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---

### Executive Board assessment and outlook
- Growth and inflation projections:
  - Real Non-oil GDP growth: 3.5 percent in 2024; 3.4 percent in 2025; 3.2 percent in 2026.
  - Real Non-oil GDP per capita growth: 2.4 percent in 2024; 2.1 percent in 2025; 1.9 percent in 2026.
  - CPI (annual average): 8.4 percent in 2023; averaging 2.2 percent in 2024; 1.5 percent in 2025; 2.0 percent in 2026.
  - CPI (end-period): 8.7 percent in 2023; 0.5 percent in 2024; 1.8 percent in 2025; 2.0 percent in 2026.
- Inflation narrative:
  - Inflation is expected to ease further—averaging 2.2 percent in 2024 and 1.5 percent in 2025—given the continued moderation of global commodity prices.
- Risk assessment:
  - Risks to the outlook are balanced.
  - Near- to medium-term downside risks include: a sudden global recession reducing PF returns; severe climate events affecting food security; political instability limiting foreign direct investment.
  - Upside possibility: agreement to develop the Greater Sunrise oil field could boost long-term exports.

### Fiscal position, Petroleum Fund, and debt sustainability
- Fiscal outcomes and projections (percent of Non-oil GDP):
  - Revenue: 51.4 (2023); 49.2 (2024); 46.1 (2025); 42.7 (2026).
  - Domestic revenue: 13.8 (2023); 11.4 (2024); 11.5 (2025); 11.5 (2026).
  - Estimated Sustainable Income (ESI): 27.2 (2023); 28.3 (2024); 26.2 (2025); 23.6 (2026).
  - Grants: 10.5 (2023); 9.4 (2024); 8.5 (2025); 7.6 (2026).
  - Expenditure: 93.9 (2023); 92.5 (2024); 95.3 (2025); 91.5 (2026).
  - Recurrent expenditure: 70.6 (2023); 69.8 (2024); 73.6 (2025); 70.5 (2026).
  - Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets: 12.8 (2023); 13.3 (2024); 13.2 (2025); 13.4 (2026).
  - Net lending/borrowing: -42.5 (2023); -43.3 (2024); -49.2 (2025); -48.8 (2026).
- Petroleum Fund and public assets:
  - Petroleum Fund balance (closing balance): $18,288 million (2023); $18,078 million (2024); $17,402 million (2025); $16,641 million (2026).
  - Public foreign assets (end-period) 1/: 19,072 (2023); 18,881 (2024); 18,282 (2025); 17,554 (2026).
  - Public foreign assets (In months of imports): 190 (2023); 184 (2024); 162 (2025); 150 (2026).
  - Petroleum Fund balance (In percent of Non-oil GDP): 1,015 (2023); 932 (2024); 839 (2025); 751 (2026).
- Public debt:
  - Public debt (in millions of U.S. dollars): 259 (2023); 267 (2024); 293 (2025); 306 (2026).
  - Public debt (In percent of Non-oil GDP): 14.4 (2023); 13.7 (2024); 14.1 (2025); 13.8 (2026).
- Staff assessment:
  - Timor-Leste remains at moderate risk of overall and external debt distress.
  - Large fiscal imbalances over the medium term would fully deplete the PF by the end of the 2030s.

### External sector and balance of payments
- Key balance of payments figures (in millions of U.S. dollars, unless indicated):
  - Current account balance: -17 (2023); -195 (2024); -515 (2025); -575 (2026).
  - Current account balance (In percent of Non-oil GDP): -1 (2023); -10.1 (2024); -24.9 (2025); -26.0 (2026).
  - Trade of Goods: -149 (2023); -611 (2024); -814 (2025); -836 (2026).
  - Exports of goods: 632 (2023); 233 (2024); 142 (2025); 152 (2026).
  - Imports of goods: 781 (2023); 845 (2024); 956 (2025); 988 (2026).
  - Trade of Services: -353 (2023); -310 (2024); -309 (2025); -318 (2026).
  - Primary Income: 397 (2023); 540 (2024); 427 (2025); 406 (2026).
  - Secondary Income: 88 (2023); 186 (2024); 180 (2025); 173 (2026).
  - Overall balance: -49 (2023); 19 (2024); 77 (2025); 33 (2026).
- External sector diagnosis:
  - Non-oil current account deficit remained large at 21 percent of non-oil GDP in 2023.
  - REER appreciated by about 20 percent over the last three years.
- Data and methodological note:
  - Balance of payments data revised to reflect the 2018 Maritime Boundary Treaty: goods exports now incorporate oil and gas sales; services imports include wages paid to oil and gas labor; primary investment income treatment adjusted.

### Monetary and financial sector
- Monetary and credit indicators:
  - Deposits (annual percent change): 2.5 (2023); 7.6 (2024); 6.9 (2025); 6.8 (2026).
  - Credit to the private sector (annual percent change): 20.6 (2023); 20.5 (2024); 15.7 (2025); 8.1 (2026).
  - Lending interest rate (percent, end of period): 11.3 (2023); 11.3 (2024); 11.3 (2025); 11.3 (2026).
- Financial sector health:
  - Credit growth strong: peak 39 percent (y/y) in June 2023; around 30 percent in June 2024.
  - Banks are well-capitalized and liquid; system-wide liquidity ratio of 77 percent as of end-2023.
  - Non-performing loans around 2 percent.
  - State-owned bank BNCTL holds around a third of system assets and has rapidly expanded lending while maintaining a healthy capital adequacy ratio.

### Economic outlook and key projections (staff and authorities)
- Growth:
  - Growth is estimated to rise to 3.5 percent in 2024, supported by fiscal expansion and strong credit growth.
  - Credit growth would remain strong at about 18 percent y/y by end-2024.
  - Growth is projected to moderate to 3.4 percent in 2025 due to the 2025 spending being mainly transfers.
  - Growth remains above the pre-pandemic average of 3 percent and converges gradually to 3 percent over the medium term.
- Inflation:
  - Headline inflation is estimated to average 2.2 percent in 2024.
  - Inflation is expected to ease to 1.5 percent in 2025, before stabilizing at around 2 percent over the medium term.
- Public finances and fiscal buffers:
  - Draft 2025 budget proposes a spending envelope about 10 percent larger than the 2024 budget.
  - Additional allocation for expanded veterans’ eligibility: $97 million ( 4½ percent of non-oil GDP), almost doubling the total allocation for veterans from $101 million in 2024.
  - Fiscal deficit expected to deteriorate by 5 percentage points of non-oil GDP to 49 percent of GDP in 2025.
  - Under baseline path and low domestic revenues, excess withdrawals from the PF would result in its full depletion by 2038 (Ministry of Finance estimates full depletion by 2035).
- Revenues and financing:
  - Domestic revenue: 13.8 percent of non-oil GDP.
  - Filing compliance: around 30 percent for personal income tax, and 8 percent for corporate income tax (ISORA 2022).
  - Authorities plan to introduce a VAT in 2026.

### Structural challenges and policy recommendations
- Overarching priorities:
  - Use sizable savings in the Petroleum Fund productively and prudently to deliver higher living standards.
  - Secure fiscal sustainability through fiscal and structural reforms to strengthen the external sector position.
- Fiscal policy recommendations:
  - Reduce public spending gradually and improve spending quality.
  - Gradually unwind the surge in recurrent spending since 2020 while accommodating higher spending on human and physical capital (including climate-resilient infrastructure) and on social safety nets.
  - Start domestic revenue mobilization promptly; key reform priority is the introduction of the VAT in 2026, requiring immediate progress with legislation and strengthening tax administration.
  - Advance Public Financial Management (PFM) reforms and formulate a medium-term fiscal framework.
- Structural reforms for private-sector development:
  - Address structural bottlenecks to lending through financial sector legal reforms.
  - Accelerate issuance of land titles to provide essential collateral and realize the potential of legal reforms.
  - Continue deeper integration in global and regional economies.
  - Advance governance and rule-of-law reforms to address vulnerabilities.
  - Address deficiencies in the AML/CFT framework in line with the Mutual Evaluation Report adopted by the Asia Pacific Group.
- Dollarization and competitiveness:
  - Improved performance under dollarization requires reduced fiscal imbalances and reforms addressing structural bottlenecks undermining competitiveness.

### Key statistics and contextual facts
- Non-oil GDP at current prices (2023): US$1.802 billion.
- Population (2023): 1.377 million.
- Non-oil GDP per capita (2023): US$1,309.
- Nominal Non-oil GDP (in millions of U.S. dollars): 1,802 (2023); 1,939 (2024); 2,073 (2025); 2,215 (2026).
- Nominal Non-oil GDP per capita (in U.S. dollars): 1,309 (2023); 1,393 (2024); 1,471 (2025); 1,551 (2026).
  - Annual percent change: 6.3 (2023); 6.5 (2024); 5.6 (2025); 5.5 (2026).
- Crude oil prices (U.S. dollars per barrel, WEO) 2/: 81 (2023); 81 (2024); 73 (2025); 70 (2026).
- Population growth (annual percent change): 1.1 (2023); 1.1 (2024); 1.3 (2025); 1.3 (2026).
- Contextual development challenges:
  - High rates of poverty and malnourishment; acute food insecurity affecting a quarter of the population (World Food Program 2024).
  - Average non-oil per-capita growth since independence: 0.7 percent.
  - Oil and gas production is dwindling; large withdrawals could deplete the PF by the end of the 2030s.

### Reform scenario and fiscal path (staff reform scenario)
- Objective: achieve a sustainable fiscal position by 2034 through moderate spending restraint, higher domestic revenue, and structural reforms.
- Outcomes under the reform scenario:
  - Petroleum Fund (PF) buffers in 2044 of around 168 percent of non-oil GDP.
  - Fiscal deficits in the medium-term (2029) would be around 20 percent of non-oil GDP, instead of 50 percent under the baseline.
  - The Petroleum Fund is preserved from 2034 onwards and generates a permanent level of investment income to support government expenditures.
- Key policy measures:
  - VAT adopted by 2026 generating about 2½ percentage points of non-oil GDP by 2034.
  - Other tax and administration reforms yield another 2½ percentage points.
  - Domestic revenue rises to the ASEAN average of 17 percent of GDP by 2034 in the scenario.
  - Recurrent spending declines to pre-pandemic levels by 2034; capital expenditure grows at about 4½ percent on average.
  - Borrowing: concessional external borrowing used to finance investment while preserving PF wealth.
- Selected reform scenario numbers (percent of non-oil GDP unless noted):
  - Domestic revenue: 13.8 (2023); 11.4 (2024); 11.5 (2025); ... 17.0 (2034).
  - Fiscal balance: -42.5 (2023); -43.3 (2024); -49.2 (2025); -20.1 (2029); -0.7 (longer horizon entries shown).
  - PF closing balance ($ million): 18,288 (2023); 18,078 (2024); 17,402 (2025); 13,640 (2029) (scenario table entries preserved as presented).

