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---

### Executive Summary — Recent developments
- Growth and labor market
  - Real GDP increased by 4.2 percent y-o-y in the first three quarters of 2024, down from 5.1 percent in 2023 but above the 2010–2019 average of 3.8 percent.
  - Unemployment decreased to historical lows of 6.6 percent in September 2024.
- Inflation and expectations
  - Inflation has been around zero since mid-2024 following a year-long bout of deflation.
  - Core inflation increased from zero in May to 0.4 percent in October 2024.
  - Two-year ahead inflation expectations are slightly below the BCCR’s target of 3 percent; one-year ahead expectations are at the bottom of the 2-4 percent range.
- External sector and reserves
  - Gross international reserves rose to US$14.2 billion at the end of October 2024.
  - Since mid-2022, the colon appreciated by about 25 percent against the dollar and is about 6 percent above its pre-pandemic average in real effective terms.
  - Current account deficit around 1 percent of GDP in 2024H1, more-than-financed by FDI.
- Financial sector
  - Private sector credit grew by 7.8 percent in July 2024 driven by corporate credit demand.
  - Despite a cumulative 500-basis points cut of the BCCR’s policy rate since March 2023, bank lending rates have been slow to fall.
  - Two small nonbank financial institutions (combined assets of 2 percent of GDP) were found insolvent; intervention and resolution processes were initiated with no public funds expected to be used.

### Outlook and risks
- Growth and inflation projections and risks
  - Economy projected to grow by 4 percent in 2024 and 3.5 percent over the medium term (consistent with potential growth).
  - Inflation is expected to converge to 3 percent by 2026, with headline inflation projected to return to the lower end (2 percent) of the BCCR’s tolerance band by 2025Q3.
  - Downside inflation risk: potential softening of inflation expectations after prolonged low inflation.
  - Upside inflation risks: commodity prices and La Niña supply disruptions.
- External and political risks
  - Downside risks to growth include weaker external demand from global growth surprises, rising protectionism from geopolitical fragmentation, and opposition to reforms in a fragmented political environment.
- Fiscal and debt risks
  - Fiscal risks include a disputed contingent claim from the social security fund (contingent claims on the central government of 10 percent of GDP) and the possibility of slower fiscal consolidation if revenues erode or unexpected expenditures materialize.
  - A severe stress scenario would increase gross financing needs to 15 percent of GDP in 2029.

### Fiscal outlook and public debt
- Balances and projections
  - Central government primary balance: 1.3 percent of GDP in 2024 and projected 1.6 percent of GDP in 2025.
  - Central government overall balance: -3.7 percent of GDP in 2024 and -3.2 percent of GDP in 2025 (staff projections table).
- Debt trajectory and financing needs
  - Central government debt: 61.1 percent of GDP in 2024, projected to fall to 55.1 percent of GDP by 2029.
  - Gross financing needs expected to be 8-9 percent of GDP until 2026 and fall thereafter (baseline); severe stress scenario raises needs to 15 percent of GDP in 2029.
- Near-term drivers of weaker primary outcome
  - The cumulative primary surplus fell from 1.7 percent of GDP in the first 9 months of 2023 to 1.2 percent of GDP in the same period of 2024 due to weaker corporate profitability, some overpayment of corporate income taxes in 2023, retroactive wage payments, and a legal obligation to transfer additional funds to the Social Development and Family Allowances Fund.

### Monetary and financial policy
- Monetary policy stance and recommendations
  - The BCCR has appropriately eased monetary policy and cut the policy rate by a cumulative 500 basis points since March 2023.
  - The central bank should be prepared to further lower the policy rate as part of a data-dependent and forward-looking approach.
  - BCCR participation in the FX market should be limited to responding to disorderly market conditions.
  - Legal proposals to institutionalize BCCR autonomy and improve governance should be approved without delay.
- Financial supervision and resolution
  - The recent intervention and resolution of two small nonbank financial institutions were appropriately executed and ensured minimal spillover effects.
  - Cases underscored the importance of passing pending legal amendments to strengthen bank resolution and deposit insurance frameworks.
  - Asset quality of financial cooperatives has weakened, but banks’ NPL ratio remains low and capital adequacy is well above regulatory minimums.

### Capacity to repay and assessment
- Fund repayment capacity
  - Outstanding Fund credit is about 2½ percent of GDP in 2024-5.
  - Costa Rica’s capacity to repay the Fund is assessed as adequate based on baseline indicators and a severe stress scenario, and supported by the authorities’ reform track record, policy plans, and institutions.
- Post-Financing Assessment context
  - Costa Rica completed the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and Resilience and Sustainability (RSF) arrangements in June 2024.
  - Credit outstanding is at levels that typically trigger a Post Financing Assessment.

### Policy recommendations and priorities
- Fiscal policy
  - Continue fiscal consolidation anchored in the medium-term fiscal framework and the fiscal rule.
  - Reduce non-priority spending and fortify revenues to allow increases in social and capital spending while decreasing debt.
  - Complete pending legislative changes to improve debt management and lower fiscal financing costs.
- Monetary and FX policy
  - Limit BCCR FX intervention to disorderly market conditions and remain prepared to lower the policy rate further if warranted by data.
  - Approve legal proposals to institutionalize BCCR autonomy and governance improvements promptly.
- Financial sector policy
  - Strengthen supervision and the resolution framework; approve pending legal amendments to bolster bank resolution and deposit insurance.
- Structural and climate resilience
  - Raise potential growth and increase resilience to climate change by improving the business environment, promoting green investment, and sustaining RSF-supported climate reforms.

*Source: International Monetary Fund, Costa Rica Post-Financing Assessment (December 3, 2024).*

### Authorities’ assessment of outlook and risks
- Authorities broadly concurred with staff’s assessment of the economic outlook and risks.
- Projection of this year’s growth was aligned; authorities were slightly more optimistic on next year’s growth (0.4 percentage point higher).
- Authorities assessed that a weakening of inflation expectations could be the most important downside risk to inflation.
- Authorities agreed that the macro-fiscal outlook was favorable despite the weaker than expected primary balance this year.

### Fiscal indicators (Percent of GDP) — latest 2024 projection (tabulated values)
- Revenue: 15.3 15.1 15.0
  - Income Tax: 5.3 5.3 4.9
- Primary Expenditure: 13.7 13.3 13.8
  - Wage bill: 5.6 5.5 5.7
  - Current transfers: 6.1 5.6 6.0
    - o.w. Social assistance: 1.7 1.7 1.8
- Primary balance: 1.6 1.9 1.3
- Interest Bill: 4.7 4.9 5.0
- Debt: 61.1 60.3 61.1

### Capacity to repay — baseline findings (selected metrics for 2025)
- In 2025 total credit represents:
  - 6.1 percent of exports
  - 15.8 percent of gross international reserves
  - 15.8 percent of government revenues
  - 11.6 percent of total public external debt
- At its peak, debt service to the Fund is:
  - 0.3 percent of GDP
  - 0.8 percent of exports
  - 2 percent of government revenues
  - 2 percent of reserves
  - 9.1 percent of public external debt service
- Conclusion: Costa Rica’s capacity to repay the Fund is adequate in the baseline.

### Adverse scenario (severe stress) — assumptions and impacts
- Assumed shocks
  - Tightening of financial conditions, a sudden stop in capital inflows, and a sharp rise in interest costs.
- Consequences and indicators
  - Substantially weaker growth and a smaller primary surplus.
  - Gross international reserves fall by one-third compared to the baseline but gradually recover over the longer-term.
  - External public debt service rises to 5.8 percent of GDP in 2030 (due to higher interest payments and a shortening of maturities) but then falls below the baseline level in the long term.
- Capacity to repay in adverse scenario
  - Outstanding Fund credit would peak at 20.3 percent of international reserves in 2027.
  - Outstanding credit would not exceed 2024 levels as a share of public external debt, revenues, or GDP.
  - Compared to the baseline, debt service to the Fund would rise to:
    - 2.2 percent of revenues and 8.3 percent of external debt service in 2025
    - 2.8 percent of reserves in 2029
  - These obligations would still be below those in 2024 despite long-lasting effects.
- Conclusion: Costa Rica’s capacity to repay remains adequate in the adverse scenario.

