## MALI: STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2025 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION ## Source details **Canonical URL:** [MALI: STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2025 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1mliea2025002-source-pdf.pdf) ## Other formats - [Markdown version](/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1mliea2025002-source-pdf.pdf.md) - [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1mliea2025002-source-pdf.pdf.json) --- ### Context and recent developments - 2024 shocks: persistent security attacks, protracted power outages, food insecurity, and catastrophic floods. - Major mine disruption: - Mali’s largest gold mine shut in January 2025 over a tax dispute tied to the 2023 mining code; operations placed under a six-month court-appointed administrator in June 2025; timing of a full restart and return of mining revenues remains unclear. - Political and aid environment: - Dissolution of all political parties and approval of a renewable five-year term for the transitional president in July. - Sharp aid cuts: USAID funding cut that caused a 70 percent reduction in assistance to food-insecure households; UNOCHA humanitarian funding reduced from $780 million to $260 million. - IMF engagement: - $129 million disbursement in April 2025 under the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF). - Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) in April 2025 focused on structural reforms to strengthen fiscal governance and transparency. - Governance progress: - FATF removal from the grey list in June 2025. - July 2023 constitution set up an independent financial-audit body; creation of specialized prosecutors and a national anti-corruption strategy through 2027. ### Outlook and principal risks - Growth projections: - Real GDP: 5.0 percent in 2025; 5.4 percent in 2026; 5.2 percent in 2027. - Inflation: - Consumer price inflation (average): 3.5 percent in 2025; 2.0 percent in 2026; 2.0 percent in 2027. - Current account (percent of GDP): - Including official transfers: -4.8 (2025), -2.8 (2026), -2.8 (2027). - Excluding official transfers: -5.0 (2025), -3.0 (2026), -3.1 (2027). - Balance of payments (percent of GDP): - Overall balance of payments: -0.8 (2025), 1.7 (2026), 1.9 (2027). - Terms of trade (deterioration -): 12.8 (2025), 1.5 (2026), -1.3 (2027). - Principal downside risks: - Gold-mine shutdown, aid cutbacks, elevated security incidents, power outages, broader domestic and global policy uncertainty. ### Fiscal outlook and public debt - Fiscal balances (percent of GDP): - Revenue: 21.5 (2025), 21.5 (2026), 21.5 (2027). - Tax revenue: 15.8 (2025), 15.6 (2026), 15.6 (2027). - Grants: 0.3 (2025), 0.3 (2026), 0.6 (2027). - Total expenditure and net lending: 25.2 (2025), 25.0 (2026), 25.1 (2027). - Overall balance (accrual basis): -3.4 (2025), -3.2 (2026), -3.0 (2027). - Overall balance (cash basis): -3.4 (2025), -3.9 (2026), -3.6 (2027). - Public debt and debt service: - Public debt: 50.5 percent of GDP (2025), 49.5 percent (2026), 48.8 percent (2027). - External public debt: 22.6 percent of GDP (2025), 21.2 percent (2026), 20.3 percent (2027). - Domestic public debt: 27.9 percent of GDP (2025), 28.3 percent (2026), 28.5 percent (2027). - Debt service: 7.1 percent of GDP (2025), 10.1 percent (2026), 12.5 percent (2027). - Staff projection and commitments: - IMF staff projection: fiscal deficit is forecast to widen to 3.4 percent in 2025, driven in part by government spending to mitigate the impact of the flooding. - Authorities committed to reduce the deficit below the WAEMU deficit ceiling of 3 percent of GDP by 2027. ### Fiscal outcomes, financing, and composition (2023–25 highlights) - Fiscal outcomes and financing in 2024: - Fiscal deficit reduced from 3.6 percent of GDP in 2023 to 2.6 percent in 2024. - Authorities raised around two thirds (CFAF 975 billion) of planned regional-market financing in 2024. - Remaining financing met with exceptional payments from mining and telecom companies and a leaner public wage bill. - Capital expenditure historically low; domestically financed investment rose from 2.8 percent of GDP in 2023 to 3.7 percent in 2024; externally financed investment fell from 0.9 to 0.4 percent. - Historically, capital expenditures averaged over 6.5 percent of GDP between 2010 and 2021. - 2025 spending and financing: - Total priority and development spending was CFAF 260 billion in the first five months of 2025 (1.8 percent of GDP), higher than authorities’ projection of CFAF 205 billion (1.4 percent of GDP) for the first half of the year. - April 2025 RCF disbursement will partly cover priority and development spending costs in 2025. - Baseline foresees multilateral and some bilateral grants and loans resuming gradually from 2027, peaking at only 0.4 percent of GDP by 2030. ### Monetary and financial sector indicators and risks - Key indicators: - Credit to the government: 2.4 (2025), 25.1 (2026), 16.5 (2027). - Credit to the economy: -5.2 (2025), 7.5 (2026), 7.3 (2027). - Broad money (M2): -1.8 (2025), 7.5 (2026), 7.3 (2027). - Banking sector soundness (end-2024 / 2024 highlights): - Risk-weighted capital ratios: 15.2 percent in December 2024. - Gross NPL ratio: 11.9 percent (end-2024). - Provisioning rate: 53.9 percent (2024 Dec). - Liquid assets to total deposits: 40.4 percent (2024 Dec). - Total loans to total deposits: 89.6 percent (2024 Dec). - Financial stability concerns: - Growing exposure of Malian banks to government securities (banks’ exposure to the public sector rose from 5 to 25 percent of banks’ assets). - Recent halt in credit expansion; Directors recommended enhancing supervisory capacity and strengthening risk management frameworks. ### Structural and governance reforms to unlock growth - Main priorities: - Reduce domestic policy uncertainty and improve the business climate via transparency and regulatory stability. - Strengthen fiscal governance, public financial management, and oversight of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), particularly Energie de Mali (EDM). - Improve public investment management, spur private sector dynamism, attract foreign investment, address climate adaptation, and diversify the economy. - Governance measures: - Strengthen anti-corruption frameworks and operationalize the beneficial ownership register. - Further action on asset declaration enforcement, SOE oversight, judicial integrity, and mining sector regulatory frameworks. - Progress noted: removal from FATF grey list; centralized beneficial ownership register with 3,143 declarations in 2024 (only 74 asset declarations filed in 2024 and none published). - Structural constraints: - Youthful population growing at 3 percent annually with median age 15. - Education and infrastructure deficits: only three-quarters of children enroll in primary school; literacy among 15- to 24-year-olds under 50 percent; roughly half of households lack electricity; paved roads at 4 percent versus 18.5 percent regional median. - Economy dominated by capital-intensive gold exports and over 70 percent informal non-agricultural employment. ### Mining code, revenue mobilization, and tax policy - 2023 revised mining code: - Statutory regime allocates a greater share of revenues to the government via sliding-scale royalties, higher rates, greater state equity, and priority dividends. - If fully complied with, could increase fiscal revenues but may push Mali’s effective tax rate on mining far above peers and risk deterring exploration or shortening mine lifespans. - Tax policy and revenue mobilization recommendations: - Accelerate digitalization of tax payments for large and medium enterprises. - Generalize mobile tax payments for small and micro taxpayers. - Expand data sources for tax cross-checking; strengthen intelligence and taxpayers’ risk analysis. - Complete digital links between tax, customs, and treasury systems. - VAT exemption rationalization and excise taxes reform. - Medium-term fiscal framework and public spending controls: - Adopt a Medium-Term Revenue Strategy; contain the wage bill to meet WAEMU’s 35 percent ceiling; phase out broad subsidies in favor of targeted social transfers. - Protect public investment and priority social spending to avoid curtailing future growth; avoid further cuts to capital spending. ### Debt sustainability analysis (DSA) and stress tests - Public debt and composition (end-2024 / projections): - Public debt stock: 51.7 percent of GDP (end-2024). - External debt: 24.2 percent of GDP (CFAF 3,347 billion); multilateral creditors: CFAF 2,611 billion (18.9 percent of GDP); bilateral creditors: CFAF 735 billion (5.3 percent of GDP). - Public debt projected: 50.5 percent of GDP (2025), 49.5 (2026), 48.8 (2027); projected to decline to about 47.4 percent by 2030. - Contingent liability test calibration: - SOE component set at 12 percent of GDP (versus default 2 percent). - Financial sector shock: 5 percent of GDP. - PPP component: 1.3 percent of GDP. - Total contingent liabilities assumed: 18.3 percent of GDP. - Stress-test outcomes and vulnerabilities: - PV of external debt-to-GDP (baseline): projected to decline from 16.9 percent in 2025 to 13.4 percent in 2035. - PV of external debt-to-exports: 58.4 percent in 2025; 50.6 percent in 2030; 57.3 percent in 2035. - Combined contingent liability shock breaches the 55 percent public debt-to-GDP threshold in 2026 and remains above it through 2035. - Commodity price shock causes a breach by 2030. - Residency-based customized scenario causes debt service-to-exports and debt service-to-revenue ratios to exceed thresholds from 2025 onward. - Key DSA numeric macro projections (selected from Text Table 4): - Real GDP Growth (2024-2030-42 Avg): 4.7, 5.0, 5.4, 5.2, 5.1, 5.1, 5.2. - Overall fiscal balance (including grants, percent of GDP) (2024-2030-42 Avg): -2.6, -3.4, -3.2, -3.0, -3.0, -3.0, -3.0. - Export of goods and services (percent of GDP): 26.3, 28.5, 30.4, 29.9, 29.2, 28.6, 22.8. - Import of goods and services (percent of GDP): 31.8, 33.4, 33.0, 32.4, 32.4, 32.1, 29.9. - Current account (including grants, percent of GDP): -4.6, -4.8, -2.8, -2.8, -3.2, -3.6, -11.6. - Policy implications from DSA: - Maintain conservative fiscal stance to return to the 3-percent WAEMU deficit ceiling by 2027. - Address financial and operational weaknesses of EDM and other SOEs to limit contingent liabilities. - Diversify financing sources and reduce reliance on expensive regional debt markets. - Improve fiscal transparency to reduce stock-flow adjustments. ### Banking sector, financing needs, and market conditions - Gross Fiscal Financing Needs (GFNs): - 2024 GFNs = 1,102 billion CFAF (1,817 million USD), 8.0 percent of GDP. - 2025 GFNs = 1,470 billion CFAF (2,413 million USD), 9.9 percent of GDP. - 2026 GFNs = 1,984 billion CFAF (3,275 million USD), 12.4 percent of GDP. - Financing conditions and market