## 1eurea2025011

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### Executive summary — purpose, scope, and context
- Purpose: assess whether euro area (EA)/EU-level institutional arrangements and the supervisory framework (not individual CMU legislative measures) are “fit for purpose” to manage risk under a successful expansion of capital markets, with particular focus on ESMA’s supervisory and supervisory-convergence roles and potential financial stability risks from enlarged capital markets with increased retail participation.
- Key contextual findings:
  - Fragmentation driven by national differences in securities, corporate, tax and pensions laws and policies, creating legal uncertainty (for example, choice of applicable law and treatment of cross-border financial investments in insolvency) and barriers to cross-border provision of investment products.
  - Wide variation across member states’ capital markets with scope for further deepening; no clear pattern distinguishing EA from non-EA member states.
  - Some EU markets are “developed”, others “emerging”, “frontier” or “standalone”, affecting index inclusion and fund flows.

### ESMA’s evolution, supervisory posture, and organizational approach
- ESMA has progressively taken direct supervision of entities primarily posing conduct and operational-resilience risks (examples: credit rating agencies, certain benchmark administrators, firms providing market data infrastructure).
- ESMA has established a structured approach to identifying and prioritizing inherent and control risks, and has used supervisory and enforcement actions and communicated supervisory expectations.
- As maturity increased, ESMA should:
  - articulate the appropriate risk tolerance and resources for its direct supervision work;
  - prepare stakeholders that no regime delivers “zero-failure” and make structured internal trade-offs between risk and resources as mandates expand.
- Organizational approach to supervised entities:
  - Supervision grouped in a single Conduct Supervision Department covering licensing, supervision, and investigation for directly supervised entities.
  - Main groupings and key risks:
    - market transparency infrastructures (MTIs): digital operational resilience and data quality/availability;
    - CRAs: integrity of rating methodology and conflicts of interest;
    - critical benchmarks: integrity and prevention/management of system-wide shocks from non-availability.

### Scope and scale of current and expected ESMA supervision (counts and examples)
- Entities under ESMA supervision (at mission time):
  - 23 CRAs;
  - 11 Benchmark Administrators (of which only one is an EU-based critical benchmark provider and 10 are third-country administrators recognized in the EU, one of which provides significant benchmarks);
  - 17 market transparency infrastructures (comprising 8 DRSPs, 4 trade repositories under EMIR, three Trade repositories under SFTR and two securitization repositories).
- Expected expansions:
  - Consolidated tape providers (CTPs) and external reviewers of EU Green Bonds due to take effect in 2026;
  - ESG Rating Providers due in 2027.
- Example: Table 3 — Class 1 Investment Firms prudentially supervised by the SSM (entity — country):
  - KBC Securities NV — Belgium
  - Citigroup Global Markets Europe AG — Germany
  - Morgan Stanley Europe SE — Germany
  - BNP Paribas Financial Markets — France
  - Portzamparc — France
  - BofA Securities Europe SA — France
  - Pro Capital — France
  - CI-B SG Option Europe — France
  - Source: SSM List of supervised entities, cut-off January 2025

### Regulatory architecture and remaining national dependencies
- Multi-layered EU legislative process:
  - Level 1: primary legislation proposed by the European Commission and negotiated by Council and Parliament.
  - Level 2: delegated acts, regulatory technical standards, implementing technical standards developed by ESAs (ESMA, EBA, EIOPA) and adopted by the Commission.
  - Level 3: “guidelines” addressed to competent authorities and/or market participants; ESMA can initiate Level 3 measures with “comply or explain” obligation for NCAs.
- ESMA can only draft Level 2 measures when expressly mandated by Level 1 and has no autonomous regulatory power.
- Persistent national dependencies: corporate, securities, insolvency laws largely unharmonized; asset safeguarding and segregation specifics determined at national level despite EU-wide principles.

### CCP supervision, EMIR, and supervisory coherence
- ESMA has built technical expertise in CCPs and recognizes third-country CCPs that accept EU participants or provide services to EU trading venues; of 37 third-country CCPs recognized at mission time, two were Tier 2 and the remainder Tier 1.
- EMIR requires validation of significant model changes and stress-test submissions for Tier 2 CCPs, which can be resource-intensive even when actions are risk-reducing.
- Under EMIR 3, ESMA will play an enhanced role for 14 EU CCPs while NCAs remain lead supervisors; ESMA will co-chair supervisory colleges and has expanded opinion powers.
- Considerations:
  - fine-tuning processes for third-country Tier 2 CCPs guided by risk and the letter of EMIR;
  - reinforce linkage between ESMA’s risk analysis and supervisory response;
  - evaluate potential benefits of phased “opt-in” consolidation of EU CCP supervision with coordination with central banks, NCBs, NCAs, and NRAs.

### Funding, governance, and powers — gaps and needs
- Funding and budgetary framework:
  - ESMA funded by fees from supervised participants, contributions from NCAs, and EU Budget contribution; fee models and timelines set in eight separate Commission implementing regulations and operate under full cost recovery for each mandate.
  - Limits: seven-year Multi-annual Financial Framework caps EU subsidy; preparatory work for new mandates often must be covered from ESMA’s running budget unless Legislative Financial Statement provides EU funding.
  - Recommendation: sustainable funding consolidated in founding regulation (ESMAR) including ability to spend on preparatory work, powers to hold reserves, and ability to set fees.
  - Suggested reduction in the share of budget contribution from NCAs to avoid disincentives to consolidation.
- Powers and legal gaps:
  - Sectoral legislation prescribes ESMA’s direct supervisory powers but often ties practical powers to formal investigation or enforcement processes; limited regular supervisory powers outside investigations.
  - Example gap: lack of power to remove a natural person from the management board of a supervised entity (contrasted with Article 69(2)(u) of MiFID II for NCAs).
  - Suggested “default” supervisory tools to be established by ESMAR to enable proportionate, targeted interventions without proof of a breach (examples listed below under recommendations).
  - Article 9a “no-action letters” power is practically limited to submitting opinions; ESMA cannot direct NCAs or market actors.
- Governance concerns:
  - Board of Supervisors (BoS) composition (ESMA Chair + heads of NCAs) and EC participation in some bodies may impair perceived independence and timeliness of decisions.
  - Suggested governance revisions: add independent non-executive directors; enhance delegation to a smaller decision-making group; ensure operational independence from the European Commission and co-legislator.

### Retail investor participation, client asset protection, and investor compensation
- Retail participation increase must be accompanied by effective investor protection across the EA.
- Key safeguards on segregation and safeguarding of client assets are largely national; adequacy of legal protections (including insolvency treatment) and supervisory assurance require careful examination.
- Supervisory convergence by ESMA needed to ensure NCAs can effectively supervise client asset protection and investor compensation arrangements.
- Investor compensation arrangements:
  - Current minimum coverage threshold under the Investor Compensation Schemes Directive is €20,000; consideration should be given to adequacy.
- Retail risks:
  - New investors may not appreciate lack of deposit-guarantee safety nets; savers moving from deposit protection up to €100,000 face different risk/reward profiles and potential “mis-selling”.
  - Operational risks for firms (cyber-attacks, fraud, safeguarding failings) could jeopardize client assets.
  - Suggested ESMA outputs: supervisory briefing on client asset supervision and a “playbook” for dealing with failing firms holding client assets.