### Other modeled risks and historical context
- A large natural disaster would likely reduce exports, reserves, GDP, and government revenues.
- Contingent liabilities would raise financing needs and could generate negative confidence effects that raise financing costs, reduce reserves and lower growth.
- Historical damages:
  - Worst year for natural disasters was 1996 with total damages of 2.1 percent of GDP (hurricanes Cesar and Douglas) vs. the 3.1 percent initial fall of GDP considered in the adverse scenario.
  - More recent events: Tropical storm Nate (2007), Hurricane Eta (2020), Temporal Vertiente del Caribe (2022) with average costs of 0.7 percent of GDP.

### Authorities’ views and commitments
- Authorities agreed with staff’s assessment that the capacity to repay the Fund is adequate and recognized that the SRDSA-based scenario reflects a severe shock.
- Highlighted that most private investment inflows are from FDI, suggesting a more stable source of external private financing even under severe adverse shock.
- Authorities committed to timely repayment of their obligations to the Fund.
- Authorities committed to continuing reforms:
  - Continue fiscal consolidation by improving spending efficiency and debt management while resisting proposals that reduce revenues.
  - Mobilize support for legal reforms to strengthen BCCR autonomy and financial supervision.
  - BCCR will keep adjusting monetary policy as needed to align with the inflation target.
  - Continue efforts to boost inclusive and green growth, improve the social safety net, and create an enabling environment to attract private resources for sustainable and efficient infrastructure projects.

### Policy discussions — Fiscal policy (findings and recommendations)
- Government plans to increase the primary balance to 2 percent of GDP over the medium term, which should lower debt below 50 percent of GDP within ten years while allowing for a gradual increase in social and capital spending.
- To achieve planned consolidation:
  - Further exclusions from the fiscal rule should be avoided.
  - New spending initiatives should be offset by spending reductions elsewhere.
  - Avoid legislative changes to tax policy that reduce revenues; legislation should focus on bolstering revenues, improving the equity and efficiency of the tax system, and ensuring consistency with the OECD/G20 Pillar 2 minimum global tax.
  - Consider elimination of the tax exemption for public employees’ bonuses.
  - Ongoing efforts to improve tax compliance should help bolster the tax base.
  - Reprioritizing spending should allow an increase in capital investment and social spending even with the larger primary surplus.
- Institutional reforms to increase spending efficiency:
  - Full implementation of the 2022 public employment law by all institutions covered.
  - Recently approved laws on public investment and procurement to strengthen resource allocation and public investment execution.
  - Establish a formal macro-fiscal unit in the Ministry of Finance and activate the fiscal council to improve budget preparation and strengthen the MTFF’s role.
- Improving debt management:
  - Recent public debt operations reduced rollover needs and interest costs.
  - A law requiring decentralized and autonomous entities to transfer balances to the Treasury Single Account will improve cash management.
  - Law to unify debt management functions will strengthen debt management.
  - Market makers program for local sovereign bonds to improve domestic market liquidity.
  - Proposed constitutional amendment to provide the executive authority to issue external debt without prior congressional approval (with total indebtedness constrained by the annual budget process) would give the debt management office greater flexibility if passed.

### Policy discussions — Monetary and Financial Sector Policy
- Monetary policy
  - The BCCR should be prepared to cut rates further to ensure inflation expectations remain firmly anchored.
  - The ex-ante real policy rate remains moderately restrictive even as the balance of risks to inflation is firmly to the downside.
  - Staff estimates the real neutral rate to be about 1 percent.
- Exchange rate and FX intervention
  - Exchange rate should be allowed to adjust flexibly to market conditions.
  - Central bank has been purchasing FX to build reserves and meet NFPS FX needs.
  - Given ample reserves (146 percent of the IMF’s ARA metric), central bank participation in the FX market should be limited to responding to disorderly conditions.
  - Central bank FX purchases on behalf of the NFPS should be aligned with FX sales to these entities to minimize market impact.
  - NFPS should enhance its capacity to manage currency risks and reduce reliance on the BCCR as intermediary for FX transactions.
- Central bank autonomy and governance
  - Scope to strengthen autonomy and governance in line with 2020 Safeguards Assessment recommendations.
  - A bill to improve BCCR transparency and accountability and institutionalize de facto autonomy is advancing.
  - A constitutional amendment to grant autonomy to the BCCR was submitted to the legislature in August 2024.
- Financial supervision and resolution
  - Shortcomings from the 2022 FSAP are being addressed via legislative and regulatory reforms.
  - Full implementation of risk-based bank supervision expected to start in early 2025.
  - Consolidated supervision partially applied since January 2023; expected to be institutionalized with risk-based supervision.
  - Amendments to enhance legal powers and protection of supervisors and resolution authorities were submitted in April 2024.
  - Recent failure of two nonbank financial institutions highlights need to strengthen bank resolution and deposit insurance framework.
    - Key drawback: reliance on bank reserves to cover guaranteed deposits because deposit guarantee fund lacks sufficient capital.
    - Amendments establishing a public resolution funding mechanism (with safeguards) are progressing through the Legislative Assembly.
    - Legislative changes being considered to empower supervisors and resolution agency to intervene and resolve failing financial institutions more quickly.
    - Improve oversight and external auditing requirements for nonbank entities.

### Policy discussions — Sustainable long-run growth and climate finance
- Business environment and human capital
  - Improvements could enhance potential growth, including higher quality education aligned with workforce needs for FDI strategy (semiconductor industry).
  - Need to reduce permits processing times, make institutional systems interoperable, and support migrant workers’ legal residency and formal workforce integration.
  - Upgrades to digital infrastructure and increased efficiency of the electricity sector could support long-run growth.
- Labor market and social outcomes
  - Rising real wages and increased formal sector employment improving social outcomes.
  - Labor formality well above pre-pandemic levels; poverty and inequality at historically low levels.
  - Policies: single window to request, target and administer social benefits; reduction of the minimum contribution base for part-time workers.
- PPPs and climate finance
  - Ongoing efforts to strengthen the PPP legal framework and develop a pipeline of bankable projects to boost private climate financing.
  - A bill to create a specialized PPP agency and a new facility to prioritize, select, and structure PPP projects is being drafted.
  - One public bank issued a “blue bond” to finance blue economy projects.
  - Authorities developing framework for green bond issuances with UNDP support, potentially incorporating sustainability-linked bonds.
  - More enabling environment for ESG financing and incorporation of climate considerations in bank stress testing should attract green finance.
- RSF-supported reforms and climate resilience
  - Climate tagging guidelines implemented for the 2025 budget; further training needed for consistent tracking across ministries.
  - BCCR data repository on climate risks facilitating research on banking exposure to hydrometeorological events.
  - New climate criteria in project appraisal, selection, and urban planning to make infrastructure more climate resilient.
  - MIDEPLAN is using the method in all proposals but further improvement needed in uptake by project proposers.
  - A revised feebate bill to incentivize lower-pollution vehicles is a government legislative priority.
  - Implementation by BCCR of a new climate stress methodology awaits legal decisions on data sharing; some banks interested in using the methodology with their own data.
  - Removing identified tax exemptions with a negative environmental impact would support decarbonization and boost revenues.

### Staff appraisal — key takeaways
- Economic fundamentals and policy frameworks continue to strengthen.
- Growth remains robust and is expected to continue at potential next year, although risks are tilted to the downside.
- Inflation is expected to converge to the central bank’s target from below.
- Strong labor market has contributed to significant reductions in poverty and inequality.
- International reserves buffers are ample.
- One-off effects on both revenues and expenditures have contributed to recent fiscal outcomes.