developments: - ECOWAS sanctions in 2022 cut Mali off from the regional securities market, contributing to arrears in 2022 and 2023. - BCEAO policy rate rose from 2 percent in 2022 to 5.5 percent in 2024. - Domestic debt increased from 14 to 27.5 percent of GDP (2015 to end-2024). - Short-term domestic debt interest-rate assumptions: 9 percent average for 2024, 8.5 percent average for 2025; longer-term domestic debt: 9-9.5 percent in 2024 and 2025. - Debt service pressures: domestic debt-service-to-revenue ratio projected to increase sharply; debt service already significant (debt service: 6.7 percent of GDP in 2024). ### Risks, uncertainties, and scenarios - Downside risks emphasized: - Prolonged shutdown of largest gold mine could lower growth and fiscal revenues (staff: uninterrupted operation of Mali’s largest gold mine would have raised real GDP growth by 0.7 percentage points and fiscal revenues by 0.7 percentage points of GDP in 2025, excluding one-off payments). - Escalation of security risks, renewed aid losses, bank-sovereign nexus via high bank holdings of government securities, and extreme climate events. - Upside possibilities: - Lower oil prices easing electricity crisis. - New solar and hydropower capacity and planned grid upgrades due to come online in 2026. - Higher mining revenues from revised mining code attenuating fiscal and financial risks. ### IMF Executive Directors’ assessment and policy recommendations - Directors agreed with staff appraisal; welcomed resilience amid shocks and cautioned about downside risks and vulnerabilities. - Fiscal policy stance: - Supported temporary fiscal loosening in 2025 given lower mining revenues and elevated flood recovery spending. - Encouraged sustained efforts to strengthen domestic revenue mobilization and establish a medium-term fiscal framework. - Social protection and PFM: - Highlighted importance of strengthening social safety nets and scaling up targeted measures to support the most vulnerable. - Underscored bolstering spending efficiency and welcomed progress in public financial management reforms under the SMP. - Governance and anti-corruption: - Stressed continued governance reforms: AML/CFT, beneficial ownership registers, asset declaration enforcement, SOE oversight, and judicial integrity. - Growth-enhancing reforms: - Urged implementation of reforms to tackle growth bottlenecks, enhance public investment management, spur private sector dynamism, attract FDI, address climate adaptation, and diversify the economy. ### Data adequacy, technical assistance, and capacity development - Data adequacy assessment: "The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance." - Data Quality Characteristics: Granularity: C; Data Adequacy Assessment Rating: C. - Specific shortcomings: - Fiscal sector: reconciliation between stocks and flows could be improved; more granularity on debt stocks and public expenditure needed. - External sector: granularity, frequency of reporting and timeliness could be improved. - Public enterprises: staff would welcome debt statistics of SOEs and detailed list of government guarantees. - Technical assistance snapshot (selected): - National accounts, balance of payments, government finance statistics: "4 TA missions in FY24" and "5 TA missions in FY25". - Revenue and tax administration: "8 TA missions in FY24" and "5 TA missions in FY25". - Public financial management and TSA: "2 TA missions in FY24, 1 TA mission in FY25" and "4 TA missions in FY24, 2 TA missions in FY25". - Planned capacity support: - Launch a new CD workstream on macroeconomic modeling at INSTAT; continue IMF capacity development on domestic revenue mobilization, PFM, and governance reforms. - Coverage date stamp for indicators: "As of June 28, 2025". ### Key economic and financial indicators (selected exact series) - Real GDP growth: 3.5 (2022), 4.7 (2023), 4.7 (2024), 5.0 (2025), 5.4 (2026), 5.2 (2027). - Consumer price inflation (average): 9.7 (2022), 2.1 (2023), 3.2 (2024), 3.5 (2025), 2.0 (2026), 2.0 (2027). - Exports of goods and services: 28.5 percent of GDP (2025), 30.4 percent (2026), 29.9 percent (2027). - Imports of goods and services: 33.4 percent of GDP (2025), 33.0 percent (2026), 32.4 percent (2027). - WAEMU pooled reserves (end period, US$ billions): 2021: 24.2; 2022: 18.4; 2023: 15.8; 2024: 21.6. - Gold price (US$/fine ounce London fix): 2024: 2,387; 2025: 3,018; 2026: 3,174; 2027: 3,100; 2028: 3,148; 2029: 3,229; 2030: 3,260. - Balance of payments (overall, percent of GDP): 2024: 2.4; 2025: -0.8; 2026: 1.7; 2027: 1.9; 2028: 1.7; 2029: 1.8; 2030: 0.9. ### Political developments (timeline highlights, 2025) - January 21: Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger created a joint force to fight terrorists. - January 29: Official withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS (goods, services, and people exchanges maintained until further notice). - April–July: Series of legal and executive actions restructuring political-party framework; National Transitional Assembly approved a renewable five-year term for the Transitional President on July 2. - May 7–22: Suspension of political party activities; legal appeals and further legislative actions followed. *Source: IMF staff report for the 2025 Article IV consultation with Mali (staff estimates and projections, July 14, 2025).* ### 5.4 percent in 2026. The fiscal deficit is forecast to widen to 3.4 percent in 2025, driven in part ### MALI: STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2025 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION ### Context and recent developments - 2024 shocks: persistent security attacks, protracted power outages, food insecurity, and catastrophic floods. - Major mine disruption: Mali’s largest gold mine shut in January 2025 over a tax dispute tied to the 2023 mining code; operations placed under a six-month court-appointed administrator in June 2025; timing of a full restart and return of mining revenues remains unclear. - Political and aid environment: Dissolution of all political parties and approval of a renewable five-year term for the transitional president in July. Sharp aid cuts: USAID funding cut that caused a 70 percent reduction in assistance to food-insecure households; UNOCHA humanitarian funding reduced from $780 million to $260 million. - IMF support: $129 million disbursement in April 2025 under the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and a Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) in April 2025 focused on structural reforms to strengthen fiscal governance and transparency. - Governance progress: FATF removal from the grey list in June 2025, reflecting significant progress in AML/CFT and anti-corruption reforms; July 2023 constitution set up an independent financial-audit body; creation of specialized prosecutors and a national anti-corruption strategy through 2027. ### Outlook and principal risks - Growth projections: - Real GDP: 5.0 percent in 2025; 5.4 percent in 2026; 5.2 percent in 2027. - Inflation: - Consumer price inflation (average): 3.5 percent in 2025; 2.0 percent in 2026; 2.0 percent in 2027. - Downside risks: gold-mine shutdown, aid cutbacks, elevated security incidents, power outages, and broader domestic and global policy uncertainty. - Current account: - Current account balance, including official transfers: -4.8 (2025), -2.8 (2026), -2.8 (2027). - Current account balance, excluding official transfers: -5.0 (2025), -3.0 (2026), -3.1 (2027). - Balance of payments: - Overall balance of payments: -0.8 (2025), 1.7 (2026), 1.9 (2027). - Terms of trade (deterioration -): 12.8 (2025), 1.5 (2026), -1.3 (2027). ### Fiscal outlook and public debt - Fiscal balances: - Revenue: 21.5 percent of GDP (2025), 21.5 percent (2026), 21.5 percent (2027). - Tax revenue: 15.8 percent of GDP (2025), 15.6 percent (2026), 15.6 percent (2027). - Grants: 0.3 percent of GDP (2025), 0.3 percent (2026), 0.6 percent (2027). - Total expenditure and net lending: 25.2 percent of GDP (2025), 25.0 percent (2026), 25.1 percent (2027). - Overall balance (accrual basis): -3.4 percent of GDP (2025), -3.2 percent (2026), -3.0 percent (2027). - Overall balance (cash basis): -3.4 percent of GDP (2025), -3.9 percent (2026), -3.6 percent (2027). - Public debt: - Public debt: 50.5 percent of GDP (2025), 49.5 percent (2026), 48.8 percent (2027). - External public debt: 22.6 percent of GDP (2025), 21.2 percent (2026), 20.3 percent (2027). - Domestic public debt: 27.9 percent of GDP (2025), 28.3 percent (2026), 28.5 percent (2027). - Debt service: 7.1 percent of GDP (2025), 10.1 percent (2026), 12.5 percent (2027). - IMF staff projection: fiscal deficit is forecast to widen to 3.4 percent in 2025, driven in part by government spending to mitigate the impact of the flooding. - Fiscal ceiling commitment: authorities committed to reduce the deficit below the WAEMU deficit ceiling of 3 percent of GDP by 2027. ### Monetary and financial sector indicators - Credit and money: - Credit to the government: 2.4 (2025), 25.1 (2026), 16.5 (2027). - Credit to the economy: -5.2 (2025), 7.5 (2026), 7.3 (2027). - Broad money (M2): -1.8 (2025), 7.5 (2026), 7.3 (2027). - Financial stability concerns: - Potential vulnerabilities from growing exposure of Malian banks to government securities. - Recent halt in credit expansion noted by Directors. - Directors’ recommendation: enhance supervisory capacity and strengthen risk management frameworks to safeguard financial stability. ### Structural and governance reforms - Priorities to unlock growth: - Reduce domestic policy uncertainty and improve the business climate by improving transparency and stability of the regulatory framework. - Strengthen fiscal governance, public financial management, and oversight of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), particularly in the electricity utility, Energie de Mali. - Improve public investment management, spur private sector dynamism, attract foreign investment, address climate adaptation, and diversify the economy. - Governance measures highlighted: - Strengthen anti-corruption frameworks and operationalize the beneficial ownership register. - Further action on asset declaration enforcement, SOE oversight, judicial integrity, and strengthening mining sector regulatory frameworks. - Commended progress on AML/CFT enhancements and exit from FATF grey list. - Structural constraints: - Youthful population growing at 3 percent annually with median age 15. - Education and infrastructure deficits: only three-quarters of children enroll in primary school; literacy among 15- to 24-year-olds under 50 percent; roughly half of households lack electricity; paved roads at 4 percent versus 18.5 percent regional median. - Economy dominated by capital-intensive gold exports and over 70 percent informal non-agricultural employment. ### IMF Executive Directors’ assessment and policy recommendations - Agreed with staff