## IMF Detailed Assessment — Switzerland (1cheea2025004-source-pdf)

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### Executive summary and overarching finding
- Continued evolution: international capital and liquidity standards, global pandemic, and the crisis of Credit Suisse in 2023 leading to a merger of the two Swiss G-SIBs.
- Switzerland implemented the Basel III (final) rules in January 2025.
- Federal Council proposed legislative reforms after the 2023 crisis; Parliamentary approval required and implementation will take years.
- Central finding: existing key gaps in legal powers limit FINMA’s scope to deliver robust, effective supervision.

### Legal powers, early intervention and appeals
- Key deficiencies:
  - FINMA lacks effective and complete early intervention powers; corrective measures can be appealed with immediate suspensive effect.
  - Protective measures (Article 26 Banking Act) exempt from suspensive effect but may only be exercised when there is a risk of insolvency.
  - Banking Act (Article 23) permits direct supervision only when issues of complexity or economic significance exist.
  - FINMA’s ability to codify supervisory practices (FINMA circulars) or issue binding prudential regulations appears weakened (FINMASA Art 7 constraints).
- Practical consequences:
  - Supervisory intervention is challenging unless a clear violation exists or until a bank is at point of non-viability.
  - Appeals can immediately suspend effect of FINMA measures; courts may reinstate suspension even if FINMA revokes suspensive effect.
  - Protracted procedural appeals have occurred (sometimes lasting nearly a decade); one systemic bank case ran through courts between 2016 and 2024; final Federal Supreme Court decision favored FINMA (issued after BCP mission).
- Explicit recommendation:
  - There should be no suspensive effect of a measure imposed by FINMA in the event of an appeal, unless a defined high threshold is met such as clear illegality.
  - The withdrawal of suspensive effect should apply to capital charges imposed under Pillar 2 (Capital Adequacy Ordinance (CAO) Art. 45) in addition to corrective measures.
- Mandate clarity:
  - Amend FINMA’s legal mandate so supervisory objectives unmistakably prioritise stability and soundness over competitiveness.

### Onsite supervision, resources, and direct engagement
- Supervisory coverage and resources:
  - FINMA’s in-depth knowledge of many banks, particularly category 3 banks, is partial; ability to engage and intervene in distressed banks is impaired.
  - Resources increased by ten per cent per year since 2022, but further amplification is needed.
  - Average headcount in 2024: 695 permanent and temporary staff members.
- Onsite and audit practice:
  - Onsite inspections 2021–2023: 304 on-site inspections (108 in conduct area).
  - FINMA increased on-site examinations by approximately 30 percent compared to before the 2019 FSAP.
  - Reliance on external regulatory audits is high; regulatory audit = compliance check, not a supervisory process.
- Recommendations:
  - Expand on-site engagement and supervisory deep dives; bring as much work in-house over time.
  - Require a named executive-level individual to sign off on regulatory data submitted to FINMA.

### Enforcement against individuals and governance tools
- Powers and limits:
  - FINMA has formal powers under FINMASA and the Banking Act to take actions against individuals (e.g., barring persons for up to five years, Art. 33 FINMASA), but practical enforcement is challenging due to high evidentiary thresholds.
  - FINMA’s power to change board composition is likely weak except in the clearest cases.
- Corporate governance:
  - FINMA supports introducing a Senior Managers Regime for all banks to identify responsibility and improve enforcement effectiveness.
  - FINMA guidance on corporate governance is high level; development of a corporate governance questionnaire and program is underway.

### Role and limits of regulatory audits
- Regulatory audit system:
  - External regulatory audits supplement FINMA’s work; audit firms submit annual risk analysis and long-form audit reports.
  - Regulatory audit tracks whether controls are in place but does not provide forward-looking, risk-based supervisory insights nor detect management failure.
- Limitations and recommendations:
  - Over-reliance on external regulatory audits can leave governance and risk management highly exposed.
  - Recommendation: grant FINMA power to directly mandate the scope and payment of regulatory audit work to increase utility and gradually reduce reliance on external regulatory audits.

### Prudential standards, capital framework, Pillar 2 and participations
- Capital framework weaknesses:
  - “The current capital framework has serious weaknesses and deficiencies.”
  - Since 2019 participations moved from a deduction approach to a risk-weighting approach (250 percent for Swiss participations and 400 percent for foreign-based holdings for consolidated regulatory capital treatment, phased in to 2027 for Category 1 banks).
  - Risk-weighting approach allowed partial backing of parent participations and “double leveraging”; this constrained Credit Suisse’s parent capital during the 2023 crisis.
  - Authorities propose reverting to a deduction approach; assessors view this as moving in the right direction.
- Pillar 2 and stress testing:
  - FINMA’s Pillar 2 powers (CAO Art. 45) are not clearly articulated and are open to legal challenge; enforcement of Pillar 2 charges can be difficult if banks appeal.
  - No general legal requirements for banks to undertake stress testing or an ICAAP.
- Capital numeric requirements (excerpted exact figures):
  - Minimum capital: 8 percent of risk weighted positions (Article 42 CAO).
  - Minimum CET1: 4.5 percent; minimum Tier 1: 6 percent.
  - Leverage ratio minimum: 3 percent (Article 46 CAO).
  - SIBs base RWA ratio: 12.86 percent and leverage ratio of 4.5 percent (Articles 129–131 CAO).
  - Capital buffers by category (Article 43 CAO): Category 1 and 2: 4.8%; Category 3: 4.0%; Category 4: 3.2%; Category 5: 2.5% (with CET1 and AT1/T2 subcomponents specified).
  - Small banks regime simplified leverage ratio: at least 8 percent (Article 47 CAO).
  - CCyB maximum: 2.5 percent; Swiss sectoral CCyB for residential mortgages: 2.5 percent since September 2022; Basel III CCyB in Switzerland: 0 percent as of FSAP date.
  - Gone concern for D‑SIBs: only 40 percent of total going concern capital requirement.
- Recommendations:
  - Strengthen legal basis for Pillar 2 (Art. 45 CAO) and remove suspensive effect of appeals for such measures.
  - Put stress testing and ICAAP requirements on solid legal footing.
  - Ensure consistent prudential calculations across accounting frameworks (e.g., deduction of software costs).
  - Revert prudential treatment of participations to the deduction approach at the parent level.

### Related party transactions, country and transfer risk
- Gaps and deficiencies:
  - Legislative definition of related parties refers only to transactions involving credit risk and omits many relevant transaction types (e.g., sales/purchases of real estate, service contracts, forgiveness of loans).
  - No dedicated reporting of related party transactions to FINMA; partial capture via large exposures/intra-group reporting but not comprehensive.
  - Country and transfer risk reporting incomplete; breaches cannot be detected from available reporting.
  - Industry guidance dates from 1997 and is not supplemented by supervisory guidelines.
- Recommendations:
  - Explicitly define related parties to include all relevant counterparts and transaction types.
  - Implement dedicated reporting requirements and develop detailed guidance; consider thematic reviews on related parties and country/transfer risk.
  - Require banks to establish country risk appetites.

### Supervisory articulation, standards, and risk management expectations
- Legal constraints:
  - FINMA lacks explicit legal basis to set binding standards for risk management (except liquidity), to require stress testing or ICAAPs, or to require CRO to be a standalone executive-board-level position for all banks.
  - FINMASA Art 7 constrains FINMA to high-level principles; circulars and guidelines subject to lengthy processes (1–1.5 years).
- Supervisory practice and tools:
  - Absence of a comprehensive supervisory manual; FINMA to develop one to improve consistency and support junior supervisors.
  - Integration of climate-related financial risks into supervision is at an early stage; a Circular on “Nature-related financial risks” published December 2024 with phased implementation from 1 January 2026.
- Recommendation: Issue guidance using “comply or explain” protocols to support less-resourced banks while preserving principles-based orientation.

### Analytical systems, FRB rating evolution and data initiatives
- FRB rating system:
  - Based on CAMELS; scale 1–9 with color coding; ratings updated automatically when data changes.
  - FRB 3.0 planned for 2025 to incorporate financial resilience, operational resilience, governance and controls and suitability; increased granularity and data usage.
- Data and digitalisation:
  - FINMA’s data innovation lab working on supervisor dashboards, external data integration, machine learning and NLP.
  - FINMA to take over receipt of some regulatory reporting from the SNB; planned credit data repository to capture all loans by counterparty expected in 2027.
- Recommendation: Enhance data governance, require named sign-off on submissions, and use data to extend supervisory reach for categories 4–5.

### Key risk-area findings (selected principles)
- IRRBB and Market Risk:
  - IRRBB: key supervisory focus; frameworks viewed as compliant.
  - Market risk: comparatively less focus; final Basel III implementation Jan 2025 expected to increase market risk RWA.
- Liquidity Risk (CP24):
  - Need to enhance liquidity data analysis and revisit proportionality application for liquidity requirements.
  - NSFR implementation rated ‘largely compliant’ in 2023 RCAP with two potentially material findings outstanding.
- Operational Risk & Resilience (CP25):
  - New circular transitional; banks find it challenging to meet requirements.
  - Outsourcing circular captures parent companies but not financial groups/conglomerates; FINMA limited in accessing critical outsourcing providers.
- Internal Control and Audit (CP26):
  - FINMA should assess banks’ internal audit adequacy more directly and elevate assurance from negative to positive where appropriate.
  - Head of Internal Audit should be subject to fit-and-proper review.
- Financial Reporting and External Audit (CP27):
  - No requirement for external audit firm rotation; same audit firm audits all Category 1 and 2 banks.
  - Recommendation: introduce mandatory audit firm rotation phased in; require different lead audit partner for regulatory and financial audits for Category 1–3 banks as minimum.
- Disclosure and Transparency (CP28):
  - Compliant; recommend including Pillar 3 disclosures in FINMA supervision system and follow up with SIX Exchange Regulation for listed banks.

### AML/CFT supervision (CP29)
- Strengthened emphasis on AML/CFT supervision; MROS reporting increased substantially:
  - Reports to MROS rose from 1,753 in 2014 to approximately 21,400 in 2023; 11,876 reports filed in 2023 (90.5 percent from banking sector).
  - 2023 reports increased by 56 percent from 7,639 in 2022 to 11,876 in 2023.
- Weaknesses:
  - FINMA cannot impose financial sanctions for AML/CFT breaches.
  - Resource limitations constrain inspection depth and frequency (AML/CFT unit: 11 FTE).
  - No statutory requirement for Executive Management individual responsibility for AML/CFT or a mandated single recipient for internal suspicious activity reports.
- Recommendations: increase AML/CFT staffing, clarify ambiguous provisions, require individual responsibility at Executive Management level and designate single officer for internal reports.

### Macro-financial context and system statistics
- Swiss financial sector contribution and scale (notable statistics as presented):
  - Financial sector provided 9.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 5.2 percent of overall employment in 2023.
  - As at the end of 2023, total banking sector assets represented approximately 430 percent of Swiss GDP.
  - Insurance: 189 companies with 573 CHF bn total capital assets.
  - Pensions: 1,065 CHF bn total capital assets.
  - Wealth management: 7,1777 CHF bn assets held under custody.
- Macro vulnerabilities:
  - Private credit growth, heavy mortgage exposure: 86 percent of total loans, mostly at fixed interest rates.
  - Real estate overvaluation estimated between 15 and 40 percent.
  - Share of mortgages with LTV above 75 percent: close to 40 percent for owner-occupied estate.

### Main recommendations (mission’s A list — selected, exact phrasing preserved where quoted)
- Principle 1: Ensure FINMA has the full suite of supervisory powers including early intervention powers, without suspensive effect unless a defined, high threshold such as clear illegality is met; remove restriction to direct supervision/on-site examination (Article 23 Banking Act); establish clear legal basis for FINMA to issue supervisory standards, guidance and expectations on risk areas.
- Principle 2: Increase FINMA’s staffing and resources; remove requirement for FINMA’s strategic objectives, Personnel Ordinance and annual report to be approved by the Federal Council; allow FINMA to issue its Fees and Levies Ordinance.
- Principle 4: Accelerate legal ability to segregate fiat deposits in bankruptcy for Fintech license holders.
- Principle 5: Require a wind-down plan for newly authorized institutions if milestones cannot be met.
- Principle 9: Grant FINMA the ability to directly mandate the regulatory audit and specify auditors’ work according to clear FINMA standards; over time bring all onsite supervisory activity in-house.
- Principle 11: Provide FINMA with actionable corrective and intervention powers which are not suspensive and apply to all banks — including powers to restrict activities, impose prudential limits, restrict/suspend payments to shareholders, bar individuals, replace management, impose fines/sanctions.
- Principle 12: Issue FINMA Circular on Consolidated Supervision in final form; extend enforcement powers to group holding companies and significant group companies.
- Principle 14: Introduce a Senior Managers Regime for all banks.
- Principle 15: Raise supervisory standards for risk management; expand supervisory manual and detailed risk requirements; integrate climate-related financial risks.
- Principle 16: Deduct participations at parent level rather than risk weight; strengthen Pillar 2 powers; strengthen legal footing for stress testing and ICAAPs; ensure consistency irrespective of accounting framework.
- Principle 26/27: Require positive assurance for critical internal controls; Head of Internal Audit subject to fit-and-proper; implement mandatory audit firm rotation (phased).
- Principle 29: Require a dedicated officer to whom internal suspicious transactions are reported; prohibit correspondent relationships where adequate supervision does not exist.

### Authorities’ response (summary)
- Authorities acknowledge the Detailed Assessment effort but disagree with key results and gradings; note earlier high compliance in 2014 and commitments since 2019.
- Authorities agree FINMA’s powers need strengthening and will submit legislative proposals; contend that FINMA has substantial powers already and that courts rely on FINMA’s technical expertise.
- On capital treatment: authorities agree strengthening parental capital treatment is needed and will propose changes but argue current grading is not appropriate relative to international practice.
- Authorities note some factual corrections were addressed but contend these did not change the overall grading.

*Source: Excerpt from IMF assessment of Switzerland supervisory framework (1cheea2025004-source-pdf).*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY __________________________________________________________________________ 4

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Overview
- Banking supervision in Switzerland has navigated: continued evolution of international capital and liquidity standards, the global pandemic, and the crisis of Credit Suisse, in 2023, which led to the merger of the two Swiss Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs).
- Switzerland has implemented the Basel III (final) rules in January 2025.
- Legislative reforms proposed by the Federal Council in the aftermath of the 2023 crisis are intended to reinforce bank supervision but will need Parliamentary approval and will take years to implement.
- Central finding: existing key gaps in legal powers limit FINMA’s scope to deliver robust, effective supervision.

### Legal powers and early intervention
- FINMA lacks effective and complete early intervention powers, constraining timely, forward-looking, and decisive supervisory action.
- Corrective measures by FINMA can be appealed with immediate suspensive effect; protective measures (Article 26 Banking Act) are exempt from suspensive effect but may only be exercised when there is a risk of insolvency.
- Practical consequences:
  - Supervisory intervention is challenging unless a clear violation of law/regulation exists or until a bank is at point of non-viability.
  - Legal environment can promote supervisory hesitation and enable prolonged procedural appeals (sometimes lasting nearly a decade) that undermine supervisory measures and waste resources.
- Specific legal impediments:
  - Banking Act (Article 23) permits FINMA to conduct direct supervision only when there are issues of complexity or economic significance, creating case-by-case justification for onsite examination for many banks.
  - FINMA’s legal ability to codify supervisory practices (FINMA circulars) or issue binding prudential regulations appears weakened.

### Onsite supervision, resources, and direct engagement
- FINMA’s in-depth knowledge of many banks, particularly category 3 banks, is partial; ability to engage and intervene in distressed banks is impaired.
- Resources:
  - FINMA has increased resources (ten per cent per year) since 2022, but further amplification is needed.
  - Lack of sufficient supervisory resources has limited expansion of risk-focused, in-depth supervision.
- FINMA has begun to broaden direct engagement beyond systemic banks and is increasingly exploiting data and analytical capabilities, but more staffing and resources are essential.
- Recommendation: expand on-site engagement, supervisory deep dives, and integrate results into analytical frameworks; further legislative changes required to underpin FINMA’s authority.

### Enforcement against individuals and governance tools
- FINMA has formal powers under FINMASA and the Banking Act to take actions against individuals, but practical enforcement remains challenging due to a high evidentiary threshold for attributing individual responsibility.
- The introduction of a Senior Managers Regime concept for all banks is an important reform welcomed by the assessors.
- FINMA’s power to change board composition is likely weak except in the clearest cases.

### Role and limits of regulatory audits
- FINMA uses external regulatory audits as a supplement to its own work and limited resources; the regulatory audit tracks whether controls are in place but is not a supervisory process.
- Limitations:
  - Regulatory audits provide compliance checks rather than forward-looking, risk-based supervisory insights and cannot address management failure.
  - Over-reliance on external regulatory audits can leave corporate governance and risk management highly exposed.
- Recommendation:
  - FINMA should be granted power to directly mandate (e.g., to scope and pay for) regulatory audit work to increase utility.
  - Over time, reliance on external regulatory audits should be meaningfully reduced and ultimately withdrawn.

### Prudential standards, capital framework, and Pillar 2
- Current capital framework weaknesses and deficiencies had real financial stability consequences.
- Historical changes:
  - Capital treatment since 2013 and subsequent revisions in 2019 replaced a prudent deduction approach with a risk-weighting approach for participation at the parent level.
  - In the case of Credit Suisse, the risk-weighting approach led to limited capital levels at the parent bank, restricting maneuverability during the crisis.
- Current proposals to revert to the deduction approach are moving in the right direction.
- FINMA’s Pillar 2 powers:
  - Not clearly articulated, making them weak and open to legal challenge.
  - FINMA can impose Pillar 2 charges, but enforcement can be difficult if a bank challenges them.
- There are no general requirements for banks to undertake stress testing or an ICAAP.
- Need for consistency in calculation of regulatory capital (e.g., software costs), irrespective of the accounting framework banks use.

### Related party transactions, country, and transfer risk
- Regulatory/supervisory gaps exist in supervision of related party transactions and country/transfer risks.
- Definitional and reporting gaps:
  - Legislation’s definition of related parties refers only to transactions involving credit risk and does not explicitly include all relevant counterparts.
  - No dedicated reporting of related party transactions to the supervisor; some are captured via large exposures and/or intra-group reporting but not comprehensively.
  - FINMA captures certain country and transfer risk data from banks, but reporting is incomplete and breaches cannot be detected.
  - No standard reporting requirements or requirements for banks to establish country risk appetites.
- Industry guidance dating from 1997 is not supplemented by supervisory guidelines.

### Supervisory articulation, standards, and risk management expectations
- Prudential standards in Switzerland are set at a very high, principle-based level; this is acceptable as a starting point but insufficient if regulatory framework is silent or too general.
- FINMA has no explicit legal basis to set binding standards for risk management (except for liquidity), to set general requirements for stress testing or ICAAPs, nor to require CRO to be a standalone executive-board-level position.
- Absence of a comprehensive supervisory manual; some processes now codified but further articulation of FINMA expectations would enhance understanding and consistency.
- Integration of climate-related financial risks into risk management supervision is at an early stage.

### Analytical system and supervisory evolution
- FINMA is advancing its analytical system; the new build concept for the rating system incorporates financial resilience, operational resilience, governance and controls, and conduct-related risks.
- The new rating system will use more data, be more granular, and allow supervisors to identify, target, and track supervisory activity plans more meaningfully.
- Operational improvements are significant but cannot realize full effect without legislative measures to improve FINMA’s powers.

### MAIN FINDINGS — Responsibilities, Objectives and Powers (CP1)
- 1. FINMA lacks a broad range of legal powers, including but not limited to timely, decisive, and immediately enforceable early intervention. Strengthening and clarifying FINMA’s legal powers, including effective early intervention, is urgent and paramount.
- 2. Public reports and the mission’s work show FINMA had a clear understanding of Credit Suisse’s weaknesses and had taken repeated supervisory action; such action lacked sufficient legal force and authority. Supervision is expected to be timely, intrusive and forward-looking and not largely dependent on last-minute emergency actions. The mission strongly encourages a swift remedy to this gap.
- 3. Other gaps: FINMA’s power to carry out direct supervision (Art 23 BA) is technically constrained to complex or economically important cases; weak legal power to correct qualitative deficiencies (e.g., corporate governance, risk management); appeals can immediately suspend effect of FINMA measures even when FINMA can seek to revoke suspensive effect.
- 4. A high-profile case with a systemic bank ran through the courts between 2016 and 2024 illustrating challenges in applying a Pillar 2 charge. The bank lodged multiple successive appeals. The protracted process was described by the Parliamentary Investigation Committee as a “good example of the procedural difficulties faced by FINMA in its supervisory work.” The final decision of the Federal Supreme Court was in FINMA’s favor (issued after the BCP mission). Over eight years following FINMA’s initial Pillar 2 ruling, various courts’ actions and decisions supported FINMA’s position, including by requiring the bank to hold capital equal to FINMA’s order from 2021, although the suspensive effect of appeal was upheld. Such challenges risk promoting indiscipline in the market.

*International Monetary Fund — Switzerland: Executive Summary*

### 5.      There should be no suspensive effect of a measure imposed by FINMA in the event of

### 5. There should be no suspensive effect of a measure imposed by FINMA in the event of an appeal, unless a defined high threshold is met such as clear illegality

### Suspensive effect, appeals, and operational impact
- Recommendation: There should be no suspensive effect of a measure imposed by FINMA in the event of an appeal, unless a defined high threshold is met such as clear illegality.
- Rationale:
  - Prevents FINMA having to justify its decision to withdraw the suspensive effect in the first place and facilitates timelines and efficiency of FINMA’s procedures.
  - The clear onus should be on the bank to demonstrate damage, if any, due to the decision against which it is lodging an appeal.
  - The withdrawal of the suspensive effect should apply to capital charges imposed under Pillar 2 (Capital Adequacy Ordinance (CAO) Art. 45) in addition to corrective measures.
- Legal context and constraints:
  - If a bank appeals against FINMA’s actions the appeal has a suspensive effect unless FINMA itself revokes the suspensive effect. The court may reinstate the suspension, based on the bank’s application.
  - The Federal Supreme Court decision on the SRO’s appeal against removal of the suspensive effect (re AML/CFT regulations) found in favor of the SRO and noted: “The legislature has designed the withdrawal of the suspensive effect as an exception. It must be based on convincing reasons.” (Supreme Court Ruling 20 November 2024: 2C_283/2023).
  - Footnote references: Parliamentary Investigation Committee, Full Report, pg. 420.

### Supervisory guidance and mandate (FINMASA Art 7)
- Legal requirement: FINMA is legally required to limit itself to issuing supervisory guidance in the form of as high-level principles and definitions as possible (FINMASA Art 7).
- Assessment:
  - The lack of supervisory guidance and expectations available in the Swiss system is excessive and does not protect less resourced banks or their depositors and investors.
  - Global and well-connected banks can interpret and implement standards using high-level principles and can operate where more detailed “comply or explain” protocols exist.
- Recommendation: Adjust supervisory guidance to better support less-resourced banks while preserving principles-based orientation where appropriate.

### Mandate clarity, competitiveness, and prudential priorities
- Finding: Amendments to FINMA’s mandate over the years have clouded the concepts of safety and soundness.
- Recommendation:
  - FINMA’s legal mandate needs to be amended so that the authority is unmistakably guided primarily by stability and soundness concerns in the short and long term.
  - Competitiveness concerns and objectives need to be secondary and subordinate to stability and soundness.
- Expected benefit: Clear mandate language would signal that Switzerland is a safe and stable market for participants, depositors and investors.

### Independence, accountability, governance, and resourcing (CP2)
- Finding: Approval of FINMA’s strategic objectives by the Federal Council represents an infringement of operational autonomy.
  - Appropriate parliamentary involvement: setting the supervisory mandate (CP1) and holding FINMA accountable for execution—does not include periodic approval/tweaks to strategic objectives.
  - Recommendation: Strengthen FINMA’s governance by focusing on the Board of Directors and abolishing the requirement for final approval from the Federal Council for FINMA’s annual report, personnel ordinance, and levies and fees ordinance (as recommended in the 2019 FSAP).
- Resourcing:
  - In practice FINMA is significantly understaffed and under resourced and this needs to be remedied.
  - Resources remained broadly constant between 2012 and 2021 although there have been modest—ten percent—annual increases since 2022, which will need to be maintained for a significant period moving forward.
  - Statistic: In 2024 the average headcount for the entire authority comprised 695 permanent and temporary staff members.
  - Causes of under-resourcing: culture favoring industry competitiveness, cost-effectiveness, economic freedom, strong industry lobbying, reliance on external resources at audit firms rather than internal development.
  - Institutional constraints: Under FINMASA FINMA must have regard to regulatory burdens; the Federal Council adopts the FINMA Ordinance on Levies and Fees and approves FINMA Personnel Ordinance.
- Supervisory coverage implications:
  - Increased thematic and horizontal work and more intensive attention to category 1 and 2 banks.
  - Very light engagement with category 3 banks and even more so for banks in category 4-5, which is not wholly desirable from a supervisory perspective.
  - Cyber risk concern: cybersecurity is only as strong as its weakest link; focusing mostly on category 1 and 2 institutions and some category 3 banks may not secure the financial sector fully.

### Small Bank Regime and entry criteria (CAO art 47 (c))
- Finding: Small Bank Regime is broadly successful as proportionality in practice.
- Flaw identified: Entry criteria are too heavily reliant on quantitative criteria.
- Recommendation: Amend Capital Adequacy Ordinance (CAO art 47 (c)) so FINMA can ensure that one of the entry criteria to the regime is that FINMA considers the applicant institution to have sufficiently sound qualitative skills with respect to risk management, governance and controls and not rely only on data.

### Cooperation and coordination (CP3)
- Finding: Frameworks for cooperation and coordination are in place. FINMA has actively participated in both multilateral and bilateral configurations.
- Evidence: Effectiveness demonstrated in the March turmoil of 2023.

