## 1. Developments of CIT Revenues

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### Introduction and key risks
- Ireland’s reliance on corporate income tax (CIT) receipts from multinational enterprises (MNEs), concentrated in a small number of companies, presents significant risks to the budget.
- CIT is the second largest revenue source and exhibits a high degree of concentration and substantial uncertainty.
- MNEs also boost personal income tax and VAT through employment and wages, so firm- and sector-specific shocks can have broader fiscal effects.
- Past experience (property-related receipts during the GFC) shows sudden reversals can create fiscal stress.
- Previous government’s net spending rule: annual growth of nominal expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures would not exceed 5 percent during 2021–25.
- The EU fiscal framework’s reliance on GDP as a denominator is unsuitable for Ireland given MNE activities; Modified Gross National Income (GNI*) is a more appropriate domestic measure for some analyses.

### Need for a strong national fiscal framework
- Rationale and instruments:
  - Adopt a prudent medium-term debt anchor (debt-to-output ratio) to guide fiscal policy and build buffers.
  - Implement multi-year expenditure ceilings calibrated to stabilize debt at the anchor while accounting for cyclical positions.
  - Expenditure limits should be defined net of discretionary revenue measures (consistent with the previous government’s net spending rule).
  - Broader tax-base measures (outside scope) could allow higher investment spending while reducing reliance on CIT.

### Calibrating a prudent debt anchor (risk-based framework)
- Methodology:
  - Apply an IMF (2018) risk-based framework with customized shocks to quantify MNE-related risks and produce debt “fan chart” distributions.
  - Use two quantitative approaches: top-down FDI panel approach and bottom-up firm-level approach for cross-checking.
- Policy design considerations:
  - Use EU 60 percent debt-to-GDP benchmark as an upper threshold for analysis.
  - Prudent anchor should keep debt-to-output below 60 percent with a sufficiently high probability to preserve strong credit ratings.
  - Safety buffer = difference between 60 percent benchmark and estimated debt anchor.
- Measurement choices:
  - Choice of output metric matters: GDP vs. GNI*. GNI* excludes MNEs’ globalized operations and better captures domestic debt-servicing capacity when excess CIT revenues are unavailable.
  - Consider net debt (gross debt – cash balance) alongside gross debt when using GNI* because part of CIT may be saved as liquid assets.

### Top-down FDI risk approach (quantifying MNE risks)
- Approach description:
  - Calibrate potential FDI shocks for Ireland using historical FDI data from a panel of 58 small open economies.
  - Changes in FDI capture global factors, firm/industry profitability prospects, and tax policy changes that affect MNE output and CIT.
  - Ireland’s time series have structural breaks; panel mitigates reliance on Ireland’s historical anomalies.
- Translational and baseline assumptions:
  - CIT assumed to grow in line with FDI in steady state; other revenues grow in line with the domestic economy.
  - Baseline nominal growth: FDI and the domestic economy both assumed to grow by 4.25 percent in nominal terms (Department of Finance, 2023; Central Bank of Ireland, 2024).
  - Baseline nominal expenditure growth assumed at 5 percent annually (previous government’s rule).
  - Variations around central scenario capture largely symmetric upside and downside risks.

### Simulated macro variables and debt fan charts
- Purpose and use:
  - Fan charts for key macro variables using panel-data-driven FDI variation illustrate uncertainty around future debt paths.
  - Simulated debt distributions provide probabilistic assessment of likelihood that debt exceeds 60 percent benchmark within a given horizon and inform the safety buffer needed for a prudent anchor.
  - Approach supports anchors that encourage buffer buildup and limit the probability of debt reaching levels that could trigger adverse consequences (e.g., EDP).

### Simulated debt anchors and probability of breaching the 60 percent benchmark
- Key simulation findings:
  - If gross debt starts at about 40 percent of GDP as of end 2024, there would be 5 percent probability of exceeding 60 percent of GDP by 2030 under the specified output and expenditure growth path.
  - With 40 percent of GDP as the medium-term anchor, the authorities’ fiscal consolidation plan in the 2025 budget and medium-term fiscal structural plan is consistent with maintaining debt at the anchor.
  - A net debt to GNI*-based anchor implies greater consolidation because GNI* is significantly smaller than GDP as a denominator; same revenue shock has larger impact on debt ratio.
  - With a risk tolerance of 10 percent, the GNI*-based net debt anchor is about 40 percent, which still provides a comfortable buffer relative to the 60 percent benchmark.
  - To ensure net debt does not breach 60 percent of GNI* by 2030 with 90 percent probability, net debt would need to be brought down to around 36 percent of GNI*, compared to the current level of about 60 percent.

### Bottom-up (firm/sector) risk calibration and results
- Concentration facts:
  - Top 10 corporate taxpayers account for more than 50 percent of Ireland’s total CIT (IFAC 2023).
- Calibration approach:
  - Use Compustat firm-level data for largest multinational companies in chemical and IT sectors; estimate historical distribution of firm profits over past 3 decades.
  - Assume an exit rate of 5 percent per year to account for firm exits.
- Simulation findings:
  - Bottom-up results broadly align with top-down approach.
  - A gross debt to GDP ratio of 43 percent or below would ensure probability of breaching 60 percent benchmark by 2030 is no more than 10 percent.
  - Both approaches suggest a debt anchor set at 40 percent of GNI* (for net debt) would be prudent to ensure the EU benchmark is not breached in most scenarios.
- Alternative firm growth specification:
  - Allowing unit-root dynamics at firm level generates more extreme upside and downside risks, wider fan charts, and lower debt anchors due to asymmetry (declining MNE revenues raise debt numerator and reduce GDP denominator, amplifying debt-to-GDP increases).

### Expenditure growth scenarios and implications for debt trajectories
- Baseline and alternatives:
  - 5 percent annual nominal spending growth (baseline) would ensure a downward path for debt over a ten-year period.
  - 6 -percent expenditure growth annually could still anchor debt over the medium term, although debt trajectory would begin to trend up toward the end of the simulation horizon.
  - With higher spending growth rates, debt trends upward sooner and may be incompatible with long-term fiscal sustainability.
  - In the very long term, even a 5-percent spending growth may not be sufficient for debt stabilization under the annual revenue growth assumption of 4.25 percent.

### Need for an operational rule and preference for expenditure rules
- Rationale:
  - A debt anchor alone is insufficient; must be complemented by an operational rule (e.g., expenditure or fiscal balance rule).
- Advantages of expenditure rules:
  - Easier to monitor and enforce (governments have direct control on spending).
  - Allow automatic stabilizers to operate.
  - Less vulnerable to overly optimistic revenue forecasts than balance-based rules.
- Design elements of effective expenditure rules: coverage, legal basis, monitoring, and consequences for non-compliance.

### Recommended operational design: multi-year expenditure ceilings and FRF calibration
- Design recommendations:
  - Multi-year expenditure ceilings covering all institutions under general government classification.
  - Ceilings informed by macro stability considerations and the debt anchor; help prevent procyclical spending in times of positive revenue shocks.
- Fiscal Reaction Function (FRF) framework:
  - Typical FRF: p_{t+1} = β0 p_t + β1 γ_t + β2 b_t, where p_t is the primary balance, γ_t the output gap (or other cyclical measure), and b_t public debt.
  - FRF determines uniquely the expenditure trajectory for a given revenue path.
- Measurement challenges in Ireland:
  - Estimating the output gap is demanding due to GDP distortions from large MNE activity.
  - GNI* is available only at annual frequency and with substantial delays.
  - Modified domestic demand focuses on domestic activity only and excludes external operations.
  - Unemployment gap is an alternative cyclical measure; natural unemployment estimated using a two-state Markov switching model (Appendix I).

### FRF estimation, calibration and optimization results
- Calibration and optimization:
  - FRFs can be estimated econometrically or calibrated; optimization (including robust control) identifies parameters that align with policy objectives under uncertainty.
  - Optimization-based results (net debt and GNI* using 2024 estimates from Budget 2025 as initial values):
    - Optimized FRFs stabilize debt at the anchor (assumed at 40 percent) and the unemployment gap at zero under plausible parameter assumptions.
    - Different methodologies imply varying speeds of adjustment but qualitatively similar paths: gradual unwinding of the primary surplus initially associated with negative unemployment gaps.
- Average nominal expenditure growth rates implied by optimized FRFs:
  - Between 6 ¼ and 6 ½ percent in the first 5 years.
  - Around 5½ percent in the first 10 years.
  - After initial period, FRFs prescribe expenditure growth at same rate as nominal revenue.
  - Higher initial spending growth reflects favorable current fiscal position and trade-off between closing the unemployment gap and reducing the substantial primary surplus.
  - Fiscal multiplier size affects speed of adjustment.
  - Approach offers scope for stepped-up productive public investment in initial period.

### Revenue shock scenario and use of fiscal buffers
- Illustrative shock:
  - Assume CIT windfall estimated at about 4.5 percent of GNI* disappears over three years, causing the revenue ratio to fall to about 38 percent and remain at that level.
- Two expenditure response scenarios:
  - Immediate adjustment: nominal expenditure increases only between 1 and 3 ½ percent in the first three years, with growth rates catching up later to model-prescribed primary balance.
  - Smoothing scenario: nominal expenditure grows at about 4 percent per annum in the adjustment period, postponing the time when debt reaches the anchor until toward the end of the simulation horizon.
- Use of financial assets:
  - Use of savings funds (e.g., the two savings funds) is not included in the illustrative shock but could cushion the shock in initial years while still allowing the debt anchor to be achieved within a reasonable timeframe.