*Source: IMF staff estimates.*

### Selected macroeconomic projections and indicators (as reported)
- Real GDP (annual percentage change): -4.3, 7.9, 4.6, 5.1, 4.0, 4.0, 3.5, 3.5, 3.5, 3.5, 3.5, 3.5
- Domestic demand (annual percentage change): -4.8, 8.6, 0.8, 3.1, 4.2, 4.4, 3.6, 3.5, 3.5, 3.6, 3.6, 3.5
- Consumer prices (period average, annual percentage change): 0.7, 1.7, 8.3, 0.5, 0.3, -0.4, 2.9, 1.6, 3.0, 3.0, 3.0, 3.0
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): -1.0, -3.2, -3.3, -1.4, -2.0, -1.9, -2.1, -1.9, -1.7, -1.6, -1.5, -1.4
- Trade balance (percent of GDP): -3.2, -4.4, -6.7, -3.7, -4.6, -3.9, -4.6, -4.0, -3.9, -4.0, -4.0, -4.0
- Services (percent of GDP): 7.2, 7.0, 10.1, 9.7, 9.8, 9.6, 9.8, 9.6, 9.7, 9.7, 9.9, 9.9
- Foreign direct investment, net (percent of GDP): -2.6, -4.8, -4.4, -4.3, -4.5, -4.3, -4.5, -4.3, -4.3, -4.3, -4.2, -4.2
- Gross international reserves (millions of U.S. dollars): 7,232; 6,921; 8,724; 13,261; 14,229; 14,441; 14,915; 15,174; 15,905; 16,478; 17,165; 17,853
  - as percent of ARA metric: 107.2, 99.7, 106.4, 146.3, 141.7, 146.7, 142.5, 147.4, 145.2, 142.3, 140.4, 138.8
  - in months of next year's imports: 4.0, 3.1, 3.7, 5.1, 4.9, 5.2, 4.8, 5.1, 5.0, 4.9, 4.8, 4.7
- External debt (percent of GDP): 49.6, 48.6, 50.7, 43.3, 42.2, 41.9, 41.4, 41.1, 41.1, 40.7, 40.0, 39.3
- Central government primary balance (percent of GDP): -3.7, -0.3, 2.1, 1.6, 1.9, 1.3, 2.0, 1.6, 1.8, 1.9, 1.9, 1.9
- Central government overall balance (percent of GDP): -8.4, -5.1, -2.8, -3.2, -3.0, -3.7, -2.7, -3.2, -2.7, -2.3, -2.0, -1.8
- Central government debt (percent of GDP): 66.9, 67.6, 63.0, 61.1, 60.3, 61.1, 59.3, 60.8, 59.8, 58.4, 56.8, 55.1

### Financial sector and fiscal context (selected indicators)
- NPL to total loans (percent, financial sector): 2.1–2.5 range across recent observations (values reported: 2.1, 2.4, 2.5, 2.3, 2.1, 2.0, 2.4)
- Gross fiscal financing needs and debt profile (selected items reported in figures): projections of interest payments, primary deficit, external amortizations, domestic amortizations, and debt shown in fiscal sector developments.

### Risk Assessment Matrix — selected external and domestic risks, likelihoods, impacts, and policy responses
- External risks (examples)
  - Intensification of regional conflicts: Likelihood: High; Impact: Medium.
  - Global growth surprises (slowdown in major economies): Likelihood: Medium; Impact: High.
  - Commodity price volatility: Likelihood: High; Impact: Medium.
  - Sovereign debt distress (spillovers): Likelihood: Medium; Impact: High.
  - Deepening geoeconomic fragmentation: Likelihood: High; Impact: Medium.
  - Climate change (extreme climate events): Likelihood: Medium; Impact: Medium.
- Domestic risks (examples)
  - Political fragmentation and reform fatigue: Likelihood: Medium; Impact: Medium.
  - Sudden surge of migration flows: Likelihood: High; Impact: Medium.
  - Loss of confidence in non-bank financial institutions after interventions: Likelihood: Low; Impact: Medium.
- Sovereign risk and debt sustainability summary
  - Under the baseline, public debt projected to decline to about 60 percent of GDP in the short run and to 50 percent of GDP within 10 years.
  - Gross financing needs estimated at about 8-9 percent of GDP in the short run and expected to decline over the medium term.
  - Key mitigating factors: financing from official external sources, domestic debt, and Eurobonds; a fiscal rule that responds to the debt ratio; the authorities' track record in taking corrective action.

### Stress scenario (SRDSA severe stress) — design, assumptions, and key macro impacts
- Design and timing
  - Shock start year: 2025.
  - Assumed: tightening of financial conditions, a sudden stop in capital inflows, and a sharp rise in interest costs.
- Key macro assumptions
  - GDP growth: falls 3.1 percentage points to 0.4 percent in 2025 and 2026.
  - Marginal effective interest rates: reach 9 percent (local currency) and 8 percent (foreign currency) in 2025 and return to the baseline in 2029.
  - GDP deflator inflation: rises 1.2 percentage points from the baseline to 3.9 percent in 2025, and declines 0.8 percentage points from the baseline to 2.4 percent in 2026.
  - Currency depreciation: depreciates 7.7 percentage points in 2025. The depreciation is permanent.
  - Primary surplus: decreases by 0.8 percent of GDP to 1 percent of GDP in 2026 and is the same as a share of GDP in later years.
  - Maturity shortening: In 2025, debt issuance splits 50 percent between short-term and long-term, with the long-term share rising gradually over a 5-year interval.
  - Debt holder assumptions:
    - Rollover rate: foreign private creditors rollover rate is 67 percent for 2025 and 2026, thereafter 100 percent.
    - New financing: foreign private creditors provide no new financing other than for existing debt rollover.
    - Creditor groups other than domestic commercial banks provide additional financing proportionate to baseline and claims reach a manageable 33 percent of GDP in 2029.
    - Commercial banks are the residual source and claims reach a manageable 19 percent of GDP.
- Key macroeconomic impacts
  - Nominal GDP growth in dollars falls about 9.6   and 4 percentage points relative to the baseline in 2025 and 2026. Nominal GDP growth in dollars is the same as baseline after 2026 so the nominal GDP loss is permanent.
  - REER depreciates 5.2 and 0.03 percentage points in 2025 and 2026, respectively.
  - Current account deficit falls by 2 percentage points of GDP in 2027 relative to the baseline; current account reaches a surplus of 0.8 percent of GDP in 2031 and returns to baseline in the long run.
  - Government revenues in dollars are 12.4 percent lower than under the baseline by 2026 and the loss is permanent.
  - External public debt service peaks at US$ 6.9   billion (5.8 percent of GDP) in 2030 compared to a baseline of US$ 4.4   billion in that year.
  - Gross international reserves cumulatively reduced by one-third relative to baseline to U$ 11 billion in 2027, equivalent to a reduction by about one quarter between 2024 and 2027.
- Indicators of capacity to repay under stress
  - Outstanding IMF credit increases 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points of GDP with respect to the baseline in 2025 and 2026, respectively (years of the shock).
  - Outstanding IMF credit increases 0.2 percentage points of GDP on average between 2027 and 2030; after 2030 the increase is less than 0.1 percentage points on average.
  - Total obligations increase by less than 0.1 percentage points of GDP.
- Conclusion: Costa Rica’s capacity to repay remains adequate in the adverse scenario.

### Long-term fiscal and demographic pressures — selected findings
- Long-term primary balance improvement cited as "1.3 percent of GDP over the long term (consistent with more fiscal space for higher spending as debt falls)".
- GDP growth slowing mainly due to a declining labor force, to about "2.5 percent in 2050".
- Pensions — time horizons and projected financing needs:
  - "30 years": "1.1% (pp of GDP per year)".
  - "50 years": "2.7% (pp of GDP per year)".
  - "Until 2100": "4.3% (pp of GDP per year)".
  - Policy options could reduce costs by "2 percent of GDP by 2050": indexation to inflation instead of wages and linking retirement age to life expectancy.
- Healthcare demographic pressures: scenario of higher spending per capita by "0.6 percent per year" suggests contingent fiscal pressures that could prevent sustained declines in debt.

### Climate change — adaptation and mitigation fiscal implications
- Adaptation cost assumptions:
  - "0.3 percent of GDP in 2030-2034"
  - "0.1 percent of GDP in the long term"
  - Commentary: These adaptation costs have a "small effect on debt and financing needs."
- Mitigation — customized scenario based on the National Decarbonization Plan:
  - Costing of "0.3 percent of GDP per year for a decade"
  - Fuel revenue losses: a permanent "0.1 percent of GDP per year"
  - Source states this customized scenario "has a small effect."

