## 1argea2024002

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### Executive summary and program performance
- Decisive implementation of the stabilization plan—centered on a strong fiscal anchor with no new monetary financing, and relative price corrections—has led to:
  - twin fiscal and external surpluses,
  - a marked turnaround in reserves,
  - faster-than-expected disinflation,
  - a bolstering of the BCRA’s balance sheet,
  - and a reduction in sovereign spreads to multi-year lows.
- Program status:
  - The program is firmly on track.
  - All quantitative performance criteria through end-March were met with margins.
  - Good progress on structural benchmarks (SBs).
  - Some unwinding of the most distortive multiple currency practices (MCPs) and exchange restrictions is underway, with many remaining temporarily in place and a minor modification to limit tax arbitrage.

### Macroeconomic baseline and outlook (key projections)
- Output and growth:
  - Output now projected to contract by around 3½ percent in 2024 (previously 2¾ percent).
  - Non-agricultural output contraction of 5 percent y/y in 2024.
  - Recovery starting in late 2024; Real GDP growth projected to rebound to around 5 percent in 2025.
- Inflation:
  - Monthly headline inflation expected to converge to around 4 percent by end-2024 (140 percent y/y vs. 150 percent previously).
  - Monthly headline inflation fell to 8.8 percent in April from 25.5 percent in December 2023.
  - Core inflation at 6.3 percent m/m in April.
- External sector:
  - External current account balance expected to shift from a deficit of 3.4 percent of GDP (2023) to a surplus of 0.6 percent of GDP in 2024.
  - Net international reserves (NIR) projected to increase by US$7 billion this year (unchanged relative to the last review).
  - Cumulative goods trade surplus (cash basis) around US$15.5 billion through April (December–April).
- Debt and sustainability:
  - Probability of debt stabilization in a fan chart ending in 2033 is close to 86 percent.
  - Public debt (percent of GDP, selected): Actual 2023: 156.79; 2024: 91.07; 2025: 78.36; 2033: 26.6.
  - Primary surplus target for 2024 revised to 1.7 percent of GDP (from 2 percent in the seventh review).

### Fiscal policy: scale, composition, and milestones
- Authorities committed to achieving a primary surplus of 1.7 percent of GDP in 2024, consistent with overall balance.
- Adjustment achieved:
  - About two-thirds of the planned adjustment (around 5 ppts of GDP) achieved as of end-April 2024.
  - Frontloaded real spending cuts of 26 percent y/y more than offset real revenue declines of 8 percent y/y, yielding a cumulative overall surplus of 0.2 percent of GDP in the first four months of 2024.
- Fiscal package (expected Congressional approval) components and expected yields (percent of GDP, national government):
  - Fiscal chapter (subject to congressional approval) 1/0.38
  - Property transfer tax-0.01
  - Wealth tax (bienes personales)0.05
  - Monotributo0.04
  - PIT0.25
  - Tobacco excises0.05
  - Other measures0.21
  - Additional VAT from tariff adjustments0.20
  - Impuesto pais on dividend payments abroad0.10
  - Total0.59
  - The package overall yields 0.6 percent of GDP if impuesto pais on dividend payments abroad is included.
- Subsidies and tariffs:
  - Electricity and gas tariffs increased—up an average of 350 percent and 200 percent, respectively, in Q1:2024 (noting other mentions of 150–300 percent for particular user groups and later expected increases of 200 and 500 percent in reforms).
  - Targeted reduction in energy subsidy bill of 0.7 percent of GDP in 2024 from tariff and segmentation reforms.
- Public financial management:
  - Consolidate central government entities into the treasury single account (TSA) at the central bank by end-September 2024 (SB).
  - Submit 2025 draft budget consistent with overall balance by September 15, 2024 (SB).
  - Comprehensive, revenue-neutral tax reform being developed (end-October 2024, SB).

### Monetary, FX policy, and BCRA balance sheet
- Monetary regime transition:
  - Authorities preparing transition towards a new monetary regime (“currency competition”) with price stability as prime objective.
  - Central bank to ensure monetary policy rates move into positive territory in real terms to support peso demand as CFMs are eased.
  - BCRA prohibited from providing financing to the government; no net monetary financing; BCRA will continue lender-of-last-resort functions and sterilize FX purchases.
- Key operational changes:
  - Plan to extend monetary operations to include repos with Treasury securities as collateral to help establish the short end of the yield curve.
  - Accounting practices refined to reflect fair value; BCRA published 2023 financial statements under a new accounting policy.
- Policy rates and money:
  - Nominal policy rates lowered from 8.6 percent m/m end-December to 3.3 percent (late); ex-ante real policy interest rates turned less negative and expected to become positive later in the year.
  - Base money growth contained via sterilization and placements of BCRA peso-denominated and FX-denominated (BOPREAL) securities as well as higher treasury deposits.
  - BCRA-remunerated liabilities down to USD16 billion (3.2 percent of GDP) from USD23 billion (8.3 percent of GDP) in December 2023.

### FX restrictions, MCPs, and easing roadmap
- FX outcomes and recent easing:
  - Central bank (BCRA) FX purchases have exceeded US$17 billion since mid-December; cumulative FX purchases since inauguration USD17.2 billion.
  - Net international reserves recovered from negative US$11.2 billion pre-devaluation to about US$0.3 billion (staff note) and NIR as of March 31 totaled USD8.7 billion (above USD6 billion target).
  - MSMEs: elimination of FX access restrictions earlier than planned after NIR overperformance.
- MCPs and impuesto pais:
  - Impuesto pais increased to 17.5 percent in December 2023 for transport services and many imported goods; extended in May 2024 to subscription of BOPREAL and purchase of foreign currency for payment of dividends and profits to non-resident investors.
  - Staff supports temporary Board approval of MCPs/exchange restrictions under the new MCP policy on balance of payments grounds where conditions are met.
- Easing and sequencing:
  - Framework for conditions-based easing of FX controls and CFMs being developed (end-July 2024, SB).
  - Authorities committed to unwind most distortive MCPs and exchange restrictions, starting with the 80:20 preferential export scheme (end-June 2024, SB) and eliminating impuesto pais before end-2024 (targeted).

### Trade, reserves, and FX debt overhang
- Trade and cash-basis dynamics:
  - Cumulative goods trade surplus reached US$7.2 billion between December and April (from deficit ~US$8 billion January–November 2023).
  - Import volumes compressed 18 percent y/y (January–April 2024); export volumes rebounded 19 percent y/y.
  - On a cash basis cumulative goods trade balance around US$15.5 billion through April; difference from accrual balance reflects near US$8.5 billion in commercial debt flows and export receipts outside the official market (around US$6 billion via CCL).
- FX backlog and BOPREAL treatments:
  - Outstanding FX debt backlog roughly US$21 billion (end-April 2024): Excess importers’ debt US$17 billion; undistributed dividends US$4 billion.
  - Reprofiled FX backlog through end-April: about US$17 billion (Legacy imports reprofiled US$8.3 billion; Dividend distribution abroad reprofiled US$1.8 billion; Delayed access to FX for new imports US$7.1 billion).
  - MSME repayments: US$0.6 billion repaid; MSME envelope US$1.2 billion (additional 0.6 billion expected in H2).
- Reserve dynamics:
  - NIR overperformance allowed early elimination of FX access restrictions for MSMEs.
  - Reserve coverage remains below 50 percent of the ARA metric; gross international reserves fell to US$23 billion by end-2023 (lowest since 2004) but BCRA purchased over US$15bn in FX assets since December 10 through end-April.

### Banking sector, regulation, and private credit
- Banking soundness:
  - Commercial banks capitalized at 40 percent of risk-weighted assets and liquid at around 80 percent of total deposits (end-March).
  - Exposure to public sector rose from 46 percent of assets in November to 51 percent in March.
  - Credit to private sector contracted 30 percent y/y; incipient recovery in small USD credit segment.
  - Profitability around 5.9 percent return on assets; non-performing loans about 2 percent in March (down from 2.7 percent in November).
- Regulatory easing to improve monetary transmission and credit:
  - Eliminated mandatory minimum interest rates on deposits and most limits on bank lending rates.
  - Limited repo access to entities regulated by BCRA and downsized credit incentive schemes.
  - Banks required to provide capital forecasts to approve dividends.
  - Further streamlining planned to ensure level playing field between Fintechs and banks, and macroprudential measures to prevent unhedged foreign-currency lending.

### Structural reforms and supply-side agenda
- Ley Bases (landmark reform legislation, approved by lower house) expected to:
  - Increase labor market flexibility and boost formal employment.
  - Modernize hydrocarbon sector legal framework and incentives for large long-term investments.
  - Reduce state participation, remove entry barriers, and strengthen competition safeguards.
  - Support productivity gains and investment.
- Energy sector specifics:
  - Transportation and distribution tariffs raised by around 270 percent for electricity and 600 percent for natural gas (as reported in sector box).
  - Complementary measures: predictable pricing policy, expansion of gas pipelines, properly designed hydrocarbon sector regulatory reform.
  - Expected outcome: sustain improvement in the energy balance and support responsible investment.
- Governance and AML/CFT:
  - Strengthen AML/CFT framework in line with FATF assessment and Law 25.246 amendments to create a centralized beneficial ownership register.
  - Consider comprehensive governance assessment with Fund technical support.

### Financing strategy and assurances
- Domestic financing:
  - Strategy focuses on reducing rollover risks by extending maturities, avoiding FX- and inflation-linked securities where feasible, and shifting from overnight central bank paper to Treasuries.
  - Voluntary exchange extended 40 percent of outstanding peso debt this year (6.5 percent of GDP) into inflation-indexed securities due 2025–28 (end-March 2024), increasing average duration from 6 months to 3 years.
- External financing and assurances:
  - Official creditors projected to provide net financing around US$1.4–1.6 billion in 2024 (variably reported across sections).
  - Firm commitments from China to substantially refinance the activated portion of the PBOC swap (US$5 billion referenced; elsewhere activated swap US$4.9 billion and baseline assumes an 80 percent rollover of the activated portion).
  - Hydro-dam project could secure around US$0.1 billion in 2024 and US$0.5 billion in 2025, contingent on implementation.
  - Baseline assumes net official financing and NIR accumulation of US$7 billion during 2024; program baseline envisages reserve accumulation of US$5–12 billion per year over the medium term.
- Market access:
  - Regaining international private capital market access projected to begin in late 2025, enabling repayment to the Fund by late 2026 if reforms and conditions hold.

### Program risks, contingencies, and policy readiness
- Risk environment:
  - Elevated but more balanced following stabilization actions.
  - Downside risks: less favorable external conditions, protracted recession, social tensions, delays in congressional approval of fiscal/structural packages, tighter global financial conditions.
  - Upside risks: faster recovery if market-oriented reforms boost confidence and investment.
- Contingent policy measures agreed if downside risks materialize or congressional delays occur:
  - (i) Strengthening and expanding excises, particularly on fuels.
  - (ii) Accelerating reduction in energy and transportation subsidies.
  - (iii) Further streamlining transfers to provinces and SOEs.
  - Enhance tax administration and budget controls; readiness to adjust FX and monetary policy including bringing ex-ante real policy interest rate into positive territory sooner.

### Arrears policy and exceptional access assessment
- Arrears resolution:
  - Authorities continue to make good faith efforts under the Fund’s Lending into Arrears policy to resolve arrears to external private creditors (about US$2.35 billion total) and other legacy claims (e.g., Mobil Exploration US$196 million).
  - Payments to YPFB for 2023 gas deliveries completed on April 5, 2024; outstanding interest pending invoicing.
- Exceptional Access (EA) criteria:
  - Staff assesses Argentina continues to satisfy the four exceptional access criteria, contingent on continued implementation of the stabilization plan.
  - Criterion highlights:
    - Criterion 1 (exceptional BOP pressures): met.
    - Criterion 2 (debt sustainability): met but not with high probability.
    - Criterion 3 (prospects to regain private market access): met, projected re-access late-2025.
    - Criterion 4 (prospect of program success): met, given implementation momentum and political support.

### Data, monitoring, and TMU provisions
- Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU) key program exchange rates (as of December 29, 2023):
  - Argentine Pesos to the US dollar 808.45
  - Argentine Pesos to the SDR 1,084.67
  - Argentine Pesos to the Euro 893.90
  - Argentine Pesos to the Canadian dollar 611.95
  - Argentine Pesos to the British pound 1,031.02
  - Argentine Pesos to the Renminbi 113.85
  - Gold price (US$/ounce) 2,064.45
- Monitoring and reporting requirements:
  - Daily, weekly, fortnightly, monthly and quarterly reporting schedules specified (daily FX and reserve data, weekly BOPREAL stocks, monthly fiscal operations with lag no more than 25 days, etc.).
  - Ceiling on domestic arrears capped at 0.8 percent of GDP (ARS 4,946,421 million) for the daily average of the final two weeks of each quarter.
  - Cumulative change in NIR measured relative to stock on December 10, 2023; NIR targets adjusted for variations in program loan disbursements (cap on downward adjustor US$750 million in each calendar year).

### Recent developments and selected high-frequency indicators
- Activity and labor:
  - Q4:2023 GDP contracted 1.9 percent q/q, sa.
  - Q1:2024 indicated further decline in demand and activity of 3 percent q/q, sa.
  - Real supermarket sales declined by 10 percent November–March.
  - Real wages down 17 percent November–March.
  - Construction employment fell by 12 percent y/y in February.
- Inflation and markets:
  - Monthly headline inflation 8.8 percent in April; city of Buenos Aires inflation 4.4 percent in May.
  - Argentine spreads around 1600 basis points (since end-May); FX gaps around 40–45 percent.
  - ROFEX futures FX expectations (t + 10 months): 1,800 AR$/USD in December 2023; 1,650 in February 2024; 1,200 in May 2024.
- Fiscal and reserve milestones:
  - Cumulative primary cash surplus through end-April ARS 4,133 billion (0.7 percent of GDP).
  - Cumulative change in NIR through end-March US$8.7 billion versus adjusted program floor of US$6 billion.
  - BCRA FX purchases since mid-December exceeded US$17 billion; NIR accumulation since December 10, 2023 represented USD11.2 billion.

### Provincial finances and subnational reform priorities
- Provincial context:
  - Subnational governments execute almost half of all public spending while tax responsibilities are fairly centralized.
  - Primary balance (percent of GDP): 2015 = -0.60; 2019 = 0.20; 2023 (est.) = 0.1.
  - Own revenues (percent of GDP): 2015 = 8.2; 2019 = 8.0; 2023 (est.) = 7.6.
- Reform recommendations:
  - Broaden co-participated taxes by reforming the PIT and reducing tax expenditures.
  - Overhaul federal-provincial relations to better align revenue and expenditure responsibilities, create binding borrowing constraints, and consider comprehensive tax reform including subnational taxation.

### Key program requests and Board actions
- Purchases and approvals:
  - Purchases under the eighth review are at SDR 0.6 billion, to be maintained in the SDR Holding Account at the IMF to meet Fund obligations as they fall due.
  - Staff supports: completion of the Eighth Review; modifications of program targets for the primary fiscal balance and reserves; Board approval of temporary MCPs and exchange restriction related to impuesto pais on dividend FX purchases; waivers of nonobservance for continuous PCs on exchange restrictions/MCPs based on corrective actions; completion of financing assurances review.
- Structural Benchmarks (selected):
  - Extend maturities of a large portion of domestic debt through voluntary exchange (end-March 2024) — Met.
  - Articulate strategy to enhance monetary policy framework and operations (end-April 2024) — Met.
  - Publish detailed reforms to tariff segmentation to better target subsidies (end-May 2024) — Met.
  - Develop framework for gradual easing of FX controls and CFMs (end-July 2024) — In progress.

*IMF staff report excerpts (Argentina), content unit 1argea2024002.*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Context
- Decisive implementation of the stabilization plan—centered on a strong fiscal anchor with no new monetary financing, and relative price corrections—has led to:
  - twin fiscal and external surpluses,
  - a marked turnaround in reserves,
  - faster-than-expected disinflation,
  - a bolstering of the BCRA’s balance sheet,
  - and a reduction in sovereign spreads to multi-year lows.
- Selected easing of FX restrictions and deregulatory efforts are improving resource allocation.
- Macroeconomic imbalances and growth bottlenecks remain sizable; a long and difficult adjustment process still lies ahead.
- Efforts are underway to build political and societal support for reforms and to scale up social assistance to protect the most vulnerable and ensure the burden of the adjustment does not fall disproportionally on working families.
- Delays in securing key legislation in Congress have led to some market volatility.

### Program performance
- The program is firmly on track.
- All quantitative performance criteria through end-March were met with margins.
- Good progress made in meeting structural benchmarks (SBs).
- Some unwinding of the most distortive multiple currency practices (MCPs) and exchange restrictions is underway, although many remain temporarily in place as imbalances are being addressed, with a minor modification to limit tax arbitrage.

### Policy discussion: overall
- Sustaining strong early progress requires:
  - improving the quality of fiscal adjustment,
  - taking initial steps towards an enhanced monetary and FX policy framework,
  - implementing the structural agenda,
  - securing financing assurances.
- Continued efforts to secure congressional approval of key fiscal and structural legislation (already passed by the lower house) are required, as well as agile policy making if external and implementation risks materialize.