### CMU action plans, progress, and risks to financial stability
- CMU history and actions:
  - Initial CMU Action Plan outlined 33 actions (relaunch securitization, facilitate cross-border fund distribution, optimize prudential calibrations, simplify prospectuses, address insolvency barriers, clarify securities ownership, address tax bias).
  - 2017 mid-term review added objectives: strengthen ESAs’ powers, foster fintech, promote sustainable finance, introduce Pan-European Pension Product, support local capital markets.
  - Achievements include: Prospectus Regulation, Securitization Regulation, and amendment of the Venture Capital Regulation.
  - ESAs Review 2019 strengthened ESMA’s supervisory convergence tools and direct supervision of some market actors.
  - EMIR review (in force 2020) strengthened ESMA’s powers over EU and third-country CCPs.
  - 2024 new Commission plan and reports by Letta, Draghi, Noyer proposed differing supervisory centralization approaches.
  - 2020 Action Plan priorities included Single Access Point, ELTIF enhancement, Listing Act, AIFM directive review, and MiFID II review (legislative initiatives entered into force in 2024).
- CMU and systemic risk considerations:
  - Deeper capital markets can enhance private risk-sharing, reduce fragmentation, and decrease dependence on bank financing.
  - Risks include emergence of less transparent/regulated private markets, complexity requiring strengthened supervision, fragmented supervisory ecosystems overlooking cross-border risks, and the need to retain national expertise.
  - Centralizing supervision without careful planning could increase risk through diversion of supervisory capacity and political capital.

### Supervisory convergence, data, and baseline gaps
- ESMA’s Article 29 mandate: foster effective supervision by NCAs and convergent application of EU rules; build common supervisory culture and consistent practices.
- Evolving toolkit includes Common Supervisory Actions and Principles on Risk Based Supervision (RBS) developed within the Senior Supervisors Forum (SSF).
- Gaps and risks:
  - Risk of convergence work focusing on advanced markets and leaving smaller NCAs with limited role and resources.
  - ESMA does not systematically collect data on NCAs’ supervisory frameworks, powers used, resources available, or detailed supervision programs, limiting system-wide baseline assessment similar to banking.
  - Need to ensure baseline supervisory capabilities in member states hosting “emerging” or “frontier” markets.

### Lessons from past mandate transfers and operational learning
- ESMA faced a learning curve in new mandates; early years require extra supervisory effort until business-model understanding, data, and relationships are established.
- Transfer of DRSP supervision highlighted:
  - loss of synergies where DRSPs are ancillary to trading venue supervision;
  - ESMA’s full cost recovery fee model led to materially higher fees than NCAs, prompting some DRSPs to reconsider operations;
  - initial supervisory intensity was perceived as high but relationships matured over time.
- Lessons for future transfers:
  - avoid sudden fee increases;
  - clearly articulate initial priorities and expectation of more intensive engagement early in regimes;
  - reflect on splitting supervision of closely related services between ESMA and NCAs.

### Key recommendations (excerpted and preserved from Table 1)
- Supervision and Supervisory Convergence
  - 1. ESMA should articulate the appropriate risk tolerance and resources to attach to its direct supervision work. — Addressee: ESMA; Priority: H; Timeframe: I
  - 2. ESMA should maximize the use of remediation tools without the need for formal investigations or the imposition of sanctions. — Addressee: ESMA; Priority: H; Timeframe: ST
  - 3. ESMA should further elaborate on intervention strategies and the choice of appropriate tools in its internal supervisory manual. — Addressee: ESMA; Priority: H; Timeframe: ST
  - 4. For CCP supervision: ESMA should reinforce the connection between its risk analysis work and its supervisory response. — Addressee: ESMA; Priority: H; Timeframe: ST
  - 5. Supervisory convergence work should focus on ensuring that a core capability in fundamentals of supervision is in place across all NCAs at different stages of market development. — Addressee: ESMA; Priority: H; Timeframe: MT
  - 6. ESMA should continue to develop its RBS Principles for use in supervisory convergence as regards use of intervention tools and escalation approach. — Addressee: ESMA; Priority: M; Timeframe: MT
- Powers, Governance and Resources
  - 7. ESMA should have a wider ‘default’ set of supervisory tools established by ESMAR, which it is able to use to reduce risk without proof of a specific breach. — Addressee: EC; Priority: H; Timeframe: ST
  - 8. ESMA should have a stable funding framework set out in ESMAR, including: (i) the ability to spend on the EU budget for preparatory work before it is able to charge fees to the relevant entities; (ii) powers to hold reserves, (iii) the ability to set fees. — Addressee: EC; Priority: H; Timeframe: ST
  - 9. The EU should consider a reduction in the share of the budget contribution to ESMA from NCAs. — Addressee: EC; Priority: H; Timeframe: ST
  - 10. ESMA’s governance arrangements should be revised to allow for fully efficient and independent decision making. New arrangements should ensure independence from individual MS interests. — Addressee: EC; Priority: H; Timeframe: ST
  - 11. The authorities should self-assess against IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles for Securities Regulation before the next ESA review, with particular regard to Principles 1-4 and ESMA’s supervisory mandate. — Addressee: EC, ESMA; Priority: H; Timeframe: ST
- Transition Planning
  - 12. Authorities should ensure thorough, funded transition planning for the transfer of any additional mandates to ESMA to ensure that existing capabilities are maintained and enhanced. — Addressee: EC, ESMA; Priority: H; Timeframe: ST
  - 13. For any transition of CCPs supervision: ensure appropriate arrangements for co-operation with central banks and, if the need arises, National Resolution Authorities. — Addressee: EC, ESMA; Priority: H; Timeframe: N/A
- Scope and Focus of CMU Initiative
  - 14. Authorities should ensure the framework for investor protection continues to be fit for purpose, including the minimum coverage threshold under the Investor Compensation Schemes Directive. — Addressee: EC; Priority: M; Timeframe: MT

### Practical supervisory tools and operational measures recommended
- Recommended “default” supervisory tools to be considered in ESMAR include:
  - (i) ability to require the firm to nominate, remove or replace a member of the board or senior management;
  - (ii) ability to direct the firm to take, cease or desist from taking a specified action;
  - (iii) power to appoint an external skilled person at the expense of the firm to carry out an assessment and report to the authority, with the choice of skilled person to be approved by ESMA and the brief determined by it.
- Additional suggested measures:
  - revise ESMA’s practical power in relation to no-action letters to enable expedient action in changing market circumstances or crisis situations;
  - supervisory briefing on assessing safekeeping and segregation of client assets held outside fund structures;
  - supervisory playbook for urgent action to protect client assets (examples: firm close to financial failure; operational incident compromising access to client asset; suspected fraud; significant failings in segregation or internal controls).

