## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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### Context and key messages
- Cameroon is described as a fragile and conflict-affected state with significant vulnerability to climate change.
- Growth remained modest amid a challenging external environment, a slow pace of reforms, and the composition of fiscal adjustment, while macroeconomic stability was maintained.
- The reduction in foreign development assistance threatens to further weaken the social safety net.
- The Presidential election in October 2025 introduces political and economic uncertainty.

### Major macroeconomic developments and figures
- Real GDP growth: 3.5 percent in 2024 (up from 3.2 percent in 2023).
- Inflation: 4.5 percent in 2024 (7.4 percent in 2023); eased further to 4.2 percent in May 2025.
- BEAC policy rate: lowered from 5 percent to 4.5 percent in March 2025.
- Sectoral: tertiary sector (financial services) drove growth; extractive industries contracted by 9.2 percent in 2024; manufacturing hindered by electricity supply challenges.
- Fiscal: non-oil primary fiscal deficit 2.4 percent of GDP in 2024 (program target: 2 percent).
- Non-oil revenue: increased by about 10 percent year-on-year in 2024 but short by 0.3 percent of GDP relative to program projection.
- Public debt-to-GDP: 42.8 percent in 2024 (43.2 percent in 2023).
- Current account deficit: improved from 4.1 percent of GDP in 2023 to about 3.1 percent in 2024; cocoa prices more than doubled in 2024.
- Market spreads on external loans: widened by 400 bps to almost 1,200 bps in April 2025, moderated thereafter.
- Banking sector: shareholders’ equity up 23 percent y-o-y at end-March 2025; NPL ratio 15.2 percent at end-March 2025; banks’ exposure to the sovereign 28 percent of assets at end-March 2025.
- Private sector credit: annual real credit growth 8 percent in March 2025; credit stock 15.6 percent of GDP in 2024 (SSA average 28 percent of GDP).

*Source: Executive Summary, 1cmrea2025002-source-pdf*

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### Program performance, reviews, and financing
- End-December 2024 performance:
  - QPCs: 2 out of 4 met.
  - ITs: 3 out of 5 met.
  - Continuous QPCs: 2 out of 3 met.
  - Missed QPCs: floor on the non-oil primary fiscal balance; ceiling on net domestic financing of the central government; continuous criterion on ceiling on Treasury advances without a budget allocation (missed by a small margin).
  - Missed ITs: ceilings on net accumulation of domestic payment arrears and on direct SNH interventions.
- Structural benchmarks and RSF reform measures (final review):
  - SBs: 2 out of 4 implemented (SB2 and SB4 implemented with delay); SB1 (revised law on investment incentives) to be published in July 2025; SB3 (SONARA restructuring interim report) lacking expected elements.
  - RSF RMs: 3 out of 4 implemented: RM2 NCP adopted and published in June 2025; RM5 decrees revised (April 2025); RM7 DRFS published in June (April 2025). RM8 (forestry sector) delayed.
- Disbursements tied to reviews:
  - Eighth ECF-EFF review completion would allow disbursement of SDR 55.2 million (about US$75.9 million).
  - Third RSF review completion would allow disbursement of SDR 51.75 million (about US$71.1 million).
  - Financing for the uncompleted RSF reform will not become available upon program expiration.
- End-March 2025 progress:
  - Eleven out of twelve ITs met; IT on the floor on non-oil revenue missed.
- Authorities requested waivers for non-observance of two QPCs and one continuous QPC; staff supports waivers conditioned on corrective actions (see below).

---

### FISCAL SLIPPAGE, DRIVERS, AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

### Slippage quantification (end-2024)
- Non-oil primary fiscal balance shortfall: missed by CFAF 146 billion.
- Net domestic financing ceiling miss: exceeded due to spending overruns by CFAF 127 billion and grant shortfall by CFAF 20 billion.
- Composition of deviations:
  - Increase in current primary spending relative to the budget: CFAF 427 billion (primarily goods and services).
  - Reduction in capital spending: CFAF 277 billion.
  - Reduction in other expenditures: CFAF 23 billion.
  - Main source of slippage: unplanned direct interventions through SNH.

### Corrective measures and prior actions
- Presidential circular (prior action) specifying:
  - (i) 2026 Budget Law include a multiyear projection of all strategic and other expenditures previously financed by direct SNH interventions; and
  - (ii) SNH transfer to the public treasury all revenue derived from the sale of hydrocarbons, after deducting production costs, but without deducting transfers and payments owed by the government to SNH.
- Government issued revised 2025 Finance Law in July 2025 in line with program (prior action).
- Arrears clearance:
  - Planned CFAF 537 billion reduction not achieved at end-2024 despite external loans drawn: Afrexim Bank CFAF 131 billion and Eurobond CFAF 332 billion.
  - New obligations accumulated: CFAF 96 billion.
  - Authorities plan to clear CFAF 233 billion arrears in 2025 (about one third of the stock) and to repay remaining arrears over following two years.
  - As of end-March 2025 most of the scheduled domestic arrears clearance for the year completed (CFAF 233 billion) via domestic bond issuances.

### Medium-term fiscal stance and targets
- 2025 revised Finance Law projection: non-oil primary balance of -1.4 percent of GDP (improvement from -2.4 percent in 2024).
- From 2026, fiscal trajectory expected to align broadly with CEMAC reference budget balance and debt sustainability goals.
- Policy priorities: enhance non-oil revenues, public investment management, and introduce an automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism.

### Revenue mobilization measures (selected)
- Tax policy:
  - Broaden base by eliminating incentives for some agricultural products and beverages.
  - Plan to eliminate tax expenditures on imported fuels (tax expenditure on imported fuels assessed at CFAF 186.5 billion, or 0.5 percent of GDP).
  - New levy on money transfers.
  - Strengthen environmental taxation in mining (excise duties on harmful products) and rebates for electric vehicles.
  - Revised Law No. 2013/004 to feature tax credits and accelerated depreciation (SB1, prior action).
- Revenue administration:
  - Electronic invoicing; enhanced customs fraud controls; automation of withholding tax certificate issuance; VAT security measures (electronic invoicing, extension of VAT within customs boundaries).
  - Customs modernization: CAMCIS expansion, 100 percent scanning procedure, Authorized Economic Operator status rollout.

---

### DEBT, FINANCING RISKS, AND IMF REPAYMENT CAPACITY

### Debt outlook and financing risks
- Cameroon at high risk of debt distress though debt considered sustainable.
- Debt indicators:
  - Undisbursed committed balances increased to CFAF 4,415 billion in March 2025.
  - Two out of four external debt indicators breach thresholds under the baseline.
  - Debt service-to-revenue ratio expected to fall below threshold in medium term; present value of public debt-to-GDP ratio recently fell below threshold.
- Financing risks from declines in ODA:
  - Decline in current account balance of 0.4 percent of GDP and decline in growth of 0.3 percent over next three years envisaged from lower ODA.

### Capacity to repay the IMF
- Total outstanding credit from the IMF: 437 percent of quota as of end-December 2024.
- Total IMF credit outstanding (existing and prospective drawings): peaked at 2.9 percent of GDP in 2024.
- Annual IMF obligations peak at about 2.8 percent of revenues in 2026-27.
- Assessment: capacity to repay adequate but subject to significant risks; mitigants include past repayment record, corrective measures, donor engagement, and a comprehensive CD program.
- Outstanding IMF credit (SDR millions, selected): 1,206.1 (2024); projected decline to 6.9 (2044).
- Principal repayments (CFAF billions, selected): 63.5 (2024), 96.6 (2025), 159.2 (2026), 184.0 (2027).

---

### OUTLOOK, PROJECTIONS, AND RISKS

### Key medium-term projections (selected)
- GDP growth (percent): 2024: 3.5; 2025: 3.8; 2026: 4.1; 2027: 4.3; 2028: 4.5; 2029: 4.5; 2030: 4.6.
- Consumer Price Inflation, average (percent): 2024: 4.5; 2025: 4.5; 2026: 3.5; 2027: 4.3; 2028: 3.6; 2029: 3.3; 2030: 3.0.
- Overall balance including grants (percent of GDP): 2024: -0.6; 2025: -1.5; 2026: -0.3; 2027: -0.8; 2028: -1.1; 2029: -1.2; 2030: -1.1.
- Non-Oil Primary Balance (percent of GDP): 2024: -2.0; 2025: -2.4; 2026: -1.3; 2027: -1.4; 2028: -1.6; 2029: -1.6; 2030: -1.5.
- Current Account (percent of GDP, including grants): 2024: -3.4; 2025: -3.1; 2026: -2.8; 2027: -2.7; 2028: -3.5; 2029: -3.3; 2030: -3.3.
- Public Debt (percent of GDP): 2024: 42.0; 2025: 42.8; 2026: 39.4; 2027: 39.4; 2028: 37.8; 2029: 36.1; 2030: 34.6.

### Outlook narrative
- Real GDP growth expected to reach 3.8 percent in 2025.
- External position expected to improve in 2025 with higher cocoa prices compensating for lower oil prices; current account expected to deteriorate thereafter due to projected deterioration in terms of trade.
- Inflation expected to decelerate toward the regional target if appropriate monetary policy and tight fiscal stance are maintained.
- Public debt-to-GDP expected to continue to decline gradually.

### Risks (Annex I summary)
- External: trade policy shocks (likelihood High), regional conflicts (Medium), geoeconomic fragmentation (High), tighter financial conditions (Medium).
- Financing: reductions in foreign aid announced by key partners for 2025-27.
- Domestic: security challenges intensified by climate change; political risks related to October 2025 Presidential election; social tensions (Medium to High).
- Upside: higher cocoa prices (already strengthened external position in 2024).

---

### FINANCIAL SECTOR RESILIENCE AND INCLUSION

### Current vulnerabilities and indicators
- NPLs: NPL ratio rose to 15.2 percent at end-March 2025; banking system NPL stock increased by 22 percent y-o-y at end‑March 2025.
- Capital and liquidity: most banks exceed regulatory minimums for Capital Adequacy Ratio and liquidity ratio; shareholders’ equity up 23 percent y-o-y at end-March 2025.
- Banks’ sovereign exposure: 28 percent of total banking sector assets at end‑March 2025 (down from 29 percent a year earlier).
- Banking sector concentration and state ownership:
  - State holds significant stakes in eight banks, majority ownership in four—representing 11 percent of total banking sector assets.
  - Plan to acquire additional shares in Société Générale Cameroun (will raise state ownership to majority control if implemented).

### Policy responses and reform priorities
- Establish first credit reference bureau in CEMAC in collaboration with BEAC.
- Digitize cadaster to enable land title registry.
- Train commercial judges in bank dispute resolution.
- Intensify oversight and targeted regulatory interventions by regional banking supervisor (COBAC).
- Develop credible strategies to address build-up of bad assets in state-owned banks.
- Strengthen secondary market for government securities; develop strategy to broaden investor base.
- Establish guarantee fund to support SMEs; restructure Crédit Foncier du Cameroun; transform Cameroon Bank of SMEs into a development bank.
- Resolve Deposit and Consignment Fund (CDEC) deadlock with regional authorities to unfreeze dormant assets transfers.

---

### GOVERNANCE, AML/CFT, AND EXTRACTIVES TRANSPARENCY

### Governance and anti‑corruption priorities
- Accelerate implementation of 2023 Governance Diagnostic Report recommendations.
- Satisfy EITI re-entry requirements: publish oil industry contracts; systematic publication of production-sharing agreements to follow conversion and simplification of old contracts.
- Beneficial ownership: mechanism established to maintain adequate, accurate, and up-to-date beneficial ownership information accessible by competent authorities.
- AML/CFT: improved alignment of strategy with national risk assessment; new CEMAC AML/CFT regulation issued in December 2024; progress on DNFBP regulatory framework pending adoption.
- Remaining needs: strengthen implementation and supervision, increase use of financial intelligence, improve training, improve interagency cooperation, and improve identification and management of seized criminal assets.

---

### CLIMATE, FORESTRY, AND COCOA SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS

### RSF-supported climate measures and outcomes
- RSF reforms advanced climate governance and mainstreaming into PFM:
  - RM1: decree defining MINEPDED’s coordinating role — Met.
  - RM2: National Climate Plan adopted and published (June 2025) — Met.
  - RM3–RM5: climate criteria for project prioritization, project maturation guide, and decree revisions — Met.
  - RM6: revised Civil Protection Law and ONR operationalization — Met.
  - RM7: Disaster Risk Financing Strategy developed and adopted — Met.
  - RM8 (forestry/SIGIF2): Not met by review due to administrative constraints; SIGIF2 modules active and SIGIF2 platform connected with tax and customs systems in June 2025; procedures for annual evaluation to be validated by August 2025; first annual evaluation expected by August 2026.
- Expected benefits: improved preparedness, reduced fiscal and external financing needs from climate shocks, and potential to catalyze concessional green financing.

### Forestry and deforestation issues
- Drivers of forest loss: illegal logging (>50 percent estimated), expansion of commercial and small-scale agriculture, extractive activities, infrastructure, and climate-driven events.
- RSF objective RM8: SIGIF 2 to digitalize forest management, enhance traceability and legality, and integrate with tax and customs systems—implementation delayed by administrative constraints.
- Legal reform: Law No. 2004/008 of 24 July 2024 on forestry and wildlife regulations includes export control and taxation of unprocessed non-timber forest products.
- Fiscal opportunities once SIGIF2 operational: groundwork for fiscal incentives (revenue-neutral feebate approach) contingent on credible certification and traceability systems.

### Cocoa sector surge and policy recommendations
- Cocoa export value doubled from 2023 to 2024 driven by prices while volumes remained largely unchanged.
- Production structure: around 90 percent of cocoa produced by smallholder farmers.
- Market: largely liberalized; farmgate prices track international prices closely.
- Macro impact: surge bolstered trade balance, current account, reserve accumulation, and offset weaker hydrocarbons and timber exports.
- Policy priorities:
  - Expand domestic cocoa processing capacity to capture a larger share of export revenues.
  - Support smallholder productivity, input access, and storage/transport infrastructure to stabilize export earnings.
  - Support sustainability and quality-improvement policies via the Cameroon Cocoa and Coffee Interprofessional Council.

---

### PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, SOEs, AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT

### PFM and PIM weaknesses and priorities
- Persisting weaknesses: large share of unbudgeted expenditures (including SNH direct interventions), low public investment execution rates, high management costs and delays.
- Strategic Plan for Public Financial Management Reforms (2024–26) validated in October 2024; aims to improve budgetary control, integrity, and predictability.
- Priorities:
  - Sustain and deepen PFM/PIM reforms, implement TA recommendations, interconnect information systems, and improve cash forecasting.
  - Close correspondent accounts (447) beginning with central administration following a census to be completed by end-2025.
  - Ensure any assignment of receivables subject to prior CNDP opinion and entered in debt register.

### SOEs and energy sector
- SONARA: in-depth study on refinery option validated; interim report delayed; commitment to finalize restructuring by end-2025.
- ENEO: liquidity pressures; planned tariff increases, procurement of smart meters, advanced metering infrastructure, and distribution densification to improve tariff collection.
- SNI: National Investment Corporation transformed with increased share capital of CFAF 200 billion to oversee SOE restructuring and recapitalization.
- Policy priorities: finalize performance contracts, validate cross-debt inventory, empower SNI, avoid use of public resources for acquisition of banks, and prioritize divestment under favorable conditions.

---

### CONDITIONALITY, MONITORING, AND STAFF VIEWS

### Conditionality and reporting
- TMU defines QPCs, ITs, SBs, and RMs; reporting frequency and cutoffs generally monthly within six weeks (end-December data by March 15).
- Key continuous and quarterly ceilings include non-oil primary balance, net domestic financing (excluding net IMF financing), disbursement of non-concessional external debt, net claims of BEAC on the government, non-accumulation of external payment arrears, PV of external debt contracted or guaranteed, and ceiling on Treasury advances without a budget allocation.

### Staff appraisal and recommendations
- Staff supports:
  - Waivers for two end-December 2024 QPCs and one continuous QPC provided corrective measures are in place (presidential circular on SNH revenue transfers and revised 2025 Finance Law issued prior to Board discussion).
  - Completion of the eighth ECF-EFF reviews and the third RSF review, enabling disbursements of SDR 55.2 million (ECF-EFF) and SDR 51.75 million (RSF).
- Overall assessment:
  - Macroeconomic stability maintained despite shocks; quantitative performance broadly on track.
  - Slow structural reform progress constrains faster growth.
  - PFM challenges persist (high share of spending through exceptional procedures; regularization of externally-financed investments outside budget information system).
  - RSF supported institutional climate reforms and helped lower prospective fiscal and external financing needs.

*Source: IMF staff report and MEFP excerpts in 1cmrea2025002-source-pdf*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Context
- Cameroon is described as a fragile and conflict-affected state with significant vulnerability to climate change.
- Growth remained modest amid a challenging external environment, a slow pace of reforms, and the composition of fiscal adjustment, while macroeconomic stability was maintained.
- The reduction in foreign development assistance threatens to further weaken the social safety net, exacerbating existing social vulnerabilities.
- The Presidential election in October 2025 introduces political and economic uncertainty, compounding challenges in an already unfavorable external environment.

### Macroeconomic developments
- Growth and inflation
  - Real GDP growth reached 3.5 percent in 2024 (up from 3.2 percent in 2023).
  - Inflation declined to 4.5 percent in 2024 from 7.4 percent in 2023 and eased further to 4.2 percent in May (year not explicitly restated in source).
  - BEAC lowered its policy rate from 5 percent to 4.5 percent in March 2025.
- Sectoral performance
  - Tertiary sector, particularly financial services, drove growth in 2024.
  - Extractive industries contracted by 9.2 percent in 2024 due to output declines from maturing fields.
  - Manufacturing was hindered by electricity supply challenges.
- Fiscal outcomes
  - The non-oil primary fiscal deficit was 2.4 percent of GDP in 2024, higher than the program target of 2 percent for 2024.
  - Non-oil revenue increased by about 10 percent year-on-year in 2024 but fell short of the program projection by 0.3 percent of GDP.
  - Current spending substantially exceeded projections (driven by goods and services), largely offset by lower capital spending.
- Public debt and external sector
  - Public debt-to-GDP declined marginally to 42.8 percent in 2024 from 43.2 percent in 2023.
  - The current account deficit improved from 4.1 percent of GDP in 2023 to about 3.1 percent in 2024, driven by a surge in international cocoa prices (which more than doubled in 2024).
  - A stronger financial account reflected increased multilateral loans and external commercial borrowing.
  - Market spreads on external loans widened by 400 bps, reaching almost 1,200 bps in April 2025, and moderated thereafter.
- Financial sector
  - Banking sector broadly stable but vulnerable.
  - Shareholders’ equity increased by 23 percent year-over-year at end-March 2025 following recapitalizations and capital injections.
  - Non-performing loans (NPL) ratio rose to 15.2 percent at end-March 2025.
  - Banks’ exposure to the sovereign was 28 percent of assets at end-March 2025.
  - Annual real credit growth to the private sector was 8 percent in March 2025, contributing to a credit stock of 15.6 percent of GDP in 2024 (below the SSA average of 28 percent of GDP).
- Safeguards
  - Implementation of 2022-23 safeguards recommendations has been slow; BEAC is making efforts, notably in governance.