### Inflation analysis and forecast (Annex I)
- Objective: analyze drivers of inflation and develop a Phillips Curve forecasting model.
- Stylized facts:
  - Historical inflation episodes: 2003: 7.2 percent; 2005: 1.1 percent; 2007 peak after 2006 unrest: 10.3 percent; August 2009: -2.5 percent (y/y); January 2012 peak: 17.7 percent (y/y); 2014-20 average: 0.6 percent; January 2023: 9.8 percent (y/y); eased substantially in 2024.
  - CPI composition: Food accounts for 54 percent of the CPI basket; 60 percent of food is imported (2024 World Food Program).
- Empirical findings:
  - Global food price inflation: positive and statistically significant driver.
  - Rice price inflation: positive but not statistically significant in baseline.
  - Lagged headline inflation: positive and statistically significant—evidence of persistence.
  - Public spending growth (lagged): statistically significant positive impact on inflation.
  - January 2023 tax hike: strong and immediate impact; dummy coefficient 3.115*** (monthly percent-change specification).
  - NEER did not have an economically meaningful impact in recent periods.
- Forecasts:
  - Baseline model forecasts average annual inflation 2024: 2.2 percent; 2025: 0.5 percent.
  - Staff baseline (accounting for upside risks): 2024: 2.2 percent (average); 2025: 1.5 percent (average).
  - Model out-of-sample performance: projected annual headline inflation for 2023: 8.9 percent (0.5 percentage points higher than actual 8.4 percent).

### Risk Assessment Matrix (Annex III) — selected risks and policy responses
- External risks:
  - Abrupt global slowdown — Likelihood: Medium; Impact: Medium. Policy Response: Promote private sector development and mobilize domestic revenue.
  - Commodity price volatility — Likelihood: High; Impact: Medium. Policy Response: Support vulnerable households with targeted transfers; contain spending pressures and mobilize domestic revenue.
- Domestic risks:
  - Onset of political instability — Likelihood: Medium; Impact: Medium. Policy Response: Prioritize reforms to support inclusive growth and fiscal sustainability.
  - Development of major oil projects (Greater Sunrise) — Likelihood: Medium; Impact: Large. Policy Response: Carefully assess benefits, costs, and risks.
  - Over investment in low-return projects — Likelihood: Medium; Impact: Large. Policy Response: Strengthen project appraisal with standard methodology.
  - Extreme climate and weather shocks (El Niño) — Likelihood: Medium; Impact: Medium. Policy Response: Mobilize concessional resources for climate-resilient infrastructure; identify a project pipeline.

### IMF engagement, capacity development, and implementation support
- IMF and development partner support:
  - Ongoing TA: PFM reforms (IMF Fiscal Affairs), revenue administration (PFTAC), governance/AML (IMF Legal), IMF STA CD for FSIs.
  - MOF established NDCPDM in September 2023 for cash and public debt management.
  - In February 2024, authorities began reporting PSDS data to the joint IMF-World Bank QPSD database.
- Capacity gaps to address:
  - Embed external borrowing in debt management framework; prepare MTDS.
  - Upgrade debt recording software and produce realistic near-term debt servicing projections.
  - Improve monitoring and reporting of fiscal risks (contingent liabilities, PPPs).
- Staff appraisal summary:
  - Growth: 3.5 percent in 2024; 3.4 percent in 2025; long-run non-oil GDP growth around 3 percent.
  - Inflation: averages 2.2 percent in 2024 and 1.5 percent in 2025.
  - External sector: substantially weaker in 2023 than fundamentals imply.
  - Fiscal and sovereign wealth considerations: PF should be used productively and prudently; Timor-Leste remains at moderate risk of debt distress; large imbalances would fully deplete PF by the end of the 2030s.
  - Policy priorities: gradual spending reduction and quality improvement; start domestic revenue mobilization (VAT in 2026); advance PFM reforms; address structural bottlenecks to lending; accelerate land titling; strengthen governance and AML/CFT frameworks.

*Source: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF TIMOR-LESTE STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2024 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION (excerpt).*

### 3.4 percent in 2025. Inflation is expected to ease further—averaging 2.2 percent in 2024 and

### 1tlsea2024002-print-pdf - 3.4 percent in 2025. Inflation is expected to ease further—averaging 2.2 percent in 2024 and

### Executive Board assessment and outlook
- Growth and inflation projections:
  - Real Non-oil GDP growth: 3.5 percent in 2024; 3.4 percent in 2025; 3.2 percent in 2026.
  - Real Non-oil GDP per capita growth: 2.4 percent in 2024; 2.1 percent in 2025; 1.9 percent in 2026.
  - CPI (annual average): 8.4 percent in 2023; averaging 2.2 percent in 2024; 1.5 percent in 2025; 2.0 percent in 2026.
  - CPI (end-period): 8.7 percent in 2023; 0.5 percent in 2024; 1.8 percent in 2025; 2.0 percent in 2026.
- Inflation narrative:
  - Inflation is expected to ease further—averaging 2.2 percent in 2024 and 1.5 percent in 2025—given the continued moderation of global commodity prices.
- Risk assessment:
  - Risks to the outlook are balanced.
  - Near- to medium-term downside risks include: a sudden global recession reducing PF returns; severe climate events affecting food security; political instability limiting foreign direct investment.
  - Upside possibility: agreement to develop the Greater Sunrise oil field could boost long-term exports.

### Fiscal position, Petroleum Fund, and debt sustainability
- Fiscal outcomes and projections (percent of Non-oil GDP unless indicated):
  - Revenue: 51.4 (2023); 49.2 (2024); 46.1 (2025); 42.7 (2026).
  - Domestic revenue: 13.8 (2023); 11.4 (2024); 11.5 (2025); 11.5 (2026).
  - Estimated Sustainable Income (ESI): 27.2 (2023); 28.3 (2024); 26.2 (2025); 23.6 (2026).
  - Grants: 10.5 (2023); 9.4 (2024); 8.5 (2025); 7.6 (2026).
  - Expenditure: 93.9 (2023); 92.5 (2024); 95.3 (2025); 91.5 (2026).
  - Recurrent expenditure: 70.6 (2023); 69.8 (2024); 73.6 (2025); 70.5 (2026).
  - Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets: 12.8 (2023); 13.3 (2024); 13.2 (2025); 13.4 (2026).
  - Donor project: 10.5 (2023); 9.4 (2024); 8.5 (2025); 7.6 (2026).
  - Net lending/borrowing: -42.5 (2023); -43.3 (2024); -49.2 (2025); -48.8 (2026).
- Petroleum Fund and public assets:
  - Petroleum Fund balance (closing balance): $18,288 million (2023); $18,078 million (2024); $17,402 million (2025); $16,641 million (2026).
  - Public foreign assets (end-period) 1/: 19,072 (2023); 18,881 (2024); 18,282 (2025); 17,554 (2026).
  - Public foreign assets (In months of imports): 190 (2023); 184 (2024); 162 (2025); 150 (2026).
  - Petroleum Fund balance (In percent of Non-oil GDP): 1,015 (2023); 932 (2024); 839 (2025); 751 (2026).
- Public debt:
  - Public debt (in millions of U.S. dollars): 259 (2023); 267 (2024); 293 (2025); 306 (2026).
  - Public debt (In percent of Non-oil GDP): 14.4 (2023); 13.7 (2024); 14.1 (2025); 13.8 (2026).
- Staff assessment:
  - Timor-Leste remains at moderate risk of overall and external debt distress.
  - Large fiscal imbalances over the medium term would fully deplete the PF by the end of the 2030s.

### External sector and balance of payments
- Key balance of payments figures (in millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated):
  - Current account balance: -17 (2023); -195 (2024); -515 (2025); -575 (2026).
  - Current account balance (In percent of Non-oil GDP): -1 (2023); -10.1 (2024); -24.9 (2025); -26.0 (2026).
  - Trade of Goods: -149 (2023); -611 (2024); -814 (2025); -836 (2026).
  - Exports of goods: 632 (2023); 233 (2024); 142 (2025); 152 (2026).
  - Imports of goods: 781 (2023); 845 (2024); 956 (2025); 988 (2026).
  - Trade of Services: -353 (2023); -310 (2024); -309 (2025); -318 (2026).
  - Primary Income: 397 (2023); 540 (2024); 427 (2025); 406 (2026).
  - Secondary Income: 88 (2023); 186 (2024); 180 (2025); 173 (2026).
  - Overall balance: -49 (2023); 19 (2024); 77 (2025); 33 (2026).
- External sector diagnosis:
  - The external sector position in 2023 was substantially weaker than implied by fundamentals and desirable policy settings.
  - Non-oil current account deficit remained large at 21 percent of non-oil GDP in 2023.
  - REER appreciated by about 20 percent over the last three years.
- Data and methodological note:
  - Balance of payments data revised to reflect the 2018 Maritime Boundary Treaty: goods exports now incorporate oil and gas sales; services imports include wages paid to oil and gas labor; primary investment income treatment adjusted.

### Monetary and financial sector
- Monetary and credit indicators:
  - Deposits (annual percent change): 2.5 (2023); 7.6 (2024); 6.9 (2025); 6.8 (2026).
  - Credit to the private sector (annual percent change): 20.6 (2023); 20.5 (2024); 15.7 (2025); 8.1 (2026).
  - Lending interest rate (percent, end of period): 11.3 (2023); 11.3 (2024); 11.3 (2025); 11.3 (2026).
- Financial sector health:
  - Credit growth strong: peak 39 percent (y/y) in June 2023; around 30 percent in June 2024.
  - Banks are well-capitalized and liquid; system-wide liquidity ratio of 77 percent as of end-2023.
  - Non-performing loans around 2 percent.
  - State-owned bank BNCTL holds around a third of system assets and has rapidly expanded lending while maintaining a healthy capital adequacy ratio.

### Structural challenges and policy recommendations
- Overarching priorities:
  - Use sizable savings in the Petroleum Fund productively and prudently to deliver higher living standards.
  - Secure fiscal sustainability through fiscal and structural reforms to strengthen the external sector position.
- Fiscal policy recommendations:
  - Reduce public spending gradually and improve spending quality.
  - Gradually unwind the surge in recurrent spending since 2020 while accommodating higher spending on human and physical capital (including climate-resilient infrastructure) and on social safety nets.
  - Start domestic revenue mobilization promptly; key reform priority is the introduction of the VAT in 2026, requiring immediate progress with legislation and strengthening tax administration.
  - Advance Public Financial Management (PFM) reforms and formulate a medium-term fiscal framework.
- Structural reforms for private-sector development:
  - Address structural bottlenecks to lending through financial sector legal reforms.
  - Accelerate issuance of land titles to provide essential collateral and realize the potential of legal reforms.
  - Continue deeper integration in global and regional economies.
  - Advance governance and rule-of-law reforms to address vulnerabilities.
  - Address deficiencies in the AML/CFT framework in line with the Mutual Evaluation Report adopted by the Asia Pacific Group.
- Dollarization and competitiveness:
  - Improved performance under dollarization requires reduced fiscal imbalances and reforms addressing structural bottlenecks undermining competitiveness.

### Key statistics and contextual facts
- Non-oil GDP at current prices (2023): US$1.802 billion.
- Population (2023): 1.377 million.
- Non-oil GDP per capita (2023): US$1,309.
- Nominal Non-oil GDP (in millions of U.S. dollars): 1,802 (2023); 1,939 (2024); 2,073 (2025); 2,215 (2026).
- Nominal Non-oil GDP per capita (in U.S. dollars): 1,309 (2023); 1,393 (2024); 1,471 (2025); 1,551 (2026).
  - Annual percent change: 6.3 (2023); 6.5 (2024); 5.6 (2025); 5.5 (2026).
- Crude oil prices (U.S. dollars per barrel, WEO) 2/: 81 (2023); 81 (2024); 73 (2025); 70 (2026).
- Population growth (annual percent change): 1.1 (2023); 1.1 (2024); 1.3 (2025); 1.3 (2026).
- Contextual development challenges:
  - High rates of poverty and malnourishment; acute food insecurity affecting a quarter of the population (World Food Program 2024).
  - Average non-oil per-capita growth since independence: 0.7 percent.
  - Oil and gas production is dwindling; large withdrawals could deplete the PF by the end of the 2030s.