### Fiscal policy
- The authorities are fully committed to achieving a primary surplus of 1.7 percent of GDP this year, consistent with overall balance.
- About two-thirds of the adjustment planned (around 5 ppts of GDP) has been achieved as of end-April, mainly through temporary higher import-related taxes, lower subsidies, and discretionary spending cuts.
- The fiscal package, expected to be approved by Congress—covering:
  - a personal income tax reform,
  - a tax amnesty,
  - an improvement to personal asset taxes,
  - and tobacco excises—will support and improve the quality of consolidation efforts.
- Beyond this year, the authorities intend to sustain an overall balance, which will require greater focus on reforming the tax, pension, and revenue-sharing systems, including to unwind distortive taxes.

### Monetary and FX policies
- Monetary and FX policies will evolve to entrench disinflation and safeguard reserve accumulation.
- To support the transition towards a new monetary regime (“currency competition”):
  - the central bank will ensure monetary policy rates move into positive territory in real terms,
  - FX policy will become more flexible with the easing of capital flow management measures (CFMs) as conditions allow.
- Authorities remain committed to an early unwinding of the most distortive MCPs and exchange restrictions.
- Further streamlining of banking regulations is necessary to strengthen monetary transmission and continue to unlock private credit.

### Supply side policies
- Authorities will continue to correct relative price misalignments and create a more market-oriented economy.
- Expected approval of the landmark reform legislation (Ley Bases) will support recovery and boost productivity through:
  - increased labor market flexibility;
  - upgrades in the legal framework and properly-designed incentives for large long-term investments in hydrocarbon and other strategic sectors;
  - reduced state participation in the economy;
  - removal of entry barriers and policies to safeguard competition.

### Financing strategy and assurances
- Domestic financing strategy will focus on reducing rollover risks and gradually reducing vulnerabilities by:
  - extending maturities,
  - avoiding FX- and inflation-linked securities,
  - and shifting from overnight central bank paper to Treasuries.
- On the external side, firm financing assurances have been sought from multilateral and regional development banks.
- Firm commitments from China are in place, including to substantially refinance the activated portion of the PBOC swap and to address project loan delays in line with project implementation progress.
- Continued efforts to address imbalances and sustain twin surpluses will be critical to ensure Argentina’s return to external markets in a timeframe consistent with debt refinancing needs.

### Program baseline
- Minor revisions to the baseline are proposed on account of a stronger contraction in activity in late 2023, and a more rapid decline in inflation.
- Output is now projected to contract by around 3½ percent in 2024 (previously 2¾ percent), although a turnaround in activity is expected during the second half of this year as:
  - headwinds from fiscal consolidation ease,
  - real wages start to recover,
  - and investment gradually picks up in response to reform efforts.
- Monthly inflation is expected to fall further, converging to around 4 percent by end-2024 (140 percent y/y vs. 150 percent previously), and declining further over the medium term as peso demand recovers from historically low levels.
- Reserves are projected to remain unchanged as the less favorable terms of trade are largely offset by stronger net capital inflows.
- Sustained fiscal and external surpluses over the medium term—supported by tight policies, productivity gains and structural improvements in the energy balance—will strengthen reserves and secure international market access prospects.

### Program and enterprise risks
- Risks remain elevated, although they have become more balanced following bold actions to restore stability.
- Downside risks persist:
  - External conditions could become less favorable.
  - The ongoing recession could become more protracted, fueling social tensions and complicating program implementation.
  - Further delays in securing congressional approval of the fiscal and structural packages could hamper stabilization efforts and would require strong offsetting measures under Executive control to secure program targets.
- Efforts should continue to ensure proper burden sharing and build reform consensus given the very fragile social and political landscape.
- Fund enterprise risks remain significant, although moderated, including near-term balance sheet risks from overdue financial obligations.

### Program modalities
- Purchases under the eighth review are at SDR 0.6 billion, which will be maintained in the SDR Holding Account at the IMF to meet Fund obligations as they fall due.
- Program targets for the primary fiscal balance and reserves have been strengthened to reflect program overperformance and updates to the macroeconomic framework.
- Approval for multiple currency practices under Article VIII, assessed in line with the new MCP policy, are sought on the grounds that the measures have been imposed for balance of payments reasons, are temporary, non-discriminatory in nature, and do not give Argentina unfair competitive advantage over other members.
- In the context of easing of cross-border dividend payment restrictions and limiting potential tax arbitrage, approval of a new exchange restriction and MCP arising from the application of the tax on FX access (impuesto pais) for payment of dividends and profits to nonresident investors is also sought as the conditions for approval are met.
- Waivers of nonobservance are requested, as this new measure caused nonobservance of the continuous PCs against the imposition/intensification of exchange restrictions and the introduction/modification of MCPs.

### Recent developments (selected)
- Determined policy actions have produced better-than-expected outcomes: large step devaluation, strong frontloaded fiscal tightening with no new net monetary financing, and actions to improve the central bank balance sheet have led to a marked turn-around in reserve and inflation dynamics.
- Monthly inflation fell to single digits in April, beating market expectations for the fifth consecutive month, with core inflation reaching its lowest since January 2023.
- Central bank FX purchases, the first consecutive monthly fiscal surpluses in almost two decades, markedly lower FX gaps, and sovereign spreads falling to multi-year lows.
- Activity and demand contracted sharply:
  - Q4:2023 GDP contracted 1.9 percent q/q, sa.
  - Q1:2024 indicated further decline in demand and activity of 3 percent q/q, sa.
  - Private consumption: real supermarket sales declined by 10 percent November–March.
  - Real wages down 17 percent November–March.
  - Employment has generally held up, though sectoral impacts vary (e.g., construction employment fell by 12 percent y/y in February).
- Signs of potential stabilization beginning in April: improvements in consumer confidence, an emerging uptick in private credit and cement consumption, and a rebound in agricultural production following last year's drought.
- Inflation developments:
  - Monthly headline inflation fell to 8.8 percent in April from 25.5 percent in December 2023.
  - Core inflation at 6.3 percent m/m in April, lower than its January 2023 level.
  - Indicators point to further disinflation in May, consistent with declining near-term inflation expectations, a significant compression in the FX gap and market depreciation expectations in the context of an unchanged 2 percent monthly rate of crawl.
- The FX gap has risen from 20 percent to around 40 percent recently, in part reflecting policy and political uncertainties around congressional approval prospects and low real policy interest rates.

*IMF Executive Summary — Argentina, May 31, 2024*

### 6.      The trade balance has reversed to surplus, and notably so on a cash basis, while financial

### 6.      The trade balance has reversed to surplus, and notably so on a cash basis, while financial outflows have slowed

### Trade balance and cash-basis dynamics
- Cumulative goods trade surplus reached US$7.2 billion between December and April, from a deficit of around US$8 billion during January–November 2023, driven by:
  - import compression of 18 percent y/y in volumes during January–April 2024;
  - export rebound of 19 percent y/y in volumes, mainly from an agricultural export recovery from last year’s drought.
- Cumulative services deficit narrowed, driven mainly by declining tourism outflows and freight expenses (from lower goods imports).
- The real effective exchange rate (REER) has appreciated by around 40 percent since the large mid-December step devaluation, reaching the staff-assessed medium-term equilibrium level after considering the impact of import-related taxes, recognizing uncertainties.
- On a cash basis:
  - cumulative goods trade balance was much stronger (around US$15.5 billion through April);
  - the difference from the accrual trade balance mainly reflects near US$8.5 billion in commercial debt flows and use of private FX for imports payments, partly offset by export receipts settled outside the official market (around US$6 billion channeled through the CCL market).
  - Since December, importers accumulated about US$7 billion in new commercial debts (through the new rules-based phased import payment schedule) while exporters’ debt grew by US$1.3 billion.
  - Central bank schemes (BOPREALs) provided near-term cash-flow relief of close to US$10 billion.
  - The untreated importers’ debt overhang accumulated during 2022–23 has fallen significantly (US$3–5 billion).

### Financial account and private sector flows
- Net private financial outflows through the official market slowed sharply:
  - households reduced foreign-currency savings to about US$20 million per month this year, compared to US$160 million per month over 2023;
  - private firms’ deleveraging eased to about US$40 million per month this year versus a monthly average of US$160 million in 2023.
- Net new FDI flows were broadly flat, with investors in a wait-and-see mode; some firms issued debt internationally and domestically in dollars:
  - YPF issued US$800 million; Pan American Energy issued US$400 million in international markets; several private energy and agribusiness companies issued USD-denominated bonds domestically.

### Reserves and external position
- Central bank (BCRA) FX purchases have exceeded US$17 billion since mid-December.
- Direct intervention in parallel markets and non-deliverable futures (NDF) markets have ceased.
- Net international reserves (NIR) recovered from negative US$11.2 billion pre-devaluation to about US$0.3 billion, supported by higher cash trade surplus and lower private sector foreign asset purchases.
- NIR overperformance allowed early elimination of FX access restrictions for micro, small-and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs).
- Despite improvement, reserve coverage remains below 50 percent of the ARA metric, requiring sustained improvement given future FX debt service obligations and a weaker overall external position than implied by medium-term fundamentals.

### Fiscal policy outcomes and composition
- Tight fiscal policy delivered the first consecutive four-month overall surplus in 16 years.
- Real spending cuts of 26 percent y/y more than offset real revenue declines of 8 percent y/y, yielding a cumulative overall surplus of 0.2 percent of GDP in the first four months of 2024.
- Revenue supports included higher fuel excises, export receipts, and temporary taxes on FX access for imports (impuesto pais); domestic taxes declined in real terms partly due to raising the PIT floor.
- Expenditure measures under Executive control included:
  - discretionary cuts in capital spending and transfers to SOEs and provinces;
  - energy, transport and water tariff increases;
  - limits to public wage increases;
  - tighter management of decentralized public entities in line with PIMA recommendations.
- Social protection maintained or scaled up: transfers increased to the AUH (universal child allowance), Alimentar food program, primeros 1000 dias early childhood program, expanded school aid allowance, and pensions protected by a newly improved indexation formula effective April.
- Fiscal arithmetic: achieving overall balance this year (equivalent to a primary surplus of about 1.7 percent of GDP) requires an ambitious adjustment of 5 percentage points of GDP (4 percentage points in underlying terms), approximately two-thirds of which was achieved in the first four months of 2024.

### Domestic debt management and central bank balance-sheet reforms
- Active public debt management reduced rollover risk:
  - voluntary exchange extended 40 percent of outstanding peso debt this year (6.5 percent of GDP) into inflation-indexed securities due 2025–28 (end-March 2024), increasing average duration from 6 months to 3 years and lowering interest bill.
  - shift toward fixed-rate instruments, unwinding costly central bank insurance (puts), and moving from BCRA to Treasury securities ongoing.
  - stock of domestic arrears maintained at around 0.2 percent of GDP.
- Central bank balance-sheet and policy rates:
  - nominal policy rates lowered from 8.6 percent m/m in end-December to 3.3 percent as of late, while ex-ante real policy interest rates turned less negative amid rapidly falling inflation.
  - BCRA peso-denominated securities fell to around 7.3 percent of annualized GDP as of end-April, from 8.5 percent of GDP at end-November.
  - base money growth contained via sterilization and placements of BCRA peso-denominated and FX-denominated (BOPREAL) securities as well as higher treasury deposits; base money and broad money measures near historic lows.
  - BCRA published 2023 financial statements under a new accounting policy valuing certain assets at amortized cost or fair value, delivering a more objective measurement of net equity and aligning with zero-deficit policy and elimination of monetary financing.

### Banking sector, deregulation, and price adjustments
- Banking system sound with rising public-sector exposure:
  - commercial banks capitalized at 40 percent of risk weighted assets and liquid at around 80 percent of total deposits (end-March).
  - exposure to public sector rose from 46 percent of assets in November to 51 percent in March.
  - credit to private sector contracted 30 percent y/y, with incipient recovery in small USD credit segment.
  - profitability remained broadly stable at 5.9 percent return on assets; non-performing loans declined to about 2 percent in March from 2.7 percent in November.
- Regulatory easing:
  - eliminated mandatory minimum interest rates on deposits and most limits on bank lending rates;
  - limited access to repos to entities regulated by the BCRA;
  - downsized credit incentive schemes, eliminated compulsory lending to MSMEs, narrowed credit products eligible for differentiated minimum reserve benefits;
  - banks mandated to provide capital forecasts for dividend approval.
- Deregulatory measures to foster market-based outcomes:
  - utility tariffs adjusted (electricity, gas, water, public transport); fuel prices aligned with international comparators; wheat price subsidies phased out.
  - Emergency Decree (DNU) repeal of rent controls increased residential rental supply and lowered real rental rates.
  - "open sky" and lower tariffs on final and intermediate goods imports, faster customs clearance, lower barriers for wholesale stores, and improved OTC medication access expected to boost competition and productivity.
- Tariff and price specifics:
  - electricity prices (PEST) raised during February–April for high-income residential users (150 percent) and all commercial user categories (225–480 percent).
  - effective April 1, natural gas prices (PIST) raised for high income and commercial users (around 300 percent) and for low-and middle-income residential users (around 100 percent).
  - public transport fares in Buenos Aires raised by over 200 percent during January–February (scheduled April hikes postponed at least two months).

### FX restrictions, program performance, and structural benchmarks
- FX easing steps since end-January included:
  - reduced FX access delays for MSMEs (from 45 days to 30 days on average);
  - cut FX access delays for a basket of basic goods;
  - lifted transaction restrictions in formal parallel market for certain exporters;
  - modified capital market regulations to ease BOPREAL transactions and extended BOPREAL to address dividend overhang;
  - removed restrictions on opening savings accounts in U.S. dollars (Comunicación "A" 8027);
  - repealed preferential exchange rate on bank accounts for tourism inflows on May 9 (Comunicación “A” 7551).
- New or retained measures:
  - impuesto pais extended to purchase of FX for payment of dividends to non-resident investors, creating a new exchange restriction and Multiple Currency Practice (MCP) and a need for waivers of nonobservance.
- Program performance through end-March and related figures:
  - all quantitative performance criteria through end-March were met; good progress on structural benchmarks.
  - fiscal: cumulative primary cash surplus through end-March reached ARS 3,800 billion (0.6 percent of GDP), overperforming program target by almost ARS 3,000 billion; stock of domestic arrears remained well below program ceiling (ARS 5,264.6 billion); indicative floor on social spending temporarily missed by 0.01 percent of GDP but now well above target after transfers.
  - reserves: cumulative change in NIR through end-March reached US$8.7 billion versus an adjusted program floor of US$6 billion.
  - monetary/financing: net credit to government remained below zero; no direct monetary financing and cumulative central bank net purchases of government bonds in secondary market was below zero.
- Structural benchmarks met or in progress:
  - extended maturities of a large portion of domestic debt through voluntary exchange (end-March 2024, SB);
  - started articulating strategy to enhance monetary policy framework and operations (end-April 2024, SB);
  - published detailed reforms to tariff segmentation to better target subsidies (end-May 2024, SB);
  - developing framework for gradual easing of FX controls and CFMs (end-July 2024, SB).

*Source: IMF staff report excerpt (Argentina).*

### 16. Delivering the planned fiscal

### 16. Delivering the planned fiscal

### Fiscal consolidation: scale and composition
- Authorities’ top priority is delivering the planned fiscal consolidation this year.
- Authorities' Plan Progress (comparing execution in 2023 with 12-month cumulative execution until April 2024) — expected yields from recent fiscal measures (in percent of GDP, national government):
  - Fiscal chapter (subject to congressional approval) 1/0.38
  - Property transfer tax-0.01
  - Wealth tax (bienes personales)0.05
  - Monotributo0.04
  - PIT0.25
  - Tobacco excises0.05
  - Other measures0.21
  - Additional VAT from tariff adjustments0.20
  - Impuesto país on dividend payments abroad0.10
  - Total0.59
- The package overall yields 0.6 percent of GDP if impuesto país on dividend payments abroad is included.
- The fiscal adjustment is large by historical and cross-country standards but comparable to successful stabilization episodes of similar magnitudes.

### Revenue-enhancing reforms and tax administration
- Revenue-enhancing reforms remain critical to strengthen the quality and durability of the fiscal anchor.
- The fiscal package passed by the lower house includes measures for balance of payment purposes; a tax amnesty proposal is expected to yield 0.3 percent of GDP in 2024 but is not included in staff's baseline.
- The proposed legislation includes investment incentives (e.g., lower CIT rate 25 percent vs. the current 35 percent for an extended period (30 years) and protection from new taxes or tax changes at the provincial and municipal level).
- Authorities are required to present to Congress a plan to rationalize tax expenditures over the next two months, considering elimination of reduced tax rates that benefit specific regions or sectors.
- Improvements in tax collection agency efficiency are ongoing, reflecting TADAT recommendations completed in March.
- Tax authorities intend to publish the Compliance Risk Management (CRM) tools and Compliance Improvement Plans (CIPs) by end-December 2024.

### Subsidy rationalization and energy reforms
- Continued rationalization of subsidies is necessary.
- Energy sector actions:
  - Electricity and gas tariffs increased by an average of 350 percent and 200 percent, respectively, in Q1:2024.
  - Authorities plan to achieve full cost recovery for most electricity and gas users and replace current tariff segmentation with one that supports only the basic energy consumption basket of vulnerable households during S2:2024.
  - Detailed reforms published end-May 2024 (SB) and a new Decree issued to remove caps on price increases tied to the wage indexation formula (prior action).
  - Electricity and gas prices are expected to increase initially by an average of 200 and 500 percent, respectively (as noted in the reforms).
  - These actions are expected to secure a 0.7 percent-of-GDP reduction in the energy subsidy bill in 2024 and regularize sector finances.
- Urban transport and water:
  - Urban transport subsidy reduction will continue, amounting to 0.1 percent of GDP for 2024, aided by bus and train fare increases in Greater Buenos Aires in May (over 50 percent).
  - Transfers to the state-owned water company are being reduced in line with projected water tariff increases per the new indexation formula.
  - An increase in water tariffs (around 200 percent) was authorized in April for the Buenos Aires area and a further increase is planned for June per the indexation formula.

