## IMF FSAP — France (source PDF: 1fraea2025002-source-pdf)

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### Macrofinancial context and near-term outlook
- Growth projection: 0.6 percent in 2025, down from 1.1 percent in 2024.
- Market developments:
  - Market volatility stabilized after fall of Prime Minister Barnier's government in December 2024 and approval of the 2025 budget in February 2025.
  - Response to April 2025 market volatility was muted, with negligeable outflows from French investment funds.

### Financial system structure and performance
- System size and composition:
  - Financial system: EUR 19 trillion (634 percent of GDP) / Structure (end-2023): Total 18.82 (In trillions of EUR); In percent of Total: 100; In percent of GDP: 665.8.
  - Deposit Institutions: 11.75 (trn EUR); Money Market funds: 0.42 (trn EUR); Investment funds: 1.45 (trn EUR); Insurance Corporations: 2.67 (trn EUR); Pension Funds: 0.35 (trn EUR).
- Concentration and groups:
  - Six major bancassurance conglomerates dominate the system.
  - Four Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) included among those conglomerates.
  - Six banks account for 86 percent of banking assets.
  - Four G-SIBs combined assets at 290 percent of GDP.
- Insurance and funds:
  - Insurance sector: largest in the EU and among top five globally.
  - Investment fund sector: EUR 2 trillion; supports corporate bond market of EUR 700 billion and MMF market of EUR 400 billion.
  - IAIGs: eight International Active Insurance Groups headquartered in France.
- Revenue and business model:
  - Banking earnings driven by fees (cross-selling), asset productivity relatively low, net interest margins compressed during past rate rises.
  - Fee-based income provides steady earnings; conservative lending yields low credit losses.

### Sovereign debt markets and public debt issuance
- Market size: EUR 2.8 trillion sovereign debt markets.
- Outstanding stock increased by 40 percent over past five years and was smoothly absorbed.
- 10-year OAT-Bund spreads rose by about 25 bps in June 2024 and stabilized thereafter.
- Holder composition: over half of sovereign debt held by non-resident investors.
- Banking sector holdings of government debt: 4 percent of assets (Eurozone average 6 percent).

### Credit growth, housing market, and private debt
- Housing and credit:
  - Housing loan issuance: declined sharply in 2023-24.
  - Residential property prices: declined by 5 percent y/y, stabilized after trough in 2024 Q1.
  - DSTI and borrower metrics: average DSTI ratio increased; household debt levels above those in other large European countries; home ownership rates below the median.
- NFCs and CRE:
  - NFC debt: among the highest in Europe.
  - Corporate credit prospects dim amid soft loan demand and tight credit standards.
  - European CRE prices: sharp decline; limited direct impact on French banking system due to small exposures.

### Systemic risk, vulnerabilities, and transmission channels
- Key domestic risks:
  - Slow fiscal consolidation, stalled structural reforms, increasing household and corporate balance-sheet weaknesses amid political fragmentation.
  - Consequences of delayed fiscal consolidation: weaker public debt dynamics, eroded confidence, higher risk premia, market repricing, adverse macro-financial feedback loops.
- Global risks:
  - Rising and more uncertain; potential triggers include market or trade shocks that raise fiscal risks and worsen debt dynamics.
- Transmission: widening sovereign spreads could raise borrowing rates, heighten borrowers’ credit risk, deteriorate asset quality, contract credit, stress core markets and NBFIs.

### Solvency stress tests — scenarios and key outcomes
- Stress-test scenarios:
  - Geopolitical scenario: global commodity and trade shocks; demand shock causing “higher for longer” inflation and rising short-term interest rates.
  - Recession scenario: global demand shocks, tightening financial conditions, fiscal shocks raising government borrowing costs and term premia, and structural productivity shocks.
- Time horizon: 2024 Q2– 2027 Q2 (three years).
- Aggregate capital outcomes:
  - Aggregate capital ratio remains above the minimum capital requirement in both adverse scenarios.
  - Decline in average system-wide CET1 ratio: 490 basis points under the recessionary scenario and 570 basis points under the geopolitical scenario.
  - G-SIBs: decline in CET1 somewhat smaller at 370 basis points and 520 basis points (reported across scenarios).
- Buffer utilization and shortfalls:
  - All banks meet minimum requirements, but several draw on additional buffers.
  - Four banks accounting for a large share of banking assets breach buffer requirements; average shortfall is 1.2 percent of RWA in the geopolitical scenario and 0.8 percent of RWA in the recession scenario.
- Primary drivers of capital decline (in descending order): credit risk—particularly among NFCs—followed by market shocks and net fees and commission income (NFCI).

### Sensitivity, concentration and counterfactuals (CCyB calibration)
- Counterfactual macro scenarios: intermediate scenarios with increasing severity—NPL increases by 50% / 25% / 100% reported by sector.
  - Construction weighted average NPL: 0.7% / 0.4% / 1.4%; standard deviation 0.4% / 0.2% / 0.8%.
  - Real estate activities weighted average NPL: 1.3% / 0.6% / 2.5%; standard deviation 0.8% / 0.4% / 1.5%.
  - Total weighted average NPL: 2.0% / 1.0% / 3.9%; standard deviation 1.1% / 0.5% / 2.1%.
- Finding: aggregate CET1 ratio reaches the aggregate capital requirement (including the CCyB) only in the 10th scenario.
- Current CCyB level: 1 percent of RWAs; conclusion: can absorb solvency impact of a moderate macroeconomic shock; precautionary buffers plus CCyB likely sufficient for a range of shocks.
- Counterfactual borrower-based policy tests using household micro data:
  - DSTI tightened to 32 percent at origination and LTV capped at 90 percent at origination analyzed.
  - Default probabilities for housing loans (entire population):
    - Baseline scenario: 2024 0.41% 2025 0.41% 2026 0.39% 2027 0.38%
    - Geopolitical scenario: 2024 0.41% 2025 0.42% 2026 0.48% 2027 0.53%
    - Recession scenario: 2024 0.41% 2025 0.44% 2026 0.57% 2027 0.65%
  - Only DSTI < 32% at origination:
    - Baseline: 2024 0.17% 2025 0.17% 2026 0.16% 2027 0.16%
    - Geopolitical: 2024 0.17% 2025 0.18% 2026 0.20% 2027 0.22%
    - Recession: 2024 0.17% 2025 0.19% 2026 0.23% 2027 0.27%
  - Only LTV < 90% at origination:
    - Baseline: 2024 0.34% 2025 0.33% 2026 0.32% 2027 0.32%
    - Geopolitical: 2024 0.34% 2025 0.35% 2026 0.39% 2027 0.44%
    - Recession: 2024 0.34% 2025 0.36% 2026 0.46% 2027 0.53%
  - Capital impacts (CET1 savings relative to current policies, percent of RWAs):
    - LTV at 90%: 0.15-0.2 percent gain in baseline; up to 0.7 percent in adverse scenarios.
    - DSTI at 32%: 0.5-0.7 percent gain in baseline; up to 1.6 percent in adverse scenarios.
  - Conclusion: DSTI mechanically matters more than LTV for housing credit risk in France; credit guarantees (Credit Logement) reduce LTV relevance for expected losses.

### Liquidity tests and cash-flow stress results
- Aggregate liquidity metrics (as of 2024 Q4):
  - Aggregate LCR for seven SIs: 148 percent.
  - Aggregate Net Stable Funding Ratio (NFSR): 116 percent.
- Cash-flow stress tests:
  - Under LCR stress with higher run-offs and valuation losses, aggregate LCRs in all currencies and in EUR are 114 percent and 112 percent, respectively.
  - Three banks have LCRs below 100 percent in that exercise.
  - Survival horizons exceed one month for all banks except one (which has a net funding gap after use of counterbalancing capacity in first two weeks).
  - USD scenarios: 1–2 banks experience net outflows that exceed CBC in first 30 days; USD LCRs volatile historically though now above 100 percent.
- Market shock from investment fund sell-off:
  - Banks’ liquidity buffers sufficient to absorb system-wide sell-off shocks; aggregate LCRs remain above Basel III requirement in tested scenarios.

### Investment fund liquidity stress tests — design and outcomes
- Sample: open-ended bond funds, mixed funds, MMFs.
- Initial shocks:
  - IR shock (rise in term premia): combined NAV decline between 2.5 to 3.2 percent.
  - CR shock (credit spread widening) included in adverse scenarios.
- Redemption assumptions: average redemption shocks 2 to 5 percent of NAV.
- Liquid assets definition: assets incurring up to 85 percent haircut under banking HQLA considered liquid.
- Key outcomes:
  - Only 4 percent of funds have liquidity coverage ratio below 1 under adverse scenario.
  - Collective liquidity shortfall: less than 0.1 percent of NAV.
  - Combined negative valuation plus asset sales: 2.3 to 8.1 percent of NAV.
  - If asset managers hoard cash by 1 percent of NAV, additional market impact of 0.1 percent may occur.
- Monitoring recommendation: improve fund-level data on holders of fund shares/units and fund liability structure; enhance data sharing between AMF, ACPR, BdF.

### Interconnectedness, contagion and market positioning
- Interconnections:
  - Direct insurance-to-bank investment: 8 percent of insurance assets invested in domestic banks.
  - Insurers hold 39 percent of investment fund assets under management.
  - French bank debt: 60 percent of MMF assets and 14 percent of investment fund assets.
  - Banks source ~40 percent of insurance business via distribution channels.
- Contagion stress test findings:
  - Large banks generally resilient to hypothetical defaults of domestic and foreign counterparts.
  - Four French G-SIBs account for majority of bilateral credit exposures; net providers of liquidity cross-border, net borrowers from other French SIs.
  - Under simulated defaults including large foreign counterparties, one smaller SI fails due to withdrawal of a relatively large funding exposure.
- Securities holdings (percent of total outstanding securities, September 2024 — BdF sample):
  - Insurance Comp.: 0.4 10.4 2.2 3.8 6.0 14.5 5.7
  - Investment Funds: 0.2 5.2 3.4 5.3 0.8 16.0 1.8
  - Domestic Banks: 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.4 2.7 10.3 9.0
- Additional metric: total number of firms with LCR < 1 in sample: 30 firms; aggregate shortfall: EUR1 billion.

### Emerging risks
- Private credit and NBFI financing: currently limited role but growing; Significant Risk Transfers (SRTs) create interdependencies and model/procyclicality risk.
- AI adoption: conservative use by banks and large financial actors due to explainability/regulatory requirements; investment firms may use AI more.

