## 1cypea2024002

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---

### Different inflation measures in Cyprus over time — overview
- Headline inflation peaked at over 10 percent in July 2022; core inflation surpassed 6 percent in July 2022.
- By end-2023, headline inflation dipped below 2 percent; core inflation declined to 2.4 percent.
- In December (2023), euro area headline and core HICP inflation: 2.9 percent and 3.4 percent, respectively.
- LIMI (goods and services with low import content) inflation remained above 4 percent at end-2023; LIMI inflation excluding restaurants and accommodation close to 3 percent since mid-2022.
- ECB policy rate moved from 0 to 4.5 percent since July 2022.

### Supply and demand decomposition of core inflation
- Methodology:
  - Bayesian Vector-Error-Correction models (BVARs) with output growth and inflation to decompose supply and demand contributions to excess core inflation.
- Key findings:
  - Post-pandemic core inflation surge attributable to both supply and demand, with demand dominating most of the time.
  - Aggregate supply factors peaked in 2022Q3—contributing 2.4 percentage points to core inflation.
  - Supply factors declined after the peak but still accounted for over a third of excess core inflation in 2023.
  - Demand factors remained stickier, consistent with a positive output gap estimate.

### Bottom-up decomposition of core inflation components
- Classification: supply-chain sensitive items; re-opening (pent-up demand) items; rent; miscellaneous.
- Findings:
  - Contribution from supply disruptions declined during 2023 and was very small at year-end.
  - Demand-related components were on average about twice as large as supply-related components in 2023.
  - Supply disruptions still accounted for around a third of 2023 excess core inflation in this decomposition.

### Fiscal vs. non-fiscal demand pressures
- Fiscal stance and methodology:
  - Fiscal balance turned strongly negative in 2020 and 2021, returned to a surplus in 2022.
  - BVAR extended to include output growth, inflation, short-term interest rate, and fiscal balance to decompose excess inflation into fiscal and non-fiscal drivers.
- Quantitative findings:
  - For 2022, estimation attributes around 1.2 percentage points of core inflation to fiscal policy.
  - Fiscal contribution declined in 2023 to 0.4 percentage points in 2023Q4 (quarter-over-quarter contribution also slightly declined).
  - By end-2023, demand pressures likely dominated by non-fiscal factors.

### Unit profits, labor costs, and price deflators
- GDP deflator decomposition (national accounts identity: unit labor costs, unit profits, unit net taxes):
  - Since 2021, unit profits increased while unit labor costs declined.
  - In 2022, nearly three-quarters of inflation was driven by unit profits; remainder from higher unit taxes; negligible contribution from unit labor costs.
  - In 2023, unit profits and unit labor costs contributed roughly equally to inflation developments.
- Consumption deflator (includes imports):
  - In 2022, foreign factors contributed significantly but less than domestic profits.
  - Domestic profits remained a significant driver even after accounting for import price shocks.
  - Unit labor costs began contributing to inflation in the most recent period.

### Monetary tightening and retail rate pass‑through
- ECB tightening: policy rate increased from 0 to 4.5 percent starting July 2022 (steepest tightening since euro inception).
- Pass‑through findings:
  - Pass‑through to new lending rates in Cyprus comparable to other European and Euro Area countries.
  - Pass‑through to new loans for NFCs somewhat weaker than for other loan types.
  - Pass‑through to consumption loans and mortgages (new loans) somewhat stronger than in other European and euro area economies.
  - Pass‑through to outstanding mortgages much stronger; for outstanding mortgages pass‑through more than twice as strong as in Europe and the euro area, yet only half of the policy rate change was passed on to outstanding mortgages.
  - Around two‑thirds of the increase in policy rates passed on to new mortgage and consumption loan rates.
- Deposit pass‑through:
  - Only a quarter of the policy rate increase passed to household time deposits; none passed to household overnight deposits.
  - Deposit pass‑through somewhat higher for corporations.
  - Deposit pass‑through in Cyprus lower and slower than in other countries despite similar lending pass‑through.
  - Structural drivers: low competition (banking sector concentration) and high banking sector liquidity (loan‑deposit ratio); Cyprus is an outlier on both measures.
- Bank profitability:
  - Heterogeneous lending and deposit pass‑through increased interest rate margins; net interest income increased strongly after tightening start.
  - Lower deposit pass‑through added to higher revenue from reserves held at the ECB, pushing up bank profits.

### Policy implications on inflation and demand management
- Continued commitment to containing aggregate demand supports final stage of disinflation.
- Monetary tightening materially affected lending rates and supported disinflation; incomplete pass‑through to deposit rates and persistent domestic demand warrant vigilance.
- Fiscal contributions were material in 2022 but declined substantially in 2023; policy coordination should consider evolving balance between fiscal and non‑fiscal drivers.
- Recommendations related to banking and housing transmission:
  - Avoid hindering transmission through the real estate sector (note that interest rate subsidy schemes and robust external housing demand have weakened wealth channel).
  - Analyze low banking competition and financial literacy; consider improving financial literacy, enhancing consumer protection, and addressing market entry/perceptions.

### Wage dynamics
- Wage pass‑through historically strong in Cyprus and drove inflation last year.
- Labor market tightness (record‑high vacancy‑to‑unemployment ratio) could intensify wage pressures.
- Increasing labor supply (immigration or increased participation) could help meet employment needs.
- Public sector wage control recommended; cost‑of‑living allowance should not be raised further.
- Elevated corporate profits could allow absorption of potential wage increases; disinflation likely needs wages to rise relative to profits and profit share normalization.

---

### Stepping up mitigation efforts — Cyprus and EU context
- Global BAU projection: global GHG emissions projected to increase 5 percent by 2030 relative to 2019 (Black, Parry and Zhunussova 2023).
- EU commitments:
  - Climate neutrality by 2050 (European Green Deal).
  - Revised NDC: 55 percent GHG reduction by 2030 compared to 1990 (up from 40 percent).
  - European Commission proposed frontloading effort to achieve 90 percent emission reduction by 2040.
  - Fit‑for‑55 package and an EU-wide ETS II anticipated in 2027.
- Cyprus commitments and RRP:
  - Revised NECP 2021-2030: ESR sectors target raised to 32 percent (up from 24 percent).
  - RRP budget: €1.2 billion (4 percent of 2023 GDP); 41 percent allocated to green transition.
  - RRP investments: electricity interconnector, energy efficiency and RES, EV promotion, reforms for emissions reduction, water and waste management, biodiversity.

### Cyprus emissions, energy mix, and constraints
- Historical emissions:
  - Annual net GHG emissions increased by more than 70 percent between 1990 and 2008, then reversed half the increase by 2013; since then broadly stable.
- Energy mix:
  - 90 percent of Cyprus energy mix from oil and petroleum products.
  - Cyprus lacks connections to EU electricity and natural gas grids; major connectivity projects delayed.
  - RES development rising but lags EU.
- ETS / ESR:
  - Almost half of 2021 emissions covered by EU ETS; 70 percent of ETS-covered emissions from power sector.
  - ETS-covered emissions down 14 percent since 2005.
  - ESR sectors: half of ESR emissions from transport; ESR emissions up 3 percent relative to 2005 by 2021.
  - Cyprus exceeded Annual Emission Allocations (AEAs) since 2017.