### Permissible activities, licensing, transfers, major acquisitions (CPs 4–7)
- Deposit taking and fintech license:
  - The new Fintech license permits deposit taking by non-banks; these deposits are neither covered by deposit protection nor segregated in case of bankruptcy, as FINMA has warned legislative authorities.
  - Client asset protection will be remedied but not expected for several years.
  - Recommendation: Accelerate legal power to segregate fiat deposits in bankruptcy to protect Switzerland’s reputation.
- Gatekeeper role and licensing conditions:
  - FINMA maintains a watchful gatekeeper role for new entrants, attaching conditions to licenses and permitting additional activities only after capability demonstration.
  - Recommendation supported: FINMA is considering requiring a wind-down plan for fresh applicants in case milestones cannot be met.
- Definitions of significance and control:
  - Thresholds: “qualified” holding at 10 percent and definition of control at 50 percent.
  - Finding: High-level approach gives transparency; FINMA has scope and onus to determine which holdings fall inside/outside control. The test is demanding and valuable if FINMA continues to identify control and ultimate beneficial control.

### Supervisory approach, tools, reporting (CPs 8–10)
- Analytical approach and rating model:
  - FINMA’s analytical approach has strengthened since 2019, combining multiple data sources and attempting forward-looking risk assessment.
  - Limitations exist (e.g., business model analysis). Next generation analytical model is at an advanced stage and aligns with best international practices.
  - New rating system will incorporate financial resilience, operational resilience, governance and controls and suitability as well as conduct related risks (such as AML, market conduct, suitability etc.).
  - The new rating model will permit supervisory override subject to explanation/oversight and will incorporate more data, greater granularity, and enable targeted supervisory plans.
- Internal guidance and knowledge transfer:
  - Finding: FINMA provides limited internal policy guidance to supervisors; needs a comprehensive policy handbook with assessment criteria to ensure consistent policy application and support junior supervisors.
  - Recommendation: Create a specific project to design a policy handbook and foster internal knowledge transfer and innovation.
- Onsite inspections and regulatory audit system:
  - Recommendation: Increase onsite inspections across all categories of banks; FINMA should bring as much work in house as reasonably possible over time.
  - Key distinction: Regulatory audit is not the same product as supervisory onsite work. Regulatory audit = compliance check; supervision = forward-looking assessment of whether the risk environment can withstand future headwinds.
  - Gap: Regulatory auditors cannot comment on management failings—this is beyond their scope and is the role of the supervisor.
- Mandating regulatory audit work:
  - Recommendation: FINMA should be granted the power to mandate directly the regulatory audit work auditors carry out, specifying work according to clear standards set by FINMA.
  - Expected outcome: Professional firms can identify relevant findings usable by supervisors, better leverage audit firms’ cyber capabilities, and shift from backward-looking compliance focus to a forward-looking, risk-based approach.
  - Framing: This is a steppingstone to FINMA taking full onsite supervision in-house over time.
- Data-driven supervision and reporting responsibilities:
  - Shift to stronger data approaches, with particular attention to G-SIB data needs.
  - Enhanced data collection is a way to strengthen supervisory reach without onsite work.
  - FINMA is planning more data-driven supervision of smaller category 4 and 5 banks and a major digitalization transformation is underway.
  - FINMA will take over receipt of some regulatory reporting from the SNB and must ensure quality of received data.
  - Recommendation: Require a named individual at least at executive management level to sign off on regulatory data submitted to FINMA and take responsibility for timely submission.

### Corrective and remedial powers (CP11)
- Finding: FINMA’s powers of intervention require critical improvement to promote and ensure effective supervisory action.
  - At present FINMA‘s powers are not specific enough to allow for timely, decisive, and immediately enforceable early intervention.
  - FINMA needs unambiguous ability to act when concerns arise, even before obvious violation or point of non-viability, as this is hallmark of forward-looking supervision.
- Legal triggers and limitations:
  - Presently, FINMA’s formal powers are effectively triggered only due to breach of law or regulation (Art 31 FINMASA) or at points of non-viability (Art 26 Banking Act).
  - FINMASA (Art 31) grants broad discretion to act if there are “other irregularities,” but the provision is at a high-level and courts may be reluctant to support corrective measures on this basis.
  - There is no record proving that the “other irregularities” legal provision has been used by FINMA in any action against a bank; it was used once when FINMA required a self-regulatory organization (SRO) to amend AML/CFT regulations, action supported by a Federal Supreme court ruling.
- Supervisory practice and enforcement:
  - FINMA’s own description of its enforcement approach refers to investigating “irregularities” but describes taking action in response to violations of law and restoring compliance with the law.
  - Observation: FINMA’s record of effective formal actions is weak.
- Suspensive effect implications:
  - The possibility of courts reinstating suspensions and the narrow design of withdrawal of suspensive effect make it difficult for FINMA to effect necessary supervisory interventions.
  - This underlines the earlier recommendation that appeals should not automatically have suspensive effect unless a high threshold (e.g., clear illegality) is met.

*Source: Excerpt from IMF assessment of Switzerland supervisory framework (text as provided).*

### 26.      The most effective supervisory practices are when banks are responsive to supervisory

### 26.      The most effective supervisory practices are when banks are responsive to supervisory

### Early intervention, FINMA powers, and supervisory responsiveness
- Finding: Banks have shown ample evidence of slow reactions to FINMA correspondence citing clear and important concerns; FINMA exercises extreme care in building cases before using formal powers.
- Finding: Compared with the 2014 BCP assessment (which “cited no difficulties regarding delays, or lack of responsiveness by the banks”), banking culture has deteriorated in terms of discipline and responsiveness over the past decade.
- Recommendation: FINMA needs a graduated suite of early intervention powers as stated in the international standards of banking supervision (notably CP11 EC4).
- Recommendation: Early intervention powers should be established on a sound legal basis and should, at a minimum, include the measures set out in CP11 EC4 and not require the breach of law or regulation for these measures to be applicable.
- Recommendation: The powers should apply to all Swiss banks.
- Finding/Recommendation: FINMA’s decisions should not be subject to suspension upon appeal by the bank upon which they have been imposed; while narrow exclusions for fairness are acceptable, the public interest is served by FINMA’s measures remaining in place even if an appeal is lodged.
- Note: The mission fully supports FINMA’s new focus on risk culture and risk appetite in banks; “the sooner an institution can course-correct, the less damage is done and the less risk to depositors, investors, and creditors.”
- Note: Proposals brought forward by the Federal Council in the TBTF package are welcomed: “FINMA should be able to order measures earlier and more effectively (early intervention). It should also be able to issue pecuniary administrative sanctions (fines) to non-compliant institutions.”

### Consolidated supervision and home-host relations (CP12–CP13)
- Finding: Swiss regulation focuses on solo entities and grants the ability to restrict activities based on an entity’s business regulations; treatment of capital consolidation (capital at group level) is considered in CP16.
- Finding: FINMA’s powers to intervene at group or individual entity level are positive on paper but suffer from weaknesses discussed in CP1 and CP11.
- Finding: Very limited powers exist with respect to the holding company of a consolidated group, although FINMA’s jurisdiction for recovery and bankruptcy has been extended to group holding companies and group companies which perform significant functions for activities requiring authorization.
- Finding: Enforcement powers for ongoing activities when insolvency is not envisaged are mostly limited to enforcement at group level and do not cover single entity level.
- Finding: FINMA actively monitors and restricts exposures to holding companies, but enhanced powers are recommended.
- Finding: FINMA is heavily reliant on regulatory audit work; this tool is not suited to determine whether management understands and appropriately controls group risks (see CP9).
- Finding: FINMA was consulting on a Circular expected to enter into force in mid-2025; the mission welcomes this initiative and views the Circular as confirming good practices rather than creating new regulation.
- Finding: FINMA has fostered core home-host relationships; core college relationships for the G-SIBs aided FINMA in the March turmoil of 2023 and subsequent restructuring. Other colleges are less developed but bilateral relationships are being built.

### Corporate governance (CP14)
- Finding: CP14 is not met with consistency beyond systemic banks due to FINMA’s current resource limitations, despite FINMA’s clear understanding of corporate governance importance.
- Finding: The regulatory audit process cannot capture management failure; determinations regarding boards and executive management are not suited to review under regulatory audit.
- Finding: FINMA has formal powers against individual board members under the Banking Act if fitness and propriety requirements are no longer met, but the high threshold for enforcement and difficulty attributing violations to individuals reduce effectiveness outside clear-cut cases.
- Recommendation: The mission strongly supports proposals to introduce a Senior Managers Regime concept to identify responsibility for actions and allow FINMA to act meaningfully while providing transparency, consistency, and equity of treatment to individuals.
- Finding/Recommendation: FINMA’s guidance on corporate governance is overly high level; FINMA should follow the BCP standard and articulate supervisory expectations by providing clear guidance, proportionate for less complex institutions.
- Finding: The development of a corporate governance questionnaire and program is promising and momentum must be maintained.

### Risk management (CP15)
- Finding: Legislative weaknesses limit FINMA’s ability to set standards for risk management, set general requirements for banks to perform stress tests or prepare Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAPs), and to require that the CRO be a standalone position elevated to executive board level.
- Finding: Guidance for banks and regulatory auditors in risk management is high level; there is no comprehensive supervisory manual to guide supervisors.
- Recommendation: Prioritise the development of a new supervisory manual and more detailed risk requirements to clarify FINMA’s expectations and promote consistency.
- Recommendation: Continue integrating climate-related financial risks into risk management supervision so consideration of climate-related risk drivers is embedded into supervisory processes.

### Capital adequacy (CP16)
- Finding: “The current capital framework has serious weaknesses and deficiencies.”
- Clarification: A BCP assessment of capital adequacy is broader than the Basel RCAP; if prudent and appropriate capital adequacy requirements are not met, this will be reflected in the BCP assessment and grade.
- Finding: Requiring participations to be risk weighted rather than deducted (approach in place since 2019 for all banks) means a parent bank’s participations in its subsidiaries only have to be partially backed by capital and may partially finance capital at its subsidiary through debt (“double leveraging”).
- Finding: This approach had very real financial stability consequences during the Credit Suisse crisis because the parent bank's limited capital levels significantly restricted its room for maneuver.
- Finding: The CAO amendment which came into force on January 1, 2019 introduced a risk weighting-based capital adequacy requirement for all banks on their participations for consolidation.
- Historical note: Prior to 2019, banks were required to phase in a deduction of participations held and consolidated at group level from CET1 capital in the standalone calculation, with full deduction in effect from 2019; FINMA granted capital reliefs (Art. 125 CAO abrogated), meaning the full deduction of participations was never applied.
- Finding: At the same time as the new risk-weighting approach in 2019, a regulatory filter was permitted which obscured the true capital situation of CS.
- Quoted observation: “without applying the filter, the capital ratio would have fallen from 10 percent at the end of 2019 to 5 percent in the third quarter of 2022, well below the regulatory minimum.”
- Finding: The change to a risk-weighting approach led to higher capital requirements than previously applied when reliefs were taken into account, but lower capital than would have applied if the deduction approach had been implemented without reliefs.
- Quoted Federal Council finding: “the complex group structure and the discounts applied led to a structurally weak capitalization of the parent bank, which instead of being a source of strength for the group, was a weakness.”
- Finding: There is scope for inconsistent treatments in capital calculations because FINMA permits different accounting frameworks (IFRS, US GAAP, Swiss GAAP), which can lead to inconsistent capital calculations.
- Finding: For D-SIBs, gone concern capital requirements are only 40 percent of the total going concern capital requirement, much lower than their closest EU peers.
- Finding/Recommendation: FINMA’s Pillar 2 powers are not fully articulated, making them weak and open to legal challenge; there are no general legal requirements for banks to undertake stress testing or an ICAAP. It is crucial that FINMA’s powers in this area are strengthened and put on a solid legal footing.

### Credit risk (CP17)
- Finding: Credit risk, particularly mortgages, is a key focus for FINMA; FINMA has no explicit legal basis to set binding standards for sound credit risk management and guidance is high level.
- Finding: Disparity of lending practices related to affordability and granting of exception-to-policy loans has been observed from onsite inspections.
- Recommendation: FINMA should develop more detailed guidance for banks, supervisors and auditors on credit risk to clearly articulate supervisory expectations.
- Recommendation: FINMA should systematically integrate climate-related financial risks into supervisory processes to ensure banks consider the impact of climate-related risk drivers on credit risk profiles and incorporate them into credit risk management systems and processes.
- Recommendation: Enhance and improve data collection and analysis in this area as planned.

### Problem assets, provisions and reserves (CP18)
- Finding: FINMA does not have the specific power to require a bank to increase its level of provisioning.
- Finding: Because FINMA’s powers are not clearly set out in legislation, there is a lack of detail in FINMA’s circulars on sound credit practices, which may limit FINMA’s ability to require changes to banks’ policies, processes or methodologies for classification and provisioning.
- Finding: FINMA regularly analyzes movements in credit portfolios and—based on data collected by the Swiss National Bank—monitors trends for impaired loans, non-performing loans, and specific and general provisions.
- Recommendation: Planned additional data collection and analysis on credit risk should support supervision in this area.

### Concentration risk and large exposures (CP19)
- Finding: Gaps exist regarding concentration risks and large exposures.
- Finding: The Basel RCAP assessment in 2023 identified two potentially material findings related to the definition of exposure values which have not been addressed.
- Finding: Concessions applied to Category 4 and 5 banks may give rise to additional risk (example: exemption of residential mortgages in Switzerland up to a certain amount from the calculation of the large exposures limit may allow significant single-name concentration risk for smaller banks).
- Finding/Recommendation: Guidance for banks and regulatory auditors in this area is high level in part because of legislative weaknesses; FINMA should ensure banks are identifying, measuring, evaluating, monitoring, reporting, and managing concentrations within and between risk types associated with climate-related financial risks.

### Transactions with related parties (CP20)
- Finding: The definition of related parties and transactions to be monitored is not comprehensively defined in legislation; the legislative definition only refers to transactions involving credit risk.
- Finding: Other transactions not covered (sales and purchases of real estate, service contracts, forgiveness of loans) may pose risks and are not explicitly captured.
- Finding: Guidance for banks and regulatory auditors in this area, with the exception of intra-group exposures, is high level.
- Recommendation: Further specification and guidance is needed because the legislative definition does not explicitly refer to all relevant related parties that should be captured.
- Finding: There is no dedicated reporting of related party transactions to the supervisor; some are captured in large exposures and/or intra-group reporting but this does not provide a complete picture.
- Recommendation: FINMA should implement reporting requirements and develop more detailed guidance for banks, supervisors, and auditors; FINMA should also consider a thematic review on related parties.

### Country and transfer risks (CP21)
- Finding: FINMA captures certain country and transfer risk data from banks, but reporting is incomplete and breaches cannot be detected.
- Finding: FINMA can send ad hoc surveys to gather information, and there is a supervisory focus at the category 1 bank, but country and transfer risk is not a supervisory focus for other categories of banks.
- Finding: The 1997 industry guidelines recognised by FINMA as a minimum standard do not include, for example, the need for a bank to define a country risk appetite; these industry guidelines should be updated.
- Recommendation: FINMA plans to collect more regular data in this area to develop enhanced analysis; this should support supervision and extend FINMA’s supervisory reach for benchmarking and outlier identification across all categories of banks.
- Recommendation: FINMA should consider a thematic review on country and transfer risk to gain an overview of exposures and practices across the banking sector.

*Source: IMF mission assessment chapter excerpt.*

### 51.      IRRBB is a key area of focus for FINMA. Comparatively there is less focus on market risk

### IRRBB is a key area of focus for FINMA. Comparatively there is less focus on market risk

### Interest Rate Risk in the Banking Book (IRRBB) and Market Risk
- IRRBB is identified as a key area of supervisory focus for FINMA.
- Comparatively less supervisory focus on market risk because it represents a smaller proportion of risk weighted assets.
- Implementation of the final Basel III standards in January 2025 is expected to result in an increase in market risk RWA for all banks, particularly internationally active banks.
- The assessors view the market risk and IRRBB frameworks as compliant with the related principles.

### Liquidity Risk (CP24)
- FINMA should increase and enhance its data analysis capabilities in liquidity to support supervision in this area.
- Consideration should be given to the appropriateness of the application of proportionality in relation to liquidity risk requirements and supervision.
- Exempting small banks from a qualitative requirement on diversification of the financing structure is not warranted, as even a small bank could face problems if it is relying on a few large depositors for funding.
- Improved data and diagnostic analysis would support greater reach and oversight of smaller banks.
- The Basel RCAP assessment in 2023 rated the implementation of the NSFR in Switzerland as ‘largely compliant,’ one notch below the highest overall grade.
  - Two potentially material findings related to the definition of exposure values that led to this grade have not been addressed.
- FINMA should ensure banks identify and quantify climate-related financial risks and incorporate those assessed as material over relevant time horizons into their internal liquidity adequacy assessment processes, including stress testing programs where appropriate.

### Operational Risk and Operational Resilience (CP25)
- The new circular on operational risks and resilience is in transitional implementation and banks are finding it challenging to meet the requirements.
- The circular on outsourcing captures parent companies but not financial groups or conglomerates, potentially leaving regulatory gaps for financial groups.
- FINMA is limited in its ability to directly access and assess critical outsourcing providers; these regulatory gaps should be addressed to capture financial groups within outsourcing requirements.
- Resources within FINMA are insufficient to appropriately supervise these risks, meaning Category 3–5 banks are not receiving enough supervisory attention, particularly in cyber.
- Recommendations:
  - Hire additional expertise and leverage the skills of professional services firms to extend supervisory reach.
  - More effectively leverage data to provide additional analysis and insights to support supervision in this area.

### Internal Control and Audit (CP26)
- FINMA should take a more direct role in assessing the adequacy of banks’ internal audit functions and activities.
- This assessment should be more systematic and to a higher standard than the current negative assurance provided by the regulatory audit.
- The Head of Internal Audit should be subject to a fit and proper review undertaken by FINMA.
- Strong internal controls should be audited to the higher standard of positive assurance rather than the default of negative assurance.

### Financial Reporting and External Audit (CP27)
- Greater scrutiny is warranted on the independence of audit firms that provide both regulatory and financial audit services to banks.
- There is currently no requirement for external audit firm rotation for the financial audit.
- Recommendation: Introduce mandatory audit firm rotation in line with international best practice.
  - Given the same external audit firm currently audits all Category 1 and 2 banks, introduction of mandatory rotation may need to be phased in.
- At a minimum, for Category 1-3 banks, require a different lead audit partner to oversee the regulatory and financial audits.
- The assessors note risks from reliance on one audit firm for all systemically important banks in Switzerland.

### Disclosure and Transparency (CP28)
- The disclosure and transparency provisions are deemed compliant by the assessors.
- FINMA should follow up with ‘SIX Exchange Regulation’ regarding their reviews of the financial statements of listed banks that apply IFRS, US GAAP or Swiss GAAP to ensure awareness of any discrepancies found.
- Inclusion of Pillar 3 disclosures in the FINMA supervision system would assist in identifying inconsistencies between regulatory data reported to FINMA and banks’ public disclosures.

### Abuse of Financial Services (CP29) / AML/CFT conduct risks
- FINMA has put increasing emphasis on supervision of AML/CFT conduct risks and there is clear awareness of conduct risk across supervisory units.
- There are no waivers for conduct risks in the Small Banks Regime.
- Weaknesses affecting AML/CFT supervision include resource limitations affecting frequency, depth and range of inspections.
- Potential regulatory gaps:
  - Requirements for dedicated “anti-money laundering officers”.
  - Prohibitions on certain banking relationships.
- Relevant guidelines (e.g., Operational Risk Circular) are articulated at a very high level and are key to supporting a careful AML/CFT environment.

### Context, methodology and key system statistics
- The BCP assessment was completed as part of the 2025 FSAP. The FSAP was undertaken by the IMF and the BCP assessment mission took place from October 22nd to November 11th, 2024.
- The current assessment used the BCP methodology issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in April 2024; ratings are not directly comparable to previous assessments.
- Notable financial sector statistics (as presented):
  - The Swiss financial sector provided 9.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 5.2 percent of overall employment in 2023.
  - As at the end of 2023, total banking sector assets represented approximately 430 percent of Swiss GDP.
  - Insurance: 189 companies with 573 CHF bn total capital assets.
  - Pensions: 1,065 CHF bn total capital assets.
  - Wealth management: 7,1777 CHF bn assets held under custody.
- The revised 2024 BCP methodology raises expectations on systemic risk, operational resilience, group-wide supervision, and the use of proportionality in supervision.

*Source: IMF Detailed Assessment excerpts from 1cheea2025004-source-pdf*

### 70.      Self-regulation and Self-Regulatory Organizations feature in the Swiss regulatory

### Self-regulation and Self-Regulatory Organizations feature in the Swiss regulatory landscape

### Self-regulation: types and FINMA role
- FINMA distinguishes between three types of self-regulation:
  - voluntary self-regulation on a private, autonomous basis without state involvement;
  - self-regulation recognised as a minimum standard, which is permitted under Article 7 para. 3 FINMASA; and
  - compulsory self-regulation.
- Under FINMASA (Article 7 para. 3) FINMA can recognise self-regulation as a minimum standard and then use its supervisory powers to enforce the standard, which will apply not only to the members of the SRO but all other organizations in the sector.
- FINMA can insist on wide consultative practices for these standards. Examples include due diligence for banks and mortgage financing.
- Legislation can require self-regulation on specific issues, including deposit guarantee (Banking Act Art. 37h) and Anti-Money Laundering (Art. 24 ff AMLA).
- FINMA’s approval is required for compulsory self-regulation.

### Macroeconomic soundness and vulnerabilities
- Growth resumed after a pandemic-induced recession in 2020 with steady growth from 2021.
- Inflation returned to the 0-2 percent price stability range set by the SNB early 2024 following a peak of 3.4 percent in 2023.
- Unemployment remains at historical lows.
- The fiscal balance closed with a small surplus.
- Public debt is 33 percent of GDP and is predominantly held by domestic creditors.
- The external balance is close to 7 percent of GDP.
- FX reserves are close to 800 million Francs.
- Macrofinancial vulnerabilities noted since the 2019 FSAP:
  - Private credit has grown rapidly over the past two decades, particularly in the mortgage sector.
  - Households’ debt is high, partly offset by high and liquid net worth.
  - Banks are heavily exposed to the mortgage market: 86 percent of the total loans, mostly at fixed interest rates.
  - Real estate overvaluation estimated in the range of 15 to 40 percent.
  - The share of mortgages with loan-to -value ratios (LTV) above 75 percent remains close to 40 percent for owner-occupied estate.
  - Loan-to -income (LTI) ratios have increased since 2019.
  - Data gaps limit a full assessment of exposure to commercial real estate (CRE).
- Credit Suisse failure in 2023:
  - Generated market turmoil; wider contagion averted by state-assisted acquisition by UBS.
  - Intervention took place outside of the resolution regime based on emergency legislation.
  - Involved a temporary state-committed support of 25 percent of GDP, though 15 billion CHF of additional Tier 1 was written down in conjunction with the state support.
  - Vulnerabilities increased, including from higher concentration and significant transition risks from the integration of UBS-CS.

### Monetary policy and financial stability mandates
- The SNB is an independent central bank; mandate: conduct monetary policy so money preserves its value and the economy develops favorably (Constitution and National Bank Act (NBA)).
- Current financial market policy adopted in 2020 by the Federal Council.
- SNB mandate to contribute to financial stability is set out in the NBA; tasks include analysis of risks, oversight of systemically important FMIs, and contributing to the operational framework for the Swiss financial center.

### Financial stability policy framework and macroprudential measures
- NBA grants SNB mandate to contribute to stability of the financial system.
- SNB is responsible, following consultation with FINMA, for designation of the SIBs under Art. 8 of the Swiss Banking Act.
- Under the Capital Adequacy Ordinance (Art 44) SNB, following consultation with FINMA, can propose activation of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) to the Swiss Federal Council and must notify the FDF at the same time.
- Basel III CCyB in Switzerland is at 0 percent as of the date of the FSAP.
- The Swiss sectoral CCyB targeted at mortgage loans financing residential property located in Switzerland is at 2.5 percent since September 2022, as decided and communicated by the Federal Council in January 2022.
- Mandatory reciprocity as foreseen in Basel III does not apply to the Swiss sectoral CCyB requirements.

### Institutional coordination
- Bilateral MoU between SNB and FINMA covers:
  - assessment of soundness of systemically important banks and/or the banking system;
  - regulations with major impact on bank soundness (liquidity, capital adequacy, risk distribution);
  - contingency planning and crisis management.
- MoU established at least biannual meetings of a Steering Committee and at least quarterly meetings of a Standing Committee on Financial Stability.
- Trilateral MoU among FDF, SNB and FINMA (replaced in 2019) governs collaboration including exchange of information on financial stability and crisis cooperation; tripartite committee meets at least biannually.

### Legal framework and public infrastructure
- Swiss legal system based on civil law tradition; Federal Supreme Court (FSC) is highest court and reviews constitutionality of federal statutes but must apply a federal statute even if it concludes it is unconstitutional (Art 189 para 4).
- Federal Judges appointed by Federal Assembly for six-year terms.
- FINMASA functions as umbrella law, setting principles for financial market regulation, liability rules and harmonised supervisory instruments and sanctions.
- Financial Market Acts listed in FINMASA Art 1 include: Mortgage Bond Act; Federal Act on Contracts of Insurance of 2 April 1908; Collective Investment Schemes Act of 23 June 2006; Banking Act of 8 November 1934; Financial Institutions Act of 15 June 2018; Anti-Money Laundering Act of 10 October 1997; Insurance Supervision Act of 17 December 2004; Financial Market Infrastructure Act; and Financial Services Act of 15 June 2018.
- All financial-market laws and ordinances are enacted by Parliament; Federal Council issues ordinances. FINMA regulates through ordinances only where explicitly authorised.