appraisal: welcomed economic resilience amid conflict, food insecurity, floods, power outages, aid cutbacks, and the gold-mine shutdown; cautioned about substantial downside risks and vulnerabilities. - Fiscal policy stance: - Supported temporary fiscal loosening in 2025 given lower mining revenues and elevated spending needs post flooding. - Encouraged sustained efforts to strengthen domestic revenue mobilization to safeguard medium-term fiscal sustainability and create space for social and growth-friendly capital spending. - Urged establishment of a medium-term fiscal framework to enhance transparency, predictability, and policy credibility. - Social protection: - Highlighted importance of strengthening social safety nets and scaling up targeted measures to support the most vulnerable given high poverty levels, large numbers of displaced people, and declining foreign aid. - Public financial management: - Underscored bolstering spending efficiency and welcomed progress in public financial management reforms under the SMP. - Governance and anti-corruption: - Stressed continued governance reforms to strengthen fiscal management, business climate, and investor confidence. - Urged sustained efforts on AML/CFT, anti-corruption, beneficial ownership registers, asset declaration enforcement, SOE oversight, and judicial integrity. - Growth-enhancing reforms: - Urged implementation of reforms to tackle growth bottlenecks, enhance public investment management, spur private sector dynamism, attract foreign investment, address climate adaptation, and diversify the economy. ### Key economic and financial indicators (selected) - Real GDP growth: 3.5 (2022), 4.7 (2023), 4.7 (2024), 5.0 (2025), 5.4 (2026), 5.2 (2027). - Consumer price inflation (average): 9.7 (2022), 2.1 (2023), 3.2 (2024), 3.5 (2025), 2.0 (2026), 2.0 (2027). - Exports of goods and services: 28.5 percent of GDP (2025), 30.4 percent (2026), 29.9 percent (2027). - Imports of goods and services: 33.4 percent of GDP (2025), 33.0 percent (2026), 32.4 percent (2027). *Source: IMF staff report for the 2025 Article IV consultation with Mali (staff estimates and projections, July 14, 2025).* ### 7. The authorities reduced the fiscal deficit ### 7. The authorities reduced the fiscal deficit ### Fiscal outcomes and financing in 2024 - Fiscal deficit reduced from 3.6 percent of GDP in 2023 to 2.6 percent in 2024. - With Malian interest rates on the regional market frequently approaching 10 percent, the authorities raised only around two thirds (CFAF 975 billion) of their planned financing on the regional market in 2024. - Lacking external budget support, remaining financing needs were met with: - exceptional payments from mining and telecom companies, and - a leaner, albeit still sizeable, public wage bill. - Capital expenditure remained at historically low levels relative to GDP. - Domestically financed investment increased from 2.8 percent of GDP in 2023 to 3.7 percent in 2024, while externally financed investment declined from 0.9 to 0.4 percent. - Historically, capital expenditures averaged over 6.5 percent of GDP between 2010 and 2021. ### State-owned enterprises and electricity sector - Management of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), especially the electricity company EDM, remained challenging. - EDM losses improved from 1.2 percent of GDP in 2023 to about 0.4 percent of GDP in 2024, but persisted because lower sales and higher oil prices cannot be offset by tariff hikes or additional subsidies under current budget constraints. - To ease EDM’s cash crunch, government measures in 2024 included: - restructuring the utility’s short-term bank debt in March 2024; - striking a fuel-supply deal with Niger in April 2024 (implementation limited by logistics). - Other major state enterprises with long-standing unprofitability include: - CMDT (cotton financing and processing), and - SOMAGEP/SOMAPEP (water services and infrastructure). ### Public debt, arrears, and debt service - Public debt stabilized in 2024 at nearly 52 percent of GDP after years of rapid growth. - Share of external debt in total public debt fell to 46.8 percent in 2024, from 50.8 percent in 2023. - Debt service costs eased modestly to just under 7 percent of GDP in 2024, reflecting reduced new short-term debt issuances. - Arrears at end-2024: - Domestic arrears: CFAF 363 billion (2.6 percent of GDP). - External arrears: CFAF 99 billion (0.7 percent of GDP). ### External position and balance developments - Current account deficit narrowed to 4.6 percent of GDP in 2024 from 7.6 percent in 2023. - Drivers: lower petroleum and commodity import prices; reduced service imports following the end-2023 MINUSMA departure. - Strong private capital inflows, bolstered by exceptional mining payments and increased FDI, more than offset record-low public portfolio inflows and turned the overall balance into a 2.4 percent of GDP surplus in 2024 (from a 4.3 percent of GDP deficit in 2023). - EBA-lite assessment: the current account deficit is about 0.4 percent of GDP lower than what can be explained by fundamentals. ### Banking sector and financial stability - Banking system appeared stable in 2024, although credit and deposit growth came to a halt. - Risk-weighted capital ratios: 15.2 percent in December 2024. - Asset quality: gross NPL ratio at 11.9 percent (end-2024, unchanged from end-2023). - Credit and deposit growth rates entered negative territory during 2024 with a slight rebound towards end-2024 and early 2025, especially for households. - Negative deposit trends likely reflect withdrawal of available savings to respond to emergencies; near-zero credit growth late-2024 especially for corporates. - Banks’ exposure to the public sector rose from 5 to 25 percent of banks’ assets (mainly through increased government bond holdings), raising risk of crowding out private sector lending and intensifying the bank-sovereign nexus. ### Outlook and projections (staff views) - Growth: - Growth expected to increase to 5 percent in 2025. - Staff projects medium-term growth of slightly above 5 percent under current policies and continued uncertainty. - Uninterrupted operation of Mali’s largest gold mine would have raised real GDP growth by 0.7 percentage points and fiscal revenues by 0.7 percentage points of GDP in 2025 (excluding one-off payments). - Inflation: - Projected to rise to 3.5 percent in 2025. - Expected to converge to 2 percent from 2026 onward. - Current account: - Projected to narrow to 4.8 percent of GDP in 2025 and to 2.8 percent of GDP in 2026 (down from 4.6 percent in 2024). - Improvement driven by lower oil prices and a stronger CFA franc vis-à-vis the US dollar; medium-term dynamics influenced by gold and lithium developments. - Fiscal deficit: - Projected to widen to 3.4 percent of GDP in 2025, driven in part by lower mining-related revenues and higher flood recovery spending. - Projected to decrease to 3.2 percent in 2026 and return to 3 percent of GDP in 2027 to be consistent with the WAEMU deficit target. - Under the baseline, the 2023 Social Stability and Growth Pact is assumed to contain wage growth and limit new hiring; anticipated modest reductions in goods-and-services spending narrow the deficit by roughly 0.2 percentage points of GDP in 2026. - Public debt path: - Expected to fall slightly as a share of GDP in 2025 and gradually decline over the medium term, assuming fiscal discipline, gradual easing of global financial conditions, and a slow-paced resumption of external support. - Fiscal composition and spending: - Total priority and development spending was CFAF 260 billion in the first five months of 2025 (1.8 percent of GDP), higher than the authorities’ projection of CFAF 205 billion (1.4 percent of GDP) for the first half of the year. - April 2025 RCF disbursement will partly cover priority and development spending costs in 2025. - Baseline foresees multilateral and some bilateral grants and loans resuming gradually from 2027, peaking at only 0.4 percent of GDP by 2030. ### Risks to the outlook (tilted to the downside) - Major downside risks: - Uncertainty around the future of Mali’s largest gold mine could deepen revenue loss and weigh on growth; prolonged shutdown or transition could trigger sharper growth downgrades, lower fiscal revenues, and further external imbalances. - Escalation of security risks from domestic and regional conflicts and socio-political tensions could weigh on growth, exacerbate food insecurity and internal displacement, and deter international financial support (e.g., following approval by the National Assembly of a renewable five-year presidential term without elections). - Growing banks’ exposure to government bonds may increase financial stability risks via the bank-sovereign nexus amid escalating government financing needs, high security expenditures, poor SOE performance, and increased interest payments. - High vulnerability to extreme climate events (alternating drought and flooding), exacerbating poverty and food insecurity. - Upside possibilities: - Lower oil prices could accelerate relief for the electricity crisis by reducing operating cost of thermal power plants. - New solar and hydropower capacity and planned grid upgrades around Bamako are due to come online in 2026 and could improve supply if realized. - Higher mining revenues from the revised mining code would attenuate fiscal and financial risks. ### Authorities’ views and policy focus - Authorities more upbeat on 2025 and medium-term outlook: - Expect loss of output from the largest gold mine to be compensated by higher extraction at other mines, higher gold prices, and higher lithium production. - From 2026, expect Vision 2063 reforms, improved security, and increased lithium production to drive growth. - Optimistic about fiscal revenues from the 2023 revised mining code and new exploration. - BCEAO National Directorate of Mali expects credit growth to improve in 2025 following reduction of the BCEAO monetary policy rate and sees no major risks to financial stability in Mali. - Policy discussions focused on three priorities: - (i) tailoring short-term fiscal policy to cope with curtailed fiscal revenues and deep aid cuts amidst heightened uncertainty; - (ii) advancing structural reforms to underpin medium-term growth and aligning ambition with realism; - (iii) deepening governance and PFM reforms—including progress on SMP structural benchmarks. - Fiscal policy challenge: - The 2024 reduction of the fiscal deficit below 3 percent of GDP was achieved by significant cuts to capital spending; further cuts to capital and social spending risk undermining growth and livelihoods of the poor. - A sustainable, growth-friendly adjustment requires boosting domestic revenue mobilization and, on the expenditure side, “doing more with less” by curbing waste, improving spending efficiency, prioritizing high-impact social programs, and rationalizing costly subsidies. *Source: 