### Program performance (ECF-EFF and RSF arrangements)
- Quantitative and indicative targets (end-December 2024)
  - Two out of four quantitative performance criteria (QPCs) were met.
  - Three out of five indicative targets (ITs) were met.
  - Two out of three continuous QPCs were met.
  - Missed QPCs included: the floor on the non-oil primary fiscal balance; the ceiling on net domestic financing of the central government; and the continuous criterion on the ceiling on Treasury advances without a budget allocation (the latter missed by a small margin).
  - ITs missed included ceilings on the net accumulation of domestic payment arrears and on direct SNH interventions.
  - Authorities reversed some slippage in domestic arrears clearance by end-March 2025.
- Structural benchmarks and reform measures
  - Two out of four structural benchmarks (SBs) due for the final review were implemented, both with delay:
    - SB2: report outlining scope for developing public procurement plans (May 2025) implemented with a minor delay.
    - SB4: two banks recapitalized to comply with 8 percent capital adequacy ratio (April 2025).
    - The revised law on investment incentives will be published in July 2025 (SB1, April 2025).
    - An interim report for the restructuring of SONARA lacked all expected elements and will take more time.
  - Three out of four reform measures (RMs) under the RSF arrangement were implemented:
    - RM2: National Climate Plan (NCP) adopted and published in June 2025.
    - RM5: Decrees revised to integrate climate considerations into the public investment project cycle (April 2025).
    - RM7: Disaster Risk Financing Strategy (DRFS) published in June (April 2025).
    - RM8 (forestry sector) was delayed due to administrative constraints; financing tied to this uncompleted reform will not become available upon completion of the review.
- Disbursements tied to reviews
  - Completion of the eighth review under the ECF-EFF arrangements will allow a disbursement of SDR 55.2 million (about US$75.9 million).
  - Completion of the third review under the RSF arrangement will allow a disbursement of SDR 51.75 million (about US$71.1 million).
  - Financing will not become available for the uncompleted RSF reform after program expiration.
- End-March 2025 progress
  - At end-March 2025, eleven out of twelve ITs were met, with the IT on the floor on non-oil revenue missed.

### Outlook and risks
- Medium-term projections and outlook (Text Table 1 summary)
  - GDP growth projections: 2024: 3.5; 2025: 3.8; 2026: 4.1; 2027: 4.3; 2028: 4.5; 2029: 4.5; 2030: 4.6 (table header indicates "GDP growth (percent)" with these values aligned to years 2024–2030).
  - Consumer Price Inflation, average (percent): 2024: 4.5; 2025: 4.5; 2026: 3.5; 2027: 4.3; 2028: 3.6; 2029: 3.3; 2030: 3.0.
  - Overall balance, including grants (percent of GDP): 2024: -0.6; 2025: -1.5; 2026: -0.3; 2027: -0.8; 2028: -1.1; 2029: -1.2; 2030: -1.1; (additional years show -1.2 and -1.3 in extended table).
  - Non-Oil Primary Balance (percent of GDP): 2024: -2.0; 2025: -2.4; 2026: -1.3; 2027: -1.4; 2028: -1.6; 2029: -1.6; 2030: -1.5; (extended: -1.6, -1.7).
  - Current Account (percent of GDP): 2024: -3.4; 2025: -3.1; 2026: -2.8; 2027: -2.7; 2028: -3.5; 2029: -3.3; 2030: -3.3; (extended: -3.3, -3.4).
  - Public Debt (percent of GDP): 2024: 42.0; 2025: 42.8; 2026: 39.4; 2027: 39.4; 2028: 37.8; 2029: 36.1; 2030: 34.6; (extended: 33.4, 32.0).
- Outlook narrative
  - Real GDP growth expected to reach 3.8 percent in 2025, reflecting a rebound and effects from the global demand downgrade.
  - External position expected to improve in 2025 with higher cocoa prices compensating for lower oil prices; current account expected to deteriorate thereafter due to projected deterioration in terms of trade (cocoa and coffee prices).
  - Inflation expected to decelerate towards the regional inflation target if appropriate monetary policy and tight fiscal stance are maintained.
  - Public debt-to-GDP expected to continue to decline gradually.
- Risks (Annex I referenced)
  - External risks: uncertainty from recent U.S. tariff announcements; unsettled financial markets; potential impacts on investment, supply chains, global demand, and commodity prices.
  - Financing risks: reductions in foreign aid announced by key development partners for 2025-27 that could create funding shortfalls affecting the fiscal deficit, current account, and growth (Annex II).
  - Domestic risks: security challenges intensified by climate change; political risks related to the October 2025 Presidential election.
  - Upside potential: higher cocoa prices, which already strengthened the external position in 2024 (Annex III).

### Policies and reforms; staff views
- Reviews and evaluation
  - The eighth and final ECF-EFF reviews and the third and final RSF review evaluated implementation of remaining reforms and assessed overall program performance over the past four years, outlining key areas for future reform from the unfinished agenda.
- Authorities’ requests and staff support
  - Authorities request waivers for non-observance of two performance criteria at end-December 2024 and one continuous performance criterion:
    - Floor on the non-oil primary fiscal balance.
    - Ceiling on net domestic financing of the central government.
    - Continuous criterion on the ceiling on Treasury advances without a budget allocation.
  - Staff supports the request for waivers, the completion of the eighth reviews under the ECF-EFF arrangement and the third review under the RSF arrangement, and the disbursement of:
    - SDR 55.2 million under the ECF-EFF arrangement.
    - SDR 51.75 million under the RSF arrangement.
- Overall assessment
  - Since program launch, authorities maintained macroeconomic stability despite external shocks, with quantitative performance broadly on track.
  - Slow structural reform progress has constrained faster growth.
  - Persistent PFM challenges include high share of spending through exceptional procedures and timely regularization of externally-financed investments outside the budget information system.
  - The RSF arrangement supported institutional climate framework reforms and helped lower prospective fiscal and external financing needs through scaled up adaptation and mitigation actions.

*Source: Executive Summary, 1cmrea2025002-source-pdf - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY*

### 17.      The end-2024 fiscal slippage necessitates corrective actions. The QPC on the floor on the

### 17.      The end-2024 fiscal slippage necessitates corrective actions.

### Fiscal slippage, drivers, and corrective measures
- QPC (quantitative performance criterion) misses:
  - Floor on the non-oil primary fiscal balance missed by CFAF 146 billion.
  - Ceiling on net domestic financing of the central government missed due to spending overruns (by CFAF 127 billion) and grant shortfall (by CFAF 20 billion).
- Composition of fiscal deviations (end-2024):
  - Increase in current primary spending relative to the budget: CFAF 427 billion (primarily higher expenditure on goods and services).
  - Reduction in capital spending: CFAF 277 billion.
  - Reduction in other expenditures: CFAF 23 billion.
  - Main source of slippage: unplanned direct interventions through SNH.
- Corrective measures and prior actions:
  - Presidential circular specifying that:
    - (i) the 2026 Budget Law include a multiyear projection of all strategic and other expenditures previously financed by direct interventions of the SNH; and
    - (ii) the SNH transfer to the public treasury all revenue derived from the sale of hydrocarbons, after deducting production costs, but without deducting transfers and payments owed by the government to the SNH (prior action).
  - Government issued the revised 2025 Finance Law in July 2025 in line with the program to ensure fiscal adjustment remains on track (prior action).

### Medium‑term fiscal stance and targets
- Authorities aim to maintain a prudent fiscal stance given limited fiscal and external buffers.
- 2025 revised Finance Law projection:
  - Non-oil primary balance of -1.4 percent of GDP (improvement from -2.4 percent of GDP in 2024).
- From 2026, fiscal trajectory expected to align broadly with the CEMAC reference budget balance and debt sustainability goals.
- Policy priorities: enhance non-oil revenues, public investment management, and introduce an automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism.

### Mobilizing non-oil revenue: policy and administration measures
- Tax policy measures:
  - Broadening the base by eliminating incentives for some agricultural products and beverages.
  - Plan to eliminate tax expenditures on imported fuels.
  - New levy on money transfers.
  - Strengthening environmental taxation in the mining sector through excise duties on harmful products and rebates for electric vehicles (MEFP paragraph 13).
  - Revised 2013 law on investment incentives (SB1 and prior action) to feature tax credits and accelerated depreciation rather than tax reduction schemes.
- Revenue administration reforms:
  - Electronic invoicing.
  - Enhanced internal mechanisms to combat customs fraud and prevent illicit financial flows.

### Arrears accumulation, clearance, and management
- Arrears dynamics:
  - Planned CFAF 537 billion reduction in arrears was not achieved at end-2024 despite drawing two external loans for this purpose.
  - External loans drawn: Afrexim Bank loan for CFAF 131 billion and Eurobond for CFAF 332 billion.
  - Instead of reducing arrears, authorities accumulated CFAF 96 billion in new obligations due to oil revenue shortfalls, spending overruns mainly through SNH interventions, and external financing shortfall.
- Oil revenue shortfalls caused by:
  - Lower-than-projected SNH royalty transfers.
  - Sharper decline in oil production.
  - Weaker global prices.
- Measures to mitigate arrears:
  - Circular on transfer of SNH revenues to the public treasury (prior action) expected to help mitigate further domestic arrears accumulation.
  - Authorities plan to clear CFAF 233 billion arrears in 2025 (about one third of the stock) as budgeted in the revised 2025 Finance Law (prior action) and to repay the remaining arrears over the following two years.
  - As of end-March, most of the scheduled domestic arrears clearance for the year had already been completed (CFAF 233 billion) through domestic bond issuances, partially reversing the 2024 slippage.
- Arrears control and fiscal risk management measures:
  - Improve cash management by reducing expenditure in line with lower revenues and available financing and by connecting information systems without further delay.
  - Improve domestic debt obligation estimates: wider coverage of unstructured domestic debt in fiscal statistics, including balances payable and floating debt (MEFP paragraph 34).
  - Close correspondent accounts ahead of the full transition to the Treasury Single Account, starting from those of the central administration following a census (MEFP paragraph 22).
  - Strengthen the financial footing of state-owned companies (SOEs): completion of SONARA interim study for restructuring (SB3); programmed utility tariff increases, procurement of smart meters, advanced metering infrastructure, and distribution network densification to improve ENEO tariff collection; clarify mandate and operationalize the National Investment Corporation (SNI) responsible for restructuring, recapitalization, and oversight of SOEs (MEFP paragraphs 28 and 31).

### Fiscal risks from declining ODA
- Stricter expenditure prioritization recommended to offset declining official development assistance (ODA).
- Potential macro effects of lower ODA over next three years:
  - Decline in the current account balance of 0.4 percent of GDP.
  - Decline in growth of 0.3 percent.

### Debt outlook and financing risks
- Cameroon remains at high risk of debt distress, though debt considered sustainable.
- Debt carrying capacity weak; two out of four external debt indicators breach thresholds under the baseline scenario.
- External debt stock indicators remain below thresholds; external debt service indicators on a downward trend.
- Debt service-to-revenue ratio expected to fall below threshold in the medium term.
- Present value of public debt-to-GDP ratio has recently fallen below threshold.
- Undisbursed committed balances (mostly on external multilateral loans) increased to CFAF 4,415 billion in March 2025 (Text Table 3, MEFP paragraph 32, Debt Sustainability Analysis 2025).

### Strengthening financial sector resilience and inclusion
- Capital and liquidity:
  - Most banks exceed regulatory minimums for Capital Adequacy Ratio, liquidity ratio, and other prudential benchmarks.
- Nonperforming loans (NPLs):
  - Total stock of banking system NPLs increased by 22 percent year-on-year at end‑March 2025.
  - NPL ratio rose marginally from 14.2 percent to 15.2 percent y-o-y due to a 14 percent expansion in the sector’s overall loan portfolio.
- Policy responses and reforms:
  - Establishing the first credit reference bureau in the CEMAC region in collaboration with BEAC.
  - Digitizing the cadaster to enable creation of a land title registry.
  - Training commercial judges in bank dispute resolution (MEFP paragraph 36).
  - Intensified oversight and targeted regulatory interventions by the regional banking supervisor.
  - Develop credible strategies for addressing build-up of bad assets in state-owned banks.
- Banks’ exposure to sovereign debt:
  - Exposure to securities issued by governments in the CEMAC region: 28 percent of total banking sector assets at end‑March 2025 (down from 29 percent a year earlier).
  - Banks establishing internal limits on sovereign debt holdings, complicating government debt issuance objectives.
  - Authorities developing strategy to deepen the secondary market for securities by broadening investor base; COBAC regulatory measures would limit banks’ exposures across CEMAC.
- Government ownership in banking sector:
  - State holds significant stakes in eight banks, majority ownership in four—representing 11 percent of total banking sector assets.
  - Agreement to acquire additional shares in Société Générale Cameroun (second-largest bank, holding 13 percent of banking sector assets), following Société Générale Group’s decision to divest its 58.08 percent stake—this will raise state ownership to majority control.
  - Mission recommended avoiding use of public resources for acquisition and prioritizing divestment from state-owned banks under favorable market conditions.
  - Call for a comprehensive policy framework for managing state stakes in the banking sector to promote good governance, risk management, operational efficiency, fair competition, and limits on government financing from state-owned banks.
- Financial inclusion and sector development measures:
  - Establishment of a guarantee fund to support SMEs.
  - Restructuring of Crédit Foncier du Cameroun to provide refinancing and partial guarantees for real estate projects.
  - Transformation of Cameroon Bank of Small and Medium Enterprises into a development bank to support National Development Strategy 2020–30.
- Deposit and Consignment Fund (CDEC) operational challenges:
  - Deadlock between CDEC and regional financial authorities on supervision model, freezing transfer of funds from banks (dormant assets and accounts), limiting CDEC funding.
  - Mission recommended resuming dialogue to resolve issues.

### Governance, anti‑corruption, and financial integrity
- Need to accelerate implementation of recommendations from the 2023 Governance Diagnostic Report, satisfy EITI re-entry requirements, and rectify AML/CFT shortcomings to exit FATF “grey list.”
- Priority measures recommended:
  - Publication of oil industry contracts.
  - Publication of beneficial owners of companies.
- EITI progress:
  - Work underway on stakeholder engagement, integration into national procedures, and regularization of contractual framework of the Permanent Secretariat staff.
  - Permanent secretariat strengthening governance, ethics, and conflict-of-interest competencies and reinforcing government leadership in EITI implementation (MEFP paragraph 43).
  - Systematic publication of production-sharing agreements will follow conversion and simplification of old contracts.
- AML/CFT progress and gaps:
  - Improved alignment of national AML/CFT strategy with national risk assessment; stepped-up investigations and prosecutions of terrorist financing.
  - Mechanism established to maintain adequate, accurate, and up-to-date beneficial ownership information accessible by competent authorities (MEFP paragraph 44).
  - Legal framework for targeted financial sanctions upgraded; new CEMAC AML/CFT regulation issued in December 2024.
  - Progress made with Fund assistance on AML/CFT regulatory framework for DNFBPs, which is yet to be adopted.
  - Remaining needs: strengthen implementation and supervision of AML/CFT framework, especially for DNFBPs; greater use of financial intelligence by law enforcement; improved training for investigative and prosecutorial authorities; improve interagency cooperation; better identification, tracing, recovering, and management of criminal assets seized or confiscated, particularly at borders.

### Climate vulnerabilities and integration into public investment
- Institutional and legal frameworks strengthened for climate mitigation and adaptation:
  - National Climate Plan (NCP) (RM2) clarifies roles and improves governance framework.
  - Next steps: update Nationally Determined Contributions and implement reinforced framework.
  - Climate considerations being integrated into public investment processes through revisions to two decrees (RM5); need further granularity by project size and clearer stakeholder roles.
  - Disaster Risk Financing Strategy (DRFS) (RM7) published in June with IMF technical assistance; C-PIMA can help strengthen the strategy.
  - Staff will follow up on operationalization of the new platform for forest information management (RM8) to connect tax and customs information systems to forestry sector data for revenue collection (MEFP Table 3 and paragraphs 9, 46, and 47).

### Program issues, regional assurances, and waiver request
- Regional assurances:
  - BEAC met its Net Foreign Assets (NFA) target for end‑March 2025 at EUR 6.05 billion, above regional assurances of EUR 4.5 billion.
  - BEAC updated policy assurances for June 2025 in support of CEMAC countries’ programs; review of regional policies and assurances discussed by the Executive Board in June 2025.
- Waiver request and QPC non‑observance:
  - Authorities requesting a waiver for non-observance of two QPCs and one continuous performance criterion:
    - Missed QPCs: floor on non-oil primary fiscal balance and ceiling on net domestic financing of the central government (misses due to spending overruns and grant shortfall).
    - Corrective measures proposed for the two QPCs: (a) Presidential circular with the SNH revenue transfer and 2026 Budget Law multiyear projection requirements (prior action); and (b) issuance of revised 2025 Finance Law in July 2025 in line with the program macroeconomic and budgetary framework (prior action).
    - Waiver for non-observance of the continuous performance criterion on the ceiling on Treasury advances without a budget allocation requested on the basis that the deviation is minor.

*Source: IMF staff summary of the Cameroon program document (text provided).*

### 36.      Cameroon’s capacity to repay the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is adequate but

### Cameroon’s capacity to repay the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is adequate but

### Repayment capacity and risks
- As of end-December 2024, total outstanding credit from the IMF amounted to 437 percent of quota.
- Total IMF credit outstanding (based on existing and prospective drawings) peaked at 2.9 percent of GDP in 2024.
- Annual obligations to the IMF peak at about 2.8 percent of revenues in 2026-27.
- Assessment: capacity to repay is adequate but subject to significant risks; capacity could be strained by materialization of potential risks (Annex I).
- Risk mitigants:
  - Cameroon’s past record of repaying the IMF and implementing its macroeconomic programs.
  - Credibility and strength of prior actions and other corrective measures.
  - Close engagement with donors.
  - A comprehensive CD program.

### Financing assurances and Fund relations
- The program remains fully financed with firm commitments for the remainder of the program.
- The World Bank disbursed its budget support in April 2025.
- The next Article IV consultation is expected within six months after the end of the arrangement, by early 2026, and will return to the 12-month cycle.
- Staff discussed progress toward initial program objectives and the future agenda with the authorities.

### Role of the RSF arrangement and climate-related measures
- The RSF arrangement was instrumental in addressing prospective balance of payments needs.
- Key climate-related measures that support fiscal and external sustainability:
  - Strengthening climate governance.
  - Integrating climate goals into public financial management.
  - Improving disaster preparedness.
- Expected benefits:
  - Enhanced coordination and reduced fiscal impact of climate action.
  - Faster recovery from climate shocks.
  - Transparent climate project prioritization lowers reconstruction costs.
  - Better disaster preparedness attracts affordable green financing and limits financial losses, easing balance of payments pressures.
- An overall program assessment under the RSF arrangement is provided in Annex IV.