### Concluding recommendations and policy implications on fiscal architecture
- Core recommendations:
  - Adopt a prudent debt anchor combined with a net spending rule as an operational target for Ireland.
  - A debt anchor of about 40 percent provides a fiscal buffer to absorb shocks while maintaining prudent indebtedness.
  - Consider both gross debt to GDP and net debt to GNI* metrics; GNI* may be more suitable as a denominator for fiscal anchors.
  - Implement expenditure-based operational rule (net of discretionary revenue measures) to limit procyclicality, enhance transparency, and facilitate monitoring and enforcement.
  - Use expenditure ceilings, informed by cyclical conditions and debt levels, for a stable and predictable framework.
- Additional design elements:
  - Legislative status for fiscal rules; include escape clause with predefined activation conditions for exceptional circumstances.
  - Specify correction mechanisms for breaches (automatic spending adjustments or corrective budget plans).
  - Independent fiscal oversight: Irish Fiscal Advisory Council should monitor compliance and assess budget forecasts.
  - Periodic reviews to recalibrate rules as macro-fiscal conditions evolve.
  - Embed fiscal rule in annual budgets and MTFF to ensure operational compliance implies achieving fiscal anchor.
  - Integrate the two savings funds established in 2024—the Future Ireland Fund and the Infrastructure, Climate and Nature Fund—into the strengthened fiscal framework.

### Implementation choices for multi-year expenditure ceilings
- Nominal vs. real ceilings:
  - Nominal ceilings: simple and transparent but may fail in unstable inflationary environments.
  - Real ceilings: preserve purchasing power but require selection of appropriate price index (e.g., HICP, CPI or GDP deflator).
- Levels vs. growth rates:
  - Growth-rate ceilings ease communication and provide continuity; with full compliance, equivalent to level-based ceilings.
  - If ceilings are breached, subsequent-year growth rates must adjust to stay on fiscal path.
- Treatment of cyclical expenditure:
  - Automatic stabilizers (e.g., unemployment benefits) could be excluded from ceilings to preserve countercyclical capacity.
- Public investment:
  - Prefer overall expenditure ceilings with subceilings for current and capital spending rather than excluding public investment from ceilings.
  - Golden-rule exclusion of public investment is not recommended due to risks of creative accounting and weakened debt-sustainability link.
  - Slower adjustment toward anchor could provide space for upfront growth-enhancing investment in a transparent manner.
- Link to financial assets:
  - Ireland has substantial financial assets (about 40 percent of GNI*); part is in cash instruments counted toward net debt under a net debt anchor, with significant portion remaining outside fiscal rule to serve as buffer for future spending pressures (ageing, climate).
  - Two savings funds should play an important role in integrated fiscal strategy.
- Net worth targets:
  - Explicit net worth targets pose operational and conceptual challenges: volatility from discount-rate revisions, public comprehension difficulties, encouragement of borrowing for investment without quality safeguards, and illiquidity of nonfinancial assets.

### FRF technical elements: unemployment gap and Markov switching estimates
- Markov-switching unemployment estimates:
  - Low-unemployment state estimated at about 4 ¾ percent.
  - High-unemployment state estimated at slightly over 10 ½ percent, with large variance.
  - Transition matrix: 96 percent probability of staying in low-unemployment regime if currently in that regime.
  - Recently unemployment gap has been negative in range of -0.3 to -0.6 percentage points.
  - Using Okun’s law with coefficient -0.3, this translates into positive output gaps between 1 and 2 percent.
- Simple calibrated FRF (baseline optimal control solution):
  - p_{t+1} = −0.43 u^�_t − 0.57 (p_t − p̄) + 0.15 (b_t − b̄)
- Sensitivity and robustness:
  - Alternative FRFs shown for varying debt weights and multipliers; minimax and robust FRFs yield stronger cyclically sensitive coefficients (examples provided in text).
  - Expenditure growth implications under baseline FRF:
    - About 6.2 percent average expenditure growth in first 5 years.
    - About 5.4 percent average expenditure growth in first 10 years.
    - Converging to 4 ¼ percent in line with potential growth thereafter.

### Deglobalization poses threats to the Irish economic model
- Vulnerabilities and channels:
  - High dependence on export-oriented activities dominated by a small number of MNEs makes Ireland vulnerable to reduced access to imported inputs, increased import tariffs, and relocation of FDI (especially intangible capital).
  - Financial fragmentation could affect cross-border investment, international payment systems, and asset prices; Ireland’s large externally-oriented financial sector has domestic linkages via non-bank lending, real estate, and professional services.
- Openness and concentration statistics:
  - Exports and imports of goods and services exceeded 250 percent of GDP in 2024.
  - Almost two-thirds of domestic value added is being exported.
  - Foreign-owned firms accounted for 31 percent of NNP and 36 percent of wages in 2022.
  - Pharmaceuticals and organic chemical products comprise over half of Irish goods exports; computer services account for more than half of services exports.
  - About 40 percent of goods exports go to EU countries and close to 30 percent to the US.
  - Services imports are dominated by the US (about 50 percent), mostly royalties and licensing fees related to IP use.

### Foreign-dependent (FD) inputs, scenarios and model results
- FD identification and exposure:
  - In 2022, imports of foreign dependent goods comprised about 3.5 percent of total Irish imports.
  - There were about 200 FD products (HS6 level); largest being medicaments not packaged for retail sale.
  - Only three categories of services classified as foreign-dependent, but their import value is about half of all imports—driven by licences for use of R&D.
  - FD services imports predominantly from the US; share from “high-risk” countries negligible in Scenario 1 and close to one in Scenario 2.
  - For FD goods, FD products from “high-risk” countries account for about 16 percent (Scenario 1) and 90 percent (Scenario 2).
- Illustrative impacts (elasticity of substitution key driver):
  - A 50 percent reduction of imports of FD goods and services could cause a contraction of total value added in Ireland of about 2 percent with elasticity of substitution of 0.02 under Scenario 1.
  - The same 50 percent reduction would lead to less than ½ percent decline for elasticity in range 0.1–0.2.
  - A 75 percent reduction results in almost 5 percent decline in value added (illustrative).
- General equilibrium BHLP model scenarios:
  - Tariff scenario (representative assumptions as of mid-April 2025):
    - Value added of indigenous sectors declines by 0.4 percent; foreign-dominated sectors by 1 percent.
    - Largest losses: manufacture of pharmaceuticals, agriculture, foods and beverages, and computer and electronics sectors.
  - FDI relocation scenario (50 percent decrease in FDI stock in ICT services represented as 30 percent productivity drop):
    - Foreign-dominated ICT services sector faces 25 percent drop in value added; indigenous ICT services segment declines by 0.7 percent.
    - Most other sectors experience modest, relatively homogeneous contractions.
  - Note limitations: model excludes capital and fiscal sector; results are long-run and sensitive to trade elasticities.

### Policy implications on deglobalization and resilience
- Recommendations:
  - Build fiscal buffers in good times to mitigate potential declines in fiscal revenue and allow flexible response.
  - Use buffers to provide focused support facilitating smoother resource reallocations in affected sectors.
  - Promote linkages between dynamic MNEs and the domestic economy (e.g., innovation cooperation) and improve infrastructure to bolster competitiveness and resilience.
  - Continue EU engagement to strengthen single market (including advancing Savings and Investments Union).

### Benchmarking public spending efficiency: infrastructure, health, education
- Context:
  - Total public spending at 40 percent of GNI* in 2023 below EU peers’ median.
  - Health spending is high (share of government expenditure rose from 19.6 percent in 2019 to almost 23 percent in 2023); education at median.
- Infrastructure:
  - Relative to frontier, Ireland faces physical infrastructure gap of 32 percent and quality gap of 27 percent.
  - General government gross fixed capital formation about 4 percent of GNI* in 2023.
  - Government committed €165 billion in capital investment for 2021–2030 under National Development Plan.
  - Ireland sits below investment efficiency frontier in both quantity and quality of infrastructure.
  - Key delivery challenges: planning delays, low construction productivity, labor shortages.
- Health:
  - HALE at birth: 70 years (up from 66.25 in 2001).
  - Acute care hospital beds operated at 90 percent occupancy in 2022 (recommended threshold 85 percent).
  - Since 2020, an additional 1,218 in-patient acute beds have been added; plan to deliver 4,367 acute in-patient beds by 2031.
  - Between 2016–2022: inflation-adjusted rise in costs 45 percent; increase in activity 3.8 percent; total nominal increase of expenditure 68 percent; average budget variance of acute hospitals 10.8 percent.
  - Health spending: public sources account for two-thirds; potential efficiency gains up to 15 percent on input dimension per OECD study (Sicari and Sutherland, 2023).
  - European Commission projects baseline public health expenditure growth of 1.5 percentage points of GDP between 2022 and 2070 (risk scenario 2.5 percentage points).
  - Share of population aged 65+ projected to almost double from 15 percent in 2022 to 29 percent in 2070; old-age dependency ratio projected to more than double to 56 percent in 2070 from 26 percent in 2022.
  - Recommendations: improve forecasting and budgeting, address recruitment and retention, target efficiency improvements.
- Education:
  - Ireland at or close to efficiency frontier for education spending.
  - Share of 25–34-year-olds without upper secondary attainment: 5 percent.
  - Student performance (PISA 2022) higher than comparators and averages.
  - Government spending per student lower than comparator peers; outcomes achieved at relative cost-effectiveness.
  - Recommendations: continue investment, strengthen tertiary–labor market alignment (digital and STEM skills).