### Public financial management, social assistance, and pensions
- Public financial management reforms in the proposed Ley Bases aim to:
  - Rationalize and improve oversight of decentralized public entities (i.e., trust funds).
  - Strengthen control over public investment projects.
  - Enhance flexibility of public employment contracts.
  - Repeal the 2023 pension moratorium.
- Authorities are improving cash management and consolidating all central government entities into the treasury single account (TSA) at the central bank by end-September 2024 (SB).
- Social assistance targeting and governance enhancements:
  - Continued focus and expansion of means-tested flagship programs (Universal Child Allowance and Food Stamp) and the new early childhood support program.
  - Mobilizing financing and technical support from official creditors.
  - Strengthen the social registry by integrating administrative databases to ensure assistance reaches the most vulnerable households (end-September 2024, SB).
  - Eliminate costly intermediaries in assistance delivery.
- Pensions will continue to be adjusted by inflation to protect purchasing power while safeguarding public finances over the medium term.

### Medium-term fiscal outlook and structural fiscal reforms
- Sustaining overall fiscal balance beyond 2024 (around 2½ percent of GDP primary surplus) will require reforming tax, pension, and revenue sharing systems.
- Milestones and commitments:
  - Government to submit to Congress a 2025 draft budget consistent with overall fiscal balance by September 15, 2024 (SB), including a breakdown of policies and a comprehensive fiscal risk statement.
  - Comprehensive, revenue-neutral tax reform being developed (end-October 2024, SB), aiming to enhance efficiency, fairness, and simplicity, and gradually phase out distortive taxes, notably impuesto pais (set to expire at end-2024).
  - Roadmap for additional fiscal reforms to improve pension sustainability and equity, strengthen fiscal frameworks, and reform intergovernmental transfers by end-2024.

### Financing policy and debt management
- Domestic financing strategy will focus on reducing rollover risks and other debt vulnerabilities.
- Strong fiscal anchor expected to enable net peso debt placements at more favorable interest rates and longer maturities, and a shift from FX- and inflation-linked bonds to fixed-rate securities.
- Authorities plan to broaden instruments and maturities offered and publish an auction calendar; deepen investor pool as inflation declines; curtail use of put options.
- To strengthen the BCRA balance sheet, steps are being taken to gradually replace central bank securities with Treasury securities as conditions permit.
- External financing:
  - Official creditors are projected to provide US$1.4 billion in net financing in 2024, including from the World Bank, IADB and other regional development banks (CAF, FONPLATA).
  - Firm commitments from China to substantially refinance the drawn portion of the PBOC swap (US$5 billion).
  - Renewed financing of the hydro-dam project contingent on implementation progress.
- Authorities aim to re-access international capital markets by late-2025 or earlier, if possible, to better manage large FX obligations falling due while avoiding an increase in external indebtedness.
- Notes on maturities and conversions:
  - Debt maturity profile chart includes principal and interest payments; data for 2024 is for May-December. Peso denominated bonds converted to USD using current official exchange rate of 885.8 ARS/USD.

### Monetary and exchange rate policies
- Transition to a new monetary regime that entails “currency competition”:
  - Authorities intend to refine monetary and FX policies to entrench disinflation and support reserve buildup as FX controls are eased (¶26).
  - The eventual regime could resemble the managed float system in Peru and Uruguay.
  - Price stability remains a prime objective; individuals would be free to save and transact in currencies of their choosing; other currencies would not have legal tender status and tax payments will continue to be made in pesos.
  - Central bank prohibited from providing financing to the government and will continue to refrain from profit transfers to the Treasury; will maintain lender-of-last-resort functions to eligible (solvent) financial institutions, sterilize foreign exchange purchases, and manage liquidity through open market operations with government securities.
  - Accounting practices to be refined so the BCRA balance sheet reflects fair value.
- Monetary policy stance and operations:
  - Monetary policy must anchor inflation and expectations; overnight ex-ante policy interest rate needs to become positive in real terms in the near term to support peso demand as CFMs are eased and private credit recovers.
  - Authorities developing a plan to extend monetary operations to include repos with Treasury securities as collateral, with the BCRA using discretion to manage liquidity alongside treasury auctions.
- FX policy and easing of controls:
  - FX policy to become more flexible as CFMs are eased; fixed rate of crawl has helped anchor inflation after the large step devaluation.
  - Authorities committed to unwind all MCPs and FX restrictions, starting with the most distortive measures, including eliminating the 80:20 preferential export scheme (end-June 2024, SB) and eliminating impuesto pais before end-2024.
  - A framework for conditions-based easing of FX controls and CFMs is being developed (end-July 2024, SB) to guide implementation of eventual exchange rate unification.

### Banking regulation, monetary transmission, and private credit
- Further streamlining of banking regulations is necessary to strengthen monetary transmission and private credit allocation.
- Plans include continuing to ease regulations, amending frameworks to ensure a level playing field between Fintechs and traditional banks, increasing market competition, and supporting rapid recovery of private credit.
- Macroprudential policies will evolve to prevent lending in currencies in which borrowers are not hedged; microprudential reserve requirements fulfilled in FX could provide a buffer for short-term FX emergency liquidity support.

### Structural policies and market orientation
- Renewed efforts are needed to create a more open and market-oriented economy.
- Adjustment in relative prices is narrowing corporate profit margins; prices in certain protected sectors now better reflect international prices.
- Authorities working to secure congressional approval of Ley Bases to:
  - Boost private formal employment by easing hiring and job transition regulations.
  - Spur large long-term direct investments, including in energy and mining, through greater predictability and incentives.
  - Strengthen the hydrocarbon sector regulatory framework.
  - Promote competition in key sectors (aerospace, healthcare, housing, pharmaceutical, wholesale trade) through lower regulatory costs, reduced barriers to entry, and institutions to safeguard competition.
  - Strengthen the SOE privatization process to rationalize and improve efficiency and governance.
- Upon approval, authorities plan to prepare implementing regulations to support responsible and properly sequenced adoption of Ley Bases and the December 2023 Emergency Decree (DNU).

*Source: Argentina—Fiscal Adjustment 2024 (chapter 16).*

### 29.      Particular focus is needed to improve the efficiency and investment incentives in the

### Particular focus is needed to improve the efficiency and investment incentives in the energy sector.

### Energy sector reforms and pricing
- Transportation and distribution tariffs were raised by around 270 percent for electricity and 600 percent for natural gas and are now being automatically updated to better reflect costs.
- Authorities will align pricing to improve cost recovery for lower and middle-income households through the new energy subsidy scheme.
- Recommended complementary measures:
  - More predictable pricing policy.
  - Properly-designed reforms of the regulatory framework of the hydrocarbon sector (also in Ley Bases).
  - Continued efforts to expand the gas pipelines.
- Expected outcomes:
  - Sustain improvement in the energy balance.
  - Support responsible investment in the energy sector.
- Note on consumer energy bills components: (i) generation costs for electricity and gas; (ii) transportation costs; (iii) distribution costs; and (iv) national, provincial, and municipal taxes.

### Transparency, governance, and AML/CFT
- Tackling pervasive corruption and strengthening government accountability are top priorities.
- Authorities committed to further strengthen the Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) framework in line with international standards and recommendations of the ongoing FATF assessment.
- Following congressional approval of reforms to AML/CFT Law 25.246, efforts center on:
  - Implementing regulations.
  - Measures to address shortcomings identified in the 2022 National Risk Assessment.
- Authorities are considering a comprehensive governance assessment, with Fund technical support, to identify priorities for a medium-term governance and anti-corruption strategy.
- Law 25.246 amendments aim to create a centralized register for beneficial ownership and control of legal persons and legal arrangements as designated by Law 27.739.

### Macroeconomic outlook and risks
- Baseline revisions:
  - Economic activity and demand projected to contract more sharply in 2024 due to carryover from lower growth in Q4:2023 and stronger impact of upfront fiscal tightening during Q1:2024.
  - Inflation expected to fall somewhat faster, supported by refinements in the monetary and FX policy framework and recovery in peso demand.
  - Projected twin fiscal and external surpluses over the medium term—supported by tight policies, productivity gains and structural improvements in the energy balance—will ensure sustainability of public debt and allow gradual conditions-based unwinding of CFMs and re-access to international capital markets.
- Key projections and expectations:
  - Real GDP growth:
    - Economy projected to contract by 3½ percent in 2024 (from 2¾ percent).
    - Non-agricultural output contraction of 5 percent y/y in 2024.
    - Recovery starting in late 2024.
    - Real GDP growth projected to rebound to around 5 percent next year, with output growth converging to potential over the medium term.
  - Inflation:
    - Monthly headline inflation expected to fall to around 4 percent by end-2024 (140 percent y/y).
    - Inflation to decline further over the medium term.
  - External:
    - External current account balance expected to shift from a deficit of 3.4 percent of GDP to a surplus of 0.6 percent of GDP this year.
    - Net international reserves projected to increase by US$7 billion this year—unchanged relative to the last review.
    - Reserve coverage projected to improve over the medium term, consistent with re-access to international capital markets by late-2025 and a step increase in foreign direct investment.
- Risk assessment:
  - Risks remain elevated despite moderation of downside risks.
  - Downside risks: more protracted recession, stubborn disinflation, delays in congressional approval of fiscal and structural legislation, tighter global financial conditions.
  - Upside risks: faster recovery if sustained market-oriented reforms boost confidence and investment.

### Policy readiness and contingent measures
- Authorities stand ready to recalibrate policies to evolving outcomes to ensure program objectives are met.
- Agreed contingent measures if downside risks materialize or congressional delays occur:
  - (i) Strengthening and expanding excises, particularly on fuels.
  - (ii) Accelerating the reduction in energy and transportation subsidies.
  - (iii) Further streamlining transfers to provinces and SOEs.
  - Redouble efforts to strengthen tax administration and budget controls.
  - Ready to adjust FX and monetary policy, including bringing ex-ante real policy interest rate into positive territory sooner if disinflation proves more stubborn.
  - Clear policy communication to guide market expectations.

### Program issues, quantitative targets, and structural benchmarks
- Quantitative target adjustments:
  - New quarterly PCs proposed through end-September 2024 and ITs set through end-December 2024.
  - Primary fiscal balance strengthened for end-June and end-September relative to the seventh review.
  - Primary surplus target for 2024 revised to 1.7 percent of GDP (2 percent in the seventh review).
  - NIR accumulation target for end-2024 remains unchanged; end-June and end-September targets increased.
  - Minor revisions to the ceiling on the federal government stock of domestic arrears due to a small downward revision to nominal GDP projections.
- Waiver and approvals:
  - Waiver of nonobservance for continuous PCs on exchange restrictions and MCPs on basis of corrective actions and request for Board approval under Article VIII to maintain measures temporarily.
  - Approval sought to maintain on a temporary basis measures assessed under the new MCP policy and the new exchange restriction and MCP arising from the application of impuesto pais to purchase of foreign currency for payment of investment income.
- Prior action:
  - On May 28, 2024, Executive Decree removed the wage indexation formula (Decree 332/2022), which capped increases in low- and middle-income households’ electricity and natural gas utility bills.
- Structural Benchmarks (SBs) proposed:
  - New SB (end-October 2024): develop and publish a draft proposal to enhance the efficiency and simplicity of the tax system, including reorienting away from distortive trade and financial transactions taxes.
  - New SB (end-September 2024): develop an action plan to consolidate all central government entities into the treasury single account (TSA) at the central bank, in consultation with Fund staff.
  - Modified SB (September 15, 2024): submit to Congress the draft 2025 budget consistent with overall balance and include a comprehensive fiscal risk statement.

### Financing assurances and capacity to repay
- Official creditor financing commitments:
  - Multilateral and regional development banks (World Bank, IADB, CAF, FONPLATA) to provide net financing of around US$1.6 billion during 2024 and US$1.3 billion in 2025 in budget support and project loans.
  - Baseline assumes a rollover of 80 percent of the activated portion of the PBOC swap line.
  - Hydro-dam project financing conditional on implementation; could secure around US$0.1 billion in 2024 and US$0.5 billion in 2025.
- Program baseline continues to assume NIR accumulation of US$7 billion during 2024, with a projected trade (goods and services) surplus of around US$20 billion.
- CFMs will continue to play a supportive role in limiting capital outflows in the near term.
- Capacity to repay:
  - Improved somewhat since last review but subject to exceptional risks.
  - Program baseline envisages reserve accumulation of US$5–12 billion per year over the medium term.
  - Fund debt service obligations projected to remain very large after 2026, averaging 7 percent of exports, or 14 percent of gross reserves during 2027–31.
  - Outstanding Fund credit projected to remain large and will only fall below 6 percent of GDP by 2027, reflecting projected market access.

### Jurisdictional issues and MCPs
- Under the new MCP policy (effective February 1, 2024), Argentina maintains a number of MCPs resulting from impermissible spreads (from 17.5 to 60 percent) caused by official actions, notably exchange taxes (impuesto pais and withholding taxes).
- Staff supports authorities’ request for Board approval to maintain these measures temporarily, as they meet conditions: temporary, for balance of payments reasons, not giving unfair competitive advantage, and not discriminatory.
- Staff supports approval of the new exchange restriction and MCP resulting from May 2024 application of impuesto pais to acquisition of FX for payment of investment income (dividends) as it was introduced primarily for BOP purposes and meets approval criteria.

### Safeguards assessment for the BCRA
- Progress noted on implementing 2022 safeguards recommendations:
  - Significant strengthening of the BCRA’s balance sheet.
  - Actions taken to align central bank financial statements more with international financial reporting standards (IFRS).
- Ongoing work and commitments:
  - Finalize the BCRA’s IT security policy.
  - Enhance the cybersecurity framework.
  - Conduct an external quality review of the internal audit function by end-2024.
  - Further engagement expected on recommendations to strengthen BCRA autonomy and transparency by reforming legal framework and fully adopting IFRS.

*IMF staff summary of content unit 1argea2024002 - 29.*

### 43.      Arrears policy. Staff assesses that the authorities continue to make good faith efforts under

### Arrears policy

### Arrears resolution status
- Staff assesses that the authorities continue to make good faith efforts under the Fund’s Lending into Arrears policy to resolve arrears to:
  - external private creditors that did not participate in the 2005/10 debt exchange or did not settle under the terms provided in 2016 and those to which there is debt outstanding from the 2001 default (about US$2.35 billion total), with the authorities closely monitoring evolving relations with these creditors;
  - Mobil Exploration, where negotiations remain underway on a repayment plan on principal claims (US$196 million).
- Payments on the claims made by YPFB (Bolivian Oil & Gas Company) for gas delivered and unpaid during 2023 were completed on April 5, 2024, and an outstanding interest payment is expected to be made upon invoicing.
- Discussions are ongoing between the Argentine and Paraguayan authorities on payment arrangements for overdue obligations owed to a binational Paraguayan and Argentine entity (Yacyreta) related to energy imports in 2023 and 2024.
- Two external arrears claims remain under litigation:
  - Bpifrance Assurance Export, where the firm filed an appeal with the Supreme Court of Justice on December 2, 2022, after the Court of Appeal had rejected the extraordinary appeal submitted by the agency on grounds of statute of limitations;
  - Titan Consortium I, LLC, where a legacy claim is currently under litigation on grounds of statute of limitations.
- Authorities affirmed that no other external arrears were incurred since the seventh review.

### Exceptional access (EA) assessment — summary of staff findings
- Staff assesses that Argentina continues to satisfy the four exceptional access criteria, contingent on continued implementation of the stabilization plan and agreed baseline policies. The assessment is subject to finely balanced judgements given elevated risks and uncertainty, including still high inflation, weak external buffers, program implementation challenges, a fragmented political landscape and a fragile social situation.

- Criterion 1 (exceptional balance of payments pressures)
  - Staff assesses this criterion as met.
  - Argentina is experiencing exceptional balance of payments pressures on the financial account.
  - Meeting large external debt service obligations during 2024 and beyond will require Fund exposure above normal access limits, with continued support of the broader international community.

- Criterion 2 (debt sustainability analysis)
  - Staff assesses this criterion as met.
  - Under sustained implementation of the ambitious fiscal consolidation plan and the revised baseline, Argentina’s public debt is assessed to be sustainable, but not with high probability (see Annex II).
  - Debt-to-GDP dynamics remain favorable from 2024 onwards, reflecting fiscal consolidation, recovery in economic activity, and convergence of the real exchange rate to medium-term fundamentals after initial overshooting.
  - Recent domestic debt exchanges and auctions have significantly reduced debt servicing costs and extended maturities, within the context of capital controls.
  - Projected debt and debt service metrics remain above indicative targets set out in the March 2020 Staff Technical Note on Public Debt Sustainability, suggesting margins for maneuver remain extremely limited.
  - Adequate safeguards are in place to meet EA2: in the event of adverse shocks there would be sufficient restructurable FX debt to the private sector potentially available after the program to improve debt sustainability and enhance safeguards for Fund resources.

- Criterion 3 (prospects to regain private market access)
  - Staff assesses this criterion as met.
  - External sovereign bond prices have risen to multi-year highs, reflecting decisive policy implementation and improved perception of Argentina’s growth and external prospects.
  - Regaining international private capital market access is projected to begin in late 2025, on a scale that would enable repayment to the Fund by the time its payments begin falling due in late 2026.
  - Continued progress requires well-sequenced market reforms (product, labor, trade, governance), strengthening regulatory frameworks (as proposed in Ley Bases), gradual easing of CFMs, and continued resolution over time of ongoing sovereign debt litigation cases.
  - The assessment remains subject to high uncertainty given implementation challenges in a complex social and political landscape.

