5, 3.4, 3.4
- Public and publicly guaranteed debt (end of period), 2025–2028: 31.3, 30.7, 30.1, 29.5
- Net lending (+)/borrowing (-), 2025–2028: -2.1, -2.1, -2.1, -2.0

### External sector (Balance of Payments, selected)
- Current account balance (in percent of GDP), 2019–2028: 3.8, 4.3, -2.2, -0.3, 0.2, 0.7, 0.8, 1.0, 1.1, 1.1
- Gross international reserves (in billions of U.S. dollars), 2019–2028: 78.5, 95.2, 109.4, 86.7, 98.7, 110.5, 122.7, 136.3, 151.5, 168.6
- Trade balance (billions of U.S. dollars), 2019–2028: 21.0, 30.7, 15.7, 25.7, 25.4, 27.9, 29.8, 32.2, 35.1, 38.1
- Exports f.o.b. (percent of GDP): 79.6, 81.6, 90.9, 91.4, 81.6, 80.9, 82.2, 84.4, 86.7, 89.0 (2019–2028)

---

### Money, credit, and liquidity

### Monetary aggregates (selected, in trillions of dong)
- Total liquidity (M2): 10,574; 12,111; 13,402; 14,227; 15,101; 16,149 (2019–2024)
- Net foreign assets: 2,131; 2,642; 2,737; 2,361; 2,750; 3,164 (2019–2024)
- Net domestic assets: 8,443; 9,469; 10,665; 11,866; 12,351; 12,985 (2019–2024)
- Credit to the economy: 8,326; 9,293; 10,548; 12,023; 13,107; 14,380 (2019–2024)

### Ratios and growth rates
- Liquidity (M2; year-on-year percent change): 14.8, 14.5, 10.7, 6.2, 6.1, 6.9 (2019–2024)
- Credit to the economy (year-on-year percent change): 12.8, 11.6, 13.5, 14.0, 9.0, 9.7 (2019–2024)
- Credit/deposits (total, in percent): 88.8, 86.3, 88.8, 93.4, ...... (table truncated in source)

---

### Structural and policy priorities (Annex I highlights)

### Monetary policy recommendations and actions
- Recommendation: Monetary policy should be data dependent, forward looking, and increasingly vigilant of rising inflation risks; greater exchange rate flexibility; continue to modernize the monetary framework.
- Actions: Monetary policy tightened in second half of 2022; loosened in early 2023 as headline inflation receded. In October 2022, the FX trading band widened to +/-5 percent from +/-3 percent. SBV is enhancing analytical and forecasting capacity through IMF-supported FPAS TA.

### Financial sector and structural reforms
- Recommendations: Close monitoring of banking risks; enhance banking resilience; strengthen macroprudential framework; strengthen AML system; deepen capital markets; harness digital transformation; improve business environment and reduce corruption; improve labor force quality and reduce skill mismatches.
- Actions: See Financial sector developments section for implemented measures and ongoing reforms. Government working on amendments of economic laws (credit institutions, land, real estate business, housing law, e-commerce), promoting e-government, reducing regulations, limited vocational training under PRD.

---

*Source: 1vnmea2023003 - 1. Fiscal Targets&Rules (extracted content from the IMF PDF).*

### Annex II. Integration of Capacity Development Assistance in

### Annex II. Integration of Capacity Development Assistance in Surveillance

### Overview
- Vietnam needs to continue to modernize its economic institutions to achieve its ambitious development objectives.
- The IMF and other development partners are actively engaged in their respective areas of expertise and are coordinating regularly.
- High-quality capacity development (CD) is central to strengthening effective implementation of IMF policy advice and engagements with the authorities.
- Main surveillance priorities: modernizing policy frameworks, enhancing financial stability, and improving data quality and transparency to help Vietnam transition to the next phase of its development.

