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### Recent developments and macro outcomes
- Growth accelerated to 4.4 percent in 2024 and is projected to slow to 1.7 percent in 2025, "in large part reflecting recent trade tensions and elevated global uncertainty."
- Inflation projected to remain "well below 2 percent in 2025," reflecting low tradable inflation and increasing slack.
- Current account balance:
  - Surplus of 17.5 percent of GDP in 2024, down from 17.7 percent of GDP in 2023.
  - Current account balance in US$ billions: US$96.0 (2024).
- Banking and non-bank financial sector:
  - Capital adequacy ratio at 18.9 percent in 2025Q1.
  - Investment funds account for one-fourth of total assets of non-bank financial institutions and met investor redemption requests in an orderly manner during high market volatility in August 2024 and April 2025.
- Note: Data and forecasts as of March 20, 2025; staff mission met officials May 5–15, 2025; report dated June 23, 2025.

### Growth, trade, labor, and inflation dynamics
- Growth and sectoral drivers:
  - Real GDP growth: 2024: 4.4 percent; 2025 (projection): 1.7 percent; 2026 (projection): 1.7 percent.
  - 2025Q1: output contracted by 0.6 percent quarter-on-quarter (seasonally-adjusted).
  - Manufacturing: integrated circuits grew by 13.9 percent in 2024; miscellaneous manufactured goods grew by 12.1 percent in 2024.
  - Nominal goods exports: +5.7 percent in 2024 and +3.6 percent in 2025Q1.
  - Goods imports: +7.8 percent in 2024 and +6.4 percent in 2025Q1.
- Labor market:
  - Annual average employment growth: 1.5 percent in 2024 (down from 4.5 percent in 2023).
  - Unemployment rate: around 2.0 percent in 2023–24; advance estimate increased from 1.9 percent in December 2024 to 2.1 percent in March 2025.
  - Nominal wage growth: declined from 7.8 percent in 2022Q1 to 4.3 percent in 2024Q3.
  - Vacancy to unemployed person ratio: declined from 2.5 in June 2022 to 1.6 in December 2024.
- Inflation and expectations:
  - CPI inflation (period average): 2024: 2.4 percent; 2025 (proj): 1.1 percent; 2026 (proj): 1.5 percent.
  - CPI inflation (end of year): 2024: 1.5 percent; 2025 (proj): 1.2 percent.
  - MAS core inflation (period average): 2024: 2.8 percent; 2025 (proj): 1.0 percent; MAS core inflation in April 2025: 0.7 percent.
  - Two-year ahead inflation expectations remain anchored just under 2 percent.

### Fiscal developments and public finances
- FY2024 overall fiscal balance (IMF presentation): surplus of 1.1 percent of GDP (April 2024–March 2025), following 0.9 percent of GDP in FY2023; budgeted surplus was 0.2 percent.
- FY2025 budget (approved February 2025) envisages overall fiscal surplus of 0.5 percent of GDP; cyclically-adjusted primary deficit increases by 0.8 percent of potential GDP relative to FY2024.
- Selected fiscal statistics and framework:
  - Public Debt to GDP: 173.1 (2024); 174.9 (2025 projection); 176.0 (2026 projection).
  - Staff estimates government net financial assets (net of government debt): 85 percent of GDP as of end-March 2024.
  - Net Investment Returns Framework (NIRF): allows inclusion of up to half of expected long-term real investment returns from past reserves as revenue in the budget.
  - SINGA eligibility and limits: minimum project scale SGD 4 billion; overall gross borrowing limit SGD 90 billion; annual interest threshold SGD 5  billion.

