## UNITED KINGDOM STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2025 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION (excerpt)

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### Context, objectives, and delivery challenges
- New government launched a “Growth Mission” after taking office in July 2024, revising fiscal rules, significantly increasing public investment, health and defense spending, and changing the benefit system.
- Report objectives:
  - Ensure medium-term fiscal strategy supports growth while stabilizing debt.
  - Complete BoE’s transition toward a smaller balance sheet and adapt liquidity tools.
  - Enhance financial market resilience.
  - Prioritize structural reforms to foster private investment and improve skills.
- Delivery challenges:
  - Heightened global volatility from trade policies and geopolitical developments.
  - Limited fiscal space amid an elevated interest burden and rising demands on public resources (defense and ageing-related spending).
  - Potential opposition and amplified resistance given breadth of reforms.

### Growth, inflation, labor market, and outlook
- Growth projections and drivers:
  - Real GDP: 1.2 percent in 2025 and 1.4 percent in 2026.
  - Domestic demand: 1.8 percent in 2025 and 1.4 percent in 2026.
  - Private domestic demand: 1.3 percent in 2025 and 1.6 percent in 2026.
  - Recovery assumed to be primarily driven by private consumption reflecting monetary policy easing, positive wealth effects from asset price growth (including real estate), and an uptick in confidence.
  - Staff estimates medium-term growth potential at 1.4 percent.
  - Announced planning reform estimated to improve potential growth in the outer years by 0.1pp compared to last year’s Art. IV report.
- Inflation:
  - CPI, period average: 3.2 percent in 2025 and 2.3 percent in 2026.
  - CPI, end-period: 2.9 percent in 2025 and 2.0 percent in 2026.
  - Headline inflation projected to rise to 3.5 percent in 2025Q3 due to regulated price increases, the NIC rate hike, and waning energy base effects; average CPI projected to decline from 3.2 percent in 2025 to 2.3 percent in 2026.
- Labor market:
  - Unemployment rate: 4.5 percent in 2025 and 4.4 percent in 2026.
  - Wage growth moderated; unemployment increased and job vacancies fell.
- Asset and nominal GDP:
  - Nominal GDP (billions GBP): 2,981 in 2025 and 3,089 in 2026.
  - Reserves (end of period, billions GBP): 139.5 in 2025 and 139.5 in 2026.

### Public finances and fiscal framework
- Key fiscal projections and metrics:
  - Public sector overall balance (percent of GDP): -4.1 in 2025 and -3.5 in 2026.
  - Public sector primary balance (percent of GDP): -1.1 in 2025 and -0.6 in 2026.
  - Public sector cyclically adjusted primary balance (percent of potential GDP): -0.8 in 2025 and -0.3 in 2026.
  - Public sector net financial liabilities (PSNFL): 82.9 in 2025 and 84.0 in 2026.
  - Public sector overall balance (fiscal year): 2024/25 = -4.7; 2025/26 = -4.1; 2026/27 = -3.5.
  - Public sector primary balance (fiscal year): 2024/25 = -1.9; 2025/26 = -1.1; 2026/27 = -0.6.
  - PSNFL (fiscal year): 2024/25 = 81.5; 2025/26 = 82.9; 2026/27 = 84.0.
  - General government gross debt (Maastricht basis): 2024/25 = 101.0; 2025/26 = 103.0; 2026/27 = 104.6.
- Fiscal framework changes (October 2024):
  - Substituted a current balance rule for the previous overall deficit rule.
  - Expanded perimeter of the net debt rule to include a broader range of financial assets and liabilities (PSNFL).
  - Horizon shortened from five to three years starting FY2026/27.
  - Commitments: reduce fiscal events per year from two to one; hold spending reviews every two years producing detailed, three-year departmental forecasts.
  - Technical detail: Starting from FY2026/27, the current balance rule will be deemed met at the time of the spring OBR forecast if the current budget is either in surplus or in deficit by no more than half a percent of GDP.
- Staff fiscal guidance:
  - Medium-term fiscal strategy appropriately supports growth while stabilizing net debt.
  - Stay the course: adhere to the announced spending envelope and use spending reviews for prioritization without increasing overall levels.
  - Contingency planning: prepare growth-friendly contingent measures (tax or expenditure-based), including reforms to property tax and VAT exemptions, stricter prioritization and efficiency savings (e.g., digitalization in health).
  - Staff advises against additional tax cuts and emphasizes high-quality consolidation measures to stabilize debt with high probability.

### Monetary policy stance and BoE transition
- Policy rate and neutral rate:
  - Bank Rate has been cut by 100 bps from its peak in August 2024; at 4.25 percent the policy rate “remains restrictive under a variety of measures of the neutral rate.”
  - Staff estimates a nominal neutral rate of 3 percent; BoE estimated a range of 2.25–3.75 percent in its February 2025 Monetary Policy Report.
  - Bank Rate (year average): 2024 = 5.1; 2025 = 4.1; 2026 = 3.2.
- Balance sheet and operational framework:
  - BoE decided in September 2024 to maintain QT at GBP100bn a year over the next 12 months.
  - Transition from a supply-driven system to a demand-driven repo-based framework; staff supports provision of reserves predominantly through repos while maintaining a small APF in steady state.
  - PMRR estimate (BoE survey): range of £385- 540bn billion.
  - At the current pace of QT, reserves are expected to reach scarcity by mid-2026.
  - Within repo operations, both STR and ILTR are needed; ILTR supplies reserves for 6 months and against a broader range of collateral.
- Staff recommendation:
  - Continue a gradual and flexible approach to policy easing; model-based simulations suggest an optimal path of one cut per quarter on average until reaching staff’s estimate of the neutral rate (3 percent) in the second half of 2026.
  - Strengthen BoE forecasting and scenario-based communication in line with Bernanke Review recommendations.

### Financial sector resilience, NBFI vulnerabilities, and macroprudential stance
- Banking sector:
  - Banking sector remains broadly resilient with aggregate CET1 Capital Ratio series and low aggregate NPL ratios.
  - Bank stress tests indicate the system is strong enough to support households and businesses during severe stress scenarios.
- NBFI sector:
  - NBFI accounts for more than half of the UK’s financial assets and plays a prominent role in corporate lending.
  - SWES 2024 improved understanding of NBFI stress reactions and linkages to banks.
  - Vulnerabilities: elevated leverage, concentration, growing interconnectedness, exposure to liquidity shocks including margin calls.
  - Initiative: development and onboarding to a contingent repo facility (CNRF) for appropriately regulated, resilient, and systemically important pension funds, insurance companies, and LDI funds.
  - Recommendation: continue international work to monitor and contain NBFI leverage; close global and domestic data gaps on Sterling asset holdings, private markets, and liquidity indicators.
- Gilt market and structural risks:
  - Gilt market functioning remained robust but structural change has shifted holders: patient investors scaled back long-term gilts while hedge funds and non-residents became more prominent.
  - Risk: hedge funds could amplify volatility and liquidity shortages in stress events.
  - Staff recommends enhancing gilt market resilience: close monitoring, regular stress testing, engagement with market makers, and consideration of central clearing for gilt repo transactions.
- Macroprudential settings:
  - Staff supports FPC decision to maintain the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) at its two percent neutral level.
  - If financial conditions tighten materially, authorities should consider easing prudential policy to avoid exacerbating a credit downturn.

### External sector assessment and risks
- Current account and NIIP:
  - Current account balance (percent of GDP): -3.4 in 2025 and -3.3 in 2026; 2024 = -2.7.
  - NIIP: 2024 = -9.8; projected deterioration to -11.4 in 2025 and -13.0 in 2026.
  - External position in 2024 assessed as moderately weaker than implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
  - Forecast assumes global trade tensions lower UK GDP by 0.3 percent cumulatively by 2026.
- Real exchange rate:
  - REER appreciated close to 4.2 percent in 2024; staff assesses REER gap at 6.5 percent in 2024 with a range of 5.5 to 7.6 percent.
- External buffers and vulnerabilities:
  - Gross Assets: 509 percent of GDP (2024); Gross Liab.: 519 percent of GDP (2024).
  - NIIP: -9.8 percent of GDP (2024).
  - Reserves and FX: sterling is a global reserve currency; share of global reserves in sterling close to 5.0 percent in 2024.

### Structural reforms, productivity, and the Growth Mission
- Core diagnosis:
  - Persistently weak labor productivity has driven slow economic growth; GDP around a quarter below the level implied by pre-GFC trend.
  - Contributing factors: chronic under-investment, limited access to finance for scaling firms, skills gaps, low business R&D, deterioration in health outcomes, loss of pre-GFC productivity drivers.
- Growth Mission pillars: (i) macroeconomic stability; (ii) investment, infrastructure, planning and housing (“capital”); (iii) people; (iv) innovation; (v) net-zero; and (vi) industrial strategy and trade.
- Key priorities and recommendations:
  - Policy stability, planning reform, and boosting human capital (skills and health) are highest priorities.
  - Planning reform: proposed Planning and Infrastructure Bill (introduced March 2025) to simplify decision-making, unblock priority infrastructure projects, and introduce a “Nature Restoration Fund” option.
  - Labor market and skills:
    - Address inactivity (close to a million out of workforce, majority due to long-term illness).
    - Deliver additional NHS funding and efficiency gains; incentivize work via incapacity and disability benefits reform.
    - Prioritize digital, manufacturing, medicine and life sciences, teaching, and construction skills; utilize Skills England.
  - Innovation and R&D:
    - Public R&D spending below many AEs; innovation hubs and AI expansion planned.
    - Recommend facilitating diffusion: improve firms’ access to finance, incentivize training, support university-private collaboration, and use NWF to help SMEs overcome financing constraints.
- National Wealth Fund (NWF):
  - Authorities provided the NWF with capital of around one percent of GDP, aiming to catalyze three times this amount in private investment.
  - Staff recommendations: rigorous project appraisal, additionality requirements, adequate risk management and reporting, and explicit quantitative exposure limits.

### Risks, scenarios, and contingency planning
- Downside risks emphasized:
  - Tighter-than-expected financial conditions combined with rising precautionary saving could hinder private consumption.
  - Persistent global trade uncertainty could weaken world activity and undermine private investment.
  - Significant rise in commodity prices could intensify inflationary pressures.
  - Stagflation risk if inflation persists while growth weakens.
- Scenario assumptions and implications:
  - Forecast assumes global trade tensions lower UK GDP by 0.3 percent by 2026.
  - Energy prices assumption: natural gas electricity price spike through 2025 (21.6 percent annual average increase) followed by steady fall of about 7.2 percent per year through the medium-term; oil prices expected to fall by 13.9 percent in 2025 and 5.7 percent in 2026.
  - Monetary policy under scenario: Bank Rate declining at one cut per quarter on average, converging to 3 percent in 2026Q3.
- Fiscal scenario (adverse):
  - In absence of measures, fiscal deficit would be around half a percent of GDP per year higher on average and the current balance rule would be breached.
  - Staff: most impact of weaker growth on fiscal aggregates should be offset by corrective measures and delivering planned medium-term consolidation.
- Monetary policy under adverse scenario:
  - Under the WEO scenario, headline inflation would be lower by 0.1pp and 0.3pp in 2025 and 2026 respectively, allowing the BoE to accelerate easing by an additional 25 basis points cuts in both 2025 and 2026.

### Policy recommendations (staff and Board)
- Fiscal:
  - Stay the course on announced spending envelope; use spending reviews for prioritization.
  - Prepare growth-friendly contingency measures (tax or expenditure-based); consider property tax reform and removing VAT exemptions.
  - Improve spending efficiency and address long-term pressures from ageing population, defense spending and climate transition.
- Monetary:
  - Continue gradual approach to policy easing; retain flexibility to adjust stance in either direction.
  - Strengthen BoE forecasting and communication capacity; deepen scenario-based communication per Bernanke Review.
  - Transition to a demand-driven repo-based reserves framework while keeping a small APF as useful in stress.
- Financial stability:
  - Maintain robust macroprudential settings; address remaining NBFI vulnerabilities domestically and internationally.
  - Enhance gilt market resilience and strengthen AML/CFT framework.
  - Support full, timely, and consistent implementation of Basel III reforms.
- Structural reforms:
  - Prioritize and sequence Growth Mission policies to secure quick wins and public/market buy-in.
  - Focus on policy stability, planning reform, and boosting skills to maximize growth benefits.
  - Apply targeted industrial policy only where market failures are evident; enforce cost-benefit analysis, time limits, and budgetary limits.
- Financial sector reforms and governance:
  - Pension fund consolidation to reduce fees and expand asset access, while avoiding mandated asset allocations.
  - Improve beneficial ownership transparency and continue Companies House reforms and register access commitments with Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies.

*Source: UNITED KINGDOM STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2025 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION (staff report text and tables).*

### 1.2 percent in 2025 and 1.4 percent in 2026, as monetary easing, positive wealth effects, and an uptick in

### UNITED KINGDOM STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2025 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION

### Context and Challenges
- New government launched a “Growth Mission” after taking office in July 2024, revising fiscal rules, significantly increasing public investment, health and defense spending, and making changes to the benefit system.
- Financial sector agenda includes consolidating pension funds, unlocking private investment in domestic capital markets, and a pro-growth approach to financial regulation.
- Structural agenda includes reviewing planning laws, enhancing labor force skills, strengthening employee rights, and a new industrial strategy.
- Delivery challenges: heightened global volatility from trade policies and geopolitical developments; limited fiscal space amid an elevated interest burden and rising demands on public resources (defense and ageing-related spending); potential opposition and amplified resistance given breadth of reforms.
- Report objectives: ensure medium-term fiscal strategy supports growth while stabilizing debt; complete BoE’s transition toward a smaller balance sheet and adapt liquidity tools; enhance financial market resilience; prioritize structural reforms to foster private investment and improve skills.

### Recent Economic Developments
- Growth dynamics:
  - UK experienced strong growth in Q1 2025 following lackluster second half of 2024.
  - GDP growth was flat in Q3 2024 and expanded by 0.1 percent in Q4 2024 (q-o-q).
  - GDP grew 0.7 percent q-o-q in Q1 2025 (mainly driven by business investment).
- Inflation and labor market:
  - Headline inflation declined from a peak of 11.1 percent in October 2022 to 1.7 percent in September 2024, then picked up in fall 2024 due to waning energy base effects.
  - Wage growth moderated; unemployment increased and job vacancies fell.
- Policy actions:
  - October 2024 Budget enacted an increase in the rate of employers' NICs from 13.8 to 15 percent, effective from April 2025.