### Fund CD priorities and recent actions
- Monetary policy
  - Surveillance recommendation: Continue to modernize the monetary policy framework.
  - CD recent actions/plans: Phase 1 on the Forecasting and Policy Analysis System (FPAS) on enhancing analytical and forecasting capacity was successfully completed. Phase II on integration to policy discussion started in April 2022.
- Financial policy / Financial stability
  - Surveillance recommendation: Strengthen the resilience of the banking sector and modernize the macroprudential framework.
  - CD recent actions/plans: A Financial Sector Stability Review (FSSR) was undertaken in 2022 and identified gaps in the financial sector infrastructure, policies, and statistics. The IMF stands ready to continue helping the SBV strengthen financial stability.
- Central bank governance
  - Surveillance recommendation: Strengthen central bank capacity on internal audit toward more transparence and risk-based management.
  - CD recent actions/plans: TA on strengthening SBV internal audit started in August 2022 and aims at developing capacity in the application of risk-based internal auditing.
- Tax policy and tax administration
  - Surveillance recommendation: Strengthen revenue mobilization by enhancing tax policy and improving tax administration.
  - CD recent actions/plans: The property tax CD is ongoing. The Fund continues to work closely with the General Taxation Department on implementation of the Tax System Reform Strategy for 2021-2030. A multiple-year CD program is ongoing with priorities on compliance, risk management, and improvement of core tax administration functions.
- Treasury management and public financial management
  - Surveillance recommendation: Improve public financial management and fiscal data, accounting and reporting.
  - CD recent actions/plans: TA provided to the Vietnam State Treasury on implementation of its Modernization Strategy for 2021-30, including internal audit, improvement of Chart of Accounts and cash management; support to improve quality of financial reports, shorten timing of state budget finalization report and upgrade Treasury’s Financial Management Information System.
- Debt management
  - Surveillance recommendation: Improve public debt management, accounting and reporting.
  - CD recent actions/plans: Training on development of a Medium-Term Debt Strategy; reviews of institutional arrangements for public debt management; help to MOF to assess legal framework regarding external debt statistics and develop a roadmap for improvement of external debt statistics by currency and residency.
- Social Security Fund management
  - Surveillance recommendation: Expand social security coverage.
  - CD recent actions/plans: A potential multi-year CD program with the Vietnam Social Security Fund (VSS) on expanding social security coverage; training to VSS to help project long-term financial position and distributional features of public pensions.
- Customs modernization
  - Surveillance recommendation: Strengthen compliance management and enforcement in Customs.
  - CD recent actions/plans: Assisted General Department of Vietnam Customs (GDVC) in strengthening compliance management; CD on enforcement will focus on intelligence, surveillance, and criminal investigation.
- Data and statistics
  - Surveillance recommendation: Improve the coverage, quality, transparency, and timeliness of statistics.
  - CD recent actions/plans: TA and training continue on transitioning state budget data to Government Financial Statistics Manual 2014 (GFSM 2014) and publishing budget data for 2020-21 in line with GFSM 2014; macroeconomic analysis and forecasting, national accounts, monetary and financial data reporting; and external sector statistics.
- AML/CFT
  - Surveillance recommendation: AML/CFT framework and execution should be strengthened in line with the FATF standards to address key country risks.
  - CD recent actions/plans: A multi-year TA program to help resolve gaps has been agreed. The TA program has started with a scoping mission in November 2022.
- Macroeconomic framework
  - Surveillance recommendation: Strengthening the capacity of macroeconomic analysis and forecasting.
  - CD recent actions/plans: The scoping mission identified areas of improvement and formulated a multi-year CD action plan.

*Prepared by IMF staff.*

---

### Annex III. Impact of an Interest Rate Shock on the Corporate Sector in Vietnam

### Objective and metric
- Objective: Examine the impact of an interest rate shock on the default risk of the non-financial corporate sector in Vietnam.
- Metric: Share of debt-at-risk = debt of firms with interest coverage ratio (ICR) less than 1. ICR is defined as earnings before tax and interest payment (EBIT) over interest payment. ICR < 1 is taken as a proxy for high default risk.

### Baseline vulnerability (2020)
- Sample: 150 thousand firms in the Orbis database.
- Share of firms with ICR < 1 in 2020: 42 percent (compared to 39 percent in 2019).
- Total debt of these firms: 37.3 percent of total corporate debt in Vietnam.
- Reference: Kroeger et al. (2020) report a share of firm- and debt-at-risk of 33.5 percent and 28.7 percent, respectively, in 2017.

### Simulation scenarios (interest rate shocks)
- Baseline average calculated borrowing rate in 2020: 6.6 percent.
- Scenarios consider increases in average borrowing rates:
  - Scenario 1: 20 percent increase → implied borrowing rate: 7.9 percent.
  - Scenario 2: 40 percent increase → implied borrowing rate: 9.2 percent.
  - Scenario 3: 60 percent increase → implied borrowing rate: 10.6 percent.
- Assumption: Using 2020 data, the exercise assumes that debt and profits remained constant since then. If profit growth was higher than debt growth in 2021-22, the simulations are an upper bound; if debt grew faster than profits in 2021-22, the impact would be more severe.