### Audit, corporate reporting and market infrastructure
- Auditors licensed by the Federal Audit Oversight Authority (FAOA); FAOA licenses individuals and firms offering statutory audit services and oversees firms auditing public interest companies.
- FAOA has bilateral agreements with foreign authorities including Canada, Japan, the UK and the US and has formal mutual recognition from the European Commission.
- Based on Accountancy Europe data, Switzerland has roughly one third of the accounting and auditing professionals per capita compared with France.
- All stock corporations and other commercial entities must prepare financial statements (balance sheet, income statement, notes). Financial statements of stock corporations are subject to an annual audit.
- Publicly traded companies, banks, other financial institutions, mutual funds and pension funds are subject to additional reporting requirements; companies with publicly traded shares or debt must publish or make financial statements available to anyone who requests them.
- SIX Group Ltd (SIX) operates key financial infrastructure; SIX is an unlisted public limited company owned by 120 domestic and international financial institutions.
  - SIX Interbank Clearing Ltd (SIC Ltd) operates the Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC) payment system on behalf of the SNB.
  - SIX is a Central Counterparty (CCP) and operates Switzerland’s national Central Securities Depository (CSD).
  - SIX established and operates the only FINMA-approved Swiss trade repository for reporting OTC and exchange traded derivatives under the FMIA.
- SNB is responsible for overseeing systemically important financial market infrastructures.

### Crisis management, recovery, and resolution
- FINMA is the supervisory authority and insolvency authority for banks and securities dealers.
- FINMA responsible for intensified supervision of banks in a recovery status; at point of non-viability FINMA establishes protective measures and is responsible for resolution or liquidation.
- FINMA is the resolution authority for banks under the Swiss Banking Act; advance resolution planning required for SIBs.
- Restructuring is investigated if insolvency is a risk; FINMA may only restructure if expected to be more beneficial to creditors than immediate insolvency (“no creditor worse off” principle).
- If no prospect of restructuring or resolution, FINMA will withdraw the bank’s license, place the bank into insolvency and announce publicly; FINMA typically appoints a liquidator who carries out insolvency under FINMA supervision.
- Tripartite MoU on crisis management among FDF, SNB and FINMA:
  - Provides for a joint national crisis management organization: a Steering Committee and a Committee on Financial Crises.
  - Steering Committee: Head of the FDF (chair), Chairman of the SNB Governing Board, Chair of the FINMA Board of Directors — responsible for strategic coordination of crisis management and interventions.
  - Committee on Financial Crises: Director of FINMA (chair), State Secretary of the FDF, Vice Chairman of the SNB Governing Board, Director of the Federal Finance Administration (FFA) — responsible for coordinating preparatory efforts and crisis management; commissions preparatory work for decision-making.
  - Both committees meet as needed; the Committee on Financial Crises generally meets on a bi-annual basis to maintain crisis awareness and preparedness.

### Systemic protection and depositor protection
- Depositor protection applies up to CHF 100,000 per customer (Banking Act Art. 37a); these are preferred or privileged deposits and must be covered by 125 percent of domestic assets.
- If depositor protection is triggered, preferred deposits are immediately paid out in full or pro rata from the bank’s available liquidity, outside the ordinary liquidation procedure.
- If the bank has insufficient liquidity to fulfil the payout then deposit insurance is triggered.
- Deposit guarantee scheme is “esisuisse,” a self-regulatory organization of banks and securities firms; all authorized financial institutions with protected deposits are required to join.
- esisuisse’s payment liability is limited by law to 1.6 percent of total protected deposits in Switzerland (with a minimum of CHF 6 billion).
- Changes to the Banking Act since January 2023 have tightened payout deadlines:
  - Payment from the deposit guarantee must be made within seven days of notification.
  - There is also a seven-day deadline for payment to the depositors.
  - Banks must post collateral to support their obligations and not merely hold liquidity.
- In times of crisis the SNB can provide emergency liquidity assistance to banks that have prepared collateral in its function as lender of last resort.

### Market discipline and disclosure
- The two Swiss stock exchanges, SIX Swiss Exchange AG (SIX) and BX Swiss AG (BX), are self-regulatory organizations under the FinMIA and have issued listing rules with reporting and disclosure requirements.
- SIX Directive on Information Relating to Corporate Governance, last amended in January 2023, requires issuers with a main Swiss listing to disclose in their annual report information on management and control mechanisms at the highest corporate level, or to give valid reasons for not doing so (“comply or explain”).
- Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance (SCBP) issued by economiesuisse:
  - Voluntary instrument of self-regulation since 2002, most recently amended in February 2023.
  - Provides non-binding recommendations on a “comply or explain” basis.
  - Swiss Banking Association is a supporting organization.
- Listing Rules of SIX and BX provide for specific reporting and disclosure requirements; SIX Directive Corporate Governance requires SIX-listed companies to disclose in annual business reports information on management and control mechanisms at the highest corporate level, or to give valid reasons for not doing so (“comply or explain”).
- Non-financial disclosure requirements:
  - Public interest entities with at least 500 full time employees and either a balance sheet total exceeding CHF20 million or revenues exceeding CHF40 million have Environmental Social and Governance (ESG) obligations including CO2 targets, social concerns, labor concerns, human rights, and anti-corruption measures.
  - Violations of these reporting duties are subject to criminal fines.

*Source: 1cheea2025004-source-pdf - 70. Self-regulation and Self-Regulatory Organizations feature in the Swiss regulatory landscape*

### 92.      The Swiss Code of Obligations has been revised so that since 1 November 2019, bearer

### The Swiss Code of Obligations has been revised so that since 1 November 2019, bearer

### Restriction of bearer shares
- Bearer shares have been considerably restricted since 1 November 2019, although not completely abolished.
- Bearer shares are permitted only if a company:
  - (i) has listed equity securities on a stock exchange; or
  - (ii) the bearer shares are issued as intermediated securities and deposited with a custodian in Switzerland or entered in the main register.
- The company must register this fact in the commercial register within 18 months.
- All other companies must convert any bearer shares into registered shares within 18 months, or the shares will be converted by law.
- No new bearer shares may be issued, except for listed companies or in case of issue as intermediated securities.
- In registration, shareholder(s) can remain anonymous on the online commercial registry entry, meaning the Swiss AG company form retains its advantage of anonymity of ownership.

### Supervisory framework: roles, objectives, and legal basis
- FINMA:
  - Is an integrated supervisory authority responsible for supervision of Switzerland’s banking sector.
  - Objectives per Article 4 FINMASA: protect “creditors, investors, and insured persons as well as ensuring the proper functioning of the financial market. It thus contributes to sustaining the reputation, competitiveness, and sustainability of Switzerland's financial center.”
  - Powers to address compliance and safety and soundness under FINMASA (Articles 24–37) and to require restoration of compliance (Art. 31 FINMASA).
  - Can issue ordinances where authorized (Art. 5 para. 1 Ordinance to the FINMASA) and circulars to set out practice; circulars are binding on FINMA when applying laws and ordinances.
  - May not currently impose statutory fines; a proposal to introduce fines is under evaluation by the Swiss Federal Council.
- SNB:
  - Contributes to financial system stability per National Bank Act (art. 5 para. 2 (e) NBA).
  - Responsible for supply of liquidity (art. 5 para. 2 (a)–(c) NBA) and monetary policy (art. 5 para. 1 NBA).
  - Monitors banking sector developments from a systemic perspective but does not exercise banking supervision or enforce banking legislation.
  - May act as lender of last resort under art. 9 (1) (e) NBA, guided by systemic importance, solvency and sufficient collateral (Guidelines of the Swiss National Bank on monetary policy instruments).

### FINMA–SNB cooperation and macroprudential tasks
- FINMA and the SNB have a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) setting out common areas of interest in financial stability; last updated in 2017.
- Macroprudential responsibilities defined in law and ordinance:
  - The SNB, in consultation with FINMA, designates systemically important banking institutions and their systemically important functions (Article 8 para. 3 of the Banking Act).
  - The SNB proposes to the Swiss Federal Council activation/adjustment/deactivation of the countercyclical buffer and must consult FINMA prior to such a proposal (Article 44 CAO).

### Principle 1: Responsibilities, objectives and powers — EC findings (EC1–EC7)
- EC1: Responsibilities and objectives
  - FINMA’s objectives and legal basis are publicly set out; SNB role defined in law.
  - FINMA and SNB MoU published; last updated in 2017.
- EC2: Primary objective of supervision
  - FINMA’s Article 4 FINMASA objective lists “creditors, investors, and insured persons” but does not explicitly mention “depositors” in German, French or Italian versions.
  - Assessors note potential concern that depositors are unmentioned despite deposit protection system (esuisse) referring to “Einlagen”.
- EC3: Framework to set and enforce prudential standards
  - Three-level regulatory hierarchy: Federal Acts (e.g., Banking Act, FINMASA), Federal Council ordinances, FINMA ordinances (limited competence), and FINMA circulars.
  - Banking Act and Banking Ordinance lay down minimum prudential standards; FINMA can require buffers above standard capital requirements (Art. 45 CAO).
- EC4: Updating laws and public consultation
  - Laws, ordinances and circulars are subject to public consultation; Federal Department of Finance (FDF) responsible for laws and ordinances; FINMA responsible for its ordinances.
  - FINMA issues consultation reports and publishes draft regulations and explanatory reports; communication, enforcement, and regulation policies updated (communication and enforcement policies last updated in 2014; Guidelines on financial market regulation last updated in 2019).
- EC5: Access and scope of supervision
  - FINMA has full access to banks’ boards, management, staff and records (Art. 29 FINMASA).
  - FINMA reviews group-wide consolidated activities when it is the lead home country regulator; conducts solo and group supervision where applicable.
  - Art. 4 quinquies Banking Act authorizes Swiss-based affiliates/branches of foreign institutions to furnish information for parent’s internal control or home country consolidated supervision.
  - Subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks must obtain a license from FINMA and are subject to similar regulatory requirements.
- EC6: Powers when banks are non-compliant or unsafe
  - FINMA lacks a full suite of graduated powers for timely intervention.
  - FINMA can order restoration of compliance (Art. 31 FINMASA), appoint investigating agents (Art. 36 FINMASA & Art. 55 APA), and take interim measures during enforcement proceedings.
  - Banks may appeal FINMA’s enforcement decisions to the Federal Administrative Court (FAC); appeals normally have suspensive effect (Art. 55 para. 1), though FINMA may withdraw suspensive effect (Art. 55 para. 2). FAC may reinstate suspensive effect (Art. 55 para. 3).
  - FINMA can revoke banking licences (Art. 37 FINMASA) and revoke fit-and-proper recognition for individuals; burden of proof on FINMA.
  - FINMA’s statutory sanctions include: declaratory rulings (Art. 32), barring persons from management for up to five years (Art. 33), publication of final supervisory rulings (Art. 34), and confiscation of profits from serious violations (Art. 35).
  - FINMA publishes enforcement information via databases and case-report/court decision databases.
- EC7: Review of parent and affiliated activities
  - FINMA establishes consolidated supervision at parent company level if parent is a holding or financial-sector company and has access to necessary information for Swiss groups.
  - If no adequate consolidated supervision abroad, FINMA may establish ring-fencing measures to protect the Swiss sub-group.
  - Non-financial parents and affiliates outside consolidation may fall outside FINMA’s direct access and powers.

### Assessment of Principle 1 — key findings and concerns
- Overall assessment: FINMA’s ability to act is flawed and needs remedy.
- Critical observations:
  - FINMA lacks meaningful early intervention powers and a complete suite of graduated powers expected under international standards.
  - Appeals processes with suspensive effect have led to protracted cases (example note: one systemic bank spent 8 years in court on capital requirements related to interest rate risk in the banking book).
  - FINMA often acts late, at point of non-viability, when losses are likely to be borne by depositors and creditors.
  - FINMA cannot effectively issue detailed guidance or supervisory expectations in key areas (corporate governance, risk management); past FAQs removed from website.
  - The statutory objective in FINMASA Article 4 does not explicitly mention depositors.
- Specific legal weaknesses identified:
  - FINMA’s power to carry out direct supervision, e.g., onsite inspection, is technically constrained (Art 23 BA).
  - No explicit power to set standards for specific risk areas other than liquidity risk.
  - Weak legal powers to correct deficiencies in corporate governance and risk management.
  - No explicit power to ensure the CRO is a standalone position elevated to executive board.
  - Limited legal power to require stress testing.
  - Limited legal power to require a bank to increase provisioning.
  - Basel Framework Pillar 2 powers not sufficiently or effectively articulated.
  - Limited power to require Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAPs).

### Recommended powers and supervisory tools (as articulated by assessors)
- FINMA should be granted a suite of powers that can be deployed early and have immediate effect, not subject to suspensive effect on appeal, based on supervisory discretion rather than rigid statutory thresholds. At a minimum, powers should include:
  - Powers in relation to corporate governance, including removal of senior management and powers in relation to remuneration (senior management regime).
  - Powers to require rectification of deficiencies in risk management and internal controls.
  - Powers to limit the scope of business.
  - Powers to ensure capital buffers can be conserved, including requiring stops on dividends and share repurchases.
  - Ability to ensure stabilization of emergency planning for SIBs and to trigger stabilisation plans when necessary.
  - The statutory power to impose fines.
- These powers should be available to FINMA and applicable to all banks; the principle of proportionality should not dilute depositor protection.

*Source: Extract from PDF chapter on Switzerland, International Monetary Fund.*

### 1. FINMA exercises its regulatory powers by issuing:

### 1. FINMA exercises its regulatory powers by issuing:

### Scope of instruments
- FINMA issues:
  - ordinances, where so provided in the financial market legislation;
  - and circulars on the application of the financial market legislation.

### Limits and guiding principles for ordinances and circulars
- FINMA issues ordinances and circulars only to the extent required for the purposes of supervision, limiting itself as far as possible to the definition of principles. In doing so, it takes account of overriding federal law and in particular of:
  - the costs that the supervised persons and entities incur due to regulation;
  - the effect that regulation has on competition, innovative ability and the international competitiveness of Switzerland’s financial center;
  - the different sizes, complexities, structures, business activities and risks of the supervised persons and entities;
  - the international minimum standards.

### Self-regulation
- It supports self-regulation and may recognize and implement the same as a minimum standard within terms of its supervisory powers.

### Regulatory process transparency and participation
- It provides for a transparent regulatory process and the appropriate participation of the parties concerned.

*Source: 1cheea2025004-source-pdf - 1. FINMA exercises its regulatory powers by issuing:*

### 5. It issues guidelines on the implementation of these principles. In doing so, it acts in

### 1cheea2025004-source-pdf - 5. It issues guidelines on the implementation of these principles. In doing so, it acts in 

### FINMA’s legal constraints and Art. 7 FINMASA
- FINMASA requires FINMA to follow the same regulatory process for circulars that outline supervisory practice as for FINMA ordinances that regulate supervised entities.
- Circulars comprising supervisory guidance will generally not enter into force sooner than 1–1.5 years after the process started.
- FINMA is explicitly required to constrain itself, so far as possible, to high level principles and to definitions and to act in agreement with the Federal Department of Finance (FDF).
- FINMA must take into account the heterogeneity of the industry, the costs of regulation and impact of regulation on competition and the international standards.
- If necessary to adjust legal certainty, an amendment to permit FINMA to issue supervisory guidance is described as urgently required.

### Absence of supervisory guidance and operational consequences
- Since the 2014 FSAP, FINMA FAQs have been withdrawn from the FINMA website; FINMA has determined it is a supervisor and not a regulator and must not issue documents that could be seen as guidance or regulation outside the specified processes for ordinances and circulars.
- Mission view: current interpretation of Art. 7 FINMASA is "too extreme and conservative" and "not serving Swiss interests."
- Consequences noted:
  - Almost complete absence of supervisory guidance for implementing important qualitative standards.
  - No substitute for FINMA’s guidance has emerged, which can be actively damaging to banking soundness.
  - High-level principles without supervisory guidance risk leaving many banks unable to "know what good looks like" or to recognize "red flags."
  - The regulatory audit system is not suited to probing qualitative supervisory matters; weaknesses and vulnerabilities could be missed.
- Suggested approach:
  - Issue guidance that respects market diversity via "comply or explain" protocols, allowing major players discretion while providing dialogue-based supervisory contact rather than check-box compliance reviews.
  - Empower FINMA to codify supervisory practices and interpretations in a timely manner (circulars/guidelines) to handle technical details agilely.

### Capital issues and limited Pillar 2 powers
- Missing powers relate to assuring sound capital adequacy and implementing Basel Framework Pillar 2.
  - Basel Pillar 2 Principles 1 and 2 expect:
    - banks to have a process for assessing overall capital adequacy relative to risk profile and a strategy to maintain capital levels;
    - supervisors to review and evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy assessments and strategies and to take appropriate supervisory action if unsatisfied;
    - supervisors to expect banks to operate above minimum regulatory capital ratios and have ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum.
- FINMA’s scope for action on any aspect of Pillar 2 is "not well supported on legal grounds" despite Switzerland being a signatory to the Basel Framework and FINMA stating it applies the Framework to all banks.

### FINMA’s mandate (Art 4 FINMASA) — scope and tensions
- First objective of FINMA’s mandate: "to protect creditors, investors, and insured persons as well as ensuring the proper functioning of the financial market."
- Mandate is silent on protecting the safety of banks as individual entities and silent on protecting depositors (distinct from creditors/investors).
  - FINMA argues pursuing listed objectives promotes safety and soundness of banks; assessors accept this argument only up to a point.
  - Assessors: legal mandate does not give recognition to banks as individual entities nor acknowledge depositors explicitly; it is not reasonable to suppose an unlisted class will enjoy same measure of concern.
- Mandate also states FINMA “thus contributes to sustaining the reputation, competitiveness, and sustainability of Switzerland's financial center.”
  - Assessors: reference to competition is problematic for a supervisor; prudential, stability objective must take clear precedence. Recommend amending mandate to ensure FINMA can give priority to banking soundness and stability.
- FINMASA requires FINMA to publish Guidelines on Financial Market Regulation; assessors note potential risk that emphasis on competitive neutrality and resorting to regulation only as last resort could be interpreted as objection to early intervention or intrusive supervision.

### Principle 2 — Independence, accountability, resourcing and legal protection (overview)
- Principle 2 summary: supervisor possesses operational independence, transparent processes, sound governance, budgetary processes that do not undermine autonomy, adequate resources, and accountability; legal framework provides legal protection for the supervisor.

### EC1 — Operational independence, accountability and governance
- FINMA established as public law institution; commenced activities on January 1st, 2009.
- Article 98 of the Federal Constitution provides constitutional basis; Chapter 2 of FINMASA (22 June 2007) covers independence, accountability, governance.
- Independence constraints and approvals:
  - FINMA required to carry out supervisory activity autonomously (Art. 21 para. 1 FINMASA).
  - Federal Council adopts FINMA Ordinance on Levies and Fees and approves FINMA Personnel Ordinance.
  - Strategic objectives of FINMA must be approved by the Federal Council (FINMASA Art. 9 para. 1 let. a).
  - Federal Council appoints Board of Directors (including Chair and Vice-Chair) and determines remuneration level for Board members.
  - FINMA Board appoints CEO and Executive Board; CEO appointment and maximum remuneration subject to Federal Council approval (Art. 9 para. 1 lit. g; Art. 17 para. 2 FINMA-Personalverordnung). Salaries of Executive Board members above a certain limit require approval of Head of the Federal Department of Finance (Art. 18 para. 2 FINMA-Personalverordnung).
- Accountability:
  - FINMA must review strategy at least once a year with the Federal Council (Art. 21 para. 2 FINMASA).
  - Federal Council must approve FINMA’s annual report before publication (Art. 9 para. 1 let. f.; Art. 22 FINMASA).
  - FINMA reports annually to Federal Council and Parliamentary Committees on strategic goal implementation.
- Financing:
  - FINMA funded by levying fees for individual cases/services and annual supervision charges on supervised entities (Art. 15 FINMASA).
  - Overall levies/fees framework established by FINMA Fees and Levies Ordinance (FINMA-GebV) issued by Federal Council (Art. 15 paras. 3 and 4 FINMASA).

### EC2 — Appointment/removal transparency, terms and public disclosure
- Board of Directors:
  - Appointed by Federal Council under Art. 9 para. 3 FINMASA; comprises seven to nine independent expert members.
  - Term of office: four years; each member may be reappointed twice (Art. 9 paras. 2 and 3 FINMASA).
  - Federal Council may remove members "if the requirements for holding office are no longer fulfilled" (Art. 9 para. 5 FINMASA).
  - Requirements profile publicly available (document approved by Bundesrat of 26 January 2022).
- Screening and disclosure:
  - DDPS conducts personnel security screening; FINMA Compliance Team screens candidates; screenings check integrity, vulnerability to coercion, etc.
  - Conditions for Holding Office published (decision of 6 December 2013; made available on FDF website in 2020).
  - No specific statutory disqualification for involvement in failed institutions is set out.
- CEO and Executive Board:
  - Appointed by Board of Directors; CEO appointment subject to Federal Council approval (Art. 9 para. 1 lets. g and h FINMASA).
  - Federal Council must approve termination of CEO if requirements for holding office no longer fulfilled (Art. 9 para. 5 FINMASA).
  - No statutory requirement to publicly disclose reasons behind termination for Board or Executive Board members, though FINMA has a track record of public disclosures.

### EC3 — Publication of objectives and accountability framework
- FINMA’s Board must determine strategic goals and obtain Federal Council approval (Art. 9 let. a FINMASA; Article 4.4 Ordinance to FINMASA SR 956.11).
- Strategic Goals:
  - Cover a period of four years; at time of FSAP mission period was 2021 to 2024 inclusive.
  - Ten high level goals; two relate to competitive/promotional concerns (innovation and structural change).
  - FINMA publishes strategic goals and accompanying "key areas" documents.
  - FINMA reports annually to Federal Council and Parliamentary Committees on progress; Federal Council produces an annual report on achievement of strategic objectives of independent units (including FINMA).
- Public accountability:
  - FINMA obligated to inform general public at least once each year about supervisory activity and practices (Art. 22 FINMASA).
  - FINMA subject to Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry (example: decree of June 8, 2023 establishing a Commission to investigate conduct related to the emergency merger of Credit Suisse with UBS; Commission reported findings in Q4 2024).

### EC4 — Internal governance, decision-making, crisis procedures and delegation
- Two-tier structure:
  - Board of Directors: strategic management body.
  - Executive Board: operational management body; responsible for operational business (Art.10 FINMASA; FINMA Organizational Regulation Article 14).
- Decision-making:
  - Virtually all supervisory decisions taken by Executive Board or lower hierarchy; Board decisions based on formal proposals from Executive Board.
  - Ratio of agenda items for information has risen to around one-third in recent years.
  - In 2021 Board introduced 'focus topics' requiring Executive Board to report on five highest risks.
- Board powers and Chair’s resolutions:
  - Board decides on matters of substantial importance based on Executive Board proposals (Art. 9 para. 1 let. b FINMASA); such decisions are rare in practice.
  - Article 2bis of FINMA’s Organizational Regulations lists key issues (first-time licenses; protective measures/recovery/liquidation; withdrawal of license; first approval of emergency plans; capital and liquidity requirements or limitations).
  - Chair may take necessary decisions in exceptional cases of importance/urgency or operational disruption; Board must be informed as soon as possible.
  - Written procedure allowed for urgent cases with a three-day window for Board members to insist on in-person meeting.
- Enforcement Committee (ENA):
  - Permanent members: CEO (Chair), heads of Support, Policy and Legal Expertise Division, and Enforcement Division.
  - Heads of affected business divisions sit on ENA on case-by-case basis with voting rights.
  - ENA issues intrusive rulings (Article 10) including measures against supervised persons/natural persons, refusals of authorization, liquidation/insolvency/restructuring orders, opening/closing proceedings.
- Governance Regulation sets delegation principle, signatory powers, crisis management responsibilities, extraordinary cross-divisional cooperation, and liability responsibilities.
- Crisis management:
  - Dedicated project mode with ExCo members and project teams; CEO, relevant division heads, resolution, enforcement and communications engaged; sub-teams and meeting frequency adapt to event needs.

### Conflicts of interest and cooling-off
- Legal and regulatory references require Board members to be independent of supervised persons/entities (Art. 9 para. 2 FINMASA).
- Conditions for Holding Office and Article 11 of Organizational Regulations:
  - Members must not engage in activities for supervised institutions; vested interests must be publicly disclosed (disclosures available on FINMA website).
  - Reporting of conflicts to Legal and Compliance Department required to determine recusal.
- Cooling-off periods:
  - Six months specified for the Chair only (per 6 December 2013 Conditions document).
  - Nothing specified for other Board members; assessors recommend specifying cooling-off periods for all members.

### EC5 — Professionalism, integrity and rules to avoid conflicts
- Personnel and conduct frameworks:
  - FINMA Personnel Ordinance (Section 10) addresses conflict of interest and loyalty; requires Board to adopt a Code of Conduct (also in Organizational Regulations Art. 2 para. 2).
  - Personnel Ordinance permits secondary employment if no conflict; must be disclosed and approved.
  - FINMA’s Code of Conduct includes rules on avoiding conflicts, investments in supervised entities, cooling-off periods, acceptance of gifts, handling of official secrecy.
  - Regulations on the protection of information govern appropriate use of information.
  - Breaches can lead to sanctions including dismissal; breaches of official secrecy subject to prosecution under Swiss Criminal Code (Art. 320).
- Operational practices:
  - In certain situations FINMA employees may be forbidden from withdrawing deposits at supervised institutions; FINMA managers hold savings at Federal Employees' Savings Bank to avoid conflicts.
  - Mission found FINMA staff to be professional and responsive.