### Concluding fiscal and policy messages
- Maintain a prudent debt anchor (about 40 percent) combined with multi-year expenditure ceilings (net of discretionary revenue measures) to build buffers against MNE-related and deglobalization risks.
- Use GNI* and net debt metrics alongside GDP and gross debt when designing anchors and operational rules.
- Prefer expenditure-based operational rules with clear design (coverage, legal basis, monitoring, correction mechanisms) and independent oversight by the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council.
- Integrate savings funds (Future Ireland Fund and Infrastructure, Climate and Nature Fund) into a coherent fiscal strategy and use them to smooth shocks and support strategic investment.
- Pursue public spending efficiency gains—especially in infrastructure and health—to create fiscal space and strengthen resilience.

*Source: 1irlea2025002-print-pdf*

### 1. Developments of CIT Revenues  ______________________________________________________ 4

### 1. Developments of CIT Revenues

### Introduction and Key Risks
- Ireland’s reliance on corporate income tax (CIT) receipts from multinational enterprises (MNEs), concentrated in a small number of companies, presents significant risks to the budget.
- CIT is the second largest revenue source and exhibits a high degree of concentration and substantial uncertainty.
- MNEs also boost personal income tax and VAT through employment and wages, so firm- and sector-specific shocks can have broader fiscal effects.
- Past experience (property-related receipts during the GFC) shows sudden reversals can create fiscal stress.
- The previous government’s spending rule: the annual growth of nominal expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures would not exceed 5 percent during 2021–25.
- The EU fiscal framework’s reliance on GDP as a denominator is unsuitable for Ireland given MNE activities; Modified Gross National Income (GNI*) is a more appropriate domestic measure for some analyses.

### Need for a Strong National Fiscal Framework
- Rationale for policy instruments:
  - A prudent medium-term debt anchor (debt-to-output ratio) is proposed to guide fiscal policy and build buffers.
  - Multi-year expenditure ceilings are proposed as an operational rule calibrated to stabilize debt at the anchor while accounting for cyclical positions.
- Expenditure limits are defined net of discretionary revenue measures, consistent with the previous government’s net spending rule.
- Broader tax-base measures (outside scope of this paper) could allow higher investment spending while reducing reliance on CIT.

### Calibrating a Prudent Debt Anchor (Risk-Based Framework)
- Methodology:
  - A risk-based framework is applied to calibrate an appropriate medium-term debt anchor (IMF, 2018).
  - Customized shocks are modeled and simulated to quantify MNE-related risks and to produce a debt “fan chart” for Ireland.
  - Two quantitative approaches are used: a top-down FDI panel approach and a bottom-up firm-level approach; these are compared for cross-checking and robustness.
- Policy design considerations:
  - The EU 60 percent debt-to-GDP benchmark is used as a useful upper threshold for analysis.
  - A prudent anchor should keep debt-to-output below 60 percent with a sufficiently high probability to preserve strong credit ratings.
  - The difference between the debt benchmark (60 percent) and the estimated debt anchor constitutes the safety buffer.
- Measurement choices:
  - Output metric choice matters: GDP vs. GNI*. GNI* excludes MNEs’ globalized operations and is more appropriate to capture domestic debt servicing capacity when excess CIT revenues are unavailable.
  - Debt concept: net debt (gross debt – cash balance) should be considered alongside gross debt when using GNI* as denominator because part of CIT may be saved as liquid assets.

### Top-Down FDI Risk Approach (Quantifying MNE Risks)
- Approach description:
  - Risks to MNE activities are quantified using historical FDI data of 58 small open economies to calibrate potential FDI shocks for Ireland.
  - Changes in FDI capture global factors, firm/industry profitability prospects, and tax policy changes that affect MNE output and CIT.
  - Ireland’s time series have structural breaks; using a panel of similar economies mitigates reliance on Ireland’s historical anomalies.
- Linkages and assumptions:
  - CIT is assumed to grow in line with FDI in steady state; other revenues grow in line with the domestic economy.
  - For the baseline, both FDI and the domestic economy are assumed to grow by 4.25 percent in nominal terms over the medium-term (Department of Finance, 2023; Central Bank of Ireland, 2024).
  - Baseline nominal expenditure is assumed to grow by 5 percent annually, in line with the previous government’s rule.
  - Variations around the central scenario capture largely symmetric upside and downside risks.

### Simulated Macro Variables and Debt Fan Charts
- Simulation purpose:
  - Fan charts for key macro variables with FDI shocks illustrate potential uncertainty around future debt paths.
  - The panel-data-driven variation of FDI around trend is used to capture substantial risks around baseline projections.
- Translational assumptions:
  - Trend growth assumptions link FDI, GDP or GNI*, revenue, and debt in the central scenario over the projection period.
  - While FDI does not translate one-for-one into CIT in the short run, it should determine MNE activity levels and profits (and hence CIT) in the steady state.
- Use of simulations:
  - Simulated debt distributions provide a probabilistic assessment of how likely debt will exceed the 60 percent benchmark within a given horizon and inform the safety buffer needed for a prudent anchor.
  - The approach supports setting anchors that encourage buffer buildup and limit the probability of debt reaching levels that could trigger adverse consequences (e.g., EDP).

### Operational Implications and Design Criteria
- A well-designed fiscal rule should meet: simplicity, operational guidance, resilience, and ease of monitoring and enforcement (IMF, 2018).
- Expenditure ceilings calibrated to stabilize debt at the anchor and adjusted for cyclical positions provide operational guidance for annual budgets.
- Anchors and rules should explicitly account for Ireland-specific measurement choices (GNI* vs. GDP; net vs. gross debt) and the possibility of tail-risks not captured by historical data.

*Source: 1irlea2025002-print-pdf - 1. Developments of CIT Revenues*

### 11.      Simulations suggest that debt anchors ranging from 30 to 40 percent of GDP or GNI*

### 11.      Simulations suggest that debt anchors ranging from 30 to 40 percent of GDP or GNI*

### Simulated debt anchors and probability of breaching the 60 percent benchmark
- If gross debt starts at the level of about 40 percent of GDP as of end 2024, there would be 5 percent probability of exceeding 60 percent of GDP by 2030 under the output and expenditure growth path discussed earlier.
- With 40 percent of GDP as the medium-term anchor, the authorities’ fiscal consolidation plan laid out in the 2025 budget and medium-term fiscal structural plan, in which the debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to continue to decline over the medium term, is consistent with maintaining debt at the anchor level.
- A net debt to GNI*-based anchor implies a greater consolidation effort because GNI* is significantly smaller than GDP as a denominator and the same shock to revenues has a larger impact on the debt ratio.
- With a risk tolerance of 10 percent, the GNI*-based net debt anchor is about 40 percent, which still provides a comfortable buffer relative to the 60 percent benchmark.
- To ensure net debt does not breach 60 percent of GNI* by 2030 with 90 percent probability, net debt would need to be brought down to around 36 percent of GNI*, compared to the current level of about 60 percent.

### Bottom-up (firm/sector) risk calibration and results
- Top 10 corporate taxpayers account for more than 50 percent of Ireland’s total CIT (IFAC 2023); income shocks or operational changes by these large taxpayers can significantly affect CIT receipts.
- Calibration approach:
  - Use Compustat firm-level data for the largest multinational companies in the chemical and IT sectors.
  - Estimate a historical distribution of firm profits over the past 3 decades to calibrate firm-specific profitability shocks for the top 10 CIT payers in Ireland.
  - Assume an exit rate of 5 percent per year to account for firm exits.
- Simulation findings:
  - Simulation results from the bottom-up approach are broadly in line with the top-down approach.
  - A gross debt to GDP ratio of 43 percent or below would ensure the probability of breaching the 60 percent benchmark by 2030 is no more than 10 percent.
  - Both macro panel data and firm-specific approaches suggest that a debt anchor set at 40 percent of GNI* (for net debt) would be prudent enough to ensure the EU benchmark is not breached in most scenarios.

### Expenditure growth scenarios and implications for debt trajectories
- The 5 percent annual nominal spending growth assumed in the baseline would ensure a downward path for debt over a ten-year period.
- A 6 -percent expenditure growth annually could still anchor debt over the medium term, although the debt trajectory would already begin to trend up toward the end of the simulation horizon.
- With higher spending growth rates, the debt trajectory trends upward sooner, implying such spending trajectories may not be compatible with long-term fiscal sustainability.
- In the very long term, even a 5-percent spending growth may not be sufficient for debt stabilization under the annual revenue growth assumption of 4.25 percent.

### Need for an operational rule and preference for expenditure rules
- A debt anchor alone is insufficient for effective fiscal management; it must be complemented by an operational rule (e.g., expenditure or fiscal balance rule) to guide short-term policy decisions and ensure compliance over time.
- Expenditure rules are usually considered more effective than budget balance or revenue rules because:
  - They are easier to monitor and enforce (governments have direct control on spending).
  - They allow automatic stabilizers to operate.
  - They are less vulnerable to overly optimistic revenue forecasts than balance-based rules.
- Design elements of effective expenditure rules include coverage, legal basis, monitoring, and consequences for non-compliance.