1mliea2025002-source-pdf - 7. The authorities reduced the fiscal deficit* ### 24. Discussions around the implementation of the 2023 revised mining code focused on ### 24. Discussions around the implementation of the 2023 revised mining code focused on ### Mining code impact and risks - The 2023 mining code’s statutory regime aims to allocate a greater share of revenues to the government through sliding-scale royalties, higher rates, greater state equity, and priority dividends. - Assuming full compliance by mining companies, the revised mining code could increase fiscal revenues, but these measures could also push Mali’s effective tax rate on mining far above that of its peers. - The revised mining code is somewhat progressive with regard to gold prices, but the high reliance on quasi-royalties induces a potentially regressive burden with respect to costs. - Identified risks: - Potential deterrence of new exploration and shortening of mine lifespans if prices slump. - Possibility of “high-grading” whereby higher cost-per-unit deposits are left unexploited. - Staff sees a risk that some investors may reduce their investment in Mali, with adverse effects on mining revenues in the longer term. ### Tax policy and revenue mobilization recommendations - Staff suggested following recommendations in the 2023 TADAT assessment to broaden the tax base. - Tax-raising measures recommended: - Accelerating digitalization of tax payments for large and medium enterprises. - Generalization of the mobile tax payments for small and micro taxpayers. - Expansion of data sources for tax cross-checking purposes. - Strengthening of intelligence function and taxpayers’ risks analysis. - Completing digital links between tax, customs, and treasury systems. - Other key reforms: VAT exemption rationalization and excise taxes. - In the medium term, given large financing pressure and continued decline in aid flows, domestic revenue mobilization will be crucial to fund additional financing needs. ### Medium-term fiscal framework and public spending controls - Setting out a detailed medium-term fiscal framework, in line with regional recommendations, was seen as reinforcing public financial management. - Staff voiced support for the WAEMU Commission’s modified 2024 Domestic Revenue Mobilization Action Plan calling for the adoption of a Medium-Term Revenue Strategy for all countries, but noted that for many countries the 2025 deadline seems unlikely to be met. - Public spending control priorities: - Reforming SOEs, managing the public wage bill, and ensuring that subsidies are well targeted. - Reform loss-making SOEs—particularly EDM, CMDT, and SOMAGEP/SOMAPEP—through enhanced oversight, strengthening performance management, and cost-effective tariffs, including with World Bank and other technical assistance. - Contain the wage bill via targeted hiring freezes, attrition-based staffing, and a unified, performance-based pay scale to meet the WAEMU’s 35 percent ceiling. - Phase out broad subsidies on fuel and electricity in favor of targeted social transfers. ### Protecting public investment and social spending - Staff viewed protection of public investment and priority social spending as crucial to avoid curtailing future economic growth. - To maximize impact of capital spending on growth, staff stressed avoiding further cuts to capital spending and ensuring quality and efficiency of public investment. - Suggested measures to improve project quality: centralized asset registry, prioritized pipeline, and stronger project management, paired with deepened PFM reforms. - Authorities had increased priority social and development spending in the first half of 2025; staff urged continuation of efforts to protect the most vulnerable and expand targeted cash transfers to tackle widespread food insecurity, in close coordination with development partners. ### Authorities’ stance on fiscal policy and mining - Authorities emphasized commitment to fiscal discipline and controlling arrears while maintaining social spending. - They expect a significant boost to fiscal revenues from the 2023 revised mining code and expect higher mining investments, noting progressivity dependent on gold prices and production. - Authorities see scope for further revenue mobilization and expenditure control, including further tax measures and wage bill restraint, and remain open to technical assistance. - Authorities committed to poverty reduction aligned with response plan to last year’s flooding and Vision 2063. ### Structural reforms and private sector development - A strong private sector and improved business climate are needed for long-term growth; constraints include security risks, policy uncertainty, and climate shocks. - Authorities focused on attracting more FDI, especially in mining, and expanding sectors (gold, lithium, textiles) to kickstart diversification. - Staff emphasized reducing policy uncertainty, transparent regulatory frameworks—especially around mining taxes—and macroeconomic stability to encourage long-term capital commitments. - Mali’s Vision 2063 aims to reach 10 percent growth over the next 40 years, with phased 10-year implementation periods and priorities including regional economic hubs, transportation and infrastructure investments, skills development, healthcare, and governance. - Staff cautioned that industrial policies must be well-designed and effectively implemented and noted lessons: maintain macroeconomic stability, invest in human capital, and foster competition. ### Governance reforms and PFM improvements - Strengthening governance is essential to efficient spending, donor trust, and attracting private investment. - Noted governance gaps: underreported asset declarations, weak SOE oversight, and undocumented off-budget operations (stock-flow adjustments) that add to public debt. - Recommendations: - Continue commitment to deepen PFM and governance reforms, leveraging remaining recommendations from the 2021 Governance Diagnostic Assessment and IMF technical assistance. - Strengthen SOE oversight with independent boards and rigorous performance accountability. - Near-term improvements on disclosure and publication by high-level officials for asset declarations. - Progress and measures: - Operationalization of centralized beneficial ownership register with 3,143 declarations made in 2024. - Only 74 asset declarations were filed in 2024 and none have been published; progress on asset declarations remains limited. - Staff commended Mali’s active role in the UNODC’s corruption review process and peer-review participation. ### SMP, PFM milestones, and mining sector governance - Solid progress under the SMP: May 2025 census of public-sector bank accounts mapped dormant balances and sets stage for a Treasury Single Account. - Integration of tax, customs, and treasury IT systems is on track for end-July completion. - Authorities will undertake a first internal review of the initial use of the April RCF disbursement in July 2025 to confirm funds’ alignment with program goals. - Improving fiscal governance of the mining sector recommended to reduce regulatory uncertainty and reputational damage from protracted legal disputes. - Staff stressed the need for clear, transparent, and stable rules for sector oversight and strong accountability and transparency for any new state entities or partnerships (e.g., SOREM). - Staff urged insulating the budget from commodity swings by buffering windfall revenues rather than fueling pro-cyclical spending. ### Anti-corruption, judicial, and AML/CFT developments - Reforms implemented since 2019–22 include anti-corruption, judicial, and AML/CFT initiatives: National Economic and Financial Pole, cybercrime unit, unified specialized anti-corruption bodies, central register of beneficial ownership information, ARGASC, special prosecution service for transnational organized crime, national directorate of human rights, and empowerment of the Court of Auditors. - Recent steps in 2024 included amendments to penal and criminal-procedure codes, public release of annual court reports, routine audits, tightened internal controls, digitalization of payments and filings, and recruitment of 316 court auditors and 245 chief clerks over three years to accelerate case processing. - Authorities noted removal of Mali from the FATF gray list on June 13, 2025. ### Other technical assistance and data needs - IMF capacity development will continue to focus on domestic revenue mobilization, PFM, and governance reforms. - With Fund support, Mali is strengthening fiscal reporting for extra-budgetary entities, harmonizing debt records, and upgrading national accounts to SNA 2008 standards. - Data gaps in granularity, timeliness, and consistency persist; need for improved real- and external-sector statistics and publication of quarterly balance-of-payments data. - Staff and authorities agreed to launch a new CD workstream on macroeconomic modeling at INSTAT for short- and medium-term growth projections. ### Staff appraisal and macroeconomic outlook - Growth is expected to reach 5 percent in 2025, reflecting resilience from better-than-expected agricultural production, the start of lithium extraction, and continued growth in services, supported by improved electricity supply and fewer outages. - Negative factors include decrease in foreign aid, lower gold production, and the shutdown of the largest mine due to a protracted dispute with the government. - The current account deficit will narrow to 4.8 percent of GDP, reflecting lower oil prices and a stronger CFA franc. - The fiscal deficit is expected to widen to 3.4 percent of GDP. - Mali’s economic outlook faces substantial downside risks: uncertainty around the largest gold mine, resurgence of security risks, a jump in oil prices, vulnerabilities in the financial sector, and climate risks. - Staff expects the government to bring the fiscal deficit back below the WAEMU deficit ceiling of 3 percent of GDP by 2027 and cautioned that this goal should mainly be pursued through enhanced domestic revenue mobilization and stricter expenditure control (managing the public wage bill, SOE reform, and well-targeted subsidies). - Staff cautioned against reductions in capital expenditure that would constrain Mali’s long-term development and growth prospects and called for protecting the most vulnerable through targeted social transfers. *IMF staff summary based on the provided chapter content.