### EC6 — Resources, financing and operational independence considerations
- FINMA funding and personnel rules:
  - FINMA funded by fees and levies; FINMA Fees and Levies Ordinance (FINMA-GebV) adopted by Federal Council (Art. 15 FINMASA).
  - FINMA Personnel Ordinance sets employment and salary conditions; approved by Federal Council; some analogies to Federal Personnel Act apply (Art. 9 and Art. 13 FINMASA).
  - Staff salaries benchmarked with market; director-level salaries benchmarked with government; CEO’s salary set by government; base level of director salary transparent though individual salaries not public.
  - Any overall funding shortfall met through annual supervisory levy on supervised banks (Art. 15 FINMASA).
- Mandataries and external experts:
  - FINMA can appoint mandataries; costs borne by supervised entities.
  - Use cases: mandated auditors, investigating agents; FINMA defines scope and costs and monitors performance.
- Training budget:
  - Budget for education and training has been CHF 3,000 per FTE per year and unchanged since 2012.
  - Five paid vacation days per employee for education and training annually (pro rata for part-time).
  - Some mandatory training (e.g., Cyber risk); strategic education and training needs identified annually.
- Technology and travel budgets:
  - Multi-year plan for digital transformation; IT tool budgets in place; additional needs reviewed and prioritized; resource constraints not perceived to be an issue.
  - Travel budget covers domestic/international meetings and on-site work; pandemic spending dip has since rebounded.

### EC7 — Workforce planning, skills and succession
- Annual planning aligns personnel planning with strategic needs (Strategic Goals); includes management board planning and annual planning development conference.
- Talent program identifies future leadership; succession and training arrangements in place to avoid disruption.
- Skills development:
  - Supervisory skills developed largely in-house; specialized skills hired from market.
  - Cyber Risk skills scarce and hard to retain.
  - Planning horizon typically 2-3 years; FINMA has flexibility via permanent employees, temporary personnel, contractors, freelancers and inbound secondees.

### EC8 — Risk-based allocation of supervisory resources and Small Bank Regime
- Institutions assigned supervisory categories 1–5; supervisory resources and intensity correspond to category (category 1 = greatest impact; category 5 = least).
- Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) set out supervisory activities by category; SOPs represent minimum levels of activity.
- Small Bank Regime eligibility criteria (Category 4 or 5 banks):
  - Simplified leverage ratio of at least 8 percent;
  - Average liquidity coverage ratio (LCR 12 months) of at least 110 percent;
  - Refinancing rate of at least 100 percent.
- FINMA may reject an application for Small Bank Regime if supervisory measures or proceedings have been initiated in relation to:
  - The Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA);
  - Cross-border business;
  - Inadequate interest rate risk management, or unreasonably high interest rate risk;
  - Rules of conduct under the Financial Services Act (FinSA);
  - Market conduct rules under the Financial Market Infrastructure Act (FinMIA).
- No disqualification based on FINMA’s discretionary view that the institution lacks appropriate standards of risk management, controls or governance.
- Benefits of the simplified regime include elimination of risk-weighted asset calculations and many qualitative/quantitative requirements, reduced disclosure and control requirements, and reduced outsourcing requirements.
- Assessors’ concern: entry criteria rely heavily on quantitative measures; recommend including qualitative assessment of risk management, governance and controls as an explicit entry requirement.

### EC9 — Legal protection and liability for FINMA and staff
- FINMASA Article 19 establishes institutional liability where:
  - staff have committed a breach of fundamental duties; and
  - loss or damage is not due to a breach by a supervised person or entity.
- Legal protection applies when supervisory measures are taken in good faith; breach of fundamental duties may occur if measures taken in bad faith.
- Staff are not personally and directly civilly liable for discharging duties; definition of staff includes management bodies, Board members and FINMA mandataries.
- Criminal proceedings against FINMA staff require authorization from the Federal Department of Justice and Police.
- FINMA’s policy and track record: when staff act in good faith, FINMA covers expenses of criminal and civil proceedings (court and lawyer fees).

### Assessment and recommendations (mission’s conclusions)
- Autonomy:
  - Approval of FINMA’s strategic objectives by the Federal Council infringes on operational autonomy; accountability should not equate to ex-ante interference.
  - FINMA is legally independent and should be treated as such.
- Resources:
  - Government has authorized FINMA to fund itself through levies, but Federal Council approval of Personnel Ordinance and adoption of Levies/Fees Ordinance create constraints.
  - FINMA is understaffed and lacks personnel to execute range of analytical and on-site activities appropriate to Swiss banking sector diversity.
  - Increased thematic and horizontal work noted; attention focused on category 1 and 2 banks; supervision of category 3, 4 and 5 banks is light.
  - Training budget per capita has not increased since 2012 (CHF 3,000 per FTE per year); assessors concerned FINMA may underestimate development needs.
  - Mission recommends sustaining and increasing on-site engagement and depth of analysis.
- Regulation and guidance:
  - FINMA should be empowered to issue timely circulars/guidelines to provide regulatory certainty and fill supervisory guidance gaps.
  - Consultative processes are lengthy but supervisory practices being written into circulars is positive.
- Governance and conflicts:
  - Improvements made since 2014 BCP assessment, but further updates recommended to meet BCP standard and international good practice.
  - Recommend greater public information on disqualification grounds for Board members (e.g., involvement with a failed institution).
  - Cooling-off periods should be specified for all Board members (currently only 6 months for the Chair).
  - Restriction on Chair not holding federal/cantonal office is in law; same restriction for other Board members should be articulated in law, not only in Federal Council decision.
  - Suggested low-priority amendment: codify governance and conflict of interest provisions in FINMASA and related regulations.
- Proportionality and Small Bank Regime:
  - Small Bank Regime is successful but entry criteria are too quantitatively focused.
  - Recommend ensuring qualitative assessment (risk management, governance, controls, personnel quality) is part of entry criteria.

*Source: 1cheea2025004-source-pdf - 5. It issues guidelines on the implementation of these principles. In doing so, it acts in — canonical PDF content provided.*

### conclusions on successful application of proportionality and simplification of international

### conclusions on successful application of proportionality and simplification of international

### Proportionality and simplification: key conclusions
- Supervisors must have awareness of risk management and governance practices in firms subject to the simpler standards.
- IMF work, in addition to conservative quantitative thresholds, identified the need for:
  - sound corporate governance and risk management; and
  - a legal and operational framework for financial sector oversight to allow supervisors to take preventative measures at an early stage, even when no minimum regulatory threshold has yet been breached.
- Identified gaps:
  - The factors identified by the BCBS and the IMF’s field work “are not in place and need to be.”
  - The liquidity threshold “in particular is not abundantly conservative” and banks are not required to have liquidity contingency plans in place as part of the simpler regime.

### Principle 3 — Cooperation and collaboration (overview)
- Principle statement: Laws, regulations or other arrangements provide a framework for cooperation and collaboration with relevant domestic authorities and foreign supervisors. These arrangements reflect the need to protect confidential information.

Findings by Essential Criterion (EC):

- EC1 (domestic cooperation)
  - FINMA has the legal gateway to provide SNB with non-public information (art 39 FINMASA).
  - FINMA may exchange non-public information with the Federal Department of Finance (FDF) where this helps maintain financial system stability (art. 39 para. 2 FINMASA).
  - Tripartite MoU between FINMA, FDF and SNB organizes exchange of information and cooperation.
  - Bilateral MoU between FINMA and SNB covers:
    - assessment of the soundness of systemically important banks and/or the banking system;
    - regulations with major impact on bank soundness, including liquidity, capital adequacy and risk distribution provisions;
    - contingency planning and crisis management.
  - FINMA shares confidential information and cooperates with federal and cantonal prosecution authorities and other domestic regulators under information gateways of the AMLA.

- EC2 (coordination with macroprudential authorities)
  - Bilateral MoU between FINMA and SNB supports coordination on macroprudential policy and actions.
  - Under the MoU: at least biannual meetings of a Steering Committee and at least quarterly meetings of a Standing Committee on Financial Stability.
  - Trilateral MoU (FINMA, SNB, FDF) dating from 2011: tripartite committee meets at least biannually and assesses the financial markets.

- EC3 (cooperation with foreign supervisors)
  - At the time of the FSAP FINMA had concluded 47 MoUs in the banking sector.
  - FINMA maintains a webpage disclosing which authorities it has agreements with and for which financial sectors.
  - MoUs specify cooperation modalities on information exchange and on-site inspection; supported by Arts. 42, 42a, 42b, 42c and 43 FINMASA.
  - FINMA participates in Supervisory Colleges for cross-border institutions and is host supervisor for UBS AG:
    - hosts an annual meeting with all foreign supervisory authorities (general colleges);
    - core colleges with the key US and UK regulators meet semi-annually, meeting senior management and aligning supervisory priorities;
    - FINMA conducts joint on-site inspections with core college authorities.
  - Press releases and reports concerning Greensill, Archegos and Credit Suisse corroborate good supervisory cooperation under crisis conditions.

- EC4 (conditions for sharing confidential information)
  - Domestic sharing: FINMA has legal authority to share confidential information with domestic authorities (Article 38 ff. FINMASA, Article 22 AOA, Article 29 AMLA, Article 10 CartA).
  - Swiss law provides professional secrecy obligations with criminal prosecution for breach (Article 47 Banking Act, Article 147 FinMia, Article 69 FinIA and Article 320 Criminal Code).
  - Foreign sharing: Article 42 para. 2 let. b FINMASA requires the receiving authority be subject to official or professional secrecy; FINMA insists on a declaration as part of the request for administrative assistance (principle of confidentiality).
  - FINMA demands assurance that transmitted information/documents are used exclusively to implement financial market law or be forwarded to competent authorities, courts or bodies for these purposes (Art. 42 para. 2 let. a FINMASA; principle of specialty).
  - FINMA is not required to have an agreement in place prior to exchanging information (Article 42 et seq. FINMASA) but generally requires a declaration from the requesting authority regarding confidentiality and specialty.
  - If the foreign authority is a Non-IOSCO(E)MMoU signatory or forwarding for other purposes (e.g., prosecution), FINMA will require prior consent before onward transmission.

- EC5 (use and protection of received confidential information)
  - FINMA treats information from other supervisors as confidential and uses it only for implementation of financial market law.
  - FINMA Board and employees bound by official secrecy under Article 14 FINMASA, FINMA Employees Act (SR 956.121) and FINMA Code of Conduct; also must comply with the Data Protection Act (SR 235.1).
  - Violation of official secrecy may lead to administrative disciplinary measures and prison sentence or fine under Article 320 Criminal Act (SR 311).
  - FINMA may in principle neither disclose confidential information nor transfer it to third parties, but has competence to decide whether to waive official secrecy (Swiss Supreme Court decision BGE 123 IV 157, E. 1b).
  - If legally compelled to disclose confidential information received from another supervisor, FINMA promptly notifies the originating supervisor and seeks to resist or protect confidentiality where consent to passing on is not given.
  - Under Article 40 FINMASA, FINMA may refuse to disclose information or hand over files to prosecution and other domestic authorities where:
    - (a) information/files solely serve internal opinions;
    - (b) disclosure would prejudice ongoing proceedings or supervisory activity; or
    - (c) disclosure not compatible with aims of financial market supervision.
  - FINMA has an obligation to cooperate with criminal authorities; FINMA asks for consent from foreign authorities but does not have the ability to refuse disclosure requests from criminal authorities without clear grounds.

- EC6 (support for resolution authorities)
  - FINMA acts as both supervisor and resolution authority.
  - Cooperation between FINMA, SNB and FDF set out in an MoU most recently updated in 2019.
  - MoU details architecture to deal with crises, including a Steering Committee and the Committee on Financial Crises (CFC):
    - Steering Committee chaired by Head of FDF; meetings held whenever necessary.
    - CFC chaired by Director FINMA; meets once or twice a year in non-crisis times and whenever necessary during a crisis.
  - International cooperation: Article 37f Banking Act provides a legal framework for coordination between FINMA and foreign authorities in case of foreclosure proceedings against a bank with cross-border activities.

Assessment and comments (Principle 3)
- Assessment: C
- Comments: Frameworks for cooperation and coordination are in place. FINMA has actively participated in multilateral and bilateral configurations. Effectiveness proven in the March turmoil of 2023.

### Principle 4 — Permissible activities (overview)
- Principle statement: The permissible activities of institutions that are licensed and subject to supervision as banks are clearly defined, and the use of the word “bank” in names is controlled.

Findings by Essential Criterion (EC):

- EC1 (definition of “bank”)
  - The term “bank” is defined in Article 1a of the Federal Act of 18 November 1934 on Banks and Savings Banks (BA):
    - a) accept deposits from the public of more than CHF 100 million on a professional basis or publicly advertises as doing so;
    - b) accept deposits from the public up to CHF 100 million or crypto-based assets designated by the Federal Council on a professional basis or publicly advertises as doing so, and invest or pay interest on these public deposits or assets; or
    - c) refinance themselves to a significant extent with several banks that do not hold a significant interest in it, in order to finance in any way for their own account an unspecified number of persons or companies with which it does not form an economic unit.
  - For more details and exceptions see Article 5 of the Federal Ordinance of 17 May 1972 on Banks and Savings Banks (BO) and FINMA Circular 08/3, “Public deposits at non-banks”.

- EC2 (permissible activities are clearly defined)
  - Swiss banking system is based on the universal banking model; banking authorization permits a range of financial services (deposit, credit, asset management, trading, etc.).
  - Non-banking activities are permitted so long as the bank’s main character is predominantly financial.
  - At licensing the bank must describe its field of business operations in by-laws and business rules (Art. 9 BO). Articles of incorporation, by-laws and internal regulation are subject to FINMA approval (Art. 3 para. 3 BA).
  - FINMA confirms that the scope of operations corresponds with financial capacities, personal resources and administrative organization.

- EC3 (use of the word “bank” limited)
  - The term “bank” or “banker” may only be used by institutions licensed by FINMA (Art. 1 para. 4 BA). The term “savings” is similarly protected.
  - Fine of up to half a million CHF can be imposed on anyone who uses these terms improperly or fails to provide information to FINMA as requested (Art. 1 para. 4 BA). Fines are imposed by the department of Finance; FINMA files criminal complaint.
  - Use of ‘bank’ by non-banks permitted only if no risk of public being misled (e.g., ‘sperm bank’).

- EC4 (deposit-taking reserved to licensed banks; Fintech license)
  - In principle only licensed banks may solicit deposits from the public on a commercial basis; Federal Council may permit exceptions if depositor protection is in place (Art. 1 para 2 BA).
  - Exemptions include corporations and institutions established under public law and persons pursuant to Art. 1b BA.
  - Persons pursuant to art. 1b BA may accept public deposits up to CHF 100 million provided funds are not invested and no interest is paid (art. 1b para. 1 lit. b BA).
  - The Fintech license (in force 1 January 2019) permits persons pursuant to art. 1b BA to accept public deposits up to CHF 100 million on condition funds are not invested and no interest is paid (art. 1b para. 1 BA).
  - Fintech license is effectively a license for payment service providers; banking provisions apply mutatis mutandis with certain exceptions (art. 1b para 1 BA; art. 1b para 4 BA).
  - Exceptions and protections:
    - Deposits under Fintech license are not covered by deposit insurance (art. 1b para 4 let. d BA).
    - No possibility of segregation for fiat deposits in case of bankruptcy.
  - Regulatory project underway to implement among other things a segregation solution for payment service providers; consultation with industry is underway and expected timeline for legislation to be final is 2026/27.
  - Interim requirement: customers must receive a clear and separate notification that their deposits are not subject to the same protections as banking deposits.
  - Entities holding these licenses are not permitted to carry out any investments; public deposits must be held at the SNB, other banks or in HQLA (Art. 14f para. 2 lit. b Banking Ordinance).
  - The Fintech license has been used by payment service providers; such entities may not use the word “bank” in their name; terms such as “banking as a service” are actively discouraged.

- EC5 (publication of licensed banks)
  - FINMA publishes and maintains lists of currently authorized banks and branches of foreign banks on its website in German, French, Italian and English.

Assessment and comments (Principle 4)
- Assessment: LC
- Comments:
  - The term “bank” is clearly protected.
  - The Fintech license permits deposit taking by non-banks but these deposits are neither covered by deposit protection nor segregated in case of bankruptcy.
  - FINMA has stressed the need for client asset protection; remedy expected in several years.
  - Recommendation: accelerate legal power to segregate fiat deposits in bankruptcy to protect Switzerland’s reputation as a safe jurisdiction.

### Principle 5 — Licensing criteria (overview)
- Principle statement: The licensing authority has the power to set criteria for licensing banks and to reject applications where criteria are not met. At a minimum, licensing assesses ownership and governance, fitness and propriety, strategic and operating plan, internal controls, risk management and projected financial condition. Where owner/parent is foreign, prior consent of home supervisor is obtained.

Findings by Essential Criterion (EC):

- EC1 (authority for granting/withdrawing license)
  - Banking Act (Art 3, para 1) establishes FINMA as the bank licensing authority.
  - Within FINMA, licensing and supervision are separate organizational functions; sections work closely together and exchange opinions.
  - New licenses normally contain conditions and requirements; business activities limited at statutory and regulatory level. Articles of association and business regulations subject to FINMA approval (Art. 3 para. 3 BA).
  - FINMA can ease new entrants into the market cautiously and require interim audits during first two years; may define areas requiring special audits when bank is being set up.
  - Screening process: FINMA operates a screening process to avoid investment in concepts unlikely to succeed; initiates contact in a project phase where a presentation is required prior to application.
  - Applications in previous five years: 27 formal or preliminary applications submitted; nearly half not considered strong enough to proceed and the great majority of successful applicants were domestic.

- EC2 (power to set criteria and reject applications)
  - Licensing requirements set out in Banking Act (Article 3 ff. BA) and Banking Ordinance (Article 8 ff. BO).
  - New applicant can use templates on FINMA's online survey and application platform ("EHP"); templates replaced guidelines for licensing in 2023.
  - If requirements not met or information inadequate, license is refused and application rejected; FINMA may issue decrees stating license not granted; appeals can be brought before the Federal Administrative Court.
  - Licenses issued on false information can be revoked under general administrative procedural law; less stringent measures possible if shortcomings can be remedied.

- EC3 (suitability of legal, managerial, operational and ownership structures)
  - Banks may choose legal form; FINMA reviews unusual formats; in practice all applications limited companies.
  - Structures that impede supervision (e.g., complex participation structures that are not transparent) are not permitted and must be rendered more transparent or simplified (Art. 3 para. 2 let. cbis BA).
  - Senior management of a bank domiciled in Switzerland must be resident in the place where they manage and bear responsibility for the bank (Art. 3 para. 2 let. d BA). Majority of senior management should be resident in jurisdiction of domicile for globally active companies; effective group control must be anchored credibly in Switzerland if FINMA supervises the group.
  - Business structures without substance (e.g., offshore / shell entities) are discouraged; no legal prohibition but FINMA discourages Swiss domiciled banks from establishing entities without physical presence abroad.
  - Foreign banks operating from within Switzerland must comply with Swiss law and are subject to provisions for Swiss banks (Art. 1 para. 2 FBO-FINMA).

- EC4 (suitability of major shareholders)
  - Fit-and-proper test for qualified shareholders and other persons substantially influencing a bank is a licensing requirement and ongoing obligation (Art. 3 para. 2 let. cbis BA).
  - Under Art. 3 para. 2 let. c and let. cbis BA, direct and indirect qualified shareholders, members board of directors and senior management are subject to fit-and-proper scrutiny.
  - Required submissions include, at a minimum, information and documents under Art. 8 para. 1 let. a BO: personal data, signed curriculum vitae, proof of good character, etc.

*Source: 1cheea2025004-source-pdf - conclusions on successful application of proportionality and simplification of international*

### references, and extracts from the criminal record and the debt collection register, judicial or

### 1cheea2025004-source-pdf - references, and extracts from the criminal record and the debt collection register, judicial or administrative proceedings if such are of commercial relevance or could adversely affect the requirement to provide assurance of proper business conduct, and qualified participations in other companies.

### Fit-and-proper requirements for shareholders, board and senior management
- Focus of fit-and-proper requirement for qualified shareholders: primarily reputational aspects.
- Reporting duties:
  - Qualified shareholders and banking institutions must report relevant shareholdings and any changes to FINMA.
- Enforcement powers:
  - FINMA may impose sanctions including the suspension of voting rights or revocation of the banking license.
  - The bar for revoking recognition of fit-and-proper status is described as extremely high, with the burden of proof resting on FINMA.
- Ownership transparency and wealth verification:
  - Requirement to establish a clear and transparent participation structure up to the ultimate beneficial owner.
  - Significant shareholders must disclose the origin of their wealth and provide evidence of capacity to inject further capital if necessary.

### EC5 — Minimum initial capital
- Legal minimum capital for a new bank:
  - The BO (Art 15) states that the minimum capital is CHF 10 million for a new bank.
  - It must be paid in full.
  - If not paid in cash (Art 15, para 2), contributed asset values and liabilities must be reviewed by an approved audit firm.
  - FINMA may permit exceptions to the CHF 10mn capital when the bank is affiliated to a central organization (e.g., part of a cooperative system).

### EC6 — Fit-and-proper assessment at authorization and ongoing suitability
- Fit-and-proper evaluation elements:
  - Expertise and integrity; availability and time commitment; potential conflicts of interest.
  - Criteria include: (i) skills and experience in relevant financial operations commensurate with intended activities; and (ii) no record of criminal activities or adverse regulatory judgments rendering a person unfit.
- Documentation and process:
  - Minimum documentation defined in FINMA guidelines "Organmutationen" (see: FINMA-website).
  - Review begins with documentation (C.V., declarations, references), followed by in-person meetings, including group and individual interviews.
  - FINMA assesses board and management as a whole to understand corporate culture and how they will work in totality.
- Observations and expectations:
  - Newer applications: business and technical skills generally strong; risk control more weakly represented.
  - If risk and compliance report to same individual, FINMA seeks strong separate profiles in the org-chart dedicated to risk and compliance.
  - Systemic banks required to have the chief risk officer on the executive board (not compulsory for other banks).
- Auditor and reporting requirements:
  - Once authorized, an audit firm takes the audit mandate after operations start.
  - License conditions can require a different auditor for the application-stage audit; an audit report is part of the application.
  - Irregularities must be reported to the licensing authority ad hoc or in the annual audit report.
- Reassessment triggers:
  - FINMA reassesses governing body composition on changes, change of control, or significant business events.

### EC7 — Review of strategic and operating plans, governance and controls
- FINMA review priorities for license applications:
  - Business strategy and business plan are key elements.
  - Operational structures must be proportionate to planned activities.
- Specific aspects analyzed in detail:
  - Management structure with two levels — board and executive management (Art. 3 para. 2 let. a BA; Art. 11 BO; FINMA Circular 2017/1).
  - Organization: separation of functions, effective internal control system, including risk management and compliance (Art. 3 para. 2 let. a BA; Art. 12 BO; FINMA Circular 2017/1).
  - Measures for due diligence and combating money laundering and terrorist financing (AMLA, AMLO-FINMA, Agreement CDB 20).
  - Compliance with business conduct rules in four areas: AML requirements, suitability, market integrity (FINMA Circular 2013/8), and cross-border (Fact Sheet 1 July 2018).
  - Compliance with outsourcing provisions (FINMA Circular 18/3).
  - Managing operational risks and operational resilience (FINMA Circular 2023/1).

### EC8 — Pro forma financial statements and principal shareholder financial capacity
- Application submission requirements:
  - Business plan plus a budget for the first three business years (including balance sheet, income statements and capital planning).
  - External auditor must examine prospective financial information and judge its plausibility.
  - Application rejection triggers: business plan too vague, doubts about realizability, or requirement for a higher capital cushion.
- Principal shareholder verification:
  - Principal shareholder must prove capability to supply fresh capital if necessary and answer for sustainable development.
  - Determination is case-by-case and may include tax statements, certificates, and questions on source of funds.
  - Standard background checks look for history of insolvency, outstanding claims, data on proceedings, etc.

### EC9 — Foreign banks: home supervisor no-objection and consolidated supervision
- FINMA practice for foreign branches/subsidiaries:
  - Home regulator is asked for a statement of no objection (branches: Art. 4 para. 1 let. c FBO-FINMA; subsidiaries: Art. 3bis para. 1bis BA).
  - For foreign groups, the lead home regulator is asked to provide a statement about adequate consolidated supervision (branches: Art. 4 para. 2 FBO-FINMA; subsidiaries: Art. 3b BA).

### EC10 — Monitoring progress of new entrants
- Immediate, ongoing supervision of newly authorized institutions.
- During set-up phase:
  - Interim audits requested; special audit areas can be defined case-by-case.
  - Licenses commonly linked to requirements/conditions; business scope may be limited initially.
  - Controlled growth allowed as financial and organizational resources become available.

### EC11 — Consistency of licensing and ongoing supervision
- Banks must comply with relevant licensing requirements at all times.
- Ongoing prudential and conduct-related supervision is part of the standard mandatory program.
- Reference: FINMA Circular 2013/3, Auditing.

### Assessment and recommendations — Principle 5
- Assessment: C
- Comments and supervisory practice:
  - FINMA acts as a watchful gatekeeper for new entrants, providing early indications of viability and assigning likely key account managers.
  - Attaching conditions to licenses and permitting additional activities only after demonstrated capability enhances success likelihood and reduces depositor/market risk.
- Proposed enhancement:
  - FINMA is considering requiring a wind-down plan for new applications if milestones cannot be met.
  - The FSAP supports this measure and encourages FINMA to implement it to facilitate orderly exits.