### Simulation results and key statistics
- Scenario 1 (20 percent rise in borrowing rates):
  - Increase in share of firms-at-risk (ICR < 1): by 12 percentage points → 53.2 percent of firms at risk of default.
  - Share of total debt categorized as risky: 49 percent (an additional 13 percentage points compared to the baseline).
- Scenario 2 and Scenario 3:
  - Firms- and debt-at-risk are expected to continue rising but at a slower pace than from Scenario 1 to Scenario 2/3, suggesting many firms are close to the ICR threshold.
- Sectoral and firm-size vulnerability:
  - Sectors most vulnerable: construction, wholesale trade, and real estate — likely to see more than 10 percentage point increases in share of debt at risk under Scenario 1.
  - Small and micro firms: over 20 percent of debt re-categorized at high risk of default even under Scenario 1.
- Financial revenues and heterogeneity:
  - In 2020, around 10 percent of firms had positive net interest revenues (financial income minus interest payments), implying higher interest rates could benefit these firms’ financial activities.
  - By firm size: 32 percent of large firms had positive net interest revenues versus 7 percent of micro firms.
- Leverage concerns for large firms:
  - Large firms have the highest ratios of current liabilities to current assets, indicating higher leverage and potential pockets of vulnerability if borrowing costs rise and working capital needs are not managed.

---

### Annex IV. Exchange Rate Pass-Through to Inflation in Vietnam

### Evidence and challenges
- Two pieces of evidence on impact of VND/USD exchange rate (ER) changes on CPI in Vietnam:
  1. Correlation between ER and price changes was substantial during the 2010-11 depreciation episode.
  2. Estimated exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) to CPI inflation in ASEAN countries, including Vietnam: 0.3 percentage points 12 months after a 10 percent change in the ER, increasing to 1.7 percent for depreciation episodes.
- Challenges to quantifying ERPT in Vietnam based on recent data:
  - Tight regulation of prices of fuel and electricity, limited ER volatility, and low inflation in the past decade reduce accuracy of ERPT estimation for Vietnam alone.
- Vietnam’s import share in household consumption (proxy for ERPT relevance): 15 percent, similar to the median among ASEAN countries.

### Step 1 — ER and inflation in Vietnam (historical episode)
- 2010-11 episode: Inflation picked up sharply a few months after a sharp ER depreciation.
- The dong depreciated by about 13 percent against the dollar between January and December 2010.
- Time-difference correlation between ER depreciation and overall CPI inflation peaked at over 0.8 about six months after the depreciation.
- Highest correlations observed for transport and housing (including fuel for cooking and electricity) and food and catering services.

### Step 2 — ERPT estimates for ASEAN countries (method and results)
- Sample countries and periods include: Brunei (2000-2022), Indonesia (2000-2022), Lao PDR (2000-July 2021), Malaysia (July 2005-2022), Philippines (2000-2022), Singapore (2000-2022), Thailand (2000-2022), and Vietnam (2000-2022).
- Empirical approach: Local projections tracing out impulse responses; model follows Caselli and Roitman (2016) specification (see text for equation).
- Baseline ERPT estimate: A 10 percent depreciation of the ER is associated with a 0.3 percentage points increase in CPI inflation after 12 months.
- Conditional on depreciations only: ERPT estimate is 1.7 percent 12 months after a 10 percent ER decline.
- Asymmetry: ERPT for appreciations is much lower and close to zero up to 3 months after the shock, turning negative and reaching about -0.9 percent 12 months after a 10 percent ER appreciation.
- Interpretation: Pass-through coefficients are the percent (age point) change in CPI inflation 0–12 months after a percent (age point) change of the exchange rate.

### Factors dampening ERPT
- Monetary policy credibility and lower ER volatility reduce ERPT: countries with more credible central banks or inflation targeting regimes generally display lower ERPTs.
- ASEAN focus on inflation containment and SBV practice of setting annual inflation targets likely contributed to relatively low ERPT values estimated.
- Larger ERPTs are documented following more severe depreciation episodes; such episodes were less frequent in ASEAN countries over the sample period.

*Prepared by IMF staff.*

### Annex V. E  stimating Worker F lows and Labor Market Dynamism

### Annex V. Estimating Worker Flows and Labor Market Dynamism

### Overview
- Uses the Vietnamese Labor Force Survey (LFS) to estimate worker flows and labor market dynamism.
- While headline employment and unemployment largely reverted to pre-pandemic levels, substantial underlying labor fluidity exists: about 4.7 percent of the working-age population changed labor status across employment, unemployment, and inactivity each quarter.

### Data and methods
- Panel constructed from LFS individuals observed at two continuous points in time to measure quarterly movement rates (worker flows, job finding rates, employment exit rates).
- Data limitation: survey only tracks individuals within a year; almost no continuous data across Q4–Q1. Reported results do not capture transitions during Q4–Q1 and might suffer from a downward bias.