### Market classification snapshot (MSCI, March 2025)
- Developed: Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Ireland; Italy; Netherlands; Portugal; Spain; Sweden
- Emerging: Czech Republic; Greece; Hungary; Poland
- Frontier: Croatia; Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania; Romania; Slovenia; Bulgaria1
- Standalone: Malta
- Footnote: 1 Consultation underway at the time of the mission on possible reclassification as ‘frontier’. Cyprus, Luxembourg and Slovakia are not classified.

*Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY and chapters “7. Capital markets regulation is mainly at the EU level, through a multi-layered system.” and related sections, 1eurea2025011*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY __________________________________________________________________________ 4

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Purpose and scope
- The Capital Markets Union (CMU) is an initiative to grow and deepen the European Union’s (EU’s) capital markets and, with the Banking Union, contribute to a Savings and Investment Union.
- This note focuses on institutional arrangements and the supervisory framework at the euro area (EA) / EU level, in particular the supervisory and supervisory convergence roles of ESMA, and on mitigating potential financial stability risks if CMU leads to an enlarged capital market with increased retail participation.
- The mission did not examine individual CMU legislative measures; it assessed whether the EA-level arrangements would be “fit for purpose” to manage risk under a successful expansion of capital markets.

### Key contextual findings
- Fragmentation of capital markets in the euro area is driven by many factors including national differences in securities, corporate, tax and pensions laws and policies, creating uncertainty (for example, determining which law is applicable and how cross-border financial investments will be treated in insolvency) and barriers to cross-border provision of investment products.
- Data show wide variation in member states’ capital markets with considerable scope for further deepening; there is no clear pattern distinguishing EA from non-EA member states in these indicators.
- Some EU markets are highly developed while others are classified as “emerging”, “frontier” or “standalone”, affecting index inclusion and fund flows.

### ESMA’s evolution and supervisory posture
- ESMA has progressively taken on direct supervision of entities that pose risks primarily through conduct and operational resilience rather than prudential failure (examples: credit rating agencies, certain benchmark administrators, firms providing market data infrastructure).
- ESMA has established a structured approach to identifying and prioritizing inherent and control risks, has taken supervisory and enforcement actions where needed, and has communicated supervisory expectations and priorities.
- As a relatively young authority, ESMA initially exhibited a relatively low implicit risk tolerance. With increased maturity, ESMA should:
  - Articulate the appropriate risk tolerance and resources to attach to its direct supervision work.
  - Prepare stakeholders that no supervisory regime delivers “zero-failure” and make structured internal decisions about trade-offs between risk and resources as mandates expand.

### CCP supervision and supervisory coherence
- ESMA has built a high degree of technical expertise in relation to CCPs.
- ESMA should determine an appropriate supervisory strategy for third-country Tier 2 CCPs guided by risk and the letter of EMIR, and support NCAs in delivering strategies via EMIR colleges.
- ESMA should reinforce the connection between its risk analysis and supervisory response and ensure coherence in governance, internal controls, and supervisory expectation-setting across CCPs and other supervised entities.

### Funding, powers, and governance needs
- To “scale-up” supervision, ESMA requires:
  - A sustainable funding mechanism, including the ability to hold reserves, to match expenditure to need during the seven-year funding period and to finance preparatory work for new mandates before it can charge fees to entities.
  - A wider, “default” set of supervisory powers in its founding regulation (ESMAR) applicable to all mandates, enabling proportionate, targeted tools to reduce risk without requiring proof of a specific breach.
  - Opportunities to streamline governance and enhance independence from the Commission, co-legislator, and NCAs (for example, adding independent non-executive directors and enhanced delegation).
- Transfers of supervisory mandates to ESMA must be carefully sequenced, adequately funded, and planned to avoid disruption and disproportionate mid-year fee increases that can threaten business models or discourage consolidation.

### Retail investor participation and investor protection
- Initiatives to increase retail investor participation must be accompanied by effective investor protection across the EA.
- Key safeguards on segregation and safeguarding of client assets are largely national; the adequacy of legal protections (including in insolvency) and supervisory assurance that protections are effective need careful examination.
- Supervisory convergence facilitated by ESMA is needed to ensure NCAs can effectively supervise client asset protection and investor compensation arrangements.
- Consideration should be given to whether current investor compensation arrangements are adequate, including the €20,000 required coverage threshold under the Investor Compensation Schemes Directive.
- Given concerns about the cost and value for money of retail investment funds, initiatives to boost retail access should ensure good value compared with alternatives (for example, pension schemes able to invest at scale).

### Main recommendations (excerpted and preserved from Table 1)
- Supervision and Supervisory Convergence
  - 1. ESMA should articulate the appropriate risk tolerance and resources to attach to its direct supervision work. — Addressee: ESMA; Priority: H; Timeframe: I
  - 2. ESMA should maximize the use of remediation tools without the need for formal investigations or the imposition of sanctions. — Addressee: ESMA; Priority: H; Timeframe: ST
  - 3. ESMA should further elaborate on intervention strategies and the choice of appropriate tools in its internal supervisory manual. — Addressee: ESMA; Priority: H; Timeframe: ST
  - 4. For CCP supervision: ESMA should reinforce the connection between its risk analysis work and its supervisory response. — Addressee: ESMA; Priority: H; Timeframe: ST
  - 5. Supervisory convergence work should focus on ensuring that a core capability in fundamentals of supervision is in place across all NCAs at different stages of market development. — Addressee: ESMA; Priority: H; Timeframe: MT
  - 6. ESMA should continue to develop its RBS Principles for use in supervisory convergence as regards use of intervention tools and escalation approach. — Addressee: ESMA; Priority: M; Timeframe: MT
- Powers, Governance and Resources
  - 7. ESMA should have a wider ‘default’ set of supervisory tools established by ESMAR, which it is able to use to reduce risk without proof of a specific breach. — Addressee: EC; Priority: H; Timeframe: ST
  - 8. ESMA should have a stable funding framework set out in ESMAR, including: (i) the ability to spend on the EU budget for preparatory work before it is able to charge fees to the relevant entities; (ii) powers to hold reserves, (iii) the ability to set fees. — Addressee: EC; Priority: H; Timeframe: ST
  - 9. The EU should consider a reduction in the share of the budget contribution to ESMA from NCAs. — Addressee: EC; Priority: H; Timeframe: ST
  - 10. ESMA’s governance arrangements should be revised to allow for fully efficient and independent decision making. New arrangements should ensure independence from individual MS interests. — Addressee: EC; Priority: H; Timeframe: ST
  - 11. The authorities should self-assess against IOSCO’s Objectives and Principles for Securities Regulation before the next ESA review, with particular regard to Principles 1-4 and ESMA’s supervisory mandate. — Addressee: EC, ESMA; Priority: H; Timeframe: ST
- Transition Planning
  - 12. Authorities should ensure thorough, funded transition planning for the transfer of any additional mandates to ESMA to ensure that existing capabilities are maintained and enhanced. — Addressee: EC, ESMA; Priority: H; Timeframe: ST
  - 13. For any transition of CCPs supervision: ensure appropriate arrangements for co-operation with central banks and, if the need arises, National Resolution Authorities. — Addressee: EC, ESMA; Priority: H; Timeframe: N/A
- Scope and Focus of CMU Initiative
  - 14. Authorities should ensure the framework for investor protection continues to be fit for purpose, including the minimum coverage threshold under the Investor Compensation Schemes Directive. — Addressee: EC; Priority: M; Timeframe: MT

*Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, 1eurea2025011*

### 7.      Capital markets regulation is mainly at the EU level, through a multi-layered system.

### 7.      Capital markets regulation is mainly at the EU level, through a multi-layered system.

### Regulatory architecture and legislative levels
- Primary legislation (“Level 1”) is proposed by the European Commission and negotiated by the Council (the EU’s 27 member states) and the European Parliament.
- Primary legislation is supplemented by technical rules in three types of secondary legislation (“Level 2”) and by “guidelines” (“Level 3”) addressed to competent authorities and/or market participants.
- Level 2 instruments include delegated acts, regulatory technical standards, and implementing technical standards developed by the relevant ESA (ESMA, EBA and IOPA, as relevant) and adopted, with or without amendment, by the Commission following input from the co-legislator.
- ESMA develops the majority of Level 2 and Level 3 measures for capital markets; some Level 2 or Level 3 measures are developed by the European Banking Authority (e.g., prudential regime for investment firms) and some by ESMA in collaboration with the ECB (e.g., financial market infrastructures).
- ESMA can only draft Level 2 measures when expressly mandated by a Level 1 measure and such measures must be adopted (and can be changed) by the Commission and co-legislator; ESMA has no autonomous regulatory power.
- ESMA can initiate Level 3 measures with which national competent authorities must either “comply or explain”.

### Remaining national dependencies and legal fragmentation
- Corporate laws, securities laws, and insolvency laws are generally unharmonized, with a few exceptions where specific EU-wide arrangements exist (for example to ensure settlement finality or certainty around the treatment of financial collateral in insolvency).
- Arrangements for certain core aspects of securities issuance depend on national laws.
- EU-wide principles exist for protection of client assets by investment firms, but specificities of asset safeguarding and segregation—particularly outside collective investment schemes—are determined at the national level.
- A December 2022 Commission proposal for a directive aims to harmonize certain aspects of insolvency law (initiative part of the Commission's priority objective of strengthening the CMU).

### Supervisory architecture and the role of ESMA and the SSM
- ESMA was the only ESA given a direct supervisory mandate at its creation (initially for Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs)); since then it has acquired supervisory responsibility for a range of other entity types and additional responsibilities are envisaged.
- Many key capital markets actors—including most investment firms, asset managers, and distributors/advisors—are authorized and regulated at national level; collective investment schemes (funds) are also authorized at national level.
- Some of the largest and most systemically significant investment firms are treated prudentially like banks; where such firms are within the EA, or a country that has opted into the single supervisory mechanism (SSM), they are subject to prudential supervision by the SSM, with conduct supervision remaining at national level.
- ESMA plays no role in the direct supervision of systemically significant investment firms.

- Table 3 — The Euro Area: Class 1 Investment Firms Prudentially Supervised by the SSM (Entity — Country)
  - KBC Securities NV — Belgium
  - Citigroup Global Markets Europe AG — Germany
  - Morgan Stanley Europe SE — Germany
  - BNP Paribas Financial Markets — France
  - Portzamparc — France
  - BofA Securities Europe SA — France
  - Pro Capital — France
  - CI-B SG Option Europe — France
  - Source: SSM List of supervised entities, cut-off January 2025

- Supervisory convergence: the three ESAs have an obligation to promote a common supervisory culture and “supervisory convergence”; some specific legislative acts require or permit specific convergence measures (e.g., EMIR and the Regulation on Central Securities Depositories require convening supervisory colleges; ESMA has a binding mediation tool under EMIR).

### Recovery, resolution, and recent regulatory regimes
- Recovery and resolution regimes are in place for CCPs, banks, and the largest investment firms; implementation is underway.
- Largest investment firms subject to capital requirements applicable to banks are within scope of the banking resolution regime, including, where applicable, the Single Resolution Board (SRB).
- A specific regime for CCP recovery and resolution has been adopted (“CCPRRR”). Supervisory colleges are assessing CCPs’ preparation of recovery plans; national resolution authorities (NRAs) are drafting resolution plans and resolution colleges have been established.
- ESMA has a distinct team for coordination and convergence work related to CCP recovery and resolution, separate from the supervisory team.

### ESMA’s powers, governance, and funding
- ESMA’s general powers and governance are set out in its founding regulation (ESMAR); direct supervisory powers are specified in sectoral legislation.
- Article 8 of ESMAR mostly refers to ESMA’s mediation and coordination role among NCAs and its supervisory convergence function.
- Sectoral legislation prescribing ESMA’s direct supervision includes procedures for requesting information, on-site visits, investigations, and enforcement actions; these sectoral provisions are prescriptive and provide limited regular supervisory powers outside of formal “investigation” and enforcement processes (e.g., ability to carry out an onsite inspection of a CRA is subject to a prior decision to open an investigation, article 23(c) of the CRA Regulation).
- Practical implication: ESMA often must rely on moral suasion to effect timely change in supervised entities or deploy burdensome approval processes to initiate enforcement actions (e.g., monetary penalties). The sectoral approach creates inefficiencies and inconsistencies across ESMA’s mandates.
- Article 9a of ESMAR provides for “no-action letters” in exceptional circumstances, but in practice ESMA’s power under this article is limited to submitting an opinion to NCAs and the Commission; ESMA cannot direct NCAs or market actors on measures to take and must await regulatory or legislative action to remedy problems—this reduces ESMA’s agility in exceptional circumstances.

- Governance bodies
  - Board of Supervisors (BoS): guides ESMA’s work and has decision-making responsibility on a broad range of matters including adoption of draft technical standards and guidelines, opinions, reports, and advice to EU institutions. Composition includes the ESMA Chair and heads of NCAs in the EU and EEA responsible for securities regulation and supervision; non-voting representatives from the EC, ESRB, EBA, EIOPA and EFTA Surveillance Authority attend.
  - Management Board: ensures ESMA carries out its mission and performs tasks assigned under ESMAR, focusing on management aspects (multi-annual work program, budget, staff resource matters). Composed of the Chair and six members selected from the BoS; the Executive Director and a Commission representative attend as non-voting participants (except on budget matters where the Commission has a vote).
- Governance adequacy concerns:
  - Stakeholders perceive the size and composition of the BoS could impair ESMA’s ability to act independently in the interest of the euro area rather than individual member states.
  - ESMA must demonstrate independence from the EC; EC participation in management bodies and voting on budget matters may threaten perceived independence.
  - Some safeguards exist (e.g., EC does not participate in supervisory discussions regarding individual market participants unless explicitly mandated) but alternative accountability avenues that do not involve EC participation in BoS and Management Board should be explored.
  - The adequacy of governance should be reviewed irrespective of further CMU advancements.