### Crisis preparedness, ELA, and deposit insurance
- Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA):
  - Recommendation: BdF should require banks to preposition credit claims calibrated on a risk basis and prioritize complex/difficult-to-value collateral.
  - Prepositioning should be complemented with simulation exercises (BdF internal and/or with banks).
  - ACPR should develop an early warning system to inform BdF of banks under liquidity stress.
  - Cross-border ELA arrangements recommended with EU NCBs and non-EU central banks; cover collateral deployment and foreign-currency ELA.
  - Readiness for ELA in resolution: BdF and ACPR to develop internal policies and document coordination with financial safety net stakeholders.
- Deposit insurance (FGDR):
  - Current target level: 0.5 percent of covered deposits.
  - IMF best practice recommendation: FGDR funds should be sufficient to withstand concurrent failure of the 2—4 largest banks; FGDR needs a public backstop.
  - Payout operational expectation: 7 days payout period.
- Authorities’ views:
  - Authorities broadly agreed with systemic risk assessment and resilience findings; supportive of most recommendations but disagreed on formalizing a neutral CCyB level, recusal of MoEF staff from supervisory boards, and introduction of a public liquidity backstop for FGDR.

### Macroprudential policies, HCSF actions, and supervisory framework
- Macroprudential tools implemented:
  - Borrower-based measures (BBMs) introduced in 2019: DSTI limit 35 percent and loan maturity limit 25 years (no LTV limits).
  - Countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB, credit protection reserve) reduced to zero during COVID-19, then raised twice; current level 1 percent.
  - Large exposure rule changed in August 2023 to a sectoral systemic risk buffer (SyRB); June 2025 HCSF decision announced plan to lift the SyRB.
- Supervisory assessments:
  - ICP assessment: 23 of 24 ICPs assessed as Observed or Largely Observed; 1 ICP Partly Observed (ICP 12 Exit from the market).
  - Need to implement Insurance Recovery and Resolution Directive by early 2027 to strengthen resolution framework.
- Governance, resourcing and coordination recommendations:
  - Ensure supervisory authorities adequately funded based on bottom-up resource reviews (ACPR, AMF, MoEF) — MT.
  - Government should recuse itself from supervisory decision-making committees at ACPR and AMF to avoid perception of conflict — MT (authorities disagreed).
  - Formalize inter-agency coordination through standing committees for i) cyber crisis response and ii) financial crisis preparedness and management (ACPR, AMF, BdF, FGDR, MoEF) — MT.
  - Improve HCSF institutional framework, communication and transparency; consider formal guidance on neutral CCyB and forward guidance to ensure releasable buffers — I/ST/MT as specified.

### Financial conglomerate and LSI supervision
- Bancassurance conglomerates: supervisory split (ECB/SSM for banking arms; ACPR for insurance arms) requires close cooperation.
- Recommendations:
  - Cooperate with European authorities on methodology to identify FICOD-relevant competent authorities (ACPR, AMF) — ST.
  - Strengthen framework for supervisory powers on conglomerate-level risks (ACPR) — MT.
  - Prioritize targeted onsite examinations for LSIs to enhance coverage; ACPR conducts around 5–6 onsite exams of LSIs yearly — MT.

### Cybersecurity, market resilience and AML/CFT
- Cybersecurity:
  - Institutional/regulatory framework strong; supervisory practices need convergence across agencies under DORA.
  - Recommendations: develop common DORA-related tools, standardize incident reporting, increase onsite supervisory presence, harmonize methodologies, and formalize cooperation with ANSSI.
- Market resilience:
  - Recommend resilience testing, identify critical dependencies and firms, ensure continuity after disruptions or outages.
- AML/CFT:
  - FATF 2022 assessment: regime largely effective; remaining weaknesses around certain CDD obligations, beneficial ownership scope, reporting delays and virtual asset “travel rule” application.
  - Recommendation: continue strengthening risk-based AML/CFT supervision and clarify beneficial ownership obligations.

### Key FSAP recommendations (selected, with timing)
- Systemic risk analysis and data:
  - Improve data quality/timeliness on interconnectedness, derivative and repo market data; ST (ACPR, AMF, BdF).
  - Improve liquidity monitoring across major currencies, consider higher liquidity buffers to cover wholesale funding outflows within a two-week horizon; ST (ACPR, BdF).
  - Improve monitoring of investment fund redemption risk through data sharing on fund liability structures; ST (ACPR, AMF, BdF).
- Authorities’ autonomy and resources:
  - Ensure supervisory authorities adequately funded after thorough review; MT (ACPR, AMF, MoEF).
  - Government to recuse itself from supervisory decision-making committees at ACPR and AMF; MT (MoEF, Ministry of Labor).
- Interagency coordination:
  - Formalize inter-agency standing committees for cyber crisis response and financial crisis preparedness/management; MT (ACPR, AMF, BdF, FGDR, MoEF).
- Macroprudential policy and tools:
  - Strengthen HCSF institutional framework and public communication; I (HCSF, MoEF).
  - Formalize availability of releasable capital buffers by improving guidance on neutral CCyB level; ST (HCSF, MoEF).
  - Broaden BBMs coverage; MT (HCSF).
- Financial conglomerates and LSI supervision:
  - Cooperate on identifying FICOD-relevant competent authorities; ST (ACPR, AMF).
  - Strengthen conglomerate supervisory powers and prioritize LSI onsite exams; MT (ACPR).
- Insurance sector:
  - Implement the Insurance Recovery and Resolution Directive, develop legislation, processes and tools; MT (ACPR, MoEF).
  - Ensure ComFrame requirements for IAIGs on enterprise-wide risk management, including liquidity risk management and recovery plans; MT (ACPR).
- Markets, cyber, and crisis management:
  - Identify and mitigate market disruption risks from outages of critical firms/operators; MT (AMF, ACPR).
  - Enhance structured cooperation and information sharing on incidents; ST (ACPR, AMF, BdF).
  - Enhance ELA arrangements: prepositioning of credit claims, ELA in resolution policies, cross-border arrangements; ST (BdF, ACPR).
  - Ensure operational readiness for resolution tools and cross-border bail-in procedures; ST (ACPR).
  - Strengthen deposit insurance fund resources with i) revised target level sufficient for combined coverage of top 2—4 banks and ii) a public backstop; MT (FGDR, MoEF).

- Timing legend: I: Immediately; ST: short term = less than 1 year; MT: medium term = 1–5 years.

*Source: IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program — Executive Summary and chapter excerpts (France).*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY __________________________________________________________________________ 7

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Macrofinancial Context
- The French economy and its financial sector have proven resilient to the stress events of the last five years but face some headwinds from domestic and external uncertainty.
- Growth projections and recent developments:
  - Growth is projected at 0.6 percent in 2025, down from 1.1 percent in 2024.
  - Market volatility stabilized following the fall of Prime Minister Barnier's government in December 2024 and approval of the 2025 budget in February 2025.
  - The response to the April 2025 market volatility was muted, with negligeable outflows from French investment funds.

### Financial System Structure and Performance
- System composition and concentration:
  - Six major bancassurance conglomerates dominate the system.
  - Four Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) are included among those conglomerates.
  - The insurance sector is the largest in the EU and among the top five globally.
- Revenue and business model features:
  - Conglomerates leverage large size and cross-selling to enhance customer reach; associated fees create a steady stream of revenues that increases resilience.
- Lending and credit risk:
  - Conservative lending practices produce low credit risk in the banking system.
  - For housing loans: high-quality borrowers, long-term fixed-rate loans, and loan guarantee schemes have produced high borrowers’ resilience to interest rate shocks and low credit losses.
  - Profitability considerations: profits on home loans are low and net interest margins have compressed during past periods of increasing interest rates because fixed-rate loans saw little repricing while funding costs on largely floating-rate liabilities rose.
  - Non-financial corporates (NFCs) carry high levels of debt; defaults remain low, though defaults have risen for SMEs as Covid-era measures rolled off.

### Systemic Risk and Stress-Test Findings
- Overall resilience:
  - French banks and the broader financial system appear resilient under severe stress-testing scenarios, although risks from NFCs and interconnections between banks and non-banks warrant continued monitoring.
- Solvency stress tests:
  - No bank falls below its minimum capital requirements under the two adverse scenarios used in bank stress testing (a geopolitical inflationary shock and a recession).
  - Several banks draw on their additional capital buffers under those scenarios.
- Sovereign and market risks:
  - Risks associated with sovereign spread widening are manageable given relatively lower bank holdings and a diversified global investor base.
- Liquidity:
  - Bank liquidity buffers remain high.
  - Cash flow stress tests indicate most banks can withstand significant outflows for up to one month under multiple adverse scenarios.
  - Stress tests on investment funds suggest they have adequate liquidity to withstand a substantial redemption shock.

### Macroprudential Policies and Supervisory Framework
- Implemented measures and coverage:
  - Since the previous FSAP, several robust macroprudential measures have been implemented to mitigate systemic risks.
  - Borrower-based measures (BBM) on home loans have successfully ensured prudent lending standards amid rising home prices and increased risk-taking by lenders.
  - A systemic risk buffer has been introduced to limit individual exposures to individual highly indebted NFCs.
  - A countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB), known in France as the credit protection reserve, exists but needs clearer guidance on early buildup, neutral rate, and release to ensure availability of releasable buffers.
- Supervisory assessments:
  - A full Insurance Core Principles (ICP) assessment found an overall high level of observance, with 23 of the 24 ICPs assessed as Observed or Largely Observed.
  - One ICP was assessed as Partly Observed; recently agreed EU legislation should strengthen the insurance resolution framework and thereby improve observance.
- Supervisory resourcing and coordination:
  - Caps on headcount and spending pose risks of oversight gaps and insufficient resources for evolving requirements, including cybersecurity.
  - Supervisory resources must be adequate to address increasingly complex markets and regulations.
  - Inter-agency cooperation should be strengthened; formalizing arrangements for inter-agency cooperation, information sharing, and financial crisis management and preparedness—including crisis simulations and cyber crisis response—is recommended.

### Cybersecurity and Operational Resilience
- Institutional framework:
  - The institutional and regulatory framework of cybersecurity is strong.
  - Authorities should ensure consistency in cyber risk supervisory practices and convergence of methodologies across agencies, as foreseen under application of the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA).
- Recommended actions:
  - Develop and share common tools for DORA-related activities among financial supervisors.
  - Increase onsite supervisory presence.
  - Enhance structured cooperation and improve information sharing on specific incidents.