*Source: IMF staff (Annex I. Risk Assessment Matrix; Annex II. Sovereign Risk and Debt Sustainability Assessment; Annex III. Costa Rica’s Climate Change Challenge; Costa Rica Post-Financing Assessment).*

### 2025.  Inflation, which has been around zero since mid-2024 following a year-long bout of

### COSTA RICA POST-FINANCING ASSESSMENT — Executive Summary

### Recent developments
- Growth and labor market
  - Real GDP increased by 4.2 percent y-o-y in the first three quarters of 2024, down from 5.1 percent in 2023 but above the 2010–2019 average of 3.8 percent.
  - Unemployment decreased to historical lows of 6.6 percent in September 2024.
- Inflation and expectations
  - Inflation has been around zero since mid-2024 following a year-long bout of deflation.
  - Core inflation increased from zero in May to 0.4 percent in October 2024.
  - Two-year ahead inflation expectations are slightly below the BCCR’s target of 3 percent; one-year ahead expectations are at the bottom of the 2-4 percent range.
- External sector and reserves
  - Gross international reserves rose to US$14.2 billion at the end of October 2024.
  - Since mid-2022, the colon appreciated by about 25 percent against the dollar and is about 6 percent above its pre-pandemic average in real effective terms.
  - Current account deficit around 1 percent of GDP in 2024H1, more-than-financed by FDI.
- Financial sector
  - Private sector credit grew by 7.8 percent in July 2024 driven by corporate credit demand.
  - Despite a cumulative 500-basis points cut of the BCCR’s policy rate since March 2023, bank lending rates have been slow to fall.
  - Two small nonbank financial institutions (combined assets of 2 percent of GDP) were found insolvent; intervention and resolution processes were initiated with no public funds expected to be used.

### Outlook and risks
- Growth and inflation
  - Economy projected to grow by 4 percent in 2024 and 3.5 percent over the medium term (consistent with potential growth).
  - Inflation is expected to converge to 3 percent by 2026, with headline inflation projected to return to the lower end (2 percent) of the BCCR’s tolerance band by 2025Q3.
  - Downside inflation risk: potential softening of inflation expectations after prolonged low inflation; upside risks: commodity prices and La Niña supply disruptions.
- External and political risks
  - Downside risks to growth include weaker external demand from global growth surprises, rising protectionism from geopolitical fragmentation, and opposition to reforms in a fragmented political environment.
- Fiscal and debt risks
  - Fiscal risks include a disputed contingent claim from the social security fund (contingent claims on the central government of 10 percent of GDP) and the possibility of slower fiscal consolidation if revenues erode or unexpected expenditures materialize.
  - A severe stress scenario would increase gross financing needs to 15 percent of GDP in 2029.

### Fiscal outlook and public debt
- Primary and overall balances
  - Central government primary balance: 1.3 percent of GDP in 2024 and projected 1.6 percent of GDP in 2025.
  - Central government overall balance: -3.7 percent of GDP in 2024 and -3.2 percent of GDP in 2025 (staff projections table).
- Debt trajectory and financing needs
  - Central government debt: 61.1 percent of GDP in 2024, projected to fall to 55.1 percent of GDP by 2029.
  - Gross financing needs expected to be 8-9 percent of GDP until 2026 and fall thereafter (baseline); severe stress scenario raises needs to 15 percent of GDP in 2029.
- Near-term drivers
  - The cumulative primary surplus fell from 1.7 percent of GDP in the first 9 months of 2023 to 1.2 percent of GDP in the same period of 2024 due to weaker corporate profitability, some overpayment of corporate income taxes in 2023, retroactive wage payments, and a legal obligation to transfer additional funds to the Social Development and Family Allowances Fund.

### Monetary and financial policy
- Monetary policy stance
  - The BCCR has appropriately eased monetary policy and cut the policy rate by a cumulative 500 basis points since March 2023.
  - The central bank should be prepared to further lower the policy rate as part of a data-dependent and forward-looking approach.
  - BCCR participation in the FX market should be limited to responding to disorderly market conditions.
  - Legal proposals to institutionalize BCCR autonomy and improve governance should be approved without delay.
- Financial supervision and resolution
  - The recent intervention and resolution of two small nonbank financial institutions were appropriately executed and ensured minimal spillover effects.
  - The cases underscored the importance of passing pending legal amendments to strengthen bank resolution and deposit insurance frameworks.
  - Asset quality of financial cooperatives has weakened, but banks’ NPL ratio remains low and capital adequacy is well above regulatory minimums.

### Capacity to repay and assessment
- Fund repayment capacity
  - Costa Rica’s capacity to repay the Fund is assessed as adequate based on baseline indicators and a severe stress scenario, and supported by the authorities’ reform track record, policy plans, and institutions.
- Post-Financing Assessment context
  - Costa Rica completed the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and Resilience and Sustainability (RSF) arrangements in June 2024.
  - Credit outstanding is at levels that typically trigger a Post Financing Assessment.

### Policy recommendations and priorities
- Fiscal policy
  - Continue fiscal consolidation anchored in the medium-term fiscal framework and the fiscal rule.
  - Reduce non-priority spending and fortify revenues to allow increases in social and capital spending while decreasing debt.
  - Complete pending legislative changes to improve debt management and lower fiscal financing costs.
- Monetary and FX policy
  - Limit BCCR FX intervention to disorderly market conditions and remain prepared to lower the policy rate further if warranted by data.
  - Approve legal proposals to institutionalize BCCR autonomy and governance improvements promptly.
- Financial sector policy
  - Strengthen supervision and the resolution framework; approve pending legal amendments to bolster bank resolution and deposit insurance.
- Structural and climate resilience
  - Raise potential growth and increase resilience to climate change by improving the business environment, promoting green investment, and sustaining RSF-supported climate reforms.

*Source: International Monetary Fund, Costa Rica Post-Financing Assessment (December 3, 2024).*

### 13.      The authorities broadly concurred with staff’s assessment of the economic outlook and

### 13.      The authorities broadly concurred with staff’s assessment of the economic outlook and

### Authorities’ assessment of outlook and risks
- Authorities broadly concurred with staff’s assessment of the economic outlook and risks.
- Projection of this year’s growth was aligned; authorities were slightly more optimistic on next year’s growth (0.4 percentage point higher).
- Authorities assessed that a weakening of inflation expectations could be the most important downside risk to inflation.
- Authorities agreed that the macro-fiscal outlook was favorable despite the weaker than expected primary balance this year.

### Fiscal indicators and latest 2024 projection (Percent of GDP)
- Revenue: 15.3 15.1 15.0
  - Income Tax: 5.3 5.3 4.9
- Primary Expenditure: 13.7 13.3 13.8
  - Wage bill: 5.6 5.5 5.7
  - Current transfers: 6.1 5.6 6.0
    - o.w. Social assistance: 1.7 1.7 1.8
- Primary balance: 1.6 1.9 1.3
- Interest Bill: 4.7 4.9 5.0
- Debt: 61.1 60.3 61.1

### Capacity to repay — baseline findings
- Outstanding Fund credit is about 2½ percent of GDP in 2024-5.
- In 2025 total credit represents:
  - 6.1 percent of exports
  - 15.8 percent of gross international reserves
  - 15.8 percent of government revenues
  - 11.6 percent of total public external debt
- At its peak, debt service to the Fund is:
  - 0.3 percent of GDP
  - 0.8 percent of exports
  - 2 percent of government revenues
  - 2 percent of reserves
  - 9.1 percent of public external debt service
- Conclusion: Costa Rica’s capacity to repay the Fund is adequate in the baseline.

### Adverse scenario (severe stress) — assumptions and impacts
- Assumed: tightening of financial conditions, a sudden stop in capital inflows, and a sharp rise in interest costs.
- Consequences:
  - Substantially weaker growth and a smaller primary surplus.
  - Gross international reserves fall by one-third compared to the baseline but gradually recover over the longer-term.
  - External public debt service rises to 5.8 percent of GDP in 2030 (due to higher interest payments and a shortening of maturities) but then falls below the baseline level in the long term.
- Capacity to repay in adverse scenario:
  - Outstanding Fund credit would peak at 20.3 percent of international reserves in 2027.
  - Outstanding credit would not exceed 2024 levels as a share of public external debt, revenues, or GDP.
  - Compared to the baseline, debt service to the Fund would rise to:
    - 2.2 percent of revenues and 8.3 percent of external debt service in 2025
    - 2.8 percent of reserves in 2029
  - These obligations would still be below those in 2024 despite long-lasting effects.
- Conclusion: Costa Rica’s capacity to repay remains adequate in the adverse scenario.