### Monetary policy, exchange rate, and reserves
- MAS operates a basket, band, and crawl (BBC) exchange rate framework managing the NEER.
- MAS loosened monetary policy in early 2025 by reducing the slope of its policy band in January and April 2025; width and midpoint unchanged.
- Net FX purchases: US$4 billion in 2024H2, down from US$25 billion in 2024H1.
- Gross international reserves: US$371.4 billion (2024); US$389 billion at end-April 2025; staff projection: US$420.4 (2025); US$462.1 (2026).
- Short-term interest rates and money/credit:
  - Three-month S$ SIBOR rate (2024): 3.3 percent.
  - 3-month compounded SORA declined from 3.6 percent in August 2024 to 2.5 percent in April 2025.
  - Broad money (M2) growth (2024): 6.7 percent; Credit to private sector (2024): 6.4 percent.

### Financial sector resilience and systemic risks
- Banking system soundness:
  - D-SIBs account for about 66 percent of total banking sector assets.
  - CET1 capital adequacy ratio for D-SIBs: 16.6 percent in 2024Q3; regulatory minimum CET1 CAR (including capital conservation buffer of 2.5 percent): 9 percent.
  - Capital adequacy ratio at 18.9 percent in 2025Q1.
  - Liquidity: LCR and net stable funding ratio of D-SIBs comfortably meet minimum requirements; foreign currency LCR close to 100 percent or more for D-SIBs.
  - NPL ratio (local banks, latest available 2024Q3): 1.1.
- Cross-border and FX funding risks:
  - Cross-border lending: about 43 percent of banks’ loan portfolios in 2024Q4; about 37 percent of this directed to non-banks.
  - Recommendation: broaden stress tests’ scope for macro-financial spillover impacts beyond interbank exposure.
- Corporate and household vulnerabilities:
  - Non-financial corporate debt: declined from ~160 percent of GDP in March 2021 to about 120 percent of GDP since 2022Q4.
  - Debt-at-risk under stress: 7 percent of overall corporate debt in 2024Q2.
  - Household sector: household debt to personal disposable income: 1.1 in 2025Q1; mortgage debt ~75 percent of household debt and ~20 percent of non-bank loans.
  - MAS household stress test (mortgage rates to 5.5 percent + income loss 10 percent): over 90 percent of households can service mortgage loans; less than 10 percent of households are highly leveraged and account for less than 4 percent of total household debt.
- Housing and CRE:
  - Private residential property price growth: 3.9 percent in 2024 (from 6.8 percent in 2023).
  - Public housing resale price growth: 9.7 percent in 2024 (from 4.9 percent in 2023).
  - Local D-SIBs allocate ~20 percent of loan portfolios to CRE; office valuations declined by ~20 percent in 2024Q2 from 2019; office vacancy rate ~11 percent in 2024H1.
  - CRE non-performing asset coverage across local D-SIBs: 100 percent to 155 percent.
- Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs):
  - NBFI sector: 20 percent of domestic financial system assets at end-2023 (up from 14 percent in 2014).
  - Insurers: one-third of NBFI assets; investment funds: one-fourth.
  - Liquidity stress simulation: some fixed income funds (7 percent of total net assets of assessed funds) could face liquidity shortfalls under stress.
- Digital finance and AML/CFT:
  - MAS finalized a stablecoin regulatory framework and expanded payment service legislation in 2024 to cover crypto custody services.
  - Continued focus on strengthening AML/CFT framework and supervision.

### External accounts, NIIP, and reserves
- Balance of payments (selected):
  - Current account balance (US$ billions): 2019: 57.9; 2020: 61.1; 2021: 86.4; 2022: 93.8; 2023: 89.4; 2024: 96.0; 2025: 96.0 (proj); 2026: 98.5 (proj).
  - Goods balance (2024): 148.1 (US$ billions).
  - Exports, f.o.b. (2024): 583.0; Imports, f.o.b. (2024): -434.9.
- NIIP and valuation:
  - NIIP: 146.9 percent of GDP in 2024, down from 179.3 percent of GDP in 2023.
  - Gross Assets: 1079.9 (% GDP, 2024); Gross Liab.: 932.9 (% GDP, 2024); Res. Assets: 68.1 (% GDP, 2024); Debt Liab.: 319.1 (% GDP, 2024).
  - Large valuation effects in 2024 due to S$NEER appreciation.
- Reserves:
  - Gross official reserves (US$ billions): 2019: 279.5; 2020: 362.3; 2021: 417.9; 2022: 289.5; 2023: 351.0; 2024: 371.4.
  - Gross official reserves (in months of imports): 5.5 (2024).
- External position assessment:
  - External position in 2024 assessed as substantially stronger than level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
  - CA gap assessed in range 3.1–7.1 percent of GDP (staff estimate midpoint 5.1 percent of GDP).