*Source: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF TIMOR-LESTE STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2024 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION (excerpt).*

### 8. Growth is estimated to rise to 3.5 percent in 2024, supported by fiscal expansion and

### 8. Growth is estimated to rise to 3.5 percent in 2024, supported by fiscal expansion and

### Economic outlook and key projections
- Growth
  - Growth is estimated to rise to 3.5 percent in 2024, supported by fiscal expansion and strong credit growth.
  - Credit growth would remain strong at about 18 percent y/y by end-2024.
  - Growth is projected to moderate to 3.4 percent in 2025 due to the 2025 spending being mainly transfers (which tend to be largely spent on imports).
  - 2025 and medium-term: growth remains above the pre-pandemic average of 3 percent and converges gradually to 3 percent over the medium term.
- Inflation
  - Headline inflation is estimated to average 2.2 percent in 2024.
  - Inflation is expected to ease to 1.5 percent in 2025, before stabilizing at around 2 percent over the medium term.
- Public finances and fiscal buffers
  - The draft 2025 budget proposes a spending envelope about 10 percent larger than the 2024 budget, notably due to a large—and permanent—increase in transfers to veterans and pensioners.
  - The additional allocation for expanded veterans’ eligibility amounts to $97 million ( 4½ percent of non-oil GDP), almost doubling the total allocation for veterans from $101 million in 2024.
  - The fiscal deficit is expected to deteriorate by 5 percentage points of non-oil GDP to 49 percent of GDP in 2025.
  - With the baseline fiscal path and low domestic revenues, excess withdrawals from the Petroleum Fund (PF) would result in its full depletion by 2038 (the Ministry of Finance estimates full depletion by 2035).
- Revenues and financing
  - Timor-Leste’s domestic revenue is 13.8 percent of non-oil GDP.
  - Filing compliance: around 30 percent for personal income tax, and 8 percent for corporate income tax (ISORA 2022).
  - The authorities plan to introduce a VAT in 2026.

### Risks to the outlook
- Downside risks
  - Global slowdown that would shrink PF returns.
  - Materialization of extreme climate and weather shocks harming food security, price stability, and growth.
  - Onset of political instability coupled with governance vulnerabilities would constrain foreign direct investment and delay economic diversification.
- Upside risks
  - Materialization of major projects, including development of the Greater Sunrise oil field, which would involve significant investment and boost long-term export receipts.

### Authorities’ views (summary)
- Authorities broadly agreed with staff’s assessment of the outlook and risks.
- They project slightly higher near-term growth based on more optimistic budget execution and private demand, citing strong incoming remittances and rising tourist arrivals.
- Authorities expect progress in major infrastructure projects (international airport expansion, submarine fiber-optic cable) and continued fiscal expansion to boost growth to 5 percent in the medium term.
- They concur with staff on inflation moderation and underscore the need to develop the private sector to reduce external imbalances.
- Authorities reaffirm commitment to strengthen budget credibility, project selection, fiscal transparency, and domestic revenue mobilization (including VAT in 2026).

### A. Supporting growth while securing fiscal sustainability — findings and recommendations
- Findings
  - The 2025 budget’s large increase in recurrent spending is driven largely by transfers and will have a limited growth impact due to low multipliers associated with transfer schemes.
  - In 2024, transfers to veterans and state-owned electricity company EDTL comprise more than 40 percent of total transfers.
  - Public sector headcount rose sharply by 45 percent from 2020 to 2023 (payroll data), but capacity constraints persist.
  - Domestic revenue (13.8 percent of non-oil GDP) lags ASEAN peers.
  - Budget execution rates are low and variable, reflecting weak fiscal discipline and limited capacity in project selection and implementation.
- Staff recommendations
  - Adopt a reform scenario during 2025–34 that supports the private sector through structural reforms and gradually reduces fiscal deficits to stabilize fiscal buffers (i.e., no excess withdrawals from the PF from 2034 onwards).
  - Expenditure restraint and rationalization:
    - Gradually unwind the surge in recurrent spending—especially on the public sector wage bill and transfer programs that do not target the most vulnerable—while accommodating higher spending on health, education, climate-resilient infrastructure, and a better-targeted social safety net.
    - Pace capital spending to the economy’s absorptive capacity; prioritize projects based on cost-benefit analysis and how they alleviate structural bottlenecks.
    - Trim public employment while increasing productivity through reforms to professionalize the public service.
  - Improve fiscal transparency and reporting:
    - Supplement newly published granular recurrent spending data with improved reporting by line ministries and the establishment of government accounting standards.
  - Domestic revenue mobilization:
    - Begin promptly and raise revenues gradually; support introduction of VAT in 2026 with immediate progress on legislation, organizational change at the revenue agency, taxpayer registration, and IT infrastructure.
    - Calibrate VAT rate and coverage to raise overall tax revenues; aim to gradually increase revenues toward the ASEAN average of around 17 percent of GDP.
  - Public Financial Management (PFM):
    - Implement revised Procurement and Budget and PFM Framework laws to improve budget planning, execution, and project selection.
    - Formulate a medium-term fiscal framework with multi-year fiscal strategy and indicative spending ceilings.
    - IMF capacity development on the macroeconomic projection tool (MPT) and budget preparation to support these reforms.

### B. Reforms to promote financial deepening and inclusion — findings and recommendations
- Findings
  - The financial system remains shallow; credit-to-GDP ratio is 27 percent in 2023 despite strong credit growth concentrated to households with stable incomes (public employees, transfer recipients).
  - Lending is impeded by lack of: (i) a functional land titling system, (ii) a legal framework for collateralization, and (iii) standardized corporate financial reporting.
  - The central bank phased in a minimum loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR) requirement that reached 35 percent in January 2024.
  - Since the LDR introduction, credit expansion has been primarily driven by the state-owned bank (BNCTL); private banks’ lending growth remains subdued.
- Recommendations
  - Advance the authorities’ ambitious financial sector reform agenda:
    - Finalize a new banking law aligned with international best practices.
    - Develop a secure transactions framework to allow movable assets as collateral.
    - Establish legal and institutional frameworks for financial reporting and auditing standards.
    - Accelerate issuance of land titles and implement a digital land registry to provide collateral.
    - Complete the underwater fiber-optic cable to improve internet reliability and support digital financial services.
  - Refrain from increasing the LDR floor; prioritize structural reforms to encourage financial development.
  - Enhance collection and public dissemination of Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs) with IMF STA CD support.
  - Implement IFRS9 accounting standards for all banks, following up on recent PFTAC training.

### Box: Lessons from Rwanda (applied implications)
- Rwanda implemented land digitization (10.4 million parcels) and expanded internet connectivity, contributing to growth in formal banking and access to credit.
- From 2008 to 2020, Rwanda’s financial inclusion increased from 48 to 93 percent; share using commercial banking services grew from 14 to 36 percent.
- Evidence shows internet connectivity boosts commercial bank usage mainly when complemented by collateral reforms; collateral mediates and amplifies the effect of internet access on bank loans.
- Implication for Timor-Leste: combine land titling reforms, digital registry, fiber-optic cable completion, and strengthened legal frameworks to realize gains in financial access and inclusion.

*Source: IMF staff report (Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste).*

### 23. The authorities expressed their commitment to boosting financial deepening and

### 23. The authorities expressed their commitment to boosting financial deepening and 

### Financial sector reforms and credit growth
- The central bank has developed a new strategic plan for financial sector development with initiatives including:
  - (i) a legislative reform agenda
  - (ii) digitalization of the financial sector
  - (iii) the development of a credit information system
- Authorities view advancing the legislative reform agenda as key to boosting lending.
- A regulatory LDR floor is viewed as a useful complementary measure until reforms take effect; authorities considered the measure effective and not overly burdensome given banks’ high profit margins and conservative business models.
- Accelerating issuance of land titles is deemed crucial and a government priority to improve collateral availability.

### Other structural reforms for private sector development
- Timor-Leste joined the WTO in February 2024 and is proceeding with its ASEAN accession roadmap; WTO and ASEAN accession are expected to:
  - provide stable market access
  - incentivize improvements in the business climate
  - contribute to higher growth, as seen in previous accession cases
- A new insolvency framework has been committed under WTO accession; improvements to macro statistics and implementation of a VAT are part of the ASEAN economic accession pillar.
- Sector priorities:
  - Agriculture and tourism are crucial to diversify export receipts, address malnutrition, and foster rural development.
  - Tourism arrivals have not fully recovered since the pandemic, constrained by poor infrastructure and low business and hospitality skills in the workforce, and possibly an overvalued REER.
  - Planned public investment to expand the airport could increase connectivity and support tourism.
  - For rural areas, sustainable development of the “blue economy” through ecotourism is highlighted as particularly beneficial and requires responsible stewardship of Timor-Leste’s ocean environment.
- Agriculture context:
  - About 60 percent of the Timorese population depend on subsistence agriculture, and productivity in the sector is very low.
  - Coffee production currently accounts for 90 percent of non-oil export and provides income for about 20 percent of all households.

### Climate resilience and public investment
- Timor-Leste is vulnerable to natural disasters including floods; frequency and severity are expected to increase with climate change.
- Overall, Timor-Leste is among the most vulnerable Asian economies to climate change.
- The 2025 budget allocates 0.1 percent for the climate agenda.
- Recommendation: mobilize concessional resources gradually to finance investments in climate-resilient infrastructure and develop a pipeline of projects as part of the broader capital expenditure plan.
- Specific priorities:
  - Develop climate-resilient roads to connect rural areas with Dili to improve market access for agricultural producers.
  - Climate resilience is essential for mitigating food insecurity.
  - Example cited: a recent program supported by Japan International Cooperation Agency to enhance rural rice production through modernized irrigation.

### Governance, rule of law, and AML/CFT
- Progress noted in governance reforms, including adoption of an expanded anti-corruption law in 2020.
- Remaining weaknesses:
  - Anti-corruption commission is under-resourced and undermined by capacity constraints across government agencies.
  - Substantial governance weaknesses in rule of law, including contract enforcement.
  - Unclear status of land rights and lack of an insolvency framework undermine property rights protection.
  - Need to complete regulatory framework, including product market regulation and business registration.
  - Authorities should address deficiencies in AML/CFT frameworks in a timely manner, in line with findings and recommendations in the Mutual Evaluation Report recently adopted by the Asia Pacific Group.

### Macroeconomic statistics and data capacity
- Data are broadly adequate for surveillance but have shortcomings due to limited capacity.
- Ongoing CD from the IMF and development partners has improved:
  - reconciliation of BOP and IIP data
  - compilation of Financial Soundness Indicators
  - Public Sector Debt Statistics
- Further improvements needed:
  - better handling of petroleum-related transactions and foreign direct investment flows
  - compilation and dissemination of GFS
  - strengthening inter-agency coordination
  - authorities should complement CD with adequate staffing and resource allocation

### Dollarization, competitiveness, and currency regime considerations
- Dollarization has helped achieve relatively low and stable inflation in a post-conflict context but may contribute to weakening competitiveness.
- The real exchange rate has appreciated considerably as the US dollar strengthened, which may hinder diversification of exports.
- Structural bottlenecks also constrain competitiveness beyond constraints imposed by dollarization.
- Improved performance under dollarization requires:
  - reduced fiscal imbalances
  - advancement of reforms addressing structural bottlenecks
  - building technical capacity at the central bank
  - improving the regulatory and legal framework for the financial system
- Authorities indicated no immediate plans to introduce a new currency.