### Crisis Preparedness and Resolution
- Resolution and ELA:
  - The resolution authority should ensure operational readiness for the combination of resolution tools and cross-border bail-in procedures.
  - Regarding emergency liquidity assistance (ELA), the BdF should require banks to preposition collateral (calibrated on a risk basis) and conduct simulation exercises.
  - Internal policies for ELA in resolution and arrangements with other central banks for cross-border ELA are needed.
- Deposit insurance:
  - The deposit insurer needs to be strengthened through a higher fund target level and a public liquidity backstop.

### Key FSAP Recommendations (selected, with timing)
- Systemic risk analysis and data:
  - Work with relevant European authorities to improve data quality and timeliness on interconnectedness, and on derivative and repo market data, and undertake related risk analysis for banks and markets. (ACPR, AMF, BdF) — ST
  - Work with relevant European authorities to improve liquidity monitoring through integration of liquidity stress in major currencies, and consider higher liquidity buffers to cover wholesale funding outflows within a two-week horizon. (ACPR, BdF) — ST
  - Improve monitoring of investment fund redemption risk through data sharing on fund liability structures. (ACPR, AMF, BdF) — ST
- Authorities: autonomy and resources:
  - Ensure that supervisory authorities are adequately funded while respecting their financial autonomy based on a thorough review of the sufficiency of resources to meet future needs. (ACPR, AMF, MoEF) — MT
  - To avoid any perception of a potential conflict of interest and facilitate operationally independent functioning, the government should recuse itself from all supervisory decision-making committees at the ACPR and the AMF. (MoEF, Ministry of Labor) — MT
- Interagency coordination:
  - Formalize inter-agency coordination through the creation of standing committees dedicated to i) cyber crisis response procedures and ii) financial crisis preparedness and management. (ACPR, AMF, BdF, FGDR, MoEF) — MT
- Macroprudential policy and tools:
  - Further strengthen HCSF’s institutional framework to ensure effectiveness and improve public communication. (HCSF, MoEF) — I
  - Formalize the availability of releasable capital buffers by improving guidance regarding the neutral level of the credit protection reserve (CCyB), even when cyclical systemic risks are not yet elevated. (HCSF, MoEF) — ST
  - Enhance effectiveness of borrower-based measures by broadening their coverage. (HCSF) — MT
- Financial conglomerates and LSI supervision:
  - Cooperate with relevant European authorities on developing a methodology to identify FICOD-relevant competent authorities, in particular for authorities supervising asset managers. (ACPR, AMF) — ST
  - Work with relevant European authorities to strengthen the framework for supervisory powers with regards to conglomerate-level risks through capital, governance, and risk management tools. (ACPR) — MT
  - Further prioritize targeted onsite examinations for LSIs to enhance coverage and allocate limited resources more efficiently. (ACPR) — MT
- Insurance sector:
  - Implement the Insurance Recovery and Resolution Directive by developing the necessary legislation, processes, guidance, and tools to complete the insurance resolution framework in line with the ICP. (ACPR, MoEF) — MT
  - Ensure ComFrame requirements for IAIGs on enterprise-wide risk management are met, including the development of liquidity risk management and recovery plans. (ACPR) — MT
- Markets, cyber, and crisis management:
  - Identify and mitigate the risk of market disruptions due to the outages of critical firms or market operators. (AMF, ACPR) — MT
  - Enhance structured cooperation among relevant authorities and improve information sharing on specific incidents. (ACPR, AMF, BdF) — ST
  - Enhance ELA arrangements through sufficient prepositioning of credit claims by banks, internal policies for ELA in resolution, and arrangements with other central banks for cross-border ELA. (BdF, ACPR) — ST
  - Prioritize work to ensure operational readiness for the combination of resolution tools and cross-border bail-in procedures. (ACPR) — ST
  - Strengthen resources of the deposit insurance fund with i) a revised target level sufficient for the combined coverage of the top 2—4 banks for which resolution plans foresee liquidation and ii) a public backstop. (FGDR, MoEF) — MT

*I: Immediately; ST: short term = less than 1 year; MT: medium term = 1–5 years*

*Source: IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program—Executive Summary (France).*

### 2.      The EUR 2.8 trillion sovereign debt markets continue to function well despite the large

### 2.      The EUR 2.8 trillion sovereign debt markets continue to function well despite the large

### Sovereign debt markets and public debt issuance
- Outstanding stock of government securities increased by 40 percent over the past five years and was smoothly absorbed by the market.
- Market size: EUR 2.8 trillion sovereign debt markets.
- 10-year OAT-Bund spreads rose by about 25 bps in June 2024, reflecting increased fiscal concerns, but have stabilized since then.
- Holder composition: over half of sovereign debt is held by non-resident investors.
- Banking sector holdings of government debt: 4 percent of assets (below the Eurozone average of 6 percent); banks with larger exposures mainly hold them to maturity.
- Debt management office practices: ensures predictability and transparency in auctions, builds sizable benchmark securities, and manages refinancing risk through active buybacks.
- Secondary market liquidity: mixed signals but generally remains strong.

### Credit growth, housing market, and private debt
- Credit growth has moderated; housing market undergoing an orderly downward adjustment.
- Household and NFC debt remain elevated.
- Household debt: levels are above those in other large European countries; home ownership rates are below the median.
- Housing loan issuance: declined sharply in 2023-24.
- Average debt service to income (DSTI) ratio: increased.
- Residential property prices: declined by 5 percent y/y, stabilized following a trough in 2024 Q1.
- NFC debt: among the highest in Europe.
- Corporate credit prospects: dim amid soft loan demand and still tight credit standards.
- European commercial real estate (CRE) prices: sharp decline has had a limited impact on the French banking system as direct exposures are small.

### Financial sector structure and performance
- Financial system size: EUR 19 trillion (634 percent of GDP).
- Banking sector concentration: highly concentrated, including 4 G-SIBs, accounts for 61 percent of the EUR 19 trillion financial system.
- Insurance companies: constitute 15 percent of financial system assets.
- Bancassurance conglomerates: six major conglomerates with important cross-border exposures; many bancassurance structures combine banks and insurers.
- Investment fund sector: EUR 2 trillion, domestically owned but internationally invested; supports a corporate bond market of EUR 700 billion and an MMF market of EUR 400 billion.
- Recent industry trend: acquisitions of major asset managers by bancassurance firms, partially driven by favorable risk-weightings for acquisitions through insurance arms.
- Banking sector revenue model: stable revenues but low returns; earnings driven by fees (including cross-selling) rather than interest income; asset productivity relatively low due to high competition for prime borrowers.
- Profitability and capitalization: have held up despite poor loan growth and compressed net interest margins.
- Margin compression drivers: fixed-rate mortgage and corporate loan books saw little repricing while funding costs rose due to reliance on wholesale funding, increasing term deposits, and higher interest rates in Livret A accounts.
- Credit losses: overall remain low despite rising defaults among SMEs as Covid-era measures expired; fixed-rate loans are shielded from rising rates and fee-based income provides steady earnings.

### Insurance and investment funds
- Insurance sector: among the top five globally and the largest in the European Union.
- Market concentration: over 80 percent of life premiums and 50 percent of non-life premiums collected by the largest 15 insurers in each market.
- IAIGs: eight International Active Insurance Groups headquartered in France.
- Dominant products: life savings and investment products largely unit-linked or Euro contracts (capital typically guaranteed but not the investment return).
- Tax treatment: favorable tax treatment contributes to product popularity.
- Response to rising rates: insurers tapped profit-sharing reserves to boost rates of return on investment products; solvency ratios remain high.
- Lapses and redemptions: rose modestly from low levels in 2022 and 2023 and returned to normal historic levels in 2024.
- Real-estate investment funds: resilience to recent shocks; liquidity risks limited by predominance of closed-end funds and potential use of gates.
- Money Market Funds (MMFs): large inflows in 2023; appear conservatively positioned to meet redemptions and do not use CNAV structures that offer redemptions at par.

### Trading activity and capital market positioning
- Post-Brexit shift: France's importance as an EU capital markets hub has risen with previously UK-based firms registered under French supervision.
- Trading firms: include investment banks, investment firms, and trading venues; generally established as standalone entities rather than branches.
- Wholesale trading markets: significant increase in size and complexity.
- Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs): volumes increased by 100-fold over the Brexit period to EUR 1.4 trillion in 2022.
- France: second largest interest rate derivatives market in the EU.

### Interconnectedness across banks, insurers, and NBFIs
- Direct insurance-to-bank investment: only 8 percent of insurance assets are directly invested in domestic banks.
- Insurers and funds: insurers are major investors in investment funds, with 39 percent of fund assets under management held by insurers.
- Bank debt as MMF asset: French bank debt is 60 percent of MMF assets and 14 percent of investment fund assets.
- Distribution channel for insurance products: banks source approximately 40 percent of insurance business.
- Housing loan guarantees: most housing loans are guaranteed by affiliated third parties; the largest guarantor is jointly owned by the major banking groups.
- Derivatives linkages: banks and NBFIs are linked through derivatives positions that may include significant contingent liabilities.

### Macroprudential policies (HCSF actions)
- Borrower-based measures (BBMs) introduced in 2019 through DSTI and loan maturity limits (no LTV limits): DSTI limit is 35 percent and loan maturity limit is 25 years.
- Countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB): reduced to zero during COVID-19, then raised twice and now stands at 1 percent.
- Large exposure rule change: 2018 hard limit on large exposures to highly indebted corporates changed in August 2023 to a sectoral systemic risk buffer (SyRB), reducing concentrated exposures of banks to individual highly indebted firms.
- June 2025 HCSF decision: announced plan to lift the SyRB, noting the specific risks it targeted have diminished and its prudential buffer impact is now insignificant.
- Compliance: share of new housing loans not in compliance with HCSF decisions tracked quarterly (Figure shows non-compliance and components).

### Systemic risk analysis: vulnerabilities and risks
- Key domestic risks: slow fiscal consolidation, stalled structural reforms, increasing balance sheet weaknesses in households and corporates amid political fragmentation.
- Consequences of delayed fiscal consolidation: weaker public debt dynamics, eroded confidence, higher risk premia, market repricing, adverse macro-financial feedback loops affecting private sector balance sheets, higher credit risk, and tighter lending standards.
- Global risks: rising and outlook more uncertain; potential triggers include market or trade shocks that raise fiscal risks and worsen debt dynamics.
- Transmission: widening sovereign spreads could raise borrowing rates, heighten borrowers’ credit risk, lead to deteriorating asset quality, contraction in credit, stress in core financial markets, and contagion from strains in NBFIs.