### Principle 6 — Transfer of significant ownership (overview)
- Principle: Supervisor has power to review, reject and impose prudential conditions on proposed transfers of significant ownership or controlling interests.
- EC1 — Definitions:
  - Banking Act, Art. 3 para. 2 let. cbis sets a 10 percent threshold of capital or voting rights (direct or indirect) or ability to influence business activities as a qualified holding; covers natural persons and legal entities.
  - Controlling: referred to in Art. 3bis para. 3 BA and Art. 21 BO — controlling if directly or indirectly holding more than half of voting or capital rights or exercising controlling influence.
  - Reporting thresholds when acquiring/disposing qualifying holdings cross thresholds of 20 percent, 33 percent or 50 per cent (Art 3 para 5 BA).
  - The Swiss Code of Obligations Article 963 para 2 also sets out a definition of control used in practice.
- EC2 — Notification and approval requirements:
  - FINMA must be informed in advance about changes in qualified participation (Art. 3 paras. 5 and 6 BA; Art. 8a para. 1 BA).
  - Reporting requirement imposed on buyers, sellers, and the bank.
  - UBO regarded as indirect qualified participation and subject to reporting.
  - Transaction can only be carried out after FINMA approval (Art. 3 paras. 5 and 6 BA; Art. 8a para. 2 BO).
  - Reporting triggered at thresholds of 20 percent, 33 percent or 50 percent of capital or voting rights (Art. 3 paras. 5 and 6 BA).
  - Foreign ownership change: necessary to apply for an additional license (Art. 3 paras. 5 and 6 and Art. 3ter BA).
- EC3 — Powers to reject or reverse unauthorized changes:
  - FINMA authorised to prohibit planned changes in participation not meeting supervisory law.
  - Formal notices of disapproval are not generally required; written indications often lead applicants to withdraw.
  - Licenses issued on false information can be revoked (Art. 37 FINMASA).
  - FINMA can take measures to restore compliance where changes in participation have been made (Art. 31 FINMASA).
  - Suspension of shareholders’ voting rights possible (Art. 23 BA).
  - Revocation and other measures implemented through enforcement proceedings.
- EC4 — Reporting of significant/shareholder holdings:
  - Banks required to report all direct and indirect qualified participations as soon as aware and annually within 60 days of the end of the financial year.
  - Reporting and information requirements in law: Art. 3 para. 6 BA; Art. 8a BO (requires info on nationality, place of residence, qualifying holdings in other companies and any pending judicial and administrative proceedings; signed curriculum vitae; references; relevant details on criminal or debt records in Switzerland or abroad); Art. 13 BO requires list of identity and participation rate of all qualified participants on closing date and any changes; Declaration of the holders of qualified or principal participations.
- EC5 — Power to address changes of control without necessary notification:
  - See EC3 (FINMA powers to prohibit, modify or reverse changes and to revoke licenses or suspend voting rights).
- EC6 — Immediate notification of material information about major shareholders:
  - Clear reporting obligation under Art. 29 para. 2 FINMASA for supervised banks to report immediately any incidents relevant to supervision, including important information about qualified shareholders impacting the bank’s reputation or sound business activities.
- Assessment: C
- Comments:
  - Swiss approach is high level; no clear statutory distinction between significant and controlling interest in the Banking Act, but thresholds and Code of Obligations definitions provide transparency.
  - FINMA treats UBOs and significant influence seriously; qualified participants must meet fit-and-proper standards.
  - FINMA faces limitations in enforcement powers (discussed in CP5), but uses Banking Act tests to protect system integrity (e.g., assessing qualified participants’ compliance with fit-and-proper standards).
  - Qualified shareholders legally obliged to refrain from exerting detrimental influence (Art. 3 para. 2 let. cbis BA).
  - Post-change enforcement ability is constrained by enforcement weaknesses noted in CP5.

### Principle 7 — Major acquisitions
- Principle: Supervisor can approve/reject and impose conditions on major acquisitions/investments and determine that corporate affiliations/structures do not expose the bank to undue risks or hinder supervision.
- EC1 — Legal definitions and thresholds:
  - Location of activity: Banks organized under Swiss law must notify FINMA in advance for initiating activities in foreign country by establishing physical presence or acquiring participating interests in foreign financial sector companies (Art 3 para. 7 BA; details in Art 20 BO).
  - Business model: Significant acquisitions/investments requiring changes to articles of incorporation, organization, and business rules are subject to FINMA approval (Art. 3 para. 2 let. a; Art. 3 para. 3 BA). Since 2019, material changes require prior FINMA authorization (Art 8 para 2, BO).
  - Limits on investments:
    - Investments in any company by a bank or group entity may not exceed 15 percent of the net own funds of the bank or consolidated group (Art. 4 para. 4 BA).
    - Total of financial fixed assets of a non-affiliated company acquired for investment may not exceed 60 percent of the net own funds of the bank or consolidated group (Art. 4 para. 4 BA).
    - CAO exceptions: restructuring purposes, standard underwriting period, or difference covered by eligible capital (Art.13 CAO).
    - BA prescribes that a bank’s loans to any single customer and participation in any single company must bear an appropriate relationship to eligible capital (Art. 4bis BA).
- EC2 — Criteria for judging proposals:
  - Foreign activities: Notification in Art 3 para. 7 BA and details in Art 20 BO; foreign activity must not prevent maintenance of regulatory standards.
  - Business model: De facto test is the licensing criteria — bank must meet standards of authorization and have organization appropriate to activity.
  - Limits: Art 4bis BA requires appropriate relationship to eligible capital; no further guidance provided.
- EC3 — Supervisor assessment of host country supervision and consolidated supervision:
  - FINMA can prevent major acquisitions or cross-border establishments incompatible with articles, organization, or effective consolidated supervision.
  - FINMA assesses whether host country laws/regulations would impede information flow and consolidated supervision; can block acquisitions if supervision impeded.
  - Example: FINMA blocked an acquisition where governance and risk control needed remediation before growth.
- EC4 — Assessment of financial, managerial and organizational resources for acquisitions:
  - Resources considered:
    - Participation limits related to eligible capital (Art 4bis BA; Art. 4 para. 4 BA).
    - Geographical extent must correspond to financial resources and administrative organization (Art 9 para 2 BO).
  - Managerial/organizational aspects:
    - Strategy and article changes (Art 3 para. 2 let. a; Art. 3 para. 3 BA).
    - Risk management function and recording (Art 12 para 2 BO).
    - Ability to meet consolidated supervision (Art 3d ff BA).
- EC5 — Risks from non-banking activities:
  - No specific requirements or powers related solely to non-banking activities.
  - Major acquisitions likely affect business strategy and require FINMA assessment/approval (Art 3, para 3 BA).
  - FINMA must ensure bank can continue to meet authorization conditions post-acquisition, including non-banking activity risks.
- EC6 — Acquisitions/investments by other entities in the group:
  - Banks must notify FINMA of any changes in circumstances underpinning the license (Art. 8a para. 1 BO).
  - High-importance changes require FINMA approval before activity continuation (Art. 8a para. 2 BO).
  - FINMA can require adjustments and, in extremis under consolidated supervision, ring-fencing was noted as an option.
- Assessment: C
- Comments:
  - FINMA’s powers allow scrutiny of major acquisitions and the bank’s ability to manage significant change.
  - Assessors observed FINMA demanding audit reports and investigations and imposing remediation before approval.

### Principle 8 — Supervisory approach (introductory excerpt)
- Principle: Supervisor develops and maintains a forward-looking assessment of banks’ risk profiles, proportionate to systemic importance, identifies system-wide risks, has early intervention framework and resolution plans.
- EC1 — Methodology requirements (excerpt):
  - Supervisor uses consistent methodology/processes to determine nature, impact and scope of risks banks are exposed to and present to system safety and soundness.
  - Methodology addresses: group structure, business models and sustainability, forward-looking risk profiles, internal control environment, and resolvability; aims to permit comparisons between banks and determine supervision intensity.
- Source excerpt ends with: "The risk-based approach for bank supervision was most recently revised and updated in"

*Italic: Source — IMF staff extract from 1cheea2025004-source-pdf (IMF country report content).*

### 2019. FINMA notes that the concept of risk covers both the specific risk profile of the

### 2019. FINMA notes that the concept of risk covers both the specific risk profile of the

### Categorisation of banks
- FINMA categorises all banks into 5 groups as set out in the Banking Ordinance (Art 2 para 2 and Annex 3).
- The categorisation is based on: total of the balance sheet; assets under management; privileged deposits; minimum own funds.
- Criteria and thresholds in CHF billions:
  - Category 1: Balance sheet total > 280; Assets under management > 1625; Privileged Deposits > 32; Minimum own funds > 20
  - Category 2: Balance sheet total > 115; Assets under management > 815; Privileged Deposits > 21,5; Minimum own funds > 2
  - Category 3: Balance sheet total > 17; Assets under management > 32,5; Privileged Deposits > 0,53; Minimum own funds > 0,25
  - Category 4: Balance sheet total > 1,125; Assets under management > 3,25; Privileged Deposits > 0,105; Minimum own funds > 0,05
  - Category 5: Balance sheet total < 1,125; Assets under management < 3,25; Privileged Deposits < 0,105; Minimum own funds < 0,05
- Following the turmoil of 2023:
  - 1 bank in category 1
  - 3 banks in category 2
  - 29 banks in category 3
  - Remaining banks in categories 4 and 5

### Rating system (FRB) and planned evolution
- FINMA uses the FRB rating system based on CAMELS and audit findings; quantitative data from regulatory reporting evaluated via several hundred key parameters and peer group analysis; qualitative data drawn from annual audit report among other sources.
- Key features:
  - Rating scale: 1-9; banks also color-coded green/amber/red.
  - Ratings updated automatically whenever new regulatory figures or input data are available: typically several times a month.
  - Risk to Future (R2F) rating based on annual risk analysis of audit firms and any supervisor or cross-sectional specialist override.
  - Analytical results of cross-divisional specialists (liquidity, capital, interest rate risks, conduct, etc.) feed directly into the rating calculation.
  - Final rating can be overridden by the KAM; system flags overrides; decisions reviewed by management (Governance Meeting – GovA).
  - A downgrade to rating 7 or below triggers intensive supervision.
- Enhancements and timeline:
  - Most recent update enhanced discriminatory power and forward-looking evaluation.
  - Further evolution (FRB 3.0) under preparation and expected in use from 2025.
  - FRB 3.0 aims to incorporate financial resilience, operational resilience, governance and controls and suitability; incorporate more data and granularity to identify and track supervisory activity plans.

### Supervisory intensity, case management and escalation
- Supervisory intensity is determined by the combination of bank category and FRB rating; matrix set out in FINMA’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
- SOPs require Key Account Managers (KAMs) to adapt frequency and intensity of supervision; SOPs act as binding minimum standards and supervisory activities are tracked in FINMA system.
- Intensive supervision applies to institutions rated 7 or lower:
  - Handled via a case management approach in IT system (SIRIUS): problem case/case management opened and escalation checklist filled and signed off by senior management.
  - Staff trained on when/how problem cases are used.
- Monitoring scope includes early identification of risks, changes to risk profile, group structure, corporate governance, organization and internal control, and crisis planning.
- Checks and balances: rating review workflow triggers if system rating moves more than 1 point away from expert rating.

### Risk Barometer and incorporation of macro and emerging risks
- Risk Barometer:
  - Produced twice a year; defines a forward-looking heat-map of main risks over a three-year horizon.
  - Produces Red/Amber/Green status for each risk; risks may be industry-wide or business-line specific.
  - Once approved by FINMA’s Executive Board, supervisory measures for 'RED' and 'AMBER' risks require Executive Board approval.
  - Barometer forms basis for FINMA’s annual Risk Monitor.
- Barometer and emerging risks:
  - Includes forward-looking view and reflects climate-related financial risks and other emerging risks.
  - FINMA consulted and finalized a Circular on "Nature-related financial risks"; the Circular on “Nature-related financial risks” was published in December 2024.
- Ad-hoc and structured data collections used for emerging risks (examples):
  - 2022: energy shortages / blackouts risk exercise.
  - 2022 and 2023: banks’ exposure to climate-related financial risks.
  - 2024 pilot data collection intended to become annual for category 1-3 banks.
  - FINMA collected data on the use of artificial intelligence from 400 financial institutes in 2024.
  - FINMA published expectations concerning the use of AI in its Risk Monitor 2023 and guidance 08/2024.
- Data innovation:
  - FINMA’s data innovation lab working to add functionality to supervisors’ dashboard, integrate external/internal data, and use machine learning and natural language processing.

### Small Bank Regime and supervisory coverage
- 2019 reorganization with update in 2023; as at end-2023:
  - 54 small banks and securities firms participated in the Small Bank Regime.
- Small Bank Regime objective: proportionality in regulatory burden for suitably qualified small institutions.
- Exemptions and limits:
  - The planned Circular on climate risks will not apply to small banks.
  - Small banks are not exempt from Conduct Risk or AML/CFT discipline.
  - FINMA 2023 Annual Report announced a plan to perform more on-site inspections at small banks (cat. 4 and 5) starting in 2025 on "Combating Money Laundering/ Terrorism Financing and Sanctions".
- Criteria for the small bank regime:
  - Institution must be a Category 4 or 5 bank or account-holding securities firm;
  - Simplified leverage ratio of at least 8%;
  - Average liquidity coverage ratio (LCR 12 months) of at least 110%;
  - Refinancing rate of at least 100%;
  - No cross-border activities.
- Supervisory structure:
  - Two FINMA teams: one for regular supervision of institutions without specific supervisory issues, another for “case management” (intensive supervision where regulatory issues arise).

### On-site and off-site supervision, regulatory audits
- FINMA on-site inspections:
  - For 2021-2023: 304 on-site inspections of which 108 in the conduct area (AML/ Crossborder/ Suitability/ Market conduct) and Sanctions.
  - FINMA increased on-site examinations by approximately 30 percent compared to before the 2019 FSAP.
  - FINMA plans to further enhance on-site capacities including at cat. 4/5 institutions and to increase resources.
- Use of regulatory audit firms:
  - Regulatory audits and risk assessments are a distinctive feature; performed by recognized external audit firms supervised by Federal Audit Oversight (FAO) authority.
  - Regulatory auditors submit annual risk analysis and audit strategy; FINMA issues detailed audit programs; long form standardized audit reports are submitted to FINMA.
  - For category 1 and 2 banks (G-SIBs and D-SIBs), FINMA prepares the audit strategy itself annually.
  - FINMA can mandate third-party mandataries or investigating agents (Art. 24a FINMASA); legal power to appoint a third party directly since 2019.
- Assessors’ findings on regulatory audits:
  - Supervisors observed instances where regulatory auditors failed to uncover findings that FINMA identified.
  - The regulatory audit process is seen as backward-looking and compliance-focused; less well-suited to forward-looking supervisory risk analysis.
  - FINMA examines the quality of reporting of recognized audit firms and communicates at least annually with the audit firm management.
  - FAOA conducts firm reviews and file reviews; FINMA cooperates closely with FAOA.

### Supervisory tools, data and digitalization
- Supervisory tools used include:
  - Analysis of financial statements and accounts; business model analysis (currently being enhanced); horizontal peer reviews and benchmark on-site inspections; corporate governance reviews; stress tests (subject to legal limits); assessments of capital and liquidity adequacy.
- Stress testing limitations:
  - FINMA has limited legal power to impose stress tests widely due to high-level and relatively imprecise legal references; expectations exist for banks to perform own stress testing; “loss potential analysis” applied to SIBs; Circular 11/2 sets expectations.
  - Weak legal basis (CAO Art 45) to impose Pillar 2 capital add-ons undermines stress test discipline.
- Data and information systems:
  - FINMA uses FRB rating system, upgraded in February 2018, currently being further upgraded.
  - FRB provides monitoring, alerts and tracking tools; standardized reports and bespoke reports produced by data unit.
  - Data Innovation Lab has developed methods to forecast FRB variables and use external data (market or press/social media) for forward-looking supervision.
  - FINMA is taking over receipt of regulatory reporting from the SNB in near future and plans major digitalization.
- Recommendations to strengthen data governance:
  - Review all incoming data to support greater granularity of analysis.
  - Require a named executive-level individual to sign off on regulatory data submissions.

### Systemic importance, resolvability and resolution
- Designation and review:
  - Under Art 8 para 3 Banking Act, SNB, after consulting with FINMA, designates systemically important banks; review carried out each year and upon indications of change.
  - SNB methodology follows Banking Act criteria: size, interconnectedness, substitutability and specifically: market share of system-relevant functions, amount of secured deposits, ratio of total assets to Swiss GDP and a bank’s risk profile.
- Resolvability assessments and powers:
  - FINMA is integrated supervisor and resolution authority.
  - FINMA required to assess resolvability of systemic banks on annual basis (Art 9 para 2 BA and Arts 65, 64a and 65b BO); since start of 2023 approach changed: if obstacles to resolvability cannot be eliminated by bank within deadline, supervisor may impose surcharges on the gone concern or liquidity requirements.
  - For G-SIBs, FSB Key Attributes require a resolvability assessment process (RAP) yearly involving Crisis Management Groups.
  - Resolution term sheets track progress against impediments (iTLAC, Operational Continuity in Resolution, Bail-in Execution, Funding in Resolution, Valuation in Resolution, Post Bail-in Restructuring and Business Disposals).
  - Resolvability assessments are not undertaken for non-systemic banks absent triggers; FINMA lacks powers to require structural changes in banks or banking groups to remove impediments to resolution.
- Assessment gap:
  - Only G-SIBs are subject to formal resolvability assessments (Art. 65a BO); D-SIBs are exempt but required to produce emergency plans (Art 60 BO) whose implementability FINMA evaluates (Art 61 BO).
  - Non-systemic banks are not required to undertake emergency planning and therefore no proportional, advance resolvability assessment exists for the majority of banks.
  - Mission recommendation: FINMA needs statutory powers to ensure effective resolvability assessment across more of the banking system.

### Enforcement, corrective powers and limitations
- FINMA’s legal powers:
  - FINMA may order restoration of compliance (Art. 31 FINMASA) and in case of serious liquidity or solvency concerns may order protective measures (Art 26 BA), restructuring (Arts 28-32 BA) or bankruptcy (Arts 33-37g BA).
  - Protective measures under Article 26 when bank reached Point of Non Viability (PONV) include instructions to Board/Management; appoint investigator; remove powers of Board/Management; dismiss audit firm; limit activities; prohibit payments; close bank; grant deferment or extend maturities.
  - FINMA may appoint investigating agents with authority to act instead of governing bodies (Art. 36 FINMASA).
- Constraints and practical limitations:
  - FINMA’s enforcement powers are framed at a high-level; Article 31 FINMASA effectively predicated on violation of law/regulation or “other irregularities” articulated at a high level; courts may be reluctant to uphold actions based solely on “other irregularities.”
  - Banks may appeal FINMA decisions; appeals have suspensive effect unless FINMA withdraws suspensive effect and courts reinstate it; legal challenges can delay enforcement and have been used, including by systemic banks.
  - FINMA currently has no statutory power to impose fines (proposal under evaluation after CS-takeover).
  - Legal basis to impose Pillar 2 add-ons or constrain distributions is weak and has led to court disputes delaying effectiveness of measures.
- Range of corrective measures available in practice:
  - Moral persuasion; formal supervisory letters; supervisory audit reports; feedback on supervisory stress tests; annual assessment letters (Cat 1-2 annually; Cat 3 at least every two years); mandate additional audits or third-party reviews.
  - Measures that can be ordered: remediation plans, increased reporting, contingency planning, limitations on activities, restrictions on distributions, governance and compensation measures, withdrawal of previously granted reliefs.
  - Interim and final enforcement measures, including public declaratory rulings and publication of enforcement decisions where necessary (Art. 22 FINMASA provisions).
- Sanctions on individuals:
  - FINMA can prohibit individuals from acting in management capacity for up to five years for serious violation of supervisory law (Art. 33 FINMASA) and may bar persons responsible for trading/advisory misconduct (Art. 33a FINMASA).
  - FINMA currently cannot impose monetary fines on individuals (statutory power absent).

### Key supervisory findings, strengths and recommendations (mission observations)
- Strengths and developments:
  - Supervisory methodology and analytical approach have strengthened and deepened since 2019.
  - FRB upgrades and planned FRB 3.0 represent alignment with international best practice; data innovation lab and use of AI and large language models beginning to deliver supervisory value.
  - FINMA has increased on-site inspections and expanded supervisory resources, particularly for G-SIB supervision after CS integration into UBS.
  - FINMA employs many high quality, skilled staff; plans to intensify focus on business model analysis, risk culture and “tone from the top.”
- Main concerns and recommendations:
  - Regulatory audit reports are ill-fitted for forward-looking supervisory risk analysis and should not be heavily relied upon for supervisory determinations.
  - FINMA should provide more comprehensive internal policy guidance and a policy handbook for supervisors to promote consistent application of supervisory policy.
  - FINMA lacks a dedicated training department; recommended to develop structured training and knowledge transfer programs.
  - FINMA should be granted stronger, clearer legal powers to enable timely, decisive early intervention (addressing limitations in Article 31 FINMASA and related provisions).
  - Recommendation that FINMA be granted the regulatory audit mandate so FINMA can specify audit work to align with supervisory objectives while preserving use of professional audit expertise; proposed as intermediate step toward bringing more on-site work in-house over time.
  - Enhance use of peer group analysis, horizontal reviews, business model analysis, stress testing capabilities and supervisory IT/suptech to avoid overreliance on spreadsheets and bespoke reports.
  - FINMA to require named executive sign-off on regulatory data submissions.

*Source: IMF staff summary of FINMA supervisory framework and assessment, as provided in the supplied content.*

### part in building its case towards being able to use formal powers. Considering the very

### SWITZERLAND

### Early intervention and FINMA powers
- Assessors conclude banking culture has deteriorated in discipline and responsiveness since the 2014 BCP assessment.
- Recommendation: FINMA should be proactive in using its current powers fully, including issuing formal rulings and building a case history to support future use of formal powers.
- Recommendation: FINMA should be provided with effective and comprehensive powers to achieve early intervention, established on a sound legal basis, at a minimum including the measures set out in EC4 (noting these should not require the breach of law or regulation for applicability).
- Recommendation: FINMA’s powers should not be subject to suspension upon appeal by the bank; legal framework should define a high threshold for courts to suspend measures (for instance, claimant demonstrating a clear case for illegality on the face of the decision and irreparable damage if implemented).
- Assessors note: FINMA has demonstrated readiness to act on information from other supervisory authorities, though investigation and action have been slow.

*Italic: Parliamentary Investigation Committee, Full Report, pg. 418 (as cited in source).*

### Principle 12 — Consolidated supervision (EC1–EC7, AC1) — description and findings
- EC1: FINMA information sources for consolidated supervision:
  - Article 3 para. 7 BA and Article 20 BO require banks to notify FINMA of intent to open subsidiaries/branches abroad and provide business plan, local managers, local audit firm, and host supervisor; notify FINMA of closures, changes, audit firm changes, or supervisory changes.
  - Regulatory auditors cover whole banking group and must submit annual standardized risk analysis and audit strategy covering items (a) to (i) in EC2: organization; internal control system; risk management and record keeping; management and business conduct; segregation of directors and executive management in accordance with Art. 11 BO; capital adequacy and risk diversification (large exposures) regulations; liquidity; accounting; uses a recognized independent and competent audit firm.
  - FINMA can require changes to audit strategy and supplementary audits; KAM (account manager) approves audit strategy.
  - Long form audit reports must confirm compliance with: adequacy of group corporate governance; measures for capital, risk diversification, liquidity at consolidated level; adequacy of consolidated risk management and central control functions; adequacy of group internal audit; compliance with Swiss and local prudential and conduct rules (notably AML-CFT); intra-group exposures approved and well-supervised; entities abroad not used to circumvent Swiss regulations.
  - FINMA cooperates with host supervisors via Supervisory Colleges and bilateral contacts.
  - Bank holding companies and ultimate parents with qualified participations (10% or more) are within consolidated supervision scope (Art. 4 para. 1 let. b BO in conjunction with Art. 23 para. 1 BO).
  - FINMA may use ring fencing for foreign-owned groups.
  - FINMA lacks powers to require structural changes to assist resolvability (see CP8), but under Art 3b BA can make authorization conditional on appropriate consolidated supervision by a financial market supervisory authority.

- EC2: Prudential standards on consolidated basis:
  - Article 3g BA authorizes FINMA to issue provisions on capital adequacy, liquidity, risk diversification (large exposures), intra-group risk positions and accounting for financial groups.
  - Article 24 BO obligations for consolidated supervision include checks that the banking group: is adequately organized; has adequate internal control system; records, mitigates and monitors risks; managed by persons guaranteeing proper business conduct; adheres to segregation of board and executive management (Art. 11 BO); adheres to capital adequacy and large exposures regulations; has adequate liquidity; applies accounting regulations correctly; has a recognized independent and competent audit firm.
  - Art 3f BA requires the financial group to ensure it can identify, limit and monitor all material risks.
  - FINMA collects consolidated information: consolidated financial statements; consolidated supervisory reporting; consolidated capital adequacy and liquidity reporting; consolidated large exposure reporting; reporting of the twenty largest borrowers group-wide (excluding total exposures to central banks and central governments); consolidated interest-rate risk reporting; consolidated prudential public disclosure (capital adequacy, liquidity, interest rate risk).
  - Exemptions under Art. 11 para. 2 CAO permit FINMA to exempt a financial sub-group from consolidation requirements if (a) group companies operate exclusively within Switzerland; and (b) the financial parent group or financial conglomerate is subject to adequate consolidated supervision by a financial market supervisory authority. FINMA may exempt immaterial sub-groups from consolidation requirements; FINMA may request a sub-group prepare and publish consolidated financial statement (Art. 35 para. 4 BO).
  - Capital treatment differences: participations in consolidated subsidiaries must be risk weighted at 250% for domestic and 400% for foreign subsidiaries; same risk weights apply to regulatory capital instruments of subsidiaries held by parent (e.g., internal AT1-Bonds). Parent banks required to disclose financial statements and capital adequacy statements.
  - Transitional arrangement for UBS parent bank: final risk weights of 250% (domestic) and 400% (foreign) must only be reached by 1 January 2028. Until then risk weights of domestic subsidiaries will increase by 5 percentage points annually and by 20 percentage points annually in the case of foreign subsidiaries.
  - Assessors note current CAO risk-weighting leads to only partial backing of regulatory capital, contagion effects from impairments on participation book value, and incentives for large subsidiaries to be financed by debt; FINMA committed to ensuring investments in consolidated foreign subsidiaries in the financial sector are fully backed by regulatory capital in parent bank going forward.

- EC3: Oversight of foreign operations by parent/head office:
  - FINMA’s consolidation obligations cover foreign operations; regulatory audit firm conducts audits abroad and submits group-wide risk reports.
  - FINMA has not issued specific guidance for oversight of foreign operations (except AMLO requirements); general requirements for adequate organization apply (Art. 12 BO, FINMA Circular 17/1).
  - FINMA tailors supervisory approach, meets with senior management and significant foreign representatives; may undertake onsite reviews (examples in US and UK). Joint reviews rare where FINMA is not home supervisor; FINMA invites host supervisors to opening and closing meetings when inspecting in their territories.
  - Supervisory cooperation in colleges and bilateral arrangements is an important information source.
  - FINMA consulted ahead of releasing a circular on Consolidated Supervision intended to enter into force in mid-2025.