### Recommended operational design: multi-year expenditure ceilings and FRF calibration
- For Ireland, multi-year expenditure ceilings covering all institutions under the general government classification are appropriate.
- Expenditure ceilings can be informed by macroeconomic stability considerations and the debt anchor; ceilings help prevent procyclical spending in times of positive revenue shocks.
- Fiscal Reaction Function (FRF) framework:
  - Typical FRF: p_{t+1} = β0 p_t + β1 γ_t + β2 b_t, where p_t is the primary balance, γ_t is the output gap (or other cyclical measure), and b_t stands for public debt.
  - The FRF determines uniquely the expenditure trajectory for a given revenue path.
- Challenges in measuring the cyclical position in Ireland:
  - Estimating the output gap is demanding due to GDP distortions from large MNE activity.
  - GNI* is available only at annual frequency and with substantial delays.
  - Modified domestic demand focuses on domestic activity only and excludes external operations.
  - The unemployment gap is an alternative cyclical measure; natural unemployment is estimated using a two-state Markov switching model (Appendix I).

### FRF estimation, calibration and optimization results
- FRFs can be estimated econometrically or calibrated via theoretical frameworks; calibration is useful when historical data have limitations.
- Optimization techniques (including robust control) identify parameter values that align with policy objectives under uncertainty.
- Optimization-based results (net debt and GNI* using 2024 estimates from Budget 2025 as initial values):
  - Optimized FRFs stabilize debt at the anchor (assumed at 40 percent) and the unemployment gap at zero under plausible parameter assumptions.
  - Different methodologies imply varying speeds of adjustment but qualitatively similar paths: gradual unwinding of the primary surplus initially associated with negative unemployment gaps.
  - Average nominal expenditure growth rates implied:
    - Between 6 ¼ and 6 ½ percent in the first 5 years.
    - Around 5½ percent in the first 10 years.
  - After the initial period, FRFs prescribe expenditure growth at the same rate as nominal revenue.
  - Higher initial spending growth reflects the favorable current fiscal position and the trade-off between closing the unemployment gap and reducing the substantial primary surplus.
  - The size of the fiscal multiplier also affects the speed of adjustment.
  - The approach offers scope for stepped-up productive public investment in the initial period.

### Revenue shock scenario and use of fiscal buffers
- Illustrative shock: assume CIT windfall estimated at about 4.5 percent of GNI* disappears over three years, causing the revenue ratio to fall to about 38 percent and remain at that level.
- Two expenditure response scenarios:
  - Immediate adjustment to achieve the model-prescribed primary balance: nominal expenditure increases only between 1 and 3 ½ percent in the first three years, with growth rates catching up later.
  - Smoothing scenario: nominal expenditure grows at about 4 percent per annum in the adjustment period, postponing the time when debt reaches the anchor until toward the end of the simulation horizon.
- Use of financial assets (e.g., the two savings funds) is not included in the illustrative shock but could cushion the shock in initial years while still allowing the debt anchor to be achieved within a reasonable timeframe.

### Concluding recommendations and policy implications
- A prudent debt anchor combined with a net spending rule as an operational target is appropriate for Ireland’s circumstances.
- A debt anchor of about 40 percent provides a fiscal buffer to absorb economic shocks while maintaining a prudent level of indebtedness.
- Consider both gross debt to GDP and net debt to GNI* metrics; GNI* may be a more suitable denominator for defining fiscal anchors because it reflects the domestic economy's size more accurately.
- Operational rule in terms of expenditure (net of discretionary revenue measures) has advantages: limiting procyclicality, enhancing transparency, and facilitating monitoring and enforcement.
- Expenditure ceilings, informed by cyclical conditions and debt levels, would provide a stable and predictable framework.

### Additional design elements for a credible, flexible, and transparent fiscal framework
- Escape clause and triggering conditions:
  - Fiscal rules should have legislative status.
  - An escape clause should allow temporary deviations for exceptional circumstances with predefined, objective activation conditions.
- Correction mechanism:
  - Specify remedial actions if fiscal rules are breached (e.g., automatic spending adjustments or corrective budget plans).
- Independent fiscal oversight:
  - The Irish Fiscal Advisory Council should monitor compliance with fiscal rules, assess budget forecasts, and ensure fiscal credibility.
- Periodic review:
  - Regular reviews to recalibrate rules as macro-fiscal conditions and structures evolve.
- Link to annual budgets and MTFF:
  - Embed the fiscal rule in annual budgeting and align with the medium-term fiscal framework to ensure operational rule compliance implies the fiscal anchor is achieved.
- Integration of the two savings funds established in 2024—the Future Ireland Fund and the Infrastructure, Climate and Nature Fund—into the strengthened fiscal framework.

### Implementation choices for multi-year expenditure ceilings
- Nominal vs. real ceilings:
  - Nominal ceilings: simplicity and transparency but may fail in unstable inflationary environments.
  - Real ceilings: preserve purchasing power but require selection of an appropriate price index (e.g., HICP, CPI or GDP deflator).
- Levels vs. growth rates:
  - Growth-rate ceilings ease communication and provide continuity; with full compliance, equivalent to level-based ceilings.
  - If ceilings are breached, subsequent-year growth rates must adjust to stay on the fiscal path.
- Treatment of cyclical expenditure:
  - Automatic stabilizers (e.g., unemployment benefits) could be excluded from ceilings to preserve countercyclical capacity.
- Public investment:
  - Prefer overall expenditure ceilings with subceilings for current and capital spending rather than excluding public investment from ceilings.
  - Excluding public investment (a golden rule) is not recommended due to risks of creative accounting, low-return project selection, excessive borrowing, and weakened link to debt sustainability.
  - A slower adjustment toward the debt anchor could provide space for upfront growth-enhancing investment in a transparent manner.
- Link to financial assets:
  - Ireland has substantial financial assets (about 40 percent of GNI*); part is in cash instruments counted toward net debt under a net debt anchor, with a significant portion remaining outside the fiscal rule to serve as a buffer for future spending pressures (ageing, climate).
  - The two savings funds should play an important role in an integrated fiscal strategy.
- Notes on net worth targets:
  - Explicit net worth targets pose operational and conceptual challenges: volatility from discount-rate revisions, public comprehension difficulties, encouragement of borrowing for investment without quality safeguards, and nonfinancial assets' illiquidity limiting immediate financing use.

*Source: IMF staff summary of the content unit provided.*

### References

### References and Appendix I. Technical Appendix

### A. FDI Risks — Sample, Data, and Model
- Sample and data:
  - Cross-country panel dataset covering 212 countries and regions from 1990 to 2023.
  - Inward FDI stock data expressed in nominal US dollars from countries’ official external sector statistics.
  - Domestic macroeconomic and fiscal variables (GDP, GNI (GNI* for Ireland), GDP deflator, fiscal revenue, government spending, primary balance, gross domestic debt) sourced from the IMF’s WEO database; variables measured in current prices in local currency and deflated for model estimation.
  - A sample of small and open economies selected: countries in the 30th to 90th percentiles for GDP size and the 50th to 99th percentiles for openness (FDI-GDP ratio), resulting in a sample of 58 countries.
  - Country-level panel VAR(1) estimated for cyclical components of GNI and FDI after HP-filtering; notation: cyclical components denoted 푦푦푖푡∗ and 푖푖푖푡.
- Model structure and stationarity tests:
  - Each country has a fixed effect 푢푢푖 drawn from a Gaussian distribution; innovations 휖휖푖푡 allowed heteroskedasticity, assumed independent and Gaussian; common autoregression matrix 퐵 across countries.
  - Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) panel unit root test for FDI rejects the null that all countries’ FDI time series have unit roots; Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) test yields p-value 0.00 rejecting the null that all countries have unit roots.
  - Dickey-Fuller (DF) tests for individual countries: null of unit root rejected at the 95 percent confidence level for most countries.
  - Ireland may deviate: DF test fails to reject unit root for Ireland; one-off events (Global Financial Crisis, one-off transfer of intangible assets in 2015) can drive non-stationarity and require revisiting parameters when structural shifts occur.
- Translation from FDI to fiscal variables (second stage):
  - FDI assumed to translate to domestic production capital one-for-one (physical capital or intellectual property).
  - MNE production function: Cobb-Douglas 푌푖푡 = 퐴푖푡 퐾푖푡훼 퐿푖푡1−훼, with 훼 as capital income share (close to one for intellectual property).
  - Labor supply assumed perfectly elastic at fixed wage, matching increases in capital as FDI settles: Δ푦푖푡 = Δ푘푖푡 = Δ푙푖푡.
  - In monopolistic competition, profits proportional to output with margin determined by demand elasticity 휂>1: Δ휏푐 = Δ휋 = (1/휂) Δ푦 = (1/휂) Δ푘.
  - Personal income tax from MNE-related employment: Δ휏푝 = Δ푙 (elastic labor assumption).
  - Aggregate percentage change of corporate income taxes: Δ휏𝑐 = 푠𝑐,dom Δ휏𝑐,dom + (1/η) 푠𝑐,FDI Δ푘.
  - Aggregate percentage change of personal income taxes: Δ휏𝑝 = 푠𝑝,dom Δ휏𝑝,dom + 푠𝑝,FDI Δ푘.
  - Domestic firm CIT and PIT track GNI* one for one: Δ휏𝑝,dom = Δ휏𝑐,dom = Δ푦∗.
  - Total percentage change of fiscal revenue: Δ휏 = 휇 Δ휏𝑐 + (1−휇) Δ휏𝑝 = (휇 푠𝑐,dom + (1−휇) 푠𝑝,dom) Δ푦∗ + [휇(1/η) 푠𝑐,FDI + (1−휇) 푠𝑝,FDI] Δ푘, where 휇 is the share of tax revenue from corporate income.
  - Difference between GDP and GNI* assumed to be value added generated by MNEs’ operations; its growth tracks FDI growth: Δln(푌 − 푌∗) = Δ푘.
  - Government budget primary balance 푃퐵𝑡 = 푇𝑡 − 퐺𝑡; domestic debt evolves as 퐵𝑡 = (1 + 푅𝑡) 퐵𝑡−1 − 푃퐵𝑡.
- Parameter assumptions for simulations:
  - Add cyclical components from VAR(1) to pre-determined trends that assume a 2¼ percent real growth rate for GDP, GNI* and FDI stock.
  - Trend growth of real government spending assumed at 3 percent.
  - Interest rate for government debt and inflation both assumed to be 2 percent per annum.