### Outlook and Key Projections
- Growth projections:
  - Real GDP: 1.2 percent in 2025 and 1.4 percent in 2026.
  - Domestic demand: 1.8 percent in 2025 and 1.4 percent in 2026.
  - Private domestic demand: 1.3 percent in 2025 and 1.6 percent in 2026.
- Inflation projections:
  - CPI, period average: 3.2 percent in 2025 and 2.3 percent in 2026.
  - CPI, end-period: 2.9 percent in 2025 and 2.0 percent in 2026.
- Labor market and saving/investment:
  - Unemployment rate: 4.5 percent in 2025 and 4.4 percent in 2026.
  - Gross national saving (percent of GDP): 13.1 in 2025 and 13.2 in 2026.
  - Gross domestic investment (percent of GDP): 16.4 in 2025 and 16.5 in 2026.
- Public finance:
  - Public sector overall balance (percent of GDP): -4.1 in 2025 and -3.5 in 2026.
  - Public sector primary balance (percent of GDP): -1.1 in 2025 and -0.6 in 2026.
  - Public sector cyclically adjusted primary balance (percent of potential GDP): -0.8 in 2025 and -0.3 in 2026.
  - Public sector net financial liabilities (PSNFL): 82.9 in 2025 and 84.0 in 2026.
- External sector:
  - Current account balance (percent of GDP): -3.4 in 2025 and -3.3 in 2026.
  - Trade balance (percent of GDP): -1.1 in 2025 and -1.1 in 2026.
  - Reserves (end of period, billions GBP): 139.5 in 2025 and 139.5 in 2026.
- Interest rates and credit:
  - Bank Rate (year average): 4.1 percent in 2025 and 3.2 percent in 2026.
  - Long Term Interest Rate (year average): 4.5 percent in 2025 and 4.1 percent in 2026.
  - Net lending to non-fin private sector (end-period, 12-month percent change): 4.6 in 2025 and 3.6 in 2026.
- Nominal GDP:
  - Nominal GDP (billions GBP): 2,981 in 2025 and 3,089 in 2026.
  - Nominal GDP (billions USD): 3,645 in 2024 (table shows "... " for 2025–30).

### Risks to the Outlook
- Downside risks emphasized:
  - Tighter-than-expected financial conditions combined with rising precautionary saving could hinder rebound in private consumption.
  - Persistent global trade uncertainty could weaken world activity, disrupt supply chains, and undermine private investment.
  - A significant rise in commodity prices could intensify inflationary pressures.
- Scenario assumption:
  - Forecast assumes, all else equal, global trade tensions lower the level of UK GDP by 0.3 percent by 2026 due to continued uncertainty, slower activity in UK trading partners, and the direct impact of remaining US tariffs on the UK.
- Inflation dynamics:
  - Temporary pickup in headline inflation driven by regulated price increases, the employer NIC rate hike, and waning base effects from energy prices; average CPI projected to decline from 3.2 percent in 2025 to 2.3 percent in 2026.

### Executive Board Assessment
- Directors agreed with staff appraisal: modest recovery in 2025 accelerating in 2026, with inflation returning to target in the second half of 2026 after a temporary spike from one-off factors.
- Fiscal policy:
  - Medium-term fiscal strategy appropriately supports growth while stabilizing net debt.
  - Importance of staying the course and reducing fiscal deficits as planned; may require additional measures if risks materialize.
  - Welcome recent improvements to fiscal framework and support further refinements to improve predictability and reduce pressures for frequent policy changes.
  - Encourage efforts to improve spending efficiency and address long-term pressures from ageing population, defense spending and climate transition.
- Monetary policy:
  - Gradual and flexible approach to monetary easing appropriate; retain flexibility to adjust stance in either direction given elevated uncertainty.
  - Welcome BoE implementation of the Bernanke Review: shift toward scenario-based communication, conditional guidance, and improved forecasting.
  - BoE’s transition to a demand-driven repo-based framework appropriate to mitigate balance sheet risks while maintaining monetary control.
- Financial stability:
  - Financial sector broadly resilient; macroprudential settings appropriate.
  - Emphasized enhancing gilt market resilience amid rising global risks.
  - Recognized progress in assessing and reducing vulnerabilities in the non-bank sector; encouraged further international collaboration.
  - Encouraged strengthening the AML/CFT framework and balancing reforms to promote growth while preserving financial stability.
- Structural reforms:
  - Welcomed authorities’ structural agenda; careful prioritization and sequencing are key.
  - Highlighted policy stability, planning reforms, and boosting human capital as highest priorities likely to deliver largest growth benefits.
  - Commended continued support for multilateral cooperation.

### Policy Recommendations (Staff)
- Fiscal policy:
  - Authorities’ fiscal plans are growth-friendly and accommodate spending pressures and investment needs while raising revenue to safeguard fiscal sustainability.
  - Contingency measures can help respond quickly to adverse shocks; managing longer-term spending pressures will require difficult choices.
  - Further refinements of the fiscal framework could enhance predictability and reduce frequent policy changes.
- Monetary policy:
  - Continue gradual approach to policy easing and transition to a demand-driven repo-based framework.
  - Strengthen Bank of England forecasting and communication capacity in line with Bernanke Review recommendations.
- Financial stability:
  - Maintain robust macroprudential settings; address remaining NBFI vulnerabilities domestically and internationally.
  - Enhance gilt market resilience and strengthen the AML/CFT framework.
- Structural reforms:
  - Prioritize and sequence the “Growth Mission” policies to secure quick wins and public/market buy-in.
  - Focus on policy stability, planning reform, and boosting skills to maximize growth benefits.

*Source: UNITED KINGDOM STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2025 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION (staff report text and tables).*

### 6. The monetary policy stance remains

### 6. The monetary policy stance remains 

### Monetary policy stance
- The Bank Rate has been cut by 100 bps from its peak in August 2024.
- At 4.25 percent, the policy rate “remains restrictive under a variety of measures of the neutral rate.”
- Staff estimates a nominal neutral rate of 3 percent; the BoE estimated a range of 2.25–3.75 percent in its February 2025 Monetary Policy Report.
- In September 2024, the BoE decided to maintain the size of quantitative tightening (QT) at GBP100bn a year over the next 12 months.
- The MPC emphasizes a “gradual and careful” approach given persistent wage and services inflation.

### Financial conditions and credit
- Financial conditions eased in 2024, driven mainly by narrowing credit spreads on high-yield and investment-grade corporate bonds; recovery in house and equity prices also contributed.
- Private credit extension grew: bank lending to households and corporates expanded and non-bank lending to corporates continued.
- Since early 2025 financial conditions have tightened somewhat; in April 2025 financial market volatility spiked in reaction to global trade uncertainty, leading to a sharp repricing in financial assets.

### Fiscal stance and public debt
- The fiscal stance remained broadly unchanged in FY2024/25.
- The Cyclically-Adjusted Primary Balance (CAPB) ratio was roughly stable between FY2023/24 and FY2024/25.
- Public Sector Net Financial Liabilities (PSNFL) increased by half a percent of GDP to reach 81.5 percent of GDP at end FY2024/25.
- Primary spending will be on average 2½ ppts of GDP per year above the previous path under the October 2024 budget; about one third is for public investment (0.8 percent of GDP per year).
- Fiscal deficits are projected to decline by 2 ppts of GDP within five years; PSNFL is projected to peak at around 84 percent of GDP.

### External sector and current account
- The current account (CA) deficit was 2.7 percent of GDP in 2024.
- A 4.2 percent appreciation of the REER and production constraints in hydrocarbon and vehicles weighed down export growth.
- Net primary income has deteriorated, as rising yields on debt liabilities outweighed profits from external equity assets.
- The external position is assessed as moderately weaker than implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies for the UK.

### Outlook: growth, potential, and assumptions
- Growth is projected at 1.2 percent in 2025 and 1.4 percent in 2026.
- Recovery is assumed to be primarily driven by private consumption reflecting monetary policy easing, positive wealth effects from asset price growth (including real estate), and an uptick in confidence.
- Staff estimates medium-term growth potential at 1.4 percent.
- The announced planning reform is estimated to improve potential growth in the outer years by 0.1pp compared to last year’s Art. IV report.
- Forecasts incorporate the May UK-US and UK-EU trade deals and assume global trade tensions lower the level of UK GDP cumulatively by 0.3 percent by 2026.
- Assumptions conditioning staff’s forecasts:
  - Energy prices: Electricity prices based on futures-implied path for natural gas indicate a spike through 2025 (21.6 percent annual average increase), followed by a steady fall of about 7.2 percent per year through the medium-term. Oil prices are expected to fall by 13.9 percent in 2025 and 5.7 percent in 2026, before stabilizing.
  - Monetary policy and credit: Bank Rate declining at a rate of one cut per quarter on average, converging to the estimated nominal neutral rate of 3 percent in 2026Q3. Credit growth to the non-financial private sector expected to grow in line with nominal GDP over the medium term (average of 3.8 percent over 2025–30 compared to average monthly growth of 2.6 percent y-o-y over 2021-24).
  - Fiscal policy: Expenditure projections aligned with authorities’ medium-term plans in the OBR March 2025 Economic and Financial Outlook. Defense spending expected to increase from 2.3 to 2.6 percent of GDP by FY2027/28.
  - Tariffs and trade deals: Forecasts incorporate tariffs effectively in place as of end-June 2025 and assume full implementation of the May 2025 UK-US and UK-EU deals, with detailed tariff provisions described in the source text.

### Inflation outlook
- Headline inflation is projected to rise to 3.5 percent in 2025Q3 due to regulated price increases, the NIC rate hike, and waning base effects from energy prices.
- Average CPI is projected to increase to 3.2 percent in 2025, before declining to 2.3 percent in 2026.
- Inflation is expected to return durably to target in the second half of 2026 given base effects and the negative output gap.

### Risks to the outlook
- Downside risks dominate:
  - Tighter-than-anticipated financial conditions combined with high household precautionary savings could hinder private consumption recovery.
  - Persistent inflationary pressures could create “stagflation” risks, complicating monetary policy and pressuring public finances.
  - A significant rise in commodity prices due to international conflicts could aggravate the situation.
  - Further escalation in global trade tensions would dampen activity; indirect effects could be significant through weaker private investment and supply chain disruptions.
- Upside scenarios:
  - More comprehensive trade agreement with the US, further UK-EU cooperation, or trade diversion could boost activity.
  - Higher public investment and planning reform could have stronger-than-anticipated spillovers.

### Authorities’ views
- Authorities broadly agreed with staff’s external assessment and outlook.
- Treasury officials noted current account deficits are partly driven by the UK’s role as a global financial center and do not target the current account explicitly.
- Authorities expect fiscal consolidation and structural reforms to moderate the deficit over the medium term.
- The BoE, like staff, expects the recent pickup in inflation to be temporary and a return to target in the second half of 2026.

### Policy discussions — fiscal policy recommendations and risks
- The authorities’ medium-term fiscal strategy aims to balance boosting growth with preserving sustainability; additional investment funded through borrowing is appropriate given intergenerational benefits.
- Staff expects positive growth impact from growth-oriented new spending because the public investment multiplier (~1) likely exceeds tax multiplier on recurrent measures (~0.3).
- Staff’s two-pronged strategy to manage risks:
  - Staying the course: strictly adhere to the announced spending envelope; use future spending reviews for prioritization without increasing overall levels; base medium-term budget on conservative growth assumptions.
  - Contingency planning: prepare growth-friendly contingent measures (tax or expenditure-based). Potential tax measures include reforming property tax and removing VAT exemptions. On spending, stricter prioritization and efficiency savings (e.g., greater digitalization and streamlining in health) could be considered.
- Longer-term fiscal challenges:
  - Population aging expected to drive spending higher in the long term; IMF staff analysis implies spending would rise by around 8 percent of GDP by 2050, compared with 5½ percent of GDP, on average, in other advanced European economies.
  - Limited space to accommodate these pressures through borrowing given relatively high public debt and a larger interest bill than in other AEs.
  - Options include revisiting the commitment not to increase taxes on “working people,” replacing the triple lock with indexing the state pension to the cost of living, expanding means testing of benefits, and introducing charges for higher-income users of public services (e.g., copayments for health), while shielding the vulnerable.

*Source: Excerpt from IMF staff report chapter — “6. The monetary policy stance remains.”*

### 20. Recent changes to the fiscal framework enhance the credibility and effectiveness of

### 20. Recent changes to the fiscal framework enhance the credibility and effectiveness of

### Recent fiscal framework changes
- At the October budget, authorities substituted a current balance rule for the previous overall deficit rule.
- The perimeter of the net debt rule was expanded to include a broader range of financial assets and liabilities (PSNFL).
- Rules remain forecast-based, with the horizon shortened from five to three years (starting from FY2026/27).
- Authorities committed to:
  - reduce the number of fiscal events per year from two to one;
  - hold spending reviews every two years that produce detailed, three-year departmental forecasts.
- Staff assessment:
  - These developments are broadly positive.
  - The current balance and PSNFL rules protect space for public investment while safeguarding fiscal sustainability.
  - A common three-year horizon for the rules and the spending review will make fiscal plans more credible while allowing time for gradual adjustment in response to shocks.
  - A single annual budget has the potential to increase the stability of fiscal policy, supporting private investment and growth.

### Remaining challenges and options to enhance predictability and stability
- Problem: Small forecasted deviations from medium-term rule targets can have a disproportionate effect on short-term fiscal policy, leading to:
  - downgrades to macro-financial forecasts implying less headroom and pressure for front-loaded corrective measures (which can be pro-cyclical and occur outside the single fiscal event);
  - positive surprises creating political pressure to cut taxes and increase spending by treating extra headroom as fiscal space;
  - intensified pressures due to the hyper-focus of financial markets and media on the concept of headroom.
- Options to reduce pressure for overly-frequent policy changes (not mutually exclusive):
  - Higher buffers.
    - First best: maintain more headroom under the rules so that small changes in the outlook do not compromise assessments of rule compliance.
  - De-emphasizing the concept of headroom in public debate.
    - OBR communication could:
      - describe headroom differently, in percentage points of GDP, or as a percentage deviation of PSNFL from the target;
      - report headroom as a range, rather than a point estimate, using the fan charts already produced by OBR (e.g., 40th–60th percentiles);
      - give more prominence to other indicators, including gross financing needs, many of which are already reported in OBR publications.
    - Other stakeholders (authorities, think thanks, and media) could highlight these other metrics and alternative headroom descriptions while placing less emphasis on the nominal value of headroom.
  - Annual assessment of rule compliance.
    - The OBR could assess rule compliance only once per year ahead of the fall budget, while still producing bi-annual forecasts in line with best practice.
    - Aligning compliance assessment with the annual budget could lower expectations for policy changes in the spring, though spring forecasts could still signal implications.
  - More precise pre-requisites for supplementary budgets (outside the single fiscal event).
    - If rules continue to be assessed twice per year, legislation could specify conditions (including the size of the deviation from medium-term fiscal targets) that would require fiscal adjustment when rules are breached.
    - This would reduce pressure for supplementary budgets in the case of small breaches and complement the margin for error built into the current balance rule.
  - Proactive communication to manage market expectations.
    - Telegraphing and explaining policy changes, including corrective fiscal measures and gilt issuance remits, in advance of formal announcements can minimize surprise and contribute to more stable financial conditions.
    - Refraining from announcing new policy measures outside the single fiscal event would also contribute to policy stability.

- Technical rule detail:
  - Starting from FY2026/27, the current balance rule will be deemed to be met at the time of the spring OBR forecast if the current budget is either in surplus or in deficit by no more than half a percent of GDP.

