## 1. Adverse Macroeconomic Scenarios and Contingency Policies for Korea

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### Context and structural priorities
- Accommodative policies are offsetting an economic slowdown amid increased domestic political and global trade policy uncertainties.
- Key structural reform priorities:
  - Raising productivity.
  - Addressing demographic headwinds.
  - Improving capital allocation.
  - Addressing structural impediments to stronger domestic demand and reducing export-related vulnerabilities.
- Authorities’ structural reforms agenda guided by the Economic Growth Strategy (EGS); parliamentary majority expected to accelerate implementation.

### Recent macro developments
- Growth and inflation:
  - Growth: 2 percent in 2024; 2025Q1 outturn -0.2 percent (q/q); 2025Q2 = 0.7 percent (q/q).
  - Inflation: headline 2.1 percent y/y and core 2 percent y/y in September 2025 (close to 2 percent target).
  - Bank of Korea policy: easing cycle started October 2024; policy rate cut by 100 basis points total to 2.5 percent as of May 2025.
  - Real neutral interest rate estimate (as of 2024-Q1): -0.2 to 1.3 percent (Bank of Korea Working Paper No. 2024-13).
  - Minimum wage increase for 2026: 2.9 percent.
- External sector and FX:
  - Exports flat in 2025H1; semiconductor export volumes strong while other items declined.
  - Imports declined by 0.5 percent (y/y) up to 2025Q3.
  - Real effective exchange rate: depreciated by 4.4 percent through August 2025 relative to 2024.
  - Authorities’ spot FX market net sales: US$3.8 billion in 2025H1.
- Korea–U.S. trade developments (July 2025):
  - U.S. imposed a 15 percent tariff on most U.S. imports from Korea; effective U.S. tariff rate on Korean imports estimated at 15.9 percent (IMF staff estimate based on WTO data).
  - Parts of deal (US$350 billion in U.S. investments and US$100 billion LNG/energy purchases) remain under discussion.
- Fiscal and budgetary:
  - Two stimulus packages totaling KRW 30 trillion (1.2 percent of GDP) approved May and July 2025; second includes temporary universal cash transfer program (0.5 percent of GDP).
  - Tax revenue improved in 2025H1 to 7.3 from 7 percent of GDP last year; slower growth expected to reduce 2025 tax revenues by 0.4 percent of GDP versus budget.
  - Central government deficit projected to widen to 2.4 percent in 2025; managed deficit 4.5 percent; cyclically adjusted primary deficit 1.3 percent (vs 0.3 percent before stimulus).
  - 2026 draft budget: fiscal deficit 2 percent of GDP; managed deficit 4.0 percent of GDP.
  - Draft allocates 2.6 percent of GDP to the ultra-innovative economy initiative and 1.3 percent of GDP to R&D in high-tech sectors.
  - Selective cuts in non-core spending (1 percent of GDP) and increased tax/non-tax revenues (0.8 percent of GDP) expected to keep deficit below 3 percent of GDP.
- Financial sector and housing:
  - Private credit-to-GDP around 200 percent of GDP by end-2024; declining since 2023.
  - About half of private credit concentrated in real estate and construction.
  - Housing price-to-income ratio Seoul: 10.1 in 2025Q1 (about 10 percent above long-term average); nationwide ratio 3.9 in 2025Q1 (slightly below long-term average) (KREB).
  - Household loan growth accelerated in late 2025Q2 driven by housing transactions and rising Seoul prices.
  - Targeted macroprudential measures introduced June and September 2025; five-year supply plan for Seoul MET announced.
  - Real estate PF: as of end-June 2025, 52 percent of unviable projects restructured or liquidated; unresolved unviable PF ≈ 0.5 percent of GDP.
  - NPL growth slowed but remains high in NBFIs (mutual credit cooperatives and savings banks).

### Outlook and risks
- Growth projections:
  - Annual growth: 0.9 percent in 2025; rebound to 1.8 percent in 2026.
  - Output gap: widen to -1.1 percent in 2025, then gradually close.
- Inflation projections:
  - Headline inflation: average 2.0 percent in 2025 and 1.8 percent in 2026.
  - Core inflation: average 1.9 percent in both 2025 and 2026.
  - Medium-term: inflation around 2 percent.
- Fiscal outlook:
  - Fiscal impulse in 2025: 0.6 percent (vs -0.6 percent in the budget).
  - Fiscal deficit projected 2.3 percent of GDP in 2026 thanks to higher revenue; fiscal impulse -0.2 percent.
  - Authorities’ 2026–2029 plan: revenue up 1.2 percent of GDP; consolidated fiscal deficit ~2.0–2.3 percent of GDP; managed deficit >4.0 percent of GDP by 2029.
  - Central government debt: projected 48 percent of GDP in 2025 rising to 59 percent of GDP by 2030.
- Current account:
  - CA surplus projected to decrease temporarily; medium term expected to rise to 4.7 percent of GDP.
- Risk assessment (tilted to the downside):
  - Prolonged trade policy uncertainty; faster-than-expected slowdown in trading partners; greater financial market volatility; higher commodity price volatility; semiconductor sector slowdown.
  - Upside: stronger fiscal stimulus impact, faster structural reforms, new trade agreements.

### Policy guidance and recommendations
- Overall guidance:
  - Given policy space, widening output gap, and inflation near target, looser monetary and fiscal policies are appropriate to stimulate domestic demand.
- Monetary policy:
  - Additional cuts toward the lower bound of the neutral range recommended under the baseline to bolster cyclical recovery while keeping inflation close to target.
  - Maintain accommodative stance well into 2026 under baseline but agility required; additional easing if downside risks materialize.
  - Medium term: aim to maintain inflation at target; coordinate with macroprudential policies.
  - Communication: maintain clear and proactive communications, including BoK’s commitment to price stability.
- Fiscal policy:
  - 2025 fiscal accommodation appropriate to support demand.
  - Increase public investment in infrastructure, productivity-enhancing R&D, and innovation; public investment multipliers in AEs typically around 0.8 (public investment multiplier estimated at 0.64; transfers multiplier ≈ 0.2).
  - Cash transfers, if used, should target vulnerable households with highest propensity to spend.
  - Medium-term: broadly neutral fiscal stance appropriate while monetary accommodation continues; resume consolidation as growth converges to potential.
  - Monitor fiscal risks from public investments in the national growth fund; structural fiscal reforms needed for long-term spending needs.

### FX interventions and market functioning
- Exchange rate volatility generally not a major challenge given limited currency mismatches and manageable passthrough.
- Episodes of market uncertainty (December 2024, April 2025) can produce herding and shallow FX markets; targeted FXI can improve market functioning and prevent disorderly moves.
- Ongoing FX reforms have deepened FX markets and reduced need for FXI (¶34).
- Policy: FX interventions should remain limited to preventing disorderly market conditions.

### Housing market vulnerabilities and macroprudential responses
- Measures implemented: targeted borrower-based macroprudential measures in June, September and October 2025; increase in risk weights on new mortgage loans effective January 2026.
- Focus: mortgage loans in Seoul MET and multiple-home owners.
- Recommendations and contingent actions:
  - Close monitoring; evaluate need for additional tightening; prevent overcorrection.
  - Consider expanding DSR coverage (including principal of jeonse deposit loans).
  - Consider lender-based measures (sCCyB or sSyRB) for household lending.
  - Increase public housing supply in Seoul MET; loosen reconstruction/redevelopment regulations to complement supply efforts.

### Project financing (PF) soft-landing and exit strategy
- Continue restructuring and liquidation of unviable projects; provide targeted liquidity support to viable projects.
- Develop a clear, well-communicated exit strategy from public liquidity support (PF loan guarantees and PF normalization fund) as asset quality improves.
- Purpose: transition toward market-driven PF and reduce moral hazard and fiscal risks.

### Financial sector resilience and NBFI vulnerabilities
- Banks: capital ratios comfortably over requirements; low NPLs.
- NBFIs: elevated vulnerabilities in mutual credit cooperatives and savings banks; ongoing prudential strengthening (higher capital requirements, higher risk weights, enhanced provisioning, stress testing).
- Priority actions:
  - Narrow regulatory gap between banks and NBFIs.
  - Continue task force work and expedite NPL resolution via private subsidiaries acquiring NPLs.

### Adverse scenarios and contingency planning (Box 1)
- Model: Quarterly Projection Model (Annex VII) simulates illustrative scenarios with endogenous policy adjustments.
- Scenario 1:
  - Calibrated to July 2025 WEO downside assumptions; higher tariffs permanent; no additional shocks.
  - Monetary easing quickly supports activity; growth returns to baseline relatively quickly with modest rate reductions.
- Scenario 2:
  - Modified April 2025 WEO downside (no financial conditions shocks); sharper slowdown in 2025–26; inflation eases as demand weakens.
  - Trade war escalation and global divergence weigh heavily on exports (semiconductors); recovery slower; requires prolonged deeper monetary accommodation.
  - Assumes smaller increase to reflect trade deals—half the size of April 2025 WEO assumptions.
- Under both scenarios:
  - Fiscal policy assumed to adjust to keep debt stable over medium term (debt ceiling in rule-based framework under consideration).
  - Korea’s policy framework provides substantial room to counter external shocks; timely, well-calibrated responses critical.

### Authorities’ views (BoK, fiscal, financial)
- BoK:
  - Supports monetary easing to aid growth; emphasizes agile stance and FX flexibility; FXI limited to addressing excessive volatility.
  - Timing, size, and pace of future cuts depend on external outlook and financial stability, including housing and household debt.
- Fiscal authorities:
  - Support fiscal expansion to bolster growth and structural transformation; argue higher growth will keep debt on downward trajectory.
  - Acknowledge universal cash transfers may have lower multiplier but argue higher transfer multiplier when activity subdued.
  - Any additional support to be targeted toward growth-enhancing projects; neutral stance as recovery takes hold.
- Financial authorities:
  - Agree with staff assessment of vulnerabilities; macroprudential measures effective in curbing household debt growth and moderating Seoul prices.
  - Ready to tighten or introduce measures; will continue soft-landing measures for real estate sector and support viable projects.
  - Commit to strengthening NBFI prudential regulations.

### Export structure, diversification, and productivity (Annex IX)
- Key vulnerabilities:
  - Export concentration in few products/destinations and high import content (backward integration).
- Policy priorities:
  - Develop services exports: services account for 15 percent of total exports; expand intellectual services (K-pop, K-drama); extend export financing to service exporters (government export financing currently focused >80 percent on goods exporters).
  - Stay at technological frontier: Korea is global leader in semiconductors; prioritize innovation and AI potential per EGS; boost SME productivity to increase domestic value-added.
  - Diversify destinations and supply chains: Korea has 22 FTAs covering 85 percent of global GDP; upgrade FTAs, reduce non-tariff barriers, deepen regional integration.
  - Diversify into defense equipment and final consumption goods (food, cosmetics).
- SME and services productivity:
  - SMEs >80 percent of employment in 2023 but <50 percent of value added; services productivity at 72 percent of OECD average in 2019.
  - Policy recommendations: reduce regulatory burden, simplify business registration, streamline support programs, scale up services R&D, support AI preparedness for SMEs, expand R&D tax incentives and research grants.
- Capital allocation and market-deepening reforms:
  - Reforms: Corporate value-up program (2024); corporate governance reforms (2025); FX market reforms July 2024—average daily FX spot trading volume July 2024–June 2025 is 16.3 percent higher than preceding 12 months and 44.6 percent higher than 2019–2023 period.
  - 2025 Commercial Act amendments: fiduciary duty of directors to "all shareholders"; limit voting rights to 3 percent for appointing/dismissing audit committee member (mandatory July 2026); "independent director" replacing "outside director" (mandatory July 2026); mandatory hybrid shareholder meetings for large companies (from January 2027); September 2025 amendments: cumulative voting for large listed companies (assets > KRW 2 trillion); selection of ≥2 audit committee members other than executive board members.
  - Cautions: evaluate financial innovations (including KRW-based stablecoins) for financial stability and integrity.