- EC4: Home supervisor visits foreign offices periodically:
  - FINMA authorized to carry out direct audits of supervised persons/entities abroad or have audits carried out by audit agents (Art 43 para. 1 FINMASA).
  - Frequency of on-site inspections abroad depends on substance of foreign operations and risk assessment.
  - As home authority to G-SIB entities, FINMA prioritizes visits and meetings with host supervisors. For category 2–5 banks, mainly category 3 banks are subject to on-site inspections abroad, with an average of one per year; focus on AML for wealth management operations.
  - Regulatory audit firms perform periodic on-site inspections of foreign entities for non-large banks; audit firm informs FINMA and host supervisors of planned audits. Preference for Swiss firms when FINMA requests highly specific audit tasks.

- EC5: Review main activities of parent and affiliates:
  - FINMA examines group situation via regular reporting and intra-group reporting; group risks likely to expand with new FRB model and business model analysis.
  - If parent/affiliates in regulatory consolidation scope, their impact is addressed in prudential audits by audit firms submitting annual risk analysis and long form reports.
  - Authorization condition (Art. 3 para. 2 let. cbis) requires qualified participations (≥10%) to guarantee influence will not negatively impact safety and soundness; FINMA can suspend voting rights of qualified shareholders or implement ring fencing measures.

- EC6: Limit range of activities/locations if safety compromised:
  - Banks must inform FINMA of intent to establish entities abroad; FINMA can discourage plans at early stage.
  - Conditions for authorization (Art. 3f para.2) require financial groups to be organized to identify, control and limit material risks; failure permits enforcement measures.
  - FINMA lacks legal power to directly require closure of group entities/foreign branches or require structural group changes.
  - FINMA’s primary instruments: require more capital or make public statements; impose restrictions on new business activities group-wide or specific divisions (including prohibiting opening new entities abroad or enlarging foreign entities).
  - If effective supervision on consolidated basis is hindered, FINMA may implement ring fencing measures.

- EC7: Supervisor also supervises individual banks on solo basis:
  - Article 3e BA requires group supervision in addition to individual supervision.
  - Same supervision regulations apply at consolidated and single-entity levels; capital adequacy and large exposure requirements must be complied with on a stand-alone basis.

- AC1: Fit-and-proper standards for senior management of parent companies:
  - Corporate ownership of banks permissible; Banking Act (Art 3 para. 2 let. cbis) defines qualified shareholders; qualified shareholders must guarantee influence will not endanger prudent and sound management.
  - Recognized banks must submit updated list of direct and indirect qualified shareholders annually.
  - Fit-and-proper focuses more on financial soundness and reputational aspects for qualified shareholders.
  - If parent is subject to consolidated supervision, board and executive board must have good reputation guaranteeing irreproachable conduct (Art. 3f para. 1 BA).
  - Regulatory auditors must comment on relations between banks and qualified shareholders and confirm arm’s length economic transactions.

- Assessment: Principle 12 graded C.
- Comments: FINMA reliance on regulatory audit work is noted as a weakness for determining management failure; limited powers regarding holding companies and enforcement powers for ongoing activities; circular on consolidated supervision expected mid-2025.

### Principle 13 — Home-host relationships (EC1–EC10) — description and findings
- EC1: Supervisory colleges and crisis management groups:
  - FINMA organizes supervisory colleges and participates in colleges run by foreign authorities.
  - For G-SIB(s): Core Supervisory Colleges and Crisis Management Groups semi-annually; General Supervisory College, APAC Supervisory College and Crisis Management Group semi-annually.
  - FINMA increased contact in core and general G-SIB colleges; adapts general college structure for host authorities.
  - FINMA does not organize colleges for domestically established banks in categories 2–5; holds annual bilateral meetings with host authorities.
  - Cross-border relationships include BaFIN, ECB and Single Resolution Board, HMKA (Hong Kong SAR), FMA (Liechtenstein), CSSF (Luxembourg), MAS (Singapore), FCA and PRA (UK), FDIC, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, FRBNY, and OCC (US) for Cat. 1 bank(s); more ad hoc relationships with Guernsey and Monaco.
  - AML participation: FINMA participates in AML college depending on institution-specific AML risk assessment; recent participation in General College for BNP Paribas and AML Colleges for Mirabaud and Intesa/Reyl.

- EC2: Timely information sharing:
  - Legal framework supports exchange (Arts. 42, 42a, 42b, 42c and 43 FINMASA).
  - FINMA prepared a common template for meetings to support focused exchange highlighting key risks and supervisory assessments.
  - FINMA had 47 formal cooperation agreements with foreign supervisory authorities for banks at time of FSAP.
  - FINMA can cooperate without specific agreement; for confidential information FINMA requires ad-hoc declaration restricting use and onward sharing without FINMA consent.

- EC3: Coordinated supervisory activities and collaborative work:
  - FINMA shares on-site inspection planning with core college members for G-SIBs and engages foreign regulators when on-site inspections are planned.
  - 2024: half (20 out of 40) of the on-site inspections were/will be carried out abroad (e.g., in one of UBS's host jurisdictions outside Switzerland).
  - On-site inspections for investment banking activities usually performed jointly with FRBNY, OCC and PRA.
  - For category 3 banks, no joint reviews in recent years, but several on-site inspections abroad with host supervisor informed and invited to participate.

- EC4: Agreed communication strategy:
  - For core colleges, FINMA provides written feedback to banks on issues discussed and expectations raised by member authorities.
  - Joint on-site findings letters are communicated after initial discussion among relevant authorities.
  - Shared update meetings held for multi-authority projects; supervisory communication (assessment letters, review reports) generally shared among home and host regulators.

- EC5: Cross-border crisis cooperation and CMGs:
  - FINMA established CMG for its G-SIB(s), including host authorities from U.S., UK and EU; SNB participates as lender of last resort.
  - CMG supported by institution-specific cooperation agreement (CoAg); CMG membership expanded to reflect business model changes.
  - CMG meets at least semi-annually; FINMA holds technical CMG workshops on valuation in resolution and funding in resolution.
  - FINMA exchanges information with other host jurisdictions and established an Asia-Pacific crisis college.

- EC6: Group resolution planning:
  - Since previous FSAP, FINMA responsible for developing group resolution plan for two G-SIBs, now one.
  - FINMA shares recovery and resolution planning information with CMG through an IT-platform (“Trust Room”).
  - Dedicated CMG workshops focus on resolution funding and coordination of recapitalization under SPOE Bail-in strategy (e.g., iTLAC triggers, potential obstacles for down streaming of capital).

- EC7: Host laws require similar prudential treatment:
  - Swiss Banking Act imposes same standards for all banking participants in Swiss market; no differentiation between domestic and foreign-owned subsidiaries, with one exception regarding intra-group exposures in FINMA-RS 13/7.

- EC8: Home supervisor on-site access to local offices:
  - FINMA has discretion to permit on-site inspection of entities in Switzerland by foreign home supervisors; permission likely under Art. 43 para. 2 FINMASA if authority is home country supervisor and conditions for administrative assistance (Art. 42 para. 2 FINMASA) fulfilled.
  - FINMA can conduct on-site inspections outside Switzerland (Art. 43 para. 1 FINMASA); FINMA informs host supervisors and subsidiaries ahead of visits and asks host approval if required.

- EC9: No shell banks:
  - There are no shell banks in Switzerland.

- EC10: Consultation before taking action based on another supervisor’s information:
  - FINMA’s policy is to consult respective supervisory authority prior to taking supervisory action based on information from another supervisor.
  - Example: intense exchange and cooperation with host authorities during Credit Suisse crisis and merger information exchange involving authorities in 42 jurisdictions.

- Assessment: Principle 13 graded C.
- Comments: Core college relationships aided FINMA in March 2023 turmoil and major bank restructuring; FINMA responsive in building bilateral relationships for other group structures.

### Principle 14 — Corporate governance (EC1–EC10) — description, findings and assessment
- Legal and regulatory framework:
  - Key legal references: Articles 3 and 3f Banking Act; Articles 8–12 and Article 24 para 1 let. a–e Banking Ordinance (BO).
  - FINMA Circulars: FINMA Circular 2017/1 Corporate governance – banks; FINMA Circular 2010/1 Remuneration schemes; FINMA Circular 2016/1 Disclosure - banks, Annex 4.
  - Swiss Code of Obligations (CO) general duties apply; Swiss Stock Exchange obligations for listed banks.

- FINMA Circular 2017/1 highlights:
  - Principle of proportionality; greater burden on large/complex institutions.
  - Requirements include board composition, qualification and independence, internal control organization.
  - Category 1–3 banks must appoint audit committee and risk committee and create role of independent CRO. For category 1 and 2 banks CRO must be a member of management board. All banks must meet corporate governance disclosure requirements.
  - Separation of risk and compliance functions not consistent across system; CRO not always on executive board in dual-camera Swiss system.

- Senior Managers Regime:
  - FINMA publicly announced support for introducing a senior managers regime in April 2023 to strengthen corporate governance, ensure accountability, tie responsibilities to performance assessment and variable remuneration, and enable targeted enforcement.

- EC2: FINMA supervisory practices on corporate governance:
  - FINMA uses licensing reviews, thematic reviews, regulatory auditor assessments, self-assessments by boards, and a questionnaire supervisory tool for larger institutions.
  - Regular meetings with Chairs and board members; frequency: at least annual for main banks; for category 2 banks FINMA meets board members twice a year, and once for category 3.
  - Minutes of board meetings not routinely reviewed but may be requested.
  - New corporate governance questionnaire to be launched in 2025 to all categories; enhancements include risk culture and remuneration dimensions; renamed Corporate Governance and Risk Culture Questionnaire (CGR_Questionnaire) in 2025.
  - FINMA developed CG Supervisory Tool for Larger Institutions in 2019: questionnaire, heat map and follow-up measures/action plan. Tool produced improvements (e.g., addressing multiple mandates, balanced executive composition).

- EC3–EC6: Board composition, nomination, oversight and fit-and-proper:
  - Art 11 para 2 BO requires separation of board and executive management; CEO cannot be chairman or board member at same legal entity.
  - Members must be fit and proper, possessing necessary skills; FINMA does not require every member to have years of banking experience but expects each to contribute core competence.
  - Larger banks must establish audit and risk committees; systemically important institutions must establish compensation and nominations committees.
  - Boards required to assess performance at least annually; new CGR questionnaire to collect annual self-assessments.
  - FINMA Guidelines on Changes in Management Bodies detail procedures for assessing changes; institutions must submit requirements profile and explanations of selection process.
  - FINMA increasing interviews for appointments in non-SIBs, with an interview matrix guiding when interviews should occur.

- EC5: Board oversight of strategy, risk appetite, culture and conflicts:
  - Board responsible for strategy, risk policy, risk appetite and institution-wide risk management framework (FINMA Circular 2017/1).
  - FINMA expects board to appoint individuals tracking actions at board level and has challenged boards on accountability; intends to document tone at the top, accountability and culture in annual Corporate Governance and Risk Culture-Dossier and risk culture sub-rating.
  - FINMA uses exit interviews with senior personnel confidentially as part of culture assessment.
  - Whistleblowing: FINMA considers whistleblowing protection deficient; whistleblowers have no legal protection from criminal liability under Supreme Court rulings; FINMA lacks explicit legal basis to examine banks’ handling of whistleblowers; FINMA explores whistleblowing through questionnaire and uses standardized questionnaire in on-site inspections.

- EC7: Compensation oversight:
  - FINMA Circular 2010/1 sets minimum standards for remuneration schemes and requires board oversight.
  - Circular aligns with FSB Remuneration Principles on incentive appropriateness, alignment with risk, long-term orientation, and alignment with capital/liquidity/financial soundness.
  - Post-2023 turmoil discussions on anchoring remuneration requirements in federal law, possibly transferring FINMA circular principles into law or ordinance and introducing clawback provisions.

- EC8–EC10: Operational structure understanding, reporting and powers:
  - FINMA expects boards to understand corporate and operational structure and approve significant changes; over-complex organizational arrangements are challenged.
  - Banks required to inform FINMA without delay of material matters affecting supervision (Art. 29 para 2 FINMASA).
  - FINMA can take action against individuals under Banking Act Article 3 for lack of fitness/properness; threshold to remove individuals is high in practice.

- Assessment: Principle 14 graded LC.
- Comments:
  - FINMA’s resource limitations mean CP14 not consistently met beyond systemic banks despite FINMA’s emphasis on corporate governance.
  - Reliance on regulatory audit insufficient to capture management failure; practical enforcement against individuals is difficult.
  - Mission welcomes Senior Manager’s Regime proposals as a step forward.
  - FINMA’s CG questionnaire evolution is welcomed; once resources available, survey work should be augmented by onsite work and interviews.
  - Need for FINMA to provide clearer guidance tailored to less complex institutions noted.

### Principle 15 — Risk management process (EC1) — description and findings
- EC1: Board-approved risk management strategies, risk appetite and oversight:
  - Requirements combine high-level principles in law/ordinances (e.g., Art. 12 BO) and topic-specific circulars.
  - FINMA Circular 2017/1 defines risk management, risk tolerance (quantitative and qualitative considerations per risk category), risk profile and board responsibilities: sign-off of institution-wide risk management framework, issuance of regulations, establishment and monitoring of effective risk management function.
  - Board Risk Committee responsibilities (Margin Nos.40–46): discuss institution-wide risk management framework; assess capital and liquidity planning; assess framework at least annually; control adequacy of risk management; monitor implementation of risk strategies and limits; receive regular reports from CRO and other office holders.
  - Topic-specific circulars: Circular 2023/1 Operational risks and resilience; Circular 2019/02 Interest rate risks; Circular 2018/03 Outsourcing; Circular 2015/02 Liquidity risks; Circular 2008/20 Market Risks; Circular 2017/7 Credit risks; Circular 2011/02 Capital buffer and capital planning.
  - Compliance with laws and circulars assessed by recognized audit firms as part of regulatory audit; general elements of corporate governance and internal control system must be audited annually (Circular 2013/3 ‘Auditing’).
  - Audit standard is ‘critical assessment’ by default (lower than ‘audit level’/positive assurance); if net risk increased or significant deficiencies identified or FINMA considers appropriate, audit depth can be raised to ‘audit level’.
  - FINMA converting Circular 2013/3 ‘Auditing’ to a new Regulatory Auditing Ordinance to convert annexes to templates for faster updates to audit strategy and risk analysis provisions.
  - Although FINMA circulars cover different risk categories, only a relatively high-level requirement exists for an enterprise-wide risk management and measurement framework; FINMA indicates it lacks legal power to set a more prescriptive requirement, limiting regulatory audit assessment scope.
  - FINMA defines audit strategy for Category 1 and 2 banks; standard audit strategies applied for Category 3–5 though FINMA can change audit strategy; Circular 2013/3 and audit programs tend to be high level.

*Italic: Excerpts from IMF Financial Sector Assessment content unit (source PDF).*

### references to bank policies, procedures and methods being ‘appropriate’ without further

### 1cheea2025004-source-pdf - references to bank policies, procedures and methods being ‘appropriate’ without further

### Overview
- Regulatory guidance frequently uses the term “appropriate” without operational definition, allowing regulatory audit firms to develop their own methodologies, leading to inconsistent assessment of prudential risks.
- FINMA finds, through onsite inspections, issues in core supervisory areas that were not identified by regulatory auditors; these issues are followed up but prudential risks may remain.

### Risk management framework (EC2–EC5, EC10–EC11)
- Supervisor expectations:
  - Banks must have comprehensive risk management policies and processes to identify, measure, evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate all material risks.59
  - Processes must be adequate to: (a) provide a comprehensive bank-wide view of risk across all material risk types; (b) for the risk profile and systemic importance of the bank; (c) to assess macroeconomic environment risks and incorporate them; (d) to assess longer-horizon risks (including digitalization, climate-related financial risks and emerging risks). Scenario analysis is used where appropriate.
- Specific circulars and requirements:
  - Circular 2017/1 ‘Corporate governance – banks’: implementation case-by-case, control function ensures monitoring and reporting, includes stress tests and scenario analysis (Margin Nos.8, 69).
  - Circular 2023/1 ‘Operational risks and resilience’ addresses digitalization risks and operational resilience.
  - FINMA published the circular on ‘Nature-related financial risks’ in December 2024; phased implementation from 1 January 2026 with initial focus on climate risks.60
- Findings:
  - FINMA does not have a general legal requirement to require banks to undertake stress tests.
  - FINMA observed areas for improvement in governance of climate-related financial risks at Category 1 and 2 banks; no substantive work had been done to date on assessing strategy, risk management and reporting of climate-related financial risks; nature and climate risks not yet integrated into supervisory skills and practices.
  - Link between a bank’s risk management strategies, policies, processes and limits and its risk appetite is not always well articulated; FINMA has provided practical feedback to banks.
  - Risk management functions must cover all material risks with sufficient resources, independence, authority and access to boards; internal audit must regularly review risk management function (Margin Nos.6, 13, 60-81, 91).
  - Margin Nos.67-68 of Circular 2017/1 require banks in supervisory Categories 1 to 3 to have a dedicated risk and compliance function headed by a CRO; SIBs must appoint a CRO who is a member of the executive board. FINMA observed instances where CRO is not on the executive board or not a standalone role and lacks legal power to mandate this.

### Stress testing, capital and liquidity planning (EC5, EC14, EC15)
- Capital planning:
  - Circular 2011/2 ‘Capital buffer and capital planning’ requires written capital planning over a three-year horizon that accounts for the economic cycle; BoD must approve at least once a year (Margin Nos.34-37, 43).
  - FINMA conducts extended capital planning dialogue with certain institutions, particularly those that pose systemic risk; FINMA may lay down particular requirements (Margin Nos.34-37).
  - FINMA performs a bottom-up regulatory stress test (loss potential analysis; LPA) with the SIBs: for the G-SIB, semi-annual with two stress scenarios over a 3-year horizon; for the D-SIBs, once a year with one stress scenario.
  - Quarterly Pillar 2 dialogue with the G-SIB covers technical discussions on ICAAP methodologies; FINMA provides a range of stressed macroeconomic parameters over three years and banks submit stressed CET1 and leverage ratios for each year.
  - FINMA intends to develop benchmarking for ICAAPs and a structured business model analysis to be incorporated into a new rating system.
- Liquidity requirements and stress testing:
  - Article 7(1) of the LO requires banks to implement processes to identify, measure, manage and monitor liquidity risks.
  - Circular 2015/02 ‘Liquidity Risks’ requires sufficient liquidity buffer aligned to business model and stress tests (Margin Nos.63-67); further liquidity stress testing in Article 9 LO and Mn.72-90 of Circular 2015/2.
  - For the G-SIB, FINMA engages in ongoing dialogue on liquidity stress-testing practices; semi-annual meetings on qualitative aspects of liquidity and funding. Category 2: annual meetings; Category 3: on-site inspections approximately every 5-6 years or liquidity/funding plan meetings every 5-6 years.
- Integration of climate/nature risks:
  - Nature-related circular will require at minimum qualitative scenario analyses to determine materiality; Category 1 and 2 banks will be required to use quantitative methods and incorporate nature-related financial risks into stress testing.
  - The Swiss Ordinance on mandatory Climate disclosures entered into force on 1 January 2024; first reports expected in the first half of 2025.
  - Currently only the G-SIB is required to incorporate climate scenario analysis in line with NGFS scenarios; specific scenarios to be used are all currently available NGFS scenarios until 2050.

### Model use and validation (EC6)
- Control function responsibilities (Circular 2017/1 Margin No.72): develop and operate risk monitoring systems, define principles and methods for risk analysis and assessment (including validation of models), and monitor compliance with supervisory regulations.
- For models requiring FINMA approval, FINMA assesses design and parameters via the Model Approval Committee (MAC); regulatory audit firm typically assesses implementation of models. Assessors observed thorough model change applications and conditional approvals where appropriate.
- Requirements for use of models set out in Circulars: 2023/1 (Operational risks), 2017/7 (Credit risks), 2008/20 (Market Risks).

### Risk data aggregation and reporting (EC7–EC8)
- Circular 2017/1 (Margin Nos.52-59, 69) requires institution-wide risk management framework; control function reports to executive board at least every six months and to BoD at least annually.
- Data aggregation capabilities are largely assessed through regulatory audits; assessors noted reporting issues not identified by regulatory auditors.
- Beyond G-SIB, data aggregation has not been a supervisory focus since 2017, when FINMA assessed BCBS239 compliance at Category 2 banks.

### New products, change management and contingency planning (EC9, EC13)
- New initiatives and product approval:
  - Margin No.15 of Circular 2017/1: BoD decisions on major changes to company/group structure and strategically important projects.
  - Margin No.73: control function must be consulted during development of new or expanded product categories and major/complex transactions.
  - Circular 2023/1 Margin No.32: ad hoc risk and control assessments prior to major changes in products, activities, processes and systems; executive board must ensure documented procedures for change management and ICT operations (Margin No.49).
  - No explicit requirement in all circulars for a formal new product approval process; FINMA considers consultation requirement to imply approval but it is not clearly stated.
- Contingency and recovery:
  - Section E of Circular 2023/1 addresses business continuity management (BCM); requirements implemented case-by-case (Margin No.19). BoD approves basic principles and monitors application (Margin Nos.23-24); crisis unit requirements and testing (Margin No.89).
  - Margin Nos.101-111 set operational resilience requirements, including identification of critical functions and tolerances for disruption to be approved by BoD.
  - Art. 9 BA and Article 4 BO require systemically important banks to prepare recovery plans; recovery plan requires FINMA approval.
  - Article 10 LO requires contingency funding plans including strategies, responsibilities, communication plans and procedures; Circular 2015/02 specifies components such as early warning indicators, emergency triggers, liquidity-generating measures, inter-jurisdictional procedures, roles/responsibilities, escalation and communication.
  - FINMA cannot require Category 3-5 banks to prepare recovery plans; may request scenario planning when banks face specific challenges.

### Supervisory gaps, weaknesses and recommended actions
- Identified systemic weaknesses:
  - Legislative limitations prevent FINMA from setting detailed standards for risk management, requiring stress tests, ICAAPs, or mandating CRO be standalone and on executive board for banks of any size.
  - Guidance for banks and regulatory auditors remains high-level in certain risk management areas; no comprehensive supervisory manual for all relevant risk topics.
  - Climate-related financial risk supervisory skills are underdeveloped and not integrated into supervisory policies and processes.
- Recommendations (as stated in source):
  - FINMA should improve supervisory guidance and develop a comprehensive supervisory manual covering relevant risk topics; include guidance for regulatory auditors.
  - Supervisory skills for climate-related financial risks should be strengthened and integrated into policies and processes.
  - Consider undertaking a thematic review on risk appetites.
  - FINMA should ensure that banks have a new product or new initiative approval process.
  - FINMA should institute a more regular process to assess whether banks appropriately account for risks in internal pricing, performance measurement and new product approval processes for all significant business activities.
  - FINMA should ensure that banks establish appropriate transfer pricing for all relevant transactions.

### Assessment of Principle 15 (Risk management) — summary
- Assessment: MNC
- Comments:
  - FINMA uses regulatory audit work to determine compliance with CP15; concerns about regulatory auditor role discussed in CP9.
  - The combination of legislative weaknesses and lack of enforceable detailed standards mutes supervisory signal to industry and auditors; weaknesses were highlighted in 2014 and remain.
  - Planned FINMA internal project includes development of a new supervisory manual and more detailed risk requirements; guidance for regulatory auditors should be included.

### Capital adequacy (Principle 16; EC1–EC2)
- Legal and regulatory basis:
  - Article 4 Banking Act requires banks to maintain adequate capital individually and on a consolidated basis; Federal Council determines constituents of capital and minimum requirements.
  - Capital Adequacy Ordinance (CAO) sets detailed regulatory capital framework.
- Pillar 1 requirements (Article 42 CAO):
  - Minimum capital after deductions: 8 percent of the risk weighted positions.
  - Minimum of 4.5 percent of the risk-weighted positions must be held in common equity tier 1 capital.
  - Minimum of 6 percent must be held in tier 1 capital.
  - Article 46 CAO: all banks must hold, after deductions, sufficient Tier 1 capital to maintain a leverage ratio of 3 per cent of unweighted exposures (total exposures).
- Capital buffers (Article 43 CAO):
  - Capital buffer by category:
    - Category 1 and 2: 4.8%
    - Category 3: 4.0%
    - Category 4: 3.2%
    - Category 5: 2.5%
  - Of which CET1:
    - Category 1 and 2: 3.7%
    - Category 3: 3.3%
    - Category 4: 2.9%
    - Category 5: 2.5%
  - Of which AT1 or higher:
    - Category 1 and 2: 0.5%
    - Category 3: 0.3%
    - Category 4: 0.1%
    - Category 5: -
  - Of which T2 or higher:
    - Category 1 and 2: 0.6%
    - Category 3: 0.4%
    - Category 4: 0.2%
    - Category 5: -
- Small banks regime (Article 47 CAO):
  - Eligible Category 4 and 5 banks may apply; capital requirement corresponds to a simplified leverage ratio of at least 8 percent (quotient of Tier 1 capital and the sum of all balance sheet assets less goodwill and financial interests plus off-balance sheet items).
  - Approximately 55-60% of eligible Category 4 and 5 banks are part of the ‘small banks regime.’
- Countercyclical capital buffer (Article 44 CAO):
  - Federal Council can require a CCyB up to a maximum of 2.5 percent of risk-weighted exposures in Switzerland, in the form of CET1.
  - Sectoral CCyB targeting Swiss residential real estate: activated Feb 2013–Mar 2020; initially 1 percent of relevant RWA, increased to 2 percent in Jan 2014; reduced to 0 in Mar 2020; reactivated and increased to 2.5 percent effective from end September 2022 onwards.
- Systemically important banks (SIBs) requirements:
  - Going concern requirements (Articles 129-131 CAO):
    - Base RWA ratio: 12.86 percent and leverage ratio of 4.5 percent.
    - Add-ons for market share in domestic lending/deposit business and for bank size by total exposures.
    - Countercyclical capital buffers applicable.
  - Gone concern requirements (Articles 132-133 CAO):
    - Minimum of 40 percent of the total going concern capital for domestic SIBs.
    - D-SIBs therefore require between 18.13 percent and 20.72 percent (12.86 percent of minimum CET 1 capital and between 5.27 percent and 7.86 percent of gone concern capital), noted as much lower than closest EU peers.
    - Swiss entity of UBS required to hold gone concern funds equal to 62 percent of its going concern requirements; group-level gone concern requirements are 75 percent of going concern capital less FINMA rebates for resolvability improvements.
    - Gone concern requirements normally fulfilled with bail-in bonds meeting certain criteria; banks may opt to meet portion with CET1 or AT1.
- Implementation and assessments:
  - RCAP Assessment of Basel III implementation (June 2013) rated definition of capital largely compliant; capital buffers compliant.
  - RCAP Assessment of Basel III G-SIB framework and D-SIB review (June 2016) assessed compliant for G-SIB framework; higher loss absorbency and disclosure subcomponents largely compliant/compliant; one deviation regarding restrictions on dividend payouts when CET1 falls below 10 percent remains unrectified per Swiss authorities’ view.
- Treatment of participations and double leverage:
  - Article 32 CAO (2012) introduced deduction of participations from CET1 in standalone calculations; FINMA granted capital reliefs under Article 125 to G-SIBs leading to a mixed system (part deduction, part risk-weighting).
  - Federal Council review and a 2017 revision introduced a risk-weighted only approach with higher risk weightings phased in until December (text ends here). 