* ### 45. Over the medium term, structural reforms will be key to develop Mali’s growth ### 45. Over the medium term, structural reforms will be key to develop Mali’s growth ### Medium-term growth prospects and role of the private sector - Over the medium term, structural reforms will be key to develop Mali’s growth prospects. - As the government is likely financially constrained, the private sector will have to play a larger role to reignite growth. - To do so, it will be important that the authorities create a stable and welcoming business environment. - Transparency of regulatory frameworks and a commitment to tackling binding bottlenecks to capital, labor and technological progress will be key. - The government’s long-term growth agenda is ambitious and strategic, but regional collaboration and renewed engagement with bilateral and international partners will be required to help finance and implement that agenda. ### Governance and public financial management reforms - Governance reforms will need to continue to play an important role to improve Mali’s business environment and attract foreign investment. - Staff welcomes the progress made in the fight against corruption and reforms to strengthen the rule of law. - Reforms to strengthen public financial management such as digitalization, enhancing the coordination between tax services and adopting a medium-term fiscal framework will result in greater accountability of the government. - Staff encourages continued effort to sustain progress in beneficial ownership transparency and on asset declarations, to fight tax evasion and corruption. - Transparent implementation of the new mining code will be essential to enhance Mali’s attractiveness as a destination for FDI. *Source: 1mliea2025002-source-pdf - 45. Over the medium term, structural reforms will be key to develop Mali’s growth* ### 47. Staff recommends that the next Article IV consultation for Mali be held on a 12- ### 47. Staff recommends that the next Article IV consultation for Mali be held on a 12-month cycle. ### Real sector: recent developments and outlook - Real GDP growth continued at similar levels in 2024 compared with 2023. - Sectoral performance in 2024: - Contractions in the secondary sector and some of the tertiary sector. - Gold production continued to decline in 2024 despite increasing gold market prices. - Medium-term growth outlook: - Output expected to grow by 5.1 percent per year between 2028 and 2030. - Growth is expected to increase from 2025 and be broad-based across sectors. - On the demand side, contributions from private consumption are expected to be larger from 2027 onwards. - Inflation: - Inflation peaked in 2022 driven by food prices and has fallen back since 2023. - Consumer price inflation (average) row in Table 1: 2023: 2.1; 2024: 3.2; 2025: 3.5; 2026–2030: 2.0 each year (exact entries: "2.1", "3.2", "3.5", "2.0", "2.0", "2.0", "2.0", "2.0"). ### External sector: developments and projections - Gold and trade: - Gold made up almost 80 percent of total exports in 2024. - Gold production is expected to fall back in 2025 and then recover somewhat over the medium term. - Current account and terms of trade: - The current account deficit is expected to narrow in 2026, reflecting a larger goods trade surplus. - Terms of trade expected to remain broadly unchanged near-term before worsening over the medium term. - Current account balance (including official transfers) from Table 1: 2024: -4.6; 2025: -4.8; 2026: -2.8; 2027: -2.8; 2028: -3.2; 2029: -3.6; 2030: -4.6 (percent of GDP). - External financing and reserves: - Net external financing expected to be negative in 2025 but should improve over the medium term as gold production increases and budget support returns. - WAEMU pooled reserves (end of period, US$ billions) in Table 1: 2021: 24.2; 2022: 18.4; 2023: 15.8; 2024: 21.6. ### Fiscal developments and outlook - Fiscal balance and public debt: - The fiscal deficit is expected to return to the WAEMU ceiling of 3 percent of GDP in 2027. - Public debt projected to decrease slightly over the medium term. - Overall balance (accrual basis) from Table 1: 2024: -2.6; 2025: -3.4; 2026: -3.2; 2027–2030: -3.0 each year (percent of GDP). - Public debt (percent of GDP) from Table 1: 2024: 51.7; 2025: 50.5; 2026: 49.5; 2027: 48.8; 2028: 48.1; 2029: 47.7; 2030: 47.4. - Revenues and spending: - Tax ratio estimated to have risen in 2024 and expected to remain elevated over the medium term. - Spending ratio increased in 2024 due to a modest recovery in capital spending. - Tax revenue (percent of GDP) in Table 2b: 2024: 14.8; 2025: 15.8; 2026: 15.8; 2027: 15.6; 2028: 15.7; 2029: 15.8; 2030: 15.9. - Financing and budget support: - External budget support has been at or near zero since 2021. - Authorities have become reliant on expensive domestic financing to fund budget needs. - Gross Fiscal Financing Needs (GFNs): - Table 3: 2024 GFNs = 1,102 billion CFAF (1,817 million USD), 8.0 percent of GDP. - 2025 GFNs = 1,470 billion CFAF (2,413 million USD), 9.9 percent of GDP. - 2026 GFNs = 1,984 billion CFAF (3,275 million USD), 12.4 percent of GDP. ### Monetary and financial sector - Credit, deposits, and financial conditions: - After declining for much of 2024, private credit growth was broadly neutral in early 2025. - Deposit growth turned slightly positive as the withdrawal of demand deposits halted. - Money supply (M2) contribution to growth from Table 5: 2024: -1.1; 2025: 1.8; 2026: -1.8; 2027–2030: 7.5, 7.3, 7.2, 7.2, 7.2 (exact series: " -1.1", "1.8", "-1.8", "7.5", "7.3", "7.2", "7.2", "7.2"). - Policy rates and yields: - The BCEAO reduced the policy rate in June by 25 bps, with market rates following. - Relatively large FX appreciation has caused a modest tightening in financial conditions. - Yield curves (Table 5 notes): 2024–2025 (until end-May) shown; debt interest costs remain very elevated due to high yields on the regional market. - Banking sector soundness (Table 6 highlights): - Gross NPLs to total loans: 2024 (Dec): 11.9 percent. - Provisioning rate: 2024 (Dec): 53.9 percent. - Regulatory capital to risk weighted assets: 2024 (Dec): 15.2 percent. - Liquid assets to total deposits: 2024 (Dec): 40.4 percent. - Total loans to total deposits: 2024 (Dec): 89.6 percent. ### Risks, uncertainties, and salient features - Domestic policy uncertainty reached an all-time high early in 2024. - Key commodity price and volume drivers: - Gold price (US$/fine ounce London fix) in Table 1: 2024: 2,387; 2025: 3,018; 2026: 3,174; 2027: 3,100; 2028: 3,148; 2029: 3,229; 2030: 3,260. - Gold accounted for nearly 80 percent of exports in 2024 and remains Mali’s key export commodity. - Balance of payments and reserves: - Overall balance of payments (percent of GDP) from Table 4b: 2024: 2.4; 2025: -0.8; 2026: 1.7; 2027: 1.9; 2028: 1.7; 2029: 1.8; 2030: 0.9. - Months of imports of goods and services next year (Table 1 memorandum): 2024: 4.5. ### Key fiscal and policy recommendation (staff advice) - Procedural recommendation: - Staff recommends that the next Article IV consultation for Mali be held on a 12-month cycle. - Policy priorities implied by the staff data and narrative: - Restore external budget support and reduce reliance on expensive domestic financing. - Support recovery in gold production and manage associated macro-fiscal volatility. - Contain fiscal deficits to return to the WAEMU ceiling of 3 percent of GDP by 2027. - Monitor and address elevated debt interest costs and banking sector asset quality. *Source: IMF staff report (figures, tables, and text excerpts provided in the content unit).* ### Annex I. Timeline of Key Political Developments, 2025 ### Annex I. Timeline of Key Political Developments, 2025 ### Overview - This annex gives an overview of major political developments since January 2025. - For an overview of events from 2022 onwards, see the 2023 Article IV staff report and the April 2025 report on a combined RCF-SMP facility. ### Key political developments in 2025 - January 21: Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger created a joint force to fight terrorists. - January 29: Official withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from ECOWAS, but free exchange of goods, services, and people maintained until further notice. - February 11: The minister for reconciliation, peace and national cohesion launched a program of disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion of ex-combatants in society. - April 30: The Council of Ministers approved a draft law repealing the Law of August 18, 2005, on the Charter of Political Parties and the Law of March 4, 2015, on the Status of the Political Opposition. This draft law is part of the implementation of the recommendations from the National Refoundation Conferences (NRC), which included: - reducing the number of political parties (around 300) by enforcing stricter conditions for their creation and financing; - revising the Charter to reaffirm the status of the leader of the opposition; and - banning political defection during a mandate. - The Council also noted the NRC’s recommendation for the installation of Army General Assimi Goïta as President of the Republic for a renewable five-year term starting in 2025—similar to his peers in the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—and the dissolution of all political parties and tightening requirements for creating political parties. - May 7: The president issued a decree suspending all activities of political parties and associations to preserve public order. Some opposition figures were arrested. - May 12: The National Transition Council (CNT) voted to repeal the political party charter, which established the moral and legal framework for political parties, as well as their operation, creation, and funding. To come into force, the repeal must be promulgated by the President. - May 13: President Goïta promulgated the law on the repeal of the charter of political parties. - May 22: Former opposition leaders filed an appeal against the suspension of political parties before 6 lower courts in Bamako and the Administrative Section of the Supreme Court, calling the government’s decision unconstitutional, an attack on the freedom of association and the right to participate in public life. - May 22: ECOWAS and foreign ministers from the AES, the Alliance of Sahelian States comprising Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, started a consultation on issues of common interest, including political and diplomatic relations, security challenges, and economic and social development. - June 11: The Council of Ministers advised favorably on a draft law to give the interim president a 5-year, renewable mandate, starting in 2025. - July 2: The National Transitional Assembly approved a renewable five-year term for the Transitional President. *Source: Annex I. Timeline of Key Political Developments, 2025.