### B. Concentration Risks — Firm Sample and Model
- Sample and data:
  - Firm data from Compustat: North America Fundamental Annual dataset for corporate financials and Index Monthly Prices for delisting information.
  - Selected top 100 US firms in tech and pharmaceutical industries (GIND codes 502030, 352020, 451030, 452020, 452010) in 1990 by average revenue in 1990.
  - Delisting treated: “bankruptcy” = bankrupt; “merger and acquisition” treated as survival over the whole sample period.
  - Collected top 10 MNEs’ revenue in Ireland in the base year from local sources; simulations assume a real log trend growth of 2¼ percent for all MNEs; other assumptions same as FDI risk model.
- Model specification:
  - Individual firm cyclical log revenue 푟푟푟푟 푣푣𝑖𝑡 and pre-tax income to revenue ratio 푝푝𝑖𝑡 jointly follow panel VAR(1): [푟푟푟푟 푣푣𝑖𝑡, 푝푝𝑖𝑡]′ = 푢𝑖 + 퐵 [푟푟푟푟 푣푣𝑖,𝑡−1, 푝푝𝑖,𝑡−1]′ + 휖𝑖𝑡.
  - Added independent Poisson exit process with constant arrival rate 휆 to capture firm exit risk; baseline matches average duration of top firms from 1990 to 2020.
  - Analytical expression for average duration with constant arrival rate 휆: E[min(T,30)] = (1/휆) [1 − r^(−30휆)] (as presented).
  - Baseline calibration: 휆 = 0.045 matches average duration of 17 years in the sample.
- Firm dynamics and simulations:
  - Historical evidence (top 52 firms since 1990) shows bankruptcy events distributed across 30 years with clustering in two major crises; bankruptcy more likely with revenue declines but some bankruptcies occur on rising revenue paths.
  - Top 10 MNEs contributed over 95 percent of total CIT from MNEs in Ireland.
  - Simulated firm pre-tax income for firm i: PPI_it = (pp̄_i + ppĭ_it) * rexp( rr̄v_it + rrv̆_it ) * resist_it, where pp̄_i is historical average pretax income to revenue ratio, rrv̄_it is pre-determined log trend, and resisit_it is survival indicator (survives with probability 1−휆 each period).
  - Aggregate MNE pre-tax income Π_t = sum_{i=1}^{10} PPI_it divided by the top 10 pre-tax income share in all MNEs in 2024.
  - Percentage changes of corporate income taxes under concentration risks: Δτ𝑐 = s𝑐,dom Δτ𝑐,dom + s𝑐,FDI Δπ_t; personal income taxes analogous.
- Alternative firm growth specification:
  - Firm-level revenue growth may have a unit root; alternative model assumes firm growth and income-to-revenue jointly follow VAR with unit-root dynamics, generating more extreme upside and downside risks, wider fan charts, and lower debt anchors due to asymmetry: declining MNE revenues both raise debt numerator and reduce GDP denominator, amplifying debt-to-GDP increases.

### C. Fiscal Reaction Function — Unemployment Gap Estimation
- Estimating natural rate of unemployment:
  - A simple Markov switching model with two states (“low” and “high” unemployment) is used for the note.
  - Observed unemployment u_t modeled as u_t = ū_{s_t} + ε_t, with ε_t ~ N(0, σ_{s_t}^2); ū_{s_t} takes two values u_0 and u_1 for low and high states.
  - Regime transitions governed by transition matrix P = [ [p_00, p_10], [1−p_00, 1−p_10] ].
  - The model yields a constant natural unemployment rate per regime; chosen for simplicity and communicability given alternation between stable low unemployment and crisis high unemployment periods.

*Source: References and Appendix I (Technical Appendix) of the provided IMF content unit.*

### 15.      The Markov switching model results suggest plausible estimates of equilibrium

### 15. The Markov switching model results suggest plausible estimates of equilibrium unemployment

### Markov-switching estimates of unemployment
- Low-unemployment state estimated at about 4 ¾ percent.
- High-unemployment state estimated at slightly over 10 ½ percent, with a large variance (model allows variances to switch).
- Transition matrix: 96 percent probability of staying in the low-unemployment regime in the next period if currently in that regime.
- Based on the probability plot (Figure 2), the economy has been in the low-unemployment regime since the recovery from the financial crisis, except for a short period during the Covid-19 pandemic.

### Unemployment gap and output implications
- Unemployment gap defined as u_t^� = u_t − u^s_t.
- Recently the unemployment gap has been negative in the range of -0.3 to -0.6 percentage points.
- Using Okun’s law with a coefficient of -0.3 (Conefrey et al., 2015), this translates into positive output gaps between 1 and 2 percent.

### Simple model of fiscal policy — structure and key relations
- Unemployment gap dynamics: u^�_{t+1} = ρ u^�_t + α η_t, where η_t is the fiscal impulse (change in cyclically adjusted balance as a ratio to potential output Y^_t) and ρ is autoregressive parameter.
- Cyclically adjusted balance constructed assuming revenue elasticity = 1 and expenditure elasticity = 0; cyclical component P_t^c = τ γ_t Y^_t with τ the (assumed relatively constant) revenue to GDP ratio and γ_t the output gap.
- Fiscal impulse: η_t := Δ p^c_{t+1} = p^c_{t+1} − p^c_t.
- Debt evolution (relative to potential output): b_{t+1} = ((1+r)/(1+g)) p_t b_t − p_{t+1}, where r and g denote interest rate and potential growth rate respectively.
- Combined state-space representation yields y_{t+1} = A y_t + B η_t + C v_t with additive disturbance vector v_t capturing uncertainty and measurement errors.

### Calibration and parameter choices for scenarios
- Autoregressive coefficient for the unemployment gap ρ fixed at 0.72.
- Fiscal multiplier for unemployment α set at 0.2 (an OLS estimate and half of Monacelli et al. (2010) value).
- Okun’s law parameter fixed at -0.3 (Conefrey et al., 2015).
- Nominal potential growth and interest rate assumed to be 4 ¼ and 2 ½ percent respectively (2 ½ percent real potential growth, 2 percent inflation and 0.5 percent equilibrium real interest rate).
- Tax to GNI ratio set at 43 percent.
- Weights in objective function: weight on unemployment gap = 1; weight on fiscal impulse (control) = 10; weight on debt anchor = 0.5 in baseline.

### Fiscal reaction functions (FRFs) — baseline and alternatives
- Baseline FRF (solution to the optimal control problem with stated parameters):
  - p_{t+1} = −0.43 u^�_t − 0.57 (p_t − p̄) + 0.15 (b_t − b̄)
- Alternative FRFs (coefficients shown as triple for [unemployment gap, primary balance deviation, debt deviation]):
  - Debt weight of 1: −0.46, −0.65, 0.21
  - Debt weight of 0.1: −0.36, −0.40, 0.07
  - Multiplier of 0.4: −0.56, −0.68, 0.15
- Interpretation: the rule prescribes fiscal tightening (increase in primary balance) when the unemployment gap is negative (positive output gap) and when debt is above the target.

### Optimal trajectories and fiscal implications
- Implementing the baseline FRF stabilizes variables at target levels.
- Primary surpluses need to be maintained for the first 5 years to allow net debt to converge to the desired level; surpluses decline gradually, allowing initially room for higher spending under the constant revenue-to-GDP assumption.
- Expenditure growth implications under the optimal PB:
  - Expenditure can increase at an average rate of about 6.2 percent in the first 5 years.
  - Expenditure can increase at an average rate of about 5.4 percent in the first 10 years.
  - Eventually, expenditure growth should converge to 4 ¼ percent in line with the potential growth rate.

### Sensitivity analysis
- Varying the debt weight and fiscal multiplier:
  - Increasing debt weight to 1 strengthens the FRF response to debt deviations.
  - Increasing the fiscal multiplier to 0.4 increases the response to the unemployment gap; reaction to debt remains similar to baseline.
  - Differences in average expenditure growth rates in the first 5 years under alternative assumptions are less than 0.5 ppts; differences essentially disappear over a 10-year horizon.