### Scenario-based solvency stress tests and bank solvency results
- Stress-test framework: two adverse scenarios from the 2025 EA FSAP:
  - Geopolitical scenario: global commodity and trade shocks (including tariff impacts), demand shock causing “higher for longer” inflation and rising short-term interest rates.
  - Recession scenario: global demand shocks, tightening financial conditions, fiscal shocks raising government borrowing costs and term premia, and structural shocks to productivity growth.
- Shocks considered: one-off market shocks at the start of year 1; credit risk from NFCs and households; interest rate risk; market risks; fluctuations in net fees and commission income (NFCI).
- Aggregate capital outcomes:
  - Aggregate capital ratio remains above the minimum capital requirement in both adverse scenarios.
  - Decline in average system-wide CET1 ratio: 490 basis points under the recessionary scenario and 570 basis points under the geopolitical scenario.
  - Primary drivers of capital decline (in descending order): credit risk—particularly among NFCs—followed by market shocks and NFCI.
- G-SIBs performance:
  - Decline in CET1 for G-SIBs: somewhat smaller at 370 basis points (recession?) and 520 basis points (geopolitical?), reflecting lower credit risk and higher NFCI for G-SIBs than for other banks.
- Buffer utilization:
  - All banks meet minimum requirements, but several utilize additional buffers under adverse scenarios.
  - Four banks accounting for a large share of banking assets breach buffer requirements; average shortfall is 1.2 percent of RWA in the geopolitical scenario and 0.8 percent of RWA in the recession scenario.
- Notes on definitions:
  - Minimum requirement defined as minimum CET1 ratio plus P2R.
  - Hurdle rate with buffers also includes the capital conservation buffer (CCOB) plus the systemic buffers (G-SIBs and O-SIIs).
  - The SyRB and CCyB are not included in the hurdle rate with buffers.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1fraea2025002-source-pdf.pdf*

### 17.      Sensitivity analysis shows that the banking system is resilient to concentration risks.

### 17. Sensitivity analysis shows that the banking system is resilient to concentration risks.

### Large exposures and sectoral credit risk
- Large exposures, especially after credit risk mitigation measures (CRM), appear well contained.
- Sectoral credit risk—such as in the real estate sector—remains small.
- Tables referenced: Table 3. France: Large Exposures, as Percent of Tier 1 Capital; Table 4. France: Sectoral Credit Risk Sensitivity Analysis: Nonperforming Loans (NPL) as percent of CET1.

### Solvency stress tests and counterfactual macroeconomic scenarios (CCyB calibration)
- A range of counterfactual macroeconomic scenarios are designed as intermediate scenarios between the baseline macroeconomic scenario and the geopolitical scenario (excluding the one-off market shocks) with increasing severity of risk parameters.
- Increase in NPL ratio by: 50% 25% 100%
  - Construction
    - Weighted average 0.7% 0.4% 1.4%
    - Standard deviation 0.4% 0.2% 0.8%
  - Real estate activities
    - Weighted average 1.3% 0.6% 2.5%
    - Standard deviation 0.8% 0.4% 1.5%
  - Total
    - Weighted average 2.0% 1.0% 3.9%
    - Standard deviation 1.1% 0.5% 2.1%
- In this exercise, the aggregate CET1 ratio of banks after three years only reaches the aggregate capital requirement (including the CCyB) in the 10th scenario (Figure 11).
- This suggests that the current CCyB level at 1 percent of RWAs can absorb the solvency impact of a moderate macroeconomic shock.
- Current precautionary buffers in combination with the CCyB would likely be sufficient to enable banks to continue lending following a range of shocks.
- If precautionary buffers were lower, the release of the current CCyB might not be sufficient to ensure banks continue to lend under these moderate downturn scenarios.

### Liquidity buffers and funding concentration
- Aggregate LCR for the seven SIs at 148 percent (as of 2024 Q4) appears to provide comfortable buffers against outflows.
- Aggregate Net Stable Funding Ratio (NFSR) at 116 percent exceeds the 100 percent requirement for all banks.
- Asset encumbrance appears to be low on aggregate and concentration of funding remains small.
- Several banks have large USD funding, which appears to be shorter-term and more volatile than overall funding.
- Although USD LCRs are now all above 100 percent, they have been very volatile in the recent past, and USD HQLAs have not always been commensurate with outflow risks.
- Data notes and sources: COREP, COREP_NSFR, C 81.00x(USD), C 81.00.c; monthly data starting 2021.

### Cash flow stress tests and survival horizons
- Under an LCR stress scenario with higher outflow run-off rates than Basel III and valuation losses on HQLAs:
  - Aggregate LCRs in all currencies and in EUR are respectively at 114 percent and 112 percent, even though three banks have LCRs below the 100 percent threshold.
- Survival horizons exceed one month for all banks under cash flow stress scenarios, except one which has a net funding gap after use of counterbalancing capacity (CBC) in the first two weeks of the shock.
- In scenarios with outflows of USD, 1-2 banks experience net outflows that exceed CBC in the first 30 days.
- Scenarios include run-offs on committed credit lines.
- Aggregate funding gaps remain small as a share of assets at least for 2 months even in the most severe scenario; funding gaps in USD are small as a share of assets even in the most severe scenario.

### Market shock from investment fund sell-off
- Banks’ liquidity buffers are sufficient to absorb a system-wide market shock from a sell-off of fixed income securities by investment funds.
- A system-wide valuation shock on HQLA from a sell-off over two days or two weeks of fixed income securities by investment funds is calibrated based on (i) the French investment fund liquidity stress tests and (ii) the EA FSAP investment fund liquidity stress tests.
- In both adverse scenarios, French banks’ aggregate LCRs remain above the Basel III requirement.

### Corporate sector stress (publicly-listed NFCs)
- Under the bank solvency stress test scenarios, based on end-2023 data for publicly-listed NFCs:
  - Debt-at-risk (Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR) below one) increases in the baseline scenario from 6 percent to 17 percent of total debt, and to about 60 percent after two years in the adverse scenarios.
- Under the two adverse macroeconomic scenarios, firms accounting for up to 65 percent of total outstanding debt of all publicly listed firms would increase their indebtedness to cover cash outflows in the baseline; in the two adverse scenarios this share would increase to almost 80 percent.
- Methodological note: Based on the methodology of Ding and Tressel (2021): Global Corporate Stress Tests—Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic and Policy Responses.

### Household vulnerabilities and default risk
- Micro survey data (Household Finance and Consumption Survey 2021) suggests French households have debt levels comparable to several other large EA countries.
- Financial leverage measured by debt-to-income or debt-to-financial assets ratios is generally as high as in several peer EA countries; lower income households have higher debt-to-financial assets ratios.
- Under the adverse scenarios of the bank solvency stress tests, household default rates would increase significantly but would remain low.
- Default definition: a household runs out of liquid financial assets to pay amortization and interest expenses on debt, considering unemployment insurance and incompressible living expenses.

### Borrower-based macroprudential counterfactuals (DSTI and LTV)
- Two policy counterfactual solvency stress tests conducted using household micro data:
  - Tighter borrower-based DSTI limits lowered to 32 percent at origination.
  - Introduction of an LTV limit of 90 percent at origination.
- Default probabilities for housing loans (Table 5, Entire population):
  - Baseline scenario 2024 0.41% 2025 0.41% 2026 0.39% 2027 0.38%
  - Geopolitical scenario 2024 0.41% 2025 0.42% 2026 0.48% 2027 0.53%
  - Recession scenario 2024 0.41% 2025 0.44% 2026 0.57% 2027 0.65%
- Only DSTI at origination < 32 percent:
  - Baseline scenario 2024 0.17% 2025 0.17% 2026 0.16% 2027 0.16%
  - Geopolitical scenario 2024 0.17% 2025 0.18% 2026 0.20% 2027 0.22%
  - Recession scenario 2024 0.17% 2025 0.19% 2026 0.23% 2027 0.27%
- Only LTV at origination < 90 percent:
  - Baseline 2024 0.34% 2025 0.33% 2026 0.32% 2027 0.32%
  - Geopolitical 2024 0.34% 2025 0.35% 2026 0.39% 2027 0.44%
  - Recession 2024 0.34% 2025 0.36% 2026 0.46% 2027 0.53%
- Capital impacts (CET1 savings relative to scenario under current policies, in percent of RWAs):
  - A binding LTV limit at 90 percent would result in a 0.15-0.2 percent capital ratio gain in the baseline, and up to 0.7 percent capital ratio gain in the adverse scenarios.
  - A DSTI limit at 32 percent would result in a 0.5-0.7 percent capital ratio gain in the baseline, and up to 1.6 percent capital ratio gain in the adverse scenarios.
  - The analysis confirms that the DSTI appears to quantitatively matter more than the LTV in containing credit risk on housing loans in France.
- Contextual notes:
  - A substantial share of housing loans benefit from a credit guarantee from Credit Logement, keeping LGD on housing loans low in France and rendering the LTV less relevant for expected losses.
  - High LTV loans tend to be originated to relatively low-default risk borrowers.
  - This partial analysis focused on borrower-based instruments and is not an assessment of capital requirements as many other channels are not analyzed.

*Source: IMF staff estimates, COREP, COREP_NSFR, C 81.00x(USD), C 81.00.c, Household Finance and Consumption Survey 2021, and IMF staff calculations as presented in the source PDF.*

### 27.      Investment fund liquidity stress tests assessed the resilience of open-ended

### Investment fund liquidity stress tests assessed the resilience of open-ended

### Investment fund stress test design and shocks
- Sample focused on open-ended bond funds, mixed funds, and MMFs.
- Initial shocks applied:
  - (i) a rise in term premia due to high-for-longer interest rate scenario (“IR shock”).
  - (ii) a recession scenario where credit spreads widen for both sovereigns and corporate sectors (“CR shock”).
- Resulting collective decline in net asset value (NAV) from initial shocks: between 2.5 to 3.2 percent.
- Assumed redemption behavior:
  - Average redemption shocks applied: 2 to 5 percent of NAV (consistent with COVID-19 experience).
  - Funds assumed to apply a pro-rata asset liquidation strategy.
- Definition of liquid assets used: Only assets that would incur up to 85 percent haircut under the banking sector HQLA definition were considered liquid.