### Outlook, baseline projections, and illustrative adverse scenarios
- Baseline projections:
  - Annual real GDP growth: fall from 4.4 percent in 2024 to 1.7 percent in 2025; 1.7 percent in 2026.
  - Small positive output gap in 2024 expected to turn negative in 2025 and widen in 2026.
  - Medium-term recovery to 2.5 percent growth driven by gradual recovery in external demand and private consumption.
  - Scarring: medium-term output roughly 1.6 percent below pre-tariff measures expectation.
  - Inflation forecast: headline and MAS core inflation below 2 percent in 2025, at 1.1 and 1.0 percent respectively.
- Adverse scenarios (based on April 2025 WEO global downside scenario):
  - Adverse scenario I (disinflationary): sharp drop in external demand; staff illustration: growth could decline to 0.2 percent in 2025 and 0.7 percent in 2026; MAS core inflation could fall by 20 bps in 2025 and 40 bps in 2026 relative to baseline.
  - Adverse scenario II (stagflation, low-likelihood): sharp drop in external demand with increased inflation from supply chain pressures; core inflation could surge and peak around 4 percent in 2026.
- Policy responses in scenarios:
  - Under adverse scenario I: ease monetary policy faster; further loosen fiscal stance with targeted support.
  - Under adverse scenario II: monetary policy may need to stay on hold or tighten; provide targeted temporary support while weighing fiscal loosening against fueling inflation.
  - In both scenarios: adjust macroprudential policies as needed; liquidity support to banks may be required.

### Risks and Risk Assessment Matrix highlights
- Key risks (likelihood/impact as stated in RAM):
  - Trade policy and investment shocks: Likelihood: High; Impact: High. Policy response: targeted fiscal support; data-dependent monetary policy; adjust macroprudential policies; accelerate structural reforms.
  - Deepening geoeconomic fragmentation: Likelihood: High; Impact: High. Policy response: accelerate structural reforms; temporary fiscal stimulus if domestic demand weakens substantially.
  - AI: Likelihood: Medium; Impact: Medium. Policy response: training programs; active labor market policies; strengthen social safety nets.
  - Commodity price volatility, tighter financial conditions, regional conflicts, cyberthreats, climate change: various likelihoods (Medium) and impacts (Low to Medium) with corresponding policy responses in RAM.
- Staff assessment: Risks to growth firmly tilted to the downside and mainly external; inflation risks on net tilted to the downside but upside inflation risks remain possible.

### Policy recommendations and stance
- Monetary policy:
  - Staff and Directors generally agreed "further easing of monetary policy is warranted in the near term" given disinflationary pressures and slowing growth.
  - MAS should remain vigilant and data dependent regarding speed and magnitude of easing; stand ready to increase pace of easing should downside inflation risks materialize.
- Fiscal policy:
  - Expansionary FY2025 stance appropriate to support activity amid slowing growth and downside risks.
  - Medium-term recommendations: reduce fiscal surplus within balanced budget rule; gradually phase out untargeted transfers; increase infrastructure spending.
  - Staff recommends periodically updating and publishing medium-term fiscal projections.
- Macroprudential and financial sector policy:
  - Continue tight macroprudential policy to mitigate housing-related systemic risks, supported by efforts to increase housing supply.
  - Maintain vigilance on cross-border credit risks, bank–NBFI interconnectedness, highly leveraged segments, and CRE exposures.
  - Welcome authorities’ efforts to step up stress testing and contingency planning; recommend broadening stress-test scenarios and enhancing monitoring of NBFI linkages.
- Structural and social policies:
  - Support temporary financial assistance to involuntarily unemployed workers (SkillsFuture Jobseeker Support: benefit capped at S$6,000 over six months; targeting average monthly income S$5,000 or less; property annual value S$31,000 or less).
  - Continue reskilling workers, facilitate AI adoption, and invest in climate-resilient infrastructure to promote inclusive growth and help reduce external surpluses over medium and long run.
- External position:
  - Continue to raise public spending and strengthen social safety nets to help reduce large external surpluses in medium and long run.