### Robustness to uncertainty — minimax and robust stabilization approaches
- Minimax optimal approach (Hansen and Sargent (2008) style) adds a robustness preference term; threshold for new parameter θ is around 62 and θ = 70 used in simulations.
  - Minimax FRF: p_{t+1} = −0.73 u^�_t − 1.09 (p_t − p̄) + 0.29 (b_t − b̄)
  - Implementing minimax rule suggests average expenditure growth of about 6 .3 and 5. 3 percent in the first 5 and 10 years, respectively.
- Robust stabilization approach (invariant set / feedback rule, ellipsoidal disturbance sets):
  - Error set calibrated to persistent shocks of around 0.75 ppts in the unemployment equation and around 0.5 ppts in the debt equation in absolute value.
  - Example initial condition: (-0.3 percent unemployment gap and 53.5 percent net debt to GNI*). Applying the robust FRF steers the system to the invariant set and keeps the state close to equilibrium despite additive disturbances.
  - Robust FRF allowing for parametric uncertainty (e.g., a drop in τ from 43 percent to about 38 percent) yields:
    - p_{t+1} = −0.53 u^�_t − 0.89 (p_t − p̄) + 0.28 (b_t − b̄)
  - Robust stabilizing rule implies average expenditure growth similar to other rules:
    - 6.4 percent in the first 5 years and 5.4 percent in the first 10 years.

### Scenario: parametric uncertainty and tax ratio shock
- Modeling parametric uncertainty as alternative system matrices A_i differing in τ to represent a scenario where windfall CIT from MNEs disappears and tax ratio drops from 43 percent to about 38 percent.
- The resulting FRF under this two-model framework is the robust FRF above (−0.53, −0.89, 0.28).

*Source: IMF staff calculations*

### 3.      Deglobalization poses threats to the Irish economic model. Ireland has benefitted

### 3.      Deglobalization poses threats to the Irish economic model.

### Overview
- Ireland has benefitted significantly from international economic integration, with free trade and foreign investment underpinning remarkable growth and improvements in the standard of living.
- A retreat from globalization would represent a serious headwind for the Irish economy because of high dependence on export-oriented activities dominated by a small number of multinational enterprises (MNEs).
- Financial fragmentation could affect cross-border investment, international payment systems, and asset prices; Ireland’s large financial sector is mostly externally-oriented but has important domestic linkages through lending by non-banks, investment in real estate, and an ecosystem of supporting firms (legal, accounting, IT).

### Channels of impact and scenarios analyzed
- Three main sources of risk assessed:
  - (i) reduced access to critical imported inputs;
  - (ii) increased import tariffs in key trading partners; and
  - (iii) relocation of FDI, especially intangible capital, by MNEs as a result of corporate restructuring (e.g., induced by trade or tax policies).
- Quantitative framework and scenarios:
  - Scenario 1 (relatively benign): “High-risk” countries are those that did not support United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/6 on peace in Ukraine.
  - Scenario 2 (adverse): every country outside of the EU is considered “high-risk”.
  - A model based on a Cobb-Douglas production function with a CES aggregate of FD and non-FD products is used to estimate impacts; elasticities of substitution between FD and non-FD inputs are central parameters.

### Openness and integration: key statistics and concentrations
- Exports and imports of goods and services exceeded 250 percent of GDP in 2024.
- Almost two-thirds of domestic value added is being exported.
- Foreign-owned firms accounted for 31 percent of NNP and 36 percent of wages in 2022.
- Sectoral and geographic concentration:
  - Pharmaceuticals and organic chemical products comprise over half of Irish goods exports.
  - Computer services account for more than half of services exports.
  - About 40 percent of goods exports go to EU countries and close to 30 percent to the US.
  - Services imports are dominated by the US (about 50 percent of total), mostly royalties and licensing fees related to the use of IP.

### Foreign-dependent (FD) goods and services: identification and exposure
- FD products are identified by indicators: (i) concentration of EU imports from extra EU sources; (ii) importance of extra EU imports in total demand; (iii) substitutability of extra EU imports with EU production.
- In 2022:
  - imports of foreign dependent goods comprised about 3.5 percent of the total Irish imports.
  - There were about 200 FD products (at the HS6 level), the largest being imports of medicaments not packaged for retail sale.
  - Only three categories of services could be classified as foreign-dependent, but their import value is significantly bigger—about half of all imports—driven by licences for use of R&D.
  - The vast majority of FD services imports originates from the US; the share of FD services coming from “high-risk” countries is negligible in Scenario 1 and close to one in Scenario 2.
  - For FD goods, FD products from “high-risk” countries account for about 16 percent of total in Scenario 1 and 90 percent in Scenario 2.

### Model results: impacts of reduced access to FD inputs
- Elasticity of substitution between FD and non-FD inputs is a key driver; literature values vary widely (near 0 in short run up to 1 or higher in the long run), with more typical values around 0.2–0.5.
- Illustrative outcomes:
  - A 50 percent reduction of imports of FD goods and services could cause a contraction of total value added in Ireland of about 2 percent with elasticity of substitution of 0.02 under Scenario 1.
  - The same 50 percent reduction would lead to less than ½ percent decline for elasticity in the range of 0.1–0.2.
  - The impact is highly non-linear: a 75 percent reduction results in almost 5 percent decline in value added (illustrative).
- Sectoral heterogeneity:
  - Manufacture of refined petroleum suffers the largest drop in value added in both scenarios (especially when elasticity is low), but its low weight in value added means limited aggregate contribution.
  - Construction and manufacture of computers have large contributions to aggregate decline in some scenarios.
  - In Scenario 2, main drivers of value-added contraction include manufacture of pharmaceuticals, publishing activities (includes software publishing) and air transport, reflecting dependence on imported inputs from the US.

### Role of FDI, MNEs, and geopolitical vulnerability
- Ireland has attracted sizeable FDI, concentrated in pharmaceuticals, financial services, and information and communication; large MNEs have strong employment, gross value added, and tax revenue contributions.
- Reliance on FDI exposes Ireland to geopolitical risks.
- A geopolitical index constructed using “ideal point distance” of UNGA voting is used to capture vulnerability: Ireland has one of the highest geopolitical indices among EU countries, reflecting large shares of investment from the US and greater geopolitical distance relative to intra-EU investor-host distances.
- Exposure to geopolitical risks is thus a function of both geographic concentration and geopolitical differences.

### Key quantitative takeaways (selected)
- Exports and imports > 250 percent of GDP (2024).
- Almost two-thirds of domestic value added exported.
- Foreign-owned firms: 31 percent of NNP and 36 percent of wages (2022).
- Imports of FD goods ≈ 3.5 percent of total Irish imports (2022).
- FD services imports value ≈ half of all imports (driven by licences for use of R&D).
- FD goods from “high-risk” countries: ≈ 16 percent (Scenario 1) and ≈ 90 percent (Scenario 2).
- Illustrative macro impacts:
  - 50 percent FD input reduction → ≈ 2 percent decline in value added (elasticity = 0.02, Scenario 1).
  - 50 percent FD input reduction → < ½ percent decline in value added (elasticity in 0.1–0.2).
  - 75 percent FD input reduction → almost 5 percent decline in value added.

*Source: IMF staff calculations and analysis as presented in the chapter "Deglobalization poses threats to the Irish economic model."*

### 15.      MNE activities in Ireland exhibit high sectoral and geographical concentration. OECD’s

### 15.      MNE activities in Ireland exhibit high sectoral and geographical concentration.

### Sectoral and Geographic Concentration of MNEs
- OECD’s Analytical Activities of MNEs (AMNE) database classifies firms into three types: (i) foreign affiliates (firms with at least 50 percent foreign ownership), (ii) domestic MNEs (domestic firms with foreign affiliates), and (iii) domestic firms not engaged in international investment.
- MNE activities are highly concentrated as reflected in both the sectoral and geographic distribution of the controlling entities, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).
- OECD’s Multinational Enterprises and Global Value Chains dataset (combining AMNE with TiVA and OECD ICIO) enables value-added analysis of MNE activities.
- Data indicate high sectoral exposure to US MNEs in key Irish sectors:
  - In the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, US MNEs contribute 73 percent of value added in the sector, while MNEs from other countries collectively account for another 12 percent.
  - In IT services, US MNEs generate 85 percent of value added.
  - In IT manufacturing, US MNEs generate 66 percent of value added.
- The high dependence on US MNEs increases Ireland’s vulnerability to shocks that could slow, halt, or reverse foreign direct investment from these companies.

### General Equilibrium Analysis (BHLP model)
- A general equilibrium framework is applied to capture spillovers across sectors and provide a more complete account of impacts of various GEF scenarios.
- The model adopted is from Huo, Levchenko, and Pandalai-Nayar (2019), Bonadio et al. (2021), and Bonadio et al. (2023) (BHLP model).
- Key features:
  - (i) Labor supply formulation that incorporates traditional trade theories (fixed total labor supply fully mobile across sectors) and business cycle theories (flexible total labor supply), along with intermediate options.
  - (ii) A nested CES structure for both final and intermediate goods bundles, differentiating elasticities of substitution among inputs and across sourcing countries for identical inputs (Armington assumption).
  - Firms operate competitively and employ constant return to scale (CRS) technologies, using domestic labor supply and intermediate inputs aggregated from various sourcing countries.
- Model limitations:
  - No capital and no role for uncertainty.
  - Magnitude of impacts depends on calibrated trade elasticities.
  - Results should be interpreted as long run given absence of frictions other than trade costs.