### Emissions projections and scenarios
- BAU (no new measures): ESR emissions projected to continue rising.
- WEM: ESR emissions decline by 7 percent by 2030 compared to 2005.
- WAM: ESR emissions fall by 21 percent by 2030 compared to 2005.
- Gap to NECP target:
  - Even under WAM, emissions projected to remain 13 percent above target by 2030 and exceed AEAs every year until 2030.
  - Most projected reductions under WAM come from transport; little reduction in other ESR sectors.
- Critical enablers: timely completion of natural gas and electricity infrastructure projects, accelerate RES and EV adoption, promote energy efficiency.

### Current carbon pricing and fuel taxation
- Net Effective Carbon Rates (NECRs):
  - Economy‑wide NECRs not far off EU average due largely to ETS permit prices on electricity.
  - In non‑ETS sectors, effective carbon prices lower than elsewhere in EU.
  - In transport, Cyprus’s NECR lags EU average by about €20/tonCO2eq.
- Fuel taxation:
  - Gasoline and diesel prices among lowest in EU due to low effective taxation on fuel; pre‑tax prices broadly similar to other European countries.
  - Until end‑March 2024, an 8 cents per liter reduction in fuel excises kept gasoline and diesel excises at the minimum allowed by the European Energy Taxation Directive.
  - Diesel used in agriculture fully exempt; partial exemptions for heating and industrial fuels.
  - Fuel prices inclusive of excises subjected to VAT rate of 19 percent (simple average VAT rate in EU is 21 percent).

### Green tax reform design and schedule (2024–2033)
- Elements introduced in 2024 and increased annually until 2033:
  - (i) carbon tax for fuels used in non‑ETS sectors;
  - (ii) levy on water;
  - (iii) charge on landfill waste;
  - (iv) nightly tourism tax.
- Carbon tax as fuel excise duty top‑up (differentiated rates and schedules):

  - Motor fuels (€/liter by year):
    - 2024: 0.05
    - 2025: 0.07
    - 2026: 0.10
    - 2027: 0.14
    - 2028: 0.19
    - 2029: 0.21
    - 2030: 0.22
    - 2031: 0.23
    - 2032: 0.24
    - 2033: 0.25

  - Motor fuels (€/tonCO2eq. by year):
    - 2024: 20.1
    - 2025: 28.1
    - 2026: 40.2
    - 2027: 56.3
    - 2028: 76.3
    - 2029: 84.3
    - 2030: 88.4
    - 2031: 92.4
    - 2032: 96.4
    - 2033: 100.5

  - Non‑ETS industry (€/liter by year):
    - 2024: 0.07
    - 2025: 0.11
    - 2026: 0.14
    - 2027: 0.17
    - 2028: 0.19
    - 2029: 0.20

  - Non‑ETS industry (€/tonCO2eq. by year):
    - 2024: 26.7
    - 2025: 42.0
    - 2026: 53.4
    - 2027: 64.9
    - 2028: 72.5
    - 2029: 76.3

- Equivalencies:
  - Motor fuels first‑year rate (5 cents per liter in 2024) ≈ €20/tonCO2eq rising to about €100 /tonCO2eq by 2033.
  - Non‑ETS industry excise starts at 7 cents per liter rising to 20 cents per liter by 2029, equivalent to about €27/tonCO2eq up to €76/tonCO2eq.

### Expected environmental and fiscal impacts of the carbon tax
- Emissions impact:
  - Tax reform expected to reduce emissions by an additional 55 thousand tons of CO2 or 3.8 percent of projected WAM emissions by 2030, closing about a third of the current gap between WAM and the 2030 target.
  - Note: CPAT computes impacts relative to BAU; deltas applied to WAM ad hoc (deltas may be overestimated for WAM).
- Revenue impact:
  - Tax expected to generate 0.1-0.2 percent of GDP per year in 2025, rising to 0.4 percent of GDP starting from 2028.
  - Gross revenue increase from higher rate per unit of carbon estimated to reach 0.5 percent of GDP.
  - Base erosion: as carbon prices reduce demand, tax base will shrink, reducing revenues from the new tax and existing fuel excises and VAT; erosion directly proportional to abatement effectiveness.
  - Revenue composition: 94 percent of additional revenues expected to arise from the tax on motor fuels.

### Distributional and sectoral considerations
- Elasticities and incidence:
  - Cyprus elasticities generally lower than global average; smaller response per unit price increase.
  - Distributional impact broadly proportional: model estimates uniform consumption decline of 0.4 percent across income groups; rural households more affected.
  - Wider‑scope tax: bottom deciles see consumption decline ~0.7 percent; highest deciles fall by 0.6 percent (slightly regressive).
- Sectoral impacts:
  - Largest emission reductions expected in transport; limited reductions in other ESR sectors without additional measures.
  - Accelerated EV adoption, RES penetration, and infrastructure completion critical to broaden decarbonization.
- Fiscal trade‑offs:
  - Rising carbon prices provide revenue but accelerate base erosion; revenue recycling and supportive policies needed to mitigate distributional impacts.

### Modelling tool and limitations
- IMF‑WB CPAT tool used (mitigation module and distribution module).
- CPAT draws on global datasets, parametrization informed by literature; computes mitigation impacts relative to BAU.
- Limitations noted: CPAT abstracts from some adjustment costs and inter‑sectoral dynamics; elasticities assumed time‑invariant for the main exercises.

### Policy scenarios, fiscal multipliers, and mitigation of distributional impacts
- Transitory macroeconomic impact:
  - Direct impact estimated to lower annual growth by 0.1-0.2 percentage points at its peak in 2029-2031 (excluding revenue recycling).
- Revenue recycling to offset distributional impacts:
  - A quarter (third) of revenues can fully offset impact on the four (five) lowest deciles via well‑targeted social transfers.
  - For a wider‑scope tax with comparable revenues, a third (half) of revenues needed to offset bottom four (five) deciles.
  - Prefer targeted PIT allowances or well‑targeted social transfers over generalized PIT rate reductions.
- Augmented (wide‑scope) carbon tax scenario:
  - Apply €20/tCO2 in 2024 rising to €100/tCO2 by 2033 (similar to motor fuels top‑up).
  - Expected to be 1.5 times the impact of current plan; ESR emissions decline additional 5.7 percent by 2030, closing almost half the gap between WAM and 2030 target.
  - Fiscal revenues reach 0.6 percent of GDP but are offset by faster base erosion (0.2 percent of GDP), leaving fiscal impact roughly same as current design.
- Ambition needed to meet 2030 target solely via carbon tax:
  - Tax rates would have to be 2.5 times higher than proposed rates; example path: start at 13 cents per liter (€50/tCO2eq) in 2024 ramping to €0.5 per liter (€200/tCO2eq) by 2030 (steeper economic/social implications).

### Complementary non‑price policies
- Non‑price policies can complement carbon pricing where harder‑to‑abate emissions exist (buildings, agriculture).
- Examples: feebates, regulations (minimum recycled content, construction waste targets), subsidies for rooftop solar, heat pumps, insulation financed by residential fuels taxation.
- Trade‑offs: less efficient than carbon pricing, do not raise revenue, can induce rebound effects, and can erode tax base.

### Key recommendations on green tax reform and mitigation strategy
- Consider applying transport carbon taxation rates more widely and uniformly to all non‑ETS sectors to raise NECRs toward EU averages and level abatement incentives across sectors (smooth transition to ETS II).
- Use revenue recycling to protect lower‑income households (quarter/third under narrow design; a third/half under wide‑scope design).
- Prefer well‑targeted social transfers or targeted PIT allowances over generalized PIT reductions.
- Combine uniform wide‑scope carbon tax with targeted sectoral policies (feebates, regulations, subsidies) to cost‑effectively close remaining gaps to 2030 targets.