### Authorities’ views on fiscal strategy
- Authorities view their fiscal strategy as underpinning growth while responsibly stabilizing net debt over the medium term.
- They believe additional spending announced at the October budget will be growth-friendly over the next five years by making critical investments and addressing pressures on public services, including healthcare.
- The government has stressed that compliance with their fiscal rules is ‘non-negotiable,’ and is committed to delivering planned deficit reduction over the medium term.
- Spending review departmental allocations adhere to the medium-term envelope announced in the October budget.
- Authorities stand ready to implement contingency measures if shocks materialize, and have reiterated a promise not to raise taxes on ‘working people.’
- Longer-term policy tools and reforms noted by authorities to mitigate pressures include:
  - spending plans and growth dividends of the structural reform agenda;
  - forthcoming increase in the State Pension age;
  - the next phase of the Pensions Review considering the balance of state, occupational and personal wealth pillars.
- Authorities welcome staff’s positive assessment and note staff recommendations for further refinements, agreeing on the importance of promoting stable fiscal policy.

### Gradual monetary easing and balance sheet transition
- Staff view:
  - A gradual approach to policy easing remains appropriate given still weak growth, a widening negative output gap, a pickup in inflation, and higher long-term interest rates.
  - Underlying inflation pressures (service inflation, wage growth) have continued to wane, and market inflation expectations remain broadly stable.
  - Staff expects the recent rise in inflation to be short-lived due to muted second-round effects (given the labor market weakening) and the one-off nature of regulated price changes and base effects from energy price dynamics.
  - Staff recommends continuation of the gradual pace of easing to balance supporting the economy and managing inflation risks.
  - Model-based simulations suggest an optimal path of one cut per quarter on average until reaching staff’s estimate of the neutral rate (3 percent) in the second half of 2026.
  - Inflation and growth risks are elevated and the balance of risks is quickly evolving; caution is warranted and the BoE should retain flexibility to adjust policy in either direction.

### BoE forecasting, communication, and scenario work
- The BoE has started implementing recommendations of the April 2024 Bernanke Review.
- Monetary Policy Reports and other communications have increasingly relied on scenarios to show how alternative interpretations of inflation persistence would impact monetary policy conduct.
- The BoE is using “conditional” guidance, with scenarios flagging channels through which uncertainty could play out, improving disclosure of its reaction function and risk management.
- Continued work needed:
  - invest in modelling capacity, data, and personnel to develop tailored scenarios quickly;
  - enhance communications around forecasts and scenarios, with MPC members using central forecast and alternative scenarios to justify decisions and explain personal views;
  - consider basing forecasts on an endogenous interest rate path for alternative scenarios to ensure consistency rather than using market interest rates;
  - establish processes to select and change scenarios anchored by high-level principles (e.g., “parsimony”, “policy relevance”, and “conditional guidance”).

### Transition to a demand-driven repo-based framework and reserve levels
- BoE plan:
  - Transition from a supply-driven system (reserves created through outright asset purchases) to a demand-driven system (reserves provided predominantly via repo operations).
  - This reduces the market footprint of the BoE and balance sheet exposure to interest rate risks, while maintaining monetary control, mitigating moral hazard, and retaining flexibility for new QE via APF if needed.
- PMRR estimate:
  - Based on a 2025Q1 survey of market participants, the BoE estimates the minimum reserves to satisfy demand from commercial banks (PMRR) in the range of £385- 540bn billion.
- At the current pace of QT, reserves are expected to reach scarcity by mid-2026.

### Review of instruments to address liquidity pressures
- Two critical decisions on asset composition:
  - Allocation of reserves supplied through repo operations versus asset purchases.
    - Staff supports provision of reserves predominantly through repos but sees value in maintaining a small APF in the steady state, possibly with shorter maturities and aligning with currency in circulation.
    - The APF could enhance the impact of BoE liquidity operations on bank lending, foster financial stability in market disruptions, and reduce operational and duration risks by reducing rollover needs and allowing for better asset-liability management.
  - Within repo operations, allocation between short-term (STR) and long-term repos (ILTR).
    - Both instruments are needed: STR for short-term needs; ILTR for longer-term liquidity and access to a broader set of collateral.
    - ILTR reduces operational risks associated with rollover of a larger volume of STR.
    - Ongoing engagement with market participants can help address potential ILTR risks, including:
      - (i) abuse of collateral transformation if the facility is excessively used to comply with liquidity regulations, resulting in structural dependency on the BoE;
      - (ii) complexity given the innovative variable-price, variable-size auction process;
      - (iii) stigma associated with accessing repo operations.
- Contextual notes:
  - STR introduced in October 2022.
  - BoE initiated consultation in December 2024 on the ILTR, with the goal of launching it in 2025.
  - The ILTR supplies reserves for 6 months (instead of one week under the STR) and against a broader range of collateral.
  - At low levels of demand, the ILTR proposed auction process provides fixed amount against different types of collateral at minimum spreads; if demand is greater, larger amounts are available at higher spreads.

### Authorities’ views on monetary policy and balance sheet transition
- MPC perspective:
  - Taken a “gradual and careful” approach to the withdrawal of monetary policy restraint.
  - Note substantial progress on disinflation over the past two years but continue to monitor risks of inflation persistence and evidence on supply-demand balance.
  - Scenarios have been helpful for understanding risks, robustness of policy choices, and enhancing internal MPC discussion.
  - MPC is conducting its annual QT review to inform the pace of QT for the next 12 months.
  - BoE is refining tools to operationalize transition to a demand-driven repo-based framework; majority of reserves expected to be backed by repos but final steady-state gilt holdings decision is under discussion.
  - Exact mix of STR and ILTR will be determined by market demand; work is continuing on recalibrating the ILTR, expected to become the primary source of liquidity as QT and the Term Funding Scheme with additional incentives for SMEs (TFSME) unwind.

### Financial sector resilience and macroprudential stance
- Banking sector:
  - Remains broadly resilient.
  - Household vulnerabilities have continued to decline against lower interest rates and higher wages; share of households in arrears or with high debt-servicing burdens is relatively low.
  - Corporate sector robust; BoE estimates share of vulnerable corporates has increased but will stay well below historical peaks.
  - BoE’s 2024 desk-based stress tests show the banking system is strong enough to support households and businesses even during severe stress scenarios with negative aggregate supply and demand shocks.
  - System is sound with adequate capital, sufficient liquidity, contained credit losses, and high profitability.
- Resolution and regulation:
  - The 2025 Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Act will enable the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) to provide funds to the BoE to recapitalize a failing small bank through resolution, and then recoup costs through industry levies.
  - Staff encourages prefunding the FSCS to an appropriate level to avoid moral hazard.
  - The Prudential Regulation Authority postponed implementation of Basel III by one year until January 2027, keeping full implementation at January 2030.
  - Staff supports full, timely, and consistent implementation of these standards.
- Macroprudential settings and risks:
  - UK financial cycle assessed to be in a mildly expansionary phase through most of 2024, with equity and house prices increasing.
  - Credit growth relatively muted and credit gap remains negative, but consumer and corporate credit extension have continued to improve.
  - Staff supports FPC decision to maintain the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) at its two percent neutral level.
  - Some risks increased: corporate bankruptcies have risen; asset prices and credit spreads have shown elevated volatility amid global trade uncertainty, which could exacerbate refinancing challenges for highly-leveraged corporates.
  - If financial conditions tighten significantly and materially increase credit losses, authorities should consider easing prudential policy to avoid exacerbating a credit downturn.

*IMF staff summary of chapter 20, "Recent changes to the fiscal framework enhance the credibility and effectiveness of fiscal policy."*

### 30. The authorities have made significant progress on   assessing and reducing some NBFI

### 30. The authorities have made significant progress on   assessing and reducing some NBFI

### NBFI vulnerabilities and recent initiatives
- Finding: The NBFI sector accounts for more than half of the UK’s financial assets and plays a prominent role in corporate lending.
- Finding: The 2024 System-Wide Exploratory Scenario ( SWES) exercise has improved understanding of how NBFIs react in stress and facilitated analysis of linkages and contagion risks between banks and non-banks.
- Initiative: Development of a new contingent repo facility (CNRF) for appropriately regulated, resilient, and systemically important pension funds, insurance companies, and LDI funds, consistent with recent Art. IV reports and FSAP recommendations (Annex VIII).
- Assessment: The NBFI sector has remained broadly stable through periods of heightened market volatility during the past year, but vulnerabilities remain due to elevated leverage levels, concentration, growing interconnectedness with banks, and exposure to liquidity shocks including those from margin calls.
- Recommendation: Continue work to further reduce vulnerabilities, including at the international level given the large number of non-UK domiciled NBFIs and significant cross-border linkages.
- Recommendation: Authorities should continue working with the Financial Stability Board on new measures to monitor, contain, and mitigate the effects of NBFI leverage.
- Data gap: Closing global and domestic data gaps remains critical, including data on Sterling asset holdings, private markets, and liquidity indicators of investment funds (Annex VII).
- Contingent recommendation: The BoE could, in the future, consider expanding access to the CNRF to include a broader range of non-banks with a large gilt market footprint, provided they are adequately supervised and regulated.

### Gilt market resilience and structural risks
- Finding: Gilt market functioning has remained robust and auctions have generally been well received, despite recent bouts of volatility as sovereign bond markets globally adjusted to higher government debt issuance plans and geopolitical developments.
- Structural change: More patient investors (pension funds and insurers) have scaled back exposure to longer-term gilts, BoE is reducing gilt holdings as part of QT, while hedge funds and non-residents have become more prominent holders.
- Risk: Hedge funds are more speculative, leveraged, and tend to have concentrated positions; they could amplify volatility and liquidity shortages in a stress event.
- SWES insight: NBFIs could face liquidity pressures if banks become less willing to extend repo finance; lack of gilt repo finance would result in further gilt sales.
- Role of CNRF: The CNRF could address some risks, but close monitoring and regular stress testing are recommended to provide insight into escalating vulnerabilities.
- Structural policy consideration: Authorities are considering policies such as central clearing for gilt repo transactions; staff welcomes such considerations.
- Fiscal and market coordination: Fiscal prudence is emphasized; authorities should remain in close contact with market makers to assess demand for various tenors of gilts ahead of planned auctions.
- Market reception: The shift of issuance toward shorter-dated securities for FY2025/26 has been well received by the market.

### Ongoing financial sector reforms and regulatory balance
- Context: UK financial assets have grown at a much slower pace than in AE peers over the past decade, though they remain significantly larger as a share of GDP. Equity market capitalization declined, credit growth has been lackluster, and pension funds have reduced risk appetite.
- Policy objective: Staff supports the government’s objective of reinforcing financial services as a driver of economic development, building on past initiatives, including the Edinburgh Reforms.
- Recent measures: Efforts to reduce red tape (e.g., streamlining data collection by regulators and revising listing requirements) and enhancing financial infrastructure (e.g., shortening stock and bond settlement times) are welcome.
- Guidance: Future growth-enhancing reforms should consider financial stability implications together with the broader economic backdrop.

Key reform topics and recommendations:
- Pension fund consolidation
  - Potential benefit: Reduce fees and expand access to diverse asset classes.
  - Risk: Manage unintended side-effects such as herding of investment approaches and weaker competitive pressure.
  - Recommendation: Avoid mandating asset allocations to ensure fiduciary responsibilities and best outcomes for beneficiaries.
  - Governance: The Pensions Regulator’s remit should take into account financial stability considerations, as recommended by the FPC, to strengthen oversight of the evolving pensions landscape.
- Recalibration of regulations
  - Context: Chancellor’s November 2024 Mansion House speech argued some post-GFC regulatory changes had gone too far; government published remit letters emphasizing supporting growth and competitiveness.
  - Recommendation: Review financial regulations to simplify complex and outdated rules, but proceed cautiously to avoid creating new financial vulnerabilities and ensure clear communication.
  - Priority: The primary objectives of financial authorities should remain safety and soundness; any competitiveness objective should be subordinate to these.
- Broader business environment
  - Recommendation: Financial sector reforms should be part of a broader strategy aligned with consistent tax, labor market, planning, and financial investment policies.

### AML/CFT regulatory and supervisory regime
- Finding: The AML/CFT regime could be further strengthened to manage ML/TF risks.
- Recommendation: Continue implementing reforms under the Economic Crime Plan II 2023-26 to bolster effective risk-based supervision by different AML/CFT supervisors.
- Legislative change: Revise the Money Laundering Regulations to support coordination across the AML/CFT regime.
- Supervisory effectiveness: Continue refining the framework to evaluate the effectiveness of different supervisors.
- FCA role: Target systemically important and high-risk entities through a data-led, proactive supervisory strategy; mitigate ML/TF risks posed by virtual assets through assertive supervision and proactive preparation for regulatory changes.
- Additional developments: Planned publication of an updated ML/TF National Risk Assessment and development of a new Anti-Corruption Strategy are timely.

### Authorities’ views and planned follow-up
- Authorities’ stance: The FPC reiterated that the UK banking system as a whole is resilient.
- Shared concern: Authorities concurred with staff that the global risk environment has deteriorated amid higher uncertainty and saw a higher probability of adverse events.
- Macroprudential view: The FPC viewed macroprudential settings as appropriate with credit conditions reflective of the overall macroeconomic outlook.
- NBFI progress: Authorities highlighted continued progress on mitigating NBFI vulnerabilities; the BoE is onboarding eligible pension funds, LDI funds and insurers to its new CNRF facility.
- Planned publication: Following the SWES, the BoE plans to publish a Discussion Paper later this year to gather views on reforms to enhance the structure and resilience of the gilt repo market, including consideration of central clearing of gilt repo transactions and minimum haircuts on non-centrally cleared repos.
- Regulatory reform stance: Authorities saw merit in financial sector regulatory reforms to enhance efficiency and support competitiveness without undermining financial stability.

### Structural reform priorities to deliver on the Growth Mission
- Core diagnosis: Persistently weak labor productivity has driven slow economic growth and stagnant living standards; GDP is around a quarter below the level implied by the trend in the pre-GFC decades.
- Contributing factors: Chronic under-investment, limited access to finance for businesses to scale up, skills gaps, challenges in retaining talent, low business spending on R&D, deterioration in health outcomes, loss of pre-GFC productivity drivers such as North Sea Oil and finance booms.
- Government agenda: The October budget articulated a “Growth Mission” around six pillars: (i) macroeconomic stability; (ii) investment, infrastructure, planning and housing (“capital”); (iii) people; (iv) innovation; (v) net -zero ; and (vi) industrial strategy and trade.
- Staff view on sequencing: Prioritize macro stability, capital, and people as the most pressing pillars; sequence policies to focus on binding constraints, account for implementation constraints and distributional effects, and ensure internal coherence among reforms.