- Funding and budgetary framework
  - ESMA is funded by a combination of fees from supervised market participants, contributions from NCAs, and a general contribution from the EU Budget.
  - The fee funding model is specified separately for each mandate in Level 2 regulation; calculation, timeline and types of fees are currently set in eight separate Commission implementing regulations.
  - Fees operate under a full cost recovery principle for each individual mandate, creating an overly rigid framework that does not allow ESMA to respond effectively to unforeseen circumstances or urgent needs.
  - The budget adoption process is complex: ESMA’s internal procedures must align with Parliament and Council processes to approve ESMA’s level of EU subsidy based on a Commission proposal.
  - ESMA operates within an annually determined budget framed by the seven-year Multi-annual Financial Framework, meaning total allocation of EU subsidies is capped for the relevant period.
  - Recital 68 of ESMA’s Regulation: costs for core activities that do not entail direct supervision are split between NCAs and the EU Budget on a 60/40 ratio.
  - Preparatory work for new mandates often has to be covered from ESMA’s running budget unless the relevant legislation includes a Legislative Financial Statement procuring EU funding; this leads to constant reprioritization and challenges in financing policy development, supervisory capacity building, IT systems, and operational capacity. Additional supervisory mandates will require procurement of resources and technical expertise not available in-house.

### Historical context, CMU initiative, and progress
- Integration efforts trace to the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and accelerated with the Euro in 1999 due to increased investor demand for foreign securities.
- The Financial Services Action Plan (EC, 1999) was an early harmonization roadmap.
- Lamfalussy Group findings highlighted costs and inefficiencies in cross-border clearing and settlement and the need for harmonization; the Lamfalussy report recommended multi-level legislative/regulatory process and creation of the European Securities Regulators Committee (ESMA’s predecessor).
- Giovannini reports identified 15 barriers across three categories: national differences in technical requirements/market practice; taxation; and legal certainty; legal barriers were particularly complex given interconnections across member states’ legal systems.
- Notable EU regulatory initiatives towards a unified capital market include: MiFID II (aligned regulation of trading venues and authorization standards/procedures for investment firms and trading venue operators), EMIR (framework for CCPs and cross-border operations), Regulation on Central Securities Depositories (fostered competition and cross-border activities), and the Settlement Finality Directive (enhanced legal clarity and mitigated systemic risk).
- Progress in core legal areas (e.g., corporate, securities, insolvency law, taxation) has been limited due to interconnections with national legal systems and involvement of many government counterparts.
- Capital Markets Union (CMU) initiative (launched 2015) objectives:
  - Diversify financing sources available to EU enterprises, with focus on small and medium enterprises.
  - Offer savers enhanced long-term investment opportunities and improve the connection between savings and productive investments across the Union.
  - Safeguard financial stability and strengthen resilience of the EU economy by promoting geographical diversification of funding sources, enhancing private risk-sharing mechanisms, and reducing dependence on bank financing.

### Market classification snapshot (MSCI, March 2025)
- Developed: Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Ireland; Italy; Netherlands; Portugal; Spain; Sweden
- Emerging: Czech Republic; Greece; Hungary; Poland
- Frontier: Croatia; Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania; Romania; Slovenia; Bulgaria1
- Standalone: Malta
- Footnote: 1 Consultation underway at the time of the mission on possible reclassification as ‘frontier’. Cyprus, Luxembourg and Slovakia are not classified.

*Source: IMF staff extract from the chapter “7. Capital markets regulation is mainly at the EU level, through a multi-layered system.”*

### 22.      The initial CMU Action Plan outlined 33 actions covering a broad range of topics.

### 1eurea2025011 - 22.      The initial CMU Action Plan outlined 33 actions covering a broad range of topics.

### CMU action plans, progress, and recent developments
- The initial CMU Action Plan outlined 33 actions covering a broad range of topics.
- Initiatives in the initial plan included:
  - measures to relaunch securitization;
  - facilitate the cross-border distribution of investment funds;
  - optimize prudential calibrations for capital market activities;
  - simplify prospectuses;
  - address key insolvency barriers;
  - tackle uncertainty around securities ownership; and
  - address bias in the tax system.
- After a mid-term review, the Commission proposed new measures in 2017 to address additional objectives including:
  - strengthening the powers of the ESAs;
  - fostering fintech development;
  - promoting sustainable finance;
  - introducing a Pan-European Pension Product framework; and
  - supporting the growth of local capital markets.
- Achievements from the 2015 and 2017 plans noted in the report:
  - introduction of the Prospectus Regulation;
  - the Securitization Regulation; and
  - amendment of the Venture Capital Regulation.
- ESAs Review in 2019 strengthened ESMA’s supervisory convergence tools and tasked it with direct supervision of some market actors.
- Review of EMIR (in force in 2020) strengthened ESMA’s powers over both EU and third-country CCPs, including mandating direct supervision of systemically important third-country CCPs to ESMA.
- The 2020 Action Plan organized around four key areas: the financing of EU businesses, market infrastructure, retail investment, and the internal market. Key initiatives include:
  - setting up of a Single Access Point to information on EU companies (in the process of being implemented);
  - enhancement of the European Long Term Investment Fund Regulation;
  - the Listing Act;
  - the Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers frameworks; and
  - the review of MiFID II (legislative initiatives entered into force in 2024).
- The Investment Firms Directive and Regulation introduced in 2021 a risk-based approach to the supervision of investment firms, including transferring supervisory responsibility of the most systemically relevant to the SSM.
- A new Commission in 2024 released a new Plan shortly after the mission, prompting renewed attention to CMU and publishing reports by Christian Noyer, Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta proposing differing approaches to capital markets supervision:
  - Letta report: most integrated market or significant players could be supervised by ESMA, less significant entities remain national;
  - Draghi report: ESMA should become the single EU supervisor for capital markets;
  - Noyer report: opt-in regime for entities to transfer into ESMA supervision as a gradual route to centralization.
- The EC was expected to launch a new plan focused on increasing retail participation in investments, access of firms to the market, making the regulatory framework more effective, and strengthening supervision including harmonizing approaches and giving more weight to ESMA’s mandate.
- The EC committed to rationalize reporting obligations and reduce such burdens by 25 percent under the regulatory fitness and performance program (Better Regulation initiative).

### CMU and risks to financial stability
- Deeper, larger capital markets can support financial sector stability by:
  - enhancing private risk-sharing across the EA to stabilize growth after local shocks;
  - reducing fragmentation and spreading financial risks across the EA;
  - reducing the bloc’s dependence on bank financing.
- Risks and supervisory needs highlighted:
  - Need to ensure risks within capital markets receive sufficient attention alongside growth and deepening efforts.
  - Commission, co-legislators and relevant ESAs require sufficient capacity to monitor and address emerging risk areas, including those in the Targeted Consultation on macroprudential policies for Non-Bank Financial Intermediation (NBFI) and potential growth of less transparent and regulated private markets.
  - Larger capital markets produce more complex frameworks that require strengthened supervision; fragmented supervisory ecosystems may overlook cross-border risks not internalized by national authorities.
  - Importance of retaining national expertise while moving toward a more unified supervisory approach.
  - Centralizing supervision alone will not create the CMU; poorly planned or implemented transitions could materially increase risk, including diversion of day-to-day supervisory capacity and resources.
  - Political capital risks: focusing on centralizing supervision may expend political capital that could address other integration barriers or risk areas.
- Retail investor protection concerns if CMU succeeds:
  - New, inexperienced investors may enter markets and not appreciate lack of deposit guarantee safety nets for investments.
  - Firms face operational risks (cyber-attacks, fraud, safeguarding failings) that could jeopardize client assets.
  - Supervision of investment firms’ client asset segregation and safeguarding has not historically been a focus for supervisory convergence due to national legal specificities despite common minimum EU requirements.
  - Investor compensation schemes framework dates back to 1997 and includes a €20,000 floor for protection which has not been revised; a 2010 attempt to update the Directive (including raising the level to €50,000) was dropped.