### Authorities’ views
- Agreed on the need for reforms to strengthen export diversification, governance, and macroeconomic statistics.
- Saw opportunities from WTO and ASEAN accession and recognized need to improve competitiveness of the young workforce.
- Noted staff’s diagnosis of governance vulnerabilities and expressed hope that a new commissioner for the Anti-Corruption Commission would strengthen activities.
- Committed to implementing recommendations from the Asia Pacific Group’s Mutual Evaluation Report on AML/CFT.
- Broadly concurred with staff's data adequacy assessment and welcomed IMF and development partner CD support.

### Staff appraisal — growth, inflation, and fiscal management
- Growth outlook:
  - Following a slowdown in 2023, growth is estimated to rise to 3.5 percent in 2024.
  - A large fiscal expansion in 2025—mainly driven by transfers with low multiplier—would deliver growth of 3.4 percent in 2025.
  - Long-run non-oil GDP growth is expected to remain modest at around 3 percent, corresponding to about 1.5 percent in per-capita terms.
- Inflation:
  - Inflation will ease further, averaging 2.2 and 1.5 percent in 2024 and 2025, respectively.
- External sector: the external sector position in 2023 was substantially weaker than implied by fundamentals and desirable policy settings.
- Risks to the outlook are balanced and include:
  - near- to medium-term: a sudden global recession reducing PF returns; severe climate events affecting food security; political instability limiting FDI
  - upside: an agreement to develop the Greater Sunrise oil field could boost long-term exports
- Fiscal and sovereign wealth considerations:
  - The sizable savings in the PF should be used productively and prudently to deliver higher living standards.
  - Timor-Leste remains at moderate risk of overall and external debt distress, but large fiscal imbalances over the medium term would fully deplete the PF by the end of the 2030s.
  - Fiscal and structural reforms are needed to secure fiscal sustainability and strengthen the external sector position.
- Policy recommendations:
  - Public spending should be reduced gradually and its quality improved, while accommodating higher spending on human and physical capital (including climate-resilient infrastructure) and social safety nets.
  - Domestic revenue mobilization should start promptly; a key reform priority is the introduction of the VAT in 2026, which requires immediate progress with legislation and strengthening tax administration.
  - Fiscal efforts should be underpinned by advancing PFM reforms and formulating a medium-term fiscal framework.
  - Address structural bottlenecks to lending through financial sector reforms and accelerate issuance of land titles.
  - Continue steps towards deeper integration in global and regional economies and address governance vulnerabilities, notably in the domain of rule of law.
  - Address AML/CFT deficiencies in line with the Mutual Evaluation Report.

*Source: 1tlsea2024002-print-pdf - 23. The authorities expressed their commitment to boosting financial deepening and*

### 38. It is proposed that the next Article IV consultation with Timor-Leste take place on the

### 1tlsea2024002-print-pdf - 38. It is proposed that the next Article IV consultation with Timor-Leste take place on the

### Real sector developments
- Oil production has been part of total GDP since 2019 post the treaty on maritime boundaries with Australia.
- Growth slowed in 2023 mainly due to a slowdown in private consumption and public investment.
- Public administration continued to play a sizable role.
- Food has been the primary contributor to recent inflation dynamics.
- Headline inflation eased in recent months as global food prices moderated and tax hikes were rolled back.
- Nominal GDP: Total, Oil, and Non-Oil (In billions of US dollars): charted values for years 2008–2023 (labels shown but numeric series not reproduced in source text).
- Real Non-Oil GDP growth contributions (2016–2023) show negative and positive contributions from public consumption, public investment, private consumption, private investment, net exports.

### Inflation and external price influences
- Headline CPI decomposition (percent, y/y) series shown with components: Constant, Tax hike 2023, Tax hike 2022, NEER, Fiscal, Own lag, Food price, Rice price, Headline CPI (series through May-24).
- Core CPI: Trade Origin Economies (Percentage, y/y) series for Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Australia from Jan-22 through Sep-24.
- Core inflation in trade partner economies mirrored Timor-Leste’s disinflation experience.

### Fiscal sector developments
- Non-oil domestic revenue has been financing a small fraction of government spending.
- The share of capital spending remains small; execution rate for capital spending was low during 2020-23.
- Recurrent spending moderated in 2023 following a large partly Covid-related spike in 2021-22.
- With oil and gas receipts dwindling, the document emphasizes the pressing need to mobilize domestic revenues and to reduce fiscal deficits to avoid depleting the PF (Petroleum Fund).
- Non-Oil Balance (Percent of non-oil GDP) charted for 2013–2023 indicates large deficits relative to non-oil GDP.

### Fiscal aggregates and projections (selected exact figures from Table 1 and Table 2)
- Non-oil GDP at current prices (2023): US$1.802 billion
- Population (2023): 1.377 million
- Non-oil GDP per capita (2023): US$1,309
- Quota: SDR 25.6 million
- Real Non-oil GDP (annual percent change): 2021: 3.0; 2022: 4.0; 2023: 2.4; 2024: 3.5; 2025: 3.4; 2026: 3.2; 2027: 3.1; 2028: 3.1; 2029: 3.0
- CPI (annual average): 2021: 3.8; 2022: 7.0; 2023: 8.4; 2024: 2.2; 2025: 1.5; 2026: 2.0; 2027: 2.0; 2028: 2.0; 2029: 2.0
- Central government revenue (percent of non-oil GDP): 2021: 57.1; 2022: 54.6; 2023: 51.4; 2024: 49.2; 2025: 46.1; 2026: 42.7; 2027: 39.5; 2028: 36.4; 2029: 33.6
- Domestic revenue (percent of non-oil GDP): 2021: 10.5; 2022: 10.2; 2023: 13.8; 2024: 11.4; 2025: 11.5; 2026: 11.5; 2027: 11.6; 2028: 11.6; 2029: 11.7
- Estimated Sustainable Income (ESI) (percent of non-oil GDP): 2021: 35.1; 2022: 33.1; 2023: 27.2; 2024: 28.3; 2025: 26.2; 2026: 23.6; 2027: 21.1; 2028: 18.7; 2029: 16.4
- Grants (percent of non-oil GDP): 2021: 11.6; 2022: 11.3; 2023: 10.5; 2024: 9.4; 2025: 8.5; 2026: 7.6; 2027: 6.8; 2028: 6.1; 2029: 5.4
- Expenditure (percent of non-oil GDP): 2021: 103.9; 2022: 115.2; 2023: 93.9; 2024: 92.5; 2025: 95.3; 2026: 91.5; 2027: 88.7; 2028: 86.0; 2029: 83.5
- Recurrent expenditure (percent of non-oil GDP): 2021: 83.3; 2022: 91.8; 2023: 70.6; 2024: 69.8; 2025: 73.6; 2026: 70.5; 2027: 68.4; 2028: 66.3; 2029: 64.4
- Net lending/borrowing (percent of non-oil GDP): 2021: -46.7; 2022: -60.6; 2023: -42.5; 2024: -43.3; 2025: -49.2; 2026: -48.8; 2027: -49.2; 2028: -49.6; 2029: -49.9
- Petroleum Fund balance (closing, in millions of U.S. dollars): 2021: 19,621; 2022: 17,273; 2023: 18,288; 2024 (proj): 18,078; 2025: 17,402; 2026: 16,641; 2027: 15,736; 2028: 14,737; 2029: 13,640
- Petroleum Fund balance (In percent of Non-oil GDP): 2021: 1,256; 2022: 1,031; 2023: 1,015; 2024: 932; 2025: 839; 2026: 751; 2027: 666; 2028: 584; 2029: 507
- Public debt (in percent of Non-oil GDP): 2021: 15.1; 2022: 15.1; 2023: 14.4; 2024: 13.7; 2025: 14.1; 2026: 13.8; 2027: 13.3; 2028: 13.1; 2029: 13.2

### External sector developments
- Dwindling oil/gas exports have substantially deteriorated the overall current account.
- Large direct investment outflows subsided in 2023, turning the financial account positive.
- China and ASEAN countries are the main trading partners; trade composition by economy in 2023 lists China, Singapore, Indonesia, Japan, United States, Taiwan (Province of China), Malaysia, India, Other (percent of total for imports and exports shown in chart).
- Timor-Leste’s NFA position is one of the highest in the world as a share of the domestic economy.
- Remittance inflows series shown and noted as increasing, with outflows picking up in recent years.
- REER has appreciated sharply amid global strength of the US dollar.

### Balance of payments and external figures (selected exact figures from Table 4)
- Current account balance (in millions of U.S. dollars): 2021: 1,525; 2022: 474; 2023: -17; 2024: -19; 2025: -5; 2026: -515; 2027: -575; 2028: -766; 2029: -829; 2030: -896 (table runs through 2029 with listed values)
- Current account balance (In percent of Non-oil GDP): 2021: 98; 2022: 28; 2023: -1; 2024: -10.1; 2025: -24.9; 2026: -26.0; 2027: -32.4; 2028: -32.9; 2029: -33.3
- Exports of goods (in millions of U.S. dollars): 2021: 2,744; 2022: 1,798; 2023: 632; 2024: 233; 2025: 142; 2026: 152; 2027: 93; 2028: 105; 2029: 119
- Of which: Oil exports (in millions of U.S. dollars): 2021: 2,615; 2022: 1,745; 2023: 577; 2024: 170; 2025: 70; 2026: 70; 2027: 0; 2028: 0; 2029: 0
- Imports of goods (in millions of U.S. dollars): 2021: -748; 2022: -904; 2023: -781; 2024: -845; 2025: -956; 2026: -988; 2027: -1,031; 2028: -1,078; 2029: -1,126
- Primary income (in millions of U.S. dollars): 2021: -152; 2022: -128; 2023: 397; 2024: 540; 2025: 427; 2026: 406; 2027: 336; 2028: 310; 2029: 281
- Public foreign assets (end-period, in millions of U.S. dollars): 2021: 20,556; 2022: 18,106; 2023: 19,072; 2024: 18,881; 2025: 18,282; 2026: 17,554; 2027: 16,697; 2028: 15,740; 2029: 14,688
- NIIP (Net International Investment Position) (in millions of U.S. dollars): 2021: 19,816; 2022: 17,263; 2023: 18,496; 2024: 18,881; 2025: 18,282; 2026: 17,554; 2027: 16,697; 2028: 15,740; 2029: 14,688
- Petroleum Fund change (in millions of U.S. dollars): 2021: 717; 2022: -2,348; 2023: 1,015; 2024: -210; 2025: -677; 2026: -761; 2027: -905; 2028: -999; 2029: -1,097

### Monetary and financial sector developments
- Private sector credit growth moderated but remained strong at around 30 percent in June 2024.
- Banking sector is highly liquid with a large overseas placement of bank assets.
- Deposit growth surged in 2021 and moderated in the last year.
- Loans to individuals are a rising contribution to private credit growth.
- Overseas placement of assets constitutes a significant share of banking sector assets.
- NPLs remained low through 2024Q1.
- Credit and deposit growth (year-on-year): private credit growth and deposit growth series charted for Jun-20 to Jun-24.
- Private sector credit growth (12-month percent change) in Table 3: 2021: 4.6; 2022: 34.5; 2023: 20.6; 2024 (proj): 20.5; 2025 (proj): 15.7
- Broad money growth (12-month percentage change): 2021: 28.7; 2022: 8.6; 2023: 2.7; 2024 (proj): 13.0; 2025 (proj): 13.0
- Broad money (in millions of U.S. dollars): 2021: 1,119; 2022: 1,215; 2023: 1,248; 2024 (proj): 1,410; 2025 (proj): 1,593
- Net foreign assets (banking system, in millions of U.S. dollars): 2021: 1,928; 2022: 2,242; 2023: 2,069; 2024 (proj): 2,680; 2025 (proj): 2,887
- Gross reserves (in millions of U.S. dollars): 2021: 935; 2022: 788; 2023: 739; 2024 (proj): 803; 2025 (proj): 880
- Amounts of non-performing loans (in millions of U.S. dollars): 2021: 6.7; 2022: 6.7; 2023: 8.4
- Non-performing loans/total loans: 2021: 2.4; 2022: 2.2; 2023: 2.2
- Lending interest rate (percent, end of period): 11.3 (2021–2025 listed constant)
- Deposit rate: 0.6 (2021–2025 listed constant)

### Business environment and governance
- Governance of Timor-Leste’s natural resource sector is weak by international standards.
- Perceived governance of the public sector is improving but with vital areas of weakness.
- Perception of corruption appears to be less of a concern compared with ASEAN economies (Corruption Perception Index examples shown).
- Main business constraints perceived by firms: political instability and limited financial access.
- Employment shares by sector (percent, 2021) and GDP shares show: Oil and mining employment 6.1; Other activities 18.7; Wholesale/retail trade 22.1; Public sector and defense 13.6; Construction 6.1; Agriculture 26.9; Manufacturing 6.5; with GDP shares lower for agriculture and services relative to employment.
- Resource Governance Index (Index ranges from 0-100, higher is better, 2021) shows Timor-Leste: 49 (categorized as Weak, 45-59).