### Staff appraisal — growth, inflation, and outlook
- Real GDP growth reached 3.5 percent in 2024, up from 3.2 percent in the previous year.
- Annual inflation decelerated to 4.5 percent in 2024 from 7.4 percent in 2023 and eased further to 4.2 percent in May 2025.
- Outlook: broadly positive over the medium term but risks are tilted to the downside, including social tensions around elections and pre-electoral spending overruns.

### Program performance and compliance
- Eighth review performance:
  - Two out of four structural reforms envisaged for the review were completed.
  - A third structural benchmark will be implemented in July: the revised law on investment incentives will be published in July 2025 (prior action).
  - At end-December 2024: two out of four QPCs and three out of five ITs were met.
  - Two out of three continuous QPCs were met at end-December 2024.
  - At end-March 2025: eleven out of twelve ITs were met.
  - Three of the four RMs due for the third review of the RSF arrangement were completed.
- Waiver requests:
  - Authorities request a waiver for non-observance of two QPCs at end-December 2024 and one continuous QPC.
  - Missed QPCs:
    - Floor on the non-oil primary fiscal balance missed due to spending overruns and grant shortfall.
    - Ceiling on the net domestic financing of the central government missed due to spending overruns and grant shortfall.
    - Continuous criterion on the ceiling on Treasury advances without a budget allocation missed by a small margin.
  - Corrective measures taken:
    - Issue a circular on the transfer of SNH revenues to the public treasury without deducting transfers and payments owed by the government to the SNH (prior action).
    - Issued a revised 2025 Finance Law in line with the program's economic framework (prior action).

### Fiscal stance, debt, and SOE management
- Policy priority: pursuing a prudent fiscal stance to preserve debt sustainability.
- Key fiscal actions needed:
  - Boost non-oil revenues.
  - Improve public investment management.
  - Strengthen domestic arrears control.
- Medium-term fiscal path: expected to be broadly consistent with the CEMAC reference budget balance and with debt sustainability.
- Public debt:
  - Sustainable but at high risk of distress.
  - Expected to remain on a downward path over the medium term if fiscal prudence is maintained and concessional financing pursued.
- State-owned enterprises:
  - Advancing the restructuring of SONARA rapidly remains a priority.
  - Reforms in other SOEs should be implemented and oversight strengthened to improve efficiency, limit contingent liabilities, and lift the quality of public services.

### Financial sector and banking vulnerabilities
- Capitalization improved: recapitalization of two banks brought them into compliance with COBAC regulations and the Basel capital adequacy framework.
- Remaining vulnerabilities:
  - High NPLs.
  - Banks’ exposure to the CEMAC public sector.
- Recommended actions:
  - Continued prudent fiscal stance.
  - Deepen the domestic secondary market for securities while monitoring associated risks with COBAC.
  - Develop credible strategies to address accumulation of bad assets in state-owned banks.
  - Adopt a comprehensive policy framework for governance and risk management, given concerns about increased government ownership.

### Governance, anti-corruption, and financial integrity
- Priorities:
  - Advance governance, anti-corruption, and financial integrity reforms decisively.
  - Maintain close collaboration with the FATF and GABAC to strengthen the AML/CFT regime with the aim of exiting the “grey list” in the near term.
  - Implement corrective actions to lift the suspension from the EITI at the next evaluation round.
  - Continue work on weaknesses identified in the IMF governance diagnostic report.

### Climate framework progress
- Progress under the RSF third review:
  - Three out of four reform measures due for the third review were met.
  - Adopted a National Climate Plan and a Disaster Financing Risk Strategy.
  - Integrated climate considerations into public investment processes through revisions to two decrees.
  - A new platform for forest information management (RM8) was not operationalized in time for the review.
- Expected outcomes:
  - Strengthened institutional and legal framework, improved preparedness for climate change.
  - Improved macroeconomic resilience to climate shocks.
  - Potential to catalyze funds for new green investments from development partners and the private sector at favorable terms.

### Staff recommendation on reviews and waivers
- Based on performance, corrective actions, and implementation of end-March 2025 regional policy assurances established in the June 2025 union-wide paper:
  - Staff supports completion of the eighth reviews under the ECF-EFF arrangements and the third review under the RSF arrangement.
  - Grounds for waiver of the two end-December 2024 QPCs are the corrective actions: circular on SNH revenue transfers and the revised 2025 Finance Law.
  - Staff supports the waiver provided that the circular on the transfer of SNH revenues to the public treasury is issued prior to the Board discussion (prior action).
  - Staff supports the waiver of the non-observance of the continuous QPC on the ceiling on Treasury advances on the ground that the deviation was minor.
  - It is proposed that Cameroon’s Article IV consultation cycle be shortened back to 12 months; the next Article IV consultation is expected to be held in January 2026.

*Source: IMF staff report (excerpts), Cameroon.*

### 3.5 Year

### 3.5 Year

### National Account and Prices
- GDP at constant prices (annual % change): 3.9 (2024), 3.5 (2025), 4.0 (2026), 3.8 (2027), 4.1 (2028), 4.3 (2029), 4.5 (2030), 4.5 (2031), 4.6 (2032).
- Oil GDP at constant prices (annual % change): -2.7 (2024), -9.2 (2025), -7.7 (2026), -5.6 (2027), 0.4 (2028), -0.1 (2029), 1.3 (2030), 2.1 (2031), 2.8 (2032).
- Non-Oil GDP at constant prices (annual % change): 4.0 (2024), 3.7 (2025), 4.2 (2026), 4.0 (2027), 4.1 (2028), 4.4 (2029), 4.6 (2030), 4.6 (2031), 4.6 (2032).
- GDP deflator (annual % change): 3.4 (2024), 6.6 (2025), 3.2 (2026), 3.5 (2027), 3.5 (2028), 3.6 (2029), 3.0 (2030), 3.0 (2031), 3.0 (2032).
- Consumer prices (average, annual % change): 4.5 (2024), 4.5 (2025), 3.5 (2026), 4.3 (2027), 3.6 (2028), 3.3 (2029), 3.0 (2030), 3.0 (2031), 3.0 (2032).
- Consumer prices (eop): 5.0 (2024), 5.0 (2025), 3.4 (2026), 4.1 (2027), 3.5 (2028), 3.1 (2029), 3.0 (2030), 3.0 (2031), 3.0 (2032).

### Money and Credit
- Broad money (M2, annual % change): 8.8 (2024), 9.6 (2025), 7.0 (2026), 6.9 (2027), 7.4 (2028), 7.6 (2029), 7.0 (2030), 7.7 (2031), 7.7 (2032).
- Net foreign assets (percent of broad money at beginning of period): 4.6 (2024), 2.7 (2025), 7.8 (2026), 11.4 (2027), 3.5 (2028), 3.2 (2029), 1.4 (2030), 0.0 (2031), -0.2 (2032).
- Net domestic assets (percent of broad money at beginning of period): 4.2 (2024), 6.9 (2025), -0.8 (2026), -4.6 (2027), 4.0 (2028), 4.4 (2029), 5.6 (2030), 7.6 (2031), 7.9 (2032).
- Domestic credit to the private sector (annual % change): 9.5 (2024), 12.3 (2025), 7.7 (2026), 10.0 (2027), 9.0 (2028), 8.0 (2029), 7.2 (2030), 7.3 (2031), 6.9 (2032).

### Savings and Investment
- Gross national savings (percent of GDP): 17.2 (2024), 17.6 (2025), 18.3 (2026), 18.4 (2027), 18.8 (2028), 19.7 (2029), 20.1 (2030), 20.7 (2031), 21.0 (2032).
- Gross domestic investment (percent of GDP): 20.6 (2024), 20.7 (2025), 21.1 (2026), 21.1 (2027), 22.3 (2028), 23.0 (2029), 23.4 (2030), 24.1 (2031), 24.3 (2032).
- Public investment (percent of GDP): 5.4 (2024), 5.4 (2025), 6.0 (2026), 6.0 (2027), 6.9 (2028), 7.4 (2029), 7.7 (2030), 8.2 (2031), 8.5 (2032).
- Private investment (percent of GDP): 15.2 (2024), 15.3 (2025), 15.0 (2026), 15.1 (2027), 15.5 (2028), 15.6 (2029), 15.7 (2030), 15.9 (2031), 15.8 (2032).

### Central Government Operations (levels and percent of GDP)
- Total revenue (including grants, CFAF billion): 5,118 (2024), 5,025 (2025), 5,464 (2026), 5,351 (2027), 5,655 (2028), 6,232 (2029), 6,765 (2030), 7,303 (2031), 7,952 (2032).
- Total revenue (percent of GDP): 15.9 (2024), 15.2 (2025), 15.9 (2026), 15.1 (2027), 14.8 (2028), 15.1 (2029), 15.2 (2030), 15.3 (2031), 15.4 (2032).
- Oil sector revenue (CFAF billion): 762 (2024), 689 (2025), 735 (2026), 642 (2027), 522 (2028), 575 (2029), 616 (2030), 662 (2031), 717 (2032).
- Non-oil sector revenue (CFAF billion): 4,252 (2024), 4,252 (2025), 4,639 (2026), 4,619 (2027), 5,087 (2028), 5,616 (2029), 6,128 (2030), 6,620 (2031), 7,215 (2032).
- Total expenditure (CFAF billion): 5,309 (2024), 5,514 (2025), 5,564 (2026), 5,646 (2027), 6,084 (2028), 6,710 (2029), 7,245 (2030), 7,873 (2031), 8,604 (2032).
- Total expenditure (percent of GDP): 16.5 (2024), 16.7 (2025), 16.1 (2026), 15.9 (2027), 15.9 (2028), 16.3 (2029), 16.3 (2030), 16.5 (2031), 16.7 (2032).
- Current expenditure (CFAF billion): 3,682 (2024), 4,187 (2025), 3,701 (2026), 3,793 (2027), 3,816 (2028), 4,157 (2029), 4,449 (2030), 4,758 (2031), 5,059 (2032).
- Capital expenditure (CFAF billion): 1,604 (2024), 1,327 (2025), 1,863 (2026), 1,853 (2027), 2,269 (2028), 2,552 (2029), 2,797 (2030), 3,115 (2031), 3,545 (2032).
- Overall balance (payment order basis, including grants, CFAF billion): -191 (2024), -488 (2025), -99 (2026), -296 (2027), -429 (2028), -477 (2029), -481 (2030), -570 (2031), -652 (2032).
- Overall balance (payment order basis, including grants, percent of GDP): -0.6 (2024), -1.5 (2025), -0.3 (2026), -0.8 (2027), -1.1 (2028), -1.2 (2029), -1.1 (2030), -1.2 (2031), -1.3 (2032).
- Overall balance (cash basis, including grants, percent of GDP): -2.3 (2024), -1.3 (2025), -0.9 (2026), -1.8 (2027), -2.3 (2028), -2.0 (2029), -1.1 (2030), -1.2 (2031), -1.3 (2032).
- Non-oil primary balance (payment order basis, incl. grants, percent of non-oil GDP): -2.0 (2024), -2.4 (2025), -1.3 (2026), -1.4 (2027), -1.6 (2028), -1.6 (2029), -1.5 (2030), -1.6 (2031), -1.7 (2032).

### Financing and Debt (2024–30)
- Overall balance including grants (payment order basis, CFAF billion): -488 (2024), -296 (2025), -429 (2026), -477 (2027), -481 (2028), -570 (2029), -652 (2030).
- Domestic payment arrears (CFAF billion): 64 (2024), -350 (2025), -437 (2026), -367 (2027), 0 (2028), 0 (2029), 0 (2030).
- Overall balance including grants (cash basis, CFAF billion): -424 (2024), -645 (2025), -866 (2026), -844 (2027), -481 (2028), -570 (2029), -652 (2030).
- Financing (CFAF billion): 424 (2024), 645 (2025), 866 (2026), 844 (2027), 481 (2028), 570 (2029), 652 (2030).
- Net external financing (CFAF billion): 414 (2024), 703 (2025), 696 (2026), 595 (2027), 672 (2028), 629 (2029), 619 (2030).
- Gross external borrowing (CFAF billion): 1,022 (2024), 1,354 (2025), 1,285 (2026), 1,259 (2027), 1,263 (2028), 1,207 (2029), 1,318 (2030).
  - Multilateral institutions (excluding IMF): 580 (2024), 1,024 (2025), 895 (2026), 959 (2027), 983 (2028), 1,007 (2029), 1,168 (2030).
  - Commercial, private: 442 (2024), 330 (2025), 390 (2026), 300 (2027), 280 (2028), 200 (2029), 150 (2030).
- Amortizations and repayments (CFAF billion): 607 (2024), 651 (2025), 589 (2026), 663 (2027), 591 (2028), 578 (2029), 699 (2030).
- Net domestic financing (CFAF billion): -50 (2024), -217 (2025), 170 (2026), 249 (2027), -191 (2028), -593 (2029), 3 (2030).
- Net IMF lending (outcome, CFAF billion): 21 (2024), -78 (2025), -129 (2026), -149 (2027), -135 (2028), -133 (2029), -118 (2030).
- Net IMF lending (prospective, CFAF billion): 159 (projection item shown).

### Balance of Payments (2024–30)
- Current account balance (CFAF billion): -1,089 (2024), -1,038 (2025), -968 (2026), -969 (2027), -1,349 (2028), -1,382 (2029), -1,467 (2030), -1,596 (2031), -1,744 (2032).
- Trade balance (CFAF billion): -713 (2024), -569 (2025), -547 (2026), -356 (2027), -799 (2028), -763 (2029), -807 (2030), -839 (2031), -956 (2032).
- Exports, goods (CFAF billion): 4,186 (2024), 4,137 (2025), 4,494 (2026), 4,482 (2027), 4,315 (2028), 4,697 (2029), 4,998 (2030), 5,407 (2031), 5,790 (2032).
  - Oil and oil products: 1,469 (2024), 1,406 (2025), 1,484 (2026), 1,283 (2027), 1,175 (2028), 1,291 (2029), 1,370 (2030), 1,526 (2031), 1,631 (2032).
  - Non-oil sector: 2,717 (2024), 2,731 (2025), 3,010 (2026), 3,198 (2027), 3,140 (2028), 3,406 (2029), 3,628 (2030), 3,880 (2031), 4,159 (2032).
- Imports, goods (CFAF billion): -4,898 (2024), -4,706 (2025), -5,041 (2026), -4,838 (2027), -5,114 (2028), -5,460 (2029), -5,804 (2030), -6,246 (2031), -6,747 (2032).
- Services (net, CFAF billion): -357 (2024), -410 (2025), -357 (2026), -445 (2027), -460 (2028), -481 (2029), -502 (2030), -530 (2031), -560 (2032).
  - Exports, services: 1,292 (2024), 886 (2025), 1,405 (2026), 948 (2027), 1,031 (2028), 1,109 (2029), 1,186 (2030), 1,271 (2031), 1,365 (2032).
  - Imports, services: -1,649 (2024), -1,295 (2025), -1,762 (2026), -1,392 (2027), -1,491 (2028), -1,590 (2029), -1,689 (2030), -1,801 (2031), -1,925 (2032).
- Income (net, CFAF billion): -562 (2024), -575 (2025), -618 (2026), -709 (2027), -660 (2028), -740 (2029), -811 (2030), -884 (2031), -949 (2032).
  - Interest due on public debt: -182 (2024), -252 (2025), -212 (2026), -266 (2027), -178 (2028), -219 (2029), -252 (2030), -281 (2031), -300 (2032).
- Transfers (net, CFAF billion): 542 (2024), 515 (2025), 554 (2026), 541 (2027), 570 (2028), 601 (2029), 654 (2030), 657 (2031), 721 (2032).
  - Inflows: 844 (2024), 731 (2025), 875 (2026), 789 (2027), 835 (2028), 886 (2029), 954 (2030), 970 (2031), 1,045 (2032).
  - Outflows: -302 (2024), -216 (2025), -320 (2026), -248 (2027), -265 (2028), -285 (2029), -300 (2030), -313 (2031), -324 (2032).
- Capital and financial account balance (CFAF billion): 1,376 (2024), 1,172 (2025), 1,450 (2026), 1,520 (2027), 1,663 (2028), 1,694 (2029), 1,597 (2030), 1,571 (2031), 1,689 (2032).
- Gross Reserves Accumulation (without RSF, CFAF billion): -324 (2024), -293 (2025), -616 (2026), -969 (2027), -184 (2028), -163 (2029), 615 (2030), 817 (2031), 73 (2032).
- Oil price ($US per barrel): 79.0 (2024), 79.2 (2025), 69.8 (2026), 66.9 (2027), 62.4 (2028), 62.7 (2029), 63.6 (2030), 64.3 (2031), 64.9 (2032).
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): Including grants: -3.4 (2024), -3.1 (2025), -2.8 (2026), -2.7 (2027), -3.5 (2028), -3.3 (2029), -3.3 (2030), -3.3 (2031), -3.4 (2032). Excluding grants: -3.6 (2024), -3.3 (2025), -3.0 (2026), -2.9 (2027), -3.7 (2028), -3.5 (2029), -3.5 (2030), -3.4 (2031), -3.4 (2032).

### Monetary Survey (levels, 2024–30)
- Net foreign assets (CFAF billion): 2,939 (2024), 2,777 (2025), 3,658 (2026), 3,835 (2027), 4,178 (2028), 4,520 (2029), 4,680 (2030), 4,684 (2031), 4,659 (2032).
  - BEAC: 1,885 (2024), 1,759 (2025), 2,574 (2026), 2,787 (2027), 3,100 (2028), 3,412 (2029), 3,542 (2030), 3,516 (2031), 3,461 (2032).
  - BEAC foreign assets (of which): 3,282 (2024), 3,251 (2025), 3,983 (2026), 4,290 (2027), 4,474 (2028), 4,637 (2029), 4,632 (2030), 4,473 (2031), 4,301 (2032).
  - IMF credit (counterpart): -864 (2024), -919 (2025), -875 (2026), -930 (2027), -801 (2028), -652 (2029), -517 (2030), -384 (2031), -266 (2032).
- Net domestic assets (CFAF billion): 6,250 (2024), 6,481 (2025), 6,176 (2026), 6,059 (2027), 6,452 (2028), 6,916 (2029), 7,562 (2030), 8,496 (2031), 9,541 (2032).
- Domestic credit (CFAF billion): 7,440 (2024), 7,594 (2025), 7,552 (2026), 8,547 (2027), 9,564 (2028), 10,785 (2029), 11,450 (2030), 12,256 (2031), 13,128 (2032).
  - Net claims on public sector (CFAF billion): 2,386 (2024), 2,383 (2025), 2,112 (2026), 2,822 (2027), 3,329 (2028), 4,057 (2029), 4,242 (2030), 4,527 (2031), 4,871 (2032).
  - Credit to the economy (CFAF billion): 5,540 (2024), 5,732 (2025), 5,926 (2026), 6,246 (2027), 6,755 (2028), 7,275 (2029), 7,793 (2030), 8,343 (2031), 8,903 (2032).
  - Credit to the private sector (CFAF billion): 5,015 (2024), 5,142 (2025), 5,401 (2026), 5,656 (2027), 6,165 (2028), 6,658 (2029), 7,138 (2030), 7,659 (2031), 8,187 (2032).
- Broad money (CFAF billion): 9,188 (2024), 9,259 (2025), 9,834 (2026), 9,894 (2027), 10,630 (2028), 11,437 (2029), 12,242 (2030), 13,180 (2031), 14,200 (2032).
  - Currency outside banks: 1,951 (2024), 2,054 (2025), 2,080 (2026), 2,181 (2027), 2,328 (2028), 2,490 (2029), 2,651 (2030), 2,838 (2031), 3,042 (2032).
  - Deposits: 7,237 (2024), 7,205 (2025), 7,753 (2026), 7,713 (2027), 8,301 (2028), 8,947 (2029), 9,591 (2030), 10,342 (2031), 11,158 (2032).