### Fiscal pressures, reform scenarios, and measures
- Long-term pressures:
  - Central government debt <50 percent of GDP end-2024 provides some space.
  - Age-related spending (pensions, health, long-term care) estimated to increase by some 30 to 35 percent by 2050.
- IMF staff projections (no-reform baseline):
  - Total spending could rise by 5-10 percent of GDP by 2050; debt ratio could reach 90-130 percent of GDP.
- Structural reform scenario:
  - Debt-to-GDP could be approximately 30 percent lower than baseline but likely remain above 60 percent of GDP.
- Key reform measures (¶37):
  - Revenue mobilization: reverse prior CIT and other tax cuts; review PIT and CIT tax expenditures; consider rationalizing VAT exemptions (VAT rate at 10 percent vs AE average 18.5 percent).
  - Scale back support as output approaches potential; align domestic energy prices with international commodity prices; terminate fuel tax cuts.
  - Pension reform: Parliament raised contribution rate from 9 to 13 percent and income replacement rate from 40 to 43 percent; reforms postpone NPS deficits from 2041 to 2048 and depletion of assets from 2056 to 2064.
- Fiscal framework:
  - Proposed fiscal rule (2022): 3 percent managed balance cap and 60 percent debt ceiling under discussion; adoption of credible fiscal anchor and enhanced MTFF recommended.

### Economic Growth Strategy (Annex II)
- Announced August 2025; objective: raise potential growth to 3 percent.
- Four pillars: Technology-driven growth; Inclusive growth; Fair growth; Strengthening institutional framework.
- Technology-driven growth:
  - 30 flagship projects funded via National Growth Fund (KRW 150 trillion) financed by government-guaranteed "Advanced Strategic Industries Fund" bonds (KRW 75 trillion) and private capital (KRW 75 trillion).
  - Key sectors: AI transformation, ultra-innovative economy (SiC semiconductors, superconductors, green energy, K-Boom projects like K-bio, K-cultural contents).
- Inclusive growth: five-pole regional development, SME productivity, AI-based startups, social safety net.
- Fair growth: fair trade practices, reduce labor market duality, industrial safety.
- Strengthening institutional framework: capital market reform, regulatory rationalization, public sector innovation, performance-oriented fiscal management, SOE evaluation reform.

### Growth outlook, projections and selected quantitative highlights
- Real GDP (percent change): 2023: 1.6; 2024: 2.0; 2025: 0.9; 2026: 1.8; 2027: 2.2; 2028: 2.2; 2029: 2.0; 2030: 1.9.
- Output gap (percent of potential GDP): 2023: -0.2; 2024: -0.2; 2025: -1.1; 2026: -1.0; 2027: -0.7; 2028: -0.2; 2029: -0.1; 2030: 0.0.
- CPI inflation (end of period): 2023: 3.2; 2024: 1.9; 2025: 1.9; 2026: 1.9; 2027: 2.0; 2028: 2.0; 2029: 2.0; 2030: 2.0.
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2023: 1.8; 2024: 5.3; 2025: 4.8; 2026: 3.9; 2027: 4.1; 2028: 4.3; 2029: 4.5; 2030: 4.7.
- Central government debt (percent of GDP): 2023: 45.4; 2024: 44.6; 2025: 48.2; 2026: 51.5; 2027: 53.7; 2028: 55.8; 2029: 57.5; 2030: 59.1.
- Balance of payments (USD billions, selected):
  - Current account balance: 2023: 32.8; 2024: 99.0; 2025: 89.3; 2026: 75.9; 2027: 83.3; 2028: 90.3; 2029: 98.3; 2030: 107.1.
  - Exports, f.o.b.: 2023: 643.6; 2024: 696.2; 2025: 680.4; 2026: 678.3; 2027: 697.8; 2028: 720.8; 2029: 744.4; 2030: 770.0.
  - Gross reserves (end period, USD billions): 2023: 415.4; 2024: 410.8; 2025: 418.6; 2026: 442.2; 2027: 435.2; 2028: 437.3; 2029: 440.3; 2030: 442.7.
- Fiscal sector (percent of GDP, selected):
  - Revenue: 2023: 22.4; 2024: 21.8; 2025: 22.6; 2026: 23.2; 2027: 23.3; 2028: 23.3; 2029: 23.5; 2030: 23.5.
  - Expenditure: 2023: 23.1; 2024: 22.5; 2025: 24.1; 2026: 24.6; 2027: 24.7; 2028: 24.7; 2029: 24.7; 2030: 24.6.
  - Overall balance: 2023: -1.5; 2024: -1.7; 2025: -2.4; 2026: -2.3; 2027: -2.3; 2028: -2.3; 2029: -2.1; 2030: -2.0.
- Additional selected figures:
  - BoK inflation target: 2 percent.
  - International reserves: 428.8 billion dollars, up from 415.6 billion dollars a year earlier.

### Quarterly Projection Model (Annex VII) — policy trade-offs
- Purpose: semi-structural QPM tailored to Korea to assess monetary-fiscal trade-offs.
- Baseline calibration: fiscal policy accommodative until output gap closure in 2029; policy rate reaches 1.75 percent by 2026Q1.
- Model core: IS curve, hybrid Phillips curve, monetary policy rule, UIP; fiscal block links debt dynamics and primary deficit rule.
- Stylized scenarios:
  - Scenario A: additional/front-loaded monetary easing — short-term output gains; inflation up ~0.1 percentage points above baseline; tighter policy later.
  - Scenario B: higher medium-term deficit (elevated at 2026 level through 2030) — no lasting growth benefit; higher inflation prompting monetary tightening; public debt rises above 60 percent of GDP.
  - Scenario C: combined monetary and fiscal stimulus — near-term activity boost but stronger inflation and sharper medium-term monetary tightening; public debt rises faster and growth slows relative to baseline.
- Key quantitative points:
  - Baseline policy rate assumption: 1.75 percent by 2026Q1.
  - Timing for output gap closure: 2029.
  - Inflation effect of monetary easing: peaks around 0.1 percentage points above baseline.

### FSAP key recommendations (Annex VIII) — financial stability priorities
- Strengthen preemptive management of systemic vulnerabilities: assign MEFM macroprudential oversight; widen definition of financial holding companies; require group-wide liquidity and contingency plans.
- Implement sectoral CCyB framework for household exposures.
- Review role of state-controlled banks to align with prudential requirements.
- Intensify supervision and promote level playing field: increase supervisory intensity for insurers; implement K-ICS; focus FSC on strategy and FSS on operational authority.
- Reinforce crisis management and resolution: include cross-border activities in resolution plans; develop RRPs; strengthen insolvency and creditor’s rights (specialized bankruptcy courts established).

### Data adequacy and dissemination (Annex X)
- Staff conclusion: "Korea's data are adequate for surveillance."
- Data Adequacy Assessment Rating: A; Median Rating: AAAAAAA.
- Noted improvement: time lag for general government data reduced to 11 months (from 14 months in 2024 report).
- Korea subscribes to SDDS since September 1996; Table of Common Indicators reported "As of October 16, 2025."

### External position, reserves, and Korea–U.S. investment commitments
- International reserves: 428.8 billion dollars (up from 415.6 billion dollars a year earlier).
- Korea–U.S. deal elements: 150 billion dollars Korean investment in shipbuilding approved by U.S.; 200 billion dollars additional Korean investment per MOU; Korea not required to fund >20 billion dollars in any calendar year; mechanisms to avoid FX market instability.

### Implementation highlights and recommended next steps
- Implement targeted macroprudential measures and monitor housing market and NBFIs.
- Prioritize public investment in R&D and infrastructure; target cash transfers to vulnerable households.
- Maintain accommodative monetary policy while being ready to adjust to evolving risks; limit FX interventions to disorderly conditions.
- Accelerate structural reforms under the EGS to raise potential growth to 3 percent, focusing on AI, SME productivity, services export development, and capital market deepening.
- Strengthen fiscal framework (MTFF and fiscal anchor), scale up revenue mobilization, and continue pension reforms to mitigate long-term fiscal risks.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1korea2025003-source-pdf.pdf*

### 1. Adverse Macroeconomic Scenarios and Contingency Policies for Korea __________________ 13

### 1. Adverse Macroeconomic Scenarios and Contingency Policies for Korea

### Context and Structural Priorities
- Accommodative policies are helping address the economic slowdown caused by increased domestic political and global trade policy uncertainties.
- Accelerating structural reforms is crucial to raise growth potential and build resilience. Key reform priorities:
  - Raising productivity.
  - Addressing demographic headwinds.
  - Improving capital allocation.
  - Addressing structural impediments to stronger domestic demand and reducing export-related vulnerabilities.
- The authorities’ structural reforms agenda will be guided by the Economic Growth Strategy (EGS). With the president’s party holding parliamentary majority, implementation of long-standing structural reform plans is expected to accelerate.

### Recent Macro Developments
- Growth and inflation:
  - Growth reached 2 percent in 2024, then slowed; 2025Q1 outturn was -0.2 percent (q/q), driven by subdued private consumption and declining investments.
  - 2025Q2 growth rose to 0.7 percent (q/q).
  - Both headline and core inflation stayed close to the 2 percent target, reaching 2.1 and 2 percent y/y respectively in September 2025.
  - The Bank of Korea began an easing cycle in October 2024, cutting the policy rate by 100 basis points in total to 2.5 percent as of May 2025.
  - The estimated range of the real neutral interest rate (as of 2024-Q1) is -0.2 to 1.3 percent (Bank of Korea Working Paper No. 2024-13).
  - The minimum wage increase for 2026 has been set at 2.9 percent.
- External sector and exchange rate:
  - Exports remained flat in 2025H1; semiconductor export volumes remained strong while other items declined.
  - Imports declined by 0.5 percent (y/y) up to 2025Q3.
  - In 2025, the real effective exchange rate depreciated by 4.4 percent through August 2025 relative to 2024.
  - Authorities intervened in the spot FX market with net sales of US$3.8 billion in 2025H1.
- Trade agreement with the U.S. (July 2025):
  - U.S. imposed a 15 percent tariff on most U.S. imports from Korea, raising the effective U.S. tariff rate on Korean imports to 15.9 percent (IMF staff estimate based on WTO data).
  - Parts of the deal, including US$350 billion in investments in the U.S. and purchases of US$100 billion worth of LNG and other energy products, remain under discussion.
- Fiscal policy and budgetary developments:
  - Two stimulus packages totaling KRW 30 trillion (1.2 percent of GDP) were approved in May and July 2025; the second includes a temporary, progressive universal cash transfer program (0.5 percent of GDP).
  - Tax revenue improved in 2025H1 to 7.3 from 7 percent of GDP last year, but slower growth is expected to reduce 2025 tax revenues by 0.4 percent of GDP compared to the budget.
  - Central government deficit projected to widen to 2.4 percent in 2025, with a managed deficit of 4.5 percent and a cyclically adjusted primary deficit of 1.3 percent (against 0.3 percent before the stimulus).
  - 2026 draft budget projects a fiscal deficit of 2 percent of GDP and a managed deficit of 4.0 percent of GDP.
  - The draft allocates 2.6 percent of GDP to the ultra-innovative economy initiative and 1.3 percent of GDP to R&D in high-tech sectors.
  - Selective cuts in non-core, low-performing spending programs (1 percent of GDP) and an increase in tax and non-tax revenues (0.8 percent of GDP) are expected to keep the deficit below 3 percent of GDP.
- Financial sector and housing:
  - Overall financial sector remains sound with large capital buffers and tight prudential requirements.
  - Financial market volatility surged in March and April 2025 but was short-lived and contained.
  - Private credit-to-GDP ratio around 200 percent of GDP by end-2024; has been declining since 2023.
  - About half of private credit concentrated in real estate and construction sectors.
  - Housing price-to-income ratio in Seoul was 10.1 in 2025Q1 (about 10 percent above its long-term average); nationwide ratio was 3.9 in 2025Q1 (slightly below its long-term average) (KREB).
  - Household loan growth accelerated in late 2025Q2 driven by a surge in housing transactions and rising property prices in the Seoul metropolitan area.
  - Authorities introduced targeted macroprudential measures in June and September 2025 and announced a five-year plan to increase supply in the Seoul MET.
  - Real estate project financing: as of end-June 2025, 52 percent of unviable projects were either restructured or liquidated, leaving unresolved unviable PF of about 0.5 percent of GDP.
  - NPL growth has slowed but remains high in NBFIs, especially mutual credit cooperatives and savings banks.