### Challenges to growth and infrastructure
- Access to electricity is nearly universal and aligned with Asian EMDEs, but losses due to electrical outages are high.
- Access to the internet is low and internet speed is slow.
- Tourist arrivals remain well below the pre-pandemic level.
- Poverty rate is among the highest in the region.

### Labor market and human capital
- School enrollment rates increased significantly in recent years.
- Improved completion rates of basic education will help raise literacy.
- Human development improved steadily until mid-2010s but has stagnated for the past decade, reflecting low educational attainment compared to peers.
- Labor force participation is the lowest among peers, with female participation lower than male participation.
- Selected indicators:
  - Gross school enrollment (Percent): Pre-Primary, Secondary for 2014 and 2020 shown in chart.
  - Youth literacy (% of total, 2020): charted relative to peers.
  - Labor force participation (Percent, 15+, 2021 or latest available): Chart shows female, male, total with Timor-Leste among lowest.

### Sustainable Development Goals and social indicators (selected exact values from Table 5)
- Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population): 24.4
- Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population): 41.8
- Poverty gap at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (%): 5.1
- Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population): 29.8 (2013) declining to 22.3 (2022)
- Prevalence of stunting, height for age (% of children under 5): 51.5 (2013) to 45.1 (2022)
- Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births): 65.3 (2013) to 50.5 and lower series noted
- Access to electricity (% of population): 59.2 (2013) rising to 100.0 (2021) and 99.7 (2022)
- Individuals using the Internet (% of population): 11.0 (2013) to 39.5 (2022)
- Corruption Perception Index (worst 0-100 best): 30 (2013) to 42 (2022)
- Unemployment rate (% of total labor force): 4.0 (2013) to 5.1 (2022)
- Access to clean fuels and technologies for cooking (% of population): 6.9 (2013) to 17.7 (2022)

*Source: Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste — IMF country report figures and tables as presented on pages summarized above.*

### Annex I. Understanding and Forecasting Inflation in Timor-Leste

### Annex I. Understanding and Forecasting Inflation in Timor-Leste

### Introduction
- Objective: analyze key drivers of inflation in Timor-Leste and develop a simple forecasting model using a Phillips Curve framework.
- Finding overview: Inflation is strongly underpinned by global commodity prices, with a role for domestic factors; model forecasts easing inflation in the near term consistent with moderation of global commodity prices.

### Stylized Facts
- Historical inflation episodes:
  - 2003: 7.2 percent
  - 2005: 1.1 percent
  - 2007 peak after 2006 unrest: 10.3 percent (annual)
  - August 2009 (low): -2.5 percent (y/y)
  - January 2012 (peak): 17.7 percent (y/y)
  - 2014-20 average: 0.6 percent
  - January 2023: 9.8 percent (y/y)
  - Eased substantially in 2024
- CPI composition and trade exposure:
  - Food accounts for 54 percent of the CPI basket.
  - 60 percent of food is imported (2024 World Food Program).
- Comparative position:
  - Broadly aligned with other EMDEs since independence.
  - Higher than peers under fixed exchange rate regimes, including other dollarized economies, except during 2014-20.

### Methodology
- Empirical approach:
  - Phillips Curve baseline regression of headline inflation on:
    - lagged inflation (to capture persistence),
    - government spending (proxy for domestic demand),
    - global food prices,
    - rice prices (A1 Thai) to capture Timor-Leste–specific food dynamics,
    - nominal effective exchange rate (NEER),
    - tax-change dummies (notably cigarette excise tax 2022; import duties, sugary beverages and tobacco taxes 2023).
  - Two lags of independent variables selected via the Akaike Information Criterion.
  - Robustness checks include oil prices, shipping costs, Indonesian inflation, US policy rate, Timor-Leste import prices, M2, and rainfall.
- Data and sample:
  - Monthly data, expressed as month-over-month growth rates; all variables seasonally adjusted except US policy rate.
  - Sample period: January 2013 to May 2024.
  - Start chosen to avoid volatility and measurement/composition issues of 2000s.

### Regression Results (key empirical findings)
- Global food price inflation:
  - Estimated coefficients are positive and statistically significant — a key driver of inflation in Timor-Leste.
- Rice price inflation:
  - Coefficients positive but not statistically significant in baseline (likely multicollinearity with global food prices); included to improve out-of-sample forecasts.
- Inflation persistence:
  - Lagged headline inflation coefficients are positive and statistically significant — evidence of persistence/adaptive expectations.
- Domestic demand proxy:
  - Public spending growth (lagged) has a statistically significant positive impact on inflation.
- Tax measures:
  - The January 2023 tax hike had a strong and immediate impact on (m/m) inflation, keeping year-on-year inflation elevated through 2023.
  - 2022 tax changes accounted for effects; 2023 tax hikes largely rolled back in the 2023 rectification and 2024 annual budget (except sugar-sweetened beverage tax maintained).
- NEER and other factors:
  - NEER did not have an economically meaningful impact on inflation dynamics in recent periods.
  - Results are robust across multiple model specifications.

### Historical Decomposition and Recent Drivers
- 2021–2022 surge: largely driven by global food price inflation.
- 2023 onward:
  - Moderation of global food prices began to unwind those effects from early 2023.
  - Rice price inflation remained elevated and continued exerting upward pressure.
  - One-time January 2023 tax hike mechanically raised inflation in 2023 (m/m and y/y due to base effects).
  - Public spending growth contributed little to inflation dynamics in recent periods.

### Forecasting: Out-of-Sample and Actual Forecast Approaches
- Out-of-sample evaluation:
  - Estimation period: 2013–2022; forecasts generated for January 2023–May 2024.
  - Baseline model (lowest RMSE) compared with variants substituting M2 for public spending, Indian wholesale rice price for Thai rice price, and adding shipping costs or rainfall.
  - Baseline model performance:
    - Projected annual headline inflation for 2023: 8.9 percent (0.5 percentage points higher than actual 8.4 percent).
    - Projected May 2024 inflation: 0.2 percent (y/y) vs actual 0.3 percent.
- Actual-forecast approach (informing near-term staff baseline):
  - Baseline model estimated using full sample; independent variable forecasts compiled at annual frequency and interpolated to monthly series (MS Excel Solver interpolation).
  - Assumed constant NEER.
  - Monthly forecasts transformed to year-on-year and averaged to produce annual inflation for 2024 and 2025.

### Forecast Results and Staff Baseline
- Model forecasts:
  - Average annual inflation 2024: 2.2 percent
  - Average annual inflation 2025: 0.5 percent
  - Disinflation driven primarily by expected moderation in global food prices (World Bank Pink Sheet).
- Staff baseline projections (informed by model but accounting for additional upside risks):
  - 2024: 2.2 percent (average)
  - 2025: 1.5 percent (average)
- Upward inflationary risks not fully captured by the model include:
  - Inflationary impact related to the Pope’s visit.
  - Low agricultural yields anticipated from the 2024 harvest, potentially exacerbated by El Niño.
  - Rising trend in the non-food inflation category, showing upward momentum since 2023H1.

### Model Performance Metrics and Table Highlights
- Model comparisons:
  - Baseline model had the lowest RMSE among tested specifications for January 2023–May 2024.
- Representative regression table highlights (monthly percent-change specification; significance markers preserved):
  - Lag 1 headline CPI: 0.187*** (Model 1)
  - Lag 2 headline CPI: 0.193*** (Model 1)
  - Lag 1 global food price: 0.0252** (Model 1)
  - Lag 1 public expenditure: 0.000682** (Model 1)
  - Dummy for 2023 tax hike: 3.115*** (Model 1)
  - Observations: 137 (Model 1)
  - R-squared: 0.598 (Model 1)
  - Standard errors and full coefficient table available in the regression output.

### Data Series and Sources (variables used)
- Lagged inflation: World Bank and INETL, I.P.
- Public spending: The authorities' website (fiscal portal)
- Money supply: Banco Central de Timor-Leste
- Food price: FAO Food Price Index
- Rice price (A1, Thai): World Bank Pink Sheet
- IND wholesale rice price: IND Department of Consumer Affairs
- Global shipping cost: Baltic Exchange Dry Index
- Global oil price: West Texas Intermediate
- NEER: INS
- TLS import price: INS
- US policy rate: Federal Reserve Board
- IDN inflation: World Bank
- 2022 tax rise: The authorities' announcement
- 2023 tax rise: The authorities' announcement
- Rainfall: The Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX)

*Source: IMF staff (Annex I. Understanding and Forecasting Inflation in Timor-Leste).*

### Annex III. Risk Assessment Matrix

### Annex III. Risk Assessment Matrix

### External Risks
- Abrupt global slowdown  
  - Likelihood: Medium  
  - Impact: Medium. This would trigger adverse spillovers through trade and financial channels, triggering sudden stops in the economy.  
  - Policy Response: Promote private sector development and the diversification of the economy. Mobilize domestic revenue to reduce the reliance on the PF to finance government spending.

- Commodity price volatility. Supply and demand fluctuations (e.g., due to conflicts, export restrictions, OPEC+ decisions, and green transition) cause recurrent commodity price volatility, external and fiscal pressures and food insecurity in EMDEs, cross-border spillovers, and social and economic instability.  
  - Likelihood: High  
  - Impact: Medium. Higher oil prices would exert greater inflationary pressure and worsen the current account, as the country relies on imports for oil products.  
  - Policy Response: Support vulnerable households with targeted transfers to offset rising consumer prices. To create fiscal space, contain government spending pressures, mobilize domestic revenue, and align spending with sustainable revenues.

### Domestic Risks
- Onset of political instability. The new government inaugurated in 2023 has a strong commitment to undertake various reforms for achieving a 5-percent growth target. However, slow progress on reforms and economic stagnation could fuel discontent, potentially leading to political instability.  
  - Likelihood: Medium  
  - Impact: Medium. Aggravated political instability, coupled with weak governance, would further constraint foreign direct investment and economic diversification.  
  - Policy Response: Prioritize reforms to support inclusive growth, improve the business environment, diversify the economy, and achieve fiscal sustainability, coordinated with developing partners.