### Capacity to Repay the IMF (2024–44)
- Outstanding IMF credit based on existing and prospective drawings (SDR millions): 1,206.1 (2024), 1,216.5 (2025), 1,057.3 (2026), 873.3 (2027), 707.1 (2028), 544.6 (2029), 400.4 (2030), 294.9 (2031), 218.9 (2032), 164.9 (2033), 135.5 (2034), 115.6 (2035), 103.5 (2036), 91.4 (2037), 79.4 (2038), 67.3 (2039), 55.2 (2040), 43.1 (2041), 31.1 (2042), 19.0 (2043), 6.9 (2044).
- Principal repayments schedule (CFAF billions, selected years): 63.5 (2024), 96.6 (2025), 159.2 (2026), 184.0 (2027), 166.2 (2028), 162.5 (2029), 138.0 (2030), 95.7 (2031), 66.2 (2032), 44.2 (2033), 19.6 (2034), 10.1 (2035), 6.9 annually (continuing values shown).
- Charges and interest (CFAF billions, selected years): 32.0 (2024), 28.1 (2025), 27.7 (2026), 26.9 (2027), 25.5 (2028), 23.7 (2029), 21.6 (2030), 19.5 (2031), 17.7 (2032), 16.4 (2033), 15.7 (2034), 15.3 (2035), 15.1 (2036), 14.8 (2037).
- Outstanding IMF credit (CFAF billions, memorandum): 970.6 (2024), 983.9 (2025), 855.8 (2026), 709.0 (2027), 575.8 (2028), 444.2 (2029), 327.3 (2030), 241.1 (2031), 178.9 (2032), 134.8 (2033), 110.7 (2034), 94.7 (2035), 84.6 (2036), 74.7 (2037), 67.4 (2038), 64.9 (2039), 55.0 (2040), 45.1 (2041), 35.3 (2042), 25.4 (2043), 15.5 (2044).
- Outstanding IMF credit as percent of government revenue (selected years): 19.3 (2024), 18.4 (2025), 15.1 (2026), 11.4 (2027), 8.5 (2028), 6.1 (2029), 4.1 (2030), 2.9 (2031), 2.0 (2032), 1.4 (2033), 1.1 (2034), 0.8 (2035), 0.7 (2036), 0.6 (2037), 0.5 (2038), 0.4 (2039), 0.3 (2040), 0.2 (2041), 0.1 (2042), 0.1 (2043), 0.0 (2044).
- Net use of Fund credit (SDR millions, selected years): 115.9 (2024), 10.4 (2025), -159.2 (2026), -184.0 (2027), -166.2 (2028), -162.5 (2029), -144.1 (2030), -105.5 (2031), -76.1 (2032), -54.0 (2033), -29.4 (2034), -19.9 (2035), -12.1 (2036), with -12.1 continuing in later years.

### Financial Soundness Indicators (2018–23)
- Total bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets: 10.8 (2018), 10.8 (2019), 13.8 (2020), 14.2 (2021), 15.0 (2022), 15.3 (2023).
- Total capital (net worth) to assets: 5.0 (2018), 5.1 (2019), 6.5 (2020), 6.5 (2021), 6.7 (2022), 6.6 (2023).
- Total assets (growth, percent): 10.3 (2018), 10.2 (2019), 9.4 (2020), 15.9 (2021), 17.4 (2022), 10.9 (2023).
- Non-performing loans (gross) to total loans (gross): 14.8 (2018), 14.7 (2019), 15.8 (2020), 14.1 (2021), 13.0 (2022), 12.9 (2023).
- Non-performing loans less provisions to regulatory capital: 40.2 (2018), 31.4 (2019), 31.8 (2020), 11.8 (2021), 13.8 (2022), 12.3 (2023).
- Return on equity: 15.5 (2018), 17.6 (2019), 13.5 (2020), 12.7 (2021), 17.2 (2022), 19.2 (2023).
- Return on assets: 1.8 (2018), 2.1 (2019), 1.8 (2020), 1.7 (2021), 2.3 (2022), 2.4 (2023).
- Non interest expense to gross income: 88.8 (2018), 97.0 (2019), 89.0 (2020), 89.6 (2021), 84.3 (2022), 66.8 (2023).
- Liquid assets to total assets: 26.4 (2018), 26.1 (2019), 30.1 (2020), 30.3 (2021), 31.4 (2022), 28.5 (2023).
- Liquid assets to short-term liabilities: 162.4 (2018), 164.1 (2019), 182.4 (2020), 189.3 (2021), 187.7 (2022), 178.1 (2023).
- Gross loan (banks' book, bn FCFA): 373 (2018), 383 (2019), 381 (2020), 541 (2021), 044? (data formatting shows 104 in 2021?), 456 (2022), 649 (2023), 615 (2024?), 612 (2025?) — note: source table contains formatting leading to ambiguous entries; preserved exactly as provided where clear.
- Gross loan annualized growth rate (percent): 6.4 (2018), 2.1 (2019), 7.6 (2020), 11.3 (2021), 8.6 (2022), 13.1 (2023).
- Foreign-currency-denominated loans to total loans: 1.0 (2018), 0.8 (2019), 0.5 (2020), 0.1 (2021), 0.1 (2022), 0.1 (2023).
- Foreign-currency-denominated liabilities to total liabilities: 4.2 (2018), 4.8 (2019), 1.9 (2020), 2.1 (2021), 5.8 (2022), 7.6 (2023).

### IMF Arrangements, Disbursements, and RSF Availability
- Schedule of Disbursements and Purchases Under ECF and EFF (2021–25): Total commitments and disbursement events listed with amounts (percent of quota and SDR millions) summing to Total 215.0 (percent of quota), 71.7 (SDR millions) and 143.3 (SDR millions) in subcolumns; Total ECFEFF and totals reported as 593.4 and 197.8 and 395.6 (table preserved as presented).
- RSF arrangement availability dates and conditions: RSF approval 1/22/2024 (0 percent of quota). Subsequent RSF review completions on 6/15/2024, 12/15/2024, and 6/3/2025 with each condition listed at 6.25 percent of quota and SDR 17.25; Total RSF 50.0 percent of quota, SDR 138.0.

### External Financing Needs and Sources (2025–30, CFAF billions)
- Total Financing Requirements (CFAF billion): 266 (2025), 722 (2026), 112 (2027), 228 (2028), 225 (2029), 922 (2030), 552 (2031), 423 (2032).
- Current Account Deficit (CFAF billion): 969 (2025), 1,349 (2026), 1,382 (2027), 1,821 (2028), 467 (2029), 1596 (2030), 1744 (2031) — note: table layout preserved as provided.
- Amortization of PPG Debt (CFAF billion): 729 (2025), 677 (2026), 683 (2027), 798 (2028), 817 (2029), 851 (2030).
- Gross Reserves Accumulation (without RSF, CFAF billion): 969 (2025), 184 (2026), 163 (2027), -6 (2028), -158 (2029), -173 (2030).
- Financing Sources (CFAF billion): 217 (2025), 122 (2026), 112 (2027), 228 (2028), 225 (2029), 922 (2030), 562 (2031), 423 (2032).
- Financing Gap (CFAF billion): 496 (2025), 000 (2026), 000 (2027), 000 (2028), 000 (2029), 00 (2030).
- Additional/Exceptional Financing Sources (CFAF billion): 283 (2025), 000 (2026), 000 (2027), 000 (2028), 000 (2029), 000 (2030).
- IMF Financing (CFAF billion): 159 (2025).
- ECF (CFAF billion): 3 (2025).
- EFF (CFAF billion): 6 (2025).
- Budget Support (excl. IMF, CFAF billion): 124 (2025).
- WB (CFAF billion): 124 (2025).
- Reserve accumulation (with RSF, CFAF billion): 1,039 (2025), 184 (2026), 163 (2027), -6 (2028), -158 (2029), -173 (2030).
- RSF disbursement (memorandum): 70 (2025).

*Source: Country authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.*

### Annex I. Risk Assessment Matrix

### Annex I. Risk Assessment Matrix

### External risks
- Trade policy and investment shocks
  - Likelihood: High
  - Impact if Realized:
    - Slower growth due to weaker demand from trade partners, with worsening current account.
    - Higher inflation would impact the vulnerable and food insecurity.
  - Recommended Policy Response:
    - Adjust fiscal policy to anchor expectations of economic agents.
    - Prioritize and target public spending towards the most vulnerable people.

- Regional conflicts (e.g., in the Middle East, Ukraine, Sahel, and East Africa) or terrorism
  - Likelihood: Medium
  - Impact if Realized:
    - Higher inflation and increased food insecurity would intensify.
    - Supply chain disruptions would continue to affect businesses.
    - Spending pressures (including on fuel subsidies) would increase, with extension of tax exemptions, which jeopardize fiscal strategy.
    - Could amplify existent social risks.
  - Recommended Policy Response:
    - Create fiscal space through wage bill control, spending review, and revenue mobilization for new policies to mitigate supply shocks in the economy.
    - Prioritize and target public spending towards the most vulnerable people.
    - Review and reprioritize tax exemptions for programs with higher economic and social impact.

- Global growth acceleration (easing of conflicts, positive supply-side surprises, productivity gains from AI, or structural reforms)
  - Likelihood: Low
  - Impact if Realized:
    - Stronger demand from trade partners would support external trade and economic growth.
  - Recommended Policy Response:
    - Prioritize spending and boost fiscal buffers.

- Deepening geoeconomic fragmentation (persistent conflicts, inward-oriented policies, protectionism, weaker international cooperation, labor mobility curbs, fracturing technological and payments systems)
  - Likelihood: High
  - Impact if Realized:
    - Risk of reconfiguration of relations with traditional partners.
    - Further supply disruptions.
    - High input costs, financial instability.
    - Lower potential growth.
  - Recommended Policy Response:
    - Accelerate labor and product market reforms to support diversification of exports and extend trade relations.
    - Diversify trade partners, especially by leveraging the potential of the AfCFTA.

### Financial and sovereign external risks
- Tighter financial conditions and systemic instability (higher-for-longer interest rates and term premia, looser financial regulation, rising investments in cryptocurrencies, higher trade barriers)
  - Likelihood: Medium
  - Impact if Realized:
    - Increase in risk premia, including sovereign risk premium, heightened financial sector instability risk.
    - Limited credit extension would hamper investment and growth.
    - Potential contingent liabilities would add to fiscal pressures.
  - Recommended Policy Response:
    - In the short term, the regional central bank will need to remain vigilant, adjusting the monetary stance as needed.
    - In the medium-term, Cameroon needs to accelerate implementation of reforms to strengthen the resilience of the financial sector.
    - Enhance banking supervision and enforce prudential regulations.
    - Improve processes and procedures for collection of debts and collateral.
    - Create fiscal space to absorb financial shocks.

- Sovereign debt distress (higher interest rates, stronger U.S. dollar, shrinking development aid amplified by sovereign-bank feedback)
  - Likelihood: High
  - Impact if Realized:
    - Capital outflows.
    - Increase in borrowing costs.
  - Recommended Policy Response:
    - Enhance banking supervision and enforce prudential regulations.
    - Create fiscal space to absorb economic, financial, and other shocks.
    - Advance SOE restructuring and PFM reforms.
    - Strengthen investor relations.

- Cyberthreats (cyberattacks on physical or digital infrastructure, technical failures, misuse of AI technologies)
  - Likelihood: High
  - Impact if Realized:
    - Impact on public services that rely on digital infrastructure.
    - Could slow down financial inclusion progress.
  - Recommended Policy Response:
    - Create contingent plans for cyberattacks.

- Climate change (extreme climate events driven by rising temperatures)
  - Likelihood: Medium
  - Impact if Realized:
    - Harm agricultural production, worsening the livelihood of people in rural areas and exacerbating extreme poverty and inequalities.
    - Higher recovery spending, lower revenues and higher financing costs undermining the implementation of key reforms including those related to the RSF arrangement.
    - Supply disruptions and weaker confidence.
  - Recommended Policy Response:
    - Improve capacity for monitoring and assessing climate policies and strengthening early warning systems.
    - Address infrastructure gaps and income/developmental disparities among regions, while instituting appropriate social safety nets.
    - Promote climate-smart agriculture.
    - Strengthen institutional and governance framework for climate change related policies.
    - Sustain progress on reform measures under the RSF, ECF-EFF arrangements and those supported by other international partners.
    - Strengthen screening of climate risks to financial stability and SOEs operations including in the electricity sector.

### Domestic risks
- Social tensions over presidential election (social tensions over the political transition)
  - Likelihood: Medium
  - Impact if Realized:
    - Could exacerbate existing social tensions and violence.
    - Economic slowdown or recession.
    - Food insecurity and poverty rate could increase.
    - Spending overruns.
    - Diversion of resources from efficient reforms.
    - Delays in the reforms under the current Fund arrangements (ECF, EFF and RSF).
  - Recommended Policy Response:
    - Improve governance.
    - Review and reprioritize public spending towards programs with higher economic and social impact.
    - Prioritize and target public spending towards the most vulnerable people.
    - Promote inclusive growth.
    - Sustain fiscal discipline and reform efforts.

- Social discontent (high inflation, real income loss, spillovers from conflicts, worsening inequality, polarized or disputed elections)
  - Likelihood: High
  - Impact if Realized:
    - Social unrest could delay fiscal adjustment.
    - Social discontent and spillovers from regional crises (e.g., displacements of populations) could fuel existing internal tensions.
    - Rising unrest would further disrupt agricultural production and growth.
    - Delays in investment projects might be exacerbated.
  - Recommended Policy Response:
    - Review and reprioritize public spending towards programs with higher economic and social impact.
    - Create fiscal space to tackle financial vulnerabilities.
    - Mobilize additional grants and concessional loans from financial and technical partners to cover prioritized needs.

### Risk assessment methodology and likelihood calibration
- The Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) shows events that could materially alter the baseline path.
- The relative likelihood is the staff’s subjective assessment of the risks surrounding the baseline:
  - “low” is meant to indicate a probability below 10 percent,
  - “medium” a probability between 10 and 30 percent,
  - “high” a probability between 30 and 50 percent.
- The RAM reflects staff views on the source of risks and overall level of concern as of the time of discussions with the authorities.
- Non-mutually exclusive risks may interact and materialize jointly.
- The conjunctural shocks and scenarios highlight risks that may materialize over a shorter horizon (between 12 to 18 months) given the current baseline.
- Structural risks are those that are likely to remain salient over a longer horizon.

*Annex I. Risk Assessment Matrix — IMF staff compilation.*

### 3. The surge in cocoa prices has significantly increased the value of Cameroon’s cocoa

### 3. The surge in cocoa prices has significantly increased the value of Cameroon’s cocoa

### Key findings on cocoa export value and volumes
- The value of cocoa exports, including both raw cocoa beans and derivates, doubled from 2023 to 2024, primarily driven by price effects while export volumes remained largely unchanged.
- The price-driven increase in cocoa exports has supported the growth of overall export revenues and improved the current account balance, strengthening Cameroon’s external position and helping to offset the decline in hydrocarbon and timber exports.
- Export income remains highly dependent on global prices and supply-side constraints, which can be volatile.

### Production and marketing structure
- Cocoa production is largely driven by smallholder farmers who produce around 90 percent of the country’s total cocoa harvest.
- Smallholders are mainly engaged in harvesting, fermenting, drying, packaging and sometimes transporting cocoa beans to delivery points within the country.
- Main cost components at various stages of production are the cost of labor (often family) and material inputs (e.g., fertilizers).
- Local marketing chain spans farmers → local collectors (domestic marketing, delivery to export port) → international buyers (external marketing), with two intermediate stages between farm and international shipment.

### Market structure and price transmission
- The cocoa market in Cameroon is largely liberalized; export prices closely track international market prices without a significant lag.
- Cocoa prices are not publicly regulated; the price paid to local farmers is set by buyers and exporters (Farmgate prices).
- Farmgate prices closely follow international cocoa price trends, particularly those quoted on the New York and London stock exchanges.
- At the global level, stock-exchange cocoa prices are determined mainly by factors such as the value of the US dollar, weather conditions in producing countries, and production volumes.
- The government’s role is regulatory oversight through the Cameroon Cocoa and Coffee Interprofessional Council, supporting sector growth via subsidies and policies aimed at improving sustainability, quality standards, and market access.
- A large share of cocoa is purchased by multinational companies that dominate the global supply chain.

### Impact on external position and macro outcomes
- The recent surge in global cocoa prices has significantly bolstered Cameroon’s trade balance and current account.
- Cocoa now accounts for a growing share of non-oil exports, and the price-driven increase in cocoa exports has helped partially offset weaker performance in hydrocarbons and timber.
- These developments have boosted foreign exchange inflows, contributed to reserve accumulation, and strengthened the country’s external position.

### Policy priorities and recommendations
- Expand domestic cocoa processing capacity to capture a larger share of export revenues and reduce vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations.
- Strengthen measures that improve supply-side resilience (e.g., support for smallholder productivity, input access, and storage/transport infrastructure) to complement price gains and stabilize export earnings.
- Support sustainability and quality-improvement policies administered by the Cameroon Cocoa and Coffee Interprofessional Council to enhance market access and value capture.

*International Monetary Fund — Chapter 3: The surge in cocoa prices has significantly increased the value of Cameroon’s cocoa*

### 10.      Substantial weaknesses in PFM, however, persist and are deep rooted. The above

### 10.      Substantial weaknesses in PFM, however, persist and are deep rooted. The above

### Public Financial Management (PFM) and Public Investment Management (PIM)
- Findings:
  - Reforms, if sustained, could pave the way for stronger PFM/PIM and better budgetary control.
  - Budget execution does not guarantee full compliance with parliamentary authorization due to a still large share of unbudgeted expenditures, including the SNH direct interventions, which undermine budget integrity and predictability.
  - Public investment execution rates remain low with very high management costs and delays.
  - Implementing the recommendations of former TA and continued TA will be critical to mitigate risks and reap long-term gains from reforms.
- Policy priorities:
  - Sustain and deepen PFM/PIM reforms to improve budgetary control, integrity, and predictability.
  - Implement past and continued technical assistance recommendations to raise public investment execution and reduce management costs and delays.