- Criterion 4 (prospect of program success and capacity)
  - Staff assesses this criterion as met.
  - The administration is decisively implementing an ambitious stabilization plan and has met all quantitative performance criteria with margins for the first time since the start of the arrangement.
  - Opinion polls suggest President Milei’s approval ratings remain strong (and above 50 percent).
  - Delays in approval of key reform legislation have been mitigated through discretionary fiscal measures while scaling up social assistance.
  - Prospects of Senate approval and eventual congressional approval of reform bills remain strong; passage would underpin higher quality fiscal adjustment and stronger recovery.
  - Implementation risks remain due to the complexity of planned reforms, a highly fragmented political landscape, and a fragile social situation. Authorities are committed to contingency plans to achieve program objectives (¶33), and the President’s statements to veto initiatives jeopardizing fiscal targets reinforce staff confidence.

### Staff appraisal and policy recommendations
- Staff commends authorities for restoring macroeconomic stability and putting the program on track, highlighting:
  - First consecutive four-month fiscal surplus in almost two decades.
  - Turnaround in international reserves.
  - Faster-than-expected disinflation.
  - Significant drop in sovereign spreads.
  - All quantitative performance criteria through end-March were met, some by significant margins.
- Policy evolution needed to build on gains and secure political and societal support:
  - Strengthen fiscal anchor by improving quality, durability, and predictability.
  - Enhance monetary and FX policy frameworks and communication to entrench disinflation, improve reserve coverage, and pave way to a new monetary regime.
  - Well-calibrated easing of CFMs, early unwinding of more distortive MCPs and exchange restrictions.
  - Reforms to create a more market-oriented economy to support recovery and boost growth potential.
  - Work with Congress, provincial governors, and stakeholders to secure congressional approval of key fiscal and structural legislation.
  - Adjust social assistance to protect the most vulnerable and ensure burden sharing.
- Fiscal priorities and reforms:
  - Continue commitment to deliver overall fiscal balance without central bank financing and complete the projected 5 percentage points of GDP adjustment.
  - Approve key fiscal and structural legislation, including PIT reform, to improve quality of adjustment and secure the year’s target.
  - Rationalize energy and transport subsidies timely and predictably; strengthen expenditure discipline and controls; reduce tax expenditures; enhance targeting and governance of social assistance.
  - Beyond 2024, maintain overall balance while starting to unwind distortive taxes; reform tax, pension, and revenue-sharing systems.
- Debt management and external financing:
  - Continue reducing domestic rollover risks, extending maturities, shifting away from inflation- and FX-linked securities, and reducing costly central bank insurance.
  - Build a yield curve in close coordination with the BCRA.
  - Continue mobilizing external financing and technical support from official creditors.
  - Rebuild external buffers to re-access international capital markets by late 2025 (or earlier if possible) without increasing net indebtedness.
- Monetary regime and FX policy guidance:
  - Support transition to a new monetary regime involving “currency competition” with a firm nominal anchor; price and financial stability to remain prime objectives.
  - Define central bank role in liquidity management and financial sector stability; strengthen communications on new monetary and FX regime.
  - Consider enshrining commitments of no net monetary financing and no central bank profit transfer to the Treasury into law to strengthen central bank independence.
  - Refine accounting practices to align central bank balance sheet with fair value.
  - Monetary policy should aim for ex-ante policy interest rate positive in real terms to support peso demand; use interest rate policy actively as CFMs are eased and private credit recovers.
  - Streamline banking regulations to strengthen monetary transmission and private credit allocation.
  - Exchange rate should become more flexible soon to reflect fundamentals and improve reserve coverage.
  - Continue unwinding most distortive MCPs and FX restrictions, including eliminating the preferential export scheme as planned and removing the tax on FX access on imports this year.
  - Finalize framework for conditions-based easing of FX controls and CFMs, drawing on cross-country experience and Argentina-specific factors.

- Micro-level reforms to support recovery and potential growth:
  - Correct relative price misalignments and improve efficiency of selected sectors.
  - Secure congressional approval of Ley Bases to eliminate entry barriers, increase labor market flexibility, modernize hydrocarbons legal framework, and create incentives for large long-term investments.
  - Complement reforms with enhanced transparency and governance, including a comprehensive governance assessment with Fund technical support.
  - Strengthen AML/CFT framework in line with international standards.

- Program risks and contingency planning:
  - Risks have moderated but remain elevated: less favorable external conditions, protracted recession, social tensions, and potential delays in congressional approval of key legislation.
  - Authorities should be ready to implement agreed contingency measures; priority on improving burden sharing and building societal consensus.

- Staff recommendations:
  - Completion of the Eighth Review under the arrangement.
  - Support requested modification of key program targets.
  - Approval of the MCPs in line with the new MCP policy, approval of the new exchange restriction/MCP arising from the application of the foreign exchange access tax (impuesto pais) to dividends as conditions for approval are met.
  - Waiver of nonobservance of the PCs on exchange restrictions / MCPs on the basis of corrective action.
  - Completion of the financing assurances review, including given Argentina’s ongoing good faith efforts to resolve its external arrears.

### Argentina’s social conditions, 2023–24 (Box 1) — key facts and recent measures
- Social conditions have deteriorated over the past decade.
  - Poverty rose from 29 percent in S1:2017 to 42 percent by S2:2023, with 12 percent of the population living in extreme poverty.
  - Distribution across age: 15 percent of those above 65 live in poverty; that figure is near 60 percent for children under 14.
- Driving forces: lackluster growth, rising informality, declining real wages, and income erosion relative to inflation.
- Safety net coverage and gaps:
  - Over 50 percent of households/individuals receive some type of social assistance.
  - Key flagship programs include conditional cash transfers supported by MDBs (AUH and Alimentar) and expanded universal pensions (PUAM).
  - The value of assistance has often not kept up with inflation; safety net does not cover informal workers without children.
  - Governance issues: some programs are not well-targeted and suffer duplications, redundancy, and governance problems (e.g., Potenciar Trabajo); intermediaries add cost and inefficiencies.
- Authorities’ recent steps to scale up social benefits and improve targeting:
  - Sharp increases in child benefits: since mid-December, AUH and Alimentar scaled up significantly, with AUH expected to almost double in real terms since end-2023, following the recent announcement of a 42 percent nominal increase to take place on June 1.
  - 500 percent increase in the early childhood support program (primeros 1000 dias) and a scholarship program to assist early education tuition payments.
  - Rationalization of inefficient programs: Potenciar Trabajo being scaled back and replaced by Volver a Trabajo and Acompañamiento Social with greater oversight and accountability.
  - New benefit indexation formula established via an Emergency Decree effective April, which included a 12.5 percent compensation for inflation earlier in the year:
    - Under the new formula, pension benefits would be automatically adjusted to the previous month’s inflation, with similar adjustments applying to selected social programs (e.g., AUH).
    - The new formula enhances sustainability of the pension system by preventing large real increases that would have accrued under the old formula once the economy recovers.
  - Strengthening integration of databases and social assistance targeting: efforts underway, in collaboration with the World Bank, to improve targeting and efficiency of social support (end-September 2024, SB), including developing a plan to upgrade the individual-level database to a household-level one.
- Additional needs:
  - Further efforts required to strengthen social assistance and burden sharing to protect the poor and lower-middle class and address gaps.
  - Active labor market policies may be required in the event of layoffs.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpts.*

### Box 2. Argentina’s Provincial Finances

### Box 2. Argentina’s Provincial Finances

### Background
- Tax responsibilities are fairly centralized, while subnational governments execute almost half of all public spending (including education, healthcare, security, and infrastructure).
- A complex system of intergovernmental transfers has arisen, involving:
  - automatic, non-earmarked transfers (e.g., coparticipación),
  - other automatic earmarked transfers,
  - discretionary transfers, including through a structure of fiduciary funds.
- These intergovernmental imbalances have tended to weaken overall fiscal discipline and efficiency:
  - The federal government has increasingly relied on distortive taxes (trade, financial transaction) that are not co-participated and on discretionary transfers to gain political patronage and support from governors.
  - Provinces have shown little incentives to improve the efficiency of their own revenue raising efforts, with spending generally following own revenues plus transfers, given borrowing constraints in many provinces.

### Recent Developments
- 2016–19:
  - With the signing of the 2017 fiscal pact, provinces agreed to reduce their fiscal spending/deficits (which had risen during 2005–15).
  - The pact replaced the discretionary scheme for approving external indebtedness by a rules-based system depending on the level of debt service to own revenues.
- 2020–23:
  - Application of the fiscal pact was suspended in 2020 during the economic emergency.
  - Over half of all provinces restructured their external obligations in coordination with the federal government.
  - Provinces ran surpluses during 2021–22 (supported by increased discretionary transfers).
  - The fiscal position deteriorated in 2023 in part reflecting the drought and election-related policies, including the decision to raise the nontaxable PIT floor, which reduced co-participated revenues sharply.

### Provincial Fiscal Balance, 2015–23 (Percent of GDP) — Key statistics
- Primary balance: 2015 = -0.60; 2019 = 0.20; 2023 (est.) = 0.1
- Own revenues: 2015 = 8.2; 2019 = 8.0; 2023 (est.) = 7.6
- Federal transfers: 2015 = 8.6; 2019 = 8.3; 2023 (est.) = 8.8
- Primary spending: 2015 = 17.4; 2019 = 16.2; 2023 (est.) = 16.2
- Overall balance: 2015 = -0.9; 2019 = -0.6; 2023 (est.) = 0.0

### Challenges Going Forward
- Need for provinces to adjust spending plans, with care to avoid excessive inequities in adjustment across provinces.
- Provincial revenue pressures:
  - Co-participated revenues: down 17 percent y/y in the first four months of 2024 due to the recession and the earlier decision to raise the nontaxable PIT floor.
  - Earmarked and discretionary provincial transfers (including those provided through trust funds): down 76 percent y/y.
  - Provincial own revenues are also being adversely affected by the recession.
  - Provincial spending is being adjusted commensurately (in the absence of market access).
- Heterogeneous adjustment risks:
  - Poorer provinces with limited revenue mobilization capacity (and thus most reliant on federal transfers) could end up adjusting more.
  - Richer provinces, including those reliant on mining royalties, may need to adjust less.
- Risks from inadequate adjustment: potential cuts in essential spending at the provincial level and the risk of disruptive financing (i.e., arrears or quasi currencies).

### Policy recommendations and reform priorities
- Improve the quality of adjustment by broadening co-participated taxes:
  - Reform the PIT and reduce tax expenditures to bolster co-participated revenues.
- Overhaul Federal-Provincial Relations over time:
  - Address horizontal inequities by better aligning revenue and expenditure responsibilities.
  - Create binding borrowing constraints for subnational governments.
  - Consider a comprehensive tax reform that includes both federal and subnational level taxation and reduces reliance on distortionary taxes (i.e., turnover tax).
  - Fiscal rules should ensure greater coordination across levels of government.
- Sustain reforms to avoid reliance on discretionary transfers and to provide stronger incentives for provinces to improve own revenue mobilization and spending efficiency.

*Source: Box 2. Argentina’s Provincial Finances — IMF staff.*

### Box 6. Taking Stock of FX Debt Backlog and Overhang

### Box 6. Taking Stock of FX Debt Backlog and Overhang

### FX backlog overview
- As of end April 2024, Argentina’s outstanding FX debt backlog reached roughly US$21 billion, of which US$17 billion reflected excess importers’ debt and an estimated US$4 billion of undistributed dividends, arising from restrictions to the distribution of dividends abroad.
- MSMEs, which recently gained expedited access to the official FX market, have repaid US$0.6 billion. Under the US$1.2 billion envelop for MSMEs, an additional 0.6 billion can be expected in the second half of the year.
- The amount of dividend backlog is estimated over 2020–23 as the difference between actual distributions and the imputed value at a reinvestment rate during periods without exchange restrictions (46 percent). A reinvestment ratio of 70 percent is assumed for 2024.

### BCRA treatments and reprofiling
- Through end-April, about US$17 billion has been reprofiled to smooth out FX obligations over time through various BOPREAL schemes for legacy imports (US$8.3 billion) and dividend distribution abroad (US$1.8 billion), as well as a decision to delay access to FX for new imports (accumulated since mid-December 2023) accounting for the rest (US$7.1 billion).
- BCRA FX obligations arising from reprofiled FX backlog, 2024–27 (in billions of U.S. dollars, as of end-April): Reprofiled FX Backlog Due total 17.2 comprised of Legacy imports 8.3 (including BOPREAL 1: 5.0; BOPREAL 2: 1.0; BOPREAL 3: 0.1) and Schedule for new imports 7.1; Dividends through BOPREAL 3.0 (0.6, 1.2 components noted).

### Balance of payments (BOP) implications and policy
- The BOPREAL schemes have substantially improved the maturity profile of the legacy FX backlog.
- Reaching reserve accumulation goals will require:
  - a prolonged commitment to tight macroeconomic policies, and
  - enhanced monetary and FX policies.
- Delayed FX access will likely be necessary for a period of time to manage the country’s import bills given payments on maturing importers’ debt accumulated since end-2023.

### Key statistics and figures (verbatim)
- Outstanding FX debt backlog: roughly US$21 billion (end April 2024).
  - Excess importers’ debt: US$17 billion.
  - Undistributed dividends: US$4 billion.
- Reprofiled FX backlog through end-April: about US$17 billion.
  - Legacy imports reprofiled: US$8.3 billion.
  - Dividend distribution abroad reprofiled via BOPREAL: US$1.8 billion.
  - Delayed access to FX for new imports (accumulated since mid-December 2023): US$7.1 billion.
- MSME repayments: US$0.6 billion repaid; envelope US$1.2 billion (additional 0.6 billion expected H2).
- Dividend backlog estimation: reinvestment rate used for periods without exchange restrictions = 46 percent; assumed reinvestment ratio for 2024 = 70 percent.

*Sources: BCRA; and Fund staff calculations.*

### Annex I. External Sector Assessment

### Annex I. External Sector Assessment

### Overall assessment and policy responses
- Overall assessment: The external position in 2023 was weaker than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies, based holistically on elevated external debt vulnerabilities, depleted international reserves and no access to international capital markets.
- Policy responses:
  - Continued implementation of the ambitious stabilization plan, centered on a strong fiscal anchor, relative price corrections and structural reforms, is necessary to strengthen the trade balance, support FDI and capital repatriation, rebuild international reserves, regain market access, and safeguard external sustainability.
  - As stability is reestablished, a gradual conditions-based easing of CFM measures will be needed, while remaining MCPs and exchange restrictions should be phased out as early as possible.

### Foreign asset and liability position and trajectory
- Background:
  - Argentina’s NIIP doubled in USD terms during 2016–19 reflecting a large increase in private sector foreign assets, which was partly offset (and likely triggered) by an increase in the public sector’s external liability (over US$60bn).
  - Since 2019, the external position has remained positive and relatively stable (at around US$110bn), although gross assets and liabilities moved substantially.
  - Public sector: significant declines in reserve assets (US$22bn) were balanced by a decline in privately held debt.
  - Private sector: increases in private deposits abroad (about US$60bn) offset by increases in private liabilities in the form of trade credit.
- Assessment:
  - Argentina has a large positive NIIP, mostly reflecting households’ holdings of external assets, while the government’s foreign position remains in deep negative territory (US$130 billion) with rising trade credit adding to vulnerabilities.
- Key statistics (2023, % GDP):
  - NIIP: 17.0
  - Gross Assets: 68.1
  - Res. Assets: 3.6
  - Gross Liab.: 51.2
  - Ext. Debt.: 44.5

### Current account
- Background:
  - The CA reached a deficit of 3.4 percent of GDP in 2023, compared to a deficit of 0.7 percent in 2022, on account of a sharp reduction in exports (due to the drought) and an insufficient compression in imports.
  - The CA balance is projected to reach a surplus of 0.6 percent in 2024, driven by a recovery in grain exports and a significant demand compression.
  - In the medium term, the CA is expected to reach a surplus of about 1.5 percent of GDP supported by a competitive exchange rate, and stronger energy balance.
- Assessment:
  - The cyclically adjusted CA balance reached a deficit of 3.6 percent of GDP in 2023, before accounting for the transitory impact from the drought (about 2.4 percent of GDP).
  - Considering Argentina’s weak reserve coverage and heightened external liabilities, external sustainability considerations suggest a CA norm of 1.5 percent of GDP, which would be consistent with bringing reserves near 100 percent of the ARA metric over the medium-term.
  - IMF staff assesses the CA gap to be –2.6 ±1 percent of GDP.
- Key statistics (2023, % GDP):
  - CA: –3.4
  - Cycl. Adj. CA: –3.6
  - EBA Norm: 0.4
  - EBA Gap: –3.9
  - Staff Adj: 1.3
  - Staff Gap: –2.6

### Real exchange rate (REER)
- Background:
  - The REER, after depreciating by more than 25 percent between end-2016 and end-2019, appreciated by over 30 percent through end-2022 and an additional 17 percent through end-November 2023.
  - In mid-December, a step devaluation (about 120 percent against the USD) was implemented to correct the large exchange rate misalignment.
  - Since then, the REER has appreciated by over 40 percent through end-March, bringing it broadly in line with IMF staff’s estimate of the equilibrium level.
- Assessment:
  - Staff-assessed CA gap implies a REER gap of about 22 percent in 2023 (with an estimated elasticity of 0.12 applied).
  - Overall, staff assesses the REER gap to have been in the range of 33   to 38   percent just before the December 2023 step devaluation, and in the range of 20 to 25 percent on average in 2023 (also consistent with the EBA REER index model).
  - EBA model notes: the EBA REER index model suggests a REER gap of 19.7 percent, while the EBA REER level model estimates a gap of 4.7 percent, with the estimate surrounded by significant uncertainty.