Key priorities and recommendations:
- Stability
  - Commendation: Government commitment to economic policy stability; steps include committing to a single annual budget and periodic spending reviews.
  - Recommendation: Adopt a gradual, consistent, and coordinated approach to revising policies and regulations to avoid destabilizing the business environment.
  - Communication: Communicate the overall macro-fiscal strategy to financial markets and the public.
  - International stance: Continue advocating for a stable global trading system and pursue deeper integration, while minimizing discriminatory elements in trade agreements.
- Capital (planning reform)
  - Problem: Capital accumulation in the UK has lagged other G7s since the GFC.
  - Recent steps: Full expensing of investment in plant and machinery and higher public investment in the October budget.
  - Planning reform importance: Easing excessively-stringent planning restrictions is central to unlocking private investment; initiatives include unblocking priority infrastructure projects, changes to the National Planning Policy Framework (including release of some green belt land), and reintroduction of mandatory housing targets.
  - Legislative action: The proposed Planning and Infrastructure Bill (introduced in parliament in March 2025) aims to simplify and improve decision-making, reduce uncertainty, encourage strategic regional planning, and introduce a new approach to environmental protection (e.g., developers allowed to contribute to a “Nature Restoration Fund”).
  - Implementation risk: Delivering proposed reforms requires adequate resourcing and support for local planning departments to overcome NIMBYism.
- People (labor market and skills)
  - Labor supply: Strong labor supply growth over two decades via immigration and higher participation, but aging population and moderated inward migration mean upskilling existing population is essential.
  - Inactivity challenge: Inactivity has risen sharply since the pandemic, with close to a million people out of the workforce, a majority due to long-term illness; increase across all age groups, including prime working-age workers affected by mental health issues, with the UK an outlier relative to other AEs.
  - Recommendations to address inactivity:
    - Deliver additional NHS funding allocated in the spending review, improve efficiency, and focus more on prevention to reduce working-age ill health.
    - Incentivize work for those capable of reentering the labor force; the ongoing reform to incapacity and disability benefits could promote employment by tightening eligibility criteria.
  - Skills shortages: Prioritize skill development to alleviate shortages in digital and software, manufacturing, medicine and life sciences, teaching, and construction.
  - Skills policy recommendations:
    - Provide more and better-quality training and apprenticeships.
    - Reverse the decline in STEM outcomes and encourage younger workers to enter future growth sectors, including dependents of migrants (2024 SIP, April 2025 WEO Chapter 3).
    - Utilize the new Skill s England agency to coordinate and prioritize policies.
    - Improve job security and employment protections as part of the Employment Rights Bill to encourage on-the-job training.

*Source: IMF staff summary of chapter content.*

### 40. The   authorities’ innovation strategy has the potential to stimulate technological

### The authorities’ innovation strategy has the potential to stimulate technological advancements at the frontier, but also needs to trickle down to the wider economy.

### Innovation, R&D, and technology diffusion
- Findings:
  - Spending on research and development (R&D) stands below that of many other AEs.
  - The UK’s scientific base and universities are of high quality, but translating scientific achievement into productivity gains remains a challenge.
  - Authorities announced the creation of innovation hubs, which are expected to generate positive knowledge spillovers.
  - Authorities also plan to expand the AI sector; leading UK firms are well equipped to benefit from investments into AI and other innovations, but diffusion to the wider economy is critical.
- Policy recommendations / enablers:
  - Complement public R&D with policies that:
    - Improve firms’ access to finance.
    - Incentivize firms’ investment in workers’ training and skills.
    - Support collaboration between universities and private investors.
  - Facilitate greater diffusion and adoption of digital technologies through more active labor market policies, including grants or tax allowances for SMEs that invest in workers’ human capital.
- Constraints noted:
  - SMEs face difficulties upskilling and securing financing to cover high fixed set-up costs related to AI and digital technologies; banks are unlikely to accept intangible assets as collateral for loans.
  - Government institutions like the National Wealth Fund (NWF) could help overcome these financial constraints.

### Climate, energy strategy, and energy security
- Findings:
  - The UK has substantially reduced emissions in the past three decades, with encouraging progress recently from electric vehicle uptake and heat pumps.
  - Reduced use of coal and drawdown in North Sea oil and gas production have increased reliance on imported gas and heightened vulnerabilities.
  - Energy prices have remained elevated since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (SIP 2023).
  - High and volatile energy prices deter investment and constrain growth.
- Targets and projections:
  - Authorities target clean power by 2030, aiming to generate at least 95 percent of Great Britain’s electricity from renewable sources and nuclear, compared to 60 percent currently.
  - A recent assessment by the UK National Energy System Operator suggests achieving the clean power target will be challenging but within reach with timely implementation of key actions.
- Policy levers:
  - Planning reforms to facilitate private investment in generation and transmission.
  - Continued progress on sectoral emissions reduction policies (e.g., electrical vehicles and electric heat pumps) to reduce reliance on imported fossil fuels.

### Industrial policy, sectoral interventions, and the National Wealth Fund (NWF)
- Findings:
  - The government launched a new high-level industrial strategy in June, aimed at overcoming barriers to growth in eight sectors while ensuring evenly distributed prosperity across regions.
  - Empirical analysis in the SIP suggests sectors like advanced manufacturing exhibit more acute market failures and could benefit most from public support.
- Principles and safeguards for industrial policy (IP):
  - IP should be targeted based on evidence of market failures where horizontal policies alone are insufficient.
  - Cost-benefit analysis and performance monitoring are necessary to ensure net positive benefits.
  - Interventions should be subject to strict budgetary limits and fixed time periods to facilitate medium-term budgetary planning and limit fiscal costs.
- National Wealth Fund specifics:
  - The NWF makes financial investments in private projects through equity injections, loans and guarantees, to support growth and clean energy.
  - Authorities provided the NWF with capital of around one percent of GDP, with the goal of catalyzing three times this amount in private investment.
  - The NWF faces competing objectives: unlocking truly “additional” investment, generating sufficient return on projects to cover financing costs, and minimizing fiscal risks.
  - Recommendations for the NWF:
    - Rigorous project appraisal processes and additionality requirements.
    - Adequate risk management and reporting, including publishing quantitative limits on exposure to different types of risk, supported by oversight from the UK Treasury.
    - Comprehensive reporting on contingent liability risks and statistical classification risks to monitor fiscal costs.
- Note:
  - Footnote: In October 2024, the UK Infrastructure Bank became the NWF, with its mandate expanded beyond infrastructure to pursue a wider industrial strategy.
  - “Additionality” is defined as meaning that the private project would not have happened without public support.

### Authorities’ views
- Authorities’ stance:
  - Growth mission is largely aligned with past IMF advice; authorities emphasize synergies across the reform agenda and a holistic approach.
  - “Mission boards” bring different departments together to pursue individual missions, ensuring consistency and stability.
  - Reforms are sequenced: deliver fiscal stability first, then drive investment and remove barriers, and reform the wider economy.
  - Planning reforms are seen as critical to remove hurdles for investment.
  - Significant increase in public investment for transportation, energy and other growth-enhancing infrastructure is expected to play a catalytic role.
  - Renewed emphasis on upskilling the labor force, with greater emphasis on short courses and training with quicker payoff.
  - Authorities underscore the need to promote innovation, including financial sector reforms to facilitate access to scale-up finance for high-growth businesses.
  - On the green transition, authorities note continued progress in emissions reductions and strong electric vehicle uptake; achieving the clean power objective will bolster energy security and stabilize electricity prices.
  - Authorities broadly agree with staff recommendations for successful IP, including targeting market failures, while also including targeted economy-wide (horizontal) reforms in the new industrial strategy.
  - Authorities state the NWF is making good progress in identifying appropriate investments and that a rigorous risk management and reporting regime was already in place.
  - Authorities remain committed to mitigating transnational aspects of corruption (Annex X).

### Staff appraisal: growth outlook, risks, and policy guidance
- Growth outlook:
  - Growth is projected at 1.2 percent in 2025 and 1.4 percent in 2026, driven by monetary easing, positive wealth effects, and an uptick in confidence bolstering private consumption.
  - The forecast assumes global trade tensions lower the level of UK GDP by 0.3 percent by 2026.
- Downside risks:
  - Tighter-than-expected financial conditions combined with households maintaining high savings rates could slow the recovery.
  - Persistent global trade tensions would weigh on UK growth.
  - Progress in negotiating and deepening trade agreements, including with the EU and US, could help mitigate some downside risks.
- Fiscal strategy:
  - The authorities’ medium-term fiscal strategy appropriately supports growth while stabilizing net debt.
  - New spending plans account for pressures on public services and investment needs and are expected to provide an economic boost that outweighs the impact of higher taxation.
  - As revenue is projected to increase, deficits are set to decline, stabilizing net debt.
  - Risks to implementation are significant; staying the course to reduce fiscal deficits as planned may require additional measures if risks materialize.
  - Longer-term tough policy decisions on spending priorities and the role of the state will be needed to align public service coverage with available resources.
- Fiscal framework and predictability:
  - Recent reforms enhance credibility and effectiveness, but further refinements could improve predictability and reduce pressure for frequent policy changes.
  - Staff suggests de-emphasizing point estimates of headroom in OBR assessments of rule compliance or assessing rules only once per year at the time of the fiscal event.
- Monetary policy:
  - A gradual and flexible approach to monetary policy easing remains appropriate.
  - The BoE should continue to strengthen its modelling capacity and scenario-based communication.
  - The Bernanke Review implementation and the use of scenarios and conditional guidance in BoE communications are welcomed.
  - Transitioning to a demand-driven approach for reserves provision, mainly through repo operations, will reduce BoE’s market footprint and limit exposure to interest and credit risks; this transition is accompanied by a timely review of BoE instruments.
- Financial sector resilience and reforms:
  - The financial sector remains broadly resilient, but reforms should balance promoting growth with preserving financial stability.
  - Macroprudential settings are appropriate, though global risks have risen.
  - Significant progress has been made in assessing and reducing vulnerabilities in the non-bank sector; work should continue domestically and internationally to close data gaps and better monitor non-bank leverage, concentration, and liquidity risks.
  - Enhancing gilt market resilience is important; staff recommends close monitoring, regular stress testing, and engagement with market participants.
  - Authorities’ plan to enhance structural resilience, including considering central clearing for gilt repo transactions, is welcome.
  - Regulatory reforms to enhance the role of financial services as a driver of growth should balance simplification and modernization with mitigating vulnerabilities.
- Structural agenda prioritization:
  - The authorities’ structural agenda covers the right areas and is broadly aligned with past IMF recommendations, but careful prioritization and sequencing will be key to success.
  - Delivering the “Growth Mission” faces significant challenges given limited fiscal space, the breadth of reforms, and a volatile external environment.
  - Staff views policy stability, planning reforms, and boosting human capital (skills and health) as the most important aspects, likely to deliver the largest growth benefits and lay a strong foundation for progress on other fronts.
  - Economy-wide reforms should remain the main tool to boost competitiveness and growth, with sectoral interventions complementing them where clear market failures exist.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpt.*

### 51. It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard

### 51. It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard

### Real Sector Developments
- After weakening in the second half of 2024, growth rebounded in 2025Q1 and "should gain momentum this year, partly due to improved confidence."
- Recovery drivers:
  - Normalization of the still elevated savings ratio.
  - Easing of interest rates and stronger asset prices.
- Outlook highlights (from medium-term scenario and figures):
  - Growth is expected to strengthen further in 2026–27, partly due to higher public spending and the ramp up of defense spending in trading partner countries.
- Key statistics and indicators (as presented):
  - Household savings ratio series shown with pre-covid average (2016–2019) as reference.
  - Asset prices indexed to Jan 2023 = 100 (equity prices and house prices series through Apr‑25).

### Inflation and Monetary Policy
- Inflation developments:
  - "Inflation has declined significantly since Oct 2022, although it has picked up more recently."
  - CPI, period average: 2024 = 2.5; 2025 = 3.2; 2026 = 2.3; 2027–2030 = 2.0 (each year).
  - CPI, end-period: 2024 = 2.5; 2025 = 2.9; 2026–2030 = 2.0 (each year).
- Labor cost and expectations:
  - "Private sector wage growth is slowing down."
  - Firm’s price and wage-setting expectations and forward-looking wage indicators point to moderation.
  - Inflation expectations from swaps (market-implied 5y and 3y ahead) have declined.
- Monetary stance and yields:
  - "Monetary policy remains restrictive despite the BoE rate cuts..."
  - Monetary stance calculation note: difference between the real interest rate (Bank Rate plus QT impact and minus different reference rates on inflation) and the real natural rate at 1 percent.
  - Bank Rate (year average): 2024 = 5.1; 2025 = 4.1; 2026 = 3.2; 2027–2030 = 3.0 (each year).
  - Long Term Interest Rate (year average): 2024 = 4.1; 2025 = 4.5; 2026 = 4.1; 2027 = 4.1; 2028 = 4.2; 2029 = 4.3; 2030 = 4.3.
  - Changes in UK gilt yields shown relative to mid-September (basis points) and UK 2Y/10Y/30Y yield series Sep‑24–May‑25.

### Labor Market Indicators
- Data caveat: "Given challenges with LFS response rates that cast doubt on labor market data, staff relies on various employment indicators that sometimes send conflicting signals."
- Overall assessment: "the data suggests labor market is easing."
- Indicators and signals:
  - Employment growth (Y‑o‑Y) series and unemployment and vacancy rate series (vacancy rate and unemployment rate plotted).
  - Firms’ sales and employment expectations: expected year‑ahead employment growth and sales growth (Decision Maker Panel).
  - Labor demand indices (S&P Global): index of demand for staff with permanent and temporary staff demand series through Apr‑25.
  - Permanent staff placements by sector and permanent staff salaries and temporary staff pay rates indices show cooling across sectors.
- ILO unemployment (Labor Force Survey) and administrative series shown; staff notes divergent signals across sources.

### Residential Real Estate
- House prices:
  - "House prices have continued to increase, but at a slower pace."
  - House Price Index (Jan 2008 = 100) series through 2025.
- Mortgage and approvals:
  - "Mortgage rates remain relatively high and mortgage approvals stagnated."
  - Mortgage rate series (2y and 5y 75% LTV fixed rate) and number of mortgage approvals shown through 2025.
- Construction and affordability:
  - "Construction has not picked up."
  - Construction Orders: New Housing (NSA; Million pounds) series.
  - House‑price‑to‑income ratio relative to long‑run average (1990Q1–2019Q4) shows the UK above peers and above long‑run average.
  - Regional housing affordability indicators: FT B Price Earnings Ratio; ONS Affordability Ratio; ONS Affordability Threshold across regions.
  - New lending to high‑LTI borrowers: share of new mortgage lending at high LTI ratios series (2008–2025).

### Financial Sector
- Banking sector resilience:
  - "The banking sector continues to maintain a comfortable level of capital buffers."
  - Aggregate CET1 Capital Ratio series and major banks’ CET1 series (2014Q1 onward).
  - Aggregate banking sector NPL ratios remain relatively low.
- Credit and nonbank financial institutions:
  - "Credit extension from banks recovered for both households and corporates."
  - Bank lending to corporates and individuals series.
  - Non‑bank financial institutions (NBFIs) account for half of financial sector assets; Financial Sector – Financial Assets shown in trillion pounds.
  - NBFIs hold a significant share of outstanding gilts; Gilt Holdings (million pounds) series and DMO holdings breakdown.
- Market volatility:
  - "Gilt yields have tended to be more volatile than sovereign yields in peer economies." Sovereign 10‑Year Bond Yields Volatility chart provided.
- Financial soundness indicators (selected):
  - Regulatory Capital to RWA: 2024 = 21.2.
  - Non‑performing Loans to Total Gross Loans: 2024 = 1.0.
  - Return on Equity: 2024 = 10.0.
  - Liquidity Coverage Ratio: 2024 = 167.9.
  - Gross asset/liability positions in financial derivatives to capital (2024: 339.7 and 334.3 respectively).
  - Sources: Bank of England; ONS; IMF FSI database.