### The supervisory baseline for CMU — current arrangements
- Licensing and supervision:
  - Most entity licensing and supervision carried out at national level.
  - European System of Financial Supervision comprises the European Systemic Risk Board, the three European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, ESMA and EIOPA), and national supervisors.
  - ECB, as part of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), is the banking supervisor for the largest banks.
  - Exchanges, other trading venues, and CSDs are licensed and supervised at national level.
  - "Investment firms" performing broker-dealer activities, portfolio management (asset management outside collective investment schemes), and/or providing financial advice are authorized/supervised at national level unless prudentially significant and treated as banks within the SSM mandate.
  - Banks carrying out investment activities, and investment firms treated as banks but not large enough for SSM supervision, are licensed and supervised at the national level.
  - Managers of collective investment schemes are licensed at the national level under UCITS or AIFM legislation; each UCITS fund must be authorized at national level and AIFs registered at national level.
  - Custodians and depositaries may be banks or licensed under national regimes.
- Passporting:
  - An entity licensed in one member state may "passport" services across the EU without a physical presence in other countries; some firms nevertheless establish branches.
  - Authorization/registration of funds is concentrated in a few jurisdictions while asset managers may be located elsewhere.
- Exceptions and thresholds:
  - Some size/materiality thresholds determine national vs EU-level supervision. Example: DRSPs defaulted to ESMA supervision on 1 January 2022 unless they fall under specified size thresholds.
  - ESMA has supervised EU-based administrators of critical benchmarks, with NCAs responsible for other EU administrators; scope set to change after agreement early in 2025 on changes to underlying regulations.
- Instances where ESMA is responsible for all entities of a given type:
  - From inception ESMA licensed and supervised credit rating agencies (CRA);
  - Responsible for derivatives and securities financing transactions trade repositories, securitization repositories;
  - Recently given responsibility for green bond reviewers, ESG ratings providers, and will be the supervisor for all consolidated tape providers (CTPs), a form of DRSPs envisaged but likely first established in 2025/2026.
- Third-country entity responsibilities:
  - For CCPs: NCAs license and supervise those established within the EU; ESMA is responsible for CCPs outside the EU seeking recognition to provide clearing services to EU trading venues or accept EU counterparties as clearing members.
  - Under the revised benchmark regulation agreed in early 2025, ESMA will become responsible for supervision of all in-scope third-country benchmark administrators.
- National competent authorities (NCAs):
  - EU legislation requires member states to nominate competent authorities, but objectives, powers, resources and administrative arrangements are determined at national level leading to wide variation across member states.
  - Some NCAs lack financial stability responsibilities; structures and mandates vary (integrated vs single-sector authorities; separate prudential and conduct authorities).
  - Some responsibilities are devolved within a country (example: state-level responsibility for regulation of exchanges in Germany).
  - MiFID II defines minimum powers NCAs must have in relation to that specific regime.
- Gaps and inconsistencies in ESMA powers:
  - Where legislation gives ESMA direct supervisory responsibility, powers are determined by each regime and gaps/inconsistencies exist compared to minimum powers specified in comparable NCA legislation.
  - Example gap: ESMA lacks the ability to remove a natural person from the management board of a supervised entity, a power NCAs have under Article 69 (2)(u) of MiFID II.
  - ESMA’s sectoral powers are mostly subject to deployment of an investigation or pre-enforcement activity.
- Information and system-wide oversight:
  - ESMA does not systematically collect data on supervisory frameworks and powers employed by NCAs, on resources available and deployment, or on detailed national supervision programs, limiting the ability to form a system-wide baseline akin to the banking sector.
  - Fragmented allocation of supervisory mandates and ESMA’s coordinating role limited to topical EU-level areas could produce a mismatch between system-wide resource allocation and areas of greatest risk.

### ESMA’s direct supervision — scope, structure, and risks
- Incremental mandates:
  - ESMA’s direct supervisory mandates have been established under individual Level 1 legislation rather than its founding ESMAR, added incrementally with distinct powers per mandate.
  - Most entities ESMA supervises were not previously licensed/supervised within the EU, except DRSPs and certain benchmark administrators which were initially licensed/supervised by NCAs.
- Entities under ESMA supervision (at the time of the mission):
  - 23 CRAs;
  - 11 Benchmark Administrators (out of which only one is an EU-based critical benchmark provider and 10 are third-country administrators recognized in the EU, one of which provides significant benchmarks);
  - 17 market transparency infrastructures (comprising 8 DRSPs, 4 trade repositories under EMIR, three Trade repositories under SFTR and two securitization repositories).
- Expected expansion of ESMA’s supervisory population:
  - Addition of CTPs and external reviewers of EU Green Bonds due to take effect in 2026;
  - ESG Rating Providers due in 2027; preparatory work is well underway.
- ESMA’s organizational approach to supervised entities:
  - Conduct rather than prudential matters are identified as the main source of risk for the types of entity ESMA supervises.
  - ESMA restructured to place directly supervised entities within a single Conduct Supervision Department covering licensing, supervision, and investigation functions and related policy work (e.g., Level 3 guidelines).
  - Supervision grouped across:
    - market transparency infrastructures (MTIs): key risks are digital operational resilience and data quality/availability;
    - CRAs: key risks relate to integrity of rating methodology and conflicts of interest;
    - critical benchmarks: risks to integrity of benchmark and constituent parts and prevention/management of system-wide shocks from non-availability of systemically-significant benchmarks (used as reference rates in financial instruments or mortgages).

*Source: IMF staff report content provided in the supplied PDF excerpt.*

### 41.      As for any supervisory authority taking on new mandates, ESMA has faced a learning

### 1eurea2025011 - 41.      As for any supervisory authority taking on new mandates, ESMA has faced a learning

### Learning curve and lessons from transfer of mandates
- ESMA experienced a learning curve in understanding business models, risk drivers and calibration of supervisory response when taking on new mandates.
- Early years of a new mandate typically require more supervisory effort until:
  - understanding of business models and individual entities’ specificities has been built;
  - a body of relevant data compiled and analyzed; and
  - effective relationships with those entities established.
- Transfer of DRSP supervision from NCAs to ESMA highlighted specific lessons:
  - Loss of synergies between trading venue supervision and DRSP supervision can arise where DRSPs are ancillary to trading venues.
  - ESMA’s full cost recovery funding model led to fees determined by ESMA being significantly greater than those previously charged by NCAs, resulting in material unplanned price increases for clients and prompting some DRSPs to reconsider continued operation.
  - Initial supervisory approach was perceived by some entities as surprisingly intensive before aims were fully understood; over time relationships and mutual understanding matured and ESMA’s efforts were appreciated.
  - For future transfers of mandates:
    - avoid sudden significant changes in fees;
    - ensure ESMA can articulate initial priorities and expectations early in the regime and set expectations that engagement may be more intensive initially than in the medium term;
    - reflect on advantages and disadvantages of splitting supervision of closely related or integrated services between ESMA and NCAs.