### Capital and financial accounts: flows and policy measures
- Background:
  - Exchange restrictions, CFM and MCP measures were introduced in late 2019 and were intensified further in 2023, including through (i) incentives to encourage export liquidation, (ii) taxes on FX access for imports, and (iii) financing requirements for imports, which led to an unprecedented rise in private commercial debt.
  - Since mid-December, the previous opaque system of administrative import controls has been replaced by a more transparent system, with a shorter delay in FX access (45 days on average), and a large share of excess commercial debt backlog has been reprofiled or resolved.
- Assessment:
  - While CFMs are not a substitute for sound macroeconomic policies, they may be needed in the near term as imbalances are being addressed.
  - More distortive exchange restrictions and MCP measures should be phased out as early as possible.

### FX intervention and reserves level
- Background:
  - Gross international reserves fell sharply (by over US$20bn) last year, reaching US$23 billion by end-2023, their lowest level since 2004.
  - Meanwhile, NIR reached $-8.5 billion.
  - Since December 10, the BCRA has purchased over US$15bn in FX assets through end-April.
- Assessment:
  - Reserve coverage remains inadequate.
  - Gross international reserves are estimated to have fallen to only around 30 percent of the IMF’s composite metric by end-2023.

*Source: IMF staff Annex I. External Sector Assessment*

### 6.       A long-term fan chart analysis points to debt

### 6.       A long-term fan chart analysis points to debt

### Debt sustainability and fan-chart findings
- The probability of debt stabilization in a fan chart ending in 2033 is close to 86 percent, consistent with debt sustainability, although with substantial risks.
- Over the medium to long term, Argentina will need to refinance maturing debt obligations from the 2020 debt restructuring as well as Fund repurchases, likely at less favorable financing terms (in the new context of higher global interest rates).
- Capacity to repay will depend on:
  - adhering to the fiscal anchor and the correction of other key macroeconomic imbalances,
  - an improvement in domestic debt market conditions,
  - adequate reserve levels,
  - and the re-access of international private credit markets.

### Medium- to long-term projections, buffers, and financing needs
- Debt (and debt service) held by the official and private sectors is projected to remain manageable in the medium- to long-term, but buffers remain very limited.
- Federal debt (excluding debt held by the BCRA and FGS) would fall slightly below the 40-percent-of-GDP threshold set in the March 2020 Technical Note.
- GFNs (for public debt not in the hands of other public entities) between 2025–2032 are projected to be within the 5 percent of GDP March Technical Note target.
- With buffers nearly exhausted:
  - large and sustained domestic financing will be required going forward,
  - efforts will be needed to improve the maturity structure,
  - and these efforts are necessary to ensure a gradual conditions-based easing of capital flow measures.

### SRDSF Key Macroeconomic Assumptions (Box 1)
- The SRDSF reflects the continuation of the Milei administration’s commitment to:
  - establish a strong fiscal anchor (of the fiscal account remaining balanced),
  - the elimination of monetary financing,
  - and the elimination of FX and relative price distortions.
- Macroeconomic assumptions:
  - Real GDP is projected to contract by 3.5 percent in 2024, mainly reflecting the effects of fiscal consolidation and demand compression.
  - Growth is expected to settle at 2.4 percent over the medium term, closing the output gap by 2029.
  - Potential growth is assumed to hover around 2.3 percent.
  - The nominal FX realignment in December 2023 resulted in a large depreciation of the REER (much larger than the estimated misalignment of around 30 percent).
  - Inflation (eop) is projected to decrease from about 211 percent in 2023 to around 140 percent in 2024.
  - Average inflation is expected to exceed 230 percent in 2024, decline to around 60 percent in 2025, and to reach single digits in 2029.
  - Fiscal consolidation is projected to continue as planned, with the primary balance turning from a deficit of 3 percent of GDP in 2023 to a surplus of 1.7 percent of GDP in 2024 (consistent with overall balance) and reaching a steady-state primary surplus of 2.5 percent of GDP from 2026 onwards.
  - Capital flow management measures (CFMs) are assumed to be gradually eased starting in Q2:2024 as conditions allow.
  - Gross international reserves are assumed to recover at a slighter faster pace in the medium-term and reach 2022 levels by 2026.

### SRDSF Key Financing Assumptions (Box 1)
- External official financing:
  - Annual official net financing remains unchanged relative to the seventh review, with average annual contributions of 0.3 percent of GDP from MDBs, through 2024 and beyond.
  - Projected repayments to the Paris Club reflect the October 2022 joint declaration, stretching out to 2028.
  - The central bank bilateral FX swap from the PBOC that was drawn in 2023 (US$4.9 billion) was not included in public debt as the value of the activated swap only temporarily crossed the de-minimis threshold of 1 percent of GDP and is projected to remain below that threshold going forward.
  - The activated swap is assumed to be substantially refinanced in 2024 (about 80 percent).
- External private sector financing:
  - Debt service on FX-denominated debt to foreign private creditors is assumed to follow the 2020 restructuring schedule, with modest new issuance in international markets from late 2025 onwards.
  - No foreign-financed debt buybacks or repo operations are assumed.
- BCRA financing of the fiscal deficit:
  - Direct transfers, after reaching 0.9 percent of GDP in 2023, are projected to be zero from 2024 onwards.
  - No further direct intervention in the secondary debt market is assumed.
- Domestic market financing:
  - The program baseline assumes overall fiscal balance in 2024, minimizing the need for mobilizing net domestic financing in 2024.
  - Reliance on inflation (CER)-linkers in the near term, with a gradual shift to fixed rate issuances.
  - Real interest rates are expected to rise gradually to 4½ percent by 2028.
  - Risks to this financing strategy remain especially large given policy uncertainty and implementation challenges.

### Argentina: Key DSA Financing Assumptions (selected figures)
- External Financing — Official (ex. IMF):
  - Disbursements (USD billions): 4.6 (2024), 4.2 (2025), 4.1 (2026), 4.1 (2027), 3.8 (2028), 3.8 (2029)
  - Net financing (USD billions): 1.1 (2024), 1.2 (2025), 1.0 (2026), 1.3 (2027), 0.8 (2028), 0.4 (2029)
  - Nominal interest rate (percent): 4.1 (2024), 3.8 (2025), 3.8 (2026), 3.8 (2027), 3.8 (2028), 3.8 (2029)
- International markets:
  - Issuance (USD billions): ... (2024), 1.5 (2025), 2.5 (2026), 3.5 (2027), 5.0 (2028), 6.0 (2029)
  - Spread (basis points): ... (2024), 450 (2025–2029)
  - Maturity (years): ... (2024), 7 (2025–2029)
  - Grace period (years): ... (2024), 4 (2025–2029)
- Peso Market Financing — Instruments (share):
  - Short-term (fixed rate): 25 (2024), 25 (2025), 25 (2026), 25 (2027), 10 (2028), 5 (2029)
  - CER-linked (2-year maturity): 65 (2024), 65 (2025), 65 (2026), 65 (2027), 65 (2028), 65 (2029)
  - Long-term (3/4-year maturity): 10 (2024), 10 (2025), 10 (2026), 10 (2027), 25 (2028), 30 (2029)
- Real Interest Rate (percent): -19.5 (2024), 2.1 (2025), 3.0 (2026), 3.8 (2027), 4.3 (2028), 4.5 (2029)

*Source: 1argea2024002 - 6.       A long-term fan chart analysis points to debt*

### 5. Debt consolidation across sectors:

### 5. Debt consolidation across sectors

### Coverage and consolidation approach
- Coverage in this SRDSA is gross federal (central government) debt held by the private, official and public sectors.
- The DSA excludes:
  - GDP warrants.
  - Debt of the provinces or municipalities.
  - Debt of the central bank.
- Staff does not judge the exclusion of provincial debt as a significant contingent liability risk, given the federal government's non-bailout approach to the recent provincial debt restructuring.
- Central bank bilateral FX swaps were not included in public debt for DSA purposes.
- Comments on consolidation and reporting:
  - Not applicable: consolidated reporting of certain intra-government holdings.
  - Excludes FGS/ANSES liabilities.
  - Excludes state govt liabilities.
  - Excludes local govt liabilities.
  - Basis of recording distinctions noted: Non-cash basis 4/; Cash basis; Nominal value 5/; Face value 6/; Market value 7/.

### Public debt structure and key indicators
- Perimeter shown is central government.
- Commentary: Foreign-currency denominated debt will continue to dominate over the long term. With inflation remaining high, the financing strategy assumes reliance on inflation (CER)-linkers, with an increase in maturity and shift towards fixed rate instruments envisaged only in the medium term.
- The large share of FX debt is held by IFIs, and the large share of overall debt held by the intra-public sectors (including non-marketable instruments) mitigates rollover risks.
- Residual maturity: 6. years (as reported).
- Projections include term buckets: ≤ 1 year, 1-5 years, > 5 years.

### Realism of baseline assumptions and forecast track record
- Staff assessment: baseline optimism in debt reduction and exchange rate paths; risks to the baseline remain exceptionally high.
- Forecast-track metrics and comparative percentiles (color code references preserved but not re-listed).
- Bond issuance analysis consistent with resumption of international market access from 2025 onwards, with modest initial issuances.
- Projected medium-term growth: optimistic relative to the 10-year average but linked to removal of distortions and reforms.

### Baseline scenario (Table 5) — selected figures (Percent of GDP, Unless Indicated Otherwise)
- Public debt:
  - Actual 2023: 156.79
  - 2024: 91.07
  - 2025: 78.36
  - 2026: 69.16
  - 2027: 60.45
  - 2028: 54.34
  - 2029: 48.64
  - 2030: 42.43
  - 2031: 36.83
  - 2032: 30.20
  - 2033: 26.6
- Change in public debt:
  - 2023: 72.1
  - 2024: -65.7
  - 2025: -12.7
  - 2026: -9.2
  - 2027: -8.7
  - 2028: -6.1
  - 2029: -5.7
  - 2030: -6.2
  - 2031: -5.7
  - 2032: -4.8
  - 2033: -5.4
- Contribution of identified flows:
  - 2023: -13.9
  - 2024: -29.9
  - 2025: -19.3
  - 2026: -10.3
  - 2027: -7.0
  - 2028: -4.8
  - 2029: -3.9
  - 2030: -3.8
  - 2031: -3.4
  - 2032: -2.6
  - 2033: -2.3
- Primary deficit (percent of GDP):
  - 2023: 2.9
  - 2024: -1.7
  - 2025: -2.3
  - 2026–2033: -2.5 (each year 2026 through 2033)
- Noninterest revenues:
  - 2023: 24.5
  - 2024: 23.9
  - 2025: 26.0
  - 2026: 26.5
  - 2027–2033: 26.3 (each year)
- Noninterest expenditures:
  - 2023: 27.4
  - 2024: 22.2
  - 2025: 23.7
  - 2026: 23.9
  - 2027–2033: 23.8 (each year 2027–2033 except 2026 listed above)
- Automatic debt dynamics:
  - 2023: -15.9
  - 2024: -28.4
  - 2025: -17.0
  - 2026: -7.8
  - 2027: -4.5
  - 2028: -2.3
  - 2029: -1.4
  - 2030: -1.3
  - 2031: -0.9
  - 2032: -0.1
  - 2033: 0.1
- Int. rate-growth differential:
  - 2023: -47.3
  - 2024: -107.3
  - 2025: -35.4
  - 2026: -19.1
  - 2027: -10.5
  - 2028: -5.4
  - 2029: -3.8
  - 2030: -4.3
  - 2031: -3.6
  - 2032: -2.8
  - 2033: -2.3
- Real interest rate:
  - 2023: -48.6
  - 2024: -113.0
  - 2025: -31.1
  - 2026: -15.6
  - 2027: -7.9
  - 2028: -3.4
  - 2029: -2.5
  - 2030: -3.2
  - 2031: -2.6
  - 2032: -2.0
  - 2033: -1.5
- Real growth rate:
  - 2023: 1.3
  - 2024: 5.7
  - 2025: -4.3
  - 2026: -3.5
  - 2027: -2.6
  - 2028: -1.9
  - 2029: -1.3
  - 2030: -1.1
  - 2031: -1.0
  - 2032: -0.8
  - 2033: -0.7
- Relative inflation (selected years):
  - 2023: 31.6
  - 2024: 78.9
  - 2025: 18.
  - 2026: 11.3
  - 2027: 5.9
  - 2028: 3.1
  - 2029: 2.4
  - 2030: 3.0
  - 2031: 2.6
  - 2032: 2.7
  - 2033: 2.4
- Gross financing needs:
  - 2023: 9.1
  - 2024: 3.0
  - 2025: 14.
  - 2026: 76.7
  - 2027: 11.6
  - 2028: 8.2
  - 2029: 9.5
  - 2030: 5.7
  - 2031: 8.0
  - 2032: 5.7
  - 2033: 5.6
- Of which: debt service:
  - 2023: 6.2
  - 2024: 4.7
  - 2025: 17.0
  - 2026: 9.2
  - 2027: 14.1
  - 2028: 10.7
  - 2029: 12.0
  - 2030: 8.2
  - 2031: 10.5
  - 2032: 8.2
  - 2033: 8.1
- Local currency financing needs:
  - 2023: 4.0
  - 2024: 1.4
  - 2025: 11.9
  - 2026: 5.8
  - 2027: 9.9
  - 2028: 5.8
  - 2029: 6.5
  - 2030: 3.4
  - 2031: 3.6
  - 2032: 1.9
  - 2033: 1.7
- Foreign currency financing needs:
  - 2023: 2.2
  - 2024: 3.3
  - 2025: 5.1
  - 2026: 3.4
  - 2027: 4.1
  - 2028: 4.8
  - 2029: 5.5
  - 2030: 4.8
  - 2031: 6.9
  - 2032: 6.3
  - 2033: 6.4
- Memo indicators:
  - Real GDP growth (percent):
    - 2023: -1.6
    - 2024: -3.5
    - 2025: 5.0
    - 2026: 4.7
    - 2027: 3.9
    - 2028: 3.3
    - 2029: 2.4
    - 2030–2033: 2.3 (each year)
  - Inflation (GDP deflator; percent):
    - 2023: 134.3
    - 2024: 236.9
    - 2025: 61.2
    - 2026: 31.8
    - 2027: 17.5
    - 2028: 10.4
    - 2029: 8.9
    - 2030: 11.4
    - 2031: 10.9
    - 2032: 10.4
    - 2033: 9.9
  - Nominal GDP growth (percent):
    - 2023: 130.2
    - 2024: 225.8
    - 2025: 69.5
    - 2026: 37.8
    - 2027: 22.1
    - 2028: 14.0
    - 2029: 11.5
    - 2030: 14.0
    - 2031: 13.4
    - 2032: 12.9
    - 2033: 12.4
  - Effective interest rate (percent):
    - 2023: 1.9
    - 2024: 2.5
    - 2025: 3.4
    - 2026: 4.4
    - 2027: 3.5
    - 2028: 3.9
    - 2029: 3.7
    - 2030: 3.9
    - 2031: 4.2
    - 2032: 4.4
    - 2033: 4.5

- Staff commentary:
  - Public debt projected to decline over the long term, reflecting baseline assumptions of strong adherence to the fiscal anchor.
  - Lower FX misalignments expected to foster more stable macroeconomic conditions.
  - Deepening domestic capital markets and boosting exports and productivity are essential to mobilize domestic saving, strengthen reserves, and improve international market access.
  - Large residuals in 2023 and 2024 explained by stock-flow adjustments due to differences between end-of-period and period average exchange rates amid sharp 2023 exchange rate adjustments.
  - Key drivers of effective interest rate reduction: recent debt exchange operation and successful auctions placing debt at longer maturities and lower yields.

### Medium-term risk analysis (Table 6) — selected indicators
- Fanchart width: 122.7 1.8
- Probability of debt not stabilizing (pct): 5.0 60.0
- Terminal debt level x institutions index: 52.3 1.1
- Debt fanchart index: ...2.96
- Average GFN in baseline: 8.9 3.0
- Bank claims on government (pct bank assets): 15.0 4.9
- Chg. in claims on govt. in stress (pct bank assets): 22.7 7.6
- GFN financeability index: ...15.5
- Prob. of missed crisis, 2024-2029 (if stress not predicted): 54.5 pct.
- Prob. of false alarm, 2024-2029 (if stress predicted): 3.4 pct.
- Staff commentary:
  - Medium-term risk assessment of high risk is driven by widening of the fanchart from the temporary spike in the debt-to-GDP ratio due to valuation effects amid strong exchange rate devaluation.
  - Staff assesses medium-term risks at moderate as debt-to-GDP ratios are expected to decline rapidly as REER overshooting unwinds and stabilizes.
  - Strong adherence to the fiscal anchor (i.e., maintaining fiscal balance) helps contain financing risks.