### Outlook and Risks
- Growth projections:
  - Annual growth projected at 0.9 percent in 2025.
  - Growth expected to rebound to 1.8 percent in 2026.
  - Negative output gap projected to widen to 1.1 percent in 2025 and then gradually close.
- Inflation projections:
  - Average headline inflation projected to moderate to 2.0 percent in 2025 and 1.8 percent in 2026.
  - Average core inflation expected to remain at 1.9 percent in both 2025 and 2026.
  - Inflation forecasted to remain around 2 percent in the medium term.
- Fiscal outlook:
  - Fiscal impulse in 2025 is 0.6 percent (compared to -0.6 percent in the budget), widening the fiscal deficit.
  - Fiscal deficit projected at 2.3 percent of GDP in 2026 thanks to higher revenue, implying a fiscal impulse of -0.2 percent.
  - Authorities’ 2026–2029 fiscal management plan projects an increase in revenue by 1.2 percent of GDP, a consolidated fiscal deficit around 2.0–2.3 percent of GDP, with the managed deficit exceeding 4.0 percent of GDP by 2029.
  - Central government debt projected to rise gradually from 48 percent of GDP in 2025 to 59 percent of GDP by 2030.
- Current account:
  - Current account surplus projected to decrease temporarily in the near term.
  - In the medium term, CA surplus expected to rise to 4.7 percent of GDP.
- Risk assessment (tilted to the downside):
  - Prolonged trade policy uncertainty and intensification of geopolitical tensions.
  - Faster-than-expected slowdown in major trading partners.
  - Greater financial market volatility leading to tighter financial conditions and amplified domestic vulnerabilities.
  - Higher global commodity price volatility causing inflationary pressures and higher fiscal burden.
  - Slowdown of domestic semiconductor sector due to softening of AI-related demand.
  - Upside risks include stronger-than-expected impact of fiscal stimulus, faster structural reforms, and new trade agreements.

### Policy Discussions — Supporting Growth and Reducing Vulnerabilities
- Overall guidance:
  - Given sufficient policy space, a widening output gap, and inflation close to target, looser monetary and fiscal policies are appropriate to stimulate domestic demand.
- Monetary policy recommendations:
  - Additional cuts in the policy rate toward the lower bound of the neutral range are recommended under the baseline to bolster the expected cyclical recovery while keeping inflation close to target.
  - Monetary policy should remain accommodative well into 2026 under the baseline but remain agile to evolving outlook and risks.
  - Additional timely easing should be considered if downside risks to growth materialize.
  - In the medium term, monetary policy should aim to maintain inflation at target.
  - Coordination with macroprudential policies is important; housing market risks are best addressed through targeted macroprudential measures (as implemented in June and September 2025).
  - Maintain clear and proactive communication of policy intentions, including BoK’s strong commitment to price stability, to keep expectations anchored.
- Fiscal policy recommendations:
  - The fiscal accommodation in 2025 is appropriate to support demand.
  - Increasing public investment in infrastructure, productivity-enhancing R&D, and innovation can generate stronger and sustained growth; public investment multipliers in AEs typically around 0.8 (the public investment multiplier is estimated at 0.64; transfers multiplier ≈ 0.2).
  - Cash transfers, if needed, should target vulnerable households with the highest propensity to spend.
  - With continued monetary accommodation expected under the baseline, a broadly neutral medium-term fiscal stance is appropriate to reduce risks of pro-cyclicality and inflationary pressures.
  - Fiscal consolidation should resume as growth converges to potential to stabilize debt around the medium-term fiscal anchor.
  - Structural fiscal reforms will be needed to sustainably meet longer-term spending needs.
  - Monitor fiscal risks or contingent liabilities from public investments in the national growth fund.
  - Maintaining accommodative monetary and fiscal stances beyond the closure of the output gap may yield further output gains but would increase risk of inflationary pressures and erode fiscal space, potentially necessitating sharper adjustments later.

*IMF staff summary of “1. Adverse Macroeconomic Scenarios and Contingency Policies for Korea.”*

### 16. Foreign exchange interventions (FXI) should remain limited to preventing disorderly

### 16. Foreign exchange interventions (FXI) should remain limited to preventing disorderly market conditions

### FX interventions and market functioning
- Exchange rate volatility generally does not pose significant economic challenges for Korea, given limited currency mismatches and manageable passthrough to consumer prices.
- Periods of increased financial market uncertainty (e.g. December 2024 and April 2025) can produce herding behaviors and temporarily shallow FX market conditions, leading to sharp exchange rate movements.
- Under such conditions, FXI can:
  - Help improve market functioning.
  - Avoid undue FX volatility.
  - Keep herding episodes short-lived.
- Ongoing FX reforms have started to deepen FX markets (¶34), improving efficiency and resilience of the currency market and reducing the need for FXI.

### Housing market vulnerabilities and macroprudential responses
- In response to rising pressures (¶7), targeted borrower-based macroprudential measures were implemented in June, September and October 2025 (Annex IV), complementing the planned implementation of the third phase of the stressed DSR rules.
- An increase in risk weights applied to banks’ new mortgage loans will take effect as of January 2026.
- Targeted measures focus primarily on mortgage loans in Seoul MET and multiple-home owners.
- Recommendations and contingent actions:
  - Close monitoring to assess impact, evaluate need for additional tightening, and prevent overcorrection.
  - If needed, consider expanding DSR coverage (including to the principal of jeonse deposit loans).
  - Consider lender-based measures—such as a sectoral countercyclical capital buffer (sCCyB) or a sectoral systemic risk buffer (sSyRB) for household lending (in line with 2020 FSAP recommendations – Annex VIII).
  - Authorities’ plans to increase public housing supply in Seoul MET to anchor expectations and enhance affordability are welcome.
  - Further loosening regulations for reconstruction and redevelopment could complement public housing efforts.

### Project financing (PF) soft-landing and exit strategy
- As PF soft-landing measures advance, a carefully planned exit strategy from public liquidity support mechanisms should be developed.
- Continue active restructuring and liquidation of remaining unviable projects, along with targeted liquidity support for viable ones.
- As disposal of the most problematic projects progresses and asset quality of exposed financial institutions improves, prepare a clear and well-communicated exit strategy from public liquidity support to viable projects (PF loan guarantees and recourse to PF normalization fund).
- Purpose of exit strategy:
  - Facilitate transition toward more market-driven PF.
  - Reduce moral hazard and associated fiscal risks.

### Financial sector resilience and NBFI vulnerabilities
- Korea’s financial sector remains broadly sound; banks remain sound and systemic risks are low, similar to the 2024 Article IV consultation.
- Banks have capital ratios comfortably over prudential requirements and low NPLs.
- Deterioration in asset quality and profitability from remaining PF exposures and vulnerable households is a concern for more exposed NBFI segments, though systemic risks remain manageable, mitigated by higher capital ratios and provision levels.
- Ongoing FSC efforts to strengthen prudential regulations for NBFIs are welcome; these include:
  - Increased capital requirements.
  - Higher risk weights for real estate and construction assets.
  - Enhanced provisioning against non-standard assets.
  - Stress testing (in line with 2020 FSAP recommendations – Annex VIII).
- Establishment of private subsidiaries to acquire and manage NPLs of mutual savings banks and credit cooperatives should help expedite asset quality improvements.
- Priority actions:
  - Narrow the regulatory gap between banks and NBFIs, and across categories of NBFIs.
  - Continue work of task forces set up by the authorities for this purpose.

### Adverse macroeconomic scenarios and contingency planning
- If downside risks materialize, further monetary and fiscal accommodation could be considered.
- In an illustrative adverse scenario—marked by widening global imbalances and a fall in global output (Box 1)—growth and inflation in Korea would slow further.
  - Monetary policy should be eased at a faster pace, and the fiscal stance should be further loosened through targeted support for vulnerable households and firms.
  - Exchange rate flexibility should be the first line of defense, with interventions limited to addressing disorderly market conditions.
  - If financial sector stress emerges due to further tightening of global financial conditions, temporary and targeted measures to support affected institutions or stabilize markets may be warranted, with appropriate safeguards to mitigate moral hazard.

Box 1 — Scenario summaries and policy implications
- Method: Quarterly Projection Model (Annex VII) simulates two illustrative scenarios showing impacts on growth with and without policy responses; policies adjust endogenously to cushion growth.
- Scenario 1:
  - Calibrated in line with the July 2025 WEO Update on global downside assumptions—higher tariffs are permanent, but there are no additional shocks, including to global financial conditions.
  - Monetary easing quickly supports activity, enabling growth to return to baseline within a relatively short period with only modest interest rate reductions.
- Scenario 2:
  - Modified April 2025 WEO downside scenario (with no financial conditions shocks), causing a sharper slowdown in growth in 2025–26, with inflation easing as weaker demand outweighs direct price effects of higher tariffs.
  - Characterized by trade war escalation and global divergence that weigh heavily on Korean exports—particularly semiconductors—and deteriorate the trade balance.
  - Also features increased global uncertainty that amplifies the trade shock; assumes a smaller increase to reflect trade deals—half the size of the April 2025 WEO assumptions.
  - Recovery is slower, requiring a more prolonged and deeper monetary policy accommodative stance.
- Under both scenarios:
  - Fiscal policy is assumed to adjust to keep debt stable over the medium term (the debt ceiling in the rule-based fiscal framework under parliament’s consideration), ensuring short-term support does not undermine fiscal sustainability.
  - Simulations suggest Korea’s policy framework provides substantial room to counter external shocks, but timely and well-calibrated policy responses remain critical.

### Authorities’ views on policy stance
- Bank of Korea (BoK):
  - Agreed monetary easing will support growth but emphasized maintaining an agile policy stance.
  - Noted recent cuts have not yet had full impact given elevated uncertainty; concurred further policy rate cuts are necessary to support domestic demand while preserving price stability.
  - Timing, size and pace of future cuts will depend on Korea’s external outlook and financial stability conditions including housing market and household debt.
  - Agreed additional easing may be warranted if downside risks materialize.
  - Reiterated commitment to exchange rate flexibility and emphasized FXI is limited to addressing excessive exchange rate volatility caused by herding behavior in markets.
- Fiscal authorities:
  - Noted fiscal expansion is needed to bolster growth, stimulate domestic demand, and support structural transformation through priorities identified in the EGS.
  - Argued higher growth would keep debt on a downward trajectory.
  - Acknowledged universal cash transfers may have resulted in a lower fiscal multiplier of the 2025 stimulus packages compared to capital or R&D expenditure, but argued transfer multiplier tends to be higher when economic activity is subdued (as in 2025H1).
  - Indicated any additional fiscal support would be targeted toward growth-enhancing projects; a neutral fiscal stance would be appropriate as recovery takes hold.
- Financial authorities:
  - Broadly agreed with staff’s assessment of financial sector vulnerabilities.
  - Noted macroprudential measures have been effective in curbing household debt growth and moderating property price increases in Seoul MET.
  - Affirmed readiness to tighten existing measures or introduce new ones if needed.
  - Planned adoption of supply-side measures and regional development focus of the EGS would help address structural mismatch between housing supply and demand.
  - Will continue implementing soft-landing measures in the real estate sector and consider continued government support for viable projects given downturn in construction sector.
  - Underscored commitment to improve soundness of NBFIs through stronger prudential regulations, particularly for mutual credit cooperatives and savings banks.

*Source: IMF staff analysis from the Republic of Korea country report excerpts (paragraphs 16–28).*

### 29. Reducing vulnerabilities in export structure could strengthen external resilience (Annex

### 29. Reducing vulnerabilities in export structure could strengthen external resilience (Annex IX)

### Export vulnerabilities and policy priorities
- Key vulnerabilities:
  - Concentration of exports in few products and destinations increases exposure to external shifts.
  - Deep integration into global value chains—reflected in a high import content of exports (backward integration) relative to peers—heightens Korea’s exposure.
- Policy priorities to sustain exports and build resilient, diversified trade linkages:
  - Developing exports of services:
    - Service exports account for only 15 percent of total exports.
    - Rapid growth in digitally delivered services since the 2010s, with potential to expand intellectual service exports (e.g., K-pop and K-drama).
    - Authorities plan targeted support to innovative business models and to ensure sustainable revenue generation from cultural services, including through intellectual property licensing.
    - Recommendations: reduce entry barriers for digitally enabled startups, incentivize R&D, improve productivity of SMEs (dominant in services), and extend government export financing—currently focused predominantly on goods exporters (over 80 percent)—to service exporters.
  - Staying at the technological frontier for goods exports:
    - Korea is a global leader in semiconductor innovation, production and export; products rank among the most technologically advanced worldwide.
    - Policies should prioritize innovation and leverage AI’s potential (¶32) as outlined in the EGS.
    - Boosting SME productivity could reposition them as key suppliers of intermediate inputs and increase domestic value-added content in exports.
    - Industrial policies should be confined to objectives where externalities or market failures prevent market solutions, minimize trade and investment distortions, be consistent with international obligations, and avoid discrimination between domestic and overseas producers.
  - Diversifying export destinations and supply chains:
    - Upgrading existing FTAs and entering new ones would help diversify supply chains and mitigate trade policy uncertainty.
    - Korea is already part of 22 FTAs with countries covering 85 percent of global GDP.
    - Deeper regional integration—reducing non-tariff barriers such as simplifying technical regulations and customs procedures—and stronger linkages with emerging market economies are recommended.
    - Diversifying export items into defense equipment and final consumption goods (food, cosmetics) to move beyond traditional intermediate and capital goods.