### External Sector Developments
- Current account and NIIP:
  - "The CA deficit deteriorated in 2023 and remained elevated in 2024 amid a reversal in temporarily positive net primary income effects."
  - Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2024 = -2.7; 2025 = -3.4; 2026 = -3.3; 2027 = -3.1; 2028 = -3.1; 2029 = -2.9; 2030 = -2.8.
  - NIIP: net investment position projections show a negative position deteriorating through 2030 (e.g., Net investment position: 2024 = -9.8; 2025 = -11.4; 2026 = -13.0; 2030 = -17.4).
- Trade and competitiveness:
  - Weak goods export volumes partly explained by appreciation of REER and NEER; Terms of Trade and Effective Exchange Rates (indices 2022 = 100) displayed.
  - Breakdown of exports by destination and savings–investment balance by sector presented.
- Outlook drivers:
  - "Going forward, fiscal consolidation should ease the CA deficit."
  - Tariff direct effects mitigated by the UK’s strong services export dominance.

### Fiscal Developments
- Fiscal stance and outlook:
  - "The October budget has raised the expenditure path to accommodate pressures on public services and investment needs."
  - Higher expenditure partly funded by higher taxation projected to boost revenue collection.
- Key fiscal aggregates (fiscal year, percent of GDP unless noted):
  - Public sector overall balance (fiscal year): 2024/25 = -4.7; 2025/26 = -4.1; 2026/27 = -3.5; 2027/28 = -2.8; 2028/29 = -2.6; 2029/30 = -2.3; 2030/31 = -1.9.
  - Public sector primary balance: 2024/25 = -1.9; 2025/26 = -1.1; 2026/27 = -0.6; 2027/28 = 0.2; 2028/29 = 0.5; 2029/30 = 0.8; 2030/31 = 1.1.
  - Public sector net financial liabilities (PSNFL): 2024/25 = 81.5; 2025/26 = 82.9; 2026/27 = 84.0; 2027/28 = 84.1; 2028/29 = 84.1; 2029/30 = 83.9; 2030/31 = 83.4.
  - Departmental Expenditure Limits (DEL) and RDEL/CDEL shares shown (DEL: 2024/25 = 19.1; RDEL: 15.6; CDEL: 3.6).
- Risks and pressures:
  - "Headroom vis‑à‑vis fiscal rules (current balance and debt targets) is low and sensitive to changes in the outlook."
  - Long‑term spending pressures are above those in peer countries, requiring tough choices to contain future borrowing.
  - Interest to revenue ratio (Percent, 2022–24 average) compared across peers (France, Italy, Germany, Spain, UK).
- Revenue and expenditure composition (selected lines from statement of public sector operations):
  - Revenue (percent of GDP): 2024/25 = 39.5; 2025/26 = 40.7; 2026/27 = 41.1; 2027/28 = 41.5; 2028/29 = 41.3; 2029/30 = 41.3; 2030/31 = 41.4.
  - Interest expense (percent of GDP): 2024/25 = 4.3; 2025/26 = 4.4; 2026/27 = 4.3; 2027/28 = 4.3; 2028/29 = 4.4; 2029/30 = 4.5; 2030/31 = 4.3.
  - General government gross debt (Maastricht basis): 2024/25 = 101.0; 2025/26 = 103.0; 2026/27 = 104.6; 2027/28 = 105.2; 2028/29 = 105.6; 2029/30 = 105.5; 2030/31 = 105.4.

### Climate Policy and Energy
- Emissions and targets:
  - "The UK has continued to reduce emissions and has announced a new 2035 NDC target and a target to achieve clean power by 2030."
  - Greenhouse Gas Emissions & Targets (MtCO2e) series presented.
- Electricity generation mix:
  - "Generation from coal has been eliminated, although the country remains heavily dependent on gas."
  - Electricity generation mix by source and year (2002–2023) shown.
- Sectoral focus and pricing:
  - "Targeting emissions reductions in the housing and transportation sectors will be critical moving forward."
  - UK Emissions by Sector (MtCO2e) and Effective Carbon Pricing by Sector (USD/tCO2e, 2021 prices) displayed.
  - Carbon prices (12‑month futures, euros) show UK carbon prices have stabilized but diverged from EU prices.
- Climate vulnerability and readiness:
  - "The UK is relatively less vulnerable to climate risks, but investment in adaptation should remain a priority."
  - Climate Risks and Readiness (ND‑GAIN, 2022) shows ND‑GAIN Vulnerability and IMF‑Adapted Readiness scores.

### Key Projection Tables (selected numeric highlights)
- Table 1 — Selected Economic Indicators (real economy and macro):
  - Real GDP growth: 2024 = 1.1; 2025 = 1.2; 2026 = 1.4; 2027 = 1.5; 2028 = 1.5; 2029 = 1.4; 2030 = 1.4.
  - Unemployment rate (percent, ILO): 2024 = 4.3; 2025 = 4.5; 2026 = 4.4; 2027 = 4.3; 2028 = 4.2; 2029 = 4.1; 2030 = 4.0.
  - Gross national saving (percent of GDP): 2024 = 15.0; 2025 = 13.1; 2026 = 13.2; 2027 = 13.5; 2028 = 13.5; 2029 = 13.7; 2030 = 13.9.
  - Bank Rate (year average): see Monetary Policy section.
- Table 2 — Medium‑Term Scenario (2024–30):
  - Real GDP (annual percent change): 2024 = 1.1; 2025 = 1.2; 2026 = 1.4; 2027 = 1.5; 2028 = 1.5; 2029 = 1.4; 2030 = 1.4.
  - Household saving rate (percent of total household available resources): 2024 = 10.0; 2025 = 9.8; 2026 = 9.4; 2027 = 9.2; 2028 = 8.9; 2029 = 8.7; 2030 = 8.5.
- Table 3 — Statement of Public Sector Operations (selected fiscal-year rows):
  - Revenue (percent of GDP): 2024/25 = 39.5; 2025/26 = 40.7.
  - Expenditure (percent of GDP): 2024/25 = 44.2; 2025/26 = 44.8.
  - Net lending/borrowing (overall balance, percent of GDP): 2024/25 = -4.7; 2025/26 = -4.1.
- Table 4 — Balance of Payments (percent of GDP):
  - Current account: 2024 = -2.7; 2025 = -3.4; 2026 = -3.3; 2027 = -3.1; 2028 = -3.1; 2029 = -2.9; 2030 = -2.8.
  - Trade in goods: 2024 = -7.9; 2025 = -8.1.
  - Trade in services: 2024 = 6.8; 2025 = 7.0.
- Table 6 — Monetary Survey (billions GBP and growth rates):
  - M4 (end‑period): 2024 = 3,090 (billions GBP).
  - M4 growth (percent): 2024 = 2.6.
- Table 7 — Financial Soundness Indicators (selected 2024 values, Q3 2024):
  - Regulatory Capital to RWA = 21.2.
  - Non‑performing Loans to Total Gross Loans = 1.0.
  - Return on Equity = 10.0.
  - Liquidity Coverage Ratio = 167.9.

*Source: IMF staff report content as presented in the supplied PDF content unit.*

### Annex I. External Sector Assessment

### Annex I. External Sector Assessment

### Overall Assessment
- The external position in 2024 was moderately weaker than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
- After improving during 2016 to 2021 and almost balancing, the CA deficit has deteriorated in recent years due to weak exports, the reversal of temporarily positive net primary income, and heightened fiscal deficits sustaining imports.
- The CA deficit is expected to narrow moderately through the medium term, driven by fiscal consolidation and improvements in the terms of trade.
- The evolution of the external position is uncertain, especially given the UK’s status as a global financial center amid shifts in the international economic environment that could change the trajectory of trade and financial flows.

### Potential Policy Responses
- The authorities’ fiscal consolidation path along with their structural reform agenda (“growth” mission) will support external rebalancing by containing import growth and boosting competitiveness.
- Progress in the net zero transition will help to mitigate risks of further energy-related terms of trade shocks.
- Given high external uncertainty, IMF staff encourages:
  - resolving trade tensions and deepening economic integration through nondiscriminatory reductions in trade barriers or by pursuing free trade agreements at the regional, plurilateral, or multilateral level;
  - deploying industrial policies cautiously, targeting specific objectives where externalities and market failures exist, and avoiding favoring domestic producers over imports.

### Foreign Asset and Liability Position and Trajectory
- Background:
  - NIIP changed from –9.3 percent of GDP in 2020 to –9.8 percent of GDP in 2024.
  - Valuation effects have largely offset CA deficits in recent years, primarily related to strong global equity growth (positively affecting foreign asset holdings) and declines in foreign debt liabilities in line with higher interest rates.
  - IMF staff projects the NIIP will moderately deteriorate over the medium term, but large and volatile valuation effects make estimates particularly uncertain.
- Assessment:
  - The external position remains vulnerable to changes in market sentiment, but there are buffers.
  - The UK has a sizable stock of external liabilities (over 500 percent of GDP), much of which is short-term debt.
  - The large mismatch between sterling-denominated liabilities relative to assets, paired with exchange rate flexibility, are mitigating factors against external shocks.
  - Intragroup bank holdings make up a large portion of external liabilities and are less reactive to changes in market sentiment.
- 2024 (% GDP) exact figures:
  - NIIP: –9.8
  - Gross Assets: 509
  - Debt Assets: 261
  - Gross Liab.: 519
  - Debt Liab.: 278

### Current Account
- Background:
  - The CA deficit deteriorated from –0.4 percent of GDP in 2021 to –3.5 percent of GDP in 2023 and remained relatively high at –2.7 percent of GDP in 2024.
  - Drivers in 2024: sustained weakness in export volume growth, reversal of temporarily positive net primary income, weakened price competitiveness (measured by the REER), hydrocarbon and vehicle production constraints, and import growth recovering with improved domestic demand.
  - Net primary income weakened since 2023 as rising yields on debt liabilities began to outweigh strong profits from global equities.
  - Structural factors—lower hydrocarbon production and uncertainties related to geoeconomic fragmentation—will continue to weigh on export growth.
  - From a savings-investment perspective, heightened fiscal deficits since the pandemic have driven recent CA deterioration, offset to an extent by a temporary spike in private savings.
  - Following a projected CA deterioration in 2025, the fiscal consolidation path and a projected recovery in the terms of trade are expected to moderate the CA deficit to around –3.0 percent of GDP over the medium term, below pre-COVID-19 averages.
- Assessment and model outputs:
  - The EBA CA model estimates a norm deficit of –0.3 percent of GDP, implying an (unadjusted) CA gap of –2.4 percent of GDP in 2024.
  - Measurement adjustments of 0.7 percent of GDP are made to account for differences between the statistical definition of income and the relevant economic concept.
  - Adjusting for this, IMF staff assesses the CA gap at –1.7 percent of GDP, within a range of –1.4 to –2.0 percent of GDP.
- 2024 (% GDP) exact figures:
  - CA: –2.7
  - Cycl. Adj. CA: –2.7
  - EBA Norm: –0.3
  - EBA Gap: –2.4
  - Staff Adj: 0.7
  - Staff Gap: –1.7

### Real Exchange Rate
- Background:
  - The REER appreciated by close to 4.2 percent in 2024 compared to 2023, and stands 10 percent stronger than before the pandemic, weighing on price competitiveness.
  - Appreciation driven primarily by NEER appreciation as interest rates remain, on average, higher in the UK than across other advanced economies; elevated relative inflation also contributed to a smaller extent.
  - The appreciation partly reverses the prepandemic (2015–19) sustained REER depreciation driven by expectations of restricted market access following Brexit.
  - As of March 2025, the CPI-based REER was 2.6 percent above its 2024 average.
- Assessment and model outputs:
  - The EBA REER level and index models suggest an overvaluation of 8.7 and 1.5 percent, respectively, for 2024.
  - Consistent with the staff CA gap, staff assesses the REER gap to be 6.5 percent in 2024 (applying an estimated 0.26 elasticity), with a range of 5.5 to 7.6 percent.

### Capital and Financial Accounts: Flows and Policy Measures
- Background:
  - The UK has maintained a very open financial account, with limited capital flow measures.
  - As a global financial hub, portfolio investment flows and other investment make up a large share of UK financial flows, often driven by intragroup bank transactions.
  - Portfolio investment debt inflows were an important source of financing for the CA deficit in 2024, counterbalanced to an extent by increased direct investment asset outflows.
- Assessment:
  - Large fluctuations in capital flows are inherent in countries with a large financial sector; this volatility is a potential source of vulnerability.
  - Vulnerability is mitigated by a robust financial stability framework overseen by the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) of the Bank of England, including a broad set of macroprudential tools.

### FX Intervention and Reserves Level
- Background:
  - The pound has the status of a global reserve currency.
  - The share of global reserves in sterling has grown very slightly over the last several years, from averaging 4.5 percent prepandemic (2016–19) to close to 5.0 percent in 2024.
- Assessment:
  - Reserves held by the UK are typically low relative to standard metrics, and the currency is free floating.
  - Reserve levels have been stable, with a minimal drawdown in 2024.

*IMF staff assessment as presented in Annex I. External Sector Assessment.*

### 2. In the scenario, corrective fiscal measures may be needed to maintain compliance with

### 2. In the scenario, corrective fiscal measures may be needed to maintain compliance with

### Fiscal scenario, corrective measures, and financing risks
- In the absence of measures, given the weaker outlook, the fiscal deficit would be around half a percent of GDP per year higher on average, compared with staff’s baseline projections, and the current balance rule would be breached.
- Financing higher deficits in the scenario would require additional borrowing throughout the medium term and could increase liquidity pressures in the face of unexpected shocks.
- Rather than letting automatic stabilizers operate fully, most of the impact of weaker growth on fiscal aggregates should be offset by implementing corrective measures and delivering on the planned medium-term consolidation.
- Possible measures are suggested in ¶ 18 of the staff report.
- Targeted and temporary fiscal support to affected domestic households and businesses may be needed, but it should be primarily financed by reprioritizing within the spending envelope.

### Monetary policy implications
- The shock is expected to reduce inflation slightly, which would allow the BoE to ease monetary policy at a faster pace than under the baseline.
- Under the WEO scenario, headline inflation would be lower by 0.1pp and 0.3pp in 2025 and 2026 respectively.
- The larger economic slack due to the growth slowdown coupled with lower inflation would allow the BoE to accelerate the pace at which it reduces monetary policy restrictiveness, by additional 25 basis points cuts in both 2025 and 2026.

### Banking sector and financial stability tools
- The banking sector would remain adequately capitalized.
- The BoE’s 2024 desk-based stress tests show that banks’ aggregate capital ratio would remain adequate following a much more severe shock to growth and asset prices.
- If risks materialize and the banking system appeared poised to tighten lending beyond what broader economic conditions justify, the FPC could consider lowering the countercyclical capital buffer.
- If liquidity pressures were to emerge, the BoE has a range of standing facilities to provide liquidity to a wide set of counterparties as well as contingent facilities that could be activated in the event that financial stability were at risk.