### Calibration and Model Assumptions
- The Multinational Enterprises and Global Value Chains dataset is used to distinguish domestic- and foreign-owned firms in inter-country input-output tables.
- Frisch labor supply elasticity set to 2.8 (following Chetty et al. (2011)).
- Sectoral labor supply elasticity set to 1.5 (following Galle, Rodríguez-Clare, and Yi (2023)).
- Elasticity of substitution of intermediate inputs across sectors assumed to be 0.2.
- Global economy divided into seven blocks: indigenous Irish firms, foreign-owned firms operating in Ireland, the rest of the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the rest of the world, with 41 economic sectors each.
- For this analysis, revenue from tariffs is ignored.

### Scenarios Simulated
- Two scenarios of main interest:
  - Higher import tariffs leading to an increase in trading costs. Underlying assumptions broadly consistent with tariff announcements as of mid-April 2025:
    - 145 percent tariff on US imports from China.
    - 125 percent tariff on Chinese imports from the US.
    - 25 percent tariff on US imports of automobiles.
    - 10 percent tariff on US imports of all other goods, except for pharmaceuticals and electronics which are exempt.
  - Relocation of FDI resulting in a decline of the FDI stock in Ireland. Illustrative scenario:
    - 50 percent decrease in the stock of FDI in the ICT services sector.
    - Since there is no capital in the model, this shock is represented as a 30 percent drop in productivity.
    - Note: Assuming a share of capital of 60 percent in a Cobb-Douglas production function, the 30 percent drop in productivity is equivalent to 50 percent decline in capital.

### Simulation Results
- Tariff scenario:
  - Value added of indigenous sectors declines by 0.4 percent.
  - Value added of MNE-dominated sectors declines by 1 percent.
  - Largest losses in manufacture of pharmaceuticals, agriculture, foods and beverages, and computer and electronics sectors.
  - Pharmaceuticals and electronics are exempt from tariffs in this scenario, but demand for these products declines due to weaker growth in key trading partners after the tariff shock.
  - Declines are generally larger in the foreign-dominated sector which is mostly externally-oriented.
  - Model excludes capital, so results do not capture effects from possible lower future investment or the impact of higher levels of uncertainty.
  - In a dynamic setting, assuming a 10 percent bilateral tariff on all goods, including pharmaceuticals and electronics, Egan and Roche (2025) estimate a negative impact on Irish GDP of about 2½ percent after seven years.
- FDI relocation scenario (50 percent reduction in the FDI stock in ICT services; simulated as 30 percent productivity shock):
  - Foreign-dominated ICT services sector would face a 25 percent drop in value added.
  - Indigenous ICT services segment declines by 0.7 percent.
  - Outcomes suggest relatively limited spillovers, reflecting the assumption of no labor reallocation between the two segments.
  - Decline in GDP is primarily driven by the ICT services sector where the FDI relocation is assumed to occur.
  - Indigenous ICT services sector may increase due to substitution effects given the substantial decline in the foreign-owned segment.
  - Most other sectors experience modest and relatively homogeneous contractions for non-ICT related foreign-owned industries due to an overall drop in demand from loss of income in the ICT sector.
  - Model-based results reported in terms of value added; in Ireland, modified gross national income (GNI*) and modified domestic demand (MDD) are more relevant measures of domestic economic performance.
  - A sizeable decline in value added generated in the foreign-owned sector may have limited impact on these metrics.
  - Model excludes a fiscal sector and does not capture negative spillovers to corporate income tax revenue; lower gross value added would likely reduce corporate income tax collections, particularly windfalls not explained by domestic fundamentals.

### Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
- Geoeconomic fragmentation (GEF) poses potential challenges to the Irish economic model reliant on free trade and investment.
- Identified channels through which GEF could impact the Irish economy:
  - Access to critical imported inputs.
  - Increased tariffs by key trading partners.
  - Relocation of FDI by multinational enterprises.
- Aggregate output losses from higher tariffs and trade disruptions appear manageable, but sectoral disparities indicate certain industries may face significant disruptions.
- Potential relocation of FDI could lead to sizeable declines in gross value added in affected sectors and corporate income tax revenues with broader reverberations.
- Policy recommendations:
  - Build fiscal buffers in good times to mitigate potential declines in fiscal revenue and allow flexible response to economic fluctuations.
  - Use buffers to provide focused support facilitating smoother resource reallocations in affected sectors.
  - Promote linkages between dynamic MNEs and the domestic economy (e.g., through innovation cooperation) and improve infrastructure to bolster competitiveness and resilience.
  - Continue to engage in the EU to further strengthen the single market, including advancing the Savings and Investments Union.
- Example of existing collaboration: The Tyndall National Institute brings together leading global companies and Irish SMEs in semiconductors technology and related areas, promoting startups and facilitating creation of high value-added jobs.

*Source: IMF staff calculations and OECD’s Multinational enterprises and global value chains dataset (as presented in the provided content).*

### Annex I. NACE Rev. 2 Industries and Codes

### Annex I. NACE Rev. 2 Industries and Codes

### NACE Rev. 2 Industries and Codes (Table 1)
- CodeLabel
- A01 Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities
- A02 Forestry and logging
- A03 Fishing and aquaculture
- B Mining and quarrying
- C10T12 Manufacture of food products; beverages and tobacco products
- C13T15 Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products
- C16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
- C17 Manufacture of paper and paper products
- C18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media
- C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products
- C20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
- C21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations
- C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
- C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
- C24 Manufacture of basic metals
- C25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
- C26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
- C27 Manufacture of electrical equipment
- C28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
- C29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
- C30 Manufacture of other transport equipment
- C31_32 Manufacture of furniture; other manufacturing
- C33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment
- D35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
- E36 Water collection, treatment and supply
- E37T39 Sewerage, waste management, remediation activities
- F Construction
- G45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
- G46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
- G47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
- H49 Land transport and transport via pipelines
- H50 Water transport
- H51 Air transport
- H52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation
- H53 Postal and courier activities
- I Accommodation and food service activities
- J58 Publishing activities
- J59_60 Motion picture, video, television programme production; programming and broadcasting activities
- J61 Telecommunications
- J62_63 Computer programming, consultancy, and information service activities
- K64 Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding
- K65 Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
- K66 Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities
- L Real estate activities
- M69_70 Legal and accounting activities; activities of head offices; management consultancy activities
- M71 Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis
- M72 Scientific research and development
- M73 Advertising and market research
- M74_75 Other professional, scientific and technical activities; veterinary activities
- N77 Rental and leasing activities
- N78 Employment activities
- N79 Travel agency, tour operator and other reservation service and related activities
- N80T82 Security and investigation, service and landscape, office administrative and support activities
- O84 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security
- P85 Education
- Q86 Human health activities
- Q87_88 Residential care activities and social work activities without accommodation
- R90T92 Creative, arts and entertainment activities; libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities; gambling and betting activities
- R93 Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities
- S94 Activities of membership organisations
- S95 Repair of computers and personal and household goods
- S96 Other personal service activities
- T Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities of households for own use
- U Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies

### Benchmarking public spending efficiency — overview
- Objective:
  - Benchmark Ireland’s public spending efficiency in infrastructure, health, and education using a variety of indicators and map efficiency frontiers using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method.
- Key high-level findings:
  - Ireland is at the efficiency frontier for education spending.
  - There is room for potential gains in efficiency for public spending on health and infrastructure.
  - Achieving these gains could create further fiscal space to improve Ireland’s buffers for shocks.
- Context and motivation:
  - Total public spending, at 40 percent of GNI* in 2023, has been below the median of EU peers.
  - Health spending is an exception, being at the top range of euro area peers as a share of GNI*; education is at the median.
  - Health spending has consistently grown faster than total spending; comparability limitations exist because health spending in Ireland may capture some social spending.
- Peer groups and comparators:
  - Individual country comparators: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
  - Broader peer groupings used, subject to data availability: EU and the OECD.
- Methodology — Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA):
  - DEA is a non-parametric statistical technique that constructs an “efficiency frontier” representing the maximum possible output for a given input.
  - DEA indicates the relative “distance” a country is from the maximum possible output given inputs; it does not impose a functional form or provide marginal output changes for marginal input changes.
  - Analysis uses various measures of public spending per capita as inputs and sectoral outputs/outcomes as outputs.
  - For health and education, outcome indicators were used instead of outputs to better capture quality and effectiveness.