### Key stress-test outcomes and market impact
- Liquidity resilience:
  - Only 4 percent of funds have a liquidity coverage ratio below 1 under the adverse scenario.
  - Collective liquidity shortfall: less than 0.1 percent of NAV.
- Valuation and market-impact outcomes:
  - Combined negative valuation impact of the initial shock and asset sales: ranging between 2.3 to 8.1 percent of NAV.
  - If asset managers hoard cash by 1 percent of NAV, the larger (non-cash) asset sales relative to redemptions would imply an additional 0.1 percent in market impact.
- Concentrations and data limitations:
  - Rate-sensitive bond funds experienced most of the NAV decline.
  - More granular data on funds-of-funds liquidity would sharpen results, particularly for mixed funds.
- Operational considerations:
  - French investment funds are well placed to implement liquidity management tools.
  - Liquidity risks can also arise from leverage-induced liquidation demands and should be closely monitored.

### Monitoring and data recommendations
- Improved monitoring requires fund-by-fund level information on holders of fund shares/units and analysis of shareholder behavior.
- AMF has ad hoc studies on performance and outflows but lacks systematic access to holdings data that reside with ACPR and BdF.
- Recommendation: enhance data sharing of fund liability structures to support stress testing and systematic monitoring, especially given heterogeneous behavior across insurance product investors.

*Source: Lipper and Fund staff calculations (figures and charts referenced in source).*  

---

### Interconnectedness and contagion risks
- Contagion stress test findings:
  - Large banks generally resilient to hypothetical defaults of domestic and foreign counterparts within a dense bilateral exposure network.
  - Four French G-SIBs account for the majority of bilateral credit exposures and are net providers of liquidity cross-border but net borrowers from other French SIs.
  - Under simulated propagation of credit and funding losses following individual bank defaults:
    - No bank would become insolvent after default of domestic counterparts alone.
    - If large foreign counterparties also default or withdraw funding, one smaller SI fails due to withdrawal of a relatively large funding exposure.

### Securities holdings by investor type (percent of total outstanding securities, September 2024)
- Note: Source: BdF. Investment fund industry includes bond, equity, hedge, mixed, real estate, other funds, and MMFs.
- Holdings matrix (percent of total outstanding securities):
  - Insurance Comp.: 0.4 10.4 2.2 3.8 6.0 14.5 5.7
  - Investment Funds: 0.2 5.2 3.4 5.3 0.8 16.0 1.8
  - Domestic Banks: 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.4 2.7 10.3 9.0
- Summary findings:
  - Insurance companies are the largest investor group, holding close to half of securities; within these, securities issued by non-residents combine to nearly half of total holdings.
  - Investment funds hold about one third of securities, with about half invested in foreign paper.
  - Domestic banks account for one fourth of holdings, mostly in foreign instruments and split almost evenly between private and public securities.

- Additional metrics from sample:
  - Total number of firms with liquidity coverage ratio of less than 1: 30 firms.
  - Aggregate amount of shortfall: EUR1 billion.

---

### Emerging risks
- Private credit and NBFI financing:
  - Currently plays a limited role but is growing and should be monitored.
  - Significant Risk Transfers (SRTs) increasingly used by French banks to generate capital relief, mimicking bank/NBFI private-credit partnerships.
  - SRTs operate as partial synthetic securitization, creating interdependencies between banks and NBFIs and increasing model risk and procyclicality risk in stress events.
- Artificial intelligence (AI) adoption:
  - Banks and large financial actors use AI conservatively for efficiency, back-office improvements, employee productivity, and customer products.
  - Regulatory requirements on model explainability slow incorporation of AI into risk modeling for banks and insurers; investment firms may utilize AI more.
  - Relationship-driven customer model limits market share for narrow-scope fintech entrants in France.

---

### Financial sector oversight and macroprudential policy

### Cross-cutting supervisory issues and governance
- Political independence and supervisory boards:
  - Government representatives (DG of the Treasury and Director of Social Security) attend ACPR Supervisory College and DG attends AMF Board in a non-voting capacity; they can request a second deliberation.
  - No voting rights, and no political interference identified; conflicts of interest appear effectively managed.
  - Current arrangements not fully compliant with international standards for banking, insurance, and securities regulation.
  - Recommendation: Government representatives should recuse themselves from supervisory meetings; DG of the Treasury’s veto power in ACPR’s Resolution College should be narrowed to resolution cases involving use of public funds only.
- Resourcing and funding:
  - Supervisory authorities should conduct bottom-up reviews of needs and develop multiyear strategic budgets and workforce plans.
  - Headcount constraints have been relaxed; material increases in AMF’s and ACPR’s 2025 budgets occurred.
  - For AMF, increases likely only offset additional resources needed for DORA and new crypto asset regulation; ACPR will likely need further increases for strategic projects.
- Crisis preparedness and cooperation:
  - Formalize inter-agency cooperation and information sharing for crisis preparedness, financial crisis management, and cyber crisis response.
  - Recommendation: Create standing bodies including ACPR, AMF, BdF, FGDR, and the Treasury as permanent members; conduct regular crisis simulations and table-top exercises.

### Macroprudential policies and tools
- Institutional arrangements:
  - HCSF is the designated macroprudential authority with hard powers over specific tools and soft powers for recommendations; chaired by the Minister of Economy and Finance.
  - HCSF includes Governor of BdF and other key agencies and three external members.
  - AMF is an active participant and promoted liquidity management tools for NBFIs.
  - HCSF actions taken: releasing and rebuilding the CCyB, introducing a sectoral systemic risk buffer, and borrower-based measures (BBMs).
- Governance and communication enhancements recommended:
  - HCSF should avoid written-procedure meetings; meet in person.
  - Improve communication with periodic strategy reviews, regular press conferences by the Chair and Governor.
  - Increase transparency: publish recommendations, opinions, and vote outcomes by default (with exceptions voted on by members).
  - Strengthen public accountability: publish voting records (with limited exceptions) and mandate annual testimonies before Parliament.
  - Enhance powers: add an explicit ‘comply or explain’ mechanism and explicit powers to make recommendations to the MoEF.
- Borrower-based measures (BBMs) and housing market:
  - BBMs have improved lending standards; DSTI limit: 35 percent with a 20 percent flexibility margin.
  - Recommendation: Broaden BBMs to renovation and other consumer loans; expand monitoring of loans to Sociétés Civiles Immobilières (SCI); consider prudential requirements within the flexibility margin or narrow the flexibility margin.
  - High LTV exposure:
    - 42 percent of new loans had LTVs above 95 percent in December 2024.
    - While high LTV loans do not appear to pose a current systemic risk based on historical performance and stress tests, they exhibited higher losses during the recent downturn.
    - Authorities should continue monitoring and consider customized LTV measures if appropriate.
- Releasable capital buffers and CCyB guidance:
  - Formalize guidance on the neutral level of the credit protection reserve; adopt a positive neutral CCyB to provide predictable insurance against lending cutbacks.
  - Offer forward guidance on future policy settings (conditions and timeframe for buffer rebuild) to reduce incentives for capital hoarding.
  - Medium-term calibration of positive neutral CCyB should consider capital losses under a moderate shock scenario, leverage ratio, and MREL constraints; balance against Basel III adjustments and low profitability.
  - Authorities should be ready to raise the CCyB rate if NFC vulnerabilities worsen and could consider a broader sectoral SyRB for corporate exposures.

### Financial conglomerate supervision
- Supervisory split challenge:
  - Supplemental supervision of seven bancassurance conglomerates and their banking operations is conducted by the ECB’s Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) while insurance arms are supervised by ACPR.
  - Close cooperation and knowledge sharing between ECB/SSM and ACPR are required.

*Source: IMF staff analysis and Lipper and Fund staff calculations.*

### 45.      Since the previous FSAP, supervisors and regulators further developed already good

### Since the previous FSAP, supervisors and regulators further developed already good practice.

### Financial conglomerate supervision
- Significant enhancements capture the unique characteristics of French conglomerates.
- European Commission implemented an enhanced reporting framework for intragroup transactions and risk concentrations; data are reported at regular intervals.
- Work on capital adequacy for financial conglomerates is anticipated to conclude in 2025.
- EU supervisors have specified methodologies for calculating capital adequacy, prerequisites for capital adequacy reporting.
- The ECB has developed the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) module to incorporate supervisory considerations and assessments specific to conglomerates and to steer supervisory actions.
- Overall, EU frameworks have gained importance and enhanced robustness of the supervision of conglomerates in France.
- Key structural observation: banks heading bancassurance conglomerates are allowed to include large equity stakes in insurance subsidiaries in their risk-weighted assets and not deduct these holdings from their regulatory capital.
- Note on calibration: effectiveness of conglomerate-level capital adequacy requirements needs to be ensured by conglomerate supervision and supported by governance and risk management measures to secure availability of capital.
- Recommendation: a holistic and structured solution, well anchored in legislation at the EU level to include a cross-border component, would considerably improve supervisors’ position in supervision and enforcement.
- Recommendation: adopt an integrated supervisory approach and strong enforcement to underpin supervisory dialogue with conglomerates through clearly structured and unified messaging.
- Recommendation: enhance collaboration among sectoral supervisors, share work programs, extend joint actions, and cooperate with European authorities to standardize methodologies for identifying relevant competent authorities.
- Recommendation: automated tools would further improve efficiency of conglomerate oversight.

### Less Significant Banking Institution (LSI) supervision
- LSIs represent 4 percent of banking sector assets.
- Current supervision by ACPR benefits from proportionate application of the EU Single Rulebook and the SSM regulation combined with ACPR’s own methodologies.
- ACPR conducts comprehensive onsite examinations but covers a limited portion of the sector.
- Each year, the ACPR conducts around 5 to 6 on-site examinations of LSIs.
- Recommendation: apply more flexibility and better targeting in supervision; implement targeted examinations to improve coverage and optimize resources.
- Recommendation: flexibly implement EU frameworks, including SREP for LSIs, ensuring diverse business models are reflected in supervisory assessments.