### Recent labor market reforms and implications for labor costs and demand
- Authorities have recently strengthened employees’ rights, increased the minimum wage, and increased the employers’ NIC rate; these reforms contribute to rising labor costs that could impact labor demand, particularly for lower paid and younger workers.
- Employment Rights Bill (introduced in October 2024):
  - Provides “day-one” employment rights (protection against unfair dismissal; entitlement to statutory sick pay, paternity, parental, and bereavement leave).
  - Regulates employment practices (prohibits “exploitative zero-hour contracts”, restricts “fire and rehire” practices).
  - Enhances enforcement through a new Fair Work Agency.
  - Potential trade-offs: could reduce labor market flexibility and entry, particularly for young individuals and those with health challenges; restrictions on zero‑hour contracts and “day-one” protections could disproportionately affect younger workers and those without clear job histories.
- Minimum wage developments:
  - The National Living Wage (NLW) for workers over 21 years of age was increased 6.7 percent in April 2025, which follows above 10 percent hikes in both 2023 and 2024.
  - The NLWs for younger workers rose 18 percent and 16.3 percent in 2025 for 16–17 year-olds and 18–20 year-olds respectively.
  - The minimum wage covers around 5 percent of workers, but rapid increases could have ripple effects on wages more broadly and incentivize labor substitution, particularly for younger and low-skilled workers.
  - IFS (2025) assesses a likely impact on labor costs (hiring a full-time worker aged 21 or over on the NLW) of around 7 percent on average, with higher increases for younger and part-time workers.
- Employer NIC changes:
  - The NIC rate that firms pay was raised from 13.8 to 15 percent from April 2025, together with a reduction in the salary threshold at which employers are obliged to make contributions.
  - The UK has a relatively low tax wedge by international standards: the most recent OECD data indicates a tax wedge of 31.3 percent in 2023, lower than the OECD of 34.8 percent for an average single worker.
  - Incidence: surveys and modelling suggest the employer NIC increase is likely to be largely passed on to workers, via lower real wages and employment, especially in labor-intensive industries with thin profit margins.
  - BoE modelling finds the increase in labor costs will be over 5 percent for the bottom 5th–10th percentiles of the pay distribution compared with just over 1 percent for the top 95th–100th percentiles of the distribution.
  - BoE estimates the net effect of changes to NICs is to increase firms’ employment costs by 1.9 ppt, while the increase in NLW will add a further 0.2 ppts.
- Combined effect and implementation caution:
  - Together, the three measures are expected to raise labor costs, particularly for younger and lower-paid workers.
  - While real unit labor costs in the UK compare favorably with peers and nominal wages are below the OECD average, weakening labor market conditions could amplify negative effects on youth and vulnerable workers.
  - Recommended implementation approaches include flexible interpretation of “day-one” protections (e.g., probationary periods) and keeping future NLW increases in line with inflation and overall wage growth; the government intends to consult businesses and workers on these measures.

### Sovereign risk, debt dynamics, and medium-term fiscal outlook
- Authorities revised their fiscal framework in October 2024, with updated fiscal rules that target a balanced current budget by FY2029/30, while stabilizing public sector net financial liabilities.
- Under staff’s baseline:
  - The primary balance is expected to improve by around 2 ppts to a surplus of 0.7 percent of GDP by the end of the forecast horizon (FY2030/31).
  - General government gross debt settles at around 105 percent of GDP over the medium term, before beginning to increase again after FY2030/31 as the rising interest bill causes debt dynamics to deteriorate.
  - Gross financing needs (GFNs) average approximately 10.6 percent of GDP over FY2025/26–FY2030/31.
- Recent macro and fiscal context:
  - UK economic growth averaged 0.8 percent over FY2023/24–FY2024/25.
  - CPI inflation reached 3.4 percent in May 2025.
  - The general government fiscal deficit ratio declined to approximately 5½ ppts in FY2024/25.
  - The general government debt-to-GDP ratio increased by 2¾ ppts over the past two fiscal years to approximately 101 percent of GDP by end FY2024/25.
- Realism and risks:
  - Historical forecast errors point to some optimism in staff’s baseline projections for medium-term primary balances and cyclical conditions.
  - The Debt Fanchart and GFN Financeability modules signal moderate risk:
    - Fanchart: high uncertainty (fanchart width), relatively high medium-term debt, and a probability of non-stabilization for medium-term debt of approximately 40 percent.
    - GFN Financeability: GFNs of around 10.6 percent of GDP per year on average under the baseline; GFNs exceed 20 percent of GDP in a generalized stress scenario with increased deficits, lower growth, and lower participation of foreign investors.
  - Mitigating factors:
    - Very long maturity of general government debt (of about 14 years on average) that smoothes GFNs and limits pass-through from higher yields to effective interest rates.
    - Lack of foreign currency‑denominated debt.
    - A sizable stock of liquid assets that can alleviate solvency pressures.
    - Substantial market absorption capacity for gilts; banks’ exposure to the public sector is currently around 3 percent of sterling‑denominated assets.
    - The BoE’s ability to stabilize the gilt market if conditions become disorderly.
  - Staff assesses overall risks of sovereign stress to be low.

*Source: IMF staff report (excerpt).*

### Annex VI. The Economic Benefits of Fiscal Policy Stability

### Annex VI. The Economic Benefits of Fiscal Policy Stability

### Overview of recent UK fiscal developments
- Large changes in the fiscal stance over the past two decades, with sharp policy loosening during the GFC and Covid pandemic, accompanied by substantial increases in public debt, followed by periods of consolidation.
- Major tax reforms including an "11 percentage point cumulative reduction in the main corporate tax rate during 2010–17", which was partially reversed in 2023 when "the rate was raised to 25 percent".
- Numerous iterations of the fiscal framework, "including nine sets of fiscal rules since 1997".

### Fiscal policy instability and uncertainty
- Lack of stability in the conduct of fiscal policy generates uncertainty for financial markets and the public; uncertainty arises when fiscal policy is unclear, subject to prolonged reviews, or volatile because of frequent changes.
- Uncertainty can relate to taxation, the size and composition of expenditure, and the path of government borrowing and debt; in large countries, fiscal policy uncertainty can have international spillovers.
- Elevated fiscal policy uncertainty in the UK since the GFC, with spikes around periods of economic stress and large policy changes (examples cited: UK referendum on exiting the European Union in 2016; energy price crisis and the "mini budget" in 2022).

### Measurement of fiscal policy uncertainty
- A new monthly index developed by IMF staff is used to capture the evolution of fiscal policy uncertainty over time.
- The index is "based on the number of mentions of UK fiscal topics in around 47 million English-language news articles in British, US and Canadian outlets since 1995".
- The index shows fiscal policy uncertainty rose at the time of the GFC and has been higher on average since then, with temporary pickups around major events noted above.

### Economic and financial impacts of fiscal policy uncertainty
- Channels and effects:
  - Heightened fiscal uncertainty tends to raise government borrowing costs by increasing term and risk premia, particularly on longer-dated government securities.
  - Higher government borrowing costs spill over to higher premia in interest rates faced by corporates and other borrowers, tightening overall financial conditions.
  - Tighter financial conditions increase the debt service burden for corporates and households, discourage business investment, and weaken household consumption.
  - There is evidence that policy uncertainty reduces the size of fiscal multipliers.
- Empirical findings from econometric analysis:
  - Econometric analysis assesses an exogenous increase in UK fiscal policy uncertainty abstracting from external shocks.
  - A 1 std. dev. increase in the UK fiscal policy uncertainty index:
    - Causes immediate sterling depreciation, which "persists for over two years".
    - Raises gilt yields relative to the Bank Rate, which spills over to higher spreads on UK corporate bonds (relative to Bank Rate), increasing the cost of borrowing for private firms.
    - Weakens private investment and causes a persistent decline in economic activity.
  - The impact in the UK is broadly in line with staff findings in other advanced economies.
  - Results show exogenous changes in the index "explain around one third of the changes in UK ten-year gilt yields (relative to Bank Rate) that occurred during August-October 2022", which included the "mini budget".
  - Caveat: during periods of elevated uncertainty, adverse impacts could be larger than suggested by linear econometric models because of non-linear effects not captured in the modeling.

### Econometric approach and model details
- The model is a structural VAR.
- The exogenous shock to UK fiscal policy uncertainty is identified using a Cholesky ordering.
- Variable ordering used: US fiscal policy uncertainty is treated as the most exogenous variable, followed by UK fiscal policy uncertainty, and then UK macroeconomic and financial variables.
- The structural VAR includes: US fiscal policy uncertainty, UK fiscal policy uncertainty, the exchange rate (increase = depreciation), the Bank of England policy rate, the 10-year UK government bond spread (relative to Bank Rate), the corporate bond spread (relative to Bank Rate), and industrial production (a monthly metric of economic activity).
- The econometric specification includes dummy variables for March to May 2020 to control for COVID-related outliers.
- Identification assumption: increase in UK fiscal policy uncertainty can impact UK macro-financial variables simultaneously, while shocks to UK macro-financial variables can only impact UK fiscal policy uncertainty with a lag.

### Policy recommendations to bolster fiscal stability
- Bolster policy stability through:
  - Use of medium-term policy plans.
  - Advance communication of new policies.
  - A fiscal framework that incentivizes continuity and predictability.
- Institutional measures the authorities have taken:
  - Single annual budget and regular spending reviews.
  - Ten-year infrastructure plan and industrial strategy.
  - Authorities' commitment not to raise taxes on working people.
- Guidance for future changes:
  - Future changes to fiscal policy, including to the gilt remit, "should be well-telegraphed in advance, to avoid surprising financial markets and the public".
  - Staff proposed potential refinements to the fiscal framework to reduce pressure for frequent policy changes, given "the sensitivity of the current fiscal rules to small changes in the outlook".

*Prepared by Andrew Hodge, Gee Hee Hong, and Anh Nguyen (Annex VI content).*

### 4. Further develop “on

### 4. Further develop “on the ground” reviews of systemically important financial firms’ exposures and risk management practices for early identification and remediation of supervisory issues, including AML/CFT risks, and to also support macroprudential surve illance. (BOE/PRA and FCA)

### Supervisory approach and on-the-ground reviews
- Time frame: 1-3 years
- Findings and updates:
  - The PRA is satisfied with the actions taken below and is not planning to take any further actions through its current strategy.
  - As part of its 2021-26 strategy, the PRA strengthened its supervisory approach and its internal capabilities. For its largest firms, the supervisory approach continues to include regular 'on the ground' reviews for some topics (e.g. capital, liquidity). For its mid-sized firms, there is a new requirement to complete annual 'on site' visits. This adjusted supervisory approach has now been in place for over one year. The PRA is satisfied that it has embedded adequately.
  - The PRA’s supervisory approach continues to include the aggregation of intelligence to inform the Bank of England’s assessments of the risks and resilience of the UK banking (and insurance) system that are routinely considered by FPC.
  - The PRA is continuing to invest in cross-firm work to enhance its macroprudential insights and frequently issues communications to the market to share its findings and to set expectations to firms on what they should do in response (e.g. the PRA wrote to relevant Chief Risk Officers after its Thematic review of private equity related financing activities in 2024).
  - The market events in spring 2023 were a good demonstration of the PRA’s ability to respond quickly where a macroprudential risk necessitates it. The PRA introduced greater focus on the composition of firms’ liquidity asset buffer portfolios and liquidity monitoring metrics, aggregated this information through an internal taskforce, responded to commissions from the FPC on the exposure from non -systemic firms and carried out contingency planning on a small subset of those firms.
  - In 2023, the PRA introduced new requirements, training and guidance to ensure greater use of Section 166 Skilled Person Reviews. The PRA is satisfied, after a year embedding, with the benefits of these changes. It is seeing sustained use of Skilled Person Reviews for its largest firms (or adequate justification when such a review is not needed). It has no plans to make any immediate changes.
  - The PRA has established an international platform for supervisory cooperation with overseas regulators for Lloyd’s of London. The first meeting took place across two days in November 2023 and was attended by over 40 representatives.
  - The PRA will be hosting the next Society of Lloyd's International Platform on 2nd April 2025, which will be attended by a similar number of representatives as the initial meeting in 2023.
  - While the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) remains the lead UK regulator for managing money laundering (AML) and terrorist financing (CFT) for the financial sector, the PRA will continue to consider both topics in its prudential assessment of firms and co-operate closely and share information with the FCA and other AML/CFT authorities.

### Cyber risk and ICT resilience
- Key recommendation: Enhance cyber risk technical reviews on technology risk management expectations for all financial firms, and conduct additional cybersecurity control verification activities to complement CBEST security testing. (BOE/PRA, and FCA)
- Time frame: 1-3 years
- Findings and updates:
  - The PRA and the Bank plan to start consulting in the second half of 2025 on expectations around the management of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and cyber resilience risks, including risks arising from IT transformations, and the sector’s ability to detect, withstand and recover from disruptions.
  - The FCA does not intend to consult jointly with the PRA in H2 2025, instead looking to leverage existing tools within FCA's remit to help clarify and reinforce cyber resilience expectations for firms.
  - The PRA, FCA and Bank issued Consultation Papers on Incident and outsourcing reporting on 13 December 2024. The consultation ran until the 13 March 2025. Following the consultation, the authorities will consider responses and develop the final policy.
  - The PRA/Bank and FCA contributed to the FSB Cyber Incident Reporting (CIR) workstream concluded in April 2023 with 16 recommendations, an updated Cyber Lexicon, and a proposal to develop FSB Format for Incident Reporting Exchange (FIRE). The FIRE workstream launched in July 2023.
  - Firms are taking steps to comply with Operational Resilience policy SS1/21 and PS21/3, including planning for a “destruction scenario” and ensuring capability to re-build infrastructure, applications and data.
  - Ransomware remains the most significant day to day threat for the UK finance sector. The Bank/PRA and FCA conducted activities to assess the threat and explore response to a catastrophic ransomware attack. SIMEX22 explored response to operational paralysis of a GSIB. Over the past year Bank/PRA and FCA worked with some of the UK’s most systemically important firms and FMIs to assess the sectors’ ability to respond and recover from a severe but plausible (SBP), including ransomware, within Impact Tolerances (ITOLs).
  - In February 2025, the UK Government published its ransomware consultation paper. The consultation period ends in April 2025.
  - The Bank/PRA and FCA have progressed a supervisory cyber toolkit in line with IMF recommendations, including:
    - Introducing a new version of CQUEST (2023) which enables regulated firms of any size to benchmark their maturity in cybersecurity risk management and providing additional guidance clarifying that the regulator might require additional evidence.
    - Jointly publishing the Simulated Target Attack and Response for the Financial Services (STAR-FS) framework (2024) and launching a supervisory initiative to increase use of the framework in the sector (2025).
    - Continuing the CBEST programme and publishing in 2023 and 2024 detailed summaries of key learnings from recent CBEST tests, including analysis by the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC).
    - Completing piloting a new concept of pen-testing, building on CBEST, to test resilience against advanced threat actors and planning new guidance.
    - Introducing a new approach to assess cyber resilience metrics and MI reporting in the sector to enable further analytical work and complement supervisory engagement and scenario-based cyber testing.
  - The Bank/PRA has completed its third Cyber Stress Test; findings are expected to be published in Summer 2025.
  - The Bank/PRA and FCA continue to contribute internationally through the G7 Cyber Expert Group, the European Systemic Cyber Group and the FSB (notably on cyber incident reporting).
  - The FCA has implemented a self-assessment tool for Operational Resilience (ORQUEST) to inform supervisory assessments.