* ### Annex IV. Figure 1. Mali: External Sector Developments ### Annex IV. Figure 1. Mali: External Sector Developments ### Current account and trade flows - Mali’s current account deficit has been volatile in the past three years and stood at 4.6 percent of GDP in 2024. - Trade flows of major goods have driven recent current account dynamics, with the last three years partly reflecting elevated gold and oil prices, combined with a widening trade deficit and lower grants. ### Commodity prices (gold and petroleum) - Gold and petroleum price developments (index, 2016 = 100) are identified as key drivers behind export and import valuation effects that influenced Mali’s external balances over the recent period. - Lower gold prices would negatively affect exports and fiscal revenues; conversely, higher gold prices have contributed to swings in the current account in recent years. ### Capital account flows and portfolio investment - Official portfolio investment declined in 2022 and 2023. - Staff models suggest a sizable gap in capital account flows relative to fundamentals (model estimates for 2024 are presented in the source material). ### Current account composition and 2024 comparisons - The source presents the 2024 current account deficit relative to the 2018–23 average in billion CFAF and decomposes components, highlighting the roles of trade balance, grants, and other current transfers in producing the 4.6 percent of GDP deficit in 2024. ### Key takeaways and implications - Recent external volatility is driven by commodity price swings (gold, oil) and the interaction of a widening trade deficit with lower grant inflows. - Declines in official portfolio investment in 2022–23 and model-implied gaps relative to fundamentals point to risks in capital flow stability and potential external financing pressures. - Monitoring commodity price trajectories and restoring stable capital inflows will be important for external stability. *Source: Annex IV. Figure 1. Mali: External Sector Developments (IMF).* ### Annex VIII. Data Issues ### Annex VIII. Data Issues ### Data Adequacy Assessment for Surveillance - Overall assessment: "The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance." - Data Quality Characteristics: - Granularity: C - Data Adequacy Assessment Rating: C - Detailed questionnaire result summary: "Overall, the data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance, mostly related to granularity, timeliness and consistency." - Specific shortcomings identified: - Fiscal sector: "reconciliation between stocks and flows could be improved, and more granularity on debt stocks and public expenditure would be welcome." - External sector: "granularity, frequency of reporting and timeliness could be improved." - Public enterprises: "Staff would welcome debt statistics of SOEs, including a detailed list of government guarantees." - Inter-sectoral consistency: "could be improved." - Staff interpretation scale (as provided): - "The data provided to the Fund is adequate for surveillance." - "The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but is broadly adequate for surveillance." - "The data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance." - "The data provided to the Fund has serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance." ### Use of Non-Official and Alternative Data Sources - The Staff Report includes: - Cadre Harmonisé (CH): "provides relevant, consensual, rigorous and transparent analysis on current and projected food and nutrition situations." - Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC): "the world's leading source of data and analysis on internal displacement." - Climate change data: "drawn from the IMF climate dashboard." ### Data Standards and Dissemination - Participation: "Mali participates in the Enhanced General Data Dissemination System (e-GDDS) and first posted its metadata in September 2001 but is yet to disseminate the data recommended under the e-GDDS." - Note on National Summary Data Page and DSBB: entries for Data Standards Initiatives are referenced to the IMF Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board. ### Changes since the Last Article IV Consultation - GDP statistics: - "GDP statistics have been rebased historically and new statistics are now available, covering the most recent years." - "INSTAT also is producing quarterly GDP statistics and is working on improving the timeliness of the release." ### Corrective Actions and Capacity Development Priorities - Ongoing technical assistance and reform efforts: - "Work is ongoing with the assistance of STA, AFRITAC West and AFRISTAT to expand the coverage of the TOFE to public agencies and local governments, and to finalize historical series for the rebased GDP statistics." - Technical assistance snapshot (selected from the annex): - Improving quality and frequency of national accounts, balance of payment statistics and government finance statistics: "4 TA missions in FY24" and "5 TA missions in FY25" (Statistics). - Public financial management and TSA/accounting: "2 TA missions in FY24, 1 TA mission in FY25" and "4 TA missions in FY24, 2 TA missions in FY25" (Fiscal Affairs). - Revenue and tax administration: "8 TA missions in FY24" and "5 TA missions in FY25" (Fiscal Affairs). - Debt management training: "1 TA mission in FY 24" and "1 TA mission in FY25" (Monetary and Capital Markets). - Note: "FY24 = May 2023-April 2024, FY25 = May 2024-April 2025. Snapshot as of March 5, 2025." ### Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance (selected metadata) - Coverage date stamp: "As of June 28, 2025" - Examples of latest observations and receipt timing (as presented in table format): - Consumer Price Index: Date of Latest Observation: "Mar-2025"; Date Received: "May-2025"; Frequency of Data: "M"; Frequency of Reporting: "M"; Expected Frequency: "M1M3M" - Exchange Rates: Date of Latest Observation: "Mar-2025"; Date Received: "May-2025"; Frequency of Data: "M"; Frequency of Reporting: "M"; Expected Timeliness: "M1M3M" - Reserve/Base Money: Date of Latest Observation: "Mar-2025"; Date Received: "May-2025"; Frequency of Data: "M"; Expected Timeliness: "M1Q3M" - Broad Money: Date of Latest Observation: "Mar-2025"; Date Received: "May-2025"; Frequency of Data: "M"; Expected Timeliness: "M2M3M" - Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Banking System: Date of Latest Observation: "Feb-2025"; Date Received: "May-2025"; Frequency of Data: "M"; Expected Timeliness: "M1Q3M" - GDP/GNP: Date of Latest Observation: "2024Q4"; Date Received: "Feb-2025"; Frequency of Data: "A,Q,M"; Expected Timeliness: "QA1Q3M" - International Investment Position: Date of Latest Observation: "Dec-2024"; Date Received: "Feb-2025"; Frequency of Data: "I"; Expected Timeliness: "IAQM2Q6M" - Stocks of Central Government and Central Government-Guaranteed Debt: Date of Latest Observation: "2023"; Date Received: "Feb-2025"; Frequency of Data: "A"; Expected Timeliness: "AAQA1Q12M" - External Current Account Balance: Date of Latest Observation: "2023"; Date Received: "Jan-2025"; Frequency of Data: "A"; Expected Timeliness: "AAMM12W1Q" - Exports and Imports of Goods and Services: Date of Latest Observation: "2024Q3"; Date Received: "Jan-2025"; Frequency of Data: "A,Q"; Expected Timeliness: "A,QQA1Q6M" - Gross External Debt: Date of Latest Observation: "2024"; Date Received: "Jan-2025"; Frequency of Data: "A"; Expected Timeliness: "AAQA2Q7M" - Notes on frequency and timeliness codes: definitions provided, e.g., "('D') daily; ('W') weekly or with a lag of no more than one week after the reference date; ('M') monthly or with lag of no more than one month after the reference date; ('Q') quarterly or with lag of no more than one quarter after the reference date; ('A') annual.; ('SA') semiannual; ('I') irregular; ('NA') not available or not applicable; and ('NLT') not later than;." ### Rationale for Staff Assessment and Implications for Surveillance - Staff rationale: "Overall, the data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance, mostly related to granularity, timeliness and consistency." - Surveillance implications and priorities: - Improve reconciliation of fiscal stocks and flows and increase granularity of debt and public expenditure data. - Improve granularity, frequency, and timeliness of external sector reporting. - Broaden public debt reporting coverage to include SOEs and other public institutions; provide detailed lists of government guarantees. - Strengthen inter-sectoral consistency across macroeconomic statistics. *Source: Annex VIII. Data Issues (Mali), Staff Report for the 2025 Article IV Consultation* ### 2. A contingent liability test with tailored magnitude of shocks is applied to reflect the ### 2. A contingent liability test with tailored magnitude of shocks is applied to reflect the ### Contingent liability shock calibration - The component of the contingent liability shock related to SOEs (which fall outside public sector coverage) is assumed to be 12 percent of GDP, 10 percentage points higher than the default setting of 2 percent of GDP. - The shock from the financial sector is set at the default level of 5 percent of GDP. - The PPP component of the contingent liability stress test is calibrated to be 1.3 percent of GDP (based on an estimated PPP capital stock of 3.7 percent of GDP). - Total contingent liabilities assumed for the stress test: 18.3 percent of GDP (sum of other elements, SOE shock, PPP, and financial market shock as shown in Text Table 2). ### SOE exposures and liabilities (examples and specifics) - Rationale: SOE liabilities outside explicit government guarantees could add to public debt. - Energie du Mali (EDM): - Balance-sheet liabilities amounted to over 7.5 percent of GDP at end-2024. - Debts of EDM, including towards banks and key suppliers of electricity and fuel, amounted to CFAF 562 billion or almost 4.1 percent of GDP. - Provisional balance sheet at end-2024 reveals a negative equity position amounting to about 3.5 percent of GDP. - Total debt position at end-2024 comprised CFAF 241 billion of bank debt and CFAF 321 billion of debt to suppliers. - In June 2024, an agreement reprofiled CFAF 241 billion of short-term debt into a 10-year maturity at 6 percent nominal rate with an initial 1-year grace period on principal and interest. - At end-2023, the government compensated EDM’s losses by CFAF 144 billion via reducing tax and other credits outstanding (recapitalization without new funds). - SOMAGEP and SOMAPEP: - Debts amounted to about 0.7 percent of GDP at end-2024. - Chronic underinvestment, inadequate tariff levels, uncompensated quasi-fiscal activities, and electricity shortages have dented operations and profitability, leading to deterioration in profitability and debt positions. - Broader SOE note: - Latest available information points to exposure to outstanding debts of about CFAF 750 billion at end-2021 for the 10 largest SOEs (considering government equity share); total debt of these SOEs amounted to almost CFAF 2,600 billion. - Since then, financial situations of EDM, SOMAGEP, and SOMAPEP have worsened considerably, while more updated data on outstanding debt is not available. ### Public debt stock and composition (end-2024) - Public debt stock: 51.7 percent of GDP. - External debt: 24.2 percent of GDP (CFAF 3,347 billion). - Multilateral creditors: CFAF 2,611 billion (18.9 percent of GDP). - Bilateral creditors: CFAF 735 