*Authorities’ views on export diversification*
- Authorities view export diversification as a priority to enhance external resilience.
- Ongoing efforts: expand government support for service-sector companies, especially in culture and tourism; facilitate innovative business models; promote global diffusion of K-content via trade promotion agencies; strengthen intellectual property rights.
- Export diversification into services expected to be a central pillar of upcoming trade strategy.
- Authorities state support to high-tech or service industries does not discriminate against foreign producers and complies with international norms, including WTO.

### Increasing productivity (services and SMEs) and AI adoption
- Findings:
  - Korea’s relatively low labor productivity compared to other AEs is largely explained by low productivity in SMEs in the services sector due to inefficient resource allocation.
  - SMEs represented more than 80 percent of total employment in 2023, but produced less than half of total value added, with activities skewed towards non-tradable services.
  - SMEs still face a more cumbersome regulatory burden than larger firms.
- Recommendations to boost SME productivity:
  - Reduce regulatory burden and legal barriers to entry, trade, and investment in service sectors—particularly network services (energy, transport, communications).
  - Simplify administrative procedures for business registration and reduce startup costs.
  - Streamline government support programs for SMEs and focus support on viable firms by reviewing eligibility criteria and linking support to firms’ ability to improve productivity, generate long-term profitability, and contribute to economic efficiency.
- AI and innovation:
  - AI adoption is rising, but larger companies have been primary beneficiaries, potentially widening productivity gaps with SMEs.
  - Recommendations: support AI preparedness of SMEs, enhance digital skills, increase labor market flexibility, fund fundamental research, expand R&D tax incentives and research grants (especially for startups), and implement targeted training and reskilling programs along with measures to strengthen the social safety net.
- Authorities’ structural reform agenda:
  - The new government’s EGS aims to boost productivity and raise potential growth to 3 percent.
  - The 2026 draft budget includes sizable R&D allocations and the EGS will prioritize 30 flagship projects focused on AI transformation and innovation.
  - Authorities plan to apply AI to select public services (tax filings, welfare delivery), expand AI education and training, collaborate with academics and young entrepreneurs, facilitate establishment of innovative startups, support viable SMEs to grow, and deploy AI-based smart factories.

### Enhancing capital allocation and market-deepening reforms
- Reforms underway:
  - Corporate value-up program (launched 2024) to address low price-to-book and price-to-earnings ratios (“Korea discount”).
  - Corporate governance reforms introduced in 2025 (Text Table 1) to enhance transparency and align shareholder incentives.
  - FX market reforms in July 2024: allowing direct access to the onshore FX market for foreign financial institutions and extended trading hours.
    - Result: average daily FX spot trading volume on the onshore market over the July 2024 – June 2025 period is 16.3 percent higher than over the preceding 12 months and 44.6 percent higher than over the 2019-2023 period.
  - Additional initiatives: introducing an aggregator system and developing electronic FX trading.
- Cautions and recommendations:
  - Carefully evaluate financial innovations (including KRW-based stablecoins) to safeguard financial stability and integrity.
  - Further measures to reduce the “Korea discount” and deepen financial markets are critical to attract long-term investment.
- Reforms introduced in 2025 (high-level highlights from amendments to the Commercial Act):
  - July 2025 amendments: codification of fiduciary duty of directors to “all shareholders”; limitation of voting rights of largest shareholders to 3 percent when appointing or dismissing audit committee member (mandatory from July 2026); replacement of “outside director” with “independent director” (mandatory from July 2026); mandatory hybrid shareholder meetings for large companies (mandatory from January 2027).
  - September 2025 amendments: cumulative voting system for large listed companies (assets exceeding KRW 2 trillion); selection of at least two audit committee members other than executive board members (against one prior).

*Authorities’ views on capital market reforms*
- Authorities aim to protect and attract investors and make markets fairer for smaller shareholders.
- Plan to announce a roadmap supporting Korea’s inclusion in the MSCI Developed Market index.
- Note: development of a won-based stablecoin could bolster attractiveness for investors but requires careful consideration of financial stability and integrity.

### Fiscal pressures, reform needs, and scenarios
- Fiscal context and long-term pressures:
  - Central government debt at less than 50 percent of GDP at end-2024 provides some space to respond to higher age-related spending.
  - Long-term: spending needs on pensions, health care, and long-term care are estimated to increase by some 30 to 35 percent by 2050.
- IMF staff projections under a no-reform baseline:
  - Total spending could rise by 5-10 percent of GDP by 2050 while the debt ratio could reach 90-130 percent of GDP, eroding fiscal space and increasing debt sustainability risks significantly.
- Structural reform scenario:
  - Debt-to-GDP ratio could be approximately 30 percent lower than in the baseline scenario.
  - Debt would likely remain above 60 percent of GDP—the proposed ceiling in the rule-based fiscal framework under parliamentary consideration.
  - Scenario does not factor in risks and uncertainty (including growth impact of reforms); debt sustainability risks would still be substantially higher, underscoring need for additional fiscal reforms.
- Key reform measures to create fiscal space (¶37):
  - Revenue mobilization and spending efficiency:
    - Reverse prior CIT and other tax cuts; review PIT and CIT tax expenditures and streamline them as necessary.
    - Consider rationalizing VAT exemptions; VAT rate at 10 percent remains low compared to the AE average of 18.5 percent—raising the VAT rate could create additional fiscal space.
    - Scale back support as output approaches potential: unwind support to local governments and businesses and streamline support to SMEs.
    - Align domestic energy prices more closely with international commodity prices and terminate fuel tax cuts to reduce public debt burden and negative climate externalities.
  - Pension reform:
    - Parliament passed reforms raising the contribution rate from 9 to 13 percent and increasing the income replacement rate from 40 to 43 percent.
    - These reforms will improve NPS fiscal sustainability, postponing the onset of deficits from 2041 to 2048 and the depletion of its assets from 2056 to 2064.
    - Further reforms should balance long-term sustainability with adequacy and equity of benefits.
- Fiscal framework and medium-term fiscal framework (MTFF):
  - Adoption of a credible fiscal anchor supported by an enhanced MTFF would help safeguard long-term fiscal sustainability.
  - The fiscal rule proposed to the National Assembly in 2022 (3 percent managed balance cap and 60 percent debt ceiling) remains under discussion.
  - An operational rule could help align the annual budget with a medium-term anchor; an MTFF that incorporates long-term spending pressures could guide annual budgets and support adoption of the fiscal anchor.
  - Complementary measures: long-term strategies for ageing-related fiscal risks supported by fiscal sustainability analyses and costing of reforms through revenue mobilization, expenditure reprioritization and pension reforms.

*Authorities’ views on fiscal reform*
- Authorities announced a five-year EGS (announced August 2025) focused on technology-driven, inclusive, fair and sustainable growth.
  - Established a new KRW 150 trillion National Growth Fund to mobilize investments over the next 5 years, financed by government-guaranteed “Advanced Strategic Industries Fund” bonds (KRW 75 trillion) and private capital (KRW 75 trillion).
  - EGS prioritizes strategic high-tech industries (AI, semiconductor, biotech, robotics), energy infrastructure and other technology ventures.
  - Impact depends on design and implementation of each pillar.
- Authorities submitted a third long-term fiscal outlook (2025~2065) to the National Assembly to monitor ageing impacts.
  - Formed committees to rationalize spending and identify pension reforms to maintain NPS solvency.
  - Plan to mobilize about 1 percent of GDP over the next five years by expanding the tax net.
  - The fiscal rule proposal remains under discussion; the National Assembly will hold a public hearing to review proposed ceilings.
  - Recognize need to enhance effectiveness of the MTFF.

*Notes on scenarios and assumptions referenced in related analysis*
- Baseline scenario incorporates UN population projections.
- Under an optimistic scenario, cumulative net migration from 2025 to 2050 doubles relative to the baseline—from 0.8 million to 1.6 million individuals.
- High fertility scenario assumes the fertility rate improves to 1.3 by 2050 and 2.1 (replacement level) by 2100.
- Low fertility scenario uses UN Population Prospects assumptions: total fertility rate of 0.53 in 2050 and 0.8 in 2100.

*Italic source attribution:*  
*Republic of Korea — International Monetary Fund, Annex: 29. Reducing vulnerabilities in export structure could strengthen external resilience (extract from 1korea2025003-source-pdf).*

### 41. Real GDP growth is expected to recover gradually, but uncertainties remain high, and

### 1korea2025003-source-pdf - 41. Real GDP growth is expected to recover gradually, but uncertainties remain high, and

### Growth outlook and risks
- Real GDP growth is expected to recover gradually; the negative output gap is expected to close by the end of the forecast period.
- Growth has slowed in 2025, but inflation remains close to BoK’s 2 percent target.
- Risks are tilted to the downside amid:
  - persistent trade policy uncertainty,
  - intensification of geopolitical conflicts,
  - weather-related risks.
- Policy environment: authorities are pursuing accommodative policies to support growth; improving domestic demand and recovering exports are cited as sources of recovery.

### Monetary policy guidance
- Recommendation: Monetary policy should remain agile to preserve price stability while supporting domestic demand.
- Given the negative output gap, well-anchored inflation expectations and balanced risks to inflation, additional cuts in the policy rate toward the lower bound of the neutral rate would support cyclical recovery.
- Caveat: Given high uncertainty, the timing, size and pace of future cuts should be aligned with the evolving outlook and risks.

### Fiscal stance and recommendations
- The fiscal stance in the 2026 draft budget is described as appropriate and should help support growth.
- Any further support, if needed, should be temporary and targeted and should take into account risks of pro-cyclicality and inflation.
- Fiscal consolidation should resume as growth reaches potential.
- Structural reforms will be needed to accommodate rising age-related spending needs.

### Financial sector vulnerabilities and policy actions
- Financial sector risks are manageable, but proactive management of vulnerabilities needs to continue.
- Recent macroprudential tightening measures have begun to take effect; a comprehensive set of measures is needed to curb household debt growth.
- Authorities should continue to monitor financial risks related to the real estate sector, including project financing and asset quality in NBFIs, and stand ready to act preemptively.
- Annex I implementation highlights:
  - A targeted macroprudential package was introduced in June 2025 to curb household debt growth in Seoul.
  - PF soft-landing measures progressed, with over half of unviable projects resolved by mid-2025.
  - Liquidity support remained contingent and was not deployed.

### External sector, exports, and diversification
- Given rising external demand vulnerabilities, revitalizing domestic demand is essential for making growth more resilient.
- Policies to diversify export products and destinations would help strengthen Korea’s resilience to external demand shifts.
- Authorities’ plans, supported by the EGS, to harness growth potential from digital and cultural services through more targeted support to innovative business models and SMEs are welcomed.
- Sustaining innovation and promoting AI adoption, particularly among smaller firms, is essential.
- Further diversifying export destinations and supply chains through deeper regional trade integration would help mitigate global trade policy uncertainty.
- The external position in 2024 was broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.

### Structural reforms and productivity
- Reforms to increase productivity and enhance capital allocation would enable higher potential growth.
- Priorities include:
  - reducing the productivity gap between SMEs and larger firms,
  - alleviating the regulatory burden in service sectors,
  - sustaining innovation and harnessing AI-driven productivity gains,
  - targeted training and reskilling programs to mitigate AI transition risks and support elderly employment.
- Authorities should continue to build on recent capital and FX market reforms to enhance Korea’s attractiveness for investment and reduce the Korea discount.

### Structural fiscal reforms for aging-related pressures
- Structural fiscal reforms remain critical to accommodate rising age-related spending pressures.
- Policy priorities to create fiscal space include pension reform, increasing revenue mobilization and prioritizing spending.
- A medium-term fiscal anchor, supported by a credible MTFF, can enhance policy framework resilience by balancing flexibility to respond to shocks with long-term fiscal sustainability.
- Pension reforms including raising the contribution rate and the income replacement rate were approved in March 2025 (Annex I).