### Insurance sector regulation and supervision
- ICP assessment: 23 of the 24 ICPs were assessed as Observed or Largely Observed.
- Reforms since 2013 include implementation of EU legislation (especially Solvency II) and national legislation creating a recovery and resolution regime.
- ORPS framework: life insurers established ORPS subsidiaries; retirement savings portfolios totalling EUR 216 billion at the end of 2023 were transferred in some cases.
- ORPSs benefit from relief from Solvency II’s valuation and capital requirements and reduced volatility of capital requirements, but are otherwise subject to requirements based on Solvency II.
- ACPR ensured at licensing that ORPS capital would be sufficient to cover needs in adverse conditions.
- Observed misalignment: valuation and solvency requirements for ORPSs (drawing on IORPs framework) are less well aligned to ICP requirements; valuations are not market consistent on an economic balance sheet and capital requirements are not reflective of associated risks.
- One ICP assessed Partly Observed (ICP 12 Exit from the market) relates to recovery and resolution of the most significant insurers; ACPR lacks some necessary tools for effective resolution under its national regime.
- EU Insurance Recovery and Resolution Directive must be implemented by early 2027.
- Governance and risk management: comprehensive requirements exist; suitability (fit and proper) requirements need strengthening—specifically, all members of the Board of directors should be included within notification and approval requirements.
- Regulatory processes: ACPR equipped to assess new license applications; supervisory risk assessment recently improved; supervisory tools enhanced; supervisors undertake thorough inspections and regular meetings with senior managers; supervisory work integrated with supervisory colleges for cross-border groups.
- Macroprudential work: ACPR carries out wide-ranging macroprudential supervision, including stress testing exercises that have included the impact of climate change.
- Recommendation: continuously evaluate risk-based approach to ensure supervisory intensity on smaller insurers remains adequate.
- Enforcement: ACPR has necessary enforcement tools but use of administrative sanctions (such as financial penalties) is limited in number and scope; the process for use of certain powers is lengthy—consider modifying or removing procedural requirements or stages to make the process more expeditious.
- Conduct supervision: ACPR has a specialist conduct supervisory function focusing on products and processes; supervision relies on prudential supervisors to consider conduct issues in oversight of governance and compliance functions; supervision of intermediaries could be strengthened with more off-site work.
- International cooperation: ACPR empowered to share confidential information, has established supervisory colleges for IAIGs and cross-border insurance groups, participates in colleges established by other supervisors, cooperates with banking supervisors on cross-border bancassurance groups, and participates actively in EU work.

### Market regulation and supervision
- AMF and ACPR have responded to increasing market complexity; supervisory approaches are effective.
- Responsibilities grew to include digital asset markets, sustainable finance, and digital operational resilience.
- AMF: supervision of fund liquidity risk and secondary markets has shown strong developments; supervisory mechanisms for leverage, liquidity and redemption risks in open-ended funds adopted in advance of EU requirements.
- AMF invested in tools for data-driven supervision, integrating and analyzing market data to improve oversight and inform supervisory priorities; supported by horizontal thematic supervision and firm-specific inspections resulting in a material number of enforcement actions in the context of EU peers.
- AMF invested resources towards financial stability and systemic risk monitoring.
- Market resilience concerns: OTC trading complexity, shifts from continuous intra-day liquidity towards point-in-time liquidity concentration, and expected consolidation increasing dependence on particular firms and infrastructure.
- Recommendation: prioritize resilience testing in markets, identify critical dependencies and firms, and consider supervisory actions to ensure trading continuity after disruptions or outages.
- Recommendation: AMF should ensure significant firms are subject to proactive supervision on financial and operational resilience, noting that some AMF-supervised firms have critical outsourcing arrangements and dependencies on group functions located outside of the EU.

### Cyber security
- Current landscape: four dedicated teams within the three financial authorities (BdF, ACPR, AMF), MoEF, and ANSSI involved; institutional and regulatory framework strong but supervisory practices not fully standardized.
- Recommendation: formalize and enhance collaboration among authorities to facilitate cooperation and information sharing in cyber security; legally establish basis for sharing necessary information and set up procedures and channels for collaboration.
- Recommendation: increase cooperation with ANSSI on critical infrastructure protection covering technical and financial stability aspects.
- DORA-related activities: develop common tools including incident reporting, databases, and a register of information on third party service providers to create a holistic cyber risk landscape.
- Recommendation: standardize incident reporting tools and information sharing; at least one authority should have a complete overview of incident and IT-related outsourcing information for the whole financial sector; channel such data into financial stability reports and macroprudential monitoring.
- Recommendation: harmonize cyber risk supervisory practices and methodologies across agencies so similar observations yield consistent supervisory actions (including deadlines and potential fines) for entities with the same IT complexity and risk profile.
- Recommendation: set up a supervisory platform for sharing cyber risk case studies, good practices, and methodologies; plan increased onsite supervisory presence with enhanced resources.

### Financial integrity (AML/CFT)
- FATF 2022 assessment found France’s AML/CFT regime largely effective.
- Legislative updates improved ability to tackle illicit financial flows; most AML/CFT competent authorities have comprehensive understanding of ML/TF risks.
- France performed well in investigations and prosecutions of TF activities and improved investigations and prosecutions of ML activities.
- Beneficial ownership transparency promoted through publication of detailed information on legal persons and arrangements.
- Remaining weaknesses: some moderate legislative shortcomings on customer due diligence obligations relating to PEPs and scope of beneficial ownership reporting and disclosure; AMF’s risk-based AML/CFT supervision is fairly new.
- Other issues: delays in reporting suspicious transactions by financial institutions; limitations in identification of beneficial owners; concerns over application of the “travel rule” by virtual assets service providers; fit and proper checks did not extend to all management positions and beneficial owners.
- Recent improvements: publication of a new national risk assessment; strengthened legislative framework for virtual assets, AML/CFT obligations relating to PEPs, and beneficial ownership; AMF formalizing and calibrating its risk-based approach; ACPR strengthened oversight of virtual asset service providers; increased awareness among obliged entities on beneficial ownership obligations.
- Legislative proposals underway to extend scope of fit and proper checks.
- Recommendation: continue strengthening risk-based AML/CFT supervision, ensure all obliged entities fully understand beneficial ownership obligations, and continue efforts to understand and mitigate ML/TF risks from the virtual asset sector.

### Crisis preparedness and management
- Recommendation: ACPR should prioritize operational readiness for cross-border bail-in procedures, including fallback options, and for combinations of resolution tools.
- Observed challenge: enforceability of bail-in powers for securities in foreign jurisdictions needs further work—particularly relevant for French banks.
- Recommendation: ACPR should continue engaging with the SRB and in international fora to prepare for effective exercise of bail-in powers in all relevant jurisdictions.
- Recommendation: intensify work on combination of tools, placing more emphasis on sale of business and on the bridge bank tool in case no private acquirers can be found.
- Recommendation: for financial conglomerates, ensure compatibility of resolution plans for banking and insurance arms.
- Recommendation: domestic law should recognize potential use of government financial stabilization tools foreseen under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) as a last resort option subject to specific safeguards.

*Source: Excerpt from IMF FSAP chapter text.*

### 68.      BdF should require banks to preposition collateral and conduct simulation exercises

### 1fraea2025002-source-pdf - 68.      BdF should require banks to preposition collateral and conduct simulation exercises

### Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA): preparedness and operational arrangements
- Recommendation: BdF should require banks to have sufficient prepositioning of credit claims to ensure preparedness to mobilize illiquid collateral for ELA purposes.
  - Prepositioning should be calibrated on a risk basis and prioritize banks with complex and difficult-to -value collateral.
  - BdF is well positioned to mandate prepositioning given its long experience in valuing credit claims.
  - A large share of credit claims is already eligible (and widely used) as part of the regular monetary operations framework.
- Complementary measure: Prepositioning should be complemented with simulation exercises (BdF internal and/or with banks).
- Early-warning and supervisory coordination:
  - ACPR should develop an early warning system based on supervisory information to swiftly inform BdF of banks under liquidity stress.
- Bancassurance considerations:
  - Given the significance of the bancassurance model, BdF should ensure it can identify and assess in advance the potential use of a bank proxy for ELA provisioning to an insurer.

### Cross-border ELA and ELA in resolution
- Recommendation: BdF should develop cooperation arrangements for cross-border ELA with other EU national central banks (NCBs) and with non-EU central banks.
  - Arrangements should cover deployment of collateral and provision of ELA in foreign currency.
  - For intra-EA ELA operations, cooperation arrangements should facilitate the swift establishment of networks that concerned NCBs in the Eurosystem would establish according to the ECB ELA Agreement.
- Readiness for ELA in resolution:
  - BdF should ensure readiness for ELA in resolution and develop internal policies together with ACPR to assess the prospective solvency of banks in resolution.
  - BdF and ACPR should document the lines of action to be taken with other financial safety net functions and stakeholders if ELA is provided.

### Deposit insurance fund (FGDR): adequacy and backstop
- Finding: France’s bank deposits are largely concentrated in a few major banks which would be subject to resolution and thus not expected, a priori, to utilize the funds held by FGDR for reimbursing their deposits.
- Recommendation: The deposit insurance fund needs to be strengthened through a higher target level and a public backstop.
  - IMF best practice: FGDR funds should be sufficient to withstand the concurrent failure of the 2—4 largest of those banks.
  - Under current circumstances, the funds fall well short of this level.
  - The FGDR also needs a public backstop to provide credibility to the scheme and ensure the quick provision of liquidity within the 7 days payout period.
- Numeric detail: The current target level in France is 0.5 percent of covered deposits.

### Authorities’ views and policy stance
- General reaction:
  - The French authorities greatly valued the FSAP engagement and cooperative discussions.
  - They broadly agreed with the systemic risk assessment and stress-test findings that the banking system is broadly resilient to severe but plausible macro-financial shocks, from solvency and liquidity perspectives.
- Specific positions:
  - Authorities argued that banks' diversified business models ensure profitability remains stable under stress.
  - Noted non-financial private sector (in particular SMEs) appears exposed to macroeconomic shocks but has been resilient to the rise in interest rates; recent rise in insolvencies partly reflects a catch-up effect following expiration of pandemic support measures.
  - Households’ default risk remains small thanks to banks' conservative origination practices and an adequate and sufficient macroprudential borrower-based measures.
- On recommendations:
  - Supportive of most recommendations and committed to strengthening financial sector resilience.
  - On macroprudential framework: saw merit in improving public communication and governance, but signaled that HCSF functions well in practice; raising larger macroprudential buffer would need to be embedded in broader regulatory buffer reform.
  - Did not support formalizing a neutral level of the credit protection reserve.
  - Disagreed with staff’s recommendation regarding the presence of the MoEF on supervisory boards, viewing it as helpful and not unduly influential.
  - On ORPS (pension funds): did not consider ICP assessment appropriate because ICPs were designed for insurance companies and are not all fit for pension funds.
  - On crisis management and cyber security: stressed that well-working informal arrangements should not be made less effective through formalization.
  - On FGDR target and backstop:
    - Considered current FGDR target level adequate as it derives from EU legislation and is based on a risk methodology developed by the EC reflecting France’s banking structure and risk profile.
    - Prefer assessing the size of the deposit insurance fund using a publicly available methodology based on assessment of individual banking risks and loss expectations.
    - Do not support implementation of a public liquidity backstop for the FGDR, citing moral hazard concerns and risk of strengthening the sovereign-banking nexus.