billion (5.3 percent of GDP). - Around 30 percent of external debt is denominated in euros (not exposed to exchange rate risk given the CFAF’s peg to the euro). - External debt average weighted interest rate: 1 percent; maturity exceeding 10 years. - Public debt service: 6.7 percent of GDP in 2024. - Domestic public debt: 27.5 percent of GDP at end-2024, up from 7.6 percent of GDP in 2015. - Domestic debt consists mostly of short- and medium-term treasury securities, predominantly held by banks in Mali and in the rest of WAEMU. - Over 90 percent of Mali’s domestic debt stock issued by the Treasury consists of bonds or syndicated loans with a maturity of more than one year. - SDR onlending is recorded as domestic debt for the DSA. ### Arrears and creditor composition - Domestic arrears on payments to suppliers: 2.6 percent of GDP at end-2024 (outstanding payments more than 90 days past due). - At end-2024, domestic arrears comprised CFAF 283 billion to the private sector, and CFAF 80 billion of arrears to other entities of the state or SOEs. - External arrears: approximately 0.7 percent of GDP in 2024 (higher than the estimate of 0.1-0.2 percent in the 2023 Article IV). - As of February 28, 2025, about 76 percent of external arrears were due to official bilateral lenders (including China, France, India, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). - The remainder due to multilateral and international financial institutions (including Arab Bank for Economic Development, European Investment Bank, Islamic Development Bank, ECOWAS Investment and Development Bank, West African Development Bank, IFAD, OPEC Development Fund). - Authorities have a credible plan to clear external arrears to IFIs contingent on available financing to be raised on the regional debt market. ### Financing pressures and market conditions - Gross financing needs: 9.7 percent of GDP in 2022 and 9.1 percent of GDP in 2023. - ECOWAS sanctions in first half of 2022 cut Mali off from the regional securities market, contributing to accumulated arrears in 2022 and 2023. - Financing conditions tightened in 2023 and remained constrained in 2024: - BCEAO raised WAEMU policy rate from 2 percent in 2022 to 5.5 percent in 2024. - Despite BCEAO purchasing almost CFAF 2 trillion of regional debt in the secondary half of 2023, regional securities market financing conditions remained tight. - Debt issuances often significantly undersubscribed, with short maturities and elevated interest rates (three-year bond rates exceeding 8 percent at times). - Heavy reliance on domestic banks underwriting issuances increased bank-sovereign nexus risks. ### Underlying macroeconomic assumptions and projections - Growth: - Estimated to have slowed to 4.7 percent in 2024. - Projected to increase slightly to 5 percent in 2025. - Medium-term potential growth assumed at 5.1 percent in real terms. - Inflation: - Averaged 3.2 percent in 2024. - Expected to average 3.5 percent in 2025. - Key drivers and shocks: - 2024 shocks included flooding (lowering growth by about 0.3 percentage points, mainly via agriculture damage), worsening electricity outages, escalating security incidents, and the departure of MINUSMA in December 2023. - Lithium production started in December 2024 and is expected to contribute to growth in 2025 and beyond. - Baseline does not explicitly factor higher expenditures needed for climate adaptation. - ECOWAS exit impact: - Exit decision became fully effective in January 2025; baseline assumes Mali remains in WAEMU. - Assessed impact from ECOWAS exit is relatively small; main effect was increased policy uncertainty and adverse financing conditions during the negotiation period. - Fiscal outlook: - Fiscal deficit: 3.6 percent of GDP in 2023; 2.6 percent of GDP in 2024. - Projected fiscal looseness in 2025 to 3.4 percent of GDP (due to higher flood-related expenditure and lower mining-related revenues), partly offset by revenue administration measures. - Total revenues (including grants) expected to rise from 20.6 to 21.5 percent of GDP between 2023-26. - Budgetary expenditure projected broadly flat from 24.8 to 25 percent of GDP between 2023-26. - Fiscal deficit expected to return to 3 percent of GDP in 2027. - Assumption: domestic arrears reduction starts in 2026 at CFAF 60bn over 6 years; external arrears remain stable at end-2025 compared to end-2024 (0.7 percent of GDP), decrease by about CFAF 49bn by end-2026 to 0.3 percent of GDP, and be cleared in 2027. - Financing composition: - Gross financing needs assumed to be met largely by domestic issuances through 2025; external financing share expected to recover in the medium term (including IDA credit disbursements under new IDA borrowing terms). - In the long term, external funding projected to decline as a share of total financing. - External sector: - Current account deficit: decreased from 7.7 percent of GDP in 2022 to an expected 4.6 percent of GDP in 2024. - Current account deficit projected to narrow to reach 3.2 percent of GDP in 2028. - 2025 outlook: record-high gold prices and lithium shipments expected to support exports; higher imports for reconstruction and capital goods expected to offset some gains; petroleum imports forecast lower following global oil price reduction and U.S. dollar depreciation. - Medium-term improvement driven by lithium-rich minerals exports, sustained high gold prices, and improved terms of trade. *Source: IMF staff analysis and Malian authorities data as presented in the provided content.* ### 10. Realism tool comparisons show that projections are broadly in line with historical ### 10. Realism tool comparisons show that projections are broadly in line with historical precedent and the experiences of comparable countries (Figures 3 and 4) ### Debt dynamics and financing assumptions - Public debt as a percent of GDP: gradual decline in the near to medium term relative to the past five years, driven by a projected growth rebound relative to 2020-22 and by reductions in pressures arising from primary deficits that offset the negative contribution of higher real interest rates. - Stock-flow adjustments (SFA) have contributed to past debt increases; these reflect government spending not captured by the fiscal deficit. - SFA averages: "SFAs have averaged 1.5 percent of GDP across the currency union, and about 0.9 percent of GDP in Mali." - Domestic financing interest-rate assumptions (revised upward for 2024 and 2025): - Short-term domestic debt (maturity ≤ 1 year): 9 percent on average for 2024, and 8.5 percent on average for 2025. - Longer-term domestic debt: interest rates range between 9-9.5 percent in 2024 and 2025. - Despite projected decline in EUR interest rates from 2025 onward, financing conditions are assumed to be conservatively tight for the DSA. ### Fiscal adjustment, public investment, and growth - Projected three-year change in the primary balance as a share of GDP is broadly flat over 2024-26 — indicating no significant fiscal adjustment over the projection period. - Public investment as a share of GDP: lower than previously forecast for 2025 onwards, reflecting capital spending cuts undertaken in 2023 and 2024 due primarily to difficult financing conditions. - Private investment outturns for 2022 and 2023 are higher than previously anticipated. - Growth projections are consistent with a variety of assumptions about the size of the fiscal multiplier in the context of the assumed fiscal consolidation. ### Country classification and stress-test design - Debt carrying capacity assessment: "medium." - Composite indicator (CI) score: 2.87. - CI thresholds: Weak if CI <2.69; Medium 2.69≤ CI ≤ 3.05; Strong CI >3.05. - Stress-test suite: six standardized stress tests, plus: - Tailored commodity price shock (magnitude based on IMF Research Department commodity outlook). - Customized scenario using residency-based definition of external debt. - Customized scenario incorporating stock-flow adjustments for below-the-line fiscal operations. - Standardized stress-test modification: SOE debt shock set at 12 percent of GDP rather than the default 2 percent of GDP to account for EDM and other SOEs. - Historical scenario: replaces key macro variables in the baseline by their 10-year historical averages as a robustness check. ### Customized scenario definitions and assumptions - Baseline uses a currency-based definition of external debt (consistent with WAEMU practice). - Residency-based customized scenario: classifies two thirds of government securities issued on the WAEMU regional market as external debt (based on auction data showing slightly less than two thirds of Mali government securities are bid by banks resident in other WAEMU member countries). - Stock-flow-adjustments customized scenario: staff assume true overall deficits are consistently 0.9 percent of GDP higher than reported each year over the forecasting horizon to capture likely continued SFA. ### External debt sustainability (key projections and indicators) - PPG external debt-to-GDP: - Projected to decline between 2025-30. - Projected to stabilize around 19.7 percent of GDP by 2030. - Long-term convergence to 15.2 percent of GDP at the end of the projection period in 2045. - PV of external debt-to-GDP (baseline): projected to decline from 16.9 percent of GDP in 2025 to 13.4 percent of GDP in 2035 (well below the 40 percent indicative threshold). - PV of external debt-to-exports: - Projected at 58.4 percent in 2025. - Projected to moderate to 50.6 percent in 2030. - Projected to rise to 57.3 percent in 2035 (driven by declining exports as a share of GDP in the medium to long term). - Under standardized stress tests, all external debt indicators remain below relevant indicative thresholds. - In the residency-based customized scenario, debt service-to-exports and debt service-to-revenue ratios exceed thresholds for a prolonged period from 2025 onward; PV debt-to-GDP and PV debt-to-exports rise close to thresholds toward the end of the projection horizon without breaching them. ### Public debt sustainability (key projections and stress-test outcomes) - Public debt-to-GDP: - 50.5 percent in 2025 (projected to remain broadly stable in 2025 with assumed fiscal deficit at 3.4 percent of GDP). - Projected to decline to about 47.4 percent by 2030. - Increase from 41 percent of GDP in 2019 to almost 52 percent at end-2024, driven primarily by regional debt financing and a rise in domestic debt from 14 to 27.5 percent of GDP (including domestic arrears). - PV of public debt-to-GDP under baseline: expected to remain below the 55 percent indicative threshold throughout the projection period. - Stress-test results: - Combined contingent liability shock (default adverse scenario) breaches the 55 percent threshold in 2026 and remains above it through 2035. - Commodity price shock (selected as most extreme by terminal PV of public debt-to-GDP) causes a breach by 2030 and produces a persistent increase