### Recommendation on Article IV timing
- It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard 12-month cycle.

### Select figures and tabulated highlights (exact values preserved)
- BoK inflation target: 2 percent.
- Table 1 headline projections (selected):
  - Real GDP (percent change): 2023: 1.6; 2024: 2.0; 2025: 0.9; 2026: 1.8; 2027: 2.2; 2028: 2.2; 2029: 2.0; 2030: 1.9.
  - Output gap (percent of potential GDP): 2023: -0.2; 2024: -0.2; 2025: -1.1; 2026: -1.0; 2027: -0.7; 2028: -0.2; 2029: -0.1; 2030: 0.0.
  - CPI inflation (end of period): 2023: 3.2; 2024: 1.9; 2025: 1.9; 2026: 1.9; 2027: 2.0; 2028: 2.0; 2029: 2.0; 2030: 2.0.
  - Current account balance (in percent of GDP): 2023: 1.8; 2024: 5.3; 2025: 4.8; 2026: 3.9; 2027: 4.1; 2028: 4.3; 2029: 4.5; 2030: 4.7.
  - Central government debt (percent of GDP): 2023: 45.4; 2024: 44.6; 2025: 48.2; 2026: 51.5; 2027: 53.7; 2028: 55.8; 2029: 57.5; 2030: 59.1.
- Balance of payments (Table 2, selected):
  - Current account balance (in billions of U.S. dollars): 2023: 32.8; 2024: 99.0; 2025: 89.3; 2026: 75.9; 2027: 83.3; 2028: 90.3; 2029: 98.3; 2030: 107.1.
  - Exports, f.o.b. (in billions of U.S. dollars): 2023: 643.6; 2024: 696.2; 2025: 680.4; 2026: 678.3; 2027: 697.8; 2028: 720.8; 2029: 744.4; 2030: 770.0.
  - Gross reserves (end of period, in billions of U.S. dollars): 2023: 415.4; 2024: 410.8; 2025: 418.6; 2026: 442.2; 2027: 435.2; 2028: 437.3; 2029: 440.3; 2030: 442.7.
- Fiscal sector (Table 3, selected, in percent of GDP):
  - Revenue: 2023: 22.4; 2024: 21.8; 2025: 22.6; 2026: 23.2; 2027: 23.3; 2028: 23.3; 2029: 23.5; 2030: 23.5.
  - Expenditure: 2023: 23.1; 2024: 22.5; 2025: 24.1; 2026: 24.6; 2027: 24.7; 2028: 24.7; 2029: 24.7; 2030: 24.6.
  - Overall balance: 2023: -1.5; 2024: -1.7; 2025: -2.4; 2026: -2.3; 2027: -2.3; 2028: -2.3; 2029: -2.1; 2030: -2.0.

### Implementation of past Fund advice (Annex I highlights)
- Monetary policy: The BoK appropriately eased the policy stance as inflation declined and the output gap widened.
- Fiscal policy: Fiscal policy turned expansionary in 2025, with two supplementary budgets totaling 1.2 percent of GDP focused on growth and social support.
- Housing and financial: Targeted macroprudential package (June 2025); PF restructuring progress with over half of unviable projects resolved by mid-2025; prudential tightening for NBFIs (capital, provisioning, risk weights).
- Structural: Pension reforms approved in March 2025 (raising the contribution rate and the income replacement rate); corporate governance reforms adopted in 2025; rule-based fiscal framework proposal under consideration; authorities’ new trade policy strategy expected to support development of service exports.

*IMF staff summary from 1korea2025003-source-pdf (chapter content provided).*

### Annex II. The Economic Growth Strategy

### Annex II. The Economic Growth Strategy

### Overview
- Announced in August 2025, the new administration’s Economic Growth Strategy aims to comprehensively transform the Korean economy into a leading innovation-driven economy.
- Objective: raise potential growth rate to 3 percent.
- Four pillars aiming to position Korea among the world’s top three AI powerhouses and top five global powers:
  - Technology-driven growth
  - Inclusive growth
  - Fair growth
  - Strengthening institutional framework

### Technology-driven growth
- Goal: advance AI technology development, promote an economy and society-wide adoption (“AI transformation”), and foster globally leading industries capable of driving future growth (“ultra-innovative economy”).
- Implementation: 30 flagship projects identified by the strategy, funded through annual budgets and a new National Growth Fund (150 trillion KRW), financed by issuance of government-guaranteed “Advanced Strategic Industries Fund” bonds and private investments.

Key sectors (Text Table 1: Key Sectors of Technology-driven Growth)
- AI transformation
  - Support the integration of AI into key manufacturing sectors such as vehicles, shipbuilding, home appliances, drones, robots and semiconductors.
  - Introduce AI into all public services including welfare and employment services, tax administration, and new drug review.
  - Accelerate AI development by nurturing AI professionals, enhancing access to data, and building a scalable data infrastructure.
- Ultra-innovative economy
  - Achieve technological self-reliance in high-tech materials and components, including silicon carbide (SiC) semiconductors and superconductors.
  - Address climate and energy challenges with solar and offshore wind power, green hydrogen and small modular reactors (SMRs), smart agriculture and fisheries, and ultra-high-resolution satellites.
  - Pioneer new export markets through “K-Boom” projects including K-bio and pharmaceuticals, K-cultural contents, K-beauty, and K-food.

### Inclusive growth
- Objective: promote inclusive growth by moving away from a unipolar Seoul-centric model to a five-pole, three-specialized-region development strategy.
- Actions:
  - Cultivate regional growth to achieve balanced regional development, focusing on 30 flagship projects.
  - Support AI-based startups and ventures.
  - Boost SME productivity and strengthen competitiveness of small merchants through digitalization.
  - Strengthen the social safety net and tackle low fertility and aging challenges.

### Fair growth
- Objective: enhance growth by fostering mutually beneficial cooperation between large and small businesses, while building a fair and safe labor market.
- Measures include:
  - Establish fair trade practices and an ecosystem for mutual growth and cooperation between large corporations and SMEs.
  - Reinforce support for SMEs in preventing technology theft.
  - Reduce labor market duality.
  - Improve industrial safety through greater accountability.

### Strengthening institutional framework
- Objective: strengthen economic infrastructure through capital market reform, regulatory rationalization, and significant public sector innovation to achieve the "Korea Premium."
- Targets and reforms:
  - Enhance corporate governance and advance Korea’s inclusion in the MSCI Developed Markets Index.
  - Reform regulations that fall short of global standards, focusing on those affecting the flagship projects.
  - Comprehensive public sector reform to support a highly innovative economy, including:
    - Performance-oriented fiscal management.
    - A new management evaluation framework for SOEs.
    - Aligning research institution goals with national missions.
    - Specialization of national and private universities and increased support for STEM fields.

*Source: The Korean authorities.*

### 2. Macroeconomic assumptions: Real GDP is projected to rebound by 1.8 percent in 2026,

### 1korea2025003-source-pdf - 2. Macroeconomic assumptions: Real GDP is projected to rebound by 1.8 percent in 2026,

### Macroeconomic assumptions and outlook
- Real GDP is projected to rebound by 1.8 percent in 2026, driven by easing uncertainties, the full effect of accommodative policies, and favorable base effects.
- The negative output gap is expected to widen to 1.1 percent in 2025 before gradually closing as domestic demand strengthens and exports recover amid reduced global trade policy uncertainty.
- Headline and core inflation are forecast to moderate to 1.9 percent in 2025 and 2026—reflecting the negative output gap, an appreciated KRW, and lower oil prices—and to hover around 2 percent over the medium term.
- The yield on the 10-year U.S. Treasury bond has reached 4.4 percent in July.

### Debt trajectory and fiscal outlook
- The central government’s primary deficit is projected at 1.6 percent of GDP in 2025, an increase of one percentage point from 2024, reflecting a more expansionary fiscal stance to support growth.
- Over the medium term, the primary deficit is expected to narrow as new tax reforms boost revenue and the authorities shift to a contractionary stance.
- The interest-growth differential remains favorable.
- Fiscal deficits excluding the Social Security Fund are estimated at 4.5 percent in 2025, declining gradually to 3.8 percent by 2030, although continued policy lending will sustain financing needs.
- Central government debt is projected to rise from 44 percent of GDP in 2024 to 59 percent by 2030.
- From Figure 4 (Baseline Scenario, selected rows, percent of GDP unless noted):
  - Public debt: 44.6 (2024), 48.2 (2025), 51.5 (2026), 53.7 (2027), 55.8 (2028), 57.5 (2029), 59.1 (2030), 60.5 (2031), 61.7 (2032), 62.8 (2033), 63.8 (2034)
  - Change in public debt: -0.7 (2024), 3.6 (2025), 3.3 (2026), 2.2 (2027), 2.1 (2028), 1.8 (2029), 1.6 (2030), 1.3 (2031), 1.2 (2032), 1.1 (2033), 1.0 (2034)
  - Contribution of identified flows: 1.5 (2024), 3.4 (2025), 3.1 (2026), 2.1 (2027), 1.9 (2028), 1.7 (2029), 1.4 (2030), 1.2 (2031), 1.1 (2032), 1.0 (2033), 0.9 (2034)
  - Primary deficit: 0.7 (2024), 1.6 (2025), 1.3 (2026), 1.4 (2027), 1.2 (2028), 1.0 (2029), 0.8 (2030), 0.8 (2031), 0.8 (2032), 0.8 (2033), 0.7 (2034)
  - Noninterest revenues: 20.8 (2024), 21.7 (2025), 22.3 (2026), 22.4 (2027), 22.4 (2028), 22.6 (2029), 22.6 (2030), 22.6 (2031), 22.6 (2032), 22.6 (2033), 22.6 (2034)
  - Noninterest expenditures: 21.5 (2024), 23.2 (2025), 23.6 (2026), 23.7 (2027), 23.6 (2028), 23.6 (2029), 23.5 (2030), 23.4 (2031), 23.4 (2032), 23.4 (2033), 23.4 (2034)
  - Real GDP growth (percent): 2.0 (Actual 2024), 0.9 (2025), 1.8 (2026), 2.2 (2027), 2.2 (2028), 2.0 (2029), 1.9 (2030), 2.2 (2031), 2.2 (2032), 2.2 (2033), 2.2 (2034)
  - Inflation (GDP deflator; percent): 4.1 (Actual 2024), 1.2 (2025), 0.3 (2026), 1.9 (2027), 1.9 (2028), 2.1 (2029), 2.0 (2030), 1.9 (2031), 1.9 (2032), 1.9 (2033), 1.9 (2034)
  - Nominal GDP growth (percent): 6.2 (Actual 2024), 2.1 (2025), 2.1 (2026), 4.1 (2027), 4.1 (2028), 4.1 (2029), 4.0 (2030), 4.1 (2031), 4.1 (2032), 4.1 (2033), 4.1 (2034)
  - Effective interest rate (percent): 2.4 (Actual 2024), 1.7 (2025), 1.7 (2026), 1.7 (2027), 1.7 (2028), 1.8 (2029), 1.8 (2030), 1.8 (2031), 1.8 (2032), 1.8 (2033), 1.8 (2034)
  - Gross financing needs: 6.3 (Actual 2024), 3.1 (2025), 3.0 (2026), 3.2 (2027), 3.1 (2028), 2.9 (2029), 3.3 (2030), 3.6 (2031), 3.9 (2032), 4.2 (2033), 4.5 (2034)
  - Of which: debt service: 6.5 (Actual 2024), 2.5 (2025), 2.5 (2026), 2.8 (2027), 2.8 (2028), 2.8 (2029), 3.4 (2030), 3.7 (2031), 4.0 (2032), 4.4 (2033), 4.7 (2034)

### Realism and assessment of projections
- Baseline forecasts fall within historical error bands, and the planned fiscal adjustments are realistic by both domestic and cross-country standards.
- Key drivers of debt dynamics align with past patterns: while slower medium-term real GDP growth is expected to increase debt, a narrower primary deficit indicates fiscal consolidation relative to the pandemic period.
- Projections for the debt-to -GDP ratio and cyclically adjusted primary balance are reasonable in the context of Korea’s historic experience and international benchmarks.
- Weaker GDP growth and an expansionary fiscal stance have raised the debt-to -GDP ratio compared with last year’s debt sustainability assessment (Annex II, IMF Country Report No. 25/41).
- The real GDP growth over the medium term is projected to be below the 10-year historic average, reflecting a slowdown in productivity growth.
- Baseline growth forecasts remain below those implied by historical fiscal multipliers.