_Source: 1sgpea2025001-source-pdf (IMF staff report; data and forecasts as of March 20, 2025; report dated June 23, 2025)._

### 1.9 percent in December 2024 to 2.1 percent in March 2025. The current account balance

### 1sgpea2025001-source-pdf - 1.9 percent in December 2024 to 2.1 percent in March 2025. The current account balance

### Recent developments and macro outcomes
- Growth accelerated to 4.4 percent in 2024 and is projected to slow to 1.7 percent in 2025, "in large part reflecting recent trade tensions and elevated global uncertainty."
- Inflation is projected to remain "well below 2 percent in 2025," reflecting low tradable inflation and increasing slack.
- Current account balance:
  - Recorded a surplus of 17.5 percent of GDP in 2024, decreasing from 17.7 percent of GDP in 2023.
  - Current account balance in US$ billions: US$96.0 (2024).
- Banking and non-bank financial sector:
  - Capital adequacy ratio at 18.9 percent in 2025Q1.
  - Liquidity positions strong: the liquidity coverage ratio and net stable funding ratio of Domestic Systemically Important Banks comfortably meet the minimum requirements.
  - Investment funds account for one-fourth of total assets of non-bank financial institutions and met investor redemption requests in an orderly manner during high market volatility in August 2024 and April 2025.

### Executive Board assessment and risks
- Executive Directors commended Singapore’s resilience and strong policy framework.
- Directors noted near-term sharp slowdown in growth and muted inflation amid ongoing trade tensions.
- Risks to growth are tilted to the downside from:
  - Potentially escalating trade tensions.
  - Tightening global financial conditions.
- Directors emphasized policies should remain agile and focus on macroeconomic and financial stability.
- Directors concurred the financial sector remains resilient but urged vigilance on vulnerabilities from:
  - Cross-border and foreign exchange exposures.
  - A small number of highly leveraged corporates and households.
  - Exposures to commercial real estate and connections between non-bank financial institutions and banks.
  - Continued strengthening of the AML/CFT framework.

### Key projections and statistics (selected)
- Nominal GDP (2024): US$547.5 billion
- Population (2024): 6.0 million
- GDP per capita (2024): US$90,689
- Real GDP growth:
  - 2024: 4.4 percent
  - 2025 (projection): 1.7 percent
  - 2026 (projection): 1.7 percent
- CPI inflation (period average):
  - 2024: 2.4 percent
  - 2025 (projection): 1.1 percent
  - 2026 (projection): 1.5 percent
- CPI inflation (end of year):
  - 2024: 1.5 percent
  - 2025 (projection): 1.2 percent
- Savings and investment (percent of GDP):
  - Gross national saving (2024): 39.7
  - Gross domestic investment (2024): 22.2
- Balance of payments (US$ billions):
  - Current account balance: 96.0 (2024); projected 96.0 (2025) and 98.5 (2026)
  - Goods balance (2024): 148.1
  - Exports, f.o.b. (2024): 583.0
  - Imports, f.o.b. (2024): -434.9
- Gross official reserves (US$ billions): 371.4 (2024); 420.4 (2025 projection); 462.1 (2026 projection)
- Public Debt to GDP: 173.1 (2024); 174.9 (2025 projection); 176.0 (2026 projection)
- Unemployment rate: 2.0 percent (2024); 2.3 percent (2025 projection)
- Money and credit:
  - Broad money (M2) growth (2024): 6.7 percent
  - Credit to private sector (2024): 6.4 percent
- Three-month S$ SIBOR rate (2024): 3.3 percent
- Note: Data and forecasts as of March 20, 2025.