in the debt ratio. - Customized stock-flow-adjustments scenario sets public debt on an upward trajectory but does not breach the 55 percent threshold. - Domestic debt-service-to-revenue ratio: projected to increase sharply in future years, absorbing a rising share of public resources; under the most extreme public debt scenario, the PV of public debt-to-revenue and debt service-to-revenue ratios rise to high levels, with the latter rising to about 50 percent over the medium term. ### Key numeric macro projections from the Text Table 4 (Current DSA) - Real GDP Growth (2024-2030-42 Avg): 4.7, 5.0, 5.4, 5.2, 5.1, 5.1, 5.2 - GDP Deflator (2024-2030-42 Avg): 2.7, 2.3, 2.0, 2.0, 2.0, 2.0, 2.0 - Overall fiscal balance (including grants, percent of GDP) (2024-2030-42 Avg): -2.6, -3.4, -3.2, -3.0, -3.0, -3.0, -3.0 - Export of goods and services (percent of GDP) (2024-2030-42 Avg): 26.3, 28.5, 30.4, 29.9, 29.2, 28.6, 22.8 - Import of goods and services (percent of GDP) (2024-2030-42 Avg): 31.8, 33.4, 33.0, 32.4, 32.4, 32.1, 29.9 - Current account (including grants, percent of GDP) (2024-2030-42 Avg): -4.6, -4.8, -2.8, -2.8, -3.2, -3.6, -11.6 - Official aid (percent of GDP) (2024-2030-42 Avg): 0.2, 1.7, 2.1, 2.6, 3.1, 3.4, 3.0 - Grants (percent of GDP): 0.1, 0.3, 0.3, 0.6, 0.9, 1.2, 1.3 - Loans (percent of GDP): 0.1, 1.4, 1.7, 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 1.7 ### Risk rating, vulnerabilities, and downside risks - Overall assessments: - Risk of external debt distress: moderate. - Risk of public (overall) debt distress: moderate. - Vulnerabilities and downside risks highlighted: - Political and economic policy uncertainty (postponement of presidential elections, escalating security risks, withdrawal of MINUSMA, uncertainty around ECOWAS exit implementation, electricity shortages, intensifying climate risks). - Tight financing conditions at the WAEMU level: high borrowing costs, frequent undersubscription, lack of concessional financing, curtailed access to funding. - Heavy reliance on expensive regional debt markets and continued isolation from traditional development partners; baseline assumption of no resumption of budget support until 2027. - Large debt, extant need for recapitalization, and structural losses of EDM and other SOEs; contingent liability stress tests show substantial increases in debt-to-revenue ratios as early as 2025. - Recent undersubscription of auctions on UMOA Titres and participation concentrated among Malian banks pose liquidity and financing risks for clearing domestic and external arrears. ### Implications and policy-relevant findings - There is "substantial space to absorb shocks" under the baseline currency-based external debt definition, but assessments are sensitive to the definition of external debt (residency-based classification reveals breaches in debt-service indicators). - Key policy priorities implied by the analysis include: - Maintain conservative fiscal stance to return to the 3-percent WAEMU deficit ceiling by 2027 and reduce primary fiscal deficits. - Address the financial and operational weaknesses of EDM and other SOEs to limit contingent liabilities and reduce pressure on public finances. - Manage reliance on regional debt markets and seek ways to diversify financing sources and lower borrowing costs, especially given constrained concessional financing. - Monitor and address stock-flow adjustments through improved fiscal transparency and accounting to reduce unexplained debt accumulation. *Source: IMF staff analysis (excerpted content).* ### 23. To reduce risks to debt sustainability, resolving disputes with regional partners, ### 23. To reduce risks to debt sustainability, resolving disputes with regional partners, ### Key risks and priorities - Resolving disputes with regional partners, making progress on security and domestic political issues, improving the profitability of EDM and working towards reducing electricity outages, and maintaining fiscal discipline will be important. - These elements are also conducive to rebuilding investor confidence and restoring a more conducive business environment. - The adoption of the 2023 mining code and the related tax audits of mining companies resulted in significant uncertainty. - Enhancing transparency around the application of the new code and ensuring a stable regulatory environment going forward will be crucial to safeguard the economic viability of the mining sector, which is a large source of revenues for the government. - These elements are key to attracting financing and investment. - Existing external and domestic arrears should be cleared in a timely manner and communication with relevant creditors should continue. - The authorities could consider debt management operations, where, feasible, to alleviate potential liquidity pressures and smooth the debt service profile. ### Policy recommendations and actions - Resolve disputes with regional partners to reduce risks to debt sustainability. - Make progress on security and domestic political issues to support investor confidence and the business environment. - Improve the profitability of EDM and work towards reducing electricity outages. - Maintain fiscal discipline. - Enhance transparency in the application of the 2023 mining code and ensure a stable regulatory environment to safeguard the mining sector’s economic viability. - Clear existing external and domestic arrears in a timely manner and continue communication with relevant creditors. - Consider debt management operations, where feasible, to alleviate potential liquidity pressures and smooth the debt service profile. ### Sectoral focus: mining and energy - Mining sector: - Adoption of the 2023 mining code and related tax audits caused significant uncertainty. - Transparency and regulatory stability are crucial to protect the mining sector, a large source of government revenues, and to attract financing and investment. - Energy sector: - Improving EDM profitability and reducing electricity outages are highlighted as priorities. ### Authorities’ Views - Authorities’ Views *MALI — INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 17* ### 24. The authorities generally agreed with the outcome of the debt sustainability analysis. ### 24. The authorities generally agreed with the outcome of the debt sustainability analysis ### Authorities' assessment and fiscal context - The authorities maintain that Mali’s debt is sustainable and remain committed to ensuring debt sustainability going forward. - Key recent macro-fiscal outcomes cited by the authorities: - Real GDP growth in 2024: 5 per cent. - Inflation: increased from 2.1 per cent in 2023 to 3.2 per cent in 2024. - Fiscal deficit: reduced to 2.6 per cent in 2024 from 3.2 per cent in 2023. - Current account deficit: improved from 7.6 per cent in 2023 to 4.6 per cent in 2024. - Public debt and financing structure statistics highlighted by the authorities: - Outstanding debt: 49.7 percent of GDP. - Debt service: accounts for 33 percent of tax revenues. - Share of bilateral and multilateral partners: 51.6 per cent (the remainder consists of domestic debt). ### Main risks to debt sustainability identified by the authorities - Tight financial conditions raising interest costs and exerting pressure on the future path of public debt. - Refinancing risk identified as the main risk affecting Mali’s public debt, including both external and domestic components. - Financial difficulties faced by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) could have sizable adverse impacts on debt sustainability. - Negative commodity price shocks could have sizable adverse impacts on debt sustainability. ### Debt management actions and options under consideration - The Treasury is engaging with the banking system to assess demand for longer-maturity bonds. - Syndicated loan issuances have been used as an alternative tool to secure financing at extended maturities. - The authorities emphasize rigorous and transparent public debt management and intend to channel borrowing to strategic, high value-added projects that deliver sustainable social and economic returns. ### DSA findings, stress tests, and judgment on risk - The authorities acknowledged the DSA outcome and its implications for policy. - The authorities note that the implementation of their strategic vision continues to ensure that Mali maintains a moderate risk of debt distress and a sustainable debt, as evidenced by the 2024 World Bank and 2025 IMF reports. - The DSA and accompanying figures/tables present multiple stress-test scenarios (commodity price shock, one-time depreciation, combined contingent liabilities, tailored stresses) and alternative definitions (customized/residency-based; stock-flow adjustment), assessing indicators such as: - PV of PPG external debt-to-GDP ratio and PV of PPG external debt-to-exports ratio under alternative scenarios. - Debt service-to-revenue and debt service-to-exports ratios under baseline and stress scenarios. - Indicators of domestic public debt (domestic debt-to-GDP, domestic debt service to revenues, net domestic debt issuance). - The DSA assumes that additional financing needs generated by the shocks under the stress tests are covered by PPG external MLT debt in the external DSA; default terms of marginal debt are based on baseline 10-year projections. - Sources for the DSA figures and projections: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections. ### Policy implications and stated priorities - Fiscal strategy and public financial management: - Commitment to create fiscal space for Vision 2063 while safeguarding fiscal and debt sustainability. - Determination to achieve the regional fiscal deficit target by 2027. - Focus on enhancing domestic revenue mobilization, improving spending efficiency, and strengthening medium-term fiscal frameworks. - Ongoing public financial management reforms: census of public-sector bank accounts toward a Treasury Single Account; rollout of the Integrated Public Financial Management System (SIGFIP). - Expenditure priorities: - Prioritize security, social sectors (education, healthcare, social protection), and infrastructure while containing non-essential spending. - Continue implementing sound public procurement rules, reduce untargeted subsidies, and improve public investment selection and management. - SOE reforms and fiscal risk mitigation: - Establishment of a SOE unit within the Ministry of Finance and a comprehensive review of the SOE portfolio. - Plans to improve governance, financial reporting, Board oversight, and management capacity of SOEs. - Engagement with partners: - Strengthen engagements with development partners, including the IMF, to support the economy’s transformation drive and mobilize needed financial and technical assistance. *Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.* --- _Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1mliea2025002-source-pdf.pdf_