- Development of major oil projects, including Greater Sunrise. The authorities are in the process of negotiating with stakeholders on Greater Sunrise, which is one of the major ongoing oil projects.  
  - Likelihood: Medium  
  - Impact: Large. Significant oil revenues could support higher social spending and inclusive growth. Meanwhile, large public investment related to project development would deplete the PF more quickly.  
  - Policy Response: Carefully assess benefits, costs, and risks from various development options before making investment decisions.

- Over investment in projects with low returns. The authorities have a number of projects in the pipeline, but the selection criteria are unclear.  
  - Likelihood: Medium  
  - Impact: Large. Large capital-intensive projects could yield low economic and social benefits and have large opportunity costs.  
  - Policy Response: Strengthen project appraisal by developing a standard methodology and verifying that it is consistently applied across line ministries.

- Extreme climate and weather shocks. ST/MT: Drought associated with El Niño is estimated to result in lower agricultural production. New events, including natural disasters triggered by climate change related to El Niño, could cause severe damage to the economy.  
  - Likelihood: Medium  
  - Impact: Medium. Food insecurity, which is more severe than in peer Asian countries, would worsen further. Inflation will accelerate, as food accounts for 54 percent of the CPI basket. The limited climate resilience of infrastructure will exacerbate the impact.  
  - Policy Response: Gradually mobilize concessional resources to finance investments in climate-  resilient infrastructure. To that end, start by identifying a pipeline of projects as part of the broader capital expenditure plan. Develop climate-resilient roads.

### Notes on the Risk Assessment Matrix
- The Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) shows events that could materially alter the baseline path (the scenario most likely to materialize in the view of IMF staff).  
- The relative likelihood of risks listed is the staff’s subjective assessment of the risks surrounding the baseline (“Low” is meant to indicate a probability below 10 percent, “Medium” a probability between 10 and 30 percent, and “High” a probability between 30 and 50 percent).  
- The RAM reflects staff views on the source of risks and overall level of concern as of the time of discussions with the authorities. Non-mutually exclusive risks may interact and materialize jointly. The PF denotes the Petroleum Fund.

*Source: Annex III. Risk Assessment Matrix*

### 3. Timor-Leste’s net public asset position is currently strong due to oil-related savings

### 3. Timor-Leste’s net public asset position is currently strong due to oil-related savings

### Petroleum Fund balance and returns
- Petroleum Fund (PF) balance at end-2023: $18.2 billion (988 percent of non-oil GDP).
- PF coverage: 182 months of prospective goods and services imports.
- PF balance increased by $1.1 billion in 2023 due to:
  - favorable market revaluations: $1.2 billion; 7 percent
  - interest and dividend income: $0.5 billion
  - oil revenues: $0.4 billion
  - less withdrawals to finance the budget: $1.1 billion (of which $0.6 billion was excess withdrawal)
- Average nominal return on Petroleum Fund assets during 2018–23: 4.4 percent.
- Assumed annual nominal investment return on the Petroleum Fund during 2023–30: around 4.5 percent; after 2030 a smaller return of 4 percent is assumed.

### Public external debt and debt service
- Outstanding public external debt in 2023: $259 million.
- External debt as share of non-oil GDP in 2023: 14.4 percent (slight decline from 14.7 percent in 2022).
- Debt service payments on existing debt average: $27 million annually (close to 1.1 percent of non-oil GDP) in the medium term.
- Composition of external debt by creditor at end-2023:
  - Asian Development Bank: 75 percent
  - World Bank: 18 percent
  - Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA): 7 percent
- Characteristics of external loans signed since 2012: concessional loans from ADB, World Bank Group, and JICA for road infrastructure, water supply and sanitation, and airport development.
- Average maturity of existing loans: 25.5 years; grace periods range from 5 to 10 years.

### Macroeconomic and fiscal projections (highlights from Text Table 3)
- Real non-oil GDP growth:
  - 2023 (outturn): 2.4 percent
  - 2024 (projected): 3.5 percent
  - Medium/long term: hover around 3 percent
- Real non-oil GDP per capita (annual percent change): 2023: 1.3; 2024: 2.4; medium-term values provided in table.
- CPI (annual average): 2023: 8.4 percent; 2024: 2.2 percent; 2025: 1.5 percent; medium term: 2.0 percent.
- Petroleum Fund balance (closing, in millions of U.S. dollars) in Text Table 3:
  - 2023: 18,288
  - 2024 (proj): 18,078
  - 2025 (proj): 17,402
  - 2029 (proj): 13,640
- Petroleum Fund balance (in percent of Non-oil GDP) in Text Table 3:
  - 2023: 1,015
  - 2024 (proj): 932
  - 2029 (proj): 507
- Public debt (in millions of U.S. dollars) in Text Table 3:
  - 2023: 259
  - 2024 (proj): 267
  - 2029 (proj): 354
- Public debt (in percent of Non-oil GDP) in Text Table 3:
  - 2023: 14.4
  - 2024 (proj): 13.7
  - 2029 (proj): 13.2
- Current account balance (in percent of Non-oil GDP): 2023: around 1 percent; 2024: about -10 percent; 2029: around -33 percent.
- Nominal Non-oil GDP (in millions of U.S. dollars) projected:
  - 2023: 1,802
  - 2024 (proj): 1,939
  - 2029 (proj): 2,688
- Public foreign assets (end-period) (includes PF balance and central bank official reserves):
  - 2023: 18,106
  - 2024 (proj): 19,072
  - 2025 (proj): 18,881
  - 2029 (proj): 14,688
- PF coverage in months of imports (Text Table 3):
  - 2023: 190 months
  - 2024 (proj): 155 months
  - 2029 (proj): 110 months

### Fiscal outlook, fiscal rules, and withdrawals
- Estimated Sustainable Income (ESI): defined as 3 percent of total petroleum wealth (sum of the PF balance and the net present value of expected future petroleum revenue).
- Revenue rule (Petroleum Fund Law): limits withdrawals for budget purposes to up to the ESI; excess withdrawals require Parliament approval.
- Debt rule: ceiling on the cost of external borrowing at 3 percent and requirement to benchmark external borrowing costs with the PF’s average rate of investment returns.
- Fiscal deficit:
  - 2023: 42½ percent of non-oil GDP (from 60½ percent in 2022)
  - Projected 2024 fiscal deficit: 43 percent of non-oil GDP
  - Projected 2025 fiscal deficit: 49 percent of non-oil GDP (driven by large—and permanent—increases in transfers to veterans and pensioners as envisaged in the draft 2025 budget)
  - Fiscal deficit projected to reach about 50 percent of non-oil GDP by 2029.
- Government revenues (including PF’s ESI) projected to decline from 41 percent of non-oil GDP in 2023 to about 40 percent in 2024, and further to about 13 percent by 2044.
- Government signaled intention to raise domestic revenue by 5 percentage points of non-oil GDP in the medium term; baseline assumes domestic revenue ratio rises by around ½ percentage point by 2029 from 11½ percent of non-oil GDP in 2024.
- Recurrent spending projected to increase by 3.5 percent each year beyond 2025; capital spending projected to increase at around 8 percent annually during 2026–29 and around 5 percent in the long term.
- Government relies on PF withdrawals; under baseline PF falls to $13.6 billion by 2029 and is fully depleted by 2038 (one year earlier than the previous DSA).

### Debt sustainability scenarios, financing assumptions, and projections
- Two scenarios used for DSA: baseline and reform.
- Baseline assumptions on external financing:
  - External financing consists of concessional loans from official creditors throughout most of the projection horizon.
  - When PF depletes in 2038, a sizable financing gap opens; technical assumption that remaining gap is closed by external non-concessional loans.
  - Terms of assumed external non-concessional loans: 5 percent interest rate, 20-year grace period, and 40-year maturity.
  - No private external borrowing is assumed.
  - No domestic financing is assumed in the baseline.
- External borrowing projected at about 1½ percent of non-oil GDP during 2024–29.
- IDA Shorter Maturity Loans (SMLs) access assumed during 2023–25; for Timor-Leste in FY25, SMLs comprise approximately 24 percent of its IDA country allocation. SMLs have a 12-year final maturity, a 6-year grace period, and zero interest or service charge.
- Long-term debt projection under baseline: once the PF is depleted, external borrowing assumed to meet financing gaps leading to external debt rising to around 270 percent of non-oil GDP by 2044 under the baseline.

### Macro forecast adjustments, execution risks, and vulnerabilities
- Revisions versus 2023 DSA:
  - PF outstanding balance at end-2023 larger than previous estimate mainly due to larger-than-estimated valuation gains.
  - Non-oil GDP growth outturn in 2023: 2.4 percent (higher than previous DSA estimate of 1.5 percent).
  - Fiscal deficit in 2023 decreased to 42½ percent (from 60½ percent in 2022); fiscal deficit in 2023 somewhat larger than previously estimated due to higher-than-expected revenues partially offsetting higher-than-expected expenditure.
- Execution assumptions:
  - Baseline assumes recurrent spending in 2024–25 averages around 94 percent of planned amount.
  - Execution rate of capital expenditure assumed to be 60 percent by end-2024 (execution rate remained around 26 percent through mid-September 2024 and is assumed to pick up in later months).
  - Execution rate of capital expenditure expected to pick up gradually in 2025 and medium term.
- Inflation path:
  - Inflation fell from a high level in 2023 to around 1.8 percent (y/y) in August 2024.
  - Inflation expected to average 2.2 percent in 2024 and 1.5 percent in 2025, returning to 2 percent in the medium term.
  - Growth in the GDP deflator revised down to 3½ percent over the medium to long term (from 4 percent in previous DSA).
- Oil production:
  - Oil production from active fields is dwindling and expected to cease by end-2026; baseline does not project restart.
  - Expected petroleum receipts during 2024–26 average just 3 percent of non-oil GDP (relative to 40 percent in the last five years).
  - Baseline does not include development of the Greater Sunrise fields.

### Risks, constraints, and policy-relevant observations
- Timor-Leste remains a fragile post-conflict state with weak human and institutional capacity, large infrastructure gaps, and high dependence on Petroleum Fund revenues.
- GNI per capita in current USD in 2023: $2,140 (below upper-middle income threshold of at least $4,096).
- Poverty and food security: national poverty rate declined from 50.4 percent in 2007 to 41.8 percent in 2014; acute food security affects a quarter of the population.
- Natural disaster risk: country affected by 14 natural disasters since 2001; increased frequency and severity due to climate change pose downside risk to long-term growth.
- Fiscal policy vulnerabilities:
  - Large fiscal deficits driven by planned permanent transfer increases could deplete PF earlier.
  - Reliance on PF withdrawals and, eventually, external non-concessional borrowing raises long-term debt sustainability concerns.
  - Assumed limited domestic revenue mobilization in the baseline contrasts with authorities’ intention to raise domestic revenue by 5 percentage points of non-oil GDP; VAT planned for 2026.
- Realism of baseline: baseline identified as potentially unrealistic but mitigated by factors; three-year primary balance adjustment between 2023 and 2026 is projected to be -6½ percentage points of GDP, which lies in the 10th percentile of Fund-supported programs in low-income countries since 1990.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2024/english/1tlsea2024002-print-pdf.pdf*

### 9. Under staff’s reform scenario—which is broadly consistent with the scenario that has

### 9. Under staff’s reform scenario—which is broadly consistent with the scenario that has

### Reform scenario: summary and fiscal path
- Objective: achieve a sustainable fiscal position by 2034 through moderate spending restraint, higher domestic revenue, and structural reforms.
- Outcomes under the reform scenario:
  - Petroleum Fund (PF) buffers in 2044 of around 168 percent of non-oil GDP.
  - Fiscal deficits in the medium-term (2029) would be around 20 percent of non-oil GDP, instead of 50 percent under the baseline.
  - The Petroleum Fund is preserved from 2034 onwards and generates a permanent level of investment income to support government expenditures.
  - Fiscal consolidation starts in 2025 and is somewhat more gradual relative to the previous DSA due to a stronger PF balance in 2023 (¶6).