### Aggregate flows and headline vs. underlying dynamics
- Quarterly average change (2018): employment increased by 254 thousand (or 0.35 percent of working-age population); unemployment increased by 4 thousand (or 0.01 percent of working-age population).
- Gross worker flows (percentage of population aged 15+), quarterly (Table 1):
  - Employment → Unemployment: 0.3
  - Employment → Inactivity: 1.2
  - Unemployment → Employment: 0.5
  - Unemployment → Inactivity: 0.2
  - Inactivity → Employment: 2.1
  - Inactivity → Unemployment: 0.3
  - Total: 4.7

### Demographic patterns in status-changing rates
- By gender:
  - Females: 5.4 percent change labor status each quarter.
  - Males: 4 percent.
- By age:
  - Youths (15–29): 7.4 percent move each quarter.
  - Prime age (30–59): 3 (6.2) percent change status. 
- By education:
  - University graduates or higher tend to remain within their labor status more than those without tertiary education.

### Role of informality and self-employment in transitions
- Job-finding rates:
  - Around 14 percent of the non-employed find a job quarterly; 88 percent of these jobs are informal.
  - Of those finding jobs, roughly 41 percent start as salaried workers and 59 percent are self-employed.
  - Among the unemployed, 40 percent found a job within a quarter; among the inactive, about 11 percent found a job within a quarter.
  - 18.4 percent of the inactive are marginally-attached, helping explain large flows between inactivity and employment.
- Employment-exit rates:
  - Employment-exit rate: 1.7 percent.
  - Of workers exiting employment: 65 percent were self-employed; 87 percent worked informally.
  - Upon leaving employment: 25 percent move to unemployment and 75 percent become inactive.
- Transitions between self-employment and wage jobs:
  - Self-employment → Wage job: 5 percent (relatively low versus peers).
  - Wage job → Self-employment: 4.8 percent (comparable with peers); this nearly cancels out reverse flow.
- Formal–informal transitions (quarterly shares):
  - About 6 percent of informal workers change work status each quarter: 3.8 percent get a formal job; 2.1 percent exit employment.
  - About 10 percent of formal workers change status: 8.7 percent get an informal job and 0.8 percent exit employment.
  - Overall, 7 percent of the currently employed either exit employment (1.7 percent) or change formality status (2.8 percent from informal→formal and 2.4 percent from formal→informal).

### Inactive pool as a source of labor supply
- The inactive working-age population supplies three quarters of total new employment given its large size, despite lower per-person job-finding rates than the unemployed.
- Only 12 percent of new entrants into employment from the non-employed pool obtain formal jobs, indicating limited direct access to formal sector employment.

### Labor churning, turnover, and implications for human capital
- High turnover indicators:
  - Wage job → Self-employment: 4.8 percent, combined with 1.4 percent of wage workers exiting employment implies that over 6 percent of wage jobs need replacement in a given quarter.
  - Formal job exit rate is around 10 percent, implying 10 percent of formal jobs need re-hiring within a quarter.
- Consequences:
  - High churning creates disincentives for firms and workers to invest in training and human capital accumulation.
  - University-level and vocational-technical skills are under-supplied; few firms provide formal training.
  - Skill mismatches concentrated among low-skilled and informal workers, reinforcing labor market duality.

### Formal–informal segmentation and accessibility
- Bidirectional formal–informal flows within employment indicate integration, but formal sector appears segmented for the non-employed:
  - Only 12 percent of new workers entering employment from non-employment obtain formal jobs.
  - The informal sector may act as an interim training bridge—non-employed workers first get informal jobs, accumulate experience, then move to formal employment.

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Need to enhance active labor policies to address market segmentation and hurdles to accessing formal jobs.
- Key policy priorities:
  - Improve labor training and skill upgrading, especially targeted to the inactive and marginally-attached.
  - Strengthen job matching mechanisms for people not currently working.
  - Address potential supply- and demand-side distortions (e.g., high costs of hiring, training, or firing) that may drive reliance on informal jobs as transitional mechanisms.
  - Encourage firm provision of formal training to reduce skill mismatches and support longer-term human capital accumulation.

*Source: Annex V. Estimating Worker Flows and Labor Market Dynamism, 1vnmea2023003*