*Italic line: Source: 1cheea2025004-source-pdf (IMF chapter/section).*

### 2027. In the CAO revision that came into effect on 1 January 2019, the move away from

### 1cheea2025004-source-pdf - 2027. In the CAO revision that came into effect on 1 January 2019, the move away from

### Capital framework for participations and group capital
- Since 2019, instead of deduction, a risk weighting of 250 percent for Swiss participations and 400 percent for foreign-based holdings has been in place for all banks (with a phase-in until December 2027 for Category 1 banks).
- The partial risk-weighting of participations applied to G-SIBs since 2013 and the full risk-weighting approach applied through phased-in implementation since 2017 led to much lower capital requirements than would have been required by the deduction approach.
- Under the current regime a parent bank’s participations in its subsidiaries are only partially backed by capital, and the current requirements allow “double leveraging”, where the parent may partially finance capital at its subsidiary through debt.
- During the Credit Suisse crisis, the effects of this capital treatment amplified the bank’s problems by significantly restricting the parent bank's room for maneuver.
- Authorities have put forward initiatives, supported by FINMA and welcomed by assessors, to strengthen parent bank capitalization by replacing the current risk weighting approach with a full deduction approach.
- Assessment/Recommendation: The prudential treatment of participations should revert to the previous prudent deduction method.

### Accounting and booking practices affecting prudential capital
- Article 15 of the CAO requires capital adequacy reporting to rely on financial statements prepared in accordance with FINMA-prescribed accounting standards; FINMA permits IFRS and US GAAP for consolidated statements and Swiss GAAP for other reporting.
- Swiss GAAP permits identification of “booked hidden reserves” (essentially general provisions adjusted for tax) which are not permitted in Basel III regulatory capital but may be included in Tier 2 capital on a solo level for unlisted banks (Margin No.99 Circular 2013/1). FINMA advises only one Category 3 bank and no internationally active banks make use of this provision.
- Valuation inconsistencies can arise across accounting frameworks and treatments (example: software treated differently across banks). FINMA supports deduction of software costs irrespective of accounting treatment.
- Assessment/Recommendation: Address inconsistent prudential capital calculations across accounting frameworks through consistent prudential rules (e.g., deduction of software costs).

### FINMA supervisory powers, Pillar 2, and stress testing
- Article 3 BA and CAO Art. 45 give FINMA extensive powers to limit material risk exposures and to require additional capital in special circumstances; CAO Art. 45 permits FINMA to require certain banks to hold additional capital when minimums and buffers do not provide sufficient security.
- FINMA’s ability to impose a Pillar 2 add-on is weakened by legislative provisions: Pillar 2 charges can be legally challenged and are difficult to enforce in all cases.
- Example: courts upheld FINMA's decision to impose a capital surcharge in a lengthy D-SIB case but also upheld the suspensive effect of judicial review; assessors recommend strengthening Art. 45 CAO and removing the suspensive effect to enable effective use of Pillar 2.
- There is no general legal requirement allowing FINMA to require a stress test or to compel ICAAP; FINMA has limited stress-testing resources.
- Assessment/Recommendations:
  - Strengthen the legal basis for FINMA’s Pillar 2 powers (Art. 45 CAO) and remove suspensive effect.
  - Strengthen legal footing for stress testing and ICAAP requirements and increase FINMA’s stress-testing resources and capacity.

### Leverage and capital buffer architecture (key numeric requirements)
- All banks must meet a leverage ratio requirement of 3 percent (CAO Art.46).
- SIBs must meet a leverage ratio requirement of at least 4.5 percent plus surcharges for their size and market share (CAO Article 129).
- Banks eligible for the small banks regime must meet a simplified leverage ratio of at least 8 percent (CAO Art.47b).
- Article 44 CAO / Federal Council: countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) can be required up to a maximum of 2.5 per cent of risk-weighted exposures in Switzerland.
- Basel III countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) in Switzerland is at 0 percent as of the FSAP date; Swiss sectoral CCyB targeted at mortgage loans financing residential property located in Switzerland is at 2.5 percent as decided and communicated by the Federal Council in January 2022 (mandatory reciprocity does not apply to the Swiss sectoral CCyB).
- Comment/Recommendation: D-SIBs should not have a gone-concern capital requirement so much lower than a G-SIB and also lower than their EU peers.

### Use of internal models and model governance
- Current model usage: one bank using A-IRB; five using F-IRB; five using advanced approaches for market risk; one for operational risk.
- Article 50 CAO and Circular 2017/7 set approval and ongoing requirements for IRB use; model changes are categorized by materiality and reviewed by FINMA’s Model Approval Committee (MAC).
- FINMA assesses model design and parameters via MAC; regulatory audit typically assesses implementation. Assessors found model change applications and assessments thorough and including conditional approvals where appropriate.

### Credit risk, problem assets, provisioning, and data/analytics
- Main standards: Circular 2017/07 ‘Credit Risk – Banks’ and Circular 2017/1 ‘Corporate governance – banks’; Article 95 CAO requires identification and monitoring of risk concentrations and large exposures; Article 100 CAO requires reporting of outstanding risk concentrations to BoD quarterly (individual entity) and semi-annually (consolidated) using FINMA forms; regulatory auditors review.
- Accounting/impairment rules: Article 23–25 FINMA Accounting Ordinance set impairment and valuation adjustment rules; Category 1 and 2 banks required to apply an expected credit loss approach aligned with IFRS where applicable; Category 3 banks follow different regimes based on business model.
- Supervisory findings:
  - Guidance for banks and regulatory auditors in certain risk management areas, including credit risk, is high-level; FINMA plans to refresh guidance to articulate expectations more explicitly.
  - Onsite inspections (2021–2024) uncovered variations in mortgage management assumptions (affordability, exceptions, collateral valuation techniques); FINMA followed up and performed benchmarking, surveys, and inspections.
- Data initiatives and timelines:
  - FINMA and SNB are developing a credit data repository to capture all loans by counterparty to enable a single counterparty view — expected to be in place in 2027.
- Climate/nature risk:
  - FINMA published a circular on ‘Nature-related financial risks’ in December 2024; the circular will enter into force in stages from 1 January 2026; phased implementation from 2026 with initial focus on climate risks.
  - Supervisory climate scenario analyses: SNB and FINMA collaborated in 2021 and subsequent analyses in 2023–2024.

### Large exposures, concentration risk, and related parties
- Large exposure rules:
  - Article 96 CAO covers on- and off-balance-sheet items for large exposure calculation.
  - Article 97 CAO: a risk concentration may not exceed 25 per cent of adjusted eligible Tier 1 capital (subject to exemptions); Article 136 CAO: more stringent limit of 15 per cent for systemically important banks.
  - Article 99 CAO allows temporary breaches under specific conditions (settlement of client payment transactions for up to five business days; affiliation-related breaches rectified within two years; other breaches require immediate notification and rectification within a period approved by FINMA).
- Basel RCAP (2023) assessment rated Swiss LEX implementation as largely compliant; two potentially material findings related to definition of exposure values remain:
  - exemption for exposures to collateral issuers in repos executed on specified platforms (Swiss-specific justification),
  - 10% weight applied to Swiss Pfandbriefe exposure value (below Basel 20% floor).
- Concessions for Category 4 and 5 banks:
  - 50% weight for short-term interbank exposures to well rated non-systemically important banks and certain non-systemically important cantonal banks (limited application),
  - hidden reserves (Swiss GAAP) may be included in eligible capital base for LEX calculation,
  - 0% weight applies to portion of mortgages up to 50% of value of Swiss residential real estate collateral.
- Related parties:
  - Article 4ter BA refers to loans to members of bank bodies and significant shareholders to be granted at arm’s length, but the legislative definition is narrower than international guidance and focuses on credit risk.
  - FINMA can restrict related-party lending case-by-case (Art. 112 para. 2 CAO).
  - No general reporting of aggregated exposures to related parties; Article 29 FINMASA allows FINMA to request information at any time.
- Assessment/Recommendation: FINMA should develop more detailed guidance and implement reporting requirements on related-party transactions; collect more granular data for benchmarking and outlier identification.

### Liquidity, LCR/NSFR, and SIB-specific measures
- All banks subject to Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) with proportionality; Category 4/5 small banks regime exempt from full NSFR if qualifying (Article 47 CAO).
- To qualify for small banks regime banks must maintain an average liquidity coverage ratio (LCR 12 months) of at least 110%.
- In response to the Credit Suisse crisis, additional quantitative liquidity requirements applied to SIBs since January 2024 (Chapter 4 LO): higher/lengthier outflows of deposits, address risks not sufficiently covered by LCR, institution-specific requirements determined by FINMA and reviewed periodically.
- RCAP assessments:
  - LCR implementation (October 2017): compliant.
  - NSFR implementation (December 2023): largely compliant.
- Intraday liquidity: intraday reporting required for all SIBs; intraday monitoring form submitted monthly (reference date: last calendar day of month; deadline: last calendar day of following month).
- Assessment/Recommendations:
  - FINMA should enhance liquidity diagnostic tools and data analysis capabilities.
  - Consider appropriateness of proportionality for liquidity requirements; exemptions for small banks from qualitative diversification requirements are not warranted.
  - Ensure incorporation of climate-related liquidity risks into liquidity adequacy and stress testing.

### Operational risk, resilience, outsourcing, ICT and cyber
- New FINMA Circular 2023/1 ‘Operational risks and resilience – banks’ (came into force January 2024 with phased implementation) sets operational resilience requirements, including identification of critical functions, tolerances for disruption, BCM/DRP testing, ICT and cyber risk obligations.
- Outsourcing: Circular 2018/3 addresses outsourcing (banks and insurers) — requires risk analysis, due diligence, contractual rights to inspect/audit service providers, inventory of outsourced functions, continuity assurances; financial groups/conglomerates fall outside scope due to FINMA legal limits.
- Findings:
  - Circular 2023/1 is in transition and banks find it challenging to meet requirements.
  - Outsourcing circular does not capture financial groups/conglomerates, leaving regulatory gaps.
  - FAT: cyber and outsourcing risks flagged as principal risks; FINMA risk monitor noted cyber incidents, with more than half affecting small institutions.
- Supervisory steps:
  - FINMA performs an annual outsourcing survey, maps dependencies, plans onsite visits to large providers, and coordinates with State Secretariat for International Finance (SIF).
- Assessment/Recommendations:
  - Address regulatory gaps for financial groups and strengthen FINMA’s ability to access and assess critical outsourcing providers.
  - Increase FINMA resources and specialized expertise in operational risk, BCM, and cyber; expand supervisory focus on Category 3–5 banks given cyber incidents prevalence.
  - Leverage data analytics to support supervision of operational risk and third-party concentration risks.

### Internal controls, audit, financial reporting and external audit
- Governance & internal control:
  - Article 12 BO requires effective internal control system and independent internal auditor; Circular 2017/1 details corporate governance, risk management and internal control expectations.
  - FINMA permits delegation of internal audit to a second audit firm, group company, or independent third party under conditions.
  - Regulatory audits perform prudential assessment; prescribed default audit standard is “critical assessment” (negative assurance) for many areas; assessors recommend higher audit standard (positive assurance) for critical areas of largest banks.
- Internal audit and compliance:
  - Internal audit must be independent, have unlimited access and right of inspection, and report to BoD/audit committee; annual comprehensive risk assessment required.
  - Head of Internal Audit is no longer subject to fit-and-proper check — assessors recommend reinstating fit-and-proper review by FINMA.
- External audit and supervisory oversight:
  - Financial audits must be carried out by audit firms approved by the Federal Audit Oversight Authority and in compliance with Swiss audit standards (local implementation of ISA).
  - Article 28a FINMASA allows FINMA in justified cases to require a bank to change auditor (must notify FAOA); bar for removing auditor is high.
- Accounting/valuation practices:
  - FINMA accounting rules apply at entity level; consolidated groups may use IFRS or US GAAP (six banks use IFRS; one uses US GAAP).
  - 2019 rules on valuation adjustments and provisioning resulted in earlier recognition of credit loss provisions per FINMA ex-post evaluation (2022).
- Assessment/Recommendations:
  - Require higher audit assurance for internal controls in critical areas of largest banks (positive assurance).
  - FINMA should take a more direct and systematic role in assessing the adequacy and effectiveness of internal audit functions and subject Head of Internal Audit to fit-and-proper checks.

### Cross-cutting supervisory data and capacity gaps
- Reliance on regulatory audit: FINMA relies extensively on regulatory audit firms to assess compliance with many CPs; assessors flag concerns about scope, depth and assurance level of regulatory audits in certain critical areas.
- Data and analytics enhancements planned or recommended:
  - Credit data repository expected in 2027 to capture all loans by counterparty.
  - FINMA intends to enhance liquidity diagnostics and supervisory rating integration.
  - FINMA to increase use of data analytics for mortgage, credit, operational, and concentration risk benchmarking and outlier detection.
- Overall supervisory capacity recommendation:
  - Increase FINMA resources across stress testing, liquidity analysis, operational resilience, ICT/cyber expertise, and direct oversight functions (e.g., internal audit and critical third-party providers).

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1cheea2025004-source-pdf.pdf*

### 44.1 also includes conditions that would be considered incompatible with providing audit

### 1cheea2025004-source-pdf - 44.1 also includes conditions that would be considered incompatible with providing audit 

### Independence of auditors and use of audit firms (EC6 / EC7)
- No requirement that the financial audit firm and the regulatory audit firm be different; practice among SIBs is that the same audit firm is used.
- The same lead audit partner and audit team may be used for both the regulatory and financial audit.
- FINMA may require the lead audit partner and/or the audit team is different for the regulatory and financial audit (Circular 2013/3 ‘Auditing’ Margin No.46).
- At least one of the systemically important banks has the same lead auditor for the regulatory and financial audit.
- All of the systemically important banks use, at least partially, the same audit teams.
- Under Article 730a of the Code of Obligations the lead auditor (person) of a bank may exercise their mandate for a maximum of seven years at a time. After a minimum period of three years, they may be reappointed.
- Rotation requirement applies only to the person named as the lead auditor; there is no requirement for audit firm rotation.
- In at least one case, the same audit firm has audited a systemically important bank for more than 20 years.
- At the time of the onsite visit the same audit firm is responsible for the financial and regulatory audit of all the systemically important (Category 1 and 2) banks in Switzerland.
- Margin No. 2.1 of Circular 2013/3 ‘Auditing’ only requires a bank to notify FINMA when it is changing auditor.
- The FAOA is responsible for the (general/prior) authorization of an audit firm, but not for approving the subsequent election of an approved audit firm by a bank.
- There is no requirement for FINMA to be consulted before the appointment of a regulatory or financial auditor.

### Supervisor–auditor interaction and reporting obligations (EC8 / EC9 / AC1)
- Under Article 29 of FINMASA supervised entities and their audit firms must provide FINMA with all information and documents that it requires to carry out its tasks; and must also immediately report to FINMA any incident that is of substantial importance to supervision.
- The bank’s auditor acts as FINMA’s ‘extended arm’ for the purposes of supervision by undertaking regulatory audit work (2013/3 Margin No. 1).
- Regular dialogue exists between FINMA and audit firms because the same audit firm is used for regulatory and financial audits.
- An annual high level meeting takes place between the supervisor and the auditors to communicate general feedback, findings and risk evaluation in financial markets per audit firm.
- As set out in FINMASA Article 27:
  - If the audit firm identifies violations of supervisory provisions or other irregularities, it shall give the audited supervised person or entity an appropriate period to restore compliance with the law.
  - If the period is not complied with, it informs FINMA.
  - In the case of a serious breach of supervisory rules and irregularities, the audit firm shall notify FINMA immediately (FINMASA Art.27(3)).
- Circular 2013/3 requires the auditor to report any criminal act to FINMA immediately (Margin No.78).
- Breaches or deficiencies must be identified and classified within the audit report with the audit firm’s recommendation for remediation.
- Additional Criterion AC1: FINMA has the power to access external auditors’ working papers where necessary under Article 29 of FINMASA.

### Assessment, concerns, and policy recommendations (Principle 27 assessment)
- Assessment of Principle 27: LC.
- Comments and recommendations in source:
  - Given the effective ‘dual mandate’ of audit firms (regulatory and financial audit), greater scrutiny is warranted on auditor independence.
  - There is currently no requirement for external audit firm rotation for the financial audit.
  - Recommendation: In line with international best practice, mandatory audit firm rotation should be introduced.
  - Implementation note: Given that the same external audit firm currently audits all Category 1 and 2 banks, the introduction of mandatory rotation may need to be phased in.
  - Concern: In an already concentrated audit market, the risks of reliance on one audit firm for all systemically important banks in Switzerland cannot and should not be ignored.
  - Minimum short-term measure: For Category 1-3 banks, there should be a requirement for a different lead audit partner to oversee the regulatory and financial audits.

### Disclosure and transparency (Principle 28; EC1 and EC2)
- Principle 28 summary: Supervisor determines that banks and banking groups regularly publish information on a consolidated and, where appropriate, solo basis that is easily accessible and fairly reflects their financial condition, performance, risk exposures, risk management strategies and corporate governance policies and processes; at least for internationally active banks, disclosure requirements are not less stringent than applicable Basel standards.
- EC1 findings:
  - Article 6 of the Banking Act: a bank must prepare an annual report for each financial year, consisting of annual accounts; a management report; and consolidated financial statements.
  - Under Article 32 of the BO, a bank must make its annual report available to the public within four months and the interim financial statements within two months of its business year-end.
  - Annual reports and interim financial statements must also be submitted to FINMA.
  - The structure of the annual report is set out in Appendix 1 of the BO and includes a balance sheet and quantitative and qualitative explanations about the bank’s risks and financial situation.
  - Private banks are exempt from the obligation to publish if their only activities are as asset managers or securities dealers and do not include deposit-taking.
  - There is no small banks exemption.
  - The largest banks also make quarterly disclosures on a voluntary basis.
  - Circular 2016/1 ‘Disclosure’ sets out the Pillar 3 disclosure requirements.
  - The final Basel III standard including the related Pillar 3 disclosures will come into force with effect from 1 January 2025.
  - Margin No. 9: Pillar 3 disclosure requirements are, in principle, to be satisfied on a consolidated basis.
  - Margin No.15: For banks in supervisory categories 4 and 5 an annual “partial disclosure” is sufficient, with the exception of those banks that apply model approaches to calculate the minimum required capital or engage in securitization transactions involving foreign assets.
- EC2 findings:
  - Article 961(c) of the Federal Act on the Amendment of the Swiss Civil Code sets out Management Report requirements to present business performance and economic position.
  - Appendix 1 of the BO includes quantitative and qualitative explanations about the bank’s risks and financial situation; disclosures to related parties; accounting and valuation principles.
  - Circular ‘2020/1 Accounting’ and Circular 2010/1 ‘Remuneration schemes’ set out further disclosure requirements.
  - Circular 2016/1 ‘Disclosure’ sets out the Pillar 3 requirements including the bank’s risk management approach; significant shareholders; composition, professional history and education of the individual members of the board of directors and executive board; the bank’s strategy and how the business model interacts with the overall risk profile.
  - Certain proportionality measures apply as described in EC1.

*Source: Excerpt from IMF assessment chapter on Switzerland (content unit: 1cheea2025004-source-pdf).*

### Annex 2, Table 1 of 2016/1 requires that banks disclose the following semi-annually:

### Annex 2, Table 1 of 2016/1 — Semi‑annual disclosure requirements and AML/CFT supervisory findings

### Required semi‑annual Pillar 3 disclosures (Annex 2, Table 1 of 2016/1)
- The description of the scope of consolidation relevant to the calculation of capital adequacy, specifying the material differences compared with the scope of consolidation for accounting purposes;
- The names of the significant group companies included in the scope of accounting consolidation but not in the scope of regulatory consolidation, and vice versa. The total assets and capital are also to be disclosed, and a description given of the main activities;
- The names of the significant group companies that are fully or proportionally consolidated. Any differences between the methods used for accounting consolidation and regulatory consolidation are to be disclosed and reasons given;
- The names of significant participations that are not fully or proportionally consolidated, specifying their treatment for capital adequacy purposes (deduction or weighting);
- Information on material changes in the scope of consolidation compared with the previous year;
- Information on any restrictions preventing the transfer of funds or capital within the group.

### Supervisor review and enforcement of disclosure standards (EC4)
- The supervisor or another authority effectively reviews and enforces compliance with disclosure standards.
- The annual report is audited as part of the financial audit.
- Per Margin No. 54 of FINMA circular 2016/1, the Pillar 3 disclosures are reviewed as part of the regulatory audit, although figures included in Pillar 3 that are also in the financial statements will be captured by the financial audit.
- FINMA may perform ad hoc checks if errors are identified in the electronic supervisory reporting.
- Currently the Pillar 3 disclosures are not loaded automatically on to the FINMA supervisory system; there is no automated checking that these disclosures align with supervisory data, although some supervisors do manual checks for consistency.
- Pillar 3 disclosures are reviewed as part of the regulatory audit.
- ‘SIX Exchange Regulation’ performs additional reviews of financial statements of listed companies which apply IFRS, US GAAP or Swiss GAAP for banks; FINMA has no visibility of this work but past agreement exists to exchange information on breaches of financial reporting rules.
- The FAOA also reviews the work of audit firms and is responsible for any enforcement actions.

### Aggregate banking system publications (EC5)
- The supervisor or other relevant authorities regularly publish information on the banking system in aggregate to facilitate public understanding and market discipline, including aggregate data on balance sheet indicators and statistical parameters.
- SNB publishes aggregated banking data including on balance sheet structure, capital ratios, income earning capacity. Different data sets are published annually, quarterly and monthly.
- Data on risk profiles is not published by SNB.
- Since 2016, FINMA also publishes key metrics for banks annually on its website using publicly available data.

### Assessment of Principle 28 (disclosure and transparency)
- Grade: C
- Comments:
  - Disclosure and transparency provisions are deemed compliant.
  - Recommendation: FINMA should follow up with ‘SIX Exchange Regulation’ regarding their reviews of financial statements of listed banks applying IFRS, US GAAP or Swiss GAAP to ensure awareness of any discrepancies found.
  - Recommendation: Inclusion of Pillar 3 disclosures in the FINMA supervision system would assist in identifying inconsistencies between regulatory data reported to FINMA and banks’ public disclosures.