---

### Climate projections, sea‑level rise, and adaptation costs
- Temperature and precipitation projections:
  - Total annual precipitation projected to decline under all emission scenarios (large uncertainty).
  - Projected additional warming by end‑century relative to 1995-2014 baseline: range 1.1°C to 1.6°C; high‑emission SSP3-7.0 up to 2.5°C.
- Fire risk:
  - Long‑run (2000-2021) shows 50% reduction in number of fires and burnt area; projections indicate increase in fire‑conducive weather.
  - High fire risk days: projected increase of 5-15 days/year in 2021-2050 vs 1961-1990.
  - Extreme fire risk days: projected increase of 1-10 days/year in 2021-2050 vs 1961-1990.
- Sea‑level rise (SLR) projections:
  - Median projections (Kopp et al. 2014): local SLR of 0.4 to 0.7 m in 2090-2099 with respect to 2000-2009 (≈ 0.3 to 0.6 m above present level) depending on emission scenario.
  - Example probabilistic RCP4.5: median 0.6 m with respect to 2000-2009; range that cannot be excluded 0.30 to 0.95 m.
  - SLR in Cyprus projected to be lower than global mean; certainty that sea level will continue to rise for ongoing decades.
- Macro‑economic risks:
  - Cumulative effect of slow‑moving warming in a fast‑warming planet: reduction in real per capita GDP by 3 to 5 percent by 2100 (range from two econometric models and SOCLIMPACT).
  - NGFS estimate: loss of GDP per capita equal to 7 percent in 2100 under RCP8.5‑like warming.
  - Historical extreme‑heat deaths: heat waves in 1998, 2000, and 2022 caused total 158 deaths.
- SLR economic costs and adaptation:
  - Projected damages from SLR: between 0.1 and 0.4 percent of GDP annually after 2050 under a moderate emission scenario (large uncertainties); IMF CIAM estimates on lower end.
  - PESETA IV extreme projection: costs up to 4.9 percent of GDP in 2100.
  - Modest investment of €7-10 million per year (≈ 0.04 percent of GDP) can reduce SLR costs by ≈ 90 percent (Vousdoukas et al. 2020, Table 5).
  - SOCLIMPACT estimates upgrading seaports: €2.2 million per year in 2046-2065; €4.3 million per year in 2081-2100 (extreme scenario).
- CIAM model and adaptation scenarios:
  - Three scenarios: No Planned Adaptation; Protection; Optimal Adaptation (mix of protection and retreat).
  - CIAM divides Cyprus coastline into 7 segments (44 Km long on average, range 1 Km to 111 Km).
  - Optimal strategy varies by segment; protection often optimal where existing capital and population density high; retreat often optimal where low.
  - Example: planned retreat may yield highest net present value in some analyses.
- Model limitations and policy implications:
  - Omitted impacts: saltwater intrusion, ocean acidification, erosion, coastal tourism losses.
  - Assumptions may overestimate adaptation costs (fixed decisions over decades) or underestimate no‑protection costs.
  - Policy recommendations:
    - Apply cost‑benefit analysis consistently; fund only projects with NPV > 0.
    - Focus government on public goods, reforms promoting private adaptation, and strengthening social programs.
    - Consider compensation/relocation subsidies where planned retreat is cheaper than full protection.
    - Address market failures, coordinate adaptation across networks, and align responsibilities across government levels.

*Source: 1cypea2024002 - IMF Cyprus chapter (selected issues).*

### 1. Different Inflation Measures in Cyprus over time _______________________________________ 3

### 1. Different Inflation Measures in Cyprus over time

### Introduction
- Inflation in Cyprus dropped in 2023 due to the diminishing impact of supply-side shocks and moderating demand.
- Some domestic price pressures persist, mostly from non-fiscal aggregate demand.
- ECB tightening has significantly impacted interest rates, including for outstanding mortgages.
- Deposit rates saw delayed and smaller increases, likely driven by high banking sector liquidity and low competition.
- Continued commitment to containing aggregate demand is supporting the final stage of disinflation.

### Key recent inflation outcomes
- Headline inflation peaked at over 10 percent in July 2022.
- Core inflation surpassed 6 percent in July 2022.
- By the end of 2023, headline inflation had dipped below 2 percent, while core inflation declined to 2.4 percent.
- In December (2023), euro area headline and core HICP inflation stood at 2.9 percent and 3.4 percent, respectively.
- LIMI (goods and services with low import content) inflation remained above 4 percent at the end of 2023.
- LIMI inflation excluding restaurants and accommodation was close to 3 percent since mid-2022.

### Supply and demand drivers of inflation
- Methodology: Bayesian Vector-Error-Correction models (BVARs) with output growth and inflation used to decompose supply and demand contributions to excess core inflation.
- Findings:
  - The post-pandemic core inflation surge is attributed to both supply and demand factors, with demand dominating most of the time.
  - Aggregate supply factors peaked in 2022Q3—contributing 2.4 percentage points to core inflation.
  - Supply factors declined after the peak but still accounted for over a third of excess core inflation in 2023.
  - Demand factors remained stickier and dominated overall, consistent with a positive output gap estimate.

### Bottom-up decomposition of core inflation
- HICP core components classified into four groups: supply-chain sensitive items; re-opening (pent-up demand) items; rent; and miscellaneous.
- Aggregation using HICP weights preserved classification over the sample.
- Findings:
  - Contribution from supply disruptions declined during 2023 and was very small at year-end.
  - Demand-related components were on average about twice as large as supply-related components in 2023.
  - Supply disruptions still accounted for around a third of 2023 excess core inflation in this decomposition as well.

### Fiscal and non-fiscal demand pressures
- Theoretical background: expansionary fiscal policy can be inflationary via consumption and investment channels and by affecting inflation expectations.
- Cyprus fiscal stance:
  - Fiscal balance turned strongly negative in 2020 and 2021, then returned to a surplus in 2022.
  - Cyprus employed temporary and mostly targeted fiscal support measures during the pandemic and energy shock.
- Empirical approach: BVAR model extended to include output growth, inflation, short-term interest rate, and the fiscal balance to decompose excess inflation into fiscal and non-fiscal drivers.
- Findings:
  - For 2022, the estimation attributes around 1.2 percentage points of core inflation to fiscal policy.
  - The fiscal contribution declined in 2023 and dropped to 0.4 percentage points in 2023Q4 (quarter-over-quarter contribution also slightly declined).
  - By end-2023, demand pressures were likely dominated by non-fiscal factors.
  - The model captures fiscal shocks in addition to the endogenous fiscal response to business cycle and supply/demand shocks.

### The role of unit profits and labor costs (GDP deflator decomposition)
- National accounts identity links GDP deflator to unit labor costs, unit profits, and unit net taxes.
- Findings:
  - Since 2021, unit profits increased while unit labor costs declined.
  - In 2022, nearly three-quarters of inflation was driven by unit profits; the remainder came from higher unit taxes, with a negligible contribution from unit labor costs.
  - The rising profit share indicates firms passed through more than immediate import cost shocks and have been relatively more shielded from inflation than wage earners.
  - In 2023, unit profits and unit labor costs contributed roughly equally to inflation developments.