### 7.      As expected, pricing carbon will have significant effects on the costs of energy.

### 7.      As expected, pricing carbon will have significant effects on the costs of energy.

### Energy price impacts by scenario
- Scenario coupling: Each scenario couples Vietnam’s ETS with an excise tax on coal; the price of permits will vary and the number of permits will be reduced.
- Percentage price increases by 2030 (High Reductions, Medium Reductions, Low Reductions):
  - Oil: 96%, 33%, or 7%.
  - Electricity: 80%, 50%, or 20%.
  - Coal: 443%, 207%, or 60%.
- ETS phase-in timing: phased in between 2028 and 2030.
- Table of projected fuel prices in 2030 (Baseline and scenario prices exactly as reported):
  - Gasoline, US$ per liter: Baseline 0.84; High Reductions Scenario 1.15; Medium Reductions Scenario 0.95; Low Reductions Scenario 0.86.
  - Diesel, US$ per liter: Baseline 0.65; High Reductions Scenario 1.00; Medium Reductions Scenario 0.77; Low Reductions Scenario 0.68.
  - LPG, US$ per liter: Baseline 0.73; High Reductions Scenario 0.95; Medium Reductions Scenario 0.80; Low Reductions Scenario 0.74.
  - Kerosene, US$ per liter: Baseline 0.56; High Reductions Scenario 0.88; Medium Reductions Scenario 0.67; Low Reductions Scenario 0.58.
  - Oil, US$ per barrel: Baseline 56.9; High Reductions Scenario 111.8; Medium Reductions Scenario 75.9; Low Reductions Scenario 61.1.
  - Coal, US$ per gigajoule (GJ): Baseline 4.75; High Reductions Scenario 25.8; Medium Reductions Scenario 14.58; Low Reductions Scenario 7.60.
  - Natural gas, US$ per gigajoule (GJ): Baseline 8.89; High Reductions Scenario 15.42; Medium Reductions Scenario 11.15; Low Reductions Scenario 9.39.
  - Electricity, US$ per kwh: Baseline 0.10; High Reductions Scenario 0.18; Medium Reductions Scenario 0.15; Low Reductions Scenario 0.12.

### Fiscal revenues from auctioning permits
- Revenue projections in 2030 if emissions permits from Vietnam’s ETS are fully auctioned:
  - High Reductions scenario: 6.9% of GDP.
  - Medium Reductions scenario: 3.9% of GDP.
  - Low Reductions scenario: 1.4% of GDP.
- Characteristics:
  - These new revenues are annual.
  - Calculations account for erosion of revenue from pre-existing fuel taxes.
  - Potential uses: help achieve Vietnam’s development goals and mitigate impacts of higher energy costs on households and firms.
- Note: ETS revenues could also be deployed for transition assistance for displaced workers from affected industries.

### Co-benefits of pricing carbon
- Transport and air-pollution co-benefits realized through reduced driving, increased public transport use, decreased road congestion, and reduced airborne pollutants (e.g., sulfur dioxide and particulate matter).
- Quantified co-benefits (Liu and Xiao (2023)) expressed as percent of GDP:
  - High Reductions: 4.5% of GDP.
  - Medium Reductions: 3.0% of GDP.
  - Low Reductions: 1.5% of GDP.

### Impacts on firms, competitiveness, and leakage
- Firm-level impacts:
  - Energy price increases will have a significant impact on costs for Vietnamese industrial firms, with larger cost increases for more energy-intensive sectors.
  - Price increases will be passed through the economy (example: price of iron and steel will rise).
- Competitiveness disadvantages if other countries do not enact similar measures:
  - Domestic producers may be at a cost disadvantage in the domestic market if they pay a price for emissions while foreign producers do not.
  - Domestic exporters may be at a disadvantage in foreign markets if they must pay a price for emissions that emitters in other countries do not.
  - The degree of these effects depends on progress in other countries; global efforts to address climate change are therefore critical.

### Options to address competitiveness and leakage
- Border Cost Adjustment (BCA):
  - Option: refund exporters for the price paid for permits as goods cross the border.
  - Consideration: EU is enacting a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism; a BCA in Vietnam would help retain carbon revenues when exporting to the EU.
  - Complexity: requires building significant capacity.
- Exemptions:
  - Option: exempt export-dependent, energy-intensive sectors from the ETS (used by many countries for at least a few years after a new ETS).
- Measures to address leakage (firms leaving Vietnam because costs rose too much):
  - Free allowances to incumbent firms (examples: Korea, New Zealand, EU).
  - Tradeable Permit System in some industries (examples: China, Canada).
  - Recycling ETS revenues to trade-exposed firms via lump sum transfers, tax cuts, or output-based rebates.
- Trade-offs:
  - Policy choice must consider different trade-offs, including opportunity cost of using ETS revenues for other priorities.

### Distributional impacts on households and revenue recycling
- Regressivity risk:
  - Poorer households spend larger fractions of their incomes on energy and are most hurt by rises in energy prices.
  - An ETS with no accompanying reforms is regressive and likely to be unpopular.
- Simulation findings (Medium Reductions Scenario, 2030):
  - ETS raises costs of electricity and gasoline, reducing household consumption; increases in prices of other goods have the largest negative impact.
  - Targeted transfers using ETS revenues can more than compensate poorest households.
- Example revenue recycling:
  - Using 30 percent of carbon pricing revenues in targeted transfers for the bottom 40 percent of households:
    - On net, the bottom two deciles of households are left better off.
    - Impact on the next two deciles is near zero.
  - Using a larger proportion of revenues on transfers would yield even larger benefits for the poorest households.
- Broader benefits of recycling revenues:
  - Public investment financed by revenues can boost domestic demand and contribute to rising productivity, reducing potential negative impacts on growth.
  - Accompanying reform reverses regressivity of an ETS, increasing political acceptability.