### Vulnerabilities and long-term risks
- Long-term risks are significant as aging-related expenditures on health, welfare, and social security are expected to rise sharply due to demographic shifts driven by low fertility and population aging.
- These pressures will result in increasing debt levels and gross financing needs under the baseline.
- Comprehensive reforms—particularly pension reform and enhanced revenue mobilization—are essential to mitigate these long-term fiscal challenges.
- Triggered modules highlight pensions and health as key drivers of long-term risk, with projections showing:
  - Pension financing needs and implied permanent adjustments of 5.3% (30 years), 7.9% (50 years), and 8.8% (Until 2100) in pp of GDP per year (Figure 8 metadata).
  - Long-term simulations suggest GFNs and amortization will exceed the 2015–2024 average by more than one standard deviation, but GFNs would remain below 10 percent of GDP by 2050 under all scenarios.
  - From low public debt levels, spending pressures would increase debt but debt would remain below 90 percent of GDP under the baseline with t+5 scenario.

### Risk assessment and policy recommendations
- Overall risk of sovereign stress: Low (near term: Low; medium term: Low; long term: High).
- Medium-term risk is assessed as low, reflecting a stable debt trajectory and manageable gross financing needs, supported by a stable primary balance, steady economic growth, and relatively low initial debt levels by advanced economy benchmarks.
- Long-term risks are high, due to aging-related expenditures on health, welfare, and social security feeding into debt dynamics.
- Global risks identified with likelihood and impact assessments include:
  - Escalating trade measures and prolonged uncertainty — Likelihood: High; Impact: High.
    - Policy response: Provide temporary and targeted fiscal support to vulnerable workers and export businesses; apply temporary and targeted stabilization measures in disorderly financial market conditions; limit FXI to counter excessive FX market volatility.
  - Financial market volatility and correction — Likelihood: High; Impact: High.
    - Policy response: Provide temporary and targeted support to affected financial institutions with safeguards; prompt resolution of problematic NBFIs; regulate issuance of crypto assets.
  - Geopolitical tensions — Likelihood: High; Impact: Medium.
    - Policy response: Provide temporary and targeted fiscal support; apply temporary and targeted market stabilization measures if needed.
  - Commodity price volatility — Likelihood: High; Impact: Medium.
    - Policy response: Allow public utility companies to pass through international energy prices with targeted support to vulnerable groups; monetary policy to preserve price stability.
  - Fiscal vulnerabilities and higher long-term interest rates — Likelihood: High; Impact: Low.
    - Policy response: Provide temporary and targeted support to affected financial institutions with safeguards.
  - Cyberthreats — Likelihood: High; Impact: Low.
    - Policy response: Assess IT risk management, prepare contingency plans; provide temporary and targeted support if disruptions cause instability.
  - Climate change — Likelihood: Medium; Impact: Medium.
    - Policy response: Enhance adaptation and mitigation strategies; provide targeted fiscal support to affected parties.
  - New trade agreements — Likelihood: Low; Impact: Medium.
    - Policy response: Diversify trade markets and products; advance structural reforms to boost productivity growth.
- Domestic risks highlighted:
  - Slowdown of the semiconductor sector due to softening of AI-related demand — Likelihood: Medium; Impact: Medium.
    - Policy response: Allow flexible exchange rates and automatic stabilizers to operate; consider slower fiscal normalization and more accommodative monetary policy if shock is larger.
  - Rising liquidity and insolvency concerns of weak NBFIs — Likelihood: Low; Impact: Medium.
    - Policy response: Provide temporary and targeted liquidity support to viable institutions with safeguards; prompt resolution of problematic NBFIs.

*Source: IMF staff (1korea2025003-source-pdf).*

### Annex VII. A Quarterly Projection Model for Korea: Assessing

### Annex VII. A Quarterly Projection Model for Korea: Assessing Monetary-Fiscal Trade-Offs

### Introduction
- Purpose: Use a semi-structural Quarterly Projection Model (QPM) tailored to Korea’s institutional and macroeconomic context to assess alternative monetary and fiscal policy paths and trade-offs over the medium term.
- Baseline calibration: Aligned with the government’s current policy priorities and the macroeconomic forecast presented in the main text of the staff report.
- Key policy tension: Accommodative monetary and fiscal measures can support slowing growth but risk pro-cyclicality, higher inflationary pressures, and weaker fiscal space if maintained beyond the closure of the output gap or deployed too aggressively.
- Expected timing in baseline: Fiscal policy remains accommodative until the output gap is closed in 2029; the baseline assumes the policy rate reaches 1.75 percent by 2026Q1.

### The Model — Core Block
- Structure: Four behavioral equations linking output, inflation, interest rates, and exchange rates through gap-based relationships.
- Core equations and roles:
  - IS curve: Output gap depends on its own lag, foreign output gap, a real monetary conditions index (MCI) capturing interest rate and exchange rate channels, and a fiscal impulse term.
  - Phillips curve: Hybrid (backward- and forward-looking) inflation equation; real marginal costs drive inflation pressure. For core inflation, drivers include the output and real exchange rate gap; for food and energy inflation, global commodity price fluctuations are also included.
  - Monetary policy rule: Nominal policy interest rate responds to deviations of expected inflation from target and the output gap; includes interest rate smoothing.
  - Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP): Exchange rate determined by interest rate differential with abroad, with lagged and expected exchange rate terms to capture capital flows and persistence.
- Purpose: Define internal transmission mechanisms and enable coherent medium-term forecasts respecting economic identities.

### The Model — Fiscal Block
- Components:
  - Government debt accumulation identity: Links public debt to past debt, nominal interest payments, and the overall deficit.
  - Primary deficit rule: Adjusts the structural primary balance in response to deviations of the debt-to-GDP ratio from its medium-term anchor; responsiveness is calibratable.
  - Fiscal impulse term: Changes in the structural primary balance feed into the IS curve to capture short-run aggregate demand effects.
- Institutional framing: Designed to capture Korea’s proposed dual-rule fiscal framework under consideration at the National Assembly — a 60 percent debt ceiling and a 3 percent managed deficit cap. The fiscal rule is not modeled as binding in every period to allow counterfactual fiscal paths.

### Policy Scenario Analysis — Overview
- Three stylized scenarios simulated with the QPM:
  - Scenario A: Additional/front-loaded monetary easing.
  - Scenario B: Higher medium-term deficit (sustained fiscal easing without medium-term consolidation).
  - Scenario C: Combined monetary and fiscal stimulus (Scenario A + Scenario B).

### Scenario A — Additional Monetary Policy Easing
- Design: Policy rate lowered more aggressively than baseline, reaching the lower bound of the Bank of Korea’s estimated neutral range by early 2026; thereafter follows the Taylor-type rule and interest rate smoothing back to long-run level.
- Key outcomes:
  - Short-term: Output rises relative to baseline over the first several quarters; the output gap closes more rapidly.
  - Inflation: Pickup in demand leads to a modest and persistent rise in inflation, peaking around 0.1 percentage points above the baseline.
  - Medium-term: To contain inflationary pressures, the policy rate gradually increases in the outer years, rising above the midpoint of the estimated neutral range; this dampens medium-term output gains.
- Interpretation: Faster easing supports growth in the short term but implies tighter policy later and more subdued activity, highlighting an intertemporal trade-off and the importance of timing.

### Scenario B — Higher Medium-Term Deficit
- Design: Fiscal deficit remains elevated at its 2026 level throughout 2030 (no medium-term consolidation).
- Key outcomes:
  - Growth: No perceptible growth benefits relative to the baseline.
  - Inflation and monetary response: Prolonged elevated deficit intensifies inflationary pressures, prompting monetary policy to raise interest rates in the medium term.
  - Output effects: Higher interest rates dampen economic activity, offsetting fiscal stimulus given relatively low fiscal multipliers.
  - Debt dynamics: Public debt rises more rapidly, rising above 60 percent of GDP by the end of the forecast period.
- Interpretation: Delaying fiscal adjustment generates macroeconomic costs—weaker medium-term growth and higher public debt—without delivering lasting growth gains.

### Scenario C — Combined Monetary and Fiscal Stimulus
- Design: Combines Scenario A’s front-loaded cuts (policy rate reaching the lower bound of the estimated neutral range in early 2026) with Scenario B’s sustained fiscal accommodation through 2030.
- Key outcomes:
  - Near-term: Economic activity follows a similar path to the monetary easing scenario in the near term.
  - Inflation: Addition of sustained fiscal accommodation produces stronger demand-side pressures and a more pronounced rise in inflation relative to the baseline.
  - Monetary tightening: The monetary policy rule triggers a sharper tightening in the medium term in response to higher inflation.
  - Growth and debt: Sharper tightening weighs on economic activity and slows growth relative to the baseline; public debt rises faster due to sustained deficits and higher debt servicing costs.
- Interpretation: Overextending expansionary policies risks weakening macroeconomic stability and increasing debt without delivering sustained gains in potential growth; structural reforms are needed to lift potential growth.

### Key Quantitative and Timing Points from Simulations and Calibration
- Baseline policy rate assumption: policy rate reaching 1.75 percent by 2026Q1.
- Timing for output gap closure in baseline: 2029.
- Monetary easing scenarios reach the lower bound of the estimated neutral range by early 2026.
- Inflation effect in monetary easing: peaks around 0.1 percentage points above the baseline.
- Fiscal scenario debt outcome: public debt rises above 60 percent of GDP by the end of the forecast period.
- High-deficit scenario horizon: fiscal deficit elevated at 2026 level through 2030.

### Complementary Recommendations and Observed Institutional Actions (selected items from related policy-monitoring table)
- Open banking and cyber security:
  - 54 banks and electronic financial service providers offering open banking services at end of 2020 were subject to inspections conducted from February to April 2021.
  - The FSC drew up measures to improve the open banking system, including ways to enhance security on October 21, 2020.
  - Amendment of the Electronic Financial Transactions Act was proposed to the National Assembly on November 27, 2020.
  - Periodic and non-periodic inspections of fintech companies and a system/framework for inspecting cyber security of financial institutions established on December 22, 2021.
- Household debt and Jeonse risks:
  - The FSC announced measures to strengthen household debt management in October 2021, including improving DSR rules on individual borrowers.
  - The FSC monitored the "reverse Jeonse" phenomenon and in July 2023 temporarily loosened loan regulations for homeowners taking loans to repay Jeonse deposits.
- Stress-testing and liquidity:
  - The temporary deregulatory measures on the FX liquidity ratio expired in June 2022; the regulatory FX LCR was restored to 80 percent.
  - FSS improved top-down stress testing by developing K-IFRS compatible lifetime expected credit loss models; further improvements planned mid- and long-term.
  - The BOK incorporated more granular risk assessment in June 2024 by estimating probability of default across borrower dimensions.
  - The BOK developed a liquidity stress test model and conducted a foreign currency liquidity stress testing for NBFIs in June 2024, including mutual savings banks, mutual credit cooperatives, credit-specialized financial companies, securities companies, insurance companies.
  - The BOK conducted a top-down stress test to assess PF risks at securities companies in July 2025, evaluating domestic PF exposures and risks from foreign commercial real estate investment.

*Prepared by Alexander Borodin (ICD), Matteo Ghilardi, and Tommy Lee (APD); based on Borodin et al. (forthcoming).*

### Annex VIII. FSAP Key Recommendations

### Annex VIII. FSAP Key Recommendations

### Strengthening the Preemptive Management of Systemic Vulnerabilities
- Strengthen the institutional framework for financial stability by assigning the MEFM (or a body empowered for the equivalent purpose) macroprudential oversight as its sole primary objective  
  - Agency: MOEF, FSC and BoK  
  - Description of Actions Taken:
    - "The  Macroeconomic  and  Finance  Meeting,  the  meeting  in  which  the  agencies  concerned  with  macroeconomic  affairs  gather and discuss, is operated in Korea with the sole primary objective of analyzing and enhancing macro-prudence."
    - "Furthermore, taking IMF’s recommendation into account, the meeting has become a regular affair to discuss the way to enhance macro-prudence."
    - "In light of recent economic circumstances, the ‘Emergency Meeting on Macroeconomic and Financial Stability’, which is presided over by the minister and joined by governors of BoK/FSS/FSC, has been held regularly in addition to the existing meeting presided over by the vice minister."

- Widen the definition of financial holding company and enhance legal powers to cover all financial conglomerates, including requirements for group- wide liquidity risks and contingency plans  
  - Agency: MOEF and FSC/FSS  
  - Description of Actions Taken:
    - "The Act on Supervision of Financial Groups took effect in June 2021. With the aim of strengthening supervision of non-holding financial conglomerates, the Act contains provisions related to (i) tightened internal control and risk management and (ii) solvency management (contagion risks and concentration risks, etc.), including the supervision of capital adequacy. Under the Act, it is required to submit and implement a management improvement plan in case of group-wide risks. Financial holding groups are already subject to similar measures under the Financial Holding Companies Act."
    - "For bank holding companies, the FSC and the FSS are regularly monitoring liquidity risk measures (LCR and NSFR)."