### Consumption deflator decomposition
- The consumption deflator includes imports (unlike GDP deflator) and can be decomposed into domestic profits, labor, foreign factors, and net taxes under simplifying assumptions.
- Finding:
  - In 2022, foreign factors contributed significantly to the consumption deflator, though less than domestic profits.
  - Domestic profits remained a significant driver of inflation even after accounting for import price shocks.
  - Unit labor costs began contributing to inflation in the most recent period.

### Monetary tightening, lending, and deposit rate pass-through
- ECB policy response:
  - The ECB started tightening in July 2022 and raised its policy rate from 0 to 4.5 percent.
  - This has been the steepest tightening since the inception of the euro.
- Transmission:
  - Bank retail rates increased following ECB rate hikes; pass-through to lending rates is a crucial channel reducing non-fiscal demand pressures.
  - Pass-through to deposit rates was delayed and smaller, likely reflecting high banking sector liquidity and low competition—muting monetary policy stimulus reduction via margins and deposit adjustments.
  - Monetary tightening contributed to the partial reduction in non-fiscal demand pressures seen in 2023.

### Policy implications and conclusions (as discussed)
- Continued commitment to containing aggregate demand helps finalize disinflation.
- Monetary tightening by the ECB has materially affected lending rates and supported disinflation, while incomplete pass-through to deposit rates and persistent domestic demand suggest remaining vigilance is warranted.
- Fiscal contributions to inflation were material in 2022 but declined substantially in 2023; policy coordination should consider the evolving balance between fiscal and non-fiscal demand drivers.

*Source: 1cypea2024002 - 1. Different Inflation Measures in Cyprus over time (IMF Selected Issues Paper, May 9, 2024).*

### 17. The pass-through to bank retail rates can be assessed with so-called beta coefficients.

### 17. The pass-through to bank retail rates can be assessed with so‑called beta coefficients.

### Definition and methodology
- Beta coefficients are defined as the ratio of the cumulative change in bank retail rates to the cumulative change in the policy rate.
- For tightening cycles, beta coefficients are computed for different bank retail rates for both households and non‑financial corporations (NFCs).
- Usually, the transmission is nearly complete after three months; for international comparison beta coefficients are computed from the first increase of the policy rate to three months after the last increase. For the international comparison, the data ends in August 2023.

### Pass‑through to lending rates — key findings
- The pass‑through to new lending rates in Cyprus has been comparable to that in other European and Euro Area countries.
- Pass‑through to new loans for NFCs has been somewhat weaker than for other loan types.
- Pass‑through to consumption loans and mortgages (new loans) has been somewhat stronger than in other European and euro area economies.
- Pass‑through to outstanding mortgages has been much stronger; for outstanding mortgages the pass‑through has been more than twice as strong as in Europe and the euro area.
- Despite a high share of flexible rate mortgages, only half of the policy rate change has been passed on to outstanding mortgages.
- Around two‑thirds of the increase in policy rates has been passed on to new mortgage and consumption loan rates.

### Role of flexible‑rate mortgages
- Cyprus has among the highest share of flexible rate mortgages in Europe, and—in contrast to most other countries—the share has not declined over the last decade.
- New flexible‑rate mortgages are more closely related to short‑term interest rates than fixed‑rate mortgages, and outstanding flexible‑rate mortgages are adjusted more often than other types.
- The stable share of flexible‑rate mortgages could signal: strong market power of banks, an inability of banks to absorb long‑term funding risks, or low financial literacy. Most likely it has been a combination of these factors.
- Recent change in mortgage composition: the share of fixed‑rate mortgages for house purchases increased from 7 percent in June 2022 to 32 percent in January 2024.

### Transmission via the real estate market and demand effects
- The impact of higher mortgage rates on aggregate demand has been somewhat mitigated by robust external demand for houses; property sales increased in 2023, with foreigners accounting for close to half the demand.
- Interest Rate Subsidy Schemes for real estate announced in May 2020, and strong external housing demand, have weakened the wealth channel of monetary policy.

### Deposit pass‑through — findings and structural drivers
- Deposit rates have increased less than lending rates: only a quarter of the policy rate increase has been passed on to household time deposits, and none to household overnight deposits.
- As a result, the share of time deposits in all deposits started increasing again (after falling strongly before).
- Deposit pass‑through has been somewhat higher for corporations; corporate deposit pass‑through likely reflects more sophisticated financial planning and more bargaining power.
- Deposit pass‑through in Cyprus has been lower and slower than in other countries, despite relatively similar pass‑through to lending rates.
- Rates on time deposits continued increasing for much longer in Cyprus, but pass‑through remained much lower even by the end of 2023.
- Structural characteristics contributing to limited and delayed deposit pass‑through include low competition (banking sector concentration) and high banking sector liquidity (loan‑deposit ratio), with Cyprus an outlier on both measures.
- The lower and slower deposit pass‑through likely weakens transmission to output and prices by disincentivizing saving, though this is mitigated by lower income flows to those saving in deposits.

### Impact on bank profitability
- The heterogeneous lending and deposit pass‑through increased interest rate margins, supporting bank profits.
- Net interest income increased strongly after the start of the monetary policy tightening cycle.
- The lower deposit pass‑through added to higher revenue from reserves held at the ECB, pushing up bank profits further.

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Containing aggregate demand would help the last mile of disinflation. Supply disruptions are no longer materially impacting inflation; domestic demand continues to put pressure on prices. Given a still positive output gap and robust growth projections, a neutral fiscal policy stance is appropriate.
- Transmission through the real estate sector should not be hindered. Policy measures such as a lower VAT for first time house buyers or interest rate subsidization schemes would further dampen transmission through the real estate market.
- The low competition in the banking sector and its interaction with financial literacy warrant further analysis. Possible policy responses include:
  - Improving financial literacy.
  - Enhancing consumer protection measures.
  - Altering perceptions of risks associated with smaller banks and new market entrants (e.g., fintech companies from outside of Cyprus).
  - Considering implications of possible future banking consolidation for the roles of financial literacy and consumer protection.
- Wage dynamics will influence the inflation outlook. Key points:
  - Wage pass‑through of inflation tends to be higher in countries with higher union density; wage pass‑through has been strong in Cyprus in the past and was driving inflation last year.
  - Wage pressures could intensify due to labor market tightness (record‑high vacancy‑to‑unemployment ratio).
  - Increasing labor supply—including immigration or increased participation—could help meet employment needs.
  - It would be prudent for the public sector to control public sector wage growth; above all, the cost‑of‑living allowance should not be raised further.
- Elevated corporate profits could offer room to absorb potential wage increases. Disinflation in Cyprus will likely need to go hand in hand with an increase of wages relative to profits and a normalization of the profit share.

*Source: IMF staff calculations and Cyprus country chapter excerpt.*

### 1.      Stepping up mitigation efforts is essential for the world to meet its climate objectives.

### 1.      Stepping up mitigation efforts is essential for the world to meet its climate objectives.

### Global and EU context
- Under a business-as-usual scenario, with no new measures, global GHG emissions are projected to increase 5 percent by 2030 relative to 2019 (Black, Parry and Zhunussova 2023).
- Countries have been raising NDC ambition, but ambition and implementation gaps remain to achieve limiting warming to 1.5 to 2°C.
- EU climate commitments and policies:
  - EU committed to climate neutrality by 2050 (European Green Deal).
  - Revised NDC: pledge of a 55 percent GHG reduction by 2030 compared to 1990 levels (up from 40 percent).
  - European Commission proposed frontloading effort to achieve a 90 percent emission reduction by 2040.
  - Fit-for-55 package: legislative proposals to reduce emissions from transport, buildings, industry; strengthen EU ETS; introduce Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).
  - EU ETS is key mitigation instrument for power and emission-intensive industrial sectors; emission allowances phasing down to zero by 2040.
  - Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR) covers emissions from transport, buildings, agriculture, other sectors under national authorities.
  - An EU-wide ETS II is anticipated in 2027 to cover transport, buildings, and other sector emissions.