### Beneficial ownership transparency and Companies House reforms
- Recommendation: Enhance entity transparency through improved verification of beneficial ownership information on the PSC Register and augment support to Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories. (HMT, DBT /Companies House, and FCDO)
- Time frame: 1-3 years
- Findings and updates:
  - The Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 introduced measures to reform the role of Companies House and improve transparency over UK companies.
  - Reforms include:
    - Introducing identity verification for new and existing directors, beneficial owners and those who file information with Companies House.
    - Broadening the Registrar’s powers to act as a more active gatekeeper.
    - Improving the financial information on the Register.
    - Providing Companies House with more effective investigation and enforcement powers and better cross-checking of data.
    - Enhancing protection of personal information and addresses provided to Companies House.
    - Broader reforms to clamp down on misuse of corporate entities.
  - The Government is working with Overseas Territories (OTs) and Crown Dependencies (CDs) to enhance transparency through improved access and verification of beneficial ownership information.
  - Commitments and timelines:
    - All OTs have committed to establishing wider access to company ownership data. At the UK-OTs Joint Ministerial Council in November 2024, the Falkland Islands and Saint Helena committed to join Montserrat and Gibraltar by implementing fully public registers by April 2025.
    - Other Territories, including the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands and Bermuda committed to expanding access to registers of beneficial ownership to those with a legitimate interest by June 2025.
    - The CDs have committed to implementing legitimate interest access to their registers of beneficial ownership, and they will do so in line with the EU.
  - CDs and six OTs with global financial centres share beneficial ownership information with UK law enforcement agencies (within 24 hours, or 1 hour in urgent cases) under the Exchange on Notes arrangements (2017).
  - All CDs and OTs with financial centres have committed to the OECD’s Common Reporting Standard.

### LIBOR cessation and transition
- Recommendation: Continue to encourage the conversion of remaining legacy LIBOR exposures of U.K. regulated firms and support foreign efforts to migrate from non-Sterling LIBOR. (FCA, HMT, and BOE)
- Time frame: 1-2 years
- Findings and updates:
  - On 30 September 2024, the remaining synthetic LIBOR settings were published for the last time and LIBOR came to an end. All 35 LIBOR settings have now permanently ceased.
  - The Working Group on Sterling Risk Free Reference Rates was wound down on 1 October 2024 following its objective being met.
  - The PRA and FCA’s central LIBOR supervisory programmes have now been wound down, with ongoing monitoring handed over to individual supervisory teams.
  - The FPC Record on 27 March 2024 covered LIBOR transition and judged that the financial stability risk in the UK associated with US dollar LIBOR had effectively been mitigated (having previously concluded the same for sterling LIBOR in March 2023).
  - The Bank, FCA and HMT continue to work closely with other international authorities in monitoring global use of reference rates. The FSB’s Official Sector Steering Group has now been wound down, with ongoing monitoring falling to the BIS Markets Committee.
  - The Alternative Reference Rates Committee in the US has now been wound down.
  - IOSCO published a statement following its review of alternatives to US dollar LIBOR, noting concerns about some credit sensitive rates and that Bloomberg announced plans to cease its BSBY index in November 2024.
  - On 1 October 2024, the Bank, FCA and RFR Working Group published a joint statement to mark the cessation of LIBOR and encourage use of robust rates such as SONIA for GBP and SOFR for USD.

### Resolution regimes and preparedness for failure scenarios
- Recommendation: Continue preparing for diverse failure scenarios; eliminate rules that may constrain the bank resolution regime; and accelerate and expand the work on recovery and resolution planning for insurers and CCPs. (HMT, BOE/PRA, FCA, and FSCS)
- Time frame: 3-5 years
- Findings and updates:
  - Banks:
    - The UK's bank resolution regime has been in place since 2009 and remains under review. The Bank has continued to prepare its Heightened Contingency Framework (HCF) execution materials for diverse failure scenarios, including cyber, and use of multiple tools concurrently.
    - The Government introduced the Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) (BRR) Bill in 2024, which received Royal Assent on 15 May 2025. Once in force later this year, the new measures will enhance the Bank’s ability to resolve smaller banks that do not issue loss absorbing debt by allowing FSCS funds to be more readily available to facilitate a transfer.
  - Insurance:
    - Amendments to FSMA in 2023 give the PRA an additional tool (s.377A) to deal with a failing insurer by allowing it to seek a court order to write down liabilities to facilitate continuity of cover for policyholders. This has been enacted and is in the process of being fully operationalised by the PRA.
    - HMT consulted on establishing an Insurer Resolution Regime (IRR) in January 2023. HMT will set out its plans for the IRR in due course.
    - In December 2024, the PRA published PS20/24 and SS11/24 setting out expectations for UK insurers to prepare for an orderly ‘solvent exit’. The ‘Preparations for Solvent Exit Instrument’ will come into force on 30 June 2026, and firms are expected to meet the expectations in SS11/24 by that date.
  - CCPs:
    - A new legislative framework came into effect on 31 December 2023, significantly enhancing the existing CCP resolution regime (see Schedule 11 of FSMA 2023 and accompanying secondary legislation).
    - In December 2024, the Bank published two Statements of Policy giving details in relation to establishing a tear-up price and the removal of impediments to resolvability.
    - The enhancements made the UK regime fully consistent with FSB standards, providing the Bank with CCP-specific tools and powers, including partial tear-up and cash calls.
    - Work to operationalise the powers started in 2024 and will continue. Resolution planning and operational preparedness were tested in 2023, 2024, and early 2025, with further exercises planned for H2 2025.
    - The Bank is developing a formal CCP Resolvability Assessment Framework (RAF) programme throughout 2025 and 2026.

### Financial Policy Committee (FPC) primacy and international focus
- Recommendation: Preserve the primacy of the FPC’s financial stability objective and strengthen its focus on global financial standards and cross-border surveillance. (HMT, BOE, PRA, and FCA)
- Time frame: 1 year
- Findings and updates:
  - The 2024 Remit letter from the Chancellor underscores the primacy of the FPC’s financial stability objective and recommends the FPC support international work to address vulnerabilities in the financial system.
  - The letter notes the FPC should continue to prioritise building the resilience of the non-bank financial sector, including by working through the Financial Stability Board to improve regulatory frameworks across jurisdictions, and using insights gained (e.g., from the System Wide Exploratory Scenario).
  - The FPC was asked to play an active role in supporting the growth and competitiveness of the UK’s financial services sector and the wider economy, through its primary objective to maintain financial stability, and also by supporting the government’s economic policy under its secondary objective.
  - The FPC has emphasised that UK financial stability will require levels of resilience at least as great as those put in place since the GFC and required by international baseline standards, and in some cases greater.
  - The FPC has publicly stressed the importance for UK financial stability of alignment with international standards within the PRA and FCA’s secondary objectives.
  - The PRA’s September 2022 discussion paper on its approach to policy noted it will remain at the forefront of efforts to strengthen international standards where necessary.

*Source: UNITED KINGDOM — INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (extracted content)*

### 10. Preserve the primacy

### 10. Preserve the primacy of PRA and FCA’s objectives of safety and soundness and market integrity, in principle and in practice, over any secondary objectives and ad hoc policy priorities. (HMT and FPC)
### Time frame
- 1 year

### Key findings and updates
- The PRA’s primary objectives rank above all other considerations when making policy, including its secondary competition objective and the secondary competitiveness and growth objective.
- The Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2023, enacted by Parliament, preserves the primacy of the primary objectives to act in a way that promotes the safety and soundness of PRA-authorised persons so far as reasonably possible and to contribute to the securing of an appropriate degree of protection for those who are or may become policyholders while providing the PRA with wider rule-making responsibilities and enhanced accountability requirements.
- FSMA 2023 gives the PRA a new secondary competitiveness and growth objective: facilitating, subject to aligning with relevant international standards, (a) the international competitiveness of the economy of the United Kingdom (including in particular the financial services sector through the contribution of PRA-authorised persons), and (b) its growth in the medium to long term.
- FSMA 2023 left unchanged the existing PRA secondary objective to facilitate effective competition in the markets for services provided by PRA-authorised firms in carrying on regulated activities.
- The secondary objectives are engaged only when the PRA is proposing to perform its general functions in pursuit of the primary objectives, and do not rank above the latter.
- The FCA’s primary objectives also rank above all considerations, including the secondary international competitiveness and growth objective (SICGO). The secondary objective only applies when advancing the FCA’s primary objectives by exercising the FCA’s general functions (as listed in s.1B of FSMA).
- The FCA’s general functions include: rule-making (s.1B(6)(a)), functions in relation to giving general guidance (s.1B(6)(c)), and determining general policies (s.1B(6)(d)) that govern how the FCA exercises particular functions.
- Senior leaders of the PRA (and Bank) have stressed in speeches and public communications that financial stability is a prerequisite for sustainable growth and that reforms supporting competitiveness and growth must not jeopardise financial stability.
- The FCA published its SIC GO report for 23/24 which provides an update on relevant rules and guidance from the FCA and how both the primary and secondary objectives were considered. This report will be updated for 24/25.
- The FCA’s 5 year strategy outlines the importance of international standards and the FCA’s approach to global cooperation.
- The PRA’s recently finalized Approach to Policy document and accompanying Policy Statement (PS) 3/25 set out how the PRA makes policy under FSMA 2023; these documents make clear that primary objectives rank above all other considerations and describe how maintaining trust among domestic and foreign firms in the PRA and UK prudential framework is important to advancing its secondary competitiveness and growth objective.

---

### 11. Review and estimate the expected workload in core and new financial stability and supervisory risk areas and determine how to align BOE/PRA and FCA capacity and resources accordingly. (HMT, BOE/PRA, and FCA)
### Time frame
- 1-3 years

### Key findings and updates
- Over 2022/23, the PRA increased its funding, re-deployed resources and set up a flexible resource hub to help manage its expanded regulatory responsibilities.
- The PRA is satisfied with these improvements, which have enabled the organization to better manage its expanded regulatory responsibilities.
- Since 2022/23 the PRA has continued to re-allocate resources within itself to reflect further changes in its responsibilities and the changing nature of the risk environment externally.
- The PRA has allocated resource to its new responsibility in overseeing critical third parties that are designated by HM Treasury under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 and are planning new policy relating to the management of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and cyber risk.
- The second part of the PRA 2026 strategy includes transformation of capabilities around solvent exit planning (complementing capabilities built on resolution as outlined in KR8) for small to mid-tier firms and the use of advanced technology to support supervision.
- Progress on solvent exit planning: the PRA has finalised new rules and expectations on banks, building societies and insurers; these will come into effect over 2025/26.
- Progress on technology: the PRA continues to release tools to assist Supervisors in analysing data received from regulated firms and other sources; supplemented by a controlled roll-out of machine learning and AI tools to staff.
- The PRA continues to engage with firms to identify targeted opportunities to streamline data collections (e.g. deletions of reporting templates that provide limited regulatory value).
- The FCA’s Strategy for 2025 to 2030 reduced priorities from 13 to four, including one priority to become ‘A smarter regulator: more efficient and effective’.
- FCA initiatives under that priority include: enhancing the FCA’s supervisory model (focusing market engagement on areas where harm is greatest, taking a more flexible approach, and reviewing firm categorization), and optimizing the FCA’s operational performance (using deeper insights into operational performance and expenditure to inform investment decisions, and making regulatory delivery, operations and processes more transparent, accountable and aligned to strategic objectives).

---

### 12. Ensure that the final accountability and transparency mechanisms adopted under the ongoing FRF review seek to safeguard regulatory independence and pose no constraints for operational and oversight effectiveness. (HMT, PRA, FCA with other agencies)
### Time frame
- 1-3 years

### Key findings and updates
- FSMA 2023 implemented the outcomes of the FRF review and includes measures to enhance regulators’ transparency and accountability and facilitate scrutiny by Parliament.
- New FSMA 2023 measures include: a requirement to keep rules under review (and to publish a framework for rule review), establishment of an independent Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) Panel, requirement to notify relevant parliamentary committees following publication of a consultation, and a requirement to respond in writing to parliamentary committees’ formal responses to consultations.
- The PRA, Bank and FCA engaged closely with HMT and other stakeholders during the FRF review, ensuring that operational independence of the regulators was appropriately considered.
- The mechanisms adopted through FSMA 2023 elevate accountability and transparency while preserving regulators’ operational independence.
- Some measures (e.g., HMT power to oblige regulators to make rules in a certain area, or to impose additional ‘have regards’ for rule-making) will require close ongoing cooperation between the regulators and HMT to ensure exercise of these powers considers relevant operational considerations.
- Both the FCA and PRA have implemented the new FSMA 2023 requirements which are now in force and are embedding these requirements to facilitate efficient and responsive policymaking while allowing effective oversight.
- The FCA and PRA CBA Panels are now set up and have started to independently scrutinise the CBAs. The FCA CBA Panel is considering relevant CBAs from the FCA as well as the Payments Systems Regulatory (PSR), while the PRA CBA Panel is considering the PRA’s CBAs as well as Bank CBAs relating to CCP and CSD rules.
- The FCA and PRA have published their respective statements of approach to CBAs and statements on how they will approach rule reviews.
- The Bank has embedded its new FSMA 2023 requirements in relation to regulation of CCPs and CSDs, following implementation on 1 January 2024.
- The Bank’s changes include a new general rulemaking power over CCPs and CSDs, new accountability and transparency mechanisms (e.g., establishment of a statutory FMI Committee), consulting the independent CBA Panel on CBAs, publication of a statement on its approach to conducting CBAs, and embedding the new secondary objective to facilitate innovation in policymaking.