### Key policy measures and reforms
- Domestic revenue mobilization:
  - A VAT is adopted by 2026 which would generate additional revenues of about 2½ percentage points of non-oil GDP by 2034.
  - Other tax policies and administration reforms (revision of excise tax rates, increase in statutory income tax rate, adopting a property tax) would yield an additional 2½ percentage points of revenues.
  - Taken together, domestic revenue would increase to the ASEAN average of 17 percent of GDP by 2034.
  - Structural reforms (¶10) are estimated to yield additional revenue growth of about 3½ percent (annualized average) during 2025-44 relative to the baseline.
  - VAT modeling assumption: a 10 percent VAT rate applied to a tax base corresponding to 10 percent of household consumption in 2026; tax base assumed to rise to 45 percent of household consumption subject to the 10 percent VAT rate by mid-2030s.
- Expenditure moderation and composition:
  - Recurrent spending (wages and salaries; and transfers) declines gradually to pre-pandemic levels by 2034.
  - Capital expenditure grows at an average annual rate of around 4½ percent (considering absorptive capacity) and is subject to rigorous cost-benefit analysis.
  - Total expenditure envelope remains flat until 2034 and declines as a share of GDP over the projection horizon (and remains below the baseline).
  - Reprioritization towards human capital development and a strengthened social safety net.
- Borrowing and financing:
  - Public external borrowing via concessional loans is raised to finance public investment in infrastructure while preserving PF wealth.
  - External borrowing is significantly lower in 2038–44 as the PF is preserved and public spending increases in line with higher sustainable revenue sources.
- Structural reforms (¶10):
  - Improve business environment: advance land titling, adopt corporate accounting standards.
  - Financial sector reforms to encourage lending.
  - Progress in regional integration.
  - Boost human capital.
  - Strengthen governance and enforcement of contracts.
  - Authorities advancing financial sector reforms and draft 2025 budget includes further structural reform measures.

### Macroeconomic assumptions and selected quantitative projections
- Selected series (Reform column as presented):
  - Real non-oil GDP growth (in percent): 2.4 3.5 3.4 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.9 3.9 5.5 6.3
  - Revenue (excl. grants) (percent of non-oil GDP): 41.0 39.7 37.6 28.2 19.0 12.5 37.8 34.1 28.4 22.0
  - Domestic revenue (percent of non-oil GDP): 13.8 11.4 11.5 11.7 12.5 12.5 11.5 16.2 17.0 17.0
  - Estimated Sustainable Income (percent of non-oil GDP): 27.2 28.3 26.2 16.4 6.5 0.0 26.3 17.9 11.4 5.0
  - Expenditure (percent of non-oil GDP): 83.5 83.1 86.8 78.1 69.8 53.3 81.4 54.2 36.0 22.7
  - Recurrent (percent of non-oil GDP): 70.6 69.8 73.6 64.4 55.5 41.3 68.4 42.3 26.0 16.0
  - Capital (percent of non-oil GDP): 12.8 13.3 13.2 13.7 14.3 12.0 13.0 11.9 10.0 6.7
  - Fiscal balance (percent of non-oil GDP): -42.5 -43.3 -49.2 -49.9 -50.8 -40.9 -43.6 -20.1 -7.6 -0.7
  - Financing — PF excess withdrawals (percent of non-oil GDP): 33.3 32.6 47.9 49.0 48.5 0.0 42.3 17.8 0.0 0.0
  - Financing — Net incurrence of liabilities (percent of non-oil GDP): 0.6 0.4 1.3 0.9 2.3 39.9 ........
  - PF closing balance ($ million): $ million18,28818,07817,40213,6406,367017,47615,74815,61917,253
  - PF closing balance (Percent of non-oil GDP): 1,0159328395071720847585384168
  - Current account balance (percent of non-oil GDP): -1.0 -10.1 -24.9 -33.3 -33.9 -28.0 -20.6 -16.9 -10.8 -4.5
  - Note: Percent of non-oil GDP unless noted otherwise; Source: IMF staff estimates.

### Debt-carrying capacity, stress tests, and DSA outcomes
- Debt-carrying capacity:
  - Latest Composite Indicator (CI) index: 2.71 (now above the 2.69 threshold and better than the previous 2.68).
  - Final debt-carrying capacity classification remains "Weak" based on the two previous vintages (CI index 2.68).
  - Applicable DSA thresholds for Timor-Leste:
    - PV of external debt-to-GDP: 30 percent
    - PV of external debt-to-exports: 140 percent
    - External debt service-to-exports: 10 percent
    - External debt service-to-revenue: 14 percent
    - PV of public debt-to-GDP: 35 percent
- Tailored stress tests:
  - Natural disaster tailored stress test (based on April 2021 cyclone/floods):
    - Assumes disaster occurs in 2025 and new debt increases public debt-to-GDP by 14 percent in 2025 (equivalent to estimated damages from April 2021 floods).
    - Real GDP and exports growth decline by 3 percent and 4 percent in 2025, respectively, relative to the baseline.
  - Commodity price shock is not triggered: commodity exports average about 13 percent of total exports of goods and services in the projection horizon, below the 50 percent threshold to trigger the test.
- DSA findings:
  - Under the baseline:
    - Two external debt indicators breach thresholds in the medium-term (2024-29): PV of external debt-to-exports breaches 140 percent; debt service-to-exports breaches 10 percent during 2024-32.
    - PV of external debt projected to decline from 15 percent of non-oil GDP in 2023 to 13 percent in 2030, then increase as PF is depleted.
    - Present value of total public and publicly guaranteed debt-to-GDP remains below threshold until PF is fully depleted but is vulnerable to growth shocks and breaches under stress starting in 2029.
    - PF projected to be depleted towards the end of the twenty-year horizon (baseline); depletion projected by 2038 under baseline and could be as early as 2036 with nominal investment return of 2.5 percent.
  - Under the reform scenario:
    - Debt dynamics and debt burden indicators improve over the next twenty years.
    - Duration of breaches of PV external debt-to-exports and debt service-to-exports in the medium-term is smaller compared to baseline.
    - PF is stabilized and generates a sustainable stream of resources to finance the budget.
  - Standardized stress tests identify natural disaster shock and shock to non-debt flows (FDI and current transfers) as the most extreme, causing breaches of debt service-to-exports and PV debt-to-exports thresholds.
- Buffer and risk judgment:
  - Mechanical DSA rating: high risk of debt distress (due to breaches in PV debt-to-exports and debt service-to-exports over 2024-32).
  - Judgmental upgrade to "moderate" risk of debt distress applied, citing large, liquid, and accessible net foreign assets in the PF that can mitigate debt service risks until PF is depleted.
  - Present value of debt remains around 25 percent of projected PF until 2036 under the baseline; under the most extreme shock case (shock to non-debt flows), PV of debt-to-PF assets reaches around 40 percent by 2036.

### Policy recommendations and priorities
- Implement gradual fiscal consolidation to achieve a sustainable fiscal position by 2034, supported by:
  - Expenditure rationalization and reprioritization (towards human capital and social safety net).
  - Domestic revenue mobilization (VAT by 2026 plus other tax reforms).
  - Structural reforms to improve business environment, governance, and competitiveness.
- Preserve Petroleum Fund wealth by decreasing withdrawals as sustainable revenue sources rise.
- Mobilize concessional external financing to finance climate-resilient infrastructure and preserve fiscal space.
- Prioritize climate adaptation investment through rationalized capital spending and develop a pipeline of climate-proof infrastructure projects.
- Strengthen public financial management (PFM) to improve quality and efficiency of public spending and maximize gains from climate-resilient investments.
- Secure political consensus to implement and sustain reform scenario measures; a study on project design and viability for offshore Greater Sunrise natural gas fields is expected end-2024.

*Source: IMF staff estimates and analysis as presented in the chapter.*

### 23. The IMF and the World Bank stand ready to support the authorities in their efforts to

### The IMF and the World Bank stand ready to support the authorities in their efforts to ensure fiscal and debt sustainability

### Fiscal transparency and public financial management reforms
- Authorities requested extensive technical assistance from the IMF for ambitious fiscal reforms aiming to secure fiscal sustainability.
- Staff welcomes the increased fiscal transparency in the draft 2025 budget that features more granular information on recurrent spending, including transfer programs and the public sector wage bill.
- This should be supplemented by ongoing initiatives to improve reporting by line ministries, including the establishment of government accounting standards.
- Ongoing technical assistance supporting these reforms:
  - Public financial management reforms: IMF Fiscal Affairs Department.
  - Revenue administration: IMF Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Center.
  - Governance in anti-money laundering: IMF Legal Department.
- The World Bank and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) are providing technical assistance to improve the financial sector and prospects for private sector development.
- Authorities should formulate a medium-term fiscal framework that articulates their multi-year fiscal strategy.
- Laws should improve budget planning and execution as well as project selection.

### Public debt management: progress and capacity gaps
- The MOF established in September 2023 the National Directorate of Cash and Public Debt Management (NDCPDM) under the General Directorate of the Treasury (DGT) as a dedicated unit in charge of state government treasury and public debt management as well as issuance of debt securities.
- In February 2024, with TA support from the IMF Statistics Department, the authorities for the first time began reporting Public Sector Debt Statistics (PSDS) data to the joint IMF-World Bank Quarterly Public Sector Debt statistics (QPSD) database.
- Key areas needing strengthening:
  - Embed external borrowing within the debt management framework, supported by best practice debt management policies and procedures.
  - Strengthen the organization and capacity of the debt management unit, including preparing a medium-term debt management strategy (MTDS).
  - Upgrade debt recording software.
  - Produce comprehensive and realistic debt servicing projections for the existing debt in the near term.
  - Improve monitoring and reporting of fiscal risks, such as contingent liabilities related to credit guarantees, pensions, public corporations, and public-private partnerships.

### Implementation support and prior reforms
- The IDA’s Sustainable Development Finance Policy (SDFP) has supported ongoing reform measures—such as VAT, tax procedures code and Fiscal Risk Statement.
- Continued technical assistance from IMF and World Bank teams will support the authorities in ensuring fiscal and debt sustainability.

*Source: 1tlsea2024002-print-pdf - 23. The IMF and the World Bank stand ready to support the authorities in their efforts to ensure fiscal and debt sustainability*

### 25. While the authorities broadly agreed with staff’s debt sustainability analysis, they

### 1tlsea2024002-print-pdf - 25. While the authorities broadly agreed with staff’s debt sustainability analysis, they

### Authorities’ assessment and policy stance
- Authorities broadly agreed with staff’s debt sustainability analysis but emphasized that boosting growth was key to achieving fiscal sustainability.
- Under spending plans and projections in the draft 2025 budget, they estimated the Petroleum Fund to be fully depleted by 2035.
- Authorities noted the likely development of the Greater Sunrise oil fields as a major mitigating factor.
- Authorities flagged a lack of political consensus on fiscal adjustment given existing spending commitments.
- Authorities’ approach to securing fiscal sustainability relies more on boosting growth via a prioritization of capital spending.
- Authorities agreed that mobilizing domestic revenues would also help, and are committed to implementing a VAT in 2026.
- The modalities of the VAT—rates, thresholds, and exemptions—will be decided based on a careful assessment of the incidence and tax bearing capacity.