### ESMA’s risk-based supervisory approach and maturity
- By the time of the mission, ESMA had:
  - well-articulated a framework for its risk-based approach to supervision;
  - identified common elements across mandates (governance, internal controls, management of outsourcing and other ‘third-party risks’) as well as mandate-specific idiosyncrasies.
- ESMA uses this approach to support internal efficiencies, consistency and effectiveness, and regularly reflects on lessons learned to refine its approach.
- Evidence from stakeholders indicated increased maturity in consistency, predictability and effectiveness relative to the early days of ESMA supervision.

### Central Counterparties (CCPs)
- Scope of ESMA’s third-country CCP recognition and supervision:
  - ESMA recognizes CCPs located outside the EU that accept EU clearing participants or provide services to EU trading venues and directly supervises those deemed systemically important to the EU.
  - EMIR’s formula is used to assess systemic significance of ‘third-country’ CCPs; recognition and oversight apply where the Commission has determined the relevant jurisdiction’s regulatory regime is ‘equivalent’.
  - Of the 37 third-country CCPs recognized at the time of the mission, two were categorized as Tier 2 CCPs and the remainder classified as Tier 1.
- Observations on supervisory process under EMIR:
  - EMIR defines a supervisory process for third-country CCPs that leaves less room for supervisory deference and risk-based resourcing than some other jurisdictions’ regimes.
  - For Tier 2 CCPs, ESMA is required to validate significant model changes and submit them to stress tests, even where these are undertaken by the lead supervisory authority.
  - These processes have been enacted in a way that can require deployment of similar resources even where a CCP’s action is risk-reducing; fine-tuning and streamlining could enable more efficient deployment of analytical and supervisory resources.
- EMIR 3 changes for EU CCPs:
  - Under EMIR 3, ESMA will play an enhanced role in supervision of the 14 EU CCPs, while NCAs remain the lead supervisor.
  - ESMA will co-chair supervisory colleges established under EMIR with relevant NCAs and has expanded powers to issue opinions on proposals before decisions are made by NCAs.
- Institutional arrangements and efficiency considerations:
  - Complex system of checks and balances (EMIR colleges, validation by NCAs and ESMA) can lead to two levels of validation for model changes, which may be resource-intensive and duplicative.
  - Consideration should be given to potential benefits of consolidating responsibility for supervision of EU CCPs in ESMA, potentially on an “opt-in” basis and with phased transition to allow preparation before taking over most complex entities.
  - Any transfer would need arrangements for effective consolidated supervision of financial groups including CCPs, and coordination with the ECB and NCBs, NCAs responsible for supervision of clearing members and NRAs.
  - Consider whether mandatory EMIR requirements for annual on-sites of each CCP and an annual peer review of CCP supervision by ESMA constitute the most effective use of resources, and whether supervisory practices could more effectively be determined through Level 2 or Level 3 measures in future.

### Supervisory convergence
- ESMA’s mandate under Article 29 of ESMAR:
  - foster effective supervision by NCAs and ensure convergent application of EU rules;
  - build a common supervisory culture and consistent supervisory practices;
  - ensure uniform procedures and consistent approaches.
  - Activities include issuing opinions, defining Union strategic supervisory priorities, reviewing application of RTS and ITS, promoting effective exchange of information, and carrying out periodic peer reviews of some or all NCA activities.
- Evolution of supervisory convergence toolkit:
  - Article 29 enables development of new practical instruments and convergence tools; toolkit has evolved based on experience, risks and requirements.
  - New tools like Common Supervisory Actions (simultaneous supervisory activity across NCAs) have been useful in bridging approaches and identifying good practices.
  - Published outcomes of convergence tools have progressively included more detail on findings and background.
- Steering and governance of convergence work:
  - Steering occurs via the Senior Supervisors Forum (SSF) alongside ESMA Standing Committees.
  - SSF provides a forum to share expertise on common supervisory issues and address horizontal convergence issues, with alternating sectoral configurations (Markets, Investment Firms, Investment Management) and a recently expanded enforcement configuration.
  - SSF’s work culminates in an annual risk assessment exercise which defines and ranks more prominent risks, influences areas for supervisory convergence and supervisory priorities at NCAs, and contributes to determination of Union Strategic Supervisory Priorities.
- Risks and inclusiveness concerns:
  - Risk that convergence priorities focus on areas relevant for more advanced markets; smaller NCAs may play a more limited role due to market materiality and resource constraints.
  - Smaller NCAs value exercise outcomes but may struggle with core supervisory topics not covered or to get timely answers to specific implementation questions.
- Initiatives to bridge supervisory gaps:
  - Development of the Principles on Risk Based Supervision (RBS) within the SSF aims to set a common framework for RBS across NCAs and ESMA.
  - Initial principles approved by the BoS; plan to work on practical implementation including development of risk-specific methodologies as needed and continued refinement.
  - ESMA plans to publish a high-level version of the Principles by year-end 2025.