- Implement a Sectoral CCyB framework for secured and unsecured household exposures of the banking sector  
  - Agency: FSC/FSS and BoK  
  - Description of Actions Taken:
    - "The FSC/FSS has been considering measures to require banks to set aside additional capital in proportion to their household assets ranging from 0% to 2.5% of the total risk-weighted assets."
    - "FSC/FSS aimed to adopt the sectoral CCyB in 2022. However, with slower growth in household lending and the easing of economic procyclicality due to the increased CCyB (1%), discussions have been put on hold for the time being. FSC/FSS is still monitoring macroeconomic developments to determine the adoption and timing of enforcement."

- Review the role of state-controlled banks and ensure that their commercial lending and investment activities conform, at a minimum, with prudential requirements for nationwide banks  
  - Agency: FSC/FSS  
  - Description of Actions Taken:
    - "To improve the resiliency of state-controlled banks with regard to the management of lending and investment activities, the Korea Development Bank and Industrial Bank of Korea adopted the Basel III framework for credit risk in December 2020, and finalized the implementation of Basel III in January 2023 with the same prudential requirements as for nationwide banks."

### Intensifying Supervision and Promoting a Level Playing Field
- Increase risk-based supervisory intensity of insurers, ensure a prudent and proportionate implementation of Korea Insurance Capital Standard (K-ICS) (solvency regime) and design of the capital charge for longevity risks  
  - Agency: FSC/FSS  
  - Description of Actions Taken:
    - "The FSC/FSS announced the final version of Korean-Insurance Capital Standard (K-ICS) and implemented K-ICS in 2023."
    - "K-ICS evaluates assets and liabilities at fair value including insurance liabilities and adds new insurance risks such as longevity risks."
    - "The FSS changed the method of measuring required capital from risk coefficient to stress approach, and increased the risk confidence levels from 99% to 99.5%."
    - "The FSC/FSS has supported the stable establishment of K-ICS and has implemented the K-ICS external verification regime requiring insurance companies to submit verification reports validated by accounting firms. To reinforce the transparency of the regime, the FSS discloses the verification reports to the public."

- Focus the role of the FSC towards strategy, addressing nonbank data gaps, market development policies, and crisis preparedness while assigning greater operational and enforcement authority to the FSS  
  - Agency: MOEF and FSC/FSS  
  - Description of Actions Taken:
    - "The FSC is responsible for formulating financial policies, supervising financial institutions, and financial markets, protecting consumers, and advancing Korea’s financial industry."
    - "On the other hand, the FSS examines and supervises financial institutions under the oversight and guidance of the FSC as per the Act on the Establishment, etc. of Financial Services Commission."
    - "The FSC and FSS will closely cooperate with each other to address financial issues in a timely and harmonious way while playing their own roles as stipulated in the Act."

- Support the development of pension and contractual savings products by introducing multi-employer pension schemes and building further capacity for oversight of pension funds market  
  - Agency: MOEL, MOHW  
  - Description of Actions Taken:
    - (No specific action text provided in the source excerpt beyond agency assignment.)

### Reinforcing Crisis Management, Safety Nets, Resolution Arrangements
- Include cross-border activities and overseas operations of financial conglomerates in resolution plans, clarify issues relating to resolvability, and relationship between ELA and resolution funding  
  - Agency: FSC/FSS  
  - Description of Actions Taken:
    - "The Recovery and Resolution Plans (RRP) for financial holding companies and banks came into effect in June 2021.  Since then, four cycles of RRP are completed. The fifth cycle is currently underway."
    - "Issues regarding cross-border activities/operations are included in FSC’s deliberation standards on RRP and resolution plans developed by the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC)."
    - "If financial institutions fail to meet FSC’s deliberation standards on RRP, the FSC may require them to supplement and address issues/challenges in accordance with the law."
    - "Pursuant to the amendment of the Act on the Structural Improvement of the Financial Industry (December 2020), D-SIFIs are required to draw up their own recovery plans, and Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation draws up the resolution plans every year as recommended by the Financial Stability Board. These requirements came into effect in June 2021."
    - "The FSS develops evaluation reports on the recovery plans prepared by D-SIFIs, and the FSC approves the recovery plans based on the evaluation reports and reviews of the RRP committee. The RRP committee comprises the chair from the FSC and four committee members from external experts."

- Strengthen the insolvency and creditor’s rights regime through well-resourced courts and a functioning insolvency practitioners’ profession  
  - Agency: MoJ  
  - Description of Actions Taken:
    - "The Act on the Establishment and Jurisdiction of Courts of Various Levels was revised in December 2022, and Suwon Bankruptcy Court and Busan Bankruptcy Court will be established to provide residents in each jurisdiction with specialized and faster judicial service regarding rehabilitation and bankruptcy cases."
    - "The Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act was revised in December 2022 to permit overlapping jurisdictions and allow debtors to file rehabilitation cases, simplified rehabilitation cases, bankruptcy cases, or individual rehabilitation cases in Busan Bankruptcy Court if they reside in or their main offices are in Ulsan Metropolitan City or Gyeongsangnam-do (South Gyeongsang Province)."

*Annex VIII. FSAP Key Recommendations, source PDF.*

### 9. High integration in global value chains (GVCs) is typically associated with productivity

### 9. High integration in global value chains (GVCs) is typically associated with productivity

### GVC integration: benefits and risks
- Benefits observed in advanced economies (AEs):
  - Access to cheaper and more varied intermediate inputs.
  - Opportunities for knowledge diffusion and economies of scale (Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, 2013; Égert, 2017).
  - Higher productivity at both the industry and firm level (Amador and Cabral, 2015).
  - Lower consumer prices, benefiting lower-income households in particular (Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal, 2016).
- Risks and trade-offs:
  - Increased dependency on imports and exposure to foreign demand shocks and supply disruptions, especially when chokepoints exist from a limited range of buyers or suppliers (Crowe and Rawdanowicz, 2013; Schwellnus et al. 2023).
  - GVCs accelerate transmission of economic shocks due to high interdependence and interconnectedness (Angelidis and Varsakelis, 2023).
  - Replacement of domestically produced inputs by imported ones can result in loss of legacy domestic value chains, with negative short-run effects on growth and labor.

### Measuring GVC participation
- Gross exports decomposition (Koopman et al., 2010):
  - Backward integration: foreign value-added embedded in exports (import content of exports).
  - Domestic value-added in exports: further decomposed by how exported products are used abroad.
    - Final consumption in destination country.
    - Intermediate input in destination country that is immediately consumed as final good.
    - Intermediate input in destination country that is re-exported (forward integration).
  - GVC participation is measured by the sum of forward and backward integration.

### Korea’s GVC profile and implications
- High backward integration:
  - Korea relies heavily on imported inputs (raw materials, components) leading to a high embedded share of foreign value-added in exports.
  - Backward integration of Korea’s exports is among the highest in the world, driven mostly by the high import content of medium- to high-technology goods, which represent the bulk of Korea’s exports.
  - Import content of service exports is at par with the global average.
  - Implication: contribution to growth via net exports is somewhat lower compared with goods and services relying more on domestic intermediate inputs.
- Low forward integration:
  - Forward integration of Korea’s exports is among the lowest, implying Korea’s position in GVCs is downstream or close to the final consumer.
  - Causes: Korea’s relatively small size limits domestic generation of intermediate inputs; strategic production model producing complex high-tech final goods reliant on many imported parts.
  - Vulnerabilities and advantages:
    - Exports are relatively more vulnerable to domestic consumption shocks in key trading partners.
    - Exports are relatively less vulnerable to trade tensions that could disrupt re-export arrangements.

### Enhancing the resilience of the export growth engine

- Goods exports: maintaining the technological edge
  - Korea’s export competitiveness depends on sustained innovation and AI adoption.
  - Korea has high and rising revealed comparative advantage over the past three decades, particularly in higher-technology goods.
  - Policy interventions with high multiplier effects:
    - Public research funding—particularly for fundamental research with high spillover effects.
    - R&D tax incentives and research grants, especially for startups.
  - AI adoption:
    - AI adoption could lead to significant medium-term productivity gains, but benefits may be concentrated among larger, more mature firms (Chang et al. 2025).
    - AI adoption and usage are rapidly rising in larger and younger companies with stronger technological capacities.
    - Supporting AI preparedness in smaller firms and increasing labor market flexibility could support broad-based productivity gains and competitiveness for smaller exporters.

- Service exports: unlocking the potential
  - Structural advantages:
    - Services typically have lower import content and rely more on domestic inputs and expertise (notable exception: finance), potentially leading to a higher contribution to growth through net exports in the short run.
    - Service trade, particularly digitally delivered services, has expanded faster since the 2010s; WTO projects that the share of services in global trade will increase by 50 percent in 2040 compared to 2019.
  - Current performance and gaps:
    - Korea ranks as the 8th largest exporter in manufacturing but 18th globally in service exports as of 2023.
    - Service exports account for only 15 percent of total exports.
    - Korea has run a persistent service trade deficit since 2000.
  - Opportunities:
    - Growth of intellectual services (charges for use of intellectual property, information and communication services, cultural and leisure services) and other business services driven by digitally delivered services.
    - Services embedded in manufacturing (“servicification”) present promise, notably in electronics and automobiles.
    - Expanding R&D on the convergence between services and manufacturing and easing regulations on innovative business models could facilitate servicification.
    - Investing in human capital is critical because innovation in manufacturing demands a highly skilled workforce.

- Cultural content and intellectual services
  - Leverage technological advancement and cultural appeal to grow intellectual service exports:
    - Traditional services (transportation, travel, construction) accounted for around 60 percent of total service exports before the COVID-19 pandemic; share declined to less than half in 2024 due to rise of intellectual services and other business services.
    - Global favorability toward Korean cultural content reached 70 percent of respondents since 2019 (Korean government survey).
    - Cultural content exports grew at an average annual rate of 16 percent from 2020 to 2024.
    - K-drama ranked as the second most-watched genre with 10 percent share on the leading global streaming platform.
    - To transform potential into sustainable growth, recommended actions include building cultural clusters, expanding public financing, supporting AI through R&D, promoting international cooperation, and promoting IP creation and ownership.

- Addressing bottlenecks for service export emergence
  - Key constraints:
    - Service sector productivity stood at only 72 percent of the OECD average in 2019.
    - Investment in service-related R&D limited: 12.3 percent of total private R&D in 2021 and 5.8 percent of the projected government R&D budget for 2025.
    - Korea maintains relatively high entry barriers in the service sector compared to the OECD average (OECD’s Product Market Regulation Indicator).
    - Government support programs and export financing currently focus predominantly on goods exporters (over 80 percent).
  - Policy priorities:
    - Scale up investment in services R&D to enhance productivity and innovation capacity.
    - Ease regulatory constraints for digitally enabled new ventures and further open the service market to maximize pro-competitive gains and technological spillovers.
    - Extend government support programs, including export financing, to better support service exporters.

- Opening new markets and preserving existing ones
  - Diversification of trading partners enhances trade network resilience.
  - Korea’s trade agreements and integration:
    - Korea has 22 FTAs in effect with 59 countries as of 2025, covering 85 percent of the global GDP.
    - Deeper economic integration through new and upgraded FTAs could help diversify supply chains, increase resilience, and minimize potential disruptions amid greater trade policy uncertainty.
    - Continued trade cooperation with major partners—strengthening partnerships in high-tech sectors and increasing FDI—is essential.
    - Scope to strengthen regional trade integration in Asia, including reducing non-tariff barriers, with potential growth benefits for Korea.
    - Further trilateral economic cooperation within East Asia and high-standard bilateral agreements with individual ASEAN countries could foster stronger trade linkages with emerging export markets in the region.

- Diversifying export products
  - Korea’s exports have become more diversified in recent years.
  - Recent shifts:
    - Exports to the EU have been on the rise in 2025, reflecting a shift toward consumer goods beyond the traditional focus on intermediate and capital goods.
  - New potential goods sectors:
    - Defense industry, food, and cosmetic products are rising alongside Korea’s soft power and could help unlock new export markets.
  - Continued innovation within Korea’s complex export product space remains a priority.

*Source: IMF staff analysis as presented in the chapter “High integration in global value chains (GVCs) is typically associated with productivity.”*

### Annex X. Data Issues

### Annex X. Data Issues

### Data Adequacy Assessment — Summary Findings
- Median Rating: AAAAAAA
- Data Adequacy Assessment Rating 1/: A
- Data Quality Characteristics — Granularity 3/: A
- Questionnaire Results 2/: Assessment (detailed questionnaire results referenced in source)
- Staff conclusion: "Korea's data are adequate for surveillance."
- Exact staff statement on use of alternatives: "Staff does not use any data and/or estimates in the staff report in lieu of official statistics."