### Other modeled risks
- Materialization of other risks in the SRDSA could increase outstanding Fund credit and obligations.
  - A large natural disaster would likely reduce exports, reserves, GDP, and government revenues.
  - Contingent liabilities would raise financing needs and could generate negative confidence effects that raise financing costs, reduce reserves and lower growth.
- Historical context:
  - Worst year for natural disasters was 1996 with total damages of 2.1 percent of GDP (hurricanes Cesar and Douglas) vs. the 3.1 percent initial fall of GDP considered in the adverse scenario.
  - More recent events: Tropical storm Nate (2007), Hurricane Eta (2020), Temporal Vertiente del Caribe (2022) with average costs of 0.7 percent of GDP.

### Authorities’ views on capacity to repay
- Authorities agreed with staff’s assessment that the capacity to repay the Fund is adequate.
- Recognized that the SRDSA-based scenario reflects a severe shock.
- Highlighted that most private investment inflows are from FDI, suggesting a more stable source of external private financing even under severe adverse shock.
- Authorities committed to timely repayment of their obligations to the Fund.

### Policy discussions — A. Fiscal Policy (findings and recommendations)
- Government plans to increase the primary balance to 2 percent of GDP over the medium term, which should lower debt below 50 percent of GDP within ten years while allowing for a gradual increase in social and capital spending.
- To achieve planned consolidation:
  - Further exclusions from the fiscal rule should be avoided.
  - New spending initiatives should be offset by spending reductions elsewhere.
  - Avoid legislative changes to tax policy that reduce revenues; legislation should focus on bolstering revenues, improving the equity and efficiency of the tax system, and ensuring consistency with the OECD/G20 Pillar 2 minimum global tax.
  - Consider elimination of the tax exemption for public employees’ bonuses.
  - Ongoing efforts to improve tax compliance should help bolster the tax base.
  - Reprioritizing spending should allow an increase in capital investment and social spending even with the larger primary surplus.
- Institutional reforms to increase spending efficiency:
  - Full implementation of the 2022 public employment law by all institutions covered.
  - Recently approved laws on public investment and procurement to strengthen resource allocation and public investment execution.
  - Establish a formal macro-fiscal unit in the Ministry of Finance and activate the fiscal council to improve budget preparation and strengthen the MTFF’s role.
- Improving debt management:
  - Recent public debt operations reduced rollover needs and interest costs.
  - A law requiring decentralized and autonomous entities to transfer balances to the Treasury Single Account will improve cash management.
  - Law to unify debt management functions will strengthen debt management.
  - Market makers program for local sovereign bonds to improve domestic market liquidity.
  - Proposed constitutional amendment to provide the executive authority to issue external debt without prior congressional approval (with total indebtedness constrained by the annual budget process) would give the debt management office greater flexibility if passed.

### Policy discussions — B. Monetary and Financial Sector Policy
- Monetary policy:
  - The BCCR should be prepared to cut rates further to ensure inflation expectations remain firmly anchored.
  - The ex-ante real policy rate remains moderately restrictive even as the balance of risks to inflation is firmly to the downside.
  - In this environment the BCCR should be prepared to continue to lower rates in coming meetings, consistent with a forward-looking, data-dependent approach.
  - Staff estimates the real neutral rate to be about 1 percent.
- Exchange rate and FX intervention:
  - Exchange rate should be allowed to adjust flexibly to market conditions.
  - Central bank has been purchasing FX to build reserves and meet NFPS FX needs.
  - Given ample reserves (146 percent of the IMF’s ARA metric), central bank participation in the FX market should be limited to responding to disorderly conditions.
  - Central bank FX purchases on behalf of the NFPS should be aligned with FX sales to these entities to minimize market impact.
  - NFPS should enhance its capacity to manage currency risks and reduce reliance on the BCCR as intermediary for FX transactions.
- Central bank autonomy and governance:
  - Scope to strengthen autonomy and governance in line with 2020 Safeguards Assessment recommendations.
  - A bill to improve BCCR transparency and accountability and institutionalize de facto autonomy is advancing.
  - A constitutional amendment to grant autonomy to the BCCR was submitted to the legislature in August 2024.
- Financial supervision and resolution:
  - Shortcomings from the 2022 FSAP are being addressed via legislative and regulatory reforms.
  - Full implementation of risk-based bank supervision expected to start in early 2025.
  - Consolidated supervision partially applied since January 2023; expected to be institutionalized with risk-based supervision.
  - Amendments to enhance legal powers and protection of supervisors and resolution authorities were submitted in April 2024.
  - Recent failure of two nonbank financial institutions highlights need to strengthen bank resolution and deposit insurance framework.
    - Key drawback: reliance on bank reserves to cover guaranteed deposits because deposit guarantee fund lacks sufficient capital.
    - Amendments establishing a public resolution funding mechanism (with safeguards) are progressing through the Legislative Assembly.
    - Legislative changes being considered to empower supervisors and resolution agency to intervene and resolve failing financial institutions more quickly.
    - Improve oversight and external auditing requirements for nonbank entities.

### Policy discussions — C. Sustainable long-run growth and climate finance
- Business environment and human capital:
  - Improvements could enhance potential growth, including higher quality education aligned with workforce needs for FDI strategy (semiconductor industry).
  - Need to reduce permits processing times, make institutional systems interoperable, and support migrant workers’ legal residency and formal workforce integration.
  - Upgrades to digital infrastructure and increased efficiency of the electricity sector could support long-run growth.
- Labor market and social outcomes:
  - Rising real wages and increased formal sector employment improving social outcomes.
  - Labor formality well above pre-pandemic levels; poverty and inequality at historically low levels.
  - Policies: single window to request, target and administer social benefits; reduction of the minimum contribution base for part-time workers.
- PPPs and climate finance:
  - Ongoing efforts to strengthen the PPP legal framework and develop a pipeline of bankable projects to boost private climate financing.
  - A bill to create a specialized PPP agency and a new facility to prioritize, select, and structure PPP projects is being drafted.
  - One public bank issued a “blue bond” to finance blue economy projects.
  - Authorities developing framework for green bond issuances with UNDP support, potentially incorporating sustainability-linked bonds.
  - More enabling environment for ESG financing and incorporation of climate considerations in bank stress testing should attract green finance.
- RSF-supported reforms and climate resilience:
  - Climate tagging guidelines implemented for the 2025 budget; further training needed for consistent tracking across ministries.
  - BCCR data repository on climate risks facilitating research on banking exposure to hydrometeorological events.
  - New climate criteria in project appraisal, selection, and urban planning to make infrastructure more climate resilient.
  - MIDEPLAN is using the method in all proposals but further improvement needed in uptake by project proposers.
  - A revised feebate bill to incentivize lower-pollution vehicles is a government legislative priority.
  - Implementation by BCCR of a new climate stress methodology awaits legal decisions on data sharing; some banks interested in using the methodology with their own data.
  - Removing identified tax exemptions with a negative environmental impact would support decarbonization and boost revenues.

### Authorities’ commitments
- Authorities committed to continuing reforms in accordance with staff advice:
  - Continue fiscal consolidation by improving spending efficiency and debt management while resisting proposals that reduce revenues.
  - Mobilize support for legal reforms to strengthen BCCR autonomy and financial supervision.
  - BCCR will keep adjusting monetary policy as needed to align with the inflation target.
  - Continue efforts to boost inclusive and green growth, improve the social safety net, and create an enabling environment to attract private resources for sustainable and efficient infrastructure projects.

### Staff appraisal — key takeaways
- Economic fundamentals and policy frameworks continue to strengthen.
- Growth remains robust and is expected to continue at potential next year, although risks are tilted to the downside.
- Inflation is expected to converge to the central bank’s target from below.
- Strong labor market has contributed to significant reductions in poverty and inequality.
- International reserves buffers are ample.
- One-off effects on both revenues and expenditures have contributed to recent fiscal outcomes.

*Source: IMF staff estimates.*

### Annex III. Costa Rica’s Climate Change Challenge. CR/22/345.

### Annex III. Costa Rica’s Climate Change Challenge. CR/22/345.

### Capacity to Repay and Risk Assessment
- "Costa Rica’s capacity to repay the Fund is adequate."
- "This assessment is informed by both the baseline and a severe stress scenario."
- "Additional assurances are provided by the strength of the authorities’ reform track record, policy plans, and institutions."

### Fiscal Policy, Consolidation, and Contingent Liabilities
- "a   reduced primary surplus for 2024 but fiscal consolidation is expected to resume in 2025."
- "Contingent liabilities create fiscal risks, but Costa Rica is at a low risk of sovereign debt distress."
- "Fiscal consolidation should continue to be guided by the medium-term fiscal framework and the fiscal rule."
- "Reducing non-priority spending and fortifying revenues will make it feasible to increase social and capital spending while decreasing debt."
- "Completing the pending legislative changes will help improve debt management and lower fiscal financing costs."