### Debt dynamics and projections (selected baseline indicators from DSA tables)
- External debt (nominal), in percent of non-oil GDP: 2021: 15.1; 2022: 15.1; 2023: 14.4; 2024: 13.7; 2025: 14.1; 2026: 13.8; 2027: 13.3; 2028: 13.1; 2029: 13.2; 2034: 17.2; 2044: 268.5; 209?: 9.5; 214?: 14.2. 
  - (Table presents the series with those exact numeric entries as shown.)
- Change in external debt: 2021: 1.3; 2022: 0.0; 2023: -0.8; 2024: -0.6; 2025: 0.4; 2026: -0.3; 2027: -0.5; 2028: -0.2; 2029: 0.1; 2034: 1.3; 2044: 25.0.
- Identified net debt-creating flows (selected): 2021: -70.6; 2022: -5.7; 2023: 2.7; 2024: 6.8; 2025: 21.7; 2026: 23.0; 2027: 29.5; 2028: 30.1; 2029: 30.6; 2034: 31.5; 2044: 19.8.
- Non-interest current account deficit (selected): 2021: -97.9; 2022: -28.8; 2023: 0.5; 2024: 9.7; 2025: 24.5; 2026: 25.6; 2027: 32.1; 2028: 32.6; 2029: 33.0; 2034: 33.6; 2044: 17.6.
- Exports (selected, percent of non-oil GDP): 2021: 177.4; 2022: 110.9; 2023: 39.0; 2024: 7.3; 2025: 7.7; 2026: 8.1; 2027: 8.6; 2028: 9.1; 2029: 9.6; 2034: 12.8; 2044: 23.0.
- Imports (selected): 2021: 66.6; 2022: 50.3; 2023: 48.2; 2024: 52.3; 2025: 56.5; 2026: 55.5; 2027: 53.2; 2028: 49.9; 2029: 50.2; 2034: 48.1; 2044: 10.0.
- Net FDI (negative = inflow), selected: 2021: 26.8; 2022: 23.6; 2023: 2.8; 2024: -2.8; 2025: -2.7; 2026: -2.6; 2027: -2.5; 2028: -2.4; 2029: -2.3; 2034: -2.0; 2044: -1.4.
- Endogenous debt dynamics contribution (selected): 2021: 0.4; 2022: -0.5; 2023: -0.6; 2024: -0.1; 2025: -0.1; 2026: -0.1; 2027: -0.1; 2028: -0.1; 2029: -0.1; 2034: -0.1; 2044: 3.6.
- Residual (financed through excess withdrawals from the Petroleum Fund), selected: 2021: 72.0; 2022: 5.7; 2023: -3.4; 2024: -7.4; 2025: -21.3; 2026: -23.3; 2027: -30.1; 2028: -30.3; 2029: -30.5; 2034: -30.2; 2044: 5.2.

### Sustainability indicators (external and public sector)
- PV of PPG external debt-to-GDP ratio (selected): 2024: 16.7; 2025: 15.8; 2026: 15.7; 2027: 15.1; 2028: 14.4; 2029: 13.9; 2030: 13.6; 2034: 14.7; 2044: 259.0.
- PV of PPG external debt-to-exports ratio (selected): 2024: 42.8; 2025: 216.7; 2026: 203.9; 2027: 186.4; 2028: 167.9; 2029: 152.9; 2030: 141.8; 2034: 114.8; 2044: 1124.9.
- PPG debt service-to-exports ratio (selected): 2024: 0.4; 2025: 1.1; 2026: 3.1; 2027: 17.3; 2028: 16.4; 2029: 14.9; 2030: 13.4; 2034: 11.9; 2044: 48.9.
- PPG debt service-to-revenue ratio (selected): 2024: 1.5; 2025: 2.9; 2026: 3.0; 2027: 3.2; 2028: 3.3; 2029: 3.4; 2030: 3.5; 2034: 3.6; 2044: 90.4.
- PV of public debt-to-GDP ratio (public DSA, selected): 2024: 16.7; 2025: 15.8; 2026: 15.7; 2027: 15.1; 2028: 14.4; 2029: 13.9; 2030: 13.6; 2034: 14.7; 2044: 259.0.
- PV of public debt-to-revenue and grants ratio (selected): 2024: 32.4; 2025: 32.2; 2026: 34.0; 2027: 35.3; 2028: 36.4; 2029: 38.1; 2034: 40.5; 2044: 668.1 (table entries preserved as presented).

### Key macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions (selected)
- Real GDP growth (in percent), annual series: 2021: 3.0; 2022: 4.0; 2023: 2.4; 2024: 3.5; 2025: 3.4; 2026: 3.2; 2027: 3.1; 2028: 3.1; 2029: 3.0; 2034: 3.0; 2044: 3.1.
- GDP deflator in US dollar terms (change in percent) (selected): 2021: -4.0; 2022: 3.2; 2023: 5.0; 2024: 4.0; 2025: 3.4; 2026: 3.5.
- Effective interest rate (percent) (selected): 2021: 2.0; 2022: 3.7; 2023: 3.3; 2024: 2.8; 2025: 2.8; 2026: 2.7.
- Growth of exports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent) (selected): 2021: 73.5; 2022: -33.0; 2023: -62.2; 2024: -79.8; 2025: 12.5; 2026: 12.4; 2027: 13.0; 2028: 13.0; 2029: 12.9; 2034: 13.0; 2044: 3.4.
- Growth of imports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent) (selected): 2021: -1.9; 2022: -19.0; 2023: 3.2; 2024: 16.8; 2025: 15.4; 2026: 4.9.
- Government revenues (excluding grants, in percent of GDP) (selected): 2021: 45.5; 2022: 43.3; 2023: 41.0; 2024: 39.7; 2025: 37.6; 2026: 35.0; 2027: 32.7; 2028: 30.4; 2029: 28.2; 2034: 19.0; 2044: 12.5.
- Aid flows (in Million of US dollars) (selected): 2021: 181.0; 2022: 190.0; 2023: 188.8; 2024: 187.9; 2025: 186.0; 2026: 179.2; 2027: 167.2; 2028: 164.7; 2029: 155.8; 2034: 140.7; 2044: 134.5.
- Nominal GDP (Million of US dollars) (selected): 2021: 1,563; 2022: 1,676; 2023: 1,802; 2024: 1,939; 2025: 2,073; 2026: 2,215; 2027: 2,363; 2028: 2,522; 2029: 2,688; 2034: 3,702; 2044: 7,017.
- Nominal dollar GDP growth (selected): 2021: -1.2; 2022: 7.3; 2023: 7.5; 2024: 7.6; 2025: 6.9; 2026: 6.8; 2027: 6.7; 2028: 6.7; 2029: 6.6; 2034: 6.6; 2044: 2.7; 20??: 6.8.

### Sensitivity analysis and stress tests (selected findings)
- Public and external DSA include extensive sensitivity analysis and bound tests (B1–B6) and tailored tests (C1–C4) for 2024–2044; tables present scenario outcomes and indicate where thresholds or benchmarks are breached (bold values in tables denote breaches).
- Figure summaries show that the most extreme shocks for various indicators include Non-debt flows and Natural disaster scenarios (figure captions and legends preserved).
- Borrowing assumptions for stress tests: all additional financing needs generated by the shocks under the stress tests are assumed to be covered by PPG external MLT debt in the external DSA; default terms of marginal debt are based on baseline 10-year projections.

### Fiscal policy implications and recommendations implicit in the analysis
- Achieving fiscal sustainability will require either credible fiscal adjustment or substantial and sustained growth improvements; authorities prefer growth-led adjustment emphasizing capital spending.
- Mobilizing domestic revenues (including implementing VAT in 2026) is part of the authorities’ commitment to help fiscal sustainability; modalities will be decided after assessing incidence and tax bearing capacity.
- The Petroleum Fund plays a central role: residuals in debt-creating flows are financed through excess withdrawals from the Petroleum Fund, and under current draft 2025 budget projections the Fund is estimated by authorities to be depleted by 2035.

*Source: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.*

### 1990. The size of 3-year adjustment from program inception is found on the horizontal axis; the

### Figure 5. Timor-Leste: Qualifications of the Moderate Category, 2024-2034 1/

### 3-Year Adjustment in Primary Balance
- Title shown: "3-Year Adjustment in Primary Balance (Percentage points of GDP)".
- Horizontal axis: "The size of 3-year adjustment from program inception".
- Vertical axis: "percent of sample".
- Distribution markers and axis labels preserved as shown:
  - Horizontal tick labels (exact): "-4 .5-4 .0-3 .5-3 .0 -2 .5-2 .0-1 .5-1 .0-0 .5 0. 0 0. 51. 01. 52. 02. 53. 03. 54. 04. 55. 05. 56. 06. 57. 07. 58. 0"
  - Annotation: "3-year PBadju stment greater than 2.5 percentage points of GDP in approx. top quartile"
  - Text element: "Projected 3-yr adjustment" and "More" and "Distribution 1/"

### Fiscal Adjustment and Possible Growth Paths
- Time series horizontal axis labels preserved exactly: "2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029"
- Vertical axis numeric labels shown (exact): "-1 -1 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4"
- Series legend entries preserved exactly: "Historic al", "Projected (Prev. DSA)", "Projected (Curr. DSA)"
- Contribution components listed exactly as shown: "Contribution of government capital (G)", "Contribution of other factors"
- Baseline and multiplier scenarios explicitly labeled (exact):
  - "Baseline"
  - "Multiplier = 0.2"
  - "Multiplier = 0.4"
  - "Multiplier = 0.6"
  - "Multiplier = 0.8"
- Additional horizontal axis labels present in figure (exact): "-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5" and "-1 0 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025"
- Unit note in charts: "In percentage points of GDP" and "In percent"

### Debt Indicators and Threshold Qualifications (2024–2034)
- Panel title: "Qualifications of the Moderate Category, 2024-2034 1/".
- Threshold definitions (exact):
  - "For the PV debt/GDP and PV debt/exports thresholds, x is 20 percent and y is 40 percent."
  - "For debt service/Exports and debt service/revenue thresholds, x is 12 percent and y is 35 percent."
- Chart categories/labels preserved exactly: "Limited space", "Threshold", "Baseline", "Some space", "Substantial space"
- Time series horizontal axis labels preserved exactly for debt charts: "2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034"
- Four debt indicator panels with their vertical axis labels preserved exactly:
  - "Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio"
    - Vertical axis tick labels (exact where visible): "0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16"
    - Additional horizontal plot-level labels: "0 50 100 150 200 250 2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034" (as shown adjacent to another panel)
  - "PV of Debt-to-Exports Ratio"
    - Vertical axis tick labels (exact where visible): "0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35"
    - Horizontal axis labels: "2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034"
  - "PV of Debt-to GDP Ratio"
    - Vertical axis tick labels (exact where visible): "0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20"
    - Horizontal axis labels: "2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034"
  - "Debt Service-to-Exports Ratio"
    - Vertical axis tick labels not numerically detailed in source extract besides shared time labels "2024 2026 2028 2030 2032 2034"

### Figures, Annotations, and Sources
- Figure footnote marker present: "1/" tied to figure title and multiple distributions.
- Sources line (exact): "Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections."

*DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF TIMOR-LESTE — INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2024/english/1tlsea2024002-print-pdf.pdf_