*Source: IMF staff analysis in 1vnmea2023003 - Chapter section on carbon pricing and climate policy in Vietnam.*

### 7.      Compensation might be more efficient than investments in adaptation to achieve

### 1vnmea2023003 - 7.      Compensation might be more efficient than investments in adaptation to achieve

### Adaptation vs. Compensation — Main Finding
- Full protection of all assets and populations at risk may be very expensive and as a result adaptation projects may have a negative NPV.
- Authorities should consider alternative support measures when adaptation investments have negative NPV, including relocation subsidies or other forms of supports with less stringent conditionality (Bellon and Massetti, 2022).
- Reference treatment: Bellon, Matthieu, and Emanuele Massetti, 2022. “Economic Principles for Integrating Adaptation to Climate Change into Fiscal Policy.” IMF Staff Climate Note 2022/001.

### External Sector Assessment — Key Findings and Indicators
- Vietnam’s external position in 2022 was assessed to be stronger than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
- Current account balance (CAB) in 2022: deficit of 0.3 percent of GDP (improved from a deficit of 2.2 percent of GDP in 2021).
- Trade and services:
  - Trade balance (including services) increased from 0.1 percent of GDP in 2021 to 3.2 percent of GDP in 2022.
  - Services exports in 2022 were roughly 2.5 times higher than their 2021 levels.
  - Net transfers fell by nearly 50 percent in 2022 due to higher remittance outflows.
- Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER):
  - REER ended 2022 up 5.6 percent versus the end-2021 level.
- Reserves and reserve adequacy:
  - Gross international reserves fell by 21 percent (USD 22.7 billion) in 2022.
  - End-2022 reserves: USD 86.7 billion.
  - Reserves equivalent to 2.3 times short-term external debt and 65 percent of the Assessing Reserve Adequacy (ARA) metric under a fixed exchange rate regime.
  - Reserve levels were at 107 percent of the metric under a flexible exchange rate.
  - Staff assesses end-2022 reserves to be moderately below adequacy and expects reserves to reach adequate levels again in 2023.
- Current account gap and REER assessment:
  - CA gap estimated at 3.4 percent of GDP (CA model).
  - Cyclical contributions (from model): (-)-1.3.
  - Adjusted CA: 1.0.
  - CA Norm (from model): 2/-2.4 (cyclically adjusted).
  - Standard Error: 0.6.
  - CA Gap: 3.4.
  - Contribution breakdown:
    - Relative policy gap: -1.5
    - Fiscal policy gap: 1.3
    - FXI*KC gap: -2.2
  - CA-implied REER gap: -5.0 (applying an elasticity of 0.7).
  - EBA REER models suggest a REER gap of 16.2-21.4 percent, indicating significant uncertainty in exchange rate assessment.

### Debt Sustainability Analysis — Baseline and Projections
- Public debt trajectory (selected years, percent of GDP):
  - Public debt 2022: 35.3
  - 2023: 33.6
  - 2024: 32.3
  - 2025: 31.3
  - 2026: 30.7
  - 2027: 30.1
  - 2028: 29.5
  - 2029: 28.9
  - 2030: 28.2
  - 2031: 27.6
  - 2032: 27.1
- Change in public debt (percent of GDP, selected):
  - 2022 actual change: -3.9
  - 2023: -1.7
  - 2024: -1.3
  - Subsequent annual changes around -0.6 to -0.9.
- Contributions to debt dynamics:
  - Contribution of identified flows 2022: -3.3; 2023: -1.3; 2024: -1.0; thereafter around -0.5.
  - Primary deficit (percent of GDP): 2022: -1.3; 2023: 0.3; 2024: 0.8; 2025: 1.2; 2026: 1.2; medium-term converging to around 1.0.
  - Noninterest revenues (percent of GDP): 19.0 (2022), then 18.4, 18.5, 18.8, 19.0, 19.2, 19.4, 19.5, 19.6, 19.6, 19.7.
  - Noninterest expenditures (percent of GDP): 17.8 (2022), then 18.7, 19.3, 19.9, 20.2, 20.4, 20.5, 20.5, 20.5, 20.5, 20.5.
  - Automatic debt dynamics (percent of GDP): -2.0 (2022), -1.6 (2023), -1.8 (2024), -1.9 (2025), then around -1.7 to -1.2 thereafter.
  - Real interest rate and relative inflation components with detailed values (e.g., Real interest rate: -0.3 (2022), -0.5 (2023), -0.3 (2024), -0.1 (2025), 0.0 (2026) ...).
- Gross financing needs and composition (percent of GDP):
  - Gross financing needs 2022 actual: 2.1; 2023: 3.4; 2024: 4.2; 2025: 3.6; 2026: 3.4; thereafter around 3.3-3.5.
  - Of which: debt service (percent of GDP): 3.4 (actual 2022), 3.0 (2023), 3.4 (2024), 2.5 (2025), 2.2 (2026), etc.
  - Local currency financing (percent of GDP): 2.5 (2022), 1.8 (2023), 2.3 (2024), 1.6 (2025), 1.4 (2026), etc.
  - Foreign currency financing (percent of GDP): 0.9 (2022), 1.3 (2023), 1.1 (2024), 0.8 (2025), 0.8 (2026), etc.
- Macro assumptions (memo):
  - Real GDP growth (percent): 2022 actual: 8.0; 2023: 4.7; 2024: 5.; 2025: 8.6; medium-term around 6.8 and subsequently 6.6-6.6.
  - Inflation (GDP deflator; percent): 3.9 (2022), 4.5 (2023), 4.1 (2024), 3.5 (2025), then ~2.9-2.7.
  - Nominal GDP growth (percent): 12.2 (2022), 9.5 (2023), 10.1 (2024), 10.7 (2025), then ~9.8-9.6.
  - Effective interest rate (percent): 2.9 (2022), 2.9 (2023), 3.0 (2024), 3.0 (2025), rising gradually to 4.0.
- Staff commentary summary:
  - Public debt projected to gradually decline reflecting narrowing primary deficits and strong GDP growth amid stable economic conditions.
  - Continued revenue mobilization and spending prudency expected to lower the primary deficit to around 1 percent of GDP in the medium term.
  - Growth expected to recover to potential annual rate of 6.8 percent in the medium term after a weaker 2023.