### Monetary Policy and Central Bank Conduct
- "The BCCR has appropriately eased its monetary policy but should limit its activity in the FX market to responding to disorderly market conditions."
- "The central bank should be prepared to further lower the policy rate as part of its data-dependent and forward-looking approach."
- "BCCR participation in the FX market should be limited to responding to disorderly market conditions."
- "Legal proposals to institutionalize BCCR autonomy and improvements in governance should be approved without delay."

### Financial Supervision, Resolution, and Deposit Insurance
- "Ongoing efforts to strengthen supervision and the resolution framework further are welcome."
- "The recent intervention and resolution of two small nonbank financial institutions was appropriately executed and ensured minimal spillover effects."
- "However, it demonstrated the importance of passing pending legal amendments to strengthen the bank resolution and deposit insurance framework."

*Source: Annex III. Costa Rica’s Climate Change Challenge. CR/22/345.*

### 38.      There is scope to raise potential growth and increase resilience to climate change.

### 1criea2024002-print-pdf - 38.      There is scope to raise potential growth and increase resilience to climate change.

### Key policy priorities and recommendations
- Priorities include:
  - further improving the business environment,
  - promoting green investment, and
  - sustaining the momentum behind a range of RSF-supported climate reforms.

### Substantive findings and analysis
- There is scope to raise potential growth and increase resilience to climate change through policy actions that:
  - improve the business environment,
  - encourage and channel green investment, and
  - maintain progress on RSF-supported climate reform measures.

### Selected macroeconomic projections and indicators (as reported)
- Real GDP (annual percentage change): -4.3, 7.9, 4.6, 5.1, 4.0, 4.0, 3.5, 3.5, 3.5, 3.5, 3.5, 3.5
- Domestic demand (annual percentage change): -4.8, 8.6, 0.8, 3.1, 4.2, 4.4, 3.6, 3.5, 3.5, 3.6, 3.6, 3.5
- Consumer prices (period average, annual percentage change): 0.7, 1.7, 8.3, 0.5, 0.3, -0.4, 2.9, 1.6, 3.0, 3.0, 3.0, 3.0
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): -1.0, -3.2, -3.3, -1.4, -2.0, -1.9, -2.1, -1.9, -1.7, -1.6, -1.5, -1.4
- Trade balance (percent of GDP): -3.2, -4.4, -6.7, -3.7, -4.6, -3.9, -4.6, -4.0, -3.9, -4.0, -4.0, -4.0
- Services (percent of GDP): 7.2, 7.0, 10.1, 9.7, 9.8, 9.6, 9.8, 9.6, 9.7, 9.7, 9.9, 9.9
- Foreign direct investment, net (percent of GDP): -2.6, -4.8, -4.4, -4.3, -4.5, -4.3, -4.5, -4.3, -4.3, -4.3, -4.2, -4.2
- Gross international reserves (millions of U.S. dollars): 7,232; 6,921; 8,724; 13,261; 14,229; 14,441; 14,915; 15,174; 15,905; 16,478; 17,165; 17,853
  - as percent of ARA metric: 107.2, 99.7, 106.4, 146.3, 141.7, 146.7, 142.5, 147.4, 145.2, 142.3, 140.4, 138.8
  - in months of next year's imports: 4.0, 3.1, 3.7, 5.1, 4.9, 5.2, 4.8, 5.1, 5.0, 4.9, 4.8, 4.7
- External debt (percent of GDP): 49.6, 48.6, 50.7, 43.3, 42.2, 41.9, 41.4, 41.1, 41.1, 40.7, 40.0, 39.3
- Central government primary balance (percent of GDP): -3.7, -0.3, 2.1, 1.6, 1.9, 1.3, 2.0, 1.6, 1.8, 1.9, 1.9, 1.9
- Central government overall balance (percent of GDP): -8.4, -5.1, -2.8, -3.2, -3.0, -3.7, -2.7, -3.2, -2.7, -2.3, -2.0, -1.8
- Central government debt (percent of GDP): 66.9, 67.6, 63.0, 61.1, 60.3, 61.1, 59.3, 60.8, 59.8, 58.4, 56.8, 55.1

### Financial sector and fiscal context (selected indicators)
- NPL to total loans (percent, financial sector): 2.1–2.5 range across recent observations (values reported: 2.1, 2.4, 2.5, 2.3, 2.1, 2.0, 2.4)
- Capital adequacy and profitability (financial sector): Capital adequacy ratio and profitability measures reported in figures and tables; see monetary and financial sector developments.
- Gross fiscal financing needs and debt profile (selected items reported in figures): projections of interest payments, primary deficit, external amortizations, domestic amortizations, and debt (RHS) shown in fiscal sector developments.

### Implementation implications
- To raise potential growth and enhance climate resilience, the report emphasizes:
  - targeted reforms to further improve the business environment,
  - policies to promote and attract green investment, and
  - continued implementation and momentum for RSF-supported climate reforms.

*Source: 1criea2024002-print-pdf - 38.      There is scope to raise potential growth and increase resilience to climate change.*

### Annex I. Risk Assessment Matrix

### Annex I. Risk Assessment Matrix

### External risks — key risks, likelihoods, impacts, and policy responses
- Intensification of regional conflicts (e.g., escalation or spread of the conflict in Gaza and Israel, Russia’s war in Ukraine, other regional conflicts or terrorism)  
  - Likelihood: High  
  - Impact: Medium  
  - Policy response:
    - Maintain adequate level of international reserve buffers to respond to adverse changes in international food and energy.
    - Maintain exchange rate flexibility to help absorb external shocks.
    - Safeguard revenues and continue spending-based consolidation to maintain fiscal space for protection of social goals while securing debt sustainability.

- Global growth surprises: slowdown in major economies (supply disruptions, tight monetary policy, rising corporate bankruptcies, deeper-than-envisaged real estate contraction) with adverse spillovers  
  - Likelihood: Medium  
  - Impact: High  
  - Policy response:
    - Maintain flexibility of the exchange rate as absorber of external shocks.
    - Use monetary and fiscal policy mix to mitigate impacts on growth and inflation based on Costa Rica’s cyclical position.
    - Maintain adequate level of international reserve buffers to respond to potential capital outflows.
    - Preserve financial sector’s capital adequacy buffers to cushion the impact of sudden stops in international financial flows.

- Commodity price volatility (supply/demand fluctuations from conflicts, export restrictions, OPEC+ decisions, green transition)  
  - Likelihood: High  
  - Impact: Medium  
  - Policy response:
    - Maintain a monetary policy stance that limits the impact on domestic inflation while maintaining exchange rate flexibility to absorb international price shocks.
    - Maintain adequate level of international reserve buffers to respond to increments of the commodity import bill.
    - Maintain priority of social spending in fiscal policy.

- Sovereign debt distress (domino effects from high global interest rates, deteriorating debt sustainability in some AEs, unfunded fiscal spending, disorderly debt events in some EMDEs)  
  - Likelihood: Medium  
  - Impact: High  
  - Policy response:
    - Maintain adequate levels of international reserve buffers to respond to capital outflows.
    - Preserve fiscal consolidation to contain financing needs and maintain fiscal space to offset spillover impacts from tighter international financial conditions.
    - Preserve financial sector’s capital and liquidity buffers to cushion capital outflows and mitigate potential sovereign-bank feedback effects.

- Deepening geoeconomic fragmentation (inward-oriented policies, weakened international cooperation, protectionism, payments systems fragmentation)  
  - Likelihood: High  
  - Impact: Medium  
  - Policy response:
    - Maintain adequate levels of international reserves to respond to changes in capital flows.
    - Maintain conditions and policies for good business environment and productivity improvements to attract FDI flows, including impact from reshoring.
    - Strengthen and diversify trade and financial linkages via implementation of Free Trade and Investment Agreements.

- Climate change (extreme climate events causing loss of life, infrastructure damage, food insecurity, supply disruptions, lower growth, financial instability)  
  - Likelihood: Medium  
  - Impact: Medium  
  - Policy response:
    - Build on reforms supported by the RSF arrangement and other measures supporting the implementation of public investment in adaptation and mitigation (resilient infrastructure, renewable energy, ecosystems conservation).
    - Create enabling environment for private-sector climate financing, including the introduction of climate-related financing instruments to channel capital flows to climate-related investments.