### Cyprus commitments and recovery plan
- Cyprus long-term strategy: align with EU climate neutrality target by 2050 via energy efficiency, expanding renewable energy sources (RES), promoting alternative fuels/technologies, and sustainable end-use energy consumption.
- Revised Cyprus NECP 2021-2030: national emission reduction target in ESR sectors raised to 32 percent (up from 24 percent).
- EU Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP) for Cyprus:
  - Total RRP budget: €1.2 billion (4 percent of 2023 GDP).
  - 41 percent of RRP budget allocated to the green transition.
  - RRP climate investments include an electricity interconnector project, energy efficiency and RES investments, electric vehicle promotion support schemes, reforms for emissions reduction, water and waste management, biodiversity preservation.

### Cyprus mitigation trends and energy mix
- Historical emissions:
  - Annual net GHG emissions increased by more than 70 percent between 1990 and 2008, then reversed half the increase by 2013; since then emissions broadly stable.
- Decoupling:
  - Emissions tracked per capita GDP until 2014, then diverged: GDP per capita continued to grow while emissions stabilized.
  - Decoupling supported by accelerated decline in energy intensity of output.
- Energy mix constraints:
  - 90 percent of Cyprus energy mix comes from oil and petroleum products.
  - Cyprus lacks connections to EU electricity and natural gas grids; natural gas import requires a regasification unit; RES scaling constrained by grid/connectivity.
  - Major connectivity projects (FSRU terminal, electricity link via Greece) are delayed due to contractual issues.
  - RES development rising but lags rest of EU.
- ETS and ESR emissions:
  - Almost half of Cyprus emissions in 2021 covered by EU ETS; 70 percent of ETS-covered emissions from power sector, remainder from energy-intensive industry.
  - ETS-covered emissions are down 14 percent since 2005.
  - ESR sectors: half of ESR emissions from transport; remaining from buildings, agriculture, waste, other sectors.
  - ESR emissions: smaller decline between 2005-2013 and larger rebound since then; by 2021 ESR emissions were up 3 percent relative to 2005.
  - Cyprus exceeded Annual Emission Allocations (AEAs) since 2017, signaling risk of deviation from mitigation target.

### Emissions projections and scenarios
- Business-as-usual (BAU) for ESR emissions: projected to continue rising (extrapolating recent trends without accounting for impact of recently announced or planned policies).
- With-existing-measures (WEM) scenario: ESR emissions decline by 7 percent by 2030 compared to 2005.
- With-additional-measures (WAM) scenario: ESR emissions fall by 21 percent by 2030 compared to 2005.
- Gap to NECP target:
  - Despite WAM reductions, emissions still short of the 32 percent pledged reduction in the revised NECP.
  - Emissions projected to exceed AEAs every year until 2030 and remain 13 percent above target by 2030.
  - Most projected reduction under WAM comes from transport; little reduction expected in other ESR sectors.
- Critical enablers:
  - Timely implementation of planned measures including completing natural gas and electricity infrastructure projects, accelerating RES adoption and electric vehicle penetration, and promoting energy efficiency is crucial to realize WEM/WAM projections.

### Current carbon pricing and taxation
- Rationale: Gradually raising carbon prices is the most economically efficient approach to mitigation; it incentivizes lower energy consumption, cleaner energy shifts, improved energy efficiency, and innovation; also generates fiscal revenues for addressing side effects.
- Net Effective Carbon Rates (NECRs):
  - Economy-wide NECRs in Cyprus are not far off EU average, largely due to ETS permit prices on electricity.
  - In non-ETS sectors, effective carbon prices are lower than elsewhere in the EU.
  - In transport, Cyprus’s NECR lags EU average by about €20/tonCO2eq.
  - NECR gaps in other non-ETS sectors are larger.
- Fuel taxation:
  - Gasoline and diesel prices in Cyprus among lowest in EU, primarily due to low effective taxation rates on fuel; pre-tax prices broadly similar to other European countries.
  - Until end-March 2024, an 8 cents per liter reduction in fuel excises kept gasoline and diesel excises at the minimum allowed by the European Energy Taxation Directive.
  - Diesel used in agriculture is fully exempt; partial exemptions for fuels used for heating and industrial purposes.
  - Fuel prices inclusive of excises are subjected to general VAT rate of 19 percent (simple average VAT rate in EU is 21 percent).

### Green tax reform design and schedule
- Reform objectives: internalize environmental externalities, encourage efficient resource use, promote sustainable development, incentivize RES adoption.
- Elements to be introduced in 2024 and progressively increased annually until 2033:
  - (i) a carbon tax for fuels used in non-ETS sectors;
  - (ii) a levy on water;
  - (iii) a charge on landfill waste;
  - (iv) a nightly tourism tax.
- Carbon tax envisioned as a fuel excise duty top-up applying to transport and non-ETS industry sector fuels with differentiated rates and schedules:
  - Motor fuels (transport) schedule (€/liter by year):
    - 2024: 0.05
    - 2025: 0.07
    - 2026: 0.10
    - 2027: 0.14
    - 2028: 0.19
    - 2029: 0.21
    - 2030: 0.22
    - 2031: 0.23
    - 2032: 0.24
    - 2033: 0.25
  - Motor fuels (€/tonCO2eq. by year):
    - 2024: 20.1
    - 2025: 28.1
    - 2026: 40.2
    - 2027: 56.3
    - 2028: 76.3
    - 2029: 84.3
    - 2030: 88.4
    - 2031: 92.4
    - 2032: 96.4
    - 2033: 100.5
  - Non-ETS industry schedule (€/liter by year):
    - 2024: 0.07
    - 2025: 0.11
    - 2026: 0.14
    - 2027: 0.17
    - 2028: 0.19
    - 2029: 0.20
  - Non-ETS industry (€/tonCO2eq. by year):
    - 2024: 26.7
    - 2025: 42.0
    - 2026: 53.4
    - 2027: 64.9
    - 2028: 72.5
    - 2029: 76.3
- Equivalencies noted:
  - Motor fuels first-year rate (5 cents per liter in 2024) ≈ €20/tonCO2eq rising to about €100 /tonCO2eq by 2033.
  - Non-ETS industry excise starts at 7 cents per liter rising to 20 cents per liter by 2029, equivalent to about €27/tonCO2eq going up to €76/tonCO2eq.

### Expected environmental and fiscal impacts of the carbon tax
- Emissions impact:
  - Tax reform expected to reduce emissions by an additional 55 thousand tons of CO2 or 3.8 percent of projected WAM emissions by 2030, thus closing about a third of the current gap between WAM and the 2030 target.
  - Note: CPAT computes impacts relative to BAU; deltas applied to WAM ad hoc (deltas may be overestimated for WAM as scenario likely has smaller baseline tax base than BAU).
- Revenue impact:
  - Tax expected to generate 0.1-0.2 percent of GDP per year in 2025, rising to 0.4 percent of GDP starting from 2028.
  - Gross revenue increase from higher rate per unit of carbon estimated to reach 0.5 percent of GDP.
  - Base erosion: as carbon prices reduce demand for carbon-intensive goods and services, the tax base will shrink, reducing revenues from the new tax and from existing fuel excises and VAT; erosion effect directly proportional to abatement effectiveness.
  - Revenue composition: 94 percent of additional revenues expected to arise from the tax on motor fuels due to larger tax base and lower price elasticity.