### Realism and Risk Assessment
- Realism analysis: past forecasts appear conservative and projections are within norms. The primary deficit is projected to become the main driver of debt creation as fiscal policy loosens.
- Medium-term risk assessment:
  - Debt fanchart module: Debt fanchart index (DFI): 1.1 — Risk signal: Low.
  - Gross financing needs (GFN) module:
    - Average baseline GFN: 3.5 (percent of GDP).
    - Banks' claims on the general government: 5.7 (pct bank assets).
    - GFN financeability index (GFI): 3.3 — Risk signal: Low.
  - Final assessment: Medium-term index points to low risk.
  - Prob. of missed crisis, 2023-2028, if stress not predicted: 0.0 pct.
  - Prob. of false alarms, 2023-2028, if stress predicted: 65.9 pct.
  - Stress scenario for FX depreciation does not materially change results as FX debt is relatively small.

### Long-Term Risk Analysis — Demographics, Climate, and Natural Resources
- Long-term projections: debt broadly stable and relatively low under alternative assumptions; some scenarios show higher financing needs.
- Pensions and demographics:
  - Population aging expected to increase pension cost significantly after 2035 without reforms.
  - Permanent adjustment needed in the pension system (pp of GDP per year):
    - 3.74% for 50 years
    - 7.70% Until 2100
    - 10.73% for 30 years
  - Commentary: government expected to implement pension reforms and revenue mobilization.
- Health (demographics):
  - Health spending need rising in the long term; manageable if revenue mobilization and spending-efficiency reforms are implemented.
- Climate change:
  - Adaptation: Investments to address climate adaptation will increase long-term financing need.
  - Mitigation: In the absence of measures, mitigation spending need is high in the standardized scenario.
  - Policy offset: Government’s planned ETS expected to generate significant revenues which could be used to finance climate adaptation and shift toward renewable energy.
  - Government’s planned ETS will operate starting 2028.
- Natural resources:
  - Vietnam is an oil producer; exhaustion of reserves without new discoveries would negatively affect GFN and public debt in the long run.
  - Natural resource sector constituted less than 3 percent of GDP in 2022, so its current influence on public debt is small.

*Source: Excerpts from the IMF chapter 7 and Annexes VIII–IX in 1vnmea2023003.*

### Annex X. Risk Assessment Matrix

### Annex X. Risk Assessment Matrix

### External Risks
- Intensification of regional conflict(s).
  - Likelihood of Risk: High
  - Time Horizon: ST, MT
  - Impact if realized: High — Higher commodity prices, extended supply chain disruptions, tighter financial conditions, lower global demand, and less trade.
  - Policy Response:
    - Provide targeted policy support.
    - Allow greater exchange rate flexibility.
    - Accelerate structural reforms and improve business environment.
    - Diversify sourcing of intermediate goods.

- Abrupt global slowdown or recession.
  - Likelihood of Risk: Medium
  - Time Horizon: ST
  - Impact if realized: High — Lower exports, tourism, and FDI.
  - Policy Response:
    - Provide targeted policy support.
    - Allow greater exchange rate flexibility.
    - Facilitate reallocation of resources through structural reforms.
    - Diversify sourcing of intermediate goods.