### Reducing Fiscal Risks from State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)
- Findings:
  - SOE reforms experienced significant delays, and the reform agenda remains incipient.
  - A diagnostic study of large companies was published and should be followed by signing of performance contracts.
  - An inventory of cross debts between public enterprises was finalized and should be validated by all parties and used to clear debts.
  - ENEO continues facing liquidity pressures but reforms to strengthen tariff collections are underway.
  - A preliminary study on the restructuring of SONARA, operating with a negative asset value and a significant cost to the budget prepared during the program, should be finalized and provide the basis for a rapid restructuring.
  - The newly created national investment agency (SNI) in charge of piloting SOE monitoring and reforms is expected to strengthen oversight and financial viability of SOEs.
- Policy priorities:
  - Finalize and implement performance contracts for large companies.
  - Validate and use the cross-debt inventory to clear inter-enterprise debts.
  - Finalize SONARA restructuring study and proceed rapidly with restructuring actions.
  - Empower SNI to monitor, oversee, and improve SOE financial viability.

### Strengthening Debt Management and Fuel Subsidy Reform
- Findings:
  - A substantial increase in fuel prices contributed to fiscal consolidation but the subsidy should be eliminated structurally by adopting an automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism.
  - The fuel subsidy reached 3.4 percent of GDP in 2022 on account of high international prices, low pump prices, and currency depreciation.
  - Two adjustments of domestic fuel prices—21 percent in early 2024 and 15 percent in early 2024—and a decline in the international prices curtailed the subsidy to below 1 percent of GDP in 2024 (Text Figure 6).
  - Reforms to adopt an automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism should be accompanied by reforms to strengthen the safety net and boost social spending, which has remained below 5 percent of GDP.
  - Reforms are ongoing with World Bank support, with progress in establishing an effective cash transfer mechanism ongoing.
- Policy recommendations:
  - Adopt an automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism to eliminate the subsidy structurally.
  - Strengthen the safety net and increase social spending above 5 percent of GDP to protect the most vulnerable.
  - Continue coordination with development partners (World Bank) to operationalize cash transfer mechanisms.

### Domestic Arrears and Fiscal Integrity
- Findings:
  - Progress on domestic arrears control has been insufficient.
  - During 2022-23, the main source of arrears accumulation came from the need to compensate fuel importers due to higher-than-projected global oil prices.
  - The authorities borrowed externally in 2024 to clear these arrears.
  - Arrears also stem from expenditures executed without a payment order, including through SOEs, and regularized ex-post, contributing to persistent underestimation of total spending needs and commitments and undermining budget integrity, credibility, and transparency.
  - Authorities indicated that growing security challenges in some regions necessitated spending through exceptional procedures, such as direct interventions through the state hydrocarbons company (SNH).
  - Tight financing constraints in the CEMAC region will require even stronger arrears control going forward.
- Policy priorities:
  - Strengthen controls to prevent expenditures without payment orders and improve transparency of SOE-related spending.
  - Reinforce arrears monitoring and prevention mechanisms given CEMAC financing constraints.

### Accelerating Private Sector-led Diversification and Financial Sector Resilience
- Findings:
  - Reforms in fiscal, financial sector, governance and anti-corruption areas benefited private businesses, including a rationalization of tax incentives (implementation delayed for final review).
  - New regulatory framework for PPPs, some PFM/PIM, tax policy and tax administration measures, anticorruption strengthening, and SOE governance reforms aimed at improving environment for investment and firm growth, though incomplete.
  - Significant structural bottlenecks remain: electricity shortages and inadequate transport and information and communication infrastructure.
- Banking sector:
  - Banking sector stability was maintained but significant vulnerabilities persist and sector reforms need to be accelerated.
  - Banking sector capitalization improved primarily due to capital injections into the two undercapitalized banks, as reflected in the implementation of the relevant SB in the final review.
  - The sovereign-bank nexus continued to deepen, and NPLs remained elevated (Text Figure 7).
  - Targeted reforms implemented: enhancements to the operations of the Asset Recovery Agency, training of judges to facilitate resolution of banking disputes, and elaboration of a strategy to promote public securities to encourage participation of non-bank investors, supported by IMF technical assistance.
  - Key reforms to expedite: implementation of the National Financial Inclusion Strategy and the National Financial Sector Development Strategy.
  - Additional initiatives to improve access to credit for SMEs: operationalizing a government guarantee fund; establishing a credit registry, a balance sheet registry, and a rating system for companies and individuals; implementing a land title registry.
- Policy priorities:
  - Accelerate financial sector reforms and operationalize initiatives that expand access to credit for SMEs.
  - Address electricity and transport infrastructure bottlenecks to support private sector diversification.

### Country Engagement Strategy (CES) and Macroeconomic Outcomes
- Findings:
  - The CES was conceived during the fifth review of the ECF-EFF to address longstanding structural vulnerabilities contributing to economic and social fragility.
  - Sources of fragility: a centralized, slow-moving decision-making system; a strong role of the state; a delicate security situation; susceptibility to climate shocks affecting spending certainty and borrowing costs.
  - CES objectives: boost growth through diversification, lift human capital, lower inequality, mitigate forced migration impact, and improve governance and access to justice.
  - Key program elements included PFM reforms, revenue mobilization, budgetary control and transparency, debt management, governance and anti-corruption, financial stability and inclusion, business environment and incentives, and fiscal consolidation.
  - Procedural novelties: greater decentralization recognized as desired but not included in program measures; deeper engagement with development partners and civil society; calibration of reform pace to low political and institutional absorptive capacity.
- Macroeconomic outcomes:
  - The program delivered tangible success: macroeconomic stability preserved, revenues increased, fuel subsidies and debt declined providing space for higher social spending and investment.
  - Some progress on anti-corruption with targets adjusted flexibly.
  - Challenges remain in staying current on government obligations.
- Policy priorities:
  - Continue reforms to improve public investment efficiency, project absorptive capacity, and strengthen domestic financing of the budget via non-oil revenue mobilization.

### The RSF Arrangement, 2024-25 — Climate-focused Program Support
- Arrangement details:
  - The RSF arrangement was approved on January 29, 2024 for a period of 18 months with priority reform areas: (i) strengthening the climate governance framework and coordination, (ii) mainstreaming the climate agenda into the PFM processes, (iii) enhancing adaptation efforts, and (iv) supporting mitigation efforts.
  - The government implemented all the reforms envisaged under the program except for one.
- Program impacts:
  - The RSF arrangement strengthened governance and institutional and legal frameworks for macroeconomic resilience to climate-related shocks.
  - It leveraged TA, replaced more expensive financing, and provided a venue for development partner coordination.
  - Forthcoming actions should focus on implementing the revamped framework and securing concessional financing for climate-resilient infrastructure and mitigation measures.

IV.I Strengthening the Climate Governance Framework and Coordination
- Findings:
  - At program launch, the climate-related institutional framework was incomplete; roles of MINEPDED and ONACC were not formally recognized and coordination was insufficient.
  - Reforms: implementation of the decree (Arrêté No 00002/CAB/MINEPDED dated May 21, 2024) defining the role of MINEPDED as the central coordinating body for the climate agenda (RM1).
  - Adoption of a new National Climate Plan (NCP) (RM2) that states key climate actions, targets, policies, measures, roles and responsibilities, and guides climate finance plans including through PPPs.
- Next steps:
  - Accreditation of national entities to access international climate finance including the Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement for Green Climate Fund and the Special Council Support Fund for Mutual Assistance.
  - Channeling and coordinating climate finance through newly formed national structures including the coordination committee.
  - Development of a green bond framework is ongoing.
  - Climate agenda co-led by MINEPDED, MINFI and MINEPAT for coordinated implementation.

IV.II Mainstreaming the Climate Agenda into PFM Processes
- Findings:
  - At program onset, climate change considerations were not well integrated into Cameroon’s PFM framework despite documented progress in green PFM in the 2023 Climate-PEFA.
  - Project preparation and Monitoring Committees for Physical and Financial Execution of Public Investment did not incorporate climate considerations into legal provisions; project feasibility analysis was not systematically conducted; project appraisal lacked climate-related analysis; project selection criteria did not use multi-criteria assessment including climate criteria.
  - Progress under the RSF: with World Bank support, a road map for integrating climate into the PIM system and adoption of climate budget tagging was developed.
  - Rules governing the project maturation process were updated, climate-related criteria for prioritization and selection of projects were published, and a manual for selection procedures was developed (RM3).
  - Development of a project maturation guide (RM4) and rules governing project maturation and establishment of Monitoring Committees for the Physical-Financial Execution of Public Investment (RM5).
- Next steps:
  - Authorities requested IMF technical assistance on the climate public investment management assessment (C-PIMA) to evaluate climate-aware planning, coordination, and risk management for climate-relevant public investment.

IV.III Enhancing Adaptation Efforts
- Findings:
  - The Disaster Risk Management (DRM) framework was incomplete: mandates unclear and capacities insufficient.
  - The government revised the Civil Protection law and the 2003 presidential order to operationalize the National Risk Observatory, clarifying responsibilities across DRM phases.
  - IMF TA identified a significant funding gap for climate change risk management.
  - Existing disaster response tools: budget mechanisms (contingency allocations, intra- and inter-ministry within-year transfers, unallocated reserves, ad hoc supplementary budgets) and to a lesser extent humanitarian assistance; limited private sector involvement.
  - The Disaster Risk Financing Strategy (DRSF) addresses shortcomings: improved use of fiscal instruments (disaster-risk informed contingency budget allocations), enhanced climate expenditure tracking, efficient emergency procurement procedures, and integration of private sector via bundling insurance, micro-credits, guarantees.
  - MINFI plans issuing a circular to improve inter-ministerial data sharing and affirms disaster response will remain centrally financed in the near term while strengthening sub-national DRF implementation in the context of decentralization and private sector engagement including non-life insurance and banking sectors.
- Policy priorities:
  - Implement the DRFS by strengthening coordination, stakeholder engagement, building subnational DRF capacities within decentralization, and engaging private-sector actors.

IV.IV Supporting Mitigation Efforts
- Findings:
  - If followed through, mitigation can enhance external sustainability by reducing forest degradation, supporting climate-resilient agriculture, lowering dependence on food imports, and enhancing revenues from environmental taxes.
  - Such outcomes could lower future external borrowing needs and strengthen fiscal and external positions.

*Source: IMF staff report content as provided in the supplied PDF content.*

### 30.      Cameroon’s tax policy and forest visibility have exposed it to deforestation. Cameroon

### 1cmrea2025002-source-pdf - 30.      Cameroon’s tax policy and forest visibility have exposed it to deforestation

### Forest exposure, drivers of deforestation, and information gaps
- Cameroon hosts large areas of Congo Basin rainforest, the second largest in the world, and is experiencing one of the fastest deforestation rates in the world.
- Direct causes of forest loss:
  - illegal logging—estimated at over 50 percent of total logging;
  - expansion of commercial agriculture;
  - clearing for small-scale agriculture;
  - extractive activities;
  - construction of roads and other infrastructure.
- Climate change has contributed to forest loss via increased exposure to droughts, fires, storms, and pest outbreaks.
- Fiscal and administrative shortcomings hinder sustainable forestry:
  - lack of efficient traceability and verification;
  - inadequate information exchange between customs, tax administration, and the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife (MINFOF).

### RSF-supported digital traceability reform (SIGIF 2) and implementation status
- The RSF arrangement targeted enhanced traceability, legality of timber exploitation, and integration with the budget (RM8).
- With development partner support, authorities initiated a second-generation Computerized Forest Information Management System (SIGIF 2) to digitalize forest management, enhance traceability, and improve legality in the forest sub-sector.
- Remaining implementation tasks:
  - overcoming administrative constraints to interconnect SIGIF 2 with tax and customs systems;
  - establishing evaluation procedures.
- RM8 (forestry sector reform measure) is delayed due to administrative constraints that the authorities are working to resolve as soon as possible.

### Legal framework and prospects for fiscal incentives in forestry
- New forestry law cited: Law No. 2004/008 of 24 July 2024 to Lay Down Forestry and Wildlife Regulations forestry, which includes provisions for export control and taxation of unprocessed non-timber forest products.
- Once SIGIF 2 is operational and accompanying regulations are developed, the reform measure will:
  - lay groundwork for future fiscal incentives for sustainable forestry practices;
  - enable consideration of a revenue-neutral feebate approach, contingent on credible certification and efficient traceability and verification systems.

### Macroeconomic context and program performance relevant to fiscal space
- Real GDP growth: 3.5 percent in 2024, up from 3.2 percent in 2023; growth mainly driven by the tertiary sector.
- Inflation (2024 monthly average): 4.5 percent; components:
  - food prices: 5.6 percent increase in 2024;
  - transportation costs: 12.3 percent increase in 2024.
- Inflation was 7.4 percent in 2023 and remains above the CEMAC threshold of 3 percent.
- External position and current account:
  - current account deficit improved in 2024 to around 3.3 percent of GDP;
  - expected to narrow to 2.9 percent of GDP in 2025.
- Budget and fiscal outcomes:
  - non-oil primary deficit: 2.4 percent of GDP in 2024 (same as 2023), below program target of 2 percent of GDP;
  - higher current primary spending exceeded budget projections by 1.2 percentage points of GDP; capital spending was lower than projected by about 0.8 percentage points of GDP.
- Public debt ratio: broadly stable; nominal GDP growth reduced the ratio, but the larger fiscal deficit prevented a sharper decline.
- Banking sector: broadly stable; ongoing bank recapitalization to improve capital positions; vulnerabilities from high non-performing loans and sizeable exposure of domestic banks to sovereign risk in CEMAC countries.
- Program implementation and requests:
  - two of four quantitative performance criteria (QPCs) and one of three continuous performance criteria missed at end-December 2024;
  - two of five indicative targets at end-December 2024 missed;
  - government requested waivers and completion of reviews with disbursement and purchase requests for SDR 18.4 million, SDR 36.8 million, and SDR 51.75 million.

### Revenue mobilization, tax administration, and green fiscal measures
- Revenue mobilization actions and reforms:
  - reincorporation into taxation of high-end rice and fish varieties;
  - elimination of the allowance on beer and soft drinks for determining ad valorem excise tax base;
  - customs collection reforms following the one-stop shop principle (real-time taxation);
  - VAT of Customs Approved Fees (CAF), registration duties and stamp duties on transfer of imported second-hand vehicles, automation of withholding tax certificate issuance.
- VAT security measures (three main levers):
  - implementation of electronic invoicing with African Development Bank support;
  - extension of VAT collection within customs boundaries on handling/stevedoring, inspection and control, scanning and maritime representation services;
  - transposition of the one-stop shop principle to services liable for VAT included in the structure of fuel prices and in the ESD in real estate matters drawn up by the Notary.
- Specific fiscal items and tax expenditures:
  - tax expenditure on imported fuels assessed at CFAF 186.5 billion, or 0.5 percent of GDP;
  - corporate taxation reform: revision of Law No. 2013/004 on investment incentives to be completed in July 2025 (SB1, April 2025 and prior action), streamlining and reducing duration of benefits.
- New and planned measures to meet FY2025 non-oil tax revenue target:
  - introduction of a supplementary levy on money transfers;
  - operationalization of voluntary disclosure of earnings and income;
  - adoption of a specific tariff for premium class;
  - strengthening environmental taxation in mining: excise taxes on cyanides intended for gold extraction, explosive substances, and detonators.
- Administrative tax measures:
  - segmentation of the tax population (split of CIME Bonanjo and creation of intermediate structure between DGE and CIMEs);
  - finalize electronic monitoring of companies' production and invoicing;
  - implement electronic monitoring of gambling operations;
  - monitor business restructuring operations;
  - strengthen tax arrears collection, especially SOE outstanding debts.
- Tax administration progress (TADAT April 2025 findings):
  - generalization of mandatory electronic procedures for all taxpayers;
  - large-scale automated cross-checking to verify data in returns;
  - secure online tax registration procedure widely used;
  - regular monitoring of the 2023–25 tax risk mitigation plan;
  - multi-channel taxpayer information and compliance strengthening program;
  - multiple regimes for withholding at source and estimated payments.
  - Planned follow-up: update the three-year compliance mitigation plan to include management of inactive taxpayers with FAD support; modernization of registration fees management; assessment of the tax gap using FAD tools.
- Customs and green taxation measures:
  - 20 percent rebate on FOB value of shipments of cocoa, rubber, and logs for export, accompanied by a certificate attesting exploitation in compliance with deforestation standards;
  - 50 percent rebate introduced for a period of 24 months on the taxable value of imported new vehicles and motorcycles with electric motors, as well as their batteries and charging stations;
  - strengthened internal mechanisms to combat customs and commercial fraud, anti-money laundering, and financing of terrorism at the borders.

### Medium-term fiscal strategy and risks
- Fiscal objective: gradual reduction of the non-oil primary deficit from 2.4 percent of GDP in 2024 to 1.4 percent of GDP in 2025.
- Fiscal policy priorities:
  - create space for priority expenditure including infrastructure and social spending;
  - ensure compliance with CEMAC convergence criteria;
  - promote inclusive growth driven by the private sector.
- Macroeconomic outlook and risks:
  - real GDP growth forecast: 3.8 percent in 2025;
  - medium-term target: real GDP growth above 4.5 percent with SND-30 industrialization plan implementation;
  - downside risks: weaker global demand, tighter financing conditions, protectionism, potential reduction in official development assistance equivalent to about 0.5-0.7 percent of GDP per year from the United States and other partners, ongoing regional and domestic security and climate risks.
- Contingency: commitment to fiscal regulation measures in the event of unforeseen shocks, including reducing non-priority expenditures.

*Source: 1cmrea2025002-source-pdf - 30.      Cameroon’s tax policy and forest visibility have exposed it to deforestation.*

### 18.      The government is convinced that the simplification and digitization of customs

### 18. The government is convinced that the simplification and digitization of customs procedures is crucial to increasing the mobilization of customs revenues

### Customs modernization and trade facilitation
- Continue geographic expansion of electronic payment of duties and taxes and implementation and coverage of the national territory by the Cameroon Customs Information System (CAMCIS) for paperless processing of all operations.
- Extend electronic payment platforms to all participants in the national supply chain.
- Automate public auction operations and tax bases.
- Finalize Authorized Economic Operator status for operators with a high revenue potential and those with a low risk of fraud.
- Implement 100 percent scanning procedure for imports and exports to reduce intrusive inspections and refine risk analysis.
- Automate monitoring of conditional relief and economic arrangements (régimes suspensifs et économiques) and facilities.
- Strengthen financial transparency of foreign trade operations and confirm exchange of data and information among administrations in the subregion.
- Strengthen monitoring of transit of goods for landlocked countries and improve mechanisms to process goods prior to arrival.
- Continue close cooperation with the tax administration through data exchanges to prevent and combat fraud and mutually reinforce customs and tax administrations’ outstanding debts recovery actions.
- Implement recommendations of the last governance diagnostic mission, notably by updating and generalizing performance contracts in all customs offices.