### Key structural and systemic context (selected figures from the chapter)
- Banking concentration: six banks account for 86 percent of banking assets.
- Global systemically important banks (GSIBs): France is home to four GSIBs, with combined assets at 290 percent of GDP.
- Deposit insurance current target level: 0.5 percent of covered deposits.
- Payout operational expectation: 7 days payout period for deposit reimbursements.

*Source: 1fraea2025002-source-pdf - 68.      BdF should require banks to preposition collateral and conduct simulation exercises*

### 1. Institutional

### 1. Institutional

### Perimeter and Coverage
- Institutions included: 7 SI banks, 4 of which are G-SIBs.
- Market share: Around 96 percent of the banking sector assets.
- Scope of consolidation: banking activities of the consolidated banking group for banks having their headquarters in France; insurance activities are excluded; banking associates are included.
- Coverage of sovereign and non-sovereign securities exposures: debt securities measured through fair value (FVPL and FVOCI) and amortized cost (AC) account.

### Data and Baseline Date
- Data vintage: 2024 Q4 (starting point for PL, balance sheet and capital).
- Supervisory data: Bank balance sheet and supervisory statistics (including FINREP and COREP), information on interest rate risk in the banking book (IRRBB), short-term exercise (STE), provided by the ECB.
- PDs for non-financial corporates: estimated based on the Corporate Stress Test (Global Corporate Stress Tests—Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic and Policy Responses) and complemented for some foreign exposures with Expected Default Frequency sourced from Moody’s.
- Household analysis: relies on the 2021 Household Finance and Consumption Survey.
- Market and publicly available data sources: ECB statistical data warehouse (funding and lending rates for new business (front-book) by type of asset and funding portfolios), Capital IQ and Orbis for corporate sector analysis.
- Additional supervisory and market information may include probability of defaults by credit portfolios and information on debt securities (duration, yield, etc.).

### Channels of Risk Propagation and Methodology
- FSAP team satellite models and methodologies.
- For internally modelled exposures (IRB): projection of PiT and TTC PDs, PiT and DT LGDs, EAD, and RWA.
- For SA exposures: projection of new flows of defaulted exposures and RWA based on risk weights for performing and non-performing loans separately.
- Balance-sheet regulatory approach.
- Provisioning for IRB and SA modeled using IFRS9 transition matrix approach.
- Market risk impact: revaluation of trading assets (FVPL) and securities classified as FVOCI assessed using a modified duration approach or sensitivities to market risk factors (Greeks) with hedging strategy considered.
- Equity and derivative exposures: assessed using sensitivities to market risk factors (Greeks).
- Interest income and expense: Time-to-repricing approach.

### Satellite Models for Macro‑Financial Linkages
- Models for credit losses, funding costs, lending rates.
- Within EA: household and corporate PD analysis using micro-data at individual household (HFCS) and non-financial corporate (commercial corporate database).
- Outside EA: EDF or the Corporate Stress Test model used as proxies for PDs.
- LGD shocks for collateralized exposures linked to paths for real estate prices in the scenario using a smoothing factor to account for the TTC regulatory approach.
- Interest income projected at portfolio level using a structural approach applying interest rate shocks on new originations and loans’ repricing ladder to outstanding volumes.
- Funding costs projected at portfolio level using funding structure by product (retail and wholesale deposits, secured and unsecured debt securities, repo, etc.) and maturity bucket (overnight vs. term).

### Tail Shocks, Horizon, and Scenarios
- Stress test horizon: 2024 Q2– 2027 Q2 (three years).
- Three scenarios:
  - Baseline: drawn from the October 2024 WEO macroeconomic projections.
  - Adverse scenario 1: A geopolitical scenario (or higher-for-longer) featuring an escalation of geopolitical conflicts.
  - Adverse scenario 2: A recessionary scenario showing a synchronized global slowdown amplified by sovereign debt distress in EA.
- Adverse scenarios rely on GFM, a structural macro-econometric model of the world economy, disaggregated into forty national economies, documented in Vitek (2018).
- Real GDP shock magnitudes: geopolitical scenario entails a shock over two years of 2.4 times the standard deviation of 2-year real GDP growth over 1970-2024; recession scenario entails a shock over two years of 2.7 times the standard deviation of 2-year real GDP growth over 1970-2024.
- Market risk shocks: modeled as an add-on materializing at the beginning of the first year of each adverse scenario.
- Second-round effects and sensitivity analysis include:
  - Counterfactual policy analysis of household borrower-based instruments and mortgage default.
  - Sovereign spreads shocks incorporated in the market risk scenarios.
  - Documentation of exposures to large counterparties.
  - Variations on scenario analysis to inform calibration of the positive neutral CCyB.

### Risks Covered and Behavioral Adjustments
- Risks covered: credit (on loans and debt securities), market (valuation impact of debt instruments through repricing and credit spread risk as well as the P&L impact of net open positions in market risk factors such as foreign exchange risks) and interest rate risk on the banking book (IRRBB).
- Behavioral adjustment for balance-sheet growth: quasi-static approach — asset allocation and composition of funding remain the same, balance sheet grows in line with nominal GDP paths of major geographical exposures, with a floor of zero percent on rate of change of balance sheets (binding in the adverse scenario).
- FX shock: revaluation effects on foreign currency loans specified in the stress test scenario.
- RWA projection:
  - Standardized portfolios: RWAs change due to balance sheet growth, new inflows of non-performing loans, exchange rate movements, and conversion of a portion of off-balance sheet items (undisbursed credit lines and guarantees) to on-balance sheet items.
  - IRB portfolios: through-the-cycle-PDs, downturn LGDs and EAD for each asset class/industry used to project risk weights.
- Calibration of risk parameters:
  - Interest income from nonperforming loan is not accrued.
  - Dividends are paid out by banks that remain profitable and adequately capitalized throughout the stress. The dividend rate will be the average ratio between observed dividends and profits after tax over the last five years.
  - The tax rate will be set at 30 percent in line with 2023 EBA methodology.

### Regulatory and Market-Based Standards and Parameters
- National regulatory framework: Basel III regulatory minima on CET1 (4.5 percent) and include any requirements due to systemic buffers (SyRB, G-SII buffer, O-SII buffer), with and without capital conservation buffer ( CCoB), and Pillar II requirement.
- Leverage ratio assessed during the stress test horizon against the 3 percent Basel III minimum requirement.

### Reporting and Output Presentation (Solvency)
- Outputs:
  - Capital path under various scenarios by groups of banks, categorized by business model.
  - System-wide capital shortfall.
  - Number of banks and percentage of banking assets in the system that fall below regulatory minima or breach capital buffers.
  - Information on impact of different result drivers, including profit components.

---

### B. Banking Sector: Liquidity Test

### Institutional Perimeter and Data
- Institutions included: 7 SI banks, of which four are G-SIBs.
- Market share: Around 96 percent of the banking sector assets.
- Data and horizon: Data vintage: 2024 Q4. Data: Supervisory data from ITS files (FINREP, COREP).
- Scope of consolidation: Consolidated group basis. Perimeter of the banking group (CRD V).

### Methodology and Horizon
- Framework: LCR-based tests, using regulatory parameters and more severe scenarios. Breakdown by significant currency, where available.
- Cashflow-based liquidity stress test with breakdown by significant currency, where available.
- Share of large depositors used to describe concentration risks.
- Stress test horizon: 30 days for LCR-based tests, and up to 1 year for cashflow analysis.

### Types of Analyses
- Scenario analysis: various stress scenarios with varying intensity of adverse liquidity conditions.
- Main risks analyzed: market upheaval and tightening of market liquidity conditions (linked to solvency adverse scenario, where possible), deposit run-offs, outflows from top funding sources.
- Reverse stress tests.

### Buffers and Behavioral Adjustments
- Liquidity from the central bank is not considered.
- Buffers assessed: capacity of banks to generate liquidity from inflows and from assets under stress (i.e., counter-balancing capacity).

### Regulatory Standards and Reporting
- For LCR-based tests: hurdle rate set at 100 percent at the aggregate currency level (per Basel III and domestic regulation).
- For cashflow analysis: outcomes of interest are the Net Liquidity Position and the survival period.
- Output presentation: Average LCR, Net Liquidity Position and survival period; Number of institutions with LCR below regulatory limits.

---

### C. Mutual Funds Sector: Liquidity Risk (Top-down Stress Test by FSAP Team — Assumptions)

### Institutional Perimeter and Data
- Institutions included: All open-end debt-oriented schemes.
- Supervisory data includes: (1) Fund level characteristics and AUM, (2) Cash flow data, (3) Fund investment portfolio, and (4) bond market trading data.
- Other commercial data sources: Bloomberg.
- Data period: From December 2017 to September 2024.

### Channels of Risk Propagation and Methodology
- Liquidity resilience measured by the Redemption Coverage Ratio based on value of high-quality liquid assets and calibration of redemption shock.
- Calibration of redemption shock uses both the historical simulation and flow-performance approach.
- Historical simulation approach: instantaneous shocks simulated based on historical net flows under fund homogeneity, fund heterogeneity and fund family assumptions.
- Flow-performance approach: exogenous market shocks trigger change of NAV which lead to additional redemption outflows; redemption shock triggered from change of NAV from macroeconomic scenarios that lead to change in interest rates and credit spreads.
- Market impact estimated based on assumptions on different fund liquidation strategies and segmental-market characteristics.
- Second-round redemption shock triggered if market sale causes significant price impacts that lead to asset devaluation of funds.