### Sectoral and Dimension Ratings (as presented)
- National Accounts: (table heading present)
- Prices: (table heading present)
- Government Finance Statistics: (table heading present)
- External Sector Statistics: (table heading present)
- Monetary and Financial Statistics: (table heading present)
- Inter-sectoral Consistency: (table heading present)
- Consistency: AA
- Frequency and Timeliness: AABAA (top row), followed by cells showing A, B, C, D in parts of the table

(Note: the table in the source shows sector headings and assessment cells; the source text notes: "When the questionnaire does not include a question on a specific dimension of data quality for a sector, the corresponding cell is blank.")

### Rationale, Shortcomings, and Changes Since Last Consultation
- Rationale for staff assessment: "Korea's data are adequate for surveillance. While the quality and accuracy of fiscal statistics is good, the frequency and timeliness of fiscal data could be further enhanced. In particular, the time lag for publication of general government data, which is available with a delay of approximately 11 months, could be reduced."
- Changes since the last Article IV consultation:
  - "The time lag for publication of general government data has been reduced to 11 months, from 14 months in the 2024 Article IV staff report, enabling more timely analysis and improving the formulation of policy advice, although still falling short from GFSM 2014 standards (recommending a delay of no more than three quarters)."
- Other data gaps: "Not applicable."
- Corrective actions and capacity development priorities: "Not applicable."
- Staff assessment of impact on surveillance:
  - "The data provided to the Fund have some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance."
  - "The data provided to the Fund have serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance." (both statements appear as categorizations in the source material)
  - Overall summary line in the source: "The data provided to the Fund are adequate for surveillance."

### Data Standards Initiatives and Data Provision
- Korea subscribes to the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) since September 1996 and publishes the data on its National Summary Data Page.
- The Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance is reported "As of October 16, 2025."
- Selected entries and metadata fragments from the Table of Common Indicators (as presented in the source):
  - Date of Latest Observation / Date Received / Frequency of Data / Frequency of Reporting / Expected Frequency 6,7 / Korea⁸ / Expected Timeliness 6,7 / Korea⁸ (table headers present)
  - Sample date entries shown in the table: "16-Oct-25", "Sep-25", "Oct-25", "Aug-25", "Q2 2025", "Q3 2025", "2023Dec-24"
  - Frequency and timeliness codes used in the table: ("D") daily; ("W") weekly or with a lag of no more than one week after the reference date; ("M") monthly or with lag of no more than one month after the reference date; ("Q") quarterly or with lag of no more than one quarter after the reference date; ("A") annual; ("SA") semiannual; ("I") irregular; ("NA") not available or not applicable; and ("NLT") not later than.
- Data categories listed in the Table of Common Indicators include (table headings as provided):
  - Exchange Rates
  - International Reserve Assets and Reserve Liabilities of the Monetary Authorities
  - Reserve/Base Money
  - Broad Money
  - Central Bank Balance Sheet
  - Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Banking System
  - Interest Rates (note: "Both market-based and officially determined, including discount rates, money market rates, rates on treasury bills, notes and bonds.")
  - Consumer Price Index
  - Revenue, Expenditure, Balance and Composition of Financing ‒ General Government (note on general government composition provided)
  - Revenue, Expenditure, Balance and Composition of Financing ‒ Central Government
  - International Investment Position
  - Stocks of Central Government and Central Government-Guaranteed Debt
  - External Current Account Balance
  - Exports and Imports of Goods and Services
  - GDP/GNP
  - Gross External Debt
- Footnotes present in the table:
  - 1: "Includes reserve assets pledged or otherwise encumbered, as well as net derivative positions."
  - 2: "Both market-based and officially determined, including discount rates, money market rates, rates on treasury bills, notes and bonds."
  - 3: "Foreign, domestic bank, and domestic nonbank financing."
  - 4: "The general government consists of the central government (budgetary funds, extra budgetary funds, and social security funds) and state and local governments."
  - 5: "Including currency and maturity composition."
  - 6 and 7: explanatory notes on frequency, timeliness, and encouraged/required reporting under e-GDDS and SDDS (text preserved from source).
  - 8: "Based on the information from the Summary of Observance for SDDS and SDDS Plus participants, and the Summary of Dissemination Practices for e-GDDS participants, available from the IMF Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board (https://dsbb.imf.org/). For those countries that do not participate in the Data Standards Initiatives, as well as those that do have a National Data Summary Page, the entries are shown as '...'."

### Data Provision to the Fund and Observance
- "The latest SDDS Annual Observance Report is available on the Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board (https://dsbb.imf.org/)." (statement preserved from source)
- "Data Provision to the Fund" and "Publication under the Data Standards Initiatives through the National Summary Data Page" are headings present in the source's table layout.

*Source: Annex X. Data Issues, staff report excerpts (Republic of Korea), as provided in the supplied content.*

### 428.8 billion dollars, up from 415.6 billion dollars a year earlier despite recent market volatility.

### 1korea2025003-source-pdf - 428.8 billion dollars, up from 415.6 billion dollars a year earlier despite recent market volatility.

### External position and current account
- International reserves: 428.8 billion dollars, up from 415.6 billion dollars a year earlier despite recent market volatility.
- Current account developments:
  - CA surplus (BoK, USD billion): (May → August projection) from 82 to 110 for 2025 / from 72 to 85 for 2026.
  - The current account surplus rose significantly in the first half of 2025 and is now expected to exceed earlier projections for both this year and next, supported by favorable semiconductor market conditions and robust primary income balances.
  - Some moderation is anticipated in 2026 amid the broader impact of higher tariffs and ongoing global trade uncertainty.
- FX policy stance:
  - Authorities reaffirm that FX market intervention is limited to episodes of excessive volatility and disorderly movements in exchange rates, and is not intended to target any particular level.

### Korea–U.S. tariff and investment agreement
- Key elements:
  - The Korea Strategic Trade and Investment deal was reaffirmed at the Korea–U.S. summit on October 29.
  - Joint factsheet released on November 13 outlining details of the agreement.
  - Includes 150 billion dollars of Korean investment in the shipbuilding sector approved by the United States.
  - Includes 200 billion dollars of additional Korean investment committed pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding with respect to Strategic Investments (MOU), signed on November 14.
- Safeguards and implementation:
  - The two governments have reached a mutual understanding that commitments in the MOU shall not be allowed to give rise to FX market instability in Korea.
  - Korea shall not be required to fund an aggregate amount greater than 20 billion dollars in any calendar year.
  - If fulfillment of MOU commitments may cause market instability, Korea may request an adjustment in the amount and timing of the funding, and the United States will, in good faith, give due consideration to such request.
- Expected impact:
  - The deal is expected to reduce uncertainty for financial markets and the broader economy and is intended to be leveraged as a catalyst for enhancing industrial competitiveness.

### New Government’s Economic Policy Priorities
- Strategic focus:
  - Revitalize domestic demand and regional economies; address long-standing structural challenges.
  - Economic Growth Strategy announced in August: build an innovation-driven, inclusive, and fair economy anchored in a strong institutional framework and globally aligned economic infrastructure.
- Policy pillars:
  - Accelerate AI transformation and expand investment and government support for cultural industries.
  - Continue financial and FX market reforms to improve capital allocation toward corporate investment and industrial innovation.
  - Reallocate fiscal and administrative resources from the Seoul metropolitan area to regional areas; provide comprehensive support for strategic industries tailored to each region’s strengths.
- Implementation and financing:
  - Strategy is backed by the 2026 budget and implemented in partnership with businesses, local governments, universities, and research institutions.

### Growth forecasts and near-term output path
- Growth rate (q/q, %) for 2025:
  - (1Q) -0.2
  - (2Q) 0.7
  - (3Q, Advanced Estimate, Bank of Korea, October 28, 2025) 1.2
- Growth forecast for 2026:
  - (Ministry of Economy and Finance, August) 1.8%
  - (Bank of Korea, August) 1.6%
  - (Korea Development Institute, November)1.8%

### Monetary policy
- Bank of Korea stance and actions:
  - BOK has maintained an accommodative monetary policy stance to alleviate subdued domestic demand.
  - Following two rate cuts in late 2024, two additional rate cuts were made in February and May of this year, bringing the Base Rate down to 2.50 percent.
  - BOK will maintain its rate cut stance in view of prevailing economic conditions and will continue to adjust the timing, size, and pace of further rate cuts based on incoming economic data.
- Financial stability monitoring:
  - BOK has closely monitored financial stability conditions, including effects of market stabilization measures on housing prices and household debt, as well as exchange rate volatility.

### Fiscal policy and reform
- Fiscal stance and objectives:
  - Authorities committed to balancing timely fiscal support with safeguarding long-term fiscal sustainability.
  - Given substantial fiscal space, accommodative policy is appropriate to revive subdued economic activity with strategic, high-impact, growth-enhancing investment.
- 2026 budget proposal priorities:
  - Strategic investment to prepare for the AI era.
  - Stronger protection for vulnerable groups.
  - Record-high R&D spending alongside significant cuts to low-performing programs.
  - Raises the standard median income and expands support for daytime activity assistance and job opportunities for persons with disabilities.
- Comprehensive fiscal reforms:
  - Revenue mobilization, expenditure restructuring, rationalization of tax exemptions, strengthening performance-based fiscal management.
  - Proactive assessment and management of medium- to long-term fiscal risks, particularly from aging-related spending pressures.
  - Building on the third long-term fiscal outlook (2025~2065), the government will support further discussions in the National Assembly on pension reform and explore measures to mitigate fiscal risks associated with social security funds.

### Financial sector policy and market reforms
- Financial stability and household debt:
  - Systemic risks remain low; financial soundness indicators across banks and non-bank financial institutions are well above regulatory thresholds.
  - Authorities expect the household debt-to-GDP ratio to moderate, supported by tighter borrower-based macroprudential measures and new supply-side policies.
- Housing and project financing:
  - Plans to expand public housing supply and encourage private participation through deregulation and enhanced legal and institutional support.
  - Risks related to real estate project financing (PF) are being addressed through ongoing soft-landing measures and market-led restructuring; comprehensive PF reform measures are being finalized by year-end.
- Market and FX infrastructure reforms:
  - Authorities reaffirm commitment to modernize corporate governance and upgrade capital market infrastructure to address persistent undervaluation of the domestic stock market and attract stable capital inflows.
  - FX market reforms advancing in a phased manner:
    - Extension of trading hours to 2:00 a.m.
    - Preparations to introduce a 24-hour trading system and establish an offshore Korean won settlement mechanism, with detailed plans and timelines expected by year-end.
  - Staff view that these reforms will strengthen the efficiency and resilience of the domestic currency market.

### Structural policies, labor, demographic, and climate agendas
- Productivity and innovation:
  - Enhancing productivity—particularly among SMEs and service sectors—through regulatory easing, stronger competition, and better-targeted government support.
  - Promote AI adoption and digital transformation to boost labor productivity and create quality jobs for youth and women; support with greater labor market flexibility and expanded training and reskilling programs.
  - Broaden region- and SME-specific job-matching initiatives.
- Labor market and social protection:
  - Develop a fair wage system, narrow wage gaps between large firms and SMEs, enhance employment stability for vulnerable groups, and improve industrial safety.
  - Strengthen social safety net measures and reduce living costs for low-income households.
- Demographic and climate policy:
  - Respond to population aging with life-cycle-based support measures: increased family-related budget spending, asset-building support for low-income youth, and expanded job opportunities for the elderly.
  - Climate commitments:
    - Confirmed 2035 NDC target of reducing net emissions by 53–61 percent from 2018 levels.
    - Preparing a long-term emission reduction roadmap for 2031–2049.
  - Authorities view climate policy as contributing to growth.

### Trade, external resilience, and economic security
- Trade orientation:
  - Strong support for non-distortionary, open trade and adherence to WTO processes.
  - In response to shifts in global trade and supply chains, efforts to enhance external resilience and support business adaptation include:
    - Promoting service exports—particularly in cultural content and intellectual property.
    - Diversifying trade partners and supply sources.
    - Providing urgent liquidity support to firms affected by higher tariffs.
- Economic security measures:
  - Strengthening preemptive and prudent management of economic security-related items and services via comprehensive vulnerability assessments, buildup of strategic reserves, and enhanced early warning systems.
  - All such measures remain fully aligned with global norms.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1korea2025003-source-pdf.pdf*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1korea2025003-source-pdf.pdf_