- Note on risk-language calibration:
  - The Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) uses staff subjective assessments where “low” indicates probability below 10 percent, “medium” indicates probability between 10 and 30 percent, and “high” indicates probability between 30 and 50 percent.

### Domestic risks — key risks, likelihoods, impacts, and policy responses
- Political fragmentation and reform fatigue (difficulty passing key government reform measures or adverse initiatives)  
  - Likelihood: Medium  
  - Impact: Medium  
  - Policy response:
    - Continue to build coalitions across party lines in the Legislative Assembly and assess macrocriticality of ongoing proposals supported by the executive branch to elaborate strategies to get agreement in the legislative process.
    - Prioritize proposals to discuss in Legislative Assembly.
    - Communicate negative consequences of adverse initiatives.

- Sudden surge of migration flows (higher-than-expected migration crossing Costa Rica due to instability in neighboring countries)  
  - Likelihood: High  
  - Impact: Medium  
  - Policy response:
    - Increase priority social spending while safeguarding the fiscal consolidation process to ensure that public debt firmly remains on a downward trend.
    - Close coordination with key stakeholders and additional support from development partners to cope with rising migration flows.

- Loss of confidence in non-bank financial institutions after Coopeservidores and Desyfin interventions (financial misreporting and weak governance)  
  - Likelihood: Low  
  - Impact: Medium  
  - Policy response:
    - Maintain adequate levels of capital and liquidity buffers.
    - Strengthen risk-based supervisory tools and processes for data quality and validation.

### Sovereign risk and debt sustainability — summary findings and projections
- Overall DSA summary assessment: Under the baseline, Costa Rica’s public debt is assessed to remain sustainable. Public debt is projected to decline to about 60 percent of GDP in the short run and to 50 percent of GDP within 10 years. Gross financing needs are estimated at about 8-9 percent of GDP in the short run and expected to decline over the medium term.
- Key mitigating factors: financing from official external sources, domestic debt, and Eurobonds; a fiscal rule that responds to the debt ratio; the authorities' track record in taking corrective action.
- Coverage note: Coverage is of the central government due to data timeliness and quality concerns for the broader public sector.

- Selected baseline projections (Percent of GDP unless indicated otherwise) — Public debt and related flows (Table 4)
  - Public debt:
    - Actual 2023: 61.1
    - 2024: 61.1
    - 2025: 60.8
    - 2026: 59.8
    - 2027: 58.4
    - 2028: 56.8
    - 2029: 55.1
    - 2030: 53.5
    - 2031: 51.8
    - 2032: 50.2
    - 2033: 48.6
  - Change in public debt (year-on-year):
    - 2023: -1.9
    - 2024: 0.0
    - 2025: -0.3
    - 2026: -1.0
    - 2027: -1.4
    - 2028: -1.5
    - 2029: -1.7
    - 2030: -1.7
    - 2031: -1.7
    - 2032: -1.6
    - 2033: -1.6
  - Contribution of identified flows (Percent of GDP):
    - Primary deficit:
      - 2023: -1.6
      - 2024: -1.2 6  (text shows "-1.26" — preserve exactly) 
      - 2025: -1.6
      - 2026: -1.8
      - 2027: -1.9
      - 2028: -1.9
      - 2029: -1.9
      - 2030: -1.9
      - 2031: -1.9
      - 2032: -1.8
      - 2033: -1.8
    - Noninterest revenues: 15.3 (2023) and 15.0 for 2024–2033
    - Noninterest expenditures: 13.7 (2023); 13.8 (2024); then 13.4, 13.3, 13.2, 13.2, 13.1, 13.1, 13.1, 13.2, 13.2
    - Automatic debt dynamics:
      - 2023: -2.0
      - 2024: 2.0
      - 2025: 1.3
      - 2026: 0.9
      - 2027: 0.6
      - 2028: 0.4
      - 2029: 0.3
      - 2030: 0.3
      - 2031: 0.3
      - 2032: 0.3
      - 2033: 0.3
    - Real interest rate and relative inflation:
      - 2023: 4.0
      - 2024: 4.4
      - 2025: 3.4
      - 2026: 2.9
      - 2027: 2.6
      - 2028: 2.4
      - 2029: 2.2
      - 2030: 2.1
      - 2031: 2.1
      - 2032: 2.0
      - 2033: 1.9
    - Real growth rate:
      - 2023: -3.1
      - 2024: -2.4
      - 2025: -2.1
      - 2026: -2.1
      - 2027: -2.0
      - 2028: -2.0
      - 2029: -1.9
      - 2030: -1.8
      - 2031: -1.8
      - 2032: -1.7
      - 2033: -1.6
  - Gross financing needs (GFN):
    - 2023: 8.9
    - 2024: 8.9
    - 2025: 8.2
    - 2026: 8.8
    - 2027: 6.4
    - 2028: 6.6
    - 2029: 7.0
    - 2030: 6.3
    - 2031: 5.5
    - 2032: 8.0
    - 2033: 6.5
  - Of which: debt service (percent of GDP):
    - 2023: 10.4
    - 2024: 10.1
    - 2025: 9.7
    - 2026: 10.6
    - 2027: 8.3
    - 2028: 8.5
    - 2029: 8.9
    - 2030: 8.2
    - 2031: 7.4
    - 2032: 9.8
    - 2033: 8.3
  - Currency composition of GFNs (Percent of GFN):
    - Local currency:
      - 2023: 6.7
      - 2024: 7.0
      - 2025: 6.1
      - 2026: 7.7
      - 2027: 5.4
      - 2028: 6.5
      - 2029: 5.9
      - 2030: 6.0
      - 2031: 5.6
      - 2032: 7.9
      - 2033: 6.3
    - Foreign currency:
      - 2023: 3.7
      - 2024: 3.2
      - 2025: 3.6
      - 2026: 2.9
      - 2027: 2.9
      - 2028: 2.0
      - 2029: 2.9
      - 2030: 2.2
      - 2031: 1.9
      - 2032: 1.9
      - 2033: 2.0
  - Memo:
    - Real GDP growth (percent):
      - 2023: 5.1
      - 2024: 4.0
      - 2025: 3.5
      - 2026–2033: 3.5, 3.5, 3.5, 3.5, 3.4, 3.4, 3.3, 3.3
    - Inflation (GDP deflator; percent):
      - 2023: -0.1
      - 2024: 0.3
      - 2025–2033: 2.7, 3.2, 3.2, 3.2, 3.2, 3.2, 3.2, 3.2
    - Nominal GDP growth (percent):
      - 2023: 5.0
      - 2024: 4.3
      - 2025: 6.3
      - 2026–2033: 6.8, 6.8, 6.8, 6.8, 6.7, 6.7, 6.6, 6.6
    - Effective interest rate (percent):
      - 2023: 8.1
      - 2024: 8.5
      - 2025: 8.2
      - 2026: 7.8
      - 2027: 7.4
      - 2028: 7.1
      - 2029: 6.9
      - 2030: 6.7
      - 2031: 6.6
      - 2032: 6.5
      - 2033: 6.3

- Commentary summary: Fiscal consolidation, a stronger currency, and strong GDP growth significantly reduced debt since 2021. Less favorable automatic dynamics, lower revenues, and one-off expenditures temporarily halted debt reduction in 2024. Over the medium term, debt reduction is expected to be supported by lower interest rates and a primary balance of almost 2 percent of GDP.

### Medium-term risk assessment and indices (selected metrics)
- Debt fanchart module:
  - Fanchart width: 51.2 0.7  (presented as "51.20.7" in source)
  - Probability of debt non-stabilization (percent): 8.7 0.1  (presented as "8.70.1")
  - Terminal debt-to-GDP x: 28.4 0.6  (presented as "28.40.6")
  - Debt fanchart index (DFI): 1.4
  - Risk signal: 3/Moderate
- Gross Financing Needs (GFN) module:
  - Average baseline GFN: 7.6 2.6  (presented as "7.6 2.6")
  - Initial Banks' claims on the general govt (pct bank assets): 9.9 3.2
  - Change in banks' claims in stress (pct banks' assets): 8.4 2.8
  - GFN financeability index (GFI): 8.6
  - Risk signal: 4/Moderate
- Medium-Term Index (combined): Risk signal: 5/ (final assessment: moderate)
- Crisis prediction metrics:
  - Prob. of missed crisis, 2024-2029, if stress not predicted: 9.1 pct.
  - Prob. of false alarms, 2024-2029, if stress predicted: 43.2 pct.
- Commentary: The MTI remains slightly below the low-risk threshold. The fanchart estimates risks to be moderate. The GFN module indicates lower risks than comparators. The contingent liability test includes contingent claims on the central government equal to 10 percent of GDP paid over 4 years, including 8 percent of GDP related to a disputed claim by the CCSS.