---

### 13. Accelerate the efforts to close data gaps on NBFI activities, including data on all Sterling asset holdings and data needed to improve the management of liquidity demands by fund managers; continue improving flow-of-funds data including all cross-border NBFI exposures. (FPC, BOE/PRA, and FCA)
### Time frame
- 3-5 years

### Key findings and updates
- The Bank submitted a new data request to banks in 2024 to address gaps in NBFI exposures, based on a comprehensive survey of available data on banks’ exposures to NBFIs. As this was a one-off exercise, the Bank will consider how to take forward any future data collections.
- The ONS published a report in December 2024 covering plans to develop the UK financial sector account statistics to meet international standards and the progress made so far.
- The ONS published for the first time in January 2025 international template data on debt securities and sectoral accounts in line of Special Data Dissemination Standards Plus on their UK National Data Summary Page.
- The ONS is planning to publish for the first time in the October 2025 Blue Book data for all UK based money market funds, as well as improved data for Non-Money Market Funds that will cover for the first time Private Equity Funds.
- The ONS primarily rely on the Financial Services Survey (FSS) to collect balance sheet data from NBFIs and has updated the questionnaire to encompass a wider range of institutions and collect more granular data, including new sector counterparty data which separately identifies the rest of the world, for publication via Data Gap Initiative phase 2 template submissions.
- The transformed FSS questionnaire was launched in January 2025, with two separate targeted samples to separate collection of income and expenditure data from collection of balance sheet data. The ONS intends to build the quality of the balance sheet data over time and integrate it into the National Accounts.
- Bank staff have completed aggregation of all internally available data on gilt holdings, forming a clear view of the size of the remaining data gap; the Bank is weighing costs, benefits, and feasibility of options to address remaining gaps.
- The Bank co-led the FSB’s Open-Ended Fund Data Pilot project which concluded last year; the FCA was also a participant. The FSB is considering a longer-term work plan to mitigate data gaps in NBFIs which the Bank and FCA will contribute to.
- The FCA, Bank and HMT are participating in multiple international workstreams considering adequacy of existing regulatory reporting, remaining gaps, and coordinated cross-jurisdictional approaches, including recent and current FSB workstreams on data gaps and leverage.
- Domestically, the FCA’s enhanced derivative reporting requirements under UK EMIR have become applicable since 30 September 2024.
- The FCA is commencing work to reform its AIFMD reporting framework as part of the SRF transfer of the AIFM Level 2 regulation this year.

---

### 14. Strengthen information sharing with relevant third-country authorities, including reviewing the approach to monitor and supervise hybrid crossborder transactions, private market activities, and internationally active mixed financial groups. (FPC, BOE/PRA, and FCA)
### Time frame
- 3-5 years

### Key findings and updates
- Good cooperation, information sharing and collaboration with relevant third country authorities remains a key priority for the UK authorities; supervisory relationships have been tested and found to be strong in both 'peace time' and during crises.
- Communication and information sharing between supervisory teams across jurisdictions remains strong; the PRA continues to look for additional opportunities to further build relationships with many third country authorities.
- The PRA has enhanced and developed its trilateral relationship with the FRB and ECB on day-to-day and long-term supervisory issues and identified potential areas for common work, horizon scanning and information sharing on financial and operational resilience issues.
- Through the Trilateral group, the PRA has developed a quantitative data collection template on NBFI exposures to consider counterparty-credit risk on a group-wide basis.
- The PRA has undertaken reviews in coordination with regulators from key jurisdictions on crystallised and emerging risks including Archegos, nickel, fixed income financing, crypto products and private equity, and has shared workplans and key areas of supervisory focus.
- The PRA worked closely with FINMA, FRB and ECB in handling the resolution and acquisition of Silicon Valley Bank and Credit Suisse respectively, bolstering bilateral and multilateral supervisory relationships and ensuring free flow of information during critical periods.
- The PRA held joint firm monitoring calls with the FRB and SSM during volatility post the invasion of Ukraine, the UK mini budget and failures of SVB and Credit Suisse, to assess firms’ changes in risk profiles, counterparty exposures and overall risk appetite.
- The PRA has consulted on updates to its approach to branch and subsidiary supervision (CP11/24) to clarify expectations of firms’ booking arrangements, extend formal application to a subset of UK banks, introduce additional indicative criteria for branch vs subsidiary decisions, and amend the PRA branch return to improve collection of whole firm liquidity data.

---

### 15. Maintain the United Kingdom’s commitment to mutual cooperation with the EU, post-Brexit, including intensifying regulatory dialogue to support financial stability and mitigate market fragmentation risks, including the regulatory status of the U.K. CCPs over the long term. (HMT, BOE, and FCA)
### Time frame
- 3-5 years

### Key findings and updates
- The UK welcomes the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Financial Services Cooperation on 27 June 2023 and the establishment of the Joint EU-UK Financial Regulatory Forum which has met three times: in October 2023, May 2024 and February 2025. UK authorities will continue to engage through semi-annual Forum meetings, bilaterally and through multilateral fora.
- The PRA has signed and implemented 34 Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with EU institutions and member states since the beginning of 2021, including as signatory to the IAIS Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding.
- The Bank has signed and implemented 13 MoUs with EU institutions and member states since the beginning of 2021 in relation to Financial Market Infrastructures.
- The FCA is signatory to MoUs with EU institutions and EU and EEA National Competent Authorities covering supervisory cooperation, enforcement and information sharing across areas including market surveillance, investment services and asset management activities; it has also signed MoUs with IAIS and IOSCO.
- The FCA has adopted specific MoUs (e.g., MoU with ESMA on benchmarks being updated; MoU with AMF on MiFID data adopted last year) and started negotiations for a DORA CTP oversight regime between the ESAs and UK authorities.
- The Bank, PRA and FCA have strengthened ongoing regulatory dialogues through senior-level and working-level engagement with the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the European Supervisory Authorities and National Competent Authorities.
- HMT granted the EU a package of equivalence decisions in November 2020, including a decision on CCP equivalence.
- The Bank has recognized three EU CCPs – Cboe Clear Europe, Eurex Clearing and LCH SA - since the Bank’s tiering policy came into force in December 2022. Further EU CCPs that have applied for recognition can continue providing services to UK clearing members and trading venues under the Temporary Recognition Regime while permanent recognition is pending.
- The Bank has signed and implemented 17 cooperation arrangements with EU institutions and members states since the beginning of 2021 in relation to Financial Market Infrastructures, including an updated MoU with ESMA in relation to UK CCPs revised to take account of EMIR 3 requirements and agreements regarding newly established resolution colleges for three EU CCPs.
- The Bank agreed with ESMA an MoU template to be used for recognition of EU CSDs which are non-systemic to UK financial stability.
- Equivalence and recognition are unilateral decisions; the European Commission renewed its equivalence decision regarding the UK CCP regime until 30 June 2028. Following the Commission’s equivalence determination and agreement of the revised UK CCP MoU between ESMA and the Bank, ESMA has extended its recognition of UK CCPs (now due to expire in June 2028).
- An enhanced UK CCP resolution regime came into effect in December 2023, making the UK regime fully consistent with international FSB standards. The Bank is developing policy options on second skin in the game (SSITG).
- The Bank and FCA continue to engage with international counterparts through CPMI-IOSCO, FSB, and the FCA is active in FSB, IOSCO and IAIS workstreams.

*Source: 1gbrea2025001-source-pdf - 10. Preserve the primacy*

### Annex IX. Staff Policy Advice from the 2024 Article IV Consultation

### Annex IX. Staff Policy Advice from the 2024 Article IV Consultation

### Monetary Policy
- Monetary policy has reached an inflection point and the MPC will need to balance the risks of premature vs. delayed easing.
- The Bernanke review will help strengthen the BoE’s data and forecasting infrastructures, and communications.
- The MPC has cut the Bank Rate four times since August 2024 to 4.25 percent from its peak of 5.25 percent; and provided guidance on further gradual cuts for the rest of 2025.
- The BoE is in the process of operationalizing the Bernanke review, including developing modelling infrastructure and shifting toward scenarios to present the forecasts and communicate uncertainty.

### Fiscal Policy — near-term stance and medium-term strategy
- The medium-term fiscal strategy needs to take better account of mounting spending pressures and investment needs. The near-term fiscal stance is appropriately restrictive.
- The medium-term expenditure envelope was revised upward at the October 2024 budget to account for spending pressures and is now closer to staff’s 2024 Article IV projections.
- Expenditure will be 2  ½  ppts of GDP higher per year on average compared with previous plans, of which three quarters is recurrent spending and the remainder public investment.
- The higher spending implies a less restrictive fiscal stance in the near term than expected at the time of the Article IV, but the fiscal deficit is still projected to decline over the medium term.

### Fiscal sustainability and recommended measures
- High-quality consolidation measures will be required to stabilize debt with high probability, given the additional spending needs.
- Staff advises against additional tax cuts.
- In the October 2024 budget, the authorities announced that revenue would be increased to partially offset the higher spending.
  - The authorities projected revenue to increase by 0.3 ppts   of GDP per year on average over the medium term, with the main measure being an increase in employer social security contributions (NICs).
- This fiscal strategy nonetheless implies additional borrowing over the medium term, so that net debt is projected to stabilize but not with high probability.
- The additional borrowing mostly funds higher investment, which is critical in the weak growth environment.

### Fiscal institutions and processes
- Broader reforms to fiscal institutions and processes: fiscal Rules; enhanced OBR role; and budget process.
- The authorities have introduced two new forecast-based fiscal rules: a current balance rule and a rule requiring PSNFL to stabilize in 5  years.
- The horizon for the rules will be shortened from 5  to  3  years in FY2026/27, to align with that of the spending reviews, which are to be updated bi-annually.
- During the October Budget, the authorities have also committed to a single budget event per year.
- In addition to two regular OBR forecasts in Spring and Fall, a ‘fiscal lock’ has been introduced which requires an OBR forecast whenever there is a policy change costing more than one percent of GDP.

### Structural Policy — raising potential growth
- To durably lift potential growth, staff recommended:
  - ease planning restrictions to reduce construction delays and costs, and enhance labor mobility;
  - upskill the workforce to address skill gaps;
  - improve health outcomes through capital and workforce investment, as well as efficient resource allocation.
- Staff also emphasized the importance of a clear and stable long-term growth strategy.
- The pillars of the authorities’ “Growth Mission” reflect many of the priorities identified in the 2024 AIV report, including:
  - the Planning and Infrastructure Bill introduced in July 2024;
  - a new entity “Skills England” to address skills gaps;
  - a significant increase in the NHS budget and investigation into its performance.
- The October Budget provided funding for the new National Wealth Fund, which is expected to catalyze £70bn of private investment (equivalent to 2½ percent of 2024 GDP), and set out plans for other reforms, including a ten -year infrastructure strategy and a plan to reduce inactivity levels (“Getting Britain Working”).

### Green transition and industrial policy
- Doubling up of policy efforts to credibly achieve the UK green transition targets and maintaining a cautious approach toward industrial policy interventions.
- The authorities have recommitted to achieving the climate targets, including a new 2035 milestone target of an   81   percent reduction in emissions relative to 1990.
- The authorities plan to achieve clean power by 2030, supported by the launch of Great British Energy, increased public investment, and measures to catalyze private investment.
- They also lifted the de-facto ban on onshore wind farms.
- A ten   -year industrial strategy was published in June 2025, to be implemented with the support of an Industrial Strategy Advisory Council.
- The strategy is based around eight target sectors: advanced manufacturing; clean energy; creative industries; defense; digital and technologies; financial services; life sciences; professional and business services.

*Annex IX. Staff Policy Advice from the 2024 Article IV Consultation*

### 1. The authorities continue to address transnational aspects of corruption. On the supply

### 1. The authorities continue to address transnational aspects of corruption. On the supply

### Supply Side of Corruption – Criminalization and Prosecution of Foreign Bribery: Updates and Findings
- The authorities significantly increased funding for foreign bribery enforcement and continued measures to encourage extension of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to the Crown Dependencies (CDs) and British Overseas Territories (BOTs).  
- March 2023: the-then UK government launched a review to examine the effectiveness of the whistleblowing framework; the government is considering options on strengthening the framework.  
- December 2024: the government announced an additional £36 million of funding for the National Crime Agency’s International Corruption Unit.  
- November 2024: the Serious Fraud Office received an additional £9.3 million.  
- The UK continues to encourage its Overseas Territories (OTs) that have not yet had the Convention extended to them to do so, including sending letters to the Attorney Generals of Anguilla and Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI).  
- The UK collaborated with OTs and CDs on enforcement-related topics through mechanisms such as the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre (IACCC).  
- Staff recommendation: the authorities are encouraged to continue implementing past recommendations to address risks of transnational aspects of corruption.

### Facilitation of Corruption – Preventing the Concealment of Foreign Corruption Proceeds: Updates and Findings
- The authorities continue efforts to improve the effectiveness of the AML/CFT supervisory regime, focusing on high-risk sectors such as banking and professional services.  
- Authorities are addressing deficiencies in risk-based supervision of the legal and accountancy sectors, recognized as key “gatekeepers” to mitigate inflows of foreign illicit proceeds into the UK financial system.  
- HMT concluded its public consultation on assessing four potential supervisory options for these sectors and is preparing respective policy changes.  
- OPBAS is implementing, jointly with the NECC and law enforcement, the Professional Enablers Strategy to strengthen intelligence sharing.  
- Companies House actions to enhance beneficial ownership transparency:
  - Removal of over 60,700 fraudulent registered office addresses over the past year.
  - April 2025: Companies House began identity verification for beneficial owners and company directors, either through a direct verification service or through authorized AML-related third-party providers registered with Companies House.
- Expansion of information accessible in the UK’s Register of Overseas Entities and rollout of legitimate access provisions upon application for information on settlors and beneficiaries of trusts and related identifying information.  
- Engagement with UK Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies on commitments to provide publicly accessible beneficial ownership registers:
  - Five Overseas Territories have committed to implement such registers with a legitimate interest access filter by June 2025.  
- Staff recommendation: continue targeted efforts to further improve effective AML/CFT supervision of high-risk sectors and focus on entity transparency to mitigate the risk of laundering of foreign proceeds of corruption in the UK.

### Broader Policy Context and Relevant Financial and Fiscal Measures (selected items from the same document)
- Fiscal and investment measures and commitments:
  - The Autumn Budget and recent Spending Review increased public investment by £120 billion over the course of the parliament.
  - The National Wealth Fund (NWF) is tasked with catalyzing over £70 billion of private investment and will produce a Strategic Plan later in the year.
  - Over the past year, over £40 billion of private investment in clean energy has been announced.
- Regulatory and supervisory developments relevant to financial stability and market functioning:
  - Bank of England (BoE) is transitioning its balance sheet from a supply-driven gilt-based framework to a demand-driven, repo-based framework and recalibrated the Indexed Long-Term Repo (ILTR) facility to complement the Short-Term Repo (STR) facility.
  - BoE uses illustrative scenarios to build uncertainty into the monetary policy framework (Bernanke Review follow-up).
  - Financial Policy Committee (FPC) maintained the UK countercyclical buffer (CCyB) rate at its neutral setting of 2%.
  - January (year not specified in this excerpt): BoE opened applications to the Contingent Non-Bank Financial Institution Repo Facility (CNRF) to eligible insurance companies and pension funds to be activated in case of severe market dysfunction.

### Key Policy Recommendations and Next Steps (as stated or implied)
- Continue implementing past recommendations to address transnational aspects of corruption, including:
  - Strengthening whistleblower protection framework following the March 2023 review.
  - Sustaining and adequately resourcing foreign bribery enforcement bodies and ensuring independence of investigation and prosecution and transparency of court decisions.
  - Continue targeted engagement with Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories to extend the application of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and to meet high enforcement standards.
  - Continue to strengthen AML/CFT supervision of high-risk sectors (legal, accountancy, banking, and professional services).
  - Continue to enhance entity transparency, beneficial ownership verification, and access controls (Companies House measures, Register of Overseas Entities, trust information access).
  - Maintain collaboration and intelligence-sharing frameworks such as the IACCC and the Professional Enablers Strategy.

*Source: STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2025 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION — INFORMATIONAL ANNEX (extract).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1gbrea2025001-source-pdf.pdf_