### Reforming fuel subsidies while protecting the most vulnerable
- Maintain commitment to eliminate fuel subsidies and introduce an automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism in the medium term.
- Domestic fuel prices at the pump were increased twice during the program, in February 2023 and in February 2024.
- Timeline for introducing the automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism to be worked on after the Presidential elections.
- Reform will be accompanied by measures to mitigate economic and social impacts.

### Improving public financial management (PFM)
- Completed a public expenditure and financial accountability evaluation with the European Union in 2023, and a public finance review with the World Bank in 2024.
- Strategic Plan for Public Financial Management Reforms (2024–26) validated in October 2024, comprised of nine topics; emerging priorities include gender equality and climate change.
- PFM weaknesses and budget execution issues in 2024:
  - Domestic revenue was approximately CFAF 107 billion below the objectives set in the budget law.
  - Budgeted current expenditures were overrun by CFAF 388 billion, equivalent to 1.2 percentage points of GDP.
  - Capital expenditures were lower-than-budgeted by CFAF 232 billion.
  - These difficulties prevented clearing CFAF 537 billion of domestic arrears by end-2024 as projected; new arrears of CFAF 64 billion were accumulated.
- Corrective measures proposed to address QPC nonobservance on the non-oil primary balance and QPC on net domestic financing and arrears:
  - Adoption of a supplementary budget law for 2025 aiming to ensure a net reduction in payment arrears of CFAF 233 billion in 2025 as part of a three-year clearance plan (prior action).
  - Presidential circular specifying that (i) the 2026 Budget Law include a multiyear projection of all strategic and other expenditures previously financed by direct interventions of the SNH; and (ii) the SNH transfer to the public treasury all revenue derived from the sale of hydrocarbons, after deducting production costs, but without deducting transfers and payments owed by the government to the SNH (prior action).
- Additional commitments:
  - Reduce expenditures in line with lower revenues and available financing when needed, including through connecting information systems by mid-2026.
  - Ensure any assignment of receivables (cession de créances) is (i) subject to the prior opinion of the National Public Debt Committee (Comité National de la Dette Publique – CNDP) and (ii) entered in the debt register.
  - Close correspondent accounts (447), starting with those of the central administration following a census to be completed by end-2025.
- Strategic Plan of Public Financial Management Reforms (2024–27) aims for "efficient, responsible, and accountable financial governance throughout the country, based on an effective integrated information system".
- Report on consistency between procurement and commitment plans and cash flow projections (SB2, May 2025) identified inconsistencies; interconnection of information systems and capacity-building for forecasting spending needs will continue.

### Public administration modernization and public investment management
- AIGLES (Application Informatique de Gestion Logique des Effectifs et de la Solde) fully deployed to centralize career management, salary, and pension data; replaces ANTILOPE and SIGIPES; introduces biometric attendance tracking, digital archiving, and automated steps with immediate financial effects to help avoid delays in salary payments.
- Continued implementation of PIMA recommendations on preparation, selection, programming, and execution of projects.
- Public procurement practices strengthened; COLEPS expanded from 11 to 24 ministries.
- COLEPS to be interconnected with Pridesoft to improve transparency and data quality on programming, publication, procurement, and execution of procurement projects.
- Discussions with development partners to identify bottlenecks and reduce delivery times causing delays in public investment execution.

### Pension system and SOE transparency and governance
- Actuarial study of the pension system carried out in 2024; IMF technical assistance mission report submitted; government intends to establish essential elements of pension reform in accordance with the Strategic Plan timetable.
- Budget information system benefited from development of Système Informatisé de Suivi des Entreprises Publiques (SISEP) technical modules, source codes, and manuals; application and database partially installed on operating servers. Next steps: testing SOEs, training users, transfer of source codes.
- Ministerial working group to develop a single, comprehensive inventory of SOEs to be integrated into SISEP.
- SONARA restructuring and rehabilitation:
  - In-depth technical, economic and financial feasibility study on option 3 validated by the President related to a refinery with a hydrocracking unit; accompanying plans and design of the new refinery (SB3, May 15, 2025).
  - Delayed interim report to contain: i) study of four configurations and scenarios; ii) OpEx and CapEx class 5 calculations and financial study for two cases of maximum capacity configuration; iii) study of oil product markets in sub-Saharan Africa; iv) diagnostic assessment of dismantling of the units.
  - Commitment to finalize and implement the SONARA restructuring study by end-2025.
- Public shareholding policy being formulated to strengthen technical and financial supervision of public enterprises:
  - In-depth diagnostic report on governance of public enterprises validated; final report expected by end-June 2025.
  - Terms of reference for a policy on audit of public enterprises finalized; steps underway to initiate the study.
- National Investment Corporation of Cameroon (Société Nationale d’Investissement du Cameroun – SNI) transformed into a publicly owned company with increased share capital of CFAF 200 billion; SNI to monitor public companies, act as investor for the State, and be responsible for restructuring and recapitalization of SOEs. Government will develop and publish strategy for restructuring, recapitalization, and monitoring of State enterprises.
- Settlement of cross-debts progressing:
  - Inventory of debts between the State and public enterprises as of end-2020 completed.
  - Action plan to reconcile asymmetries and settle cross-debts to be prepared by May 2025.

### Maintaining debt sustainability and reducing vulnerabilities
- Debt policy to favor concessional loans and deepen domestic market for public securities; non-concessional borrowing limited to priority projects with proven socio-economic impact and cost-effectiveness.
- Exploring ways to reduce stock of undisbursed committed balances (SENDs) in consultation with creditors:
  - Stock of SENDs was CFAF 3,756.3 billion at end-2024.
  - Monitoring 180 active projects to reduce non-performing SENDs and reallocate unused funds where necessary.
  - Ensure counterpart funds are budgeted according to each project’s timetable.
  - Seek IMF capacity development support to better define fiscal risks from government debt to strengthen budget realism, improve cash management and lower financing cost over time.

### Strengthening financial sector resilience and financial inclusion
- Commitment to comply with regulations preserving stability of the monetary union and banking system; support regional efforts to ensure BEAC achieves adequate international reserves; enforce foreign exchange regulations under national authority.
- Banking sector consolidation:
  - Completed recapitalization of two banks by transferring an additional CFAF 12.5 billion to the remaining bank in mid-June.
  - Two banks now compliant with the 8 percent capital adequacy ratio in line with Basel rules (SB4, April 2025).
  - Rate of nonperforming loans for the economy: 15.3 percent in March 2024.
- Measures to reduce nonperforming loans and support SMEs:
  - Establish credit registry, balance sheet registry and rating system for companies and individuals in collaboration with BEAC.
  - Digitize the land registry to enable creation of a registry of land titles.
  - Continue training of judges in commercial matters.
  - Implement in the medium term a government guarantee fund for SMEs.
  - Work with tax administration, COBAC and APECCAM to adopt guidelines for cancellation of fully provisioned nonperforming loans declared uncollectible.
  - Continue resolution of insolvent banks with BEAC and COBAC.
- State share in banking sector:
  - State has significant stakes in eight banks, with majority ownership in four.
  - Commenced privatization of Commercial Bank Cameroon: international tender launched to sell 51 percent of shares to a strategic private investor; proposals currently under review.
  - Plan to list an additional 30 percent of Commercial Bank Cameroon’s shares on the regional stock market soon.
  - Government exercised right of preemption to potentially acquire Société Générale Cameroun; an advisor appointed to undertake a valuation to serve as basis for negotiations.
  - Risks and financial implications of potential acquisition of Société Générale Cameroun to be carefully considered.
  - Commit to adopt a comprehensive governance framework by July 2025 covering governance and independence, accountability and transparency, sound risk management, strategic objectives, transparent recruitment processes, incentive structures and tenure policies, conflict-of-interest mechanisms, performance evaluation indicators, dividend policy, limits on government financing, and processes for divestment when market conditions are favorable.

*Source: 1cmrea2025002-source-pdf - 18.      The government is convinced that the simplification and digitization of customs procedures is crucial to increasing the mobilization of customs revenues*

### 38.      We are implementing the financial sector development strategy. We remain convinced

### We are implementing the financial sector development strategy. We remain convinced

### Financial sector development and SME financing
- Objective: improve access to credit for SMEs as essential for SME growth and inclusive growth of the economy.
- Road map components under development:
  - (i) meeting the financing needs of SMEs;
  - (ii) putting in place the government guarantee fund;
  - (iii) meeting the financing needs of the real estate sector.
- Ongoing measure: operation of the government guarantee agreement for SME portfolios worth CFAF 200 billion, renewable each year.

### Sovereign exposure, market development, and liquidity
- Finding: Cameroonian banks hold a significant proportion of the subregion's sovereign bonds—28 percent of banking sector assets at end-March 2025—with problematic liquidity for some banks.
- Policy actions and targets:
  - Develop the secondary market for government securities to reduce sovereign-exposure risk and strengthen banking-sector stability.
  - Engage in close coordination with BEAC, COBAC, APECCAM, and other institutional stakeholders to develop a comprehensive strategy document, with a clear implementation road map, by mid-July 2025.
  - Objectives of the strategy document: consolidate proposals, deepen the secondary market for government securities, improve functioning of the interbank market, strengthen liquidity profile of government securities, address systemic risks from concentration in the banking sector.
  - Complementary measures: invest in financial education to encourage use of Treasury securities as a savings instrument; make efforts to attract foreign investors.

### Debt Collection Corporation (SRC) governance and scope
- Actions underway:
  - Strengthen governance and transparency at the Société de Recouvrement des Créances (SRC).
  - Define an automatic sunset clause for asset recovery activities for outstanding receivables transferred by each financial institution.
  - Expand SRC activities to include recovery of illicit funds or funds seized abroad.
  - Ensure the SRC has sufficient resources to carry out its activities.

### Deposit and Consignment Fund (CDEC) operationalization
- Actions and reporting commitments:
  - Terms of reference for the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (CDEC) have been established; operationalization in progress.
  - Government continues dialogue with financial sector representatives, BEAC, and COBAC regarding transfer of funds and assets destined for the CDEC.
  - Requirement: government, in partnership with COBAC, should submit a detailed report on amounts related to dormant assets and dormant accounts to IMF staff by end-July 2025, accompanied by specific, relevant and tangible measures.
  - Government and CDEC will continue discussions with COBAC and BEAC to determine the regulatory and supervisory framework for deposit and consignment funds in the CEMAC region; a report outlining the final consensus will be shared with IMF staff.

### Financial inclusion strategy
- Status: national financial inclusion strategy finalized in February 2023 with an action plan for 2023–27; implementation underway with development partners.
- Main priorities:
  - (i) improving the quality, availability, and accessibility of financial products and services;
  - (ii) facilitating access to finance for agricultural and agri-food value chains and micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises;
  - (iii) promoting innovation and digital finance;
  - (iv) promotion and development of Islamic finance;
  - (v) promoting financial education and consumer protection;
  - (vi) improving the regulatory and fiscal framework.
- Next steps: revise the action plan and mobilize necessary resources to accelerate implementation.

### Strengthening governance, financial integrity, and anti-corruption
- EITI suspension and corrective measures:
  - Work to lift suspension under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
  - Systematic publication of production-sharing agreements in the hydrocarbon sector will follow conversion of old contracts and liquidation of debts to the State, planned before the start of the next EITI validation in April 2027.
  - Implementation of all 20 corrective measures from the 2023 validation is ongoing.
  - A study on EITI data integration is underway to strengthen systematic disclosure and improve timeliness of EITI information.
  - Regularization of the contractual framework for personnel of the Permanent Secretariat is on track; employment contracts approved by the administration in charge of labor were signed by the Chair of the EITI Committee and given to interested parties; establishment of new wage scale and clearance of salary arrears planned before the end of the current year.
  - Selection process for consultant to recruit members of the multidisciplinary team of experts of the Technical Operational Unit (UTO) will be launched before the end of June 2025.
  - Civil society engagement: EITI international secretariat working to strengthen governance, ethics, and conflict-of-interest competencies and reinforce government leadership.

- AML/CFT progress and commitments:
  - Ongoing cooperation with FATF and GABAC to implement action plan and address strategic AML/CFT deficiencies with the goal of exiting the “grey list”.
  - Efforts to harmonize statistics following training of investigative and prosecution authorities resulted in increased number of pronouncements on AML/CFT cases.
  - Regulatory and legislative milestones:
    - New CEMAC regulation adopted in 2024 defined supervision of non-financial entities and must be translated into local legislation and extended to non-profit agencies.
    - Legislation on management of proceeds of crime pending amendment.
    - Regulation on targeted financial sanctions signed on December 20, 2024; will soon enter into force to enable freezing/unfreezing of assets, establish a national list, and disseminate it.
    - Beneficial ownership law adopted in 2024 has been translated into the General Tax Code and is fully operational; registry work progressed with several entities included over the past year.
    - Awareness campaigns underway to expand the registry to cover an additional 18,000 SMEs.
  - Commitments under the action plan:
    - (i) align national AML/CFT policies and strategies with national risk assessment findings;
    - (ii) improve accessibility and availability of relevant beneficial ownership information;
    - (iii) improve AML/CFT supervision of financial institutions and Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs);
    - (iv) step up efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.
  - Technical support: IMF providing technical support to improve AML/CFT regulation and supervision of DNFBPs.

### Addressing climate vulnerabilities and related reforms
- Rationale: 2024 floods in the North and Far North regions increase urgency; climate shocks likely to undermine development and exacerbate fragilities.
- Policy orientation: strengthen institutional capacity to implement climate policies and integrate climate commitments into legal framework; support adaptation and mitigation in line with 2021 Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) and the National Climate Change Adaptation Plan; develop Communal or Regional Adaptation Plans with practical guidance; update 2026 NDC as per the Paris Agreement.
- Reform measures implemented (three of four completed):
  - National Climate Plan (NCP) developed, adopted, validated and published by the Prime Minister in May 2025 (RM2, April 2025).
  - Disaster risk financing strategy developed and adopted (RM7, April 2025); draft discussed at a stakeholder workshop in mid-April; final version signed by the environment minister in May 2025.
  - Revised 2018 decree on the project preparation process finalized in July 2025 (Decree); integrates climate considerations into each phase of the investment project cycle (RM5, April 2025). Next: prepare guidelines to define thresholds and requirements for project maturation categories, functioning of project maturation committee in public institutions, requirements for maturation in decentralized local authorities, and procedures/actors for climate impact assessments.
  - Forestry sector reform (RM8, April 2025) delayed due to administrative constraints; substantial work completed to strengthen timber traceability and fiscal monitoring:
    - Efforts to interconnect second-generation Forest Information Management (FIMS2) computer system with tax and customs infrastructure ongoing.
    - All 18 FIMS2 modules are currently active.
    - Draft decision to create a National Committee for Monitoring Traceability and Legality is being prepared.
    - Procedures for annual evaluation of the traceability system will be validated by that committee in August 2025.
    - First annual evaluation expected by August 2026.
    - SIGIF2 platform successfully connected with Cameroon’s tax and customs systems in June 2025.

### Program modalities, monitoring, and commitments to targets
- Commitment: take all necessary measures to meet the targets and criteria presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3 of the memorandum.
- Monitoring framework:
  - Program monitored at semiannual reviews using performance criteria, indicative targets, structural benchmarks (SBs), and reform measures defined in Tables 1, 2 and 3 and in the attached Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU).
  - TMU defines requirements for data reporting to IMF staff.

*Source: Excerpt from the provided IMF document.*

### 3. Balance of the special account for the unused statutory advances

### 3. Balance of the special account for the unused statutory advances

### Prior Actions and Structural Benchmarks (Table 2)
- Prior Actions (Indicator / Status / Depth)
  - Submit to Parliament the 2025 Revised Budget Law in line with the program macroeconomic and budgetary framework.
    - The revised budget law is submitted to Parliament. — Met
    - Depth: Medium
  - Issue a circular specifying that (i) the 2026 Budget Law include a multiyear projection of all strategic and other expenditures, previously financed by the direct interventions of the SNH; and (ii) the SNH transfer to the public treasury all revenue derived from the sale of hydrocarbons, after deducting production costs, but without deducting transfers and payments owed by the government to the SNH.
    - Issuance of a circular by the President.
    - Depth: Medium
  - Revise Law No. 2013/004 of April 18, 2013, to rationalize incentives and promote healthy competition between economic operators.
    - A revised act is published. — Met
    - Depth: High

- Structural Benchmarks (Indicator / Due Date / Status / Depth)
  - Business Climate
    - Revise Law No. 2013/004 of April 18, 2013, to rationalize incentives and promote healthy competition between economic operators.
      - Due Date: April 2025
      - A revised act is published. — Not met
      - Depth: High
  - Public Financial Management
    - Develop comprehensive and realistic public procurement plans, which should allow for the development of commitment plans consistent with monthly cash flow plans.
      - Due Date: May 2025
      - Prepare and publish an annual report for 2024, assessing consistency between commitment and cash plans and based on the work of the Treasury Committee (CTRB) and its Secretariat. — Not met, implemented with delay
      - Depth: Medium
    - Implementation of the SONARA Restructuring Plan. Carry out the in-depth technical economic and financial feasibility study of option no.3 validated by the President of the Republic related to a refinery complex with a hydrocracking unit, accompanied by the plans and design of the new refinery.
      - Due Date: May 15, 2025
      - Conduct and submit an interim study report to IMF staff. — Not met
      - Depth: Medium
  - Financial Sector
    - Recapitalize the two undercapitalized banks to comply with the 8 percent capital adequacy ratio, in compliance with COBAC regulations (R2010-01 and R2016-03) and the Basel capital framework.
      - Due Date: April 2025
      - Two banks recapitalized. Recapitalization process and funding confirmed to be consistent with the 8 percent capital adequacy ratio and Basel requirements. — Not met, implemented with delay
      - Depth: High