### Decomposition of public debt and debt service by creditor (Table 7) — selected extracts (2024–2025)
- Total debt stock (In US$ bn):
  - Total (end-period): 399.0 (100.0 percent); Percent of GDP: 83.0
- External:
  - External: 137.1 (34.4 percent total debt); Percent of GDP: 28.5; Debt service percent GDP: 10.6
- Multilateral creditors (2024 totals included in External):
  - Total multilaterals: 74.8 (18.8 percent total debt); Percent of GDP: 15.6; Debt service percent GDP: 7.7
  - IMF: 43.0 (10.8 percent total debt); Percent of GDP: 8.9; Debt service percent GDP: 4.7
  - World Bank: 9.8 (2.5 percent total debt); Percent of GDP: 2.0; Debt service percent GDP: 0.7
  - CAF: 4.3 (1.1 percent total debt); Percent of GDP: 0.9; Debt service percent GDP: 0.6
  - IADB: 16.3 (4.1 percent total debt); Percent of GDP: 3.4; Debt service percent GDP: 1.4
- Bilateral creditors:
  - Bilateral creditors: 4.2 (1.1 percent total debt); Percent of GDP: 0.9; Debt service percent GDP: 1.1
  - Paris Club: 1.5 (0.4 percent)
  - Non-Paris Club: 2.7 (0.7 percent)
  - o/w: China: 2.6 (0.6 percent)
- Bonds and marketable external:
  - Bonds: 57.6 (14.4 percent total debt); Percent of GDP: 12.0; Debt service percent GDP: 1.8
- Domestic:
  - Domestic: 262.0 (65.6 percent total debt); Percent of GDP: 54.5; Debt service percent GDP: 32.1
  - T-Bills: 77.6 (19.5 percent total debt); Percent of GDP: 16.1; Debt service percent GDP: 9.4
  - Bonds: 176.5 (44.2 percent total debt); Percent of GDP: 36.7; Debt service percent GDP: 18.1
  - Loans: 7.8 (2.0 percent total debt); Percent of GDP: 0.0; Debt service percent GDP: 4.6
- Notes:
  - Debt stock and debt service figures use end-of-period exchange rate in December where applicable.
  - Debt coverage as reported by country authorities according to their classification of creditors; holdouts are included in the DSA but not in this table.

### Update on the foreign exchange regime (Annex III) — exchange restrictions and MCPs
- At the time the extended arrangement was approved, staff identified several exchange restrictions and multiple currency practices (MCPs), including:
  - General restrictions on access to the FX market.
  - Restrictions on payments for imports, invisible transactions (transfers of dividends, profits, wages, remittances etc.), payments of interests and amortization of loans.
  - MCPs arising from exchange taxes, withholding taxes and the parallel market.
- Since December 2023, authorities have started to liberalize the FX regime. Measures introduced prior to the seventh review and subsequent easing include:
  - (i) Access delays further reduced to 30 days for a basket of basic goods.
  - (ii) Further reducing access delays to official FX for MSME imports to 30 days, excluding cars and a few other selected goods. MSMEs can access FX in advance for up to 20 percent of capital good purchases.
  - (iii) Easing restrictions on BOPREAL transactions to make the new instruments more attractive.
  - (iv) Streamlining the withholding taxes resulting in one withholding tax of 30%.
  - (v) Repealing the preferential exchange rate for non-resident tourists which was assessed as giving rise to an MCP.
- BOPREAL instruments:
  - Issued by the central bank to help unwind the large stock of importers’ debt overhang and dividend payments to non-residents.
  - For commercial debt accumulated before December 13, 2023, eligible importers with properly registered/verified debt can purchase these securities, payable in USD with maturities of up to 4 years at varying interest rates.
  - Importers with immediate need to service FX debt can use BOPREAL for collateralized borrowing, sell them in the secondary market (where trading at a discount), or use them as a payment promise. Subscription is done in pesos.
  - BOPREAL can be used for the payment of tax obligations at a specified exchange rate.
  - Since May 2024 authorities allowed subscription of BOPREAL instruments to be used to settle dividend payments to non-resident investors.

*Source: IMF staff report section “5. Debt consolidation across sectors.”*

### 4. The government has also adjusted the level and scope of the Impuesto Pais tax. In

### 1argea2024002 - 4. The government has also adjusted the level and scope of the Impuesto Pais tax. In

### Impuesto País adjustments and scope
- December 2023: impuesto pais increased from 7.5 to 17.5 percent for transportation services and a wide set of imported goods, with exemptions for essential goods.
- December 2023: impuesto pais extended to apply to import payments made with subscriptions of the BOPREAL instruments.
- May 2024: the 17.5 percent impuesto pais tax was further extended to:
  - the subscription of BOPREAL; and
  - purchase of foreign currency for the payment of dividends and profits to non-resident investors.
- Policy implication: application of impuesto pais to dividend and profit payments gives rise to a modification of an MCP with respect to the purchase of FX for dividend and profit payments and an exchange restriction.

### Exchange restrictions (summary of measures subject to Fund jurisdiction)
- Broad characterization: Argentina maintains a large number of exchange restrictions, largely the same as at approval of the arrangement and subsequently supplemented and adjusted under the EFF-supported program.
- a. General Restriction:
  - Limitations on access to the official foreign exchange market (MULC) for making any payments or transfers for current international transactions unless the requester has not in the previous and subsequent 90 days undertaken certain transactions in the securities market (CCL).
  - The non-CCL transaction affidavit period extended to 180 days for CCL transactions with securities under foreign law.
- b. Restrictions on Payments for Imports:
  - (i) delayed access to and limitations on the amounts of FX that can be accessed for import payments;
  - (ii) limitations on advance payments for imports;
  - (iii) limitations on payments for imports of luxury goods;
  - (iv) a preauthorization requirement for payments of services to related parties;
  - (v) a prohibition on accessing FX market for making payments for imports of soybeans until the export proceeds for the soybean product have been received.
  - Operational detail: Currently, for most goods, importers access FX in four installments of 25 percent each at 30, 60, 90 and 120 days after the purchase. Exceptions include fuel and energy (no delay), pharmaceutical goods and fertilizers (30 days), cars and selected other goods (180 days). Also, MSMEs have a reduced delay of 30 days.
- c. Invisible Transactions:
  - (i) limitations on accessing the FX market to make transfers of foreign currency abroad as profits and dividends to non-resident shareholders;
  - (ii) limitations on access to FX by resident individuals for invisible transactions (e.g., wages, salaries, family remittances, medical expenses, educational expenses) and other current account transfers and for non-residents for transferring abroad proceeds from current international transactions.
- d. Restrictions on payments of interest and amortization on external loans:
  - (i) limitations requiring all external debt proceeds have been surrendered into the local exchange market prior to accessing foreign exchange to service external debt;
  - (ii) mandatory refinancing requirements;
  - (iii) limitations on advance payments of debt;
  - (iv) prior BCRA consent for payments of principal (including amortization) to related parties;
  - (v) BCRA authorization requirement for FX market access for payments of interests to non-resident related counterparty.
  - April 2024 note: central bank resolution A7994 introduced an exemption for exporters to access the official foreign exchange market to settle external debt (both capital and interest) if certain criteria are met, including that the settlement is made with newly borrowed funds from a domestic financial institution via foreign credit line.
- e. Exchange Taxes (rates and coverage):
  - (i) a 30 percent tax on the purchase of foreign exchange by individuals and on payments for consumption abroad, including (a) travel allowance and savings, (b) personal, cultural, and recreational services, and (c) the importation of a list of luxury goods.
  - (ii) an 8 percent tax on the purchase of foreign exchange and payment for certain professional services (including digital services).
  - (iii) a 17.5 percent tax on the purchase of foreign exchange and payment, including through subscription of BOPREAL, for transportation services, imported goods (with exemptions for essential goods) and dividends and profits to non-resident investors.
  - (iv) a 25 percent tax on the purchase of foreign exchange and payment, including through subscription of BOPREAL, for other services.
- f. Pension Restrictions:
  - Restriction of individuals who participate in the pension buyback scheme from accessing the FX market for a period of twelve months.
  - Restrictions of individuals who have debt with the National Security Administration (ANSES) from accessing the FX market.
  - Restrictions on beneficiaries of and contributors to the Argentine Integrated Pension System (SIPA) who receive financing provided under the ANSES credit scheme from accessing the FX market for as long as the loan remains unpaid.

### Executive Board decision and timing
- The Executive Board granted approval to retain the above measures on a temporary basis.
- Board approval: Argentina may maintain these exchange restrictions for a period of 12 months beginning January 31, 2024, or the date of the completion of the next Article IV consultation with Argentina.

### MCPs under the new MCP policy (assessment and determinations)
- Policy context:
  - New MCP policy effective February 1, 2024: all old MCPs were deemed removed and previous Board approvals lapsed; staff conducted a new assessment under the new policy.
  - Under the new policy, an MCP arises where an official action results in an actual exchange rate spread that differs unreasonably from the normal commercial costs and risks of exchange transactions (exchange rate spreads which are not considered “commercially reasonable”), i.e., exceed the permissible margins specified in the MCP policy.
- Staff determinations of MCPs (official actions creating impermissible spreads):
  - a. a 30 percent exchange tax plus a 30 percent withholding exchange tax on the purchase of foreign exchange by individuals for (i) travel allowance (and savings); and (ii) the importation of a list of luxury goods;
  - b. an 8 percent exchange tax plus a 30 percent withholding exchange tax on the purchase of foreign exchange for the payment of certain professional services (including digital services);
  - c. a 30 percent exchange tax on the purchase of foreign exchange by individuals on payments for consumption abroad, including personal, cultural, and recreational services;
  - d. a 25 percent exchange tax on the purchase of foreign exchange for other services; and
  - e. a 17.5 percent exchange tax on the purchase of foreign exchange for (i) other goods (excluding a list of essential goods) and transport and (ii) payment of dividends and profits to non-resident investors.
- Clarification on parallel market spread:
  - The previous finding of an MCP arising from the spread relative to the parallel (blue) market does not meet the requirement of the current policy because parallel (blue) market transactions are illegal; staff determined that the spread relative to that market does not give rise to an MCP under the new policy.

### Economic effects, trade-offs, and distortions
- Distortions and effects noted by staff:
  - All taxes on purchases of foreign currency make imported goods more expensive and hence compress imports.
  - In the presence of a crawling peg that prevents adjustments of the exchange rate to these taxes, these taxes reduce balance of payment needs.
  - Proceeds of these taxes yield fiscal revenues that contribute to the fiscal surplus and in turn to the reduction in sovereign risk, further easing BOP pressures.
  - Costs: by discouraging trade with arbitrary cost differences, these taxes impede the operation of firms and reduce foreign competition; they distort allocation, penalizing both imported goods and firms that do not hold enough FX deposits.
  - The divergence of rates across goods adds to the misallocation of resources, while modestly reducing effective inequality.
  - Note: The preferential exchange rate for non-resident tourists via domestic bank accounts, which has now been eliminated, seemed to be of limited use and thus limited impact.

### Letter of Intent and program commitments (key program results and requests)
- Administrative summary (May 31, 2024):
  - Government claims delivered outcomes:
    - the first four-month sustained fiscal surplus in nearly two decades;
    - a complete halt to net central bank financing of the government;
    - faster-than-expected disinflation;
    - a rapid turnaround in international reserves;
    - a notable strengthening of the central bank’s balance sheet.
  - Social measures: scaled up support to vulnerable young mothers and children and measures to protect the purchasing power of pensions.
  - Performance: met all end-March quantitative performance criteria.
- Requests to the IMF:
  - Completion of the Eighth Review under the arrangement with disbursement of SDR 600 million, to be maintained in Argentina’s SDR Holding Account at the IMF to meet Fund obligations as they fall due.
  - Executive Board approval sought for:
    - Modifications of program targets for the primary fiscal balance and reserves to reflect program overperformance and macro framework updates.
    - Multiple currency practices and an exchange restriction under Article VIII, on grounds that these measures, including the recent application of FX access tax (impuesto pais) to the newly allowed payment of dividends and profits to nonresident investors, have been imposed for balance of payments reasons, are temporary, non-discriminatory, and do not give Argentina unfair competitive advantage over other members.
    - Waivers of nonobservance requested due to recent measures causing non-observance of continuous PCs against imposition/intensification of exchange restrictions and introduction/modification of MCPs.
  - Completion of the financing assurances review: program remains fully financed with financing secured from multilateral and regional development banks (CAF, FONPLATA, IADB, World Bank).
  - BCRA intends to maintain swap lines with the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and firm commitments are in place, including to substantially refinance the drawn portion of the swap.

### Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) update — key program context and recent performance
- Context and objectives:
  - Continue to strengthen macroeconomic and structural policies to sustain stabilization and enable recovery.
  - Commitments include: strengthening fiscal anchor (no net central bank financing), refining monetary and FX policy framework (transition towards a “competition of currency” regime and easing FX restrictions), and reinvigorating structural reform agenda (labor market, investment framework, reduce state participation).
- Recent developments and program performance:
  - Economic activity: Real GDP fell by about 2 percent q/q (sa) in Q4:2023; economy contracted by 1.6 percent last year.
  - Q1:2024: further contraction in activity and demand (3 percent q/q, sa), although employment generally held up.
  - Other outcomes noted: significant buildup in international reserves; faster-than-anticipated reduction in inflation and inflation expectations; strengthening of central bank balance sheet; realignment in many relative prices and improvements in resource allocation; improvement in market indicators.
  - Social protection: targeted support to young mothers and children more than doubled; new pension formula adopted by presidential decree to protect purchasing power of pensions.
  - Policy stance: maintain overall fiscal balance with no central bank financing; improve progressivity and efficiency of tax system; streamline subsidies; strengthen expenditure controls; better target social assistance; prudently ease FX restrictions consistent with reserve accumulation goal; pursue micro-economic reforms to boost private investment, formal employment, and productivity.

*Source: IMF country report content provided in the supplied PDF excerpt.*

### 4.      Our bold stabilization efforts are allowing a rapid disinflation process. Monthly inflation

### 4.      Our bold stabilization efforts are allowing a rapid disinflation process. Monthly inflation

### Disinflation, monetary stance, and central bank balance sheet
- Monthly inflation reached single digits in April (8.8 percent), with core inflation trending even lower and high frequency indicators pointing to a continuation in the disinflation trend, exceeding market expectations.
- The central bank’s balance sheet is being strengthened, supported by a decline in policy interest rates.
- Base money has been kept generally unchanged in nominal terms as:
  - reserve purchases and interest payments on BCRA securities have been sterilized through a reduction in net credit to the government and BCRA-issued FX swaps (worth around US$8 billion) to address the importer debt overhang and delays in dividend payments (BOPREAL).
- Real base money and broad money measures are now near historic lows.
- Net credit to the government has been maintained below zero; there continues to be no monetary transfers.

### External position, trade, and reserves
- The FX realignment has allowed external surpluses and a rapid accumulation of reserves, well above program targets.
- Cumulative cash goods trade surplus during December-April reached around US$15.5 billion, driven by:
  - compression in import volumes: 18 percent y/y during January-April 2024;
  - rebound in export volumes: 19 percent y/y;
  - higher import financing enabled by a narrowing of the FX gap and a new rules-based scheme for accessing imports.
- Net international reserves (NIR) increased by over US$11 billion since the FX correction in December—US$2.7 billion above the end-March quarterly performance criteria (QPC).
- This NIR overperformance allowed elimination of restrictions to FX access to micro, small-and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) earlier than originally planned (¶20).
- NIR is still projected to increase by US$7 billion this year.

### Fiscal performance, subsidies, and social measures
- The cumulative primary cash surplus through end-April reached ARS 4,133 billion (0.7 percent of GDP), overperforming the end-March program QPC by almost ARS 3,000 billion.
- Fiscal overperformance driven by strong expenditure restraint and improved targeting of energy, transport, and water subsidies and ensuring tariffs better reflect cost recovery levels.
- Social assistance scaled up and protections introduced or expanded:
  - flagship universal child allowance program (AUH);
  - food program (Alimentar);
  - new early childhood support program (primeros 1000 dias);
  - expansion of the school aid allowance program to support working families covering private-school tuition.
- Presidential decree protecting the real value of pensions through a new indexation formula linked to past inflation, effective April, partially compensating earlier real losses.
- Social spending is already above the indicative target, following minor shortfalls through end-March.
- Revenue and tax measures:
  - Revised fiscal package presented to Congress and recently approved by the lower house.
  - Tax measures expected to boost revenues by about 1 percent of GDP this year, including a personal income tax (PIT) reform, a tax amnesty, rationalization of personal asset taxes, and improved coverage of tobacco excises.
- Specific subsidy and pricing actions:
  - Electricity and gas tariffs raised—up an average of 350 percent and 200 percent, respectively; plan to achieve full cost recovery for most electricity and gas users during S2:2024.
  - Commitment to reduce energy and transport subsidies this year by at least 0.7 percent of GDP.
  - Train fares were increased by an additional 53 percent in May.
  - Water tariffs expected to increase further in June, in line with the new indexation formula.
- Public finance management reforms and controls:
  - Decree to remove the CVS formula (Decree 332/2022) (prior action).
  - Plan to consolidate central government entities into the treasury single account (TSA) at the central bank (end-September 2024, SB).
  - Ley Bases reform bill presented to Congress and recently approved by the lower house to modernize and deregulate Argentina and strengthen public finance management.