### Realism of baseline assumptions and stress/testing notes
- Realism analysis: No major concerns triggered. Structural improvement in the primary balance is underpinned by implementation track record and the MTFF. Spreads expected to be lower owing to multilateral financing and less pressure on local markets. GDP growth projections align with recent averages, implied fiscal multipliers, and potential growth estimates.
- Triggered modules / long-term scenario indicators (Table 7 selected custom scenario averages):
  - Real GDP growth: 2029: 3.5% ; 2029–2033 average: 3.3% ; 2033 to 2037 average: 3.2%
  - Primary Balance-to-GDP ratio: 2029: 1.9% ; 2029–2033 average: 1.8% ; 2033 to 2037 average: 1.3%
  - Real depreciation: -2.3% (for 2029, 2029–2033 average, and 2033–2037 average)
  - Inflation (GDP deflator): 3.2% (for 2029, 2029–2033 average, and 2033–2037 average)
  - Module commentary: The module flags variables that exceed historical averages by more than one standard deviation; staff’s baseline is shown by the custom scenario with a primary balance averaging (text truncated in source).

*Source: IMF staff (Annex I. Risk Assessment Matrix; Annex II. Sovereign Risk and Debt Sustainability Assessment, selected tables and notes).*

### 1.3 percent of GDP over the long term (consistent with more fiscal space for higher spending as debt falls) and GDP grow

### 1criea2024002-print-pdf - 1.3 percent of GDP over the long term (consistent with more fiscal space for higher spending as debt falls) and GDP grow

### Long-term fiscal outlook and growth
- Long-term primary balance improvement cited as "1.3 percent of GDP over the long term (consistent with more fiscal space for higher spending as debt falls)".  
- GDP growth slowing mainly due to a declining labor force, to about "2.5 percent in 2050".  
- Declining debt and GFN paths and the overall risk indication are characterized as "consistent with a low overall long-term risk."  
- Large amortizations noted as a factor in medium-term dynamics.

### Demographics — Pensions
- Time horizons and projected pension financing needs:
  - "30 years": "1.1% (pp of GDP per year)".
  - "50 years": "2.7% (pp of GDP per year)".
  - "Until 2100": "4.3% (pp of GDP per year)".  
- Commentary:
  - The pensions module focuses on old age, death, and disability pension.
  - Modeled demographic pressures run down assets by "2036" (in line with the MTFF but sooner than a new actuarial study), generating fiscal pressures and debt risks.
  - Results are described as illustrative, not forecasts, indicating the "need for parametric changes."
  - Policy options that could reduce costs by "2 percent of GDP by 2050": indexation to inflation instead of wages and linking retirement age to life expectancy.  
- Permanent adjustment needed in the pension system to keep pension assets positive for multiple horizons is illustrated by projected series (charts referenced in source).

### Demographics — Health
- Commentary:
  - Healthcare modules estimate aging effects using CCSS spending data.
  - A scenario of higher spending per capita by "0.6 percent per year" suggests contingent fiscal pressures that could prevent sustained declines in debt.
- Visuals in source show impacts on GFN-to-GDP Ratio and Total Public Debt-to-GDP Ratio under:
  - "Baseline: Custom"
  - "Health (Demographics)"
  - "Health (Demographics + ECG)"

### Climate change — Adaptation
- Standardized adaptation cost assumptions:
  - "0.3 percent of GDP in 2030-2034"
  - "0.1 percent of GDP in the long term"
- Commentary: These adaptation costs have a "small effect on debt and financing needs."
- Scenario labels used: "Baseline: Custom" and "With climate adaptation (standardized scenario)".

### Climate change — Mitigation
- Commentary: Costa Rica's near-complete renewable electricity generation makes the default EM scenario less applicable.
- Customized mitigation scenario based on the National Decarbonization Plan:
  - Costing of "0.3 percent of GDP per year for a decade"
  - Fuel revenue losses: a permanent "0.1 percent of GDP per year"
- Source states this customized scenario "has a small effect."
- Scenario labels used: "Baseline: Custom", "With climate mitigation (standardized scenario)", "With climate mitigation (customized scenario)".

### Stress Scenario (Annex III) — design and assumptions
- Purpose: A severe stress scenario in Costa Rica’s SRDSA to analyze capacity to repay the Fund; quantification consistent with materialization of global risks and adverse domestic developments.
- Shock start year: "2025".
- Key scenario features for Costa Rica:
  - GDP growth: "falls 3.1 percentage points to 0.4 percent in 2025 and 2026."
  - Marginal effective interest rates: "reach 9 percent (local currency) and 8 percent (foreign currency) in 2025 and return to the baseline in 2029."
  - GDP deflator inflation: "rises 1.2 percentage points from the baseline to 3.9 percent in 2025, and declines 0.8 percentage points from the baseline to 2.4 percent in 2026."
  - Currency depreciation: "depreciates 7.7 percentage points in 2025. The depreciation is permanent."
  - Primary surplus: "decreases by 0.8 percent of GDP to 1 percent of GDP in 2026 and is the same as a share of GDP in later years."
  - Maturity shortening: In 2025, debt issuance splits "50 percent between short-term and long-term," with the long-term share rising gradually over a "5-year interval."
  - Debt holder assumptions:
    - Rollover rate: "foreign private creditors rollover rate is 67 percent for 2025 and 2026, thereafter 100 percent."
    - New financing: "foreign private creditors provide no new financing other than for existing debt rollover."
    - Creditor groups other than domestic commercial banks provide additional financing proportionate to baseline and claims reach "a manageable 33 percent of GDP in 2029."
    - Commercial banks are the residual source and claims reach "a manageable 19 percent of GDP."

### Stress Scenario — external sector complements
- Current account path:
  - Responds to the real exchange rate with a two-year lag using a current account-REER elasticity of "-0.29."
  - Over the long term, the current account "gradually returns to the baseline."
- Private financial flows:
  - Short run: net private-sector flows "are substantially weaker than under the baseline."
  - Thereafter: flows recover and "cumulatively match those under the baseline over the medium and long run."

### Stress Scenario — key macroeconomic impacts
- GDP:
  - "Nominal GDP growth in dollars falls about 9.6   and 4 percentage points relative to the baseline in 2025 and 2026." (text shows two figures; formatting preserved)
  - After 2026, nominal GDP growth in dollars is the same as baseline so the nominal GDP loss is "permanent."
- External sector:
  - REER depreciates "5.2 and 0.03 percentage points in 2025 and 2026, respectively."
  - Current account deficit falls by "2 percentage points of GDP in 2027 relative to the baseline."
  - Current account reaches a surplus of "0.8 percent of GDP in 2031" and returns to baseline in the long run.
- Government revenues:
  - "Government revenues in dollars are 12.4 percent lower than under the baseline by 2026 and the loss is permanent."
- External public debt service:
  - Peaks at "US$ 6.9   billion (5.8 percent of GDP) in 2030" compared to a baseline of "US$ 4.4   billion in that year" due to higher interest payments and maturity shortening.
- Gross international reserves:
  - Cumulative effects reduce reserves by "one-third relative to baseline to U$ 11 billion in 2027," equivalent to a reduction by "about one quarter between 2024 and 2027."
  - Note: Decline consistent with historical fall in reserves observed between "January 2020 and June 2022."

### Indicators of Capacity to Repay
- Outstanding IMF credit increases:
  - "0.2 and 0.3 percentage points of GDP with respect to the baseline in 2025 and 2026, respectively (years of the shock)."
  - "0.2 percentage points of GDP on average between 2027 and 2030."
  - After 2030, the increase is "less than 0.1 percentage points on average."
- Total obligations increase "by less than 0.1 percentage points of GDP."

*Source: IMF staff estimates; content extracted from the provided PDF content unit.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2024/english/1criea2024002-print-pdf.pdf_