### Infrastructure — findings and metrics
- Infrastructure gap and rankings:
  - Relative to the frontier, Ireland faces a physical infrastructure gap of 32 percent and a quality gap of 27 percent.
  - IMF Tool for Investment and Efficiency (2021) — Ireland’s gap: 32 percent (physical) vs global average gap of 38 percent, European Union 21 percent, peer comparators 25 percent.
  - On quality of infrastructure, Ireland’s gap is 27 percent vs global average gap of 22 percent, EU 15 percent, and peer comparators 8 percent.
  - IMD World Competitiveness index 2024: Ireland ranks 4th out of 67 countries overall, but 17th for infrastructure provision and 38th for basic infrastructure.
  - IFAC finds infrastructure per capita in Ireland and capital stock to national income to be around 25 percent and 20 percent below the average for a high-income European country, respectively.
- Investment and spending trends:
  - General government spending on gross fixed capital formation is at about 4 percent of GNI* in 2023 and is catching up to the pre-crisis average.
  - The Irish government has outlined a commitment of €165 billion in capital investment over the period of 2021–2030 through the National Development Plan.
  - Priority sectors in the Programme for Government include housing, water, energy, and transport.
- Investment efficiency:
  - Using physical infrastructure and quality indicators as outputs mapped against public capital stock shows Ireland sits below the investment efficiency frontier in both measures of quality and quantity of infrastructure, suggesting potential efficiency gains.
  - An alternate measure using the Global Infrastructure Quality Index (2023) yielded similar results.
- Institutional and policy developments:
  - Notable advancements since the 2017 Public Investment Management Assessment (PIMA) include alignment of investment and planning through the National Development Plan and Investment Framework, establishment of the National Investment Office, and implementation of annual spending reviews to reallocate resources within current expenditures.

*Source: 1irlea2025002-print-pdf - Annex I. NACE Rev. 2 Industries and Codes*

### introduction of the investment project tracker has played a crucial role in improving transparency

### introduction of the investment project tracker has played a crucial role in improving transparency

### Infrastructure
- The introduction of the investment project tracker has played a crucial role in improving transparency and monitoring of expenditures.
- Key challenges in effective delivery of infrastructure:
  - Planning delays.
  - Low construction productivity, including the need to utilize modern methods of construction.
  - Labor shortages in the construction sector.
- Continued efforts are warranted to address concerns on:
  - The planning process.
  - Project prioritization.
  - Construction sector productivity.
  - Labor shortages in the sector.

### Health: outcomes, capacity, spending, and efficiency
- Outcomes and population health:
  - Health-adjusted life expectancy (HALE) at birth: 70 years old.
  - HALE increased from 66.25 in 2001 to 70.
  - Prior to the pandemic, Ireland’s life expectancy increased by more than the EU average; during the pandemic its decline was comparatively smaller (OECD, 2023).
  - Overall age-adjusted mortality rates and those from preventable and treatable causes are consistently lower than the EU average.
  - Self-reported health status is the highest in the EU, but masks widening differences between socio-economic groups.
    - In 2022, 90 percent of adults in the highest income quintile reported being in good health, relative to 66 percent in the lowest quintile; the gap is slightly larger than the EU and has increased compared to 2019.
  - In old age, both Irish men and women are likely to lead longer and healthier lives with a lower prevalence of health-related activity limitations relative to the EU average.
- Capacity constraints and service delivery:
  - Extensive waitlists at public hospitals are the main reason for unmet needs for medical care, compounded by the pandemic backlog.
  - A deficit in bed capacity is likely the key reason for overcrowding in public hospitals.
  - Public hospital beds per capita were at undercapacity in 2022, significantly lower than the EU average, with high occupancy rates above the recommended threshold.
    - Acute care hospital beds operated at 90 percent occupancy, above the recommended threshold of 85 percent for maintaining an emergency buffer (OECD, 2023).
  - The provided data does not yet reflect the increase in acute beds by the government in recent years, with further plans for expansion.
    - Since 2020, an additional 1,218 in-patient acute beds have been added.
    - In May 2024, the government announced the Acute Inpatient Hospital Bed Expansion Plan, which aims to deliver 4,367 acute hospital in-patient beds by 2031.
  - Hospitalization rates for avoidable diseases such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) are relatively high, indicating an underdeveloped primary care system.
  - Recruitment and retention challenges persist, particularly doctor shortages in certain specializations despite relatively high production of medical graduates per capita compared to the EU (OECD, 2023).
- Health expenditures:
  - Health expenditures in Ireland are high overall, considering its relatively young population.
    - Current age structure statistics: 26 percent share of population below age 20; median age 38.8; 15 percent share of population aged 65 and above (comparative statements).
  - Across several metrics, spending on health is elevated relative to comparators, OECD and EU peers, though partly reflecting inclusion of some social care components of long-term care expenditure in health spending (OECD, 2025).
  - Public sources account for two-thirds of total health spending in Ireland.
  - Health spending as a share of government expenditure rose from 19.6 percent in 2019 to almost 23 percent in 2023.
  - Drivers of elevated spending may include:
    - A hospital-based system.
    - Relatively out-of-date clinical infrastructure from a legacy of past underinvestment.
    - Reliance on more costly agency staff given hiring and retention challenges.
    - High general wage levels in the health sector (Sicari and Sutherland, 2023; IFAC, 2024; OECD, 2022 and 2025; Wren and Fitzpatrick, 2020).
- Expenditure overruns and drivers:
  - Between 2016 to 2022, all acute hospitals exceeded their annual budget and costs rose disproportionately.
    - Inflation-adjusted rise in costs: 45 percent.
    - Increase in activity: 3.8 percent (IGEES, 2024).
    - Total nominal increase of expenditure was 68 percent in 2016–2022.
    - Average budget variance of the acute hospitals: 10.8 percent.
  - The wage bill accounted for two-thirds of the rise of total expenditure, reflecting pay increases, an expanded workforce, a higher share of consultants, and more use of agency staff and overtime.
  - Non-pay expenditure has also risen, particularly non-clinical expenditure that were out of line with general trends.
  - Forecasts for health system spending do not sufficiently account for costs of maintaining the existing level of service delivery, resulting in below-adequate allocations (IFAC, 2023).
- Potential efficiency gains:
  - Efficiency frontier analysis using HALE as output and current health expenditure per capita in PPP terms as input suggests room for substantial efficiency gains.
  - An OECD study (Sicari and Sutherland, 2023) suggests estimated potential efficiency gains could be as large as:
    - 15 percent on the input dimension (saving up to 15 percent of current health expenditures, while maintaining unchanged life expectancy).
    - 1 percent on the output dimension (increase life expectancy by around 1 percent while keeping level of spending constant, but adjusting composition to OECD best practice).
- Fiscal and future demand pressures:
  - The healthcare system will need to confront future demands from population growth and aging, and pharmaceutical cost pressures.
  - The European Commission projects baseline public expenditure health costs to grow by 1.5 percentage points of GDP between 2022 and 2070, the second largest increase at the EU level.
    - Under a risk scenario, the projected rise is 2.5 percentage points of GDP.
  - Share of population aged 65 and older is projected to almost double from 15 percent in 2022 to 29 percent in 2070; old-age dependency ratio projected to more than double to 56 percent in 2070 from 26 percent in 2022 (Ageing Report for Ireland, European Commission, 2024).
- Policy implications and recommendations for health:
  - Improve forecasting and budgeting to better anticipate costs of maintaining service delivery.
  - Address recruitment and retention challenges to reduce reliance on locum/agency staff and overtime.
  - Target efficiency improvements identified by efficiency frontier analyses and OECD recommendations to realize potential savings of up to 15 percent of current health expenditures.

### Education: outcomes, spending, and efficiency
- Outcomes and attainment:
  - Ireland has strong educational outcome indicators relative to peers.
  - School enrollment rates are high, with near-universal enrollment for 5–14-year-olds.
  - Share of 25–34-year-olds without upper secondary educational attainment: 5 percent, below the OECD average by a large margin.
  - Student performance (PISA 2022) has increased over time in Reading and Science and is higher than comparators, as well as EU and OECD averages, across all categories.
- Spending and efficiency:
  - Public expenditure on education is comparable to or lower than peer averages across different metrics.
  - Government spending per student is lower than comparator peers across all levels of education.
  - Public spending efficiency on education is at or close to the frontier when mapping PISA scores and education spending per student (USD,PPP or as a share of GNI* per capita).
  - Ireland has attained satisfactory outcomes at relative cost-effectiveness across different education levels.
- Skills and labor market alignment issues:
  - Identified disconnects between tertiary education and labor market needs:
    - Skill mismatches in the labor market.
    - High rates of overqualification.
    - Lack of digital and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) skills.
- Policy implications and recommendations for education:
  - Continue investment in education to maintain competitiveness and the skilled labor force.
  - Strengthen alignment between tertiary education outputs and labor market demand, with emphasis on digital and STEM skills.

### Concluding remarks and fiscal implications
- Summary of public spending efficiency opportunities:
  - Infrastructure: Gaps remain in both stock and quality output indicators, and in investment efficiency; address planning, prioritization, construction productivity, and labor shortages.
  - Health: Positive outcomes but challenges with long waitlists, high occupancy rates, staff recruitment and retention; high spending and persistent budget overruns point to potential gains in spending efficiency.
  - Education: Outcome indicators are strong and outperform peers; public spending efficiency is at or close to the frontier, but tertiary-labor market disconnects remain.
- Fiscal context and recommendations:
  - In a high global economic uncertainty environment, spending efficiency improvements could help improve Ireland’s fiscal buffers for shocks.
  - Improved public spending efficiency could create additional fiscal space to increase capital expenditure to meet infrastructure needs.
  - More efficient spending in health will enable continued high levels of service delivery amid growing demands.
  - Staying at the frontier for education spending is critical to preserve the skilled labor force that underpins Ireland’s competitiveness.

*Source: 1irlea2025002-print-pdf - introduction of the investment project tracker has played a crucial role in improving transparency*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1irlea2025002-print-pdf.pdf_