### Conclusions: Managing risk under an enhanced CMU
- Firm foundations for CMU:
  - Renewed efforts should address uncertainties and conflicts in securities, corporate and insolvency laws, particularly predictability of choice of law and protection of investor rights in relation to securities and other financial instruments in insolvency.
  - Increased awareness of financial risks and protection for an expanded retail investor base is important:
    - Some new investors switching from high-risk investments to mainstream investing may face reduced fraud and operational risk.
    - Savers moving from deposit accounts with deposit protection up to €100,000 face different risk/reward profiles and may be at risk of being “mis-sold”.
    - Supervisory focus at European and national level is needed, particularly in member states permitting payment of inducements and where firms may solicit investments across the EU.
    - New investors will face additional operational risk relating to segregation and safekeeping of assets; adequacy of client asset controls should be a focus for supervisory convergence work even without fully harmonized framework.
    - ESMA could prepare a supervisory briefing on key elements of client asset supervision and a “playbook” for dealing with an investment firm holding client assets that is failing or where there is suspicion of serious loss or theft of client assets.
  - A review of the investor compensation scheme framework should be considered, including:
    - increasing the minimum investor compensation scheme coverage across the EU (currently at €20,000);
    - deeper discussion of what risks such schemes should cover and whether protection against fraud and error are warranted.
- Preparing for an enlarged ESMA mandate:
  - ESMA is better prepared than a few years ago for potential expansion of its supervisory mandate, having introduced a more structured supervisory framework and building capability for targeted investigations and calibrated enforcement.
  - Enhanced approach to risk-based supervision:
    - ESMA should reflect on and articulate appropriate risk tolerance and resources for direct supervision.
    - Consider whether intensity of supervision for ESMA-supervised firms is appropriate relative to entities regulated at national level.
    - ESMA should set stakeholder expectations that no supervisory regime delivers ‘zero-failure’ and make structured internal decisions about trade-offs between risk and resources.
    - Maximise use of remediation tools without formal investigations or sanctions; set expectations and hold firms accountable for delivering solutions to meet supervisory expectations.
    - Continue to elaborate choice of tools in internal supervisory manual and ensure linkage between CCP risk analysis (e.g., stress tests) and supervisory follow-up.
    - Reinforce placing appropriate responsibility on senior management and control functions of regulated entities to devise and implement effective and proportionate solutions, incentivizing senior managers to take ownership and rely on entity control functions.
  - Strengthened supervisory toolkit:
    - ESMA needs a wider range of tools for direct supervision beyond enforcement powers. Suggested “default” tools in founding regulation include:
      - (i) the ability to require the firm to nominate, remove or replace a member of the board or senior management;
      - (ii) the ability to direct the firm to take, cease or desist from taking a specified action;
      - (iii) the power to appoint an external skilled person at the expense of the firm to carry out an assessment and report to the authority, with the choice of skilled person to be approved by ESMA and the brief determined by it.
    - If ESMA were given responsibility for crypto asset service providers, investment firms or asset managers, powers would likely need to be supplemented by powers to freeze assets, obtain injunctions and other measures necessary to safeguard client assets.
    - Clarity required on collaboration with relevant authorities where criminal investigation may be contemplated.
    - ESMA’s current power in relation to no-action letters should be revised to enable expedient action in changing market circumstances or crisis situations and provide adequate guidance and relief to NCAs and industry as needed.

*IMF mission text extracted from the provided content.*

### 59.      ESMA’s funding model also needs to be put on a sustainable basis. ESMA’s entitlement

### ESMA’s funding model also needs to be put on a sustainable basis.

### Funding model and fees
- ESMA’s entitlement to funds from the EU budget, including for supervisory purposes, should be consolidated in its founding regulation and include specific provision for spending on preparatory work before it is able to charge fees to the relevant entities.
- ESMA should be given powers to hold reserves to:
  - reflect the strong likelihood of it being given additional tasks by the co-legislator that are not envisaged in the financial fiche prepared at the time of the original Commission proposals, and
  - allow it to be responsive to emerging risk within the seven-year budgetary period.
- The share of the budget contribution from NCAs should be reduced to avoid creating an unhelpful disincentive to further consolidation of supervisory tasks at ESMA.
- ESMA should be given the power, and responsibility, to set its own fees to enable greater agility than is possible through the mechanism of delegated acts.
- Granting ESMA fee-setting powers would enable a future transition to increased dependence on fees within the funding model, should direct supervisory mandates expand.

### Governance arrangements
- ESMA’s governance arrangements should be revisited to ensure timely and independent decisions in relation to supervision and supervisory convergence.
- Considerations include:
  - adding independent non-executive directors to the existing BoS or management board or a newly-constituted board configuration;
  - formalizing the delegation or transfer of decisions in relation to ESMA’s direct supervision to a smaller group than the BoS, consisting predominantly of senior ESMA staff.
- In the meantime, ESMA should continue to make full use of delegations from the BoS to the ESMA Chair, and where legally permissible to ESMA staff.
- Care is needed to ensure appropriate operational independence from the European Commission and co-legislator, as well as from any national interest.

### Transition planning and risk prioritization
- Thorough, funded transition planning is needed for the transfer of any additional mandates to ESMA.
- Key points on complexity and capability:
  - The types of entity under discussion (trading venues, large asset managers, CCPs, CSDs) are much more complex than those ESMA currently supervises, and the potential impact of crystallized risk greater.
  - Experience and expertise accumulated in NCAs will need to be transferred to ESMA with care to ensure capability is at least as strong from “day one” of any new arrangements.
  - Within ESMA, expertise would need to be built in microprudential supervision, and the balance of risk and resourcing between prudential and conduct supervision considered.
- Clarity and coordination needs:
  - Entities need clarity about what supervision will look like, and the attached costs.
  - Careful consideration is needed on the potential implication of splitting financial groups between supervisory authorities to ensure appropriate coordination and a consolidated view where appropriate.
  - For any transition of EU CCP supervision, careful consideration will be needed to ensure appropriate arrangements for co-operation with central banks and, if the need arises, NRAs.26
  - For entity types where only a sub-set might transfer to ESMA (for example asset managers), arrangements are needed to ensure appropriate benchmarking and consistency with the risk assessment and supervisory approach for those remaining at national level.
- Timing and temporary measures:
  - Lead times for transition should be sufficiently long to enable effective preparation and supported by funded transition plans.
  - Temporary arrangements, like grace periods for shared responsibilities during transition, could be considered.
- Market-wide risk focus and supervisory convergence:
  - As ESMA’s supervisory mandate expands, it must increase focus on risks in the overall market including areas where supervision is undertaken elsewhere.
  - While prudential oversight of investment firms identified so far as systemically-significant is under the SSM, conduct supervision is likely to remain at national level, as will prudential and conduct oversight of the remaining investment firms, many asset managers (including fund managers), custodians/depositaries and others, as well as licensing or registration of individual funds.
  - ESMA will need to ensure sufficient focus on these entity types when determining convergence work on supervisory frameworks and risk prioritization, including through further development of the Principles of Risk Based Supervision and similar initiatives.
  - Attention should be given to ensuring baseline supervisory capabilities in member states that host “emerging” or “frontier” capital markets so that the benefits of CMU/SIU accrue across the EA.
- Practical supervisory tools recommended:
  - a supervisory briefing or similar guide on how to assess the safekeeping and segregation of client assets held outside of a fund structure;
  - a supervisory playbook for urgent action to protect client assets (e.g., where a firm is close to financial failure; has experienced an operational incident compromising access to client asset; financial fraud is suspected; significant failings are found in asset segregation or other relevant internal controls).
- Continued data gathering on member states’ approach to supervision to identify focus areas and jurisdictions that may benefit from targeted work on fundamentals.

### Benchmarking and international standards
- With an enlarged mandate, ESMA’s institutional arrangements and supervisory practices need to be in line with international standards.
- IOSCO’s Principles for Securities Regulation, particularly Principles 1-4, set standards for financial and operational independence, powers, and clarity in relation to the entity’s remit and transparency and consistency in its operating procedures.
- Actions to align ESMA with these principles include:
  - ensuring ESMA’s supervisory role and powers are fully reflected and empowered in its founding regulation;
  - further enhancing the transparency of ESMA’s supervisory approach;
  - continuing participation in supervisory convergence exercises such as peer reviews alongside NCAs where relevant;
  - seeking opportunities to benchmark against other peer authorities or to seek external input, as the SSM has done in relation to the SREP.
- Authorities should self-assess against the IOSCO Principles and use them to benchmark any new institutional mandate for ESMA proposed by the co-legislators.

*Source: IMF staff analysis (excerpt).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1eurea2025011.pdf_