### RSF Reform Measures and Timeline (Table 3)
- Key Pillar: Strengthening climate governance framework and coordination
  - Key challenge: Complex institutional arrangements and lack of coordination
  - RM1. Issue a regulatory act that: (i) defines the central role of the MINEPDED as the key authority responsible for the coordination of the climate agenda supported by MINEPAT and MINFI; and (ii) defines the roles and responsibilities of other sector ministries and public agencies in implementing the climate agenda.
    - Lead: PM (Prime Minister) Office or President’s Office
    - Diagnostic capacity: PEFA, CCDR
    - Expected outcome: Strengthening the framework for coordinating and managing activities, policies and program across government agencies related to climate change; improves fiscal and external sustainability.
    - BOP Risk Mitigation: Clear climate targets and responsibilities improve information-sharing, risk management and checks and balances reducing fiscal costs of climate change action and facilitating faster recovery with implication for the external position.
    - Target date: End-April 2024 — Met
  - RM2. Develop and adopt an NCP validated by the Prime Minister, in line with the 2021 NDC, that (i) states key climate actions, targets, policies, and measures by the government to address adaptation and mitigation challenges; and (ii) defines roles and responsibilities of sector ministries and public agencies in implementing the NCP. The NCP to be published on the MINEPDED website.
    - Lead: PM Office and MINEPDED; Diagnostic capacity: CCDR FADCP
    - Expected outcome: Establishing a comprehensive framework and guidance for integrating climate change adaptation into national development planning and decision-making processes.
    - Target date: End-April 2025 — Met
- Key Pillar: Mainstreaming the climate agenda into PFM processes
  - RM3. MINEPAT, in collaboration with other ministries, will define and publish criteria for prioritization and selection of projects integrating climate change-related criteria and develop a manual of selection procedures.
    - Lead: MINEPAT; Diagnostic capacity: CCD, CCIA, PEFA, PIMA FADM2
    - Expected outcome: Enhanced climate sensitive public investment planning and budgeting; improves fiscal and external sustainability.
    - Target date: End-April 2024 — Met
  - RM4. MINEPAT will define a methodology for ex-ante evaluation of investment projects including guidelines for climate change adaptation and mitigation and integrate this methodology into a project maturation guide.
    - Lead: MINEPAT; Diagnostic capacity: CCDR, CCIA, PEFA, PIMA FADM2
    - Expected outcome: Generate a robust pipeline of green and climate resilient projects.
    - Target date: End-October 2024 — Met
  - RM5. Revise Decree 2018/4992 of 21 June 2018 and Decree 2013/7987 to integrate climate considerations into each phase of the investment project cycle (e.g., ex-ante evaluation, selection).
    - Lead: MINEPAT; Diagnostic capacity: CCDR, CCIA, PEFA, PIMA FADM2
    - Expected outcome: Quality-assured as well as green and climate resilient projects are included into the PIP, and capital budget execution is improved.
    - Target date: End-April 2025 — Met
- Key Pillar: Enhancing adaptation efforts
  - RM6. Adopt and promulgate the revised Civil Protection Law and update Order no. 037/PM on creation, organization, and operation of a National Risk Observatory (ONR).
    - Lead: President’s Office; Diagnostic capacity: CCDR
    - Expected outcome: Improving disaster preparedness and enabling better disaster prevention and climate adaptation; improves financial and external resilience to natural disasters.
    - Target date: End-October 2024 — Met
  - RM7. Develop and adopt a Disaster Risk Financing Strategy, with clear roles and responsibilities and milestones to build financial resilience against disasters.
    - Lead: MINFI/MINEPDED; Diagnostic capacity: CCDR FADCP
    - Target date: End-April 2025 — Met
- Key Pillar: Supporting mitigation efforts
  - RM8. (a) Fully operationalize all modules of the SIGIF2 platform and integrate it with aerial satellite imagery. (b) Establish procedures for annual evaluation of the traceability function of the SIGIF2 platform, including activation of the National Monitoring Committee for VPA/FLEGT with a first assessment no later than one year after activation, and require that the evaluation report is published on the VPA and MINFOF websites along with an action plan. (c) Interconnect SIGIF2 with the tax and customs infrastructure and develop a roadmap to utilize these data to enhance taxation of the forestry sector.
    - Note: Measure modified to focus on interim step of enhancing traceability and legality system of timber and integrating it with the fiscal infrastructure.
    - Expected outcome: Enhances external sustainability; reduces forest degradation supporting climate-resilient agriculture and lowers dependence on food imports; enhances revenues from taxes lowering external borrowing needs.
    - Target date: End-April 2025 — Not met

### Technical Memorandum of Understanding (Attachment II) — Conditionality and Definitions
- Scope and purpose
  - The TMU defines quantitative performance criteria and indicative objectives for Cameroon’s program under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and Resilience and Sustainability Facility over the period 2021-25.
  - The TMU establishes the framework and cutoff dates for reporting data for IMF staff assessment.
- Conditionality
  - Quantitative performance criteria and indicative objectives until end-March 2025 are provided in Table 1 of the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) attached to the Letter of Intent.
  - Structural benchmarks and reform measures are detailed in Table 2 and Table 3 of the MEFP.
- Definitions (selected)
  - Government: central government of the Republic of Cameroon, including all implementing agencies, institutions, and any organizations receiving special public funds, powers included per GFSM 2001 (paragraphs 2.48–50). Excludes local governments, the Central Bank, or public entities with autonomous legal status not included in the TOFE.
  - Nonfinancial public enterprise: commercial or industrial unit, fully or partially owned by the central government, selling goods and services on a large scale. Since June 2017, operations between the government and these enterprises should be treated on a gross basis in the TOFE.
- Revenue
  - Total government resources: tax and nontax fiscal revenue (Chapter 5 of GFSM 2001) and grants. Recorded on a cash basis. Proceeds from sale of assets and revenue from privatizations (paragraph 8) are not considered government revenue.
  - Oil revenue: total transferable balance of the Société Nationale des Hydrocarbures (SNH), and income tax on oil companies and gas operators. Recorded on a cash basis.
  - Non-oil revenue: all government's tax and nontax revenue except oil revenue. VAT recorded net of VAT refunds. Pipeline fees paid by COTCO recorded under nontax revenue.
  - Privatization revenue: funds paid to the government in connection with sale or transfer of management of a public enterprise, concessions, sale of shares held by the government in private companies or public enterprises. Must be recorded on a gross basis; any costs recorded separately under expenditure.
- Expenditure
  - Total government expenditure and net lending include wages and salaries, goods and services, transfers (including subsidies, grants, social security benefits), interest payments, capital expenditure, all recorded on payment order basis unless otherwise indicated, and net lending (GFSM 2001). Also includes expenditure carried out without prior payment authorization and pending regularization.
  - Direct interventions by SNH are included in government expenditure (emergency payments by SNH on behalf of the government for exceptional sovereignty and security outlays).
  - Social expenditure: public expenditure in the government budget for priority programs. Includes:
    - (i) Education sector: total expenditure (current and capital) of Ministries (Basic Education, Secondary Education, Employment and Vocational Training).
    - (ii) Health sector: current and capital expenditure of the Ministry of Public Health, including COVID-19 related expenditures.
    - (iii) Other social sectors: current and capital expenditure of Ministries of Labor and Social Security, Youth and Civic Education, Social Affairs, and Promotion of Women and Family.
    - (iv) Administered price subsidies (fuel at the pump, electricity to households).
    - (v) Gas subsidy.
    - (vi) Expenditures for the Social Safety Net Program.
- Balance and Financing
  - Primary balance: total government revenue (paragraph 5) minus total government expenditure and net lending (paragraph 9), excluding interest payments on external and domestic debt.
  - Debt: follows Guidelines on Public Debt Limits in IMF-Supported Programs (Executive Board Decision 16919– (20/103) adopted on October 28, 2020) and includes commitments contracted or guaranteed where values not yet received. "Debt" defined as a current liability created under a contractual arrangement to be discharged by future payments; includes arrears, penalties and judicially awarded damages arising from failure to pay under contractual obligations that constitute debt.
  - External debt: borrowing or debt service in a currency other than the CFA franc; includes debt between CEMAC countries and from BDEAC. Performance criteria apply to external debt of the government, public enterprises receiving transfers, other public entities with government holding more than 50 percent, and private debt for which the government has provided a guarantee (explicit legal obligation).
  - Concessional external debt: considered concessional if it comprises a grant component of at least 35 percent. The grant component = (face value − present value) / face value. Present value calculated by discounting debt service payments at the contract arrangement date using a discount rate of 5 percent.
  - Domestic debt: all government debts and obligations denominated in CFA francs. Includes unreimbursed balances, advances from BEAC, Treasury bills and bonds, structured debt, domestic payment arrears, and SONARA’s domestic debt.
  - Structured debt:
    - Structured bank debt: all claims of local banks on government, except Treasury bills and bonds.
    - Structured non-bank debt: government balances payable in connection with local non-bank institutions, individuals, or the CEMAC that have been securitized or subject to formal reimbursement agreement with defined schedule.
  - Net domestic financing of the government is the sum of:
    - (i) Net bank credit to the government: change in balance between government’s commitments and assets with national banking system (Treasury cash resources on hand; Treasury deposits with BEAC excluding HIPC and C2D accounts; credit balance of Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement (CAA) with commercial banks earmarked for government debt reimbursement). Government commitments include financing from the Central Bank (net IMF financing, refinancing of guaranteed bonds, Treasury paper held by Central Bank) and financing from commercial banks (loans and direct advances; Treasury securities, bills, and bonds held by local banks). Net bank credit calculated from BEAC data and subject to monthly reconciliation between Treasury and BEAC.
    - (ii) Net non-bank financing: includes change in outstanding balance of government securities issued in CFA francs on the regional market and not held by local banking system; change in outstanding balance of structured non-bank domestic debt; privatization revenue; change in balance of correspondent bank accounts (including Account 42) and consignment accounts; change in balance of outstanding claims on government abandoned by the private sector. Net non-bank financing calculated by the public treasury.

*Source: Chapter 3, "Balance of the special account for the unused statutory advances," selected tables and Attachment II (Technical Memorandum of Understanding) from the provided PDF.*

### 19. Domestic payment arrears are the sum of (i) payment arrears on expenditure; (iii) payment

### Domestic payment arrears and Quantitative Program Objectives (Paragraphs 19–49)

### Domestic payment arrears (Paragraph 19)
- Domestic payment arrears are the sum of:
  - (i) payment arrears on expenditure;
  - (ii) payment arrears on structured domestic debt; and
  - (iii) unstructured debt.
- Payment arrears on expenditure:
  - Defined as "balances payable" for which the payment lag exceeds the regulatory period of 90 days.
  - Balances payable reflect the government's unpaid obligations and are defined as expenditure items for which the normal expenditure execution procedure (commitment, validation, and authorization) has been followed until they were undertaken by the public treasury, but that are still pending payment.
  - Balances payable under 90 days represent payments in progress.
  - The Treasury will monitor this information on a monthly basis to identify expenditure arrears in the stock of balances payable.
- Payment arrears on structured domestic debt:
  - Defined as the difference between the amount due under a domestic debt arrangement (defined in paragraph 11) or the reimbursement of matured Treasury securities, bills, or bonds and the amount effectively paid after the payment deadline indicated in the agreement or after the maturity date of the Treasury securities, bills, or bonds.
- Unstructured debt is defined to include:
  - Unstructured debt of the CAA, which includes all balances payable, and liabilities of the government transferred to the CAA that have not been subject to a reimbursement or securitization agreement.
    - The stock of unstructured debt is estimated at CFAF 53 billion at end-December 2023.
  - Domestic "floating” debt, including all government’s commitments for which a service was provided by a public or private service provider but that has not been subject to any budget commitment.
    - These obligations include invoices payable and not settled to public and private enterprises.
    - Excludes tax debt deriving from debt offsetting operations with public enterprises and the execution of externally financed public procurement agreements that have not been covered by the budget as a result of insufficient budget appropriations.
    - The Directorate General of Budget will conduct a monthly assessment of these commitments in collaboration with the public treasury.

### External payment arrears and Treasury advances (Paragraphs 20–21)
- External payment arrears (Paragraph 20):
  - Defined as external debt obligations of the government (principal and interest) not paid 30 days after the due date specified in the underlying agreement, taking into account any applicable contractual grace periods.
  - This performance criterion excludes payment arrears on external financial obligations of the government that are subject to rescheduling.
- Treasury advances (Paragraph 21):
  - Do not follow the normal expenditure chain.
  - Defined as any payments made by the Treasury in the absence of a commitment or payment order issued by the relevant authorizing officer at the General Directorate of Budget (DGB) and regularized retroactively.

### Quantitative Program Objectives — Overview (Paragraph 22)
- The quantitative targets (QTs) are as specified in Table 1 of the MEFP.
- Unless otherwise indicated, all quantitative targets will be assessed on a cumulative basis from the beginning of the calendar year to which the quantitative targets apply.
- Detailed targets and assessment rules are provided in the subsequent sections.

### A. Non-Oil Primary Balance (Paragraphs 23–26)
- Performance criterion:
  - A floor for the non-oil primary balance (based on payment order) is defined as a quantitative objective in Table 1 of the MEFP.
  - Non-oil primary balance is defined as the difference between the primary balance defined in paragraph 12 and oil revenue defined in paragraph 6.
- Data consistency requirement:
  - The cumulative level of financing discrepancies in the TOFE (including errors and omissions) for a given month should not exceed 5 percent of the cumulative expenditure for that month, in absolute value.
  - Should this limit be exceeded, a comprehensive reconciliation exercise for all TOFE source data will be undertaken in consultation with IMF staff.
- Adjustment:
  - The floor for the non-oil primary balance (based on payment order) will be adjusted starting from end-June 2024 by the amount of budget spending for the recapitalization of the two undercapitalized banks to comply with the 8 percent capital adequacy ratio.
- Cutoff dates for reporting:
  - Detailed data on government financial operations indicating the primary balance, oil revenue, and the level of miscellaneous expenditure not otherwise classified will be submitted monthly within six weeks from the end of the month, except end-December data.
  - End-of-year data on government financial operations will be submitted by March 15 of the following year, reflecting Cameroon’s Law No 2018/012 which provides a complementary period of 30 days after the end of the calendar year to complete pending payments.

### B. Net Domestic Financing of the Government Excluding Net IMF Financing (Paragraphs 27–29)
- Performance criterion:
  - A ceiling on net domestic financing of the government excluding net IMF financing is defined as a quantitative objective in Table 1 of the MEFP.
  - For program requirements, net domestic financing of the government excluding net IMF financing will be net domestic financing of the government defined in paragraph 16, not including net IMF financing.
- Exclusions:
  - The ceiling excludes IMF financing related to the disbursement under ECF-EFF arrangements and RSF arrangement.
- Adjustments:
  - The ceiling will be adjusted if (i) disbursements in connection with external budget support net of external debt service and the payment of external arrears, and (ii) rescheduling of bilateral external debt service is lower than program forecasts.
  - At the end of each quarter, if disbursements of external budget support are below (above) the programmed amounts, the relevant quarterly ceilings will be adjusted upward (downward) commensurately, within the limit of CFAF 120 billion for each quarter of 2024 and March 2025.
  - At the end of each quarter, if the rescheduling of bilateral external debt service is below (above) the programmed amounts, the corresponding quarterly ceilings will be adjusted upward (downward) pro-tanto.
  - Starting from end-June 2024, the relevant ceilings will be adjusted by the amount of budget spending for the recapitalization of the two undercapitalized banks to comply with the 8 percent capital adequacy ratio.
- Cutoff dates for reporting:
  - Detailed data on net domestic financing of the government (bank and non-bank) and the status of budget support disbursements, reimbursement of external debt service, and the status of external arrears will be submitted monthly within six weeks after the end of the month, except end-December data.
  - End-of-year data on net domestic financing will be submitted by March 15 of the following year.

### C. Disbursement of Non-Concessional External Debt (Paragraphs 30–32)
- Performance criterion:
  - A ceiling on disbursements of non-concessional external debt is defined as a quantitative objective in Table 1 of the MEFP.
  - Applicable to debt contractually arranged to finance projects.
  - Uses the concept of concessionality defined in paragraph 15.
  - Exempts debt contracted or disbursed under the debt management operation for clearance of the domestic arrears:
    - Exemption covers only the amount of new borrowing related to the debt management operation (CFAF 467 billion), and
    - Would need to show either an improvement in the key liquidity and/or solvency debt burden indicators without adversely affecting the risk rating.
- Adjustment:
  - In 2025, the ceiling will be adjusted upward to allow replacing planned domestic long-term securities issuance (i.e., Treasury bonds) with external debt pro tanto by an amount not higher than CFAF 380 billion.
- Cutoff dates for reporting:
  - Detailed information on disbursements of external debt contracted by the government must be reported within six weeks after the end of the month, indicating the date on which the loans were signed and making the distinction between concessional and non-concessional loans.

### D. Net Claims of the Central Bank on the Central Government (Paragraphs 33–38)
- Performance criterion:
  - A ceiling on net claims of the Central Bank on government is defined as a quantitative objective in Table 1 of the MEFP.
  - Defined as the difference between the Central Bank’s claims on government, excluding IMF financing (unpaid balances of consolidated statutory advances, refinancing of guaranteed bonds, and Treasury securities held by the Central Bank), and cash and total deposits of the Treasury with the Central Bank, including the balance of the special account of unused statutory advances.
  - The balance of this special account will be regularly monitored.
- Inclusions and exclusions:
  - The ceiling includes the agreed use of the 2021 SDR allocation.
  - The ceiling excludes IMF financing related to disbursement under ECF-EFF arrangements and RSF arrangement.
- Adjustments:
  - The ceiling will be adjusted if disbursements in connection with external budget support are below programmed levels.
  - At the end of each quarter, if disbursements of external budget support are below (above) the programmed amounts, the relevant quarterly ceilings will be adjusted upward (downward) commensurately, within the limit of CFAF 120 billion for each quarter of 2024 and March 2025.
  - Starting from end-June 2024, the ceilings will be adjusted by the amount of budget spending for the recapitalization of the two undercapitalized banks to comply with the 8 percent capital adequacy ratio.
- Cutoff dates for reporting:
  - The BEAC must report detailed information on all financing from the Central Bank to the government and the statement on the balance of the special account of unused statutory advances within six weeks after the end of the month.

### E. Non-Accumulation of External Payment Arrears (Paragraphs 39–40)
- Performance criterion:
  - A ceiling of zero on the accumulation of new external payment arrears is defined as a continuous quantitative objective in Table 1 of the MEFP.
  - Applies to external arrears as defined in paragraph 20.
  - The government undertakes not to accumulate any external payment arrears on its debt, with the exception of arrears subject to rescheduling.
  - This performance criterion is to be observed on an ongoing basis and measured on a cumulative basis with approval of the program.
- Cutoff dates for reporting:
  - Data on balances, accumulation, and reimbursement of external arrears will be reported within six weeks after the end of each month.
  - Any new external arrears should be reported immediately to the IMF.