### Distributional and sectoral considerations
- Price-elasticities:
  - For Cyprus (as a developed country closer to carbon-efficiency frontier), estimated elasticity generally lower than global average; implies smaller response per unit price increase than global average.
- Sectoral impacts:
  - Largest emission reductions expected in transport; limited reductions expected in ESR sectors other than transport without additional measures.
  - Accelerated EV adoption, RES penetration, energy infrastructure completion are critical to broaden decarbonization across sectors.
- Fiscal policy trade-offs:
  - Rising carbon prices provide fiscal revenue but also accelerate base erosion; revenue recycling and supportive policies necessary to mitigate distributional impacts and support low-carbon transition.

### Modelling tool and methodology
- IMF-WB CPAT tool used for analysis:
  - CPAT modules used: mitigation module (reduced-form macro-energy model) and distribution module (cost-push microsimulation).
  - CPAT assesses impacts on emissions, revenues, GDP, welfare, energy system, households, industry, air pollution, and road congestion.
  - CPAT draws on global datasets on GHGs, energy consumption/prices, price and income elasticities, NDCs, input-output tables, household budget surveys.
  - CPAT parametrization informed by literature and cross-country databases to come in mid-range of other models.
  - CPAT computes mitigation impacts relative to BAU; results applied to WAM scenarios as described in the analysis.

*Source: 1cypea2024002 - 1.      Stepping up mitigation efforts is essential for the world to meet its climate objectives.*

### 22. There could be a transitory impact on growth. As for any fiscal measure, there will be a

### 22. There could be a transitory impact on growth. As for any fiscal measure, there will be a

### Transitory macroeconomic impact
- Temporary impact on aggregate demand depends on:
  - the cyclical position of the economy,
  - the overall fiscal stance,
  - how associated tax revenues are used.
- Adjustment costs arise from changes in relative prices as households and firms switch to cleaner fuels or technologies; these costs are not captured by CPAT.
- Literature finds little evidence of a sustained negative impact from carbon taxation on growth or employment.
- Using a range of assumptions for the fiscal multiplier calibrated to global, income-group, and country-specific parameters, the direct impact is estimated to lower annual growth by 0.1-0.2 percentage points at its peak in 2029-2031, excluding any offsetting impact from revenue recycling.
- Current estimation limitations include:
  - absence of inter-sectoral dynamics (e.g., increased demand for power due to electrification),
  - abstraction from the time-varying nature of price elasticities, as the impact is assumed fully realized in the following year.

### Distributional impacts
- Energy price effects:
  - The tax raises prices of energy products (direct effect) and of non-energy products (indirect effect) depending on price pass-through and energy-intensity.
  - Model’s default assumption is full price pass-through.
- Estimated incidence:
  - Distributional impact is broadly proportional across income groups, uniformly lowering consumption by 0.4 percent.
  - Rural households expected to be more affected than urban households due to a higher budget share of fuels.
- With a wider-scope tax:
  - Lowest income deciles see consumption decline by around 0.7 percent while highest deciles fall by 0.6 percent (incidence becomes slightly regressive).

### Revenue recycling and mitigation options
- A limited share of revenue recycling can fully offset adverse impacts on lower-income groups:
  - A quarter (third) of the revenues is sufficient to fully offset the impact on the four (five) lowest income deciles via well-targeted social transfers.
  - Alternatively, reductions in personal income tax (PIT) liabilities for lower-income groups (e.g., absolute personal allowances or exemptions for lower income thresholds) can be used, but:
    - PIT reductions are less susceptible to leakage and have better implications for work incentives,
    - Social transfers, if well targeted, better capture lowest income deciles across working status, age, and gender.
- For a wider-scope tax with comparable fiscal revenues to the narrow-scope design:
  - A third (half) of the revenues is needed to offset the decline in consumption for the bottom four (five) deciles of the income distribution.

### Policy scenarios and mitigation effectiveness
- Authorities’ current plan:
  - Expected to close about a third of the gap to the 2030 target.
- Augmented (wide-scope) carbon tax scenario:
  - Apply €20/tCO2 in 2024 rising gradually to €100/tCO2 by 2033 (similar to the fuel excise top-up for motor fuels).
  - Expected impacts:
    - 1.5 times the impact of the current plan.
    - ESR emissions would be expected to decline by an additional 5.7 percent by 2030, which closes almost half the gap between the WAM scenario and the 2030 target.
    - Fiscal revenues reach 0.6 percent of GDP but are offset by faster base erosion (0.2 percent of GDP), leaving fiscal impact roughly the same as the current design.
  - Distributional trade-off:
    - Slightly regressive incidence requires a larger share of revenues for redistributive measures (a third (half) to fully offset bottom four (five) deciles).
- Ambition required to meet 2030 target solely via carbon taxation:
  - Tax rates would have to be 2.5 times higher than the proposed rates, even with wider scope.
  - Example path that would be required:
    - Start at 13 cents per liter of fuel (€50/tCO2eq) in 2024 and ramp up to €0.5 per liter (€200/tCO2eq) by 2030.
  - Such rapid escalation would have steeper economic and social implications and stronger political-economy constraints.

### Complementary non-price policies
- Targeted non-price policies are less economically efficient than carbon pricing but can complement it, especially where emissions are harder to abate (buildings, agriculture).
- Limitations of non-price policies:
  - Operate mainly on the intensive margin and can induce a rebound effect.
  - Do not raise additional revenues while eroding the tax base, adding fiscal pressure if redistributive measures are needed.
- Examples of complementary measures:
  - Feebates to promote carbon-efficient capital goods through financial rewards and penalties.
  - Regulations such as minimum recycled content quotas and construction waste reduction targets.
  - Subsidies for rooftop solar panels, heat pumps, and insulation upgrades financed by taxation of residential fuels.
- Strategic incorporation of these policies into the national mitigation plan supports a multi-pronged approach to achieve mitigation targets.

### Climate targets, progress, and adaptation context
- Cyprus’s revised target: pledging a 32 percent reduction in ESR emissions by 2030.
- Current outlook:
  - Timely implementation of NECP measures and RRP investments is critical.
  - Even accounting for current and planned policies, emissions are set to exceed the target by 13 percent by 2030.
  - Green tax reform is a key policy of the RRP.
- Adaptation and sea-level rise:
  - Sea-level rise (SLR) without adaptation can cause costs up to 0.4 percent of GDP annually after 2050.
  - An adaptation strategy combining protection and planned retreat would cut overall cost of SLR by 70 to 90 percent to approximately 0.1 percent of annual GDP by mid-century.
- Climate trends and exposure:
  - Cyprus has a Mediterranean climate with average annual temperatures ranging from 16°C to 19°C and a mean of 17.5°C.
  - Warmest year recorded was 2010 at 20.4°C.
  - Annual precipitation has varied from a low of 200 mm in 1972-73 to a high of 800 mm in 1968-69, with a mean of 503 mm for 1961-90.
  - Nicosia average annual temperature rose from 18.9°C to 20.9°C over the past 30 years, signifying a 2.0°C increase and an additional 20 days per year under extreme heat.