### AML/CFT supervisory framework — Essential Criteria and findings (Principle 29 summary)
- Principle 29: Abuse of financial services — supervisor determines banks have adequate policies and processes, including robust and risk-based customer due diligence (CDD) rules and effective compliance functions.
- Legal and regulatory framework highlights:
  - FINMA’s mandate and powers set out in FINMASA (Article 24 ff.); FINMA can restore compliance and apply various measures (Art. 31–37 FINMASA), including: declaratory rulings (Art. 32), prohibitions from practicing (Art. 33 / 33a), publication of supervisory rulings (Art. 34), confiscation of profits (Art. 35), appointment of independent agents (Art. 36), revocation of licenses (Art. 37).
  - BA and BO supplement FINMASA (authorization, systemically important banks, supervision, duty to provide information).
  - FINMA empowered to supervise compliance with the Anti‑Money Laundering Act (AMLA) (Art. 1 para. 1 let. f FINMASA); AMLA Art. 16 requires FINMA to submit a report (SAR/STR) to MROS if certain suspicions exist and a report has not been filed by the intermediary.
  - AMLO‑FINMA implements detailed duties of due diligence and sets requirements (e.g., Art. 3, 9, 11, 13–21, 24–29).
  - FINMA issues circulars and guidance, including Guidance 05/2023 – Money laundering risk analysis pursuant to Article 25 para. 2 AMLO‑FINMA.
- Key operational and supervisory findings and requirements (selected ECs):
  - EC1: FINMA has review and enforcement powers; gap noted that FINMA cannot impose financial sanctions (per FATF Recommendation 27 expectation).
  - EC2: Banks required to be organized to identify, manage and monitor risks; AMLA/AMLO‑FINMA set general and enhanced due diligence duties; banks must set up AML specialist unit (Arts. 24–26 AMLO‑FINMA).
  - EC3: Duty to report material incidents to FINMA (FINMASA Art. 29 para. 2); banks must inform FINMA of certain MROS reports (Art. 22a AMLO‑FINMA).
  - EC4: FINMA obliged under AMLA Art. 16 to inform MROS of reasonable grounds to suspect specified criminal offences if bank has not reported; FINMA and MROS may provide each other any information or documents required for enforcement (Arts. 29, 29a AMLO‑FINMA).
  - EC5: Banks’ CDD framework requirements detailed (customer acceptance policy, ongoing CDD, transaction monitoring, enhanced due diligence for high‑risk accounts and PEPs, record retention of minimum ten years under Art. 7 para. 3 AMLA).
  - EC6: Correspondent banking relationships are classified as increased risk (Art. 13 para. 3 AMLO‑FINMA); enhanced due diligence and senior management approval required; banks may not enter into relationships with shell banks (Art. 8 let. b AMLO‑FINMA).
  - EC7: BA, BO and FINMA circular 2017/1 require adequate systems and controls; annual regulatory audit covers broad compliance issues.
  - EC8: FINMA can take administrative measures to restore compliance and open enforcement proceedings; FINMA cannot impose financial penalties for AML/CFT breaches.
  - EC9: Requirements for internal audit, AML/CFT specialist unit, compliance function and training are set out; two structural gaps identified:
    - No obligation for a member of Executive Management or Board to manage AML/CFT compliance individually.
    - No requirement to name a single dedicated officer within the bank to whom suspicious activity reports must be made.
  - EC10: MIS and reporting requirements specified in FINMA circular 2017/1; AMLO‑FINMA requires clear escalation rules to AML/CFT specialist unit and senior management.
  - EC11: Art. 11 AMLA provides protection from liability for persons who in good faith file reports under Art. 9 AMLA or 305ter para. 2 SCC.
  - EC12: Legal gateways for domestic and foreign information exchange exist (FINMASA Art. 42ff.; AMLA Arts. 30, 27, 29, 29a, 29b); MROS information exchange has increased (2023: 696 information requests from other Swiss authorities, up 4.3 percent from 2022; MROS provided information in 200 cases to Swiss supervisory authorities, up 13 percent from 2022).
  - EC13: FINMA maintains a money laundering and financial crime unit; unit currently consists of 11 full‑time equivalents; FINMA publishes guidance, Risk Monitor, annual report, AML/CFT conference and dossiers; AML/CFT unit works with enforcement and other experts as required.
  - EC14: Group‑wide AML/CFT program requirements set out in Art. 5 and Art. 6 AMLO‑FINMA (periodic consolidated risk analysis; annual reporting from foreign group entities; proactive reporting to head office of material changes; regular risk‑based on‑site inspections).

### Data and trends on suspicious transaction reporting (STR/MLRO data)
- Over the last ten years, the number of reports filed to MROS increased by approximately 20-30 percent per year, rising from 1,753 in 2014 to approximately 21,400 in 2023 (11,876 reports filed).
- Since 2020, the number of filed reports has more than doubled (total of 5,334 reports filed in 2020 vs. total of 11,876 reports filed in 2023).
- In 2023 the number of filed reports increased by 56 percent from total 7,639 reports filed in 2022 to total 11,876 reports filed in 2023 (of which 90.5 percent comes from the banking sector).

### Assessment of Principle 29 (AML/CFT supervision)
- Grade: LC
- Principal observations and comments:
  - FINMA has increased emphasis on AML/CFT conduct risks and supervisory awareness across units; no waivers for conduct risks across bank categories.
  - Key weaknesses affecting AML/CFT supervision:
    - Staff resources are too few to ensure adequate coverage and review; heavy reliance on regulatory audit firms.
    - Some regulatory provisions are expressed at a high level and lack specificity (for example, the treatment of correspondent banking prohibitions under Art. 37 AMLO‑FINMA vs. Art. 8).
    - Ancillary standards (e.g., Operational Risk Circular on Critical Data Management) are high level and not explicitly targeted at AML/CFT.
    - The absence of explicit individual responsibility at Executive Management level for AML/CFT compliance and the lack of a mandated single recipient for internal suspicious activity reports are notable gaps against BCP standards.
    - FINMA may not impose financial sanctions for AML/CFT deficiencies, limiting disciplinary tools.
  - Recommendations implied by comments:
    - Increase FINMA AML/CFT staff resources to improve direct supervisory coverage and reduce reliance on external regulatory audits.
    - Clarify regulatory requirements where ambiguity exists (e.g., explicit prohibition on correspondent relationships lacking adequate supervision).
    - Require explicit individual responsibility at Executive Management level for AML/CFT compliance and designate a required single officer to receive internal reports of suspicious activity.
    - Integrate Pillar 3 disclosures into FINMA supervisory systems to enable automated consistency checks between supervisory data and public disclosures.

*Source: 1cheea2025004-source-pdf - Annex 2, Table 1 of 2016/1 requires that banks disclose the following semi-annually*

### 1. Responsibilities, objectives and powers MNC FINMA’s lacks a broad range of legal powers,

### 1. Responsibilities, objectives and powers

### Key findings on mandate, powers, and legal constraints
- FINMA lacks a broad range of legal powers, including, but not limited to, effective early intervention.
- As the supervisory authority in an advanced systemically important jurisdiction, responsible for the oversight of one, recently two, G-SIBs, these limitations invite risks to financial stability and spillovers.
- FINMA’s power to carry out direct supervision, e.g., onsite inspection is technically constrained.
- FINMA’s ability to issue supervisory guidance or standards in risk areas has a very weak legal basis and has led to deficiencies noted throughout the assessment.
- FINMA’s mandate includes a competitive objective which is not suitable for a prudential authority; this objective ought to be clearly subordinated to prudential concerns and unmistakably and directly clear from the legal text.

### Recommendations and implications
- Amend FINMA's legal mandate so that prudential objectives are unmistakably and directly clear from the legal text.
- Strengthen legal basis for issuing supervisory guidance and standards to remedy deficiencies across assessments.
- Expand effective early intervention powers and direct supervision authorities (including onsite inspection powers).

---

### 2. Independence, accountability, resourcing and legal protection for supervisors

### Key findings
- FINMA is formally independent, and its supervisory staff enjoy legal protection.
- Despite budget autonomy, and notwithstanding ten percent annual growth in its total staffing since 2022, FINMA remains significantly under resourced for its supervisory tasks.
- Supervisory oversight of non-SIBs is low despite efforts to increase in recent years through off-site and onsite techniques.
- Cybersecurity oversight is a particular weakness: focusing mostly on more significant institutions may not serve the cause of securing the financial sector fully.
- FINMA is required to submit its strategic objectives to the Federal Council for approval every four years, which represents an imposition on FINMA’s autonomy rather than an act of accountability.
- The Small Bank Regime is broadly successful as an application of proportionality, but its entry criteria need to be strengthened to include a positive assessment of quality of governance and risk management.

### Recommendations
- Provide additional resources to FINMA to meet supervisory demands, especially for non-SIBs and cyber resilience oversight.
- Remove or reform the requirement that FINMA’s strategic objectives must be submitted to the Federal Council for approval every four years to preserve autonomy.
- Strengthen Small Bank Regime entry criteria to include governance and risk management quality assessments.

---

### 3. Cooperation and collaboration

### Key findings
- Frameworks for cooperation and coordination are in place.
- FINMA has actively participated in both multilateral and bilateral configurations.
- The effectiveness of the arrangements was clearly proven in the March turmoil of 2023.

---

### 4. Permissible activities

### Key findings
- The Fintech license opens deposit taking to non-banks and these deposits are neither covered by deposit protection nor segregated in case of bankruptcy.
- FINMA has stressed these issues to the legislative authorities.
- Client asset protection will be remedied but this is not expected for several years.

---

### 5. Licensing criteria

### Key findings and recommendation
- FINMA has maintained a strong gatekeeping role on the banking sector.
- FINMA is encouraged to move forward with instituting a requirement that a wind-down plan should be in place in the event that milestones cannot be met.

---

### 6. Transfer of significant ownership

### Key findings
- The high-level principle means there is no clear distinction between a significant interest and a controlling interest.
- There is a clear threshold for a “qualified” holding, where approval standards apply.
- There is a consistent requirement for UBOs to be identified.

---

### 7. Major acquisitions

### Key finding
- FINMA’s powers allow scrutiny of the suitability of major acquisitions and the ability of a bank to manage and absorb a significant change.

---

### 8. Supervisory approach

### Key findings
- FINMA’s analytical approach has strengthened and deepened since 2019.
- At risk of inconsistent policy and analytical approaches; needs to harness best practices across the organization.
- Work quality is uneven and, even before implementation of new supervisory systems planned for 2025, work of uneven quality and on occasion poorly prioritized was in evidence.

---

### 9. Supervisory techniques and tools

### Key findings
- FINMA is currently unable to deliver sufficient direct engagement with sufficient firms across all categories due to the current arrangements of use of regulatory auditors (dual system) and conditions present in Art 23 FINMASA.
- Contact with non-systemic banks is too low, even allowing for safety margins for institutions in the Small Banks Regime.
- The regulatory audit function is not a suitable substitute for supervisory contact; it is not a supervisory process and cannot be used as such.
- FINMA should be granted the power to mandate directly the work of the regulatory “audit” so it can be directed to yield the greatest utility and value to all engaged in the tripartite arrangement.

### Recommendation
- Grant FINMA power to mandate and direct regulatory audit work.

---

### 10. Supervisory reporting

### Key findings
- There is a discernible shift into stronger data approaches to support more granular analysis.
- FINMA is paying particular attention to the data needs surrounding the G-SIB.
- Enhanced data collection is one way to strengthen supervisory reach without going onsite.
- Supervision of smaller category 4 and 5 banks is planned to be more data driven, but data obligations for these banks are starting from a low level.

---

### 11. Corrective and sanctioning powers of supervisors

### Key findings
- FINMA has not demonstrated an effective track record of using its currently limited corrective powers; lack of effective and complete early intervention powers is the key driver.
- FINMA does not have powers to impose fines.
- FINMA’s formal powers are triggered due to breach of law or regulation or “other irregularities” (Art 31 FINMASA) or at points of non-viability (Art 26 Banking Act).
- The “other irregularities” provision is articulated at a high level, making it unclear as a solid basis for enforcement; there is no track record of use against banks.
- In practice, FINMA’s ability to act is pushed to a late stage when effective solutions may no longer be achievable.
- The bank’s appeal of FINMA’s actions has a suspensive effect; while FINMA can revoke the suspensive effect, the court may reinstate it based on the bank's application, making immediate early intervention measures difficult to effect.

### Recommendations
- Strengthen early intervention powers and sanctioning toolkit, including consideration of fining powers.
- Clarify and lower legal thresholds for triggering supervisory actions to avoid late-stage interventions.

---

### 12. Consolidated supervision

### Key findings
- Weaknesses in consolidated supervision include insufficient onsite activity, limited effective coverage beyond systemic banks, and lack of guidance on supervisory expectations on consolidated supervision (albeit soon to be remedied).
- FINMA’s powers to intervene at group or individual entity level suffer from the weaknesses discussed in CP1 and CP11.
- Very limited powers with respect to the holding company of a consolidated group, though augmented compared with the 2014 FSAP.

---

### 13. Home-host relationships

### Key findings
- Core college relationships for the G-SIBs served FINMA well in the March turmoil of 2023 and subsequent restructuring of major banks.
- Other colleges are less developed; FINMA has been responsive in building bilateral relationships relevant to certain group structures.

---

### 14. Corporate governance

### Key findings
- Limitations on FINMA’s resources mean CP14 is not met with consistency beyond systemic banks.
- FINMA has powers under the Banking Act to take actions against an individual, but the threshold for successful enforcement is very high.
- FINMA’s powers to change Board composition are likely weak or missing except in the most clear-cut cases.
- Introduction of a Senior Managers Regime concept is an important reform.

---

### 15. Risk management process

### Key findings
- Due to weak legislative underpinning, FINMA has no explicit legal basis to set binding standards for risk management, set general requirements for banks to undertake stress tests, require banks to prepare ICAAPs, or require banks to ensure the CRO is a standalone position elevated to executive board level.
- Guidance is therefore very high level.
- No comprehensive supervisory manual covering all risks is in place.
- Work to embed climate-related financial risks into supervision is at an early stage.

### Recommendation
- Establish explicit legal basis for binding risk management standards and supervisory requirements such as stress testing and ICAAPs.

---

### 16. Capital adequacy

### Key findings
- The current capital framework has serious weaknesses and deficiencies; prudent and appropriate capital adequacy requirements for all banks that reflect risks undertaken have not been in place.
- Risk weighting of participations rather than a prudent deduction permits a parent bank’s participations in its subsidiaries to be only partially backed by capital.
- Pillar 2 powers are not articulated clearly enough, making them weak and open to legal challenge.
- No explicit legal basis to set general requirements for stress testing or ICAAP.
- There may be inconsistent treatments in prudential calculations when different accounting frameworks are used.

---

### 17. Credit risk

### Key findings
- Credit risk, particularly for mortgages, is a key focus for FINMA.
- No clear legislative requirement allows FINMA to require detailed and sound credit risk management practices; guidance remains high level.
- Consideration of climate-related financial risks into credit risk management is not yet embedded into supervisory processes.
- Scope exists to enhance data collection and analysis in this area.

---

### 18. Problem assets, provisions, and reserves

### Key findings
- FINMA regularly analyzes data on impaired loans, non-performing loans, and provisions.
- FINMA does not have the specific power to require a bank to increase its level of provisioning.
- Because FINMA’s powers are not clearly set out in legislation, there is a lack of detail in FINMA’s circulars on sound credit practices.

---

### 19. Concentration risk and large exposure limits

### Key findings
- Supervisory gaps exist regarding concentration risks and large exposures.
- The Basel RCAP assessment in 2023 rated LEX regulations in Switzerland as largely compliant.
- Matters giving rise to that assessment have not yet been addressed.
- Concessions applied to Category 4 and 5 banks may give rise to additional risk.
- Guidance for banks and regulatory auditors is high level.
- Integration of climate-related financial risks into concentration risk assessments is at a very early stage.

---

### 20. Transactions with related parties

### Key findings
- The definition of related parties and transactions to be monitored is not comprehensively defined in legislation and regulation.
- Guidance for banks and regulatory auditors in this area, except some intra-group exposures, is high level.
- There is no dedicated reporting of related party transactions to the supervisor.

---

### 21. Country and transfer risks

### Key findings
- FINMA can and does send out ad hoc surveys to banks to gather information on potential risks in response to specific global developments.
- FINMA does not capture country and transfer risk data from banks in any systematic way.
- The SBA Guidelines do not include a requirement for a bank to define a country risk appetite and have not been updated since 1997.
- Country and transfer risk is not the subject of supervisory focus beyond the Category 1 bank.

---

### 22. Market risk

### Key finding
- Market risk is not a material risk for Category 2-5 banks; FINMA’s main focus is on the Category 1 bank.
- The assessors view the current framework as compliant with this principle.

---

### 23. Interest rate risk in the banking book

### Key finding
- IRRBB is an area of focus across all bank categories; assessors consider the current framework compliant with this principle.

---

### 24. Liquidity risk

### Key findings
- FINMA considers liquidity to be one of the most important risks facing banks.
- RCAP NSFR implementation in 2023 was rated ‘largely compliant.’
- Proportionality provisions may not all be appropriate.
- Data analysis capabilities would enhance supervision.
- FINMA should ensure banks identify and quantify climate-related financial risks and incorporate them into internal liquidity adequacy assessment processes, including stress testing where appropriate.

---

### 25. Operational risk and operational resilience

### Key findings
- New Circular on operational risks and resilience is still in transitional phase.
- There is a pressing need for additional resources.
- Category 3-5 banks are not getting sufficient supervisory attention.
- Data analysis should be enhanced.

---

### 26. Internal control and audit

### Key findings and recommendations
- FINMA should take a more direct role in assessing adequacy of internal audit.
- Current audit standard of negative assurance should be raised to positive assurance for internal control and audit.
- The Head of Internal audit should be subject to a fit and proper review.

---

### 27. Financial reporting and external audit

### Key findings
- Audit firms provide both regulatory and financial audit services to banks; greater scrutiny on their independence is warranted.
- There is currently no requirement for external audit firm rotation for financial audits.
- The same external audit firm currently audits all Category 1 and 2 banks.
- In a concentrated audit market, reliance on one audit firm for all systemically important banks poses risks.
- No requirement exists for a different lead audit partner for the financial and regulatory audit.

---

### 28. Disclosure and transparency

### Key findings and recommendation
- Disclosure and transparency provisions are deemed compliant.
- FINMA should follow up with ‘SIX Exchange Regulation’ regarding their reviews of financial statements of listed banks to ensure awareness of any discrepancies found.
- Inclusion of Pillar 3 disclosures in the FINMA supervision system would assist in identifying inconsistencies between regulatory data reported to FINMA and banks’ public disclosures.

*SWITZERLAND — INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND*

### 29. Abuse of financial services LC FINMA has put increasing emphasis on the

### 29. Abuse of financial services

### Supervision of AML/CFT and conduct risk — key findings
- FINMA has put increasing emphasis on the supervision of AML/CFT conduct risks and there was a strong awareness of the relevance of conduct risk across the supervisory units.
- There are no waivers for conduct risks in the Small Banks Regime.
- General weaknesses affecting AML/CFT supervision identified in the assessment:
  - Resource limitations affecting frequency, depth and range of inspections.
  - Ancillary guidelines (e.g., Operational Risk Circular) are articulated at a very high level.
  - Regulatory gaps: missing requirement for individual responsibility to oversee AML/CFT compliance at Executive Management.
  - FINMA lacks the power to impose financial sanctions for AML/CFT breaches, unlike the majority of its peer supervisory authorities.

### Recommended Actions (A) — to improve compliance with the Basel Core Principles and supervisory effectiveness
- Principle 1
  - Ensure FINMA has the full suite of supervisory powers including:
    - Early intervention powers, without suspensive effect unless a defined, high threshold such as clear illegality is met.
    - Removal of any and all restriction to direct supervision/on-site examination (Article 23 Banking Act).
    - Establish clear legal basis for FINMA to issue supervisory standards, guidance and expectations on risk areas; power should be comprehensive and forward looking.
- Principle 2
  - Increase FINMA’s staffing and resources commensurate with systemic-jurisdiction supervisory responsibilities.
  - Remove requirement for FINMA’s strategic objectives, FINMA's Personnel Ordinance and FINMA's annual report to be approved by the Federal Council.
  - Allow FINMA to issue its Fees and Levies Ordinance.
  - Amend legislation to require public reasons for dismissal of any member of the Board of Directors and Executive Board; review FINMASA and other regulations to improve codification around governance and conflict of interest.
  - Ensure better specification and transparency of qualifications to be a member of the Board of Directors.
  - Review Chair of the Board’s emergency power in light of advances in communications technology.
  - Amend FINMASA (Article 9) condition preventing the Chair from holding federal or cantonal office to apply to all FINMA Board members.
  - Augment conditions for entry to the FINMA Small Bank Regime to include a qualitative standard for governance and risk management.
- Principle 4
  - Accelerate legal ability to segregate fiat deposits in the event of bankruptcy of a fintech license holder.
- Principle 5
  - Require a wind-down plan for newly authorized institutions if milestones cannot be met.
- Principle 8
  - Create a comprehensive internal policy handbook for supervisory staff.
  - Develop additional tools and techniques to foster internal knowledge transfer and innovation.
- Principle 9
  - Grant FINMA the ability to directly mandate the regulatory audit and specify auditors’ work according to clear FINMA standards.
  - Over time, bring all onsite supervisory activity in-house.
- Principle 10
  - Consider an explicit requirement for banks’ Executive level committee to certify accuracy of supervisory returns; with a senior managers regime, one senior manager should do this.
- Principle 11
  - Provide FINMA with actionable corrective and intervention powers which are not suspensive and apply to all banks, allowing early action before breach, including at a minimum the ability to:
    - restrict the current activities of the bank,
    - impose more stringent prudential limits and requirements, withholding approval of new activities or acquisitions,
    - restrict or suspend payments to shareholders or share repurchases,
    - restrict asset transfers,
    - bar individuals from the banking sector,
    - replace or restrict the powers of managers, board members or controlling owners,
    - impose fines/sanctions.
  - Ensure the ability to impose fines at the same time as other corrective measures.
- Principle 12
  - Issue FINMA Circular on Consolidated Supervision in final form.
  - Extend enforcement powers for ongoing activities to group holding companies and group companies performing significant functions for authorized activities.
- Principle 14
  - Introduce a senior manager’s regime for all banks.
- Principle 15
  - Raise supervisory standards for risk management to international level; expand supervisory manual and more detailed risk requirements including for regulatory auditors.
  - Integrate consideration of climate-related financial risks into supervisory processes.
  - Ensure banks have new product approval process, appropriate transfer pricing, and regular assessment of internal pricing, performance measurement and new product approval for significant activities.
- Principle 16
  - At the parent level, participations should be deducted rather than risk weighted.
  - Strengthen FINMA’s Pillar 2 powers; powers to set general requirements for banks to perform stress tests; and powers to require banks to prepare an ICAAP; put these on a solid legal footing.
  - Ensure consistency in prudential calculations irrespective of accounting framework (e.g., treatment of software costs).
  - Enhance resources and capacity to run supervisory stress tests.
  - Ensure D‑SIBs do not automatically have a gone concern capital requirement much lower than a G‑SIB and lower than EU peers.
- Principle 17
  - Develop more detailed guidance for banks, supervisors and auditors; integrate climate-related financial risk considerations and enhance data collection and analysis.
- Principle 18
  - Develop more detailed guidance; give FINMA power to require a bank to increase provisioning via changes in provisioning policy.
  - Enhance data collection and ensure banks manage concentrations related to climate‑related financial risks.
- Principle 19
  - Address points raised in the Basel RCAP assessment in 2023 that gave rise to the largely compliant grade.
  - Consider appropriateness of concessions applied to Category 4 and 5 banks; develop more detailed guidance; ensure management of concentrations tied to climate risks.
- Principle 20
  - Explicitly define related parties to include all parties in scope.
  - Do not limit monitored transactions to those involving credit risk.
  - Develop more detailed guidance; implement dedicated reporting of related party transactions to the supervisor; consider a thematic review.
- Principle 21
  - Enhance supervisory focus and develop regular reporting.
  - Update guidance on country and transfer risk; consider a thematic review of exposures and practices across the banking sector.
- Principle 24
  - Address RCAP NSFR findings from 2023; assess proportionality provisions; enhance data analysis.
  - Ensure banks identify and quantify climate-related financial risks and incorporate them into internal liquidity adequacy assessment processes, including stress testing where appropriate.
- Principle 25
  - Allocate more supervisory resources; enhance data analysis.
  - Address regulatory gaps and increase supervisory focus on Category 3-5 banks.
- Principle 26
  - Take a more direct role in assessing adequacy of internal audit function.
  - Audit internal controls and internal audit to the standard of positive assurance rather than negative assurance.
  - Subject the Head of Internal Audit to a fit and proper assessment.
- Principle 27
  - Implement mandatory audit firm rotation for the financial auditor.
  - Require a different lead auditor for the financial and regulatory audit, at least for Category 1-3 banks.
- Principle 28
  - FINMA should follow up with ‘SIX Exchange Regulation’ on reviews of financial statements of listed banks to identify discrepancies.
  - Include Pillar 3 disclosures in the FINMA supervision system to identify inconsistencies between regulatory data and banks’ public disclosures.
- Principle 29
  - Ensure a requirement for a dedicated officer to whom potential abuses of the bank's financial services (including suspicious transactions) are reported.
  - Ensure prohibition on relationships with correspondent banks for whom adequate supervision does not exist.

### Authorities’ response (B) — summary of key positions and observations
- The authorities acknowledge the Detailed Assessment effort but disagree with key results and gradings, noting lack of demonstration how revisions to standards or methodology explain substantial differences compared to previous exercises.
- They recall that the 2014 assessment against the BCP found a high level of compliance and the 2019 FSAP noted commitment to high standards; since then amendments have strengthened the Swiss framework.
- Authorities agree FINMA’s powers need strengthening and will submit a proposal to Parliament shortly, but contend the grading does not reflect the substantial set of powers currently available; FINMA has specific means for early intervention, acts upon them and can revoke the suspensive effect of any appeal against corrective action.
- Under proposed legislation, the suspensive effect of appeals is abolished for certain decisions while retaining the right to legal recourse; courts rely heavily on FINMA’s technical expertise and have ruled in FINMA’s favor in precedents referenced to staff.
- On capital: authorities acknowledge need to strengthen capital requirements for participation in foreign subsidiaries and will submit a proposal to Parliament, but argue the weak grading of the current capital framework is not appropriate and not evenhanded compared to international practice; note Switzerland implemented Basel III and the capital framework for systemically important banks was strengthened since the 2014 BCP assessment, with changes in 2019 leading to higher requirements.
- Authorities state some significant errors by assessors were addressed but corrections did not change overall original grading, impairing coherence and consistency with previous assessments.
- Authorities assert the assessment would have benefitted from faithful reflection of their comments and factual corrections as required under the BCP Assessment Framework; they describe Switzerland’s legal and institutional framework as reflecting federal structure, legal certainty and separation of powers, with detailed implementing ordinances at the federal level.
- FINMA’s regulatory instruments noted:
  - FINMA may enact FINMA‑ordinances where enabled by superordinate law; these contain provisions of supervisory law and are binding.
  - FINMA issues circulars describing its interpretation of financial market law; circulars are binding insofar as based on overarching legislation.
  - FINMA communicates guidance to supervised institutions, interprets and applies financial market law subject to judicial review, and has obligation to clarify statutory ambiguities.
- On standalone capital requirements, authorities note no international standard exists; they agree participations capital treatment should be strengthened and will submit a proposal, but maintain Switzerland is relatively advanced by setting standalone capital requirements, and few jurisdictions have transparency requirements on standalone treatment of participations.
- On abuse of financial services, authorities emphasize significant progress: Switzerland’s efforts were recognized by the FATF in follow-up reports in 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2023; Switzerland’s ratings on 6 recommendations were upgraded and Switzerland exited the FATF enhanced follow-up process.

*SWITZERLAND — INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1cheea2025004-source-pdf.pdf_