### Tail Shocks, Scenarios, and Sensitivity Analysis
- Scenario analysis includes two scenarios:
  - Baseline: historical simulation approach calibrates the redemption shock based on time series cash flow data under four years horizon.
  - Adverse: exogenous market shock triggers asset depreciation through interest rate risk and creates additional redemption shocks.
- Fund liquidation approaches: prorate approach and waterfall approach.
- Market impact from asset liquidation estimated under three market scenarios based on the volume of market trading activity at its peak, normal and low.
- Sensitivity analysis: Reverse stress test showing total number of funds failure with levels of redemption shock applied to funds homogeneously.

### Risk Factors Assessed
- Interest rate risk.
- Market risk.
- Liquidity risk.

*Table 8: France: Stress Test Matrix (STeM) — A. Banking Sector: Solvency Stress Test; B. Banking Sector: Liquidity Test; C. Mutual Funds Sector: Liquidity Risk.*

### 5. Reporting format

### 5. Reporting format

### Output Presentation
- Redemption Coverage Ratio and liquidity shortfalls on fund level
- Number of funds that cannot survive the shocks (with the RCR ratio below one and liquidity shortfall larger than zero)
- Total value of assets sold under different scenarios
- The percent of price decline under different market conditions and the mitigation effect of central bank lending facilities

### Structure of Financial System (End-2023)
- Total: 18.82 (In trillions of EUR); In percent of Total: 100; In percent of GDP: 665.8
- Deposit Institutions: 11.75 (In trillions of EUR); In percent of Total: 62.4; In percent of GDP: 415.8
- Money Market funds: 0.42 (In trillions of EUR); In percent of Total: 2.2; In percent of GDP: 14.9
- Investment funds: 1.45 (In trillions of EUR); In percent of Total: 7.7; In percent of GDP: 51.3
- Other Financial Institutions: 1.65 (In trillions of EUR); In percent of Total: 8.7; In percent of GDP: 58.2
- Insurance Corporations: 2.67 (In trillions of EUR); In percent of Total: 14.2; In percent of GDP: 94.6
- Pension Funds: 0.35 (In trillions of EUR); In percent of Total: 1.9; In percent of GDP: 12.5
- Social Security Funds: 0.52 (In trillions of EUR); In percent of Total: 2.8; In percent of GDP: 18.5
- Source: BdF

### Status of 2019 Key FSAP Recommendations — Selected Findings and Implementation Status
- Preemptive Management of Systemic Vulnerabilities
  - Engage with ECB and other EU agencies on use of Pillar II measures to address bank-specific residual risk from concentration of exposures to large, indebted corporates.
    - Agency: ACPR; Timing*: I; Implementation Status: D
    - Key points: ECB published “guide on leveraged transactions” dated May 2017; bank-specific letters sent to most exposed banks (of which 4 French groups); HCSF replaced measure art. 458 “Large exposure” with a sectoral systemic risk buffer (SyRB) of 3 percent on exposures of French banks to large, heavily indebted corporates (press release published on July 31st).
  - Develop analytical framework for borrower-based measures for corporates. Consider a sectoral Systemic Risk Buffer (SRB) if risks intensify.
    - Agency: HCSF; Timing*: NT; Implementation Status: D
    - Key point: Monitoring enhanced; on July 28th, 2023, French macroprudential authority introduced a sectoral systemic risk buffer of 3 percent on exposures of French banks to large, heavily indebted corporates (press release published on July 31st).
  - Evaluate options to further incentivize corporates to finance through equity rather than debt.
    - Agency: MoF; Timing*: NT; Implementation Status: NA

- Ensuring Adequate Liquidity Management and Buffers
  - Develop with the ECB options to manage any disruptions in wholesale funding markets. Consider liquidity buffers to cover at least 50 percent of wholesale funding outflows over/up to five days horizon for all major currencies.
    - Agency: ACPR, ECB; Timing*: NT; Implementation Status: PD
    - Key points: Banks maintain significant liquidity buffer, above the 100 percent usual threshold for LCR and NSFR introduced June 2021. ECB judged liquidity risks not particularly high in 2022 SREP. Monitoring of liquidity risk to be reinforced in context of higher rates and TLTRO reimbursement effects.
  - Actively engage with the ESRB and others for speedy development of liquidity and leverage related tools for insurers and investment funds.
    - Agency: BdF, HCSF, ACPR, AMF; Timing*: NT; Implementation Status: PD
    - Key points: Revision of AIFM Directive strengthens liquidity management rules for open-ended funds (managers to choose at least two tools); article 25 provides market authority capacity to impose a limit on leverage. Review of Directive 2009/138/EC enhances liquidity monitoring and supervision for insurers and introduces power for public authorities to suspend redemptions in liquidity crisis. Banque de France and AMF monitor liquidity and leverage risks in fund sector and participate in Eurosystem, FSB, ESRB workstreams; AMF published a position paper co-signed with Spanish, Italian and Austrian regulators. French Treasury involved in FSB Working Group on OEFs and MMF Peer review; member of FSB Standing Committee on Supervisory and Regulatory Cooperation and Expert Group on Banking, Payments, and Insurance of the European Commission.

- Further Integration of Financial Conglomerate Oversight
  - Report intragroup exposures and transactions within conglomerates on a flow and stock basis at quarterly or regular frequency.
    - Agency: ACPR, AMF; Timing*: NT; Implementation Status: PD
    - Key points: French conglomerates report common exposures and intragroup transactions regularly (CONGLOMER reporting). Enhanced reporting developed by the European Joint Committee on Financial Conglomerates; European Commission to adopt through Implementing Technical Standard by 2024. First reporting date was 31/12/2023.
  - Develop with the ECB and other EU agencies liquidity risk management requirements and stress testing at the conglomerate level.
    - Agency: ACPR, AMF; Timing*: NT; Implementation Status: PD
    - Key points: No liquidity risk management requirement considered yet; prudential consolidation perimeter deemed satisfactory. ACPR conducting ad hoc research projects on liquidity analysis and conglomerate-level stress testing; research ongoing and presented to ACPR Scientific Committee.
  - Strengthen conglomerate oversight and work with the Joint Committee of the ESAs to finalize common reporting templates, and with the ECB on common supervisory guidance for conglomerates.
    - Agency: ACPR, AMF; Timing*: NT; Implementation Status: PD
    - Key points: ACPR deputy Secretary General chairs JC of the ESAs on common reporting templates; group expected to deliver full set by end 2021. ACPR actively participated in ESA’s work on digital finance and potential review of FICOD to supervise mixed-activity groups. ACPR and ECB putting coordination arrangements in place for each financial conglomerate.

- Enhancing Governance, Financial Policies and Financial Integrity
  - The ACPR and AMF should have autonomy to determine their resource levels based on a forward-looking review of supervisory and monitoring needs.
    - Agency: ACPR, AMF, MoF; Timing*: I; Implementation Status: PD
    - Key points: NSAs free to allocate resources to needed fields, but constitutionally cannot determine global resource level (parliamentary decision required). ACPR cap on number of staff removed but cap on total budget remains. Both caps remain for the AMF.
  - To avoid perception of conflict of interest, government should recuse itself from all supervisory decision-making committees at the ACPR and the AMF.
    - Agency: MoF; Timing*: I; Implementation Status: NA
    - Key points: MoEF still present in both agencies’ bodies. Government agencies adopted policy of no longer attending ACPR Sanctions Committee meetings (legislation not yet changed). Director General of the Treasury remains a full voting member of ACPR’s Resolution Committee. Treasury is a non-voting member on AMF Board, but not Sanctions Committee.
  - Reduce further the spread between market interest rates and the return on regulated savings products. Ensure timely and effective implementation of CDC governance reform under the Loi PACTE and undertake a full review of regulated savings framework at the appropriate time.
    - Agency: MoF; Timing*: NT; Implementation Status: PD
    - Key points and exact figures:
      - 2018 and 2023 decisions contributed to reducing the spread.
      - 2018: new formula to calculate return on Livret A and LDDS, removed “inflation floor” and replaced EONIA with €STR.
      - Livret A rate rose from 0.5% in January 2022 to 3% in February 2023.
      - Minister froze the rate at 3% for eighteen months until February 2025, as permitted by law.
      - Without the freeze, strict application of the formula would have given a return of 4,1% in August 2023 and 3,9% in February 2024.
      - Under Loi PACTE, ACPR became CDC's supervisor; “Commission de surveillance” became a decision-making body; budgetary process clarified.

- Enhance AML/CFT supervision of smaller banks rated as high-risk. Explore ways to provide systematic guidance on detection of potential terrorist financing activities.
  - Agency: ACPR, Tracfin; Timing*: I; Implementation Status: D
  - Key points: ACPR implements risk-based AML/CFT supervisory approach linking supervisory intensity to individual risk assessment. Over 2015-2020 onsite inspection cycle: 88% of higher-risk banks had onsite inspection; 44% medium-high-risk; 9% medium-low risk; 1% lower-risk. CPR/TRACFIN joint Guidelines list criteria including weak signals for detection of terrorist financing. Sectoral Risk Assessment published by ACPR focuses on CFT per activity.

- Reinforcing Crisis Management, Safety Nets, Resolution Arrangement
  - Work toward an enhanced resolution framework for insurers by including wider powers to restructure liabilities (bail-in), and enhanced safeguards and funding.
    - Agency: ACPR; Timing*: MT; Implementation Status: NA
    - Key point: No legal changes since last FSAP. European Directive on Insurance Recovery and Resolution (IRRD) should be transposed by end of 2026/early 2027 into French law; it will add bail-in powers and resolution financing arrangements.
  - The eligibility of the FGDR’s Supervisory Board membership, which is formed by bank executives in activity, should be changed to independent members only.
    - Agency: FGDR; Timing*: MT; Implementation Status: PD
    - Key point: Membership not changed, but safeguards in place to prevent conflicts of interest.
  - Develop modalities for providing ELA in currencies other than euros and establish general rules to assist banks in identifying assets that might be proposed as ELA collateral and buttress operational readiness to pledge them.
    - Agency: BdF, ACPR; Timing*: MT; Implementation Status: PD
    - Key points: Main responsibility for ELA lies with National Central Banks and must comply with ECB ELA agreement. Banque de France has a recently updated procedure in place. Further work remains to buttress banks’ operational readiness to pledge collateral.

- Timing notation: * I= immediate (within one year), NT= near term (1–3 years), MT= medium term (3–5 years); these ratings reflect the authorities’ own assessment of implementation status.

*Source: IMF staff summary of chapter content*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1fraea2025002-source-pdf.pdf_