- Deepening geo-economic fragmentation.
  - Likelihood of Risk: High
  - Time Horizon: ST/MT
  - Impact if realized: Medium — Supply disruptions and weaker confidence adversely affect economic activity globally. However, Vietnam may continue benefiting from trade diversion.
  - Policy Response:
    - Allow greater exchange rate flexibility.
    - Accelerate structural reforms and improve business environment.

- Monetary policy miscalibration.
  - Likelihood of Risk: Medium
  - Time Horizon: ST, MT
  - Impact if realized: High/Medium — Tighter global financial conditions, lower capital inflows; increase inflationary pressure.
  - Policy Response:
    - Allow greater exchange rate flexibility.
    - Tighten monetary policy when economic situation allows.
    - Agile and more targeted fiscal policy.

- Systemic financial instability.
  - Likelihood of Risk: Medium
  - Time Horizon: ST, MT
  - Impact if realized: Medium — Lower external demand and tighter global financial conditions.
  - Policy Response:
    - Allow greater exchange rate flexibility.
    - Tighten monetary policy when economic situation allows.
    - Closely monitor financial stability risks.
    - Provide targeted policy support.

### Domestic Risks
- Slowdown in credit to the economy.
  - Likelihood of Risk: High
  - Time Horizon: ST, MT
  - Impact if realized: Medium — Reduced economic activity accompanied by tighter financial conditions as credit risks increase.
  - Policy Response:
    - Establish a crisis monitoring function to address short-term risks to financial stability.
    - Urgently modernize the bank resolution and the emergency liquidity frameworks.
    - Prevent contagion from troubled real estate developers to avoid posing risks to financial stability.
    - Over time, strengthen bank regulation, supervision and resolution frameworks, establish a well-functioning corporate bond market and firm insolvency framework.

- Slow and inconsistent policy implementation.
  - Likelihood of Risk: Medium
  - Time Horizon: ST, MT
  - Impact if realized: Medium — Hampers labor reallocation and fuels supply disruptions; weak stimulus implementation slows recovery.
  - Policy Response:
    - Enhance policy coordination and reduce regulatory and other barriers.
    - Clearly communicate harmonized policies and consistent application nationally.

- Debt overhang and liquidity constraints.
  - Likelihood of Risk: Medium
  - Time Horizon: ST, MT
  - Impact if realized: Medium — Slows recovery, threatens financial stability.
  - Policy Response:
    - Target support to viable firms and vulnerable households.
    - Closely monitor asset quality, enhance provisioning, and rebuild capital buffers.

- Climate change.
  - Likelihood of Risk: High
  - Time Horizon: ST, MT
  - Impact if realized: High — By 2100, climate change could severely impact more than 12 percent of the population and reduce growth by 10 percent.
  - Policy Response:
    - Address both climate mitigation and adaptation.
    - Lower the intensity of fossil fuels.
    - Provide stronger incentives through taxation of fossil fuels.
    - Invest in climate resilient infrastructure.
    - Improve capacity to adapt technological change.

### Analytical Notes and Definitions
- “L” =Low; “M” =Medium; “H” =High.
- The Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) shows events that could materially alter the baseline path (the scenario most likely to materialize in the view of IMF staff).
- The relative likelihood of risks listed is the staff’s subjective assessment of the risks surrounding the baseline (“low” is meant to indicate a probability below 10 percent, “medium” a probability between 10 and 30 percent, and “high” a probability between 30 and 50 percent).
- The RAM reflects staff views on the source of risks and overall level of concern as of the time of discussions with the authorities. Non-mutually exclusive risks may interact and materialize jointly.

*Source: Annex X. Risk Assessment Matrix, Staff Report for the 2023 Article IV Consultation (Vietnam).*

### Conclusion

### Conclusion

### Growth outlook and policy stance
- Vietnam's economy is poised to continue growing at a reasonably healthy pace, supported by the coherent blend of prudent and pragmatic policy measures.
- Going forward, the policy direction will remain proactive and adaptable, factoring in the dynamics of external and domestic risks.
- Policies will take into consideration the characteristics of the Vietnamese economy, which heavily depends on external demand.

### Structural reforms and institutional strengthening
- The Vietnamese authorities reiterate their strong commitment to pursue structural reforms to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth.
- The modernization of the legal and institutional framework is progressing.
- Efforts are ongoing to strengthen governance, AMLF/CFT, and address climate risks.

### International support and technical assistance
- Technical assistance from the IMF and other international organizations are of immense value and is highly appreciated.

### Implementation priorities and approach
- Looking ahead, the realization of this ambitious structural reform agenda necessitates meticulous planning, prioritization, and phased implementation, considering the available resources, to yield optimal benefits for Vietnam.

### Key numeric value preserved from source
- 5

*1vnmea2023003 - Conclusion*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2023/english/1vnmea2023003.pdf_