### Key policy recommendations (summary)
- Consider applying carbon taxation rates envisaged for transport more widely and uniformly to all non-ETS sectors to:
  - Raise NECRs in non-ETS sectors toward EU averages,
  - Abate emissions in sectors not projected to decline under WEM and WAM scenarios,
  - Enhance abatement efficiency by leveling abatement incentives across sectors,
  - Ensure a smoother transition to ETS II.
- Use revenue recycling to protect lower-income households:
  - Channel a quarter (third) of revenues to offset impacts on the four (five) lowest deciles under the narrow-scope design; a third (half) needed under the wide-scope design.
  - Prefer well-targeted social transfers or targeted PIT allowances (absolute personal allowances or exemptions for lower income thresholds) over generalized PIT rate reductions.
- Combine a uniform and wide-scope carbon tax with targeted sectoral policies (feebates, regulations, subsidies) to cost-effectively close remaining gaps to 2030 targets.

*Source: IMF staff analysis contained in the Cyprus country chapter on green tax plan impact, CPAT results, and climate adaptation assessment.*

### 8.   Cyprus’s temperatures are projected to continue to increase for decades. In the three

### 8.   Cyprus’s temperatures are projected to continue to increase for decades. In the three

### Temperature and precipitation projections
- Model consensus: total annual precipitations will decline using all emission scenarios, but there is large uncertainty on the magnitude of projected changes.
- Projected additional warming by end of century relative to 1995-2014 baseline:
  - Range: 1.1°C to 1.6°C.
  - High-emission SSP3-7.0 scenario: potential increase of up to 2.5°C.
- Cyprus is expected to undergo less extreme temperature increases compared to some other countries in the EMME but starts from baseline temperatures relatively high compared to most advanced economies, increasing heat-stress risks and the need for ongoing monitoring.

### Forest fires and fire risk
- Forest fires present a present threat to ecosystems and residential areas, especially during high temperatures, prolonged droughts, strong winds, and presence of flammable vegetation.
- 2021 record wildfire was exacerbated by a week-long heatwave with temperatures surpassing 40°C.
- Long-run statistics (2000-2021) show a significant 50% reduction in number of fires and burnt area—potentially reflecting successful management measures by the Department of Forests.
- Fire Weather Index (FWI) and regional climate model projections indicate increased fire-conducive weather:
  - High fire risk days: 5-15 days/year projected to increase in 2021-2050 compared to 1961-1990.
  - Extreme fire risk days: 1-10 days/year projected to increase in 2021-2050 compared to 1961-1990.
- Attribution of trends to climate change is difficult because of many concurring factors.

### Sea-level rise (SLR) projections and risks
- Median projections (Kopp et al. 2014) for Cyprus:
  - Projected local sea-level rise of 0.4 to 0.7 m in 2090-2099 with respect to 2000-2009 (approximately 0.3 to 0.6 m above the present level), depending on emission scenario.
  - SLR in Cyprus is projected to be lower than the global mean.
- Probabilistic projection example (RCP4.5):
  - Median projection: sea level rise of 0.6 m with respect to 2000-2009.
  - Range that cannot be excluded: 0.30 to 0.95 m.
- Certainty and uncertainty:
  - It is certain sea level will continue to rise for ongoing decades; achieving Paris goals slows but does not stop SLR at least until end of century.
  - Projections remain uncertain due to emission trajectories and sea-level response to warming.

### Macro-economic risks from slow-moving warming and extreme weather
- IMF staff and literature review: moderate macroeconomic risks with large uncertainties.
- Slow-moving warming and SLR are expected to be a drag on the economy, especially without adaptation.
- Estimated cumulative effect of slow-moving warming in a fast-warming planet:
  - Reduction in real per capita GDP by 3 to 5 percent by 2100 (range calculated using two econometric models and SOCLIMPACT estimates).
  - This range corresponds to larger-than-expected warming rates (90th percentile of temperature range projected by climate models using SSP3-7.0); effects of changes in extreme weather and SLR are not included in this estimate.
- NGFS estimate (using Kalkuhl and Wenz (2020) under RCP8.5-like warming rates):
  - Loss of GDP per capita equal to 7 percent in 2100 (measured against a hypothetical scenario of no climate change).
- Historical and projected disaster impacts:
  - Heat waves in 1998, 2000, and 2022 caused an estimated total number of 158 deaths.
  - Overall historical economic impact from weather disasters is limited and not easily assessed.
- Advanced econometric and machine-learning analyses:
  - Do not reveal significant macroeconomic shocks from a multitude of weather extremes in the present for Cyprus; country-level analyses suggest resilience to weather shocks at macroeconomic level.
- Uncertainties and downside risks:
  - Large uncertainties remain about future evolution of physical hazards and their economic, social, and environmental impacts.
  - Continued and possibly intensified dry conditions represent a downside risk with potentially large yet unknown impacts in an already water-scarce country.
  - Recommendation: monitor risks and prepare contingency plans also for low-probability events.

### Sea-level rise economic costs and adaptation
- IMF staff and other studies estimate SLR damages and adaptation effectiveness:
  - Projected damages from SLR: between 0.1 and 0.4 percent of GDP annually after 2050 under a moderate emission scenario (large uncertainties). IMF CIAM estimates are on the lower end of this range.
  - PESETA IV estimates higher costs and, under an extreme projection of SLR, costs of up to 4.9 percent of GDP in 2100.
- Adaptation effectiveness and costs:
  - Adaptation can greatly contain SLR losses at modest cost; optimal mix of protection and planned retreat remains uncertain and requires granular analysis.
  - Modest investment of €7-10 million per year (approximately 0.04 percent of GDP) can reduce SLR costs by approximately 90 percent (Vousdoukas et al. 2020, Table 5).
  - SOCLIMPACT estimates upgrading seaports to keep them operable with SLR costs:
    - €2.2 million per year in 2046-2065.
    - €4.3 million per year in 2081-2100 (extreme emission scenario).
- CIAM model insights:
  - Protection is highly effective at reducing losses from permanent inundation; planned retreat from the coastline is the cheapest option in many cases.
  - CIAM divides Cyprus coastline into 7 segments (44 Km long on average, range 1 Km to 111 Km) and estimates inundation, capital, and population at risk using Kopp et al. (2014) local SLR projections.
- Policy implications:
  - A forward-looking adaptation strategy can be highly effective at reducing SLR impacts with relatively low costs.
  - Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is useful to select efficient coastal adaptation strategies despite challenges; best practices can be drawn from international examples.

### Methodological notes and model comparisons
- Box 1 (Macro-Economic Impacts of Gradual Warming) summary:
  - Kahn et al. (2021): connect deviations of temperature and precipitation from historical norms to growth in real GDP per capita using data from 174 countries (1960−2014). Adaptation is implicitly included; after 30 years countries are assumed to have fully adapted to the observed trend.
  - NGFS (based on Kalkuhl and Wenz (2020)) finds larger losses than Kahn et al. (2021) but differences are minor given long-run uncertainties.
  - SOCLIMPACT and other CGE models (GEM-ER-ISL, GINFORS) find impacts in the 3 to 5 percent range under high-end warming scenarios (RCP8.5/SSP3-7.0).
  - Akyapi, Bellon, and Massetti (2022) use high-resolution weather observations and machine learning; global panel analysis finds severe droughts and days with maximum temperature above 35°C significantly reduce GDP per capita growth, but selected weather variables do not have a statistically significant effect on Cyprus GDP growth in country-specific analyses.
- Box 2 (Estimating the Cost of Sea-Level Rise and Adaptation) summary:
  - CIAM (Coastal Impact and Adaptation Model) is used by IMF staff to estimate economic costs and benefits of adaptation to SLR, dividing coasts into more than 12,000 segments globally; Cyprus coastline modeled as 7 segments.
  - No-adaptation scenario: population and capital remain until inundation forces relocation; costs include abandonment of capital and monetized disutility of reactive migration.
  - Models differ on optimal mix of adaptation (hard protection, nature-based solutions, planned retreat) because of data, scenarios, and normative criteria, but they agree long-term planning and governance are essential.