### Debt, financing, and arrears
- Prudent and active public debt management has allowed net placements and reduced rollover risks, including:
  - voluntary debt exchange that extended 40 percent of all outstanding peso debt this year (6.5 percent of GDP) into inflation-index securities falling due 2025-28 (end-March 2024, SB).
- Treasury actions to support net-zero monetary financing target:
  - introduction of a new short-term fixed rate instruments program to shift liquidity from BCRA’s overnight facilities to Treasury bills, buy back treasuries in the BCRA balance sheet, and strengthen Treasury cash buffers.
- Clearance of large inherited arrears (including with CAMMESA) and maintenance of domestic arrears well below the program ceiling.
- Efforts underway to secure financing assurances from key official creditors (IADB, WB) and maintain swap lines with the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), including substantial refinancing of the drawn portion of the swap.
- Private sector companies have started to tap international credit markets after a long absence.

### Outlook and key projections
- Real GDP growth:
  - Economy expected to start expanding during S2:2024 as headwinds fade.
  - Economy expected to contract by 3½ percent in 2024, primarily reflecting negative carryover from Q4:2023.
  - Economy expected to grow by 5 percent in 2025.
- Inflation:
  - Monthly headline inflation is expected to converge to around 4 percent by end-2024 (140 percent y/y), declining further over the medium term.
  - Sustained reduction underpinned by fiscal anchor, end of debt monetization, and strengthened monetary and FX policy framework toward a “currency competition” regime.
- External:
  - Current account balance expected to shift from a deficit of 3.4 percent of GDP to a surplus of 0.6 percent of GDP this year.
  - External surpluses projected over the medium term; reserve coverage will improve further consistent with re-access to international capital markets by late-2025 and a step increase in foreign direct investment.

### Risks and contingency policies
- Risks remain, including tighter global financial conditions, stronger USD, lower commodity prices, weaker growth in trading partners, and potential delays in congressional approval of fiscal and reform legislation.
- Contingent policy steps if risks materialize:
  - Fiscal policy measures to: (i) strengthen and expand excises, particularly on fuels; (ii) accelerate reduction in subsidy spending in both energy and transportation (¶14); (iii) further streamline transfers to provinces and SOEs; and (iv) further enhance tax administration and expenditure controls.
  - Monetary and FX policy readiness to adjust policies to achieve disinflation and reserve accumulation goals, including bringing ex-ante real policy interest rate into positive territory sooner if inflation and inflation expectations prove more challenging.
  - Continued clear policy communication to achieve intended results.

### Program policies — fiscal, financing, monetary/FX (selected commitments and timelines)
- Fiscal:
  - Achieve overall fiscal balance this year, consistent with a primary surplus of about 1.7 percent of GDP.
  - Submit Draft 2025 budget consistent with overall balance and comprehensive fiscal risk statement (September 15, 2024, SB).
  - Proposal to enhance tax system efficiency, equity, and simplicity (end-October 2024, SB); plan to unwind impuesto pais by end-2024 or earlier if conditions permit.
- Spending and subsidies:
  - Transition to new subsidy/tariff segmentation supporting only basic consumption for vulnerable households (published reforms to transition—end-May 2024, SB).
  - Target to reduce energy and transport subsidies by at least 0.7 percent of GDP in the year.
- Financing:
  - Continue to tap domestic debt market to refinance maturing debt through primary market auctions and shift toward fixed-rate securities as inflation declines.
  - Continue efforts to deepen investor base, extend the treasury yield curve, and scale back put options (only exercisable during the final month before maturity).
- Monetary and FX:
  - Evolve monetary and FX policy framework to support disinflation while strengthening reserve buffers and easing FX controls as conditions permit.
  - Develop key underpinnings for an eventual “currency competition” regime in which price stability remains a prime objective and individuals have freedom to transact in currencies of their choosing.

*Source: IMF staff report (1argea2024002).*

### 19.      During the transition, monetary policy will continue to be instrumental in anchoring

### During the transition, monetary policy will continue to be instrumental in anchoring inflation and inflation expectations.

### Monetary policy: stance and operations
- Negative policy rates have been instrumental in addressing unsustainably large quasi-fiscal deficits and supporting disinflation in the context of FX controls and strong fiscal anchor.
- The overnight policy interest rate will evolve to continue to guide inflation and inflation expectations.
- Real (ex-ante) policy rate is reported as "significantly less negatively than earlier in the year" and is expected to move into positive territory later in the year to support peso demand as FX controls are eased and private credit recovers.
- Necessary steps will continue to be taken in conjunction with the Treasury to limit the quasi-fiscal cost.
- A plan is being developed to extend monetary operations to include Treasuries, which, alongside treasury auctions, would help establish the short end of the yield curve.
- The BCRA will refrain from any profit transfers to the Treasury (¶15).
- Accounting standards will continue to be refined in line with international standards to reflect the fair value of the BCRA balance sheet.

### Foreign exchange (FX) policy: evolution and unwind of controls
- FX policy will evolve over time, moving with more flexibility in line with fundamentals to sustain the reserve buildup and disinflation process.
- Further unwinding of FX restrictions is planned to eliminate costly distortions while supporting Argentina’s external balance.
- Specific steps in process:
  - (i) extending the BOPREAL scheme to address the backlog on dividend payments abroad of corporates to encourage new FDI;
  - (ii) removing a multiple currency practice in the form of the preferential exchange rate on bank accounts for tourism inflows (eliminate Comunicacion “A” 7551);
  - (iii) eliminating FX restrictions for MSMEs.
- Commitment to eliminate the preferential export scheme where 20 percent of export proceeds can be channeled through the securities (CCL) FX market (end-June 2024, SB).
- As imbalances are addressed and policy frameworks are strengthened, a further easing of FX controls and CFMs will be considered, based on a framework being developed (end-July  2024, SB).

### Banking system regulation and monetary transmission
- Initial regulatory reforms implemented:
  - Eliminating mandatory minimum interest rates on deposits and most limits on bank lending rates.
  - Limiting access to repurchase agreements (repos) solely to entities regulated by the BCRA.
  - Downsizing credit incentive schemes, eliminating compulsory MSME lending, and narrowing the range of credit products eligible for differentiated minimum reserve requirement benefits.
- Banks are now mandated to provide capital forecasts to guide the approval of dividend payouts.
- A regulatory review process is underway to ensure a level playing field between Fintech companies and traditional banking institutions.
- Expected effects: increase market competition, enhance the credit channel of monetary transmission, and support the recovery of private credit from historic low levels.

### Structural policies and market openness (Ley Bases and executive actions)
- Ley Bases (proposed landmark reform legislation), expected to be approved by Congress shortly, aims to:
  - (i) support private formal employment by easing regulations related to hiring and job transition;
  - (ii) provide greater predictability and incentives for new large long-term direct investments;
  - (iii) strengthen the regulatory framework for the hydrocarbon sector;
  - (iv) streamline regulatory costs and barriers to entry in key sectors (aerospace, healthcare, housing, pharmaceutical, wholesale trade) while creating effective mechanisms and institutions to safeguard competition;
  - (v) rationalize and improve the efficiency and governance of SOEs, while clarifying the privatization process.
- Upon approval, focus will shift to preparing the needed implementing regulations.
- Executive actions to continue: improve efficiency and align investment incentives for key sectors (e.g., energy, communication healthcare) and unwind cross subsidies to improve resource allocation.

### Governance and AML/CFT
- Improving governance and addressing corruption are central reform objectives.
- Commitments:
  - Further strengthen the AML/CFT framework in line with international standards by approving pending reforms to Law 25.246.
  - Implement by mid-2025 the necessary mitigating measures to address shortcomings identified in the 2022 National Risk Assessment.
- Consideration will be given to conducting a comprehensive governance assessment, with Fund technical support, to identify priorities underpinning the medium-term strategy.

### Quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets (selected figures and status snapshots)
- Tables report a range of fiscal and monetary targets and realizations. Selected entries (values preserved exactly as presented):
  - Fiscal Performance Criterion 1 (Cumulative floor on the federal government primary balance): examples include -222.3, -210.9, -192.7 (Status: Met); -874.4, -848.6, -800.7 (Met); -1156.8, -1136.0, -1096.1 (Met); -2015.7, -2017.2, -1955.1 (Met).
  - Performance Criterion 2 (Ceiling on the federal government stock of domestic arrears): 535.9...336.2 (Met); 612.2...489.4 (Met); 654.0...589.7 (Met); 654.0...615.5 (Met).
  - Monetary Performance Criterion 5 (Cumulative floor on the change in net international reserves of BCRA, in billions of U.S. dollars): 1.2001.2451.568 (Met); 3.4502.9502.703 (Not met); 4.1003.6004.591 (Met); 5.005.045.43 (Met).
  - Monetary Performance Criterion 6 (Cumulative ceiling on central bank financing of the federal government): 236.8...122.0 (Met); 475.8...435.1 (Met); 665.4...620.1 (Met); 654.0...620.1 (Met).
  - Indicative Target 7 (Ceiling on the central bank stock of non-deliverable futures, in billions of U.S. dollars): 6.000...1.249 (Met); 7.000...4.358 (Met); 9.000...3.131 (Met); 9.000...0.587 (Met).
- Additional table excerpts for 2023 and 2024 contain multiple end-period targets, adjusted actuals, and status flags (Met/Not Met) for fiscal and monetary metrics, including large numeric entries (e.g., -441.5, -441.9, -689.9; 1177.4...709.0; 1.902.40.1; 6.86.5-4.7).
- 2024 proposed/concluding table entries include:
  - Fiscal Performance Criterion 1: 962.4...3868.3 (Met) and subsequent proposed CR 24/37 figures 19254600.42887.37694.5 (as printed).
  - Monetary Performance Criterion 5 (Cumulative floor on the change in net international reserves of BCRA): 6.05.98.7 (Met); 9.210.97.68.7 (as printed).
  - Cumulative ceiling on net central bank financing of the federal government: 0.0...-2119.4 (Met); 0.00.00.00.0 (as printed).
- Structural benchmarks (selected):
  - Issuance of a decree to remove the CVS formula (Decree 332/2022) — Sector: Fiscal/Structural — Status: Met — Completion Date: May 28, 2024.
  - New/Modified structural benchmarks with completion dates include:
    - Develop and publish a draft proposal to enhance the efficiency, equity and simplicity of the tax system — end-October, 2024.
    - Submit to Congress the draft 2025 budget, consistent with overall balance, with specified elements — September 15, 2024.
    - Develop an action plan to consolidate all central government entities into the treasury single account (TSA) at the central bank — end-September, 2024.
  - Previously agreed structural benchmarks marked Met with completion dates:
    - Extend maturities of a portion of the domestic debt coming due in 2024 — Financing — Met — end-March, 2024.
    - Refinement of the monetary policy framework and operations to ensure clear medium-term objectives consistent with price stability — Monetary/FX Policy — Met — end-April, 2024.
    - Publication of detailed reforms of the current tariff segmentation scheme to better target subsidies — Fiscal Structural — Met — end-May, 2024.
    - Develop and publish a framework, in consultation with Fund staff, for the gradual easing of FX controls and CFMs — Monetary/FX Policy — end-March, 2024; Reset to end-July, 2024.
    - Eliminate existing preferential export scheme — FX Policy — End-June 2024.

### Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU): program rules and definitions
- TMU effective update date: May 31, 2024.
- For program purposes, all foreign currency-related assets, liabilities, and flows will be evaluated at “program exchange rates” as defined (starting from the seventh review—rates that prevailed on December 29, 2023). Text Table 1 reports program exchange rates:
  - Argentine Pesos to the US dollar 808.45
  - Argentine Pesos to the SDR 1,084.67
  - Argentine Pesos to the Euro 893.90
  - Argentine Pesos to the Canadian dollar 611.95
  - Argentine Pesos to the British pound 1,031.02
  - Argentine Pesos to the Renminbi 113.85
  - Gold price (US$/ounce) 2,064.45
  - 1/ Rate published by the BCRA as of December 29, 2023.
- Variables not explicitly defined in the TMU follow Fund standard statistical methodology (e.g., GFS Manual 2014 and Public Sector Debt Statistics Guide).
- Definitions for the Cumulative Floor on the Federal Government Primary Balance:
  - Federal government (Sector Público Nacional No Financiero) includes central administration, social security institutions, the decentralized institutions (Administración Nacional), PAMI, fiduciary funds, and other entities and enterprises of the federal government.
  - Primary balance measured above-the-line and defined in accordance with monthly and annual reporting of the “Esquema IMIG”, with adjustments to reflect 2014 GFS Manual practices: total revenues minus primary spending.
  - Revenues are recorded on a cash basis and include tax revenues (ingresos tributarios), revenue income (rentas de la propiedad), other current revenues (otros ingresos corrientes), and capital revenues (ingresos de capital).
  - For assessing the floor, revenues exclude: any type of financial transfers from the Central Bank (including Utilidades and Adelantos Transitorios), interest income from intra-public sector holding of securities and debt obligations, proceeds from the sale of financial assets (including privatization proceeds through the sale of shares), proceeds from the sale of licenses/permits, revenue income from issuance of government debt that is part of non-tax revenues (resto rentas de la propiedad), and SDRs allocated by the Fund or received bilaterally from other IMF members.
  - Federal government primary expenditure is recorded on a cash basis and includes social protection (prestaciones sociales), economic subsidies (subsidios económicos), operational expenses (gastos de funcionamiento), current transfers to provinces (transferencias corrientes a provincias), other current spending (otros gastos corrientes), and capital spending (gastos de capital), including capital transfers to provinces.
  - Government-funded public-private partnerships will be treated as traditional public procurements and recorded transparently in budget data as they occur (cash basis).
  - Costs associated with divestment operations or liquidation of public entities will be allocated to current and capital expenditures accordingly.
  - All primary expenditures directly settled with bonds or any other form of non-cash liabilities will be recorded above-the-line and contribute to a decrease in the primary balance, excluding settlement of liabilities related to pensions, revenue sharing and expenditure allocation with provinces and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires associated with court proceedings finalized or pending as of March 3, 2022, and payments of arrears as per ICSID or similar arbitration rulings.

*Source: IMF staff and Argentine authorities (Text extracted from the cited chapter and TMU).*

### 6.      Measurement: The Federal government’s primary balance will be measured at each test date

### 6.      Measurement: The Federal government’s primary balance will be measured at each test date

### Measurement of the Federal government primary balance
- The Federal government’s primary balance will be measured at each test date as the cumulative value starting from the beginning of each calendar year.

### Monitoring of fiscal data for program purposes
- All fiscal data referred to above and needed for program monitoring purposes will be provided to the Fund with a lag of no more than 25 calendar days after the end of each month.

### Ceiling on Federal Government Accumulation of Domestic Arrears — Definition
- Domestic arrears are defined as the floating debt, i.e., the difference between primary spending recorded on an accrual basis (gasto devengado, from the SIDIF system) and primary spending recorded on a cash basis (base caja, from the Treasury).
- This includes intra-public transfers (transferencias figurativas), and primary spending for:
  - personnel (gasto en personal),
  - acquisition of goods and services (bienes y servicios),
  - nonprofessional services (servicios no profesionales),
  - capital expenditures (bienes de uso),
  - transfers (transferencias).

### Ceiling on Domestic Arrears — Measurement
- Arrears are measured on a daily basis.
- Arrears will be capped at 0.8 percent of GDP (ARS 4,946,421 million) for the daily average of the final two weeks of each quarter.

### Ceiling on Domestic Arrears — Monitoring
- Daily data on the stock of arrears (and underlying spending on an accrual and cash basis), recorded at daily frequency will be provided to the Fund with a lag of no more than 25 calendar days after the end of each month.

### Cumulative Floor on the Change in Net International Reserves (NIR) of BCRA — Definitions
- Net international reserves (NIR) of the BCRA: the balance of payments concept of NIR defined as the U.S. dollar value of gross official reserves of the BCRA minus gross official reserve liabilities. Non-U.S. dollar denominated foreign assets and liabilities will be converted into U.S. dollar at the program exchange rates.
- Gross official reserve assets: defined consistently with BPM6 as readily available claims on nonresidents denominated in foreign convertible currencies, and include BCRA’s:
  - (i) monetary claims,
  - (ii) free gold,
  - (iii) holdings of SDRs, including all Fund disbursements since March 25, 2022,
  - (iv) the reserve position in the IMF,
  - (v) holdings of fixed income instruments,
  - (vi) net cash balances within ALADI.
- Exclusions from reserve assets: assets that are pledged, collateralized, or otherwise encumbered; claims on residents; claims in foreign exchange arising from derivatives in foreign currency vis-à-vis domestic currency; precious metals other than gold; assets in nonconvertible currencies; illiquid assets.
- Gross official reserve liabilities in foreign currencies include:
  - (i) foreign currency liabilities with original maturity of one year or less,
  - (ii) Fund cumulative disbursements, except for the net financing component of the program (SDR 3.166 billion), net of cumulative Fund payments that have taken place from March 25, 2022 onwards,
  - (iii) any deliverable forward foreign exchange (FX) liabilities with original maturity of one year or less on a net basis defined as the long position minus the short position payable in foreign currencies directly undertaken by the BCRA or by any other financial institutions on behalf of the BCRA.
- Certain items are treated as foreign exchange liabilities of the BCRA with maturity one year or less for program purposes: the foreign currency swap with the People’s Bank of China (including the activated and nonactivated portions), the foreign exchange bank reserve requirements, SEDESA, ALADI and other non-resident deposits.
- Neither the Federal government’s foreign liabilities nor its FX deposits at the BCRA are considered gross foreign liabilities of the BCRA.

### Cumulative Change in NIR — Measurement
- The change in net international reserves will be measured as the cumulative change in the stock of NIR at each test date relative to the stock on December 10, 2023.

### Cumulative Change in NIR — Monitoring
- Foreign exchange asset and liability data at the BCRA will be provided to the Fund at daily frequency within two days.