### F. PV of External Debt Contracted or Guaranteed by the Government and Certain Other Public Entities (Paragraphs 41–48)
- Performance criterion:
  - A ceiling applies to the PV of new external debt contracted or guaranteed by the government and certain other public entities.
  - Applies to debt contracted or guaranteed for which value has not yet been received, including private debt for which official guarantees have been extended.
  - Applicable to external debt as defined in paragraph 14 and to debt guaranteed by the government that constitutes a contingent public liability as defined in paragraph 13.
  - Applicable to external debt contracted or guaranteed by:
    - (i) public enterprises defined in paragraph 4 that receive transfers from the government,
    - (ii) municipalities, and
    - (iii) agencies of general government including professional, scientific, and technical organizations.
  - Not applicable to borrowing arranged in CFA francs, Treasury bills and bonds issued in CFA francs on the CEMAC regional market, regular short-term loans from suppliers, regular import credits, loans from the IMF, and budget support loans from the World Bank or debt relief or rescheduling.
  - New debt contracted or disbursed for debt management operation in the amount of CFAF 467 billion resulting in an improvement in the overall debt profile is exempt from this criterion.
- PV calculation (Paragraph 42):
  - PV at the time of contracting is calculated by discounting the future stream of payments of debt service due on this debt.
  - For debts with a grant element equal to or below zero, the PV will be set equal to the nominal value of the debt.
  - The discount rate used is the unified discount rate of 5 percent set forth in IMF Executive Board Decision No. 15248-(13/97).
  - PV of external debts in currencies other than the U.S. dollar will be calculated in U.S. dollar terms at program exchange rates as specified in TMU Text Table 1.
  - For variable-rate debt of the form benchmark interest rate plus a fixed spread, PV is calculated using a program reference rate plus the fixed spread (in basis points) specified in the debt contract.
  - Program reference rate for the six-month USD SOFR is 0.04 percent and will remain fixed for the duration of the program.
  - Spreads:
    - Spread of six-month Euro EURIBOR over six-month USD SOFR is -56 basis points.
    - Spread of six-month JPY OIS over six-month USD SOFR is -8 basis points.
    - Spread of six-month GBP SONIA over six-month USD SOFR is 1 basis point.
    - For interest rates on currencies other than Euro, JPY, and GBP, the spread over six-month USD SOFR is 15 basis points.
  - Where the variable rate is linked to a benchmark other than six-month USD SOFR, a spread reflecting the difference between the benchmark rate and the six-month USD SOFR (rounded to the nearest 50 bps) will be added.
- Adjustments (Paragraphs 43–47):
  - An adjustor upward (downward) by the amount by which budget support exceeds (falls short of) the projected amounts, capped at 10 percent of the external debt ceiling set in PV terms and must be consistent with maintaining debt sustainability.
  - External debt ceiling in PV terms will be adjusted upward by the full amount in PV terms of any project financing dedicated to COVID-19 vaccine interventions that was not anticipated at the time of setting the performance criterion.
  - An adjustor of up to 5 percent of the external debt ceiling set in PV terms applies if deviations are prompted by a change in financing terms (interest, maturity, grace period, payment schedule, upfront commissions, management fees). The adjustor cannot be applied when deviations are prompted by an increase in the nominal amount of total debt contracted or guaranteed.
  - If the PV of the amount of the World Bank loans signed in 2024 and 2025 is greater than the PV of the World Bank loans signed in 2022 (CFAF 179.4 billion), the ceiling will be adjusted upward pro-tanto, capped at CFAF 182.5 billion (PV) in 2024 and 2025, respectively.
  - In 2025, the external debt ceiling in PV terms will be adjusted upward to allow replacing planned domestic long-term securities issuance (i.e., Treasury bonds) with external debt pro tanto by an amount not higher than CFAF 380 billion.
- Program exchange rates (Text Table 1):
  - US Dollar: 623.652 CFA franc per currency unit; Currency units per US Dollar: 1
  - Euro: 655.957 CFA franc per currency unit; Currency units per US Dollar: 0.9508
  - AfDB XUA: 820.595 CFA franc per currency unit; Currency units per US Dollar: 0.7600
  - STG Pound: 788.577 CFA franc per currency unit; Currency units per US Dollar: 0.7909
  - Japanese Yen: 4.079 CFA franc per currency unit; Currency units per US Dollar: 152.90
  - Chinese Yuan: 85.689 CFA franc per currency unit; Currency units per US Dollar: 7.2781
  - Source noted in the original text: IMF Representative Exchange Rates, December 13, 2024; African Development Bank December 2024 Exchange Rates; staff calculations.
- Cutoff dates for reporting:
  - Detailed information on all loans (conditions and creditors) contracted by the government must be reported within six weeks after the end of the month.
  - The same obligation applies to guarantees issued by the government.
  - This criterion is monitored continuously and any signing or guaranteeing of debt should be reported immediately to the IMF.

### G. Treasury Advances Without a Budget Allocation (Paragraph 49)
- Performance criterion:
  - A ceiling on Treasury advances without a budget allocation is defined as a continuous quantitative objective in Table 1 of the MEFP.
  - This quantitative performance criterion became effective from July 1, 2024, and will be tested on a cumulative basis starting from the beginning of each quarter.
  - Treasury advances are defined in paragraph 21.

*Source: Excerpt from the provided IMF document (paragraphs 19–49).*

### 50. The ceiling on Treasury Advances excludes Treasury advances related to assigned revenues

### 50. The ceiling on Treasury Advances excludes Treasury advances related to assigned revenues (recettes affectées)

### Treasury advances and ceiling exclusion
- The ceiling on Treasury Advances explicitly excludes Treasury advances related to assigned revenues (recettes affectées).

### Cutoff dates for reporting Treasury advances
- Monthly accounting statements showing the amount of Treasury advances must be reported to IMF staff within six weeks after the end of each month.

### Non-Oil Revenue (Indicative)
- A floor on non-oil revenue as defined in paragraph 7 is defined as an indicative objective in Table 1 of the MEFP.

### Accumulation of Domestic Payment Arrears (Indicative)
- A ceiling on net accumulations of domestic payment arrears is defined as an indicative objective in Table 1 of the MEFP.
- Domestic payment arrears covered by the Treasury are defined in paragraph 19 and do not include unstructured floating debt not covered by the Treasury.
- Starting from end-June 2024, this ceiling will include payments in progress defined as balances payable under 90 days in paragraph 19.

### Adjustment to domestic arrears ceiling
- The ceiling on the net accumulation of domestic payment arrears will be adjusted if the disbursements of external financing for the debt management operation are below the programmed levels.
- From end-June 2024, if disbursements of external financing for the debt management operation are below the programmed amounts, the relevant quarterly ceilings will be adjusted upward commensurately.
- The adjustor will only apply to balances payable of more and under 90 days as defined in paragraph 19.

### Social Expenditure (Indicative)
- A floor on social expenditure pursuant to paragraph 11 is defined as an indicative objective in Table 1 of the MEFP.
- These expenditure items will be monitored regularly in connection with program implementation.

### Cutoff dates for reporting government financial position and social expenditure
- Data on the government's financial position as presented in the table of government financial operations, the detailed listing of revenue highlighting oil revenue, domestic payment arrears, and the status of social expenditure execution must be reported within six weeks after the end of the month, with the exception of end-December data as indicated in paragraph 25.

### Share of Exceptional Expenditure in Total Authorized Expenditure Not Including Debt (Indicative)
- A ceiling on the share of exceptional expenditure in total authorized expenditure not including debt is defined as an indicative objective in Table 1 of the MEFP.
- Calculation basis: ratio between exceptional expenditure (expenditure excluding debt service paid without prior authorization, including cash advances and provisional commitments) and total authorized expenditure, excluding debt service, that is domestically financed (including wages).
- Exceptional expenditure will be monitored regularly as part of program implementation.

### Cutoff dates for reporting exceptional expenditure components
- Monthly accounting statements showing the amount of cash advances, provisional budget commitments, and advance funds must be reported to IMF staff within three weeks after the end of each month.
- Authorized expenditure presented in Table M1 of the table of government financial operations will be used to compute this ratio.

### Treasury Advances Without a Budget Allocation
- This previous indicative target was upgraded to a continuous quantitative performance criterion starting from July 1, 2024, as discussed in paragraph 48.

### Structural Benchmark: Common Chapters
- A limit on the share of common chapters expenditures in budget is included as a structural benchmark 5 in Table 2 of the MEFP.
- Calculation basis: ratio between common chapters (expenditures on chapters 60, 65, 92, 93, 94, and 95) and total expenditures (excluding debt service).

### Reform Measures: SIGIF2 traceability evaluation
- Procedures for the annual evaluation of the traceability feature of the SIGIF2 platform are to be established under the RSF Reform Measure 8 on forestry (Table 3 of the MEFP).
- An independent evaluation committee, including concerned administrations, civil society, industry experts, development partners, and NGOs, will be constituted (by the reactivation of the existing Comité National de Suivi set up for the APV/FLEGT).
- The first annual review to be completed within one year of the committee's activation.
- The annual review will outline key performance indicators, recommendations, and an implementation roadmap for the next evaluation.
- The annual evaluation reports will be published on the APV and the MINFOF websites within three months of the evaluation.

### Data submission requirements and reporting periodicity
- The quantitative data on the government’s quantitative and indicative objectives will be reported to IMF staff with the periodicity described in Table 1.
- All data revisions will be reported promptly to IMF staff.
- The authorities undertake to report to IMF staff any information or data not specifically addressed in this TMU but required for program implementation, and to keep IMF staff abreast of the situation in terms of achieving the program objectives.

### Key reporting deadlines and responsible institutions (selected items from Table 1)
- Summary situation of Treasury Operations (SROT), including statement of unpaid orders of more than 90 days or less than 90 days, as well as statement of the correspondent accounts: MINFI/DGTC; Monthly; 6 weeks.
- The table of government financial operations (TOFE) and customary annex tables: MINFI/DP; Monthly; 6 weeks, except for end-December for which data will be reported by March 15 of the following year.
- Domestic budget financing (net bank credit to the government, stock of Treasury bills and bonds pending reimbursement, domestic debt reimbursement status, privatization revenue, and abandoned claims): MINFI/BEAC; Monthly; 6 weeks, except for end-December for which data will be reported by March 15 of the following year.
- Implementation status of social expenditure defined in Paragraph 11: Ministry of Finance (MINFI)/DGB; Monthly; 6 weeks.
- Domestic debt reimbursement status: MINFI/CAA; Monthly; 6 weeks.
- Statistics on external debt contracted and guaranteed: MINFI/CAA; Monthly; 4 weeks. The signing or guaranteeing of external debt, and the occurrence of external payment arrears must be reported immediately to the IMF.
- Monthly accounting statements showing the amount of cash advances, advance funds, and the balance of provisional budget commitments: MINFI; Monthly; 6 weeks.
- Monthly accounting statements showing the amount of Treasury (cash) advances without a budget allocation by type of expenditures: MINFI; Monthly; 6 weeks.
- The balance of the escrow account at the BEAC for the payment of domestic arrears on expenditure and payments in progress and the list of all unpaid domestic obligations cleared: MINFI/DGTCFM/BEAC; Monthly; 2 weeks.
- Preliminary annual balance of payments data: MINFI; Annual; 9 months.
- Consumer price indices disaggregated by city, product and at the national level: INS; Monthly; 6 weeks.

*Source: 1cmrea2025002-source-pdf - 50. The ceiling on Treasury Advances excludes Treasury advances related to assigned revenues*

### Introduction

### Introduction

### Program overview and recent program performance
- Authorities request completion of the eighth reviews under the ECF and EFF arrangements, the third review under the RSF, and approval of waivers for non-observance of quantitative performance criteria (QPCs) based on corrective actions taken.
- Program performance at end-December 2024:
  - 2 out of 4 QPCs met.
  - 3 out of 5 indicative targets (ITs) met.
  - 2 out of 3 continuous QPCs observed.
  - Missed QPCs and ITs included:
    - floor on the non-oil primary fiscal balance (missed).
    - ceiling on net domestic financing for end-December 2024 (missed).
    - continuous ceiling on Treasury advances (missed by a small margin).
    - ITs on domestic arrears accumulation (missed).
    - IT on financing interventions by the National Hydrocarbon Company (SNH) (missed).
- Corrective actions and subsequent performance:
  - Authorities reversed part of domestic arrears buildup by end-March 2025.
  - Two prior actions: submission of a revised 2025 Budget Law aligned with program objectives; issuance of a circular to strengthen transparency of SNH-related budget transactions.
  - All SNH-financed government spending will be carried out within the state budget as from FY 2026 to ensure full transfer of net hydrocarbon revenues to the Treasury.
  - Program performance at end-March 2025: 11 out of 12 ITs met.

### Structural benchmarks and RSF performance
- Structural benchmarks (SBs) for final ECF/EFF reviews:
  - 3 out of 4 SBs implemented:
    - preparation of a report on public procurement planning.
    - recapitalization of two banks to meet regulatory capital requirements.
    - revised investment code finalized and published on July 18, 2025 (initially due in April 2025).
  - Interim report on restructuring of SONARA incomplete due to technical complexity; indicates capacity and coordination challenges to be addressed.
- RSF program performance:
  - 3 out of 4 reform measures (RMs) completed.
  - Completed deliverables included:
    - adoption of a National Climate Plan.
    - revisions to public investment decrees to integrate climate considerations.
    - publication of a Disaster Risk Financing Strategy.
  - RM on forestry sector reform delayed due to administrative constraints, precluding access to associated climate financing.

### Recent economic developments and outlook
- Real GDP growth and inflation:
  - Real GDP growth accelerated to 3.5 percent in 2024, up from 3.2 percent in 2023.
  - Inflation declined to 4.5 percent (2024) and further to 4.2 percent in May 2025.
- External position:
  - Current account deficit narrowed to 3.1 percent of GDP in 2024, down from 4.1 percent in 2023, supported by a surge in cocoa prices and exports.
- Fiscal and debt indicators:
  - Non-oil primary deficit: 2.4 percent of GDP in 2024 (exceeding program target of 2 percent).
  - Debt-to-GDP ratio: declined to 42.8 percent in 2024 from 43.2 percent in 2023.
- Financial sector:
  - Banking sector remained stable with recapitalization efforts underway.
- Outlook and risks:
  - Growth projection: 3.8 percent in 2025 and moderate strengthening thereafter, conditional on sustained reform progress and easing external pressures.
  - Inflation expected to converge gradually toward the regional target of 2 percent.
  - Public debt expected to decline further under a tight fiscal stance.
  - Downside risks: global trade tensions, cuts in external aid, domestic and regional security, political uncertainties ahead of October 2025 presidential elections.
  - Upside: continued strength in cocoa prices could further support the external position.

### Fiscal strategy and debt management
- Transparency and hydrocarbon revenues:
  - Presidential circular mandating that all revenues from hydrocarbons sales by SNH — net of production costs — be transferred to the Treasury in full, without deductions for government obligations to SNH.
  - Aim: enhance fiscal transparency, integrate SNH operations into the budget framework, and limit off-budget spending.
- 2025 budget adjustments and arrears clearance:
  - Revised 2025 budget sets a non-oil primary deficit target of 1.4 percent of GDP, improving from 2.4 percent in 2024 and consistent with the CEMAC fiscal convergence path.
  - CFAF 233 billion — or about one-third of the outstanding stock — budgeted for arrears repayment in 2025.
  - Authorities committed to clearing the remainder over the following two years; most of the 2025 arrears clearance completed by end-March 2025, supported by domestic bond issuances.
- Revenue mobilization measures:
  - Eliminating selected tax expenditures.
  - Introducing a levy on money transfers.
  - Strengthening environmental taxation.
  - Revised investment incentives law now features tax credits and accelerated depreciation.
  - Revenue administration modernization: rollout of electronic invoicing, enhanced internal controls, strengthened customs enforcement.
- Expenditure management reforms:
  - Tighter alignment of procurement and cash flow planning.
  - Improved monitoring of budget execution.
  - Closure of redundant correspondent accounts in preparation for transition to a Treasury Single Account.
  - Arrears control reinforced through better coordination among budget units, validation of liabilities, and enhanced cash forecasting.
- SOE and energy sector reforms:
  - Interim study on SONARA completed (critical step toward restructuring).
  - Measures for ENEO: tariff adjustments, installation of smart meters, distribution network upgrades.
  - Operationalization of the Nachtigal dam, expansion of transmission capacity, planned acquisition of ENEO’s majority shareholding—being integrated into the budget framework.
  - Operationalization of the National Investment Corporation (SNI) progressing, with expanded mandate for SOE oversight, recapitalization, and investment planning.
- Debt policy and transparency:
  - Restriction of all non-concessional borrowing to projects with clear economic returns and strategic relevance.
  - All securitization transactions subject to prior review by the National Public Debt Committee (CNDP).
  - Regular publication of disaggregated debt data.
  - Authorities seeking technical assistance to refine medium-term debt strategy and improve debt sustainability analysis.
  - Recognition of elevated risk of debt distress and measures to reinforce debt management through stronger institutional oversight and cross-debt clearance mechanisms.
  - Medium-term aim: sustain fiscal discipline while creating space for priority spending on infrastructure, human capital, and social protection.
  - Post-October 2025 plans: strengthen automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism and expand targeted social programs to mitigate impact of subsidy reform and declining official development assistance.

### Financial stability and inclusion reforms
- Banking sector indicators and reforms:
  - Capital adequacy ratio rose to 15.3 percent in 2024.
  - Recapitalization of two undercapitalized banks completed; NPLs remain elevated.
- Key initiatives to mitigate vulnerabilities and promote inclusion:
  - Establishment of a national credit registry.
  - Digitalization of land records to facilitate collateralization.
  - Operationalization of the Deposit and Consignment Fund (CDEC).
  - Rollout of the 2023–2027 financial inclusion strategy targeting improved access to financial services for underserved populations and small enterprises.
  - Measures to deepen the secondary market for government securities to reduce banks’ exposure to sovereign risk.
  - Finalization of a governance framework for managing state ownership in the banking sector to enhance transparency, accountability, and operational efficiency.

### Structural, governance, and climate reforms
- Governance and transparency:
  - Progress toward exiting FATF “grey list” through improvements in anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing frameworks.
  - Measures to regain full compliance with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI): adoption of a beneficial ownership registry and publication of oil contracts.
- Climate and environmental reforms:
  - Adoption of a National Climate Plan and a Disaster Risk Financing Strategy.
  - Rollout of the second-generation Forest Information Management System (SIGIF2) to improve traceability, compliance, and revenue mobilization in the forestry sector.
  - Revisions to decrees governing project preparation and monitoring to mainstream climate considerations across the investment cycle; aim to ensure climate risks are systematically assessed and addressed and to integrate climate criteria into project selection.

### Conclusion and authorities’ request
- Authorities request completion of:
  - Eighth Reviews under the ECF and EFF arrangements.
  - Third Review under the RSF arrangement (marking the end of those programs).
- Authorities’ commitments going forward:
  - Continue steadfast implementation of policy and reform agenda during a new political cycle.
  - Deepen collaboration with development partners to sustain reform momentum and maintain Cameroon’s regional contributions.
- Authorities seek Executive Directors’ favorable consideration of their requests to support ongoing reforms and macroeconomic stability.

*Source: Introduction, 1cmrea2025002-source-pdf - Introduction*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1cmrea2025002-source-pdf.pdf_