*Source: Content unit 1cypea2024002 (IMF Cyprus chapter).*

### Box 2. Estimating the Cost of Sea-Level Rise and Adaptation (concluded)

### Box 2. Estimating the Cost of Sea-Level Rise and Adaptation (concluded)

### Adaptation scenarios and modelling approach
- Three policy scenarios assessed for Cyprus using a state-of-the-art model of sea-level rise costs and adaptation (CIAM) and SLR scenarios from Kopp et al (2014) under RCP 4.5:
  - No Planned Adaptation – society reacts to sea-level rise by relocating, no protection is built and capital losses are large.
  - Protection – society plans construction of cost-effective protection against sea-level rise by anticipating its effects without relocating people or assets.
  - Optimal Adaptation – society plans a mix of protection and retreat anticipating sea-level-rise, by comparing costs and benefits of each option and choosing the strategy with the largest net present value.
- For each coastal segment the model calculates the net present value (NPV) of each adaptation strategy by summing discounted costs and benefits (avoided damages) over time. The optimal strategy is the strategy with the largest NPV and can differ across coastal segments within the same country.
- Protection can be full, partial, or minimal; protection can be sized to sea-level only, or to also avoid 10-year, 100-year, 1,000-year, or 10,000-year storm surge levels.
- Planning and optimization features:
  - The model optimizes adaptation strategies over 50 years (measurement of the cost per period).
  - Both protection and planned retreat are planned until 2050 and from 2050 to 2100. Over these limited time horizons there is perfect foresight and sea-level is known with certainty. There is no edging against uncertain sea-level rise.
  - Country-level costs in the Optimal Protection scenario are calculated by summing costs for the least-cost protection grade at segment level. Protection is planned over a 50-year time horizon in which the social planner has perfect foresight. After this period protection is re-optimized for the following 50 years.

### Cost components and valuation
- Costs and benefits monetized and included in CIAM:
  - Protection Cost: constructing and maintaining protection (generalized as sea walls). Measured as a function of coastline length, height of sea walls, and value of the land occupied by the sea walls.
  - Retreat Cost: relocation of population and assets from affected areas, including forced emigration in case of no planned adaptation and planned retreat. Measured as cost of relocating population and mobile capital in the incremental area of retreat, and cost of demolishing immobile capital.
  - Inundation Cost: loss of land and assets due to SLR-caused inundation. In case of no planned retreat the full value of capital assets is lost; in planned retreat only the depreciated level of capital assets is lost. Measured based on extent of land endowment lost and associated value of land and capital stock.
  - Wetland Loss Cost: loss of wetland due to inability to migrate inland; two forms measured — (1) total service value of wetland occupied by sea walls; (2) service value of wetland lost related to the rate of SLR.
  - Storm Cost: expected damage associated with the risk of storm surge. Likelihood of storm surge follows the generalized extreme value distribution using local surge frequency data from the DIVA tool; total land affected depends on elevation exposed to a given flood water height.
- Loss of life is monetized using the Value of Statistical Life and loss of wetland is monetized using estimates of willingness to pay for biodiversity preservation.
- Storm surge costs are incremental with respect to a baseline scenario in which storms occur with lower sea-level.
- The cost of building and maintaining seawalls, and other key parameters, are drawn from the literature.

### Key model findings and trade-offs
- Protection scenario: society invests in cost-effective seawalls and other barriers to avoid inundation from sea-level rise; capital and land are not lost, the population does not move, but storms can still periodically inundate protected areas if protection is not sufficiently strong. The cost of SLR is equal to the cost of protection plus the expected value of the cost of storms.
- Planned retreat scenario: society keeps using coastal areas without building new capital and lets existing capital depreciate; land and some residual value of capital are accepted as lost, population gradually moves to higher grounds before inundation. The cost of SLR is equal to the sum of the residual cost of capital, the value of inundated land, and the disutility cost of migration.
- The optimal strategy varies across segments: protection is usually optimal where there is large existing capital and high population density; retreat is optimal where capital and population density are low.
- Example outcome: in the example of adaptation to sea-level rise presented in the box, retreat is the strategy with the highest net present value.
- Charted result label: Cost of Sea Level Rise, 2020-2099 (Percent of GDP). (Wiskers indicate the range of total cost using the 5th and 95th percentile of the probabilistic distribution of sea-level rise; ranges may be asymmetric due to highly non-linear impacts.)

### Model limitations and omitted impacts
- Omitted impacts that could underestimate the cost of no protection: saltwater intrusion, ocean acidification, erosion, coastal tourism, loss of recreation.
- Some model assumptions could overestimate adaptation costs: protection and retreat decisions are assumed fixed for many decades; a smoother response to SLR would reduce adaptation costs.
- General equilibrium effects are omitted; these can increase or decrease estimated costs depending on secondary effects (e.g., redistribution of tourism flows).
- Several impacts and uncertainties require careful assessment: lack of data, uncertainty in long-term projections, sensitivity to choice of discount rates.
- Despite uncertainties and simplifying assumptions, the model provides a useful framework to systematically evaluate costs and benefits of alternative adaptation options; more granular coastal modeling and more accurate mapping of assets can provide more precise assessments.

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Apply cost-benefit analysis (CBA) consistently:
  - CBA can help collect, aggregate, and compare information on public adaptation projects; limitations must be assessed.
  - Cost-effectiveness analysis can be an alternative when outcomes are considered too uncertain.
  - According to standard CBA rules, only programs with NPV greater than zero should be financed; competing programs should be ranked and financed by highest ranking.
- Government role and prioritization:
  - Concentrate government efforts on (i) adaptation policies that are public goods; (ii) reforms that promote efficient private adaptation; and (iii) strengthening of social programs.
  - Government intervention is warranted when adaptation has large externalities (e.g., coastal protection, public infrastructure); market inefficiencies and policy failures may limit private adaptation.
  - Strengthening social programs can offset adverse effects on the most vulnerable and ensure a just transition.
- Consider compensation as an alternative to costly protection:
  - Full protection of all assets and populations may be very expensive and adaptation projects may have negative NPV; compensation (e.g., relocation subsidies) could redistribute costs from affected landowners to society if planned retreat is cheaper than full protection.
- Market reforms to boost private adaptation (Box 3 key points):
  - Address underprovision of public goods and positive externalities (information, emergency preparedness, seawalls, basic research).
  - Coordinate adaptation for network-dependent resilience (dikes, water networks, transportation).
  - Align the distribution of responsibilities across government levels based on scope of externalities.
  - Correct market distortions and policy failures (e.g., remove subsidies that worsen resource scarcity, reduce barriers to trade).
  - Mitigate moral hazard via regulations (zoning, building codes, mandatory evacuations, mandatory insurance).

*Sources: Diaz (2016), Kopp et al. (2014), and IMF staff calculations.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2024/english/1cypea2024002.pdf_