### Cumulative Change in NIR — Adjustor (Official non-project loans and grants)
- The NIR targets will be adjusted upward (downward) by the surplus (shortfall) in program loan disbursements and grants from multilateral institutions (including the BCIE, EIB, IBRD, IADB and CAF) and bilateral partners, relative to the baseline projection reported in Text Table 3.
- The value of the downward adjustor, i.e., in the event of a shortfall of loans and grants, would be capped at a cumulative of US$750 million in each calendar year.
- Program loan disbursements are defined as external loan disbursements (excluding project financing disbursements and IMF disbursements) from official creditors for the financing of the general government.

### Baseline Projection — Program Loan Disbursements (Table figures, cumulative from January 1)
- end-March 2024: 66
- end-June 2024: 199
- end-September 2024: 437
- end-December 2024: 950

### Cumulative Ceiling on the BCRA’s Net Financing of the Federal Government — Definitions
- BCRA financing to the government includes:
  - (i) overdraft transfers from the BCRA to the Federal Government (Adelantos Transitorios),
  - (ii) distribution of profits (Utilidades),
  - (iii) acquisition of government debt in the primary market or by direct purchases from public institutions,
  - (iv) issuance of new non-marketable government bonds (Letras Intransferibles),
  - (v) purchase of government securities in the secondary markets (including transactions bilateral, conducted at MAE and BYMA, or made at other parties’ discretion from application of regulation A7291 and execution of “put options” under A7555 and A7716).
- Net financing of the Federal Government is defined as financing to the government net of cash transfers from the Federal Government to the BCRA to repurchase government securities, reduce the stock of overdraft transfers or the stock of non-marketable government bonds or recapitalize the BCRA.
- Transactions in the context of debt exchanges or rollover of non-marketable government bonds are excluded from this definition.

### Cumulative Ceiling on BCRA Net Financing — Measurement and Clarification
- The cap of cumulative flows on net financing is set to zero in 2024.
- Any decrease in the stock of Adelantos shall only reflect cash payments of this amount in pesos by the Treasury to the BCRA.
- Transfer of Letras Intransferibles to the BCRA will not reduce the stock of Adelantos.

### Cumulative Ceiling on BCRA Net Financing — Monitoring
- Daily data will be provided to the Fund within two days.
- The flow of BCRA net financing to the government will be measured at each test date as the cumulative value starting from December 10, 2023.
- Given the unpredictability of secondary market purchases and time needed to offset them, these will be measured up to the end of the month prior to the target date.

### Continuous Performance Criteria — Federal Government Non-Accumulation of External Debt Payments Arrears — Definitions
- Debt: a current, i.e., not contingent liability, created under a contractual arrangement through the provision of value in the form of assets (including currency) or services and which requires the obligor to make one or more payments in the form of assets (including currency) or services, at some future point(s) in time; these payments will discharge the principal and/or interest liabilities incurred under the contract.
- Forms of debt include:
  - i. loans (including deposits, bonds, debentures, commercial loans and buyers’ credits) and temporary exchanges of assets equivalent to fully collateralized loans (e.g., repurchase agreements and official swap arrangements);
  - ii. suppliers’ credits, where the supplier permits the obligor to defer payments after delivery/provision of goods/services;
  - iii. leases: debt is the present value (at the inception of the lease) of all lease payments expected during the agreement, excluding payments for operation, repair or maintenance.
- Under this definition, arrears, penalties, and judicially awarded damages from failure to make payment under a contractual obligation that constitutes debt are debt. Failure to make payment on an obligation not considered debt (e.g., payment on delivery) will not give rise to debt.
- External debt: for program purposes, determined by residency criterion and encompasses nonresident holdings of Argentine law peso and foreign currency debt.
- External arrears: external debt payment arrears for program monitoring purposes are defined as external debt obligations (principal and interest) falling due after March 3, 2022, that have not been paid, considering contractual grace periods.

### Continuous Performance Criteria — Coverage and Monitoring
- Coverage: this performance criterion covers the federal government.
- Exceptions: does not cover (i) arrears on trade credits, (ii) arrears on debt subject to renegotiation or restructuring, (iii) arrears resulting from nonpayment of commercial claims that are the subject of litigation initiated prior to March 3, 2022.
- Monitoring: this PC will be monitored on a continuous basis.

### Exchange Restrictions, MCPs, Bilateral Payment Agreements and Import Restrictions (Continuous PCs)
- Commitments (consistent with IMF arrangements): the authorities will not:
  - (i) impose or intensify any exchange restrictions,
  - (ii) introduce or modify Multiple Currency Practices (MCPs), as elaborated in the TMU,
  - (iii) conclude bilateral payment agreements that are inconsistent with Article VIII,
  - (iv) impose or intensify import restrictions for balance of payment reasons.
- Note: Narrowing the scope or lowering the rates of impuesto pais and the withholding taxes assessed as giving rise to MCPs by the Fund will not constitute a modification as defined under the PC.

### Quantitative Indicative Targets: Cumulative Floor on Federal Government Spending on Social Assistance Programs — Definition
- Social spending for the program is computed as the cumulative sum of all federal government spending (both current and capital) on the following social assistance programs:
  - Asignación Universal para Protección Social, which includes: Asignación Universal por Hijo, Asignación por Embarazo, Ayuda Escolar Anual
  - Tarjeta Alimentar
  - Progresar

### Quantitative Indicative Targets — Monitoring
- Data will be provided to the Fund with a lag of no more than 25 calendar days after the end of each month.

*Source: 1argea2024002 - 6.      Measurement: The Federal government’s primary balance will be measured at each test date*

### 25.      In addition to providing any data and information staff request to monitor program

### 25.      In addition to providing any data and information staff request to monitor program implementation

### Data provision schedule and requirements
- Daily:
  - Nominal exchange rates; total currency issued by the BCRA; deposits held by financial institutions at the BCRA; total liquidity assistance to banks through normal BCRA operations, including overdrafts; and interest rates on overnight deposits.
  - Disaggregated data of BCRA’s international reserve assets by source with a lag of three days.
  - Aggregated data on banks’ foreign exchange positions, provided in the following categories: public national; public provincial; private domestic; private foreign; and small banks.
  - Data on gross BCRA sales and purchases of securities settled in different currencies, for each market segment and at transaction price in the applicable currency, will be provided to the Fund with a daily frequency, with a lag of three days.
  - Data on BCRA position of non-deliverable futures by maturity, to be provided within two working days.
  - Data on BCRA government securities purchased and sold in the secondary market by maturity and mechanism, and corresponding price and quantities, with a lag of three days.
  - Data on the outstanding stock of BCRA put options on government bonds.

- Weekly:
  - BCRA balance sheet.
  - Daily data on BCRA-issued securities by type of security and interest rate.
  - Weekly data on (i) the stock of BOPREAL by series, (ii) the maturity profile of BOPREAL, (iii) interest payments on BOPREAL and (iv) the stock of the debt registry.
  - Daily data on sales and purchases of securities settled in different currencies, recorded and provided by the Comision Nacional de Valores, including trading by the BCRA. This information will include a report of the daily estimation of total stocks and implicit exchange rate of the most representative securities transacted in the CCL and MEP modalities and operations.
  - Daily data on Treasury deposits in SDRs at the BCRA.
  - Daily data on flows in and out of the BCRA’s SDR holding account including amount and purpose.

- Fortnightly:
  - Interest rates on domestic debt instruments including LELITE, LEDES, LECER, LEPAS, BONAR, BONTE, BONAD and BONCER at different maturities.
  - Information on outstanding debt instruments (local and global debt): maturity, currency, legislation, characteristics (DL, Dual, CER, fixed), holders (banks, FXI, insurance, corporates, foreigners, BCRA, FGS, BNA, provinces).
  - Daily data on external financing from each multilateral and bilateral creditor, broken down by budget support and project financing, and by largest bilateral projects.

- Monthly (with a lag of no more than 25 days after month end unless otherwise specified):
  - Federal government operations including monthly cash flow from the beginning to the end of the current fiscal year (and backward revisions as necessary), according to both the format of the Informe Mensual de Ingresos y Gastos (IMIG) and to the format of the Cuenta Ahorro Inversion Financiamiento (AIF). Specific reporting will include details on:
    - i. Revenues from sales of physical assets, licenses, and permits (and 12-month projections for future sales of such assets).
    - ii. Income related to the issuance of government debt securities (resto de rentas de la propiedad).
  - Data on the stock of domestic arrears by ministry or agency.
  - Fiscal financing sources (below-the-line), including BCRA transfers, issuance of domestic public securities, financing from within the non-financial public sector, external financing, and other financing schemes.
  - Detailed quarterly financing plan for the coming twelve months, including the aforementioned sources, to be provided one month in advance.
  - External financing received and projections for the coming four quarters, with loans and grants categorized by program and project.
  - On federal debt:
    - i. Domestic and external debt service (amortization and interest payments) of the federal government, with projected monthly federal government debt amortization/repayments and interest payments (local currency and FX bonds, treasury bills, Eurobonds, domestic loans, external commercial and external official loans). This would include both direct and guaranteed debt. In the case of issuance of government guaranteed debt, the name of the guaranteed individual/institution shall be included.
    - ii. Information on the stock of external arrears will be reported on a continuous basis.
    - iii. Federal government debt stock by currency, as at end month, including by (i) creditor (official, commercial domestic, commercial external); (ii) instrument (local currency and FX   denominated bonds, treasury bills, Eurobonds, domestic loans, external commercial and external official loans); and (iii) direct and guaranteed.
    - iv. The balances of the (federal) government at the central bank and in the commercial banking system needed to determine the cash position of the (federal) government.
  - Required and excess reserves of the banking sector in local and foreign currency.
  - Balance sheets of other financial corporations (non-deposit taking), including holdings of federal and provincial debt and of the BCRA instruments within one month after month end.
  - Data on the total loans value of all new federal government-funded public private partnerships.

- Quarterly:
  - Federal government transfers to the provinces and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires related to the settlement of liabilities associated with pensions, revenue sharing and expenditure allocation, as well as payments of arrears as per ICSID or similar arbitration rulings.
  - On provincial government operations, with a lag of no more than two months after the closing of each quarter, according to the format defined by the Ministry of Finance.
  - On provincial debt:
    - i. Quarterly data on the provincial government debt stock by currency, provided within two months following the closing of each quarter, including by (i) creditor (official, commercial domestic, commercial external; (ii) instrument (local currency and FX denominated bonds, treasury bills, Eurobonds, domestic loans, external commercial and external official loans); and (iii) direct and guaranteed.
    - ii. Quarterly domestic and external debt service (amortization and interest payments) of the provincial governments, provided within two months following the closing of each quarter.
    - iii. Quarterly projections for the following semester for provincial government debt amortization/repayments and interest payments, at least 30 days before the end of each quarter. This would include local currency and FX bonds, treasury bills, Eurobonds, domestic loans, external commercial and external official loans), and both direct and guaranteed debt. In the case of issuance of government guaranteed debt, the name of the guaranteed individual/institution shall be included.

### Recent developments and market indicators (as of June 10, 2024 update)
- Market and economic conditions:
  - Since end-May, Argentine spreads have risen to around 1600 basis points.
  - FX gaps have risen to around 40–45 percent.
  - BCRA FX purchases in the official market moderated to about US$30 million a day on average in June, compared to US$115 million in May.
- Fiscal and revenue developments:
  - Tax revenues grew by 11 percent y/y in real terms in May (first positive real growth since August 2023).
  - Stronger collection drivers: FX access tax (253 percent y/y), corporate income taxes (81 percent y/y), export duties (12 percent y/y), adjustments to fuel taxes (7 percent y/y).
  - Provincial co-participated revenues rose by 21 percent in real terms.
  - Fiscal targets for end-June reported as on track.
- Energy price and subsidy adjustments:
  - Wholesale electricity and gas prices were raised in June; next adjustments expected after August.
  - Monthly caps on subsidized consumption introduced: electricity cap 350 kWh for low-income households; for medium-income households electricity cap lowered from 400 kWh to 250 kWh.
  - Low- and middle-income households in the Greater Buenos Aires Area saw electricity and gas bills increase by 73 percent and 16 percent in real terms; for this group, bills remain on average 78 percentage points below cost recovery.
- Trade and FX outcomes:
  - Goods trade surplus of USD7.2 billion from December 2023 to April 2024, compared to a deficit of minus USD8 billion in January–November 2023 (a USD15.2 billion turnaround).
  - FX purchases amounted to USD17.2 billion since inauguration.
  - Net International Reserves (NIR) as of March 31 totaled USD8.7 billion (above the USD6 billion target).
  - NIR accumulation since December 10, 2023 represented USD11.2 billion.
  - FX expectations from ROFEX futures contracts (t + 10 months): 1,800 AR$/USD in December 2023; 1,650 in February 2024; 1,200 in May 2024.

### Authorities’ implementation, outcomes, and policy orientation (Statement by Leonardo Madcur)
- Fiscal consolidation and results:
  - Frontloaded fiscal consolidation of 5 percent of GDP as of end of April.
  - Net credit to government became negative for about AR$1.5 trillion.
  - Consecutive five-month overall surplus achieved; tax collection up 10.7 percent and spending down 27.6 percent, both in real terms as of May 2024.
  - Fiscal primary surplus commitment for 2024 is 1.7 percent of GDP.
  - Net domestic financing of AR$24 trillion through end May 2024 (3.9 percent of GDP) with a rollover rate of 258 percent.
  - Extension of peso-denominated treasuries’ maturities from an average duration of six months to three years.
- Monetary and central bank developments:
  - BCRA-remunerated liabilities down to USD16 billion, 3.2 percent of GDP, from USD23 billion, 8.3 percent of GDP in December 2023.
  - Interest annual policy rate down to 40 percent from 133 percent.
  - BCRA published 2023 financial statements under new accounting standards marking non-transferable treasury bills and temporary advances to the government at fair value or amortized cost.
- Social protection and expenditure targeting:
  - Social benefits stepped up with improved targeting.
  - Flagship child allowance program (AUH) more than doubled in real terms compared to the previous year.
  - Significant increases in food stamp benefits (Alimentar & Primeros 1000 dias) and refinements to targeting of Potenciar Trabajo.
- Structural and fiscal reforms:
  - Ley Bases and fiscal package passed by the lower house and expected to be debated at the Senate; planned measures include advanced quality measures, tax compliance improvements, tax system rationalization, subsidy targeting, pension sustainability reforms, provincial coordination, and SOE governance improvements.
  - Rate reduction of impuesto PAIS announced from 17.5 percent to 7.5 percent, once both legislation initiatives get Congress approval.
  - Plans and technical assistance from IMF, IDB, and World Bank to support reforms.
- Exchange rate and multiple currency practices:
  - Authorities intend to continue easing FX controls and unwind Multiple Currency Practice (MCPs) as conditions permit, transitioning to the new monetary regime “currency competition”.

### Key statistics, targets, and achievements cited by the authorities
- Spreads: around 1600 basis points (since end-May).
- FX gaps: around 40–45 percent.
- BCRA FX purchases: about US$30 million/day in June; US$115 million/day in May.
- Tax revenue growth: 11 percent y/y in real terms in May.
- Specific tax growth drivers: FX access tax 253 percent y/y; corporate income taxes 81 percent y/y; export duties 12 percent y/y; fuel taxes 7 percent y/y.
- Provincial co-participated revenues: 21 percent rise in real terms.
- Energy bill changes for Greater Buenos Aires low/middle-income group: electricity up 73 percent in real terms; gas up 16 percent in real terms; bills remain on average 78 percentage points below cost recovery.
- Goods trade: surplus of USD7.2 billion (Dec 2023–Apr 2024) vs deficit of minus USD8 billion (Jan–Nov 2023).
- FX purchases since inauguration: USD17.2 billion.
- Net International Reserves (NIR) as of March 31: USD8.7 billion; USD6 billion target.
- NIR accumulation since December 10, 2023: USD11.2 billion.
- BCRA-remunerated liabilities: USD16 billion (3.2 percent of GDP) down from USD23 billion (8.3 percent of GDP) in December 2023.
- Interest annual policy rate: 40 percent (down from 133 percent).
- Net domestic financing through end May 2024: AR$24 trillion (3.9 percent of GDP); rollover rate 258 percent.
- Tax collection and spending (as of May 2024): tax collection up 10.7 percent; spending down 27.6 percent (both in real terms).
- Inflation: decreased to 8.8 percent in April 2024 from 25.5 percent in December 2023; inflation in the city of Buenos Aires was 4.4 percent in May 2024, down from 9.8 percent in April 2024.
- ROFEX futures FX expectations (t + 10 months): 1,800 AR$/USD in December 2023; 1,650 in February 2024; 1,200 in May 2024.

### Policy intentions, requests, and conclusions
- Authorities request Executive Directors to support:
  - the eighth review under the extended arrangement under the EFF,
  - requests for approval of the modification of performance criteria to reflect program overperformance,
  - a temporary exchange restriction and multiple currency practices,
  - and the financing assurances review.
- Authorities reaffirm commitment to the EFF-supported program’s policies, targets, and structural conditionality for the remainder of the program and intend to continue engagement with the Fund for medium-term policy development.
- Authorities emphasize continued focus on:
  - disinflation,
  - reserve accumulation,
  - easing FX controls and MCPs as conditions permit,
  - advancing structural reforms to boost investment and job creation and to improve governance and AML/CFT frameworks.

*Supplement: EIGHTH REVIEW UNDER THE EXTENDED ARRANGEMENT UNDER THE EXTENDED FUND FACILITY—SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION (June 10, 2024).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2024/english/1argea2024002.pdf_