### Policy recommendations and stance
- Monetary policy:
  - Staff and Directors generally agreed that "further easing of monetary policy is warranted in the near term" given disinflationary pressures and slowing growth.
  - Monetary policy should remain vigilant and data dependent because of large uncertainty and two-sided inflation risks.
- Fiscal policy:
  - The expansionary fiscal stance in the FY2025 budget is appropriate to support activity amid slowing growth and downside risks.
  - With strong fiscal institutions and ample fiscal space, Singapore is well positioned to deploy temporary and targeted support if downside risks materialize.
  - Medium-term recommendations include accommodating rising spending needs by:
    - Reducing the fiscal surplus within the balanced budget rule.
    - Gradually phasing out untargeted transfers.
    - Increasing infrastructure spending.
- Financial sector and macroprudential policy:
  - Continue tight macroprudential policy to mitigate housing-related systemic risks, supported by efforts to increase housing supply.
  - Maintain vigilance on cross-border credit risks, bank–NBFI interconnectedness, highly leveraged segments, and commercial real estate.
  - Welcome authorities’ efforts to step up stress testing and contingency planning.
- Structural and social policies:
  - Support for temporary financial assistance to involuntarily unemployed workers is welcome.
  - Continue efforts to reskill workers, help firms adopt AI technologies, and invest in climate resilient infrastructure to promote inclusive growth and help reduce external surpluses over the medium and long run.

### Additional institutional and contextual notes
- Executive Directors noted uncertainty in assessing Singapore’s external position given the country’s unique characteristics; many Directors expect current account surpluses to moderate medium term due to population ageing, slowing income growth, and anticipated increases in public spending.
- The report was prepared with data as of March 20, 2025 and the staff mission met officials in Singapore during May 5–15, 2025; report dated June 23, 2025.

*Source: 1sgpea2025001-source-pdf (IMF staff report; data and forecasts as of March 20, 2025; report dated June 23, 2025).*

### 3.      Growth accelerated in 2024 but has since slowed due to recent trade actions.

### 3.      Growth accelerated in 2024 but has since slowed due to recent trade actions.

### Growth dynamics and sectoral drivers
- Real GDP growth increased to 4.4 percent in 2024, up from 1.8 percent in 2023.
- Strong private consumption offset weak net exports in 2024H1.
- In 2024H2, a recovery in external demand boosted net exports and inventories, attributed to:
  - an upturn in the global technology cycle,
  - some front-loading of trade and manufacturing production ahead of anticipated trade tensions,
  - accommodative global financial conditions.
- Investment and government consumption also strengthened in 2024.
- Singapore’s manufacturing sector is more capital intensive and externally oriented relative to more domestically-integrated sectors (e.g., real estate); manufacturing saw an increase in labor productivity from a slight decline in employment in 2024.
- The strong manufacturing performance did not produce a major cyclical upturn in domestically-integrated sectors or the broader labor market in 2024H2, allowing steady disinflation despite a small positive output gap emerging for the year.

### Trade and external sector developments
- Since February 2025, increased trade tensions: U.S. administration imposed a series of tariffs on certain sectors (e.g., automobiles) and varying levels of tariffs on many economies, with some economies retaliating.
- Singapore faces relatively lower effective tariff rates compared to other regional economies but is highly exposed due to openness to global trade and negative confidence effects from higher uncertainty.
- 2025Q1: output contracted by 0.6 percent quarter-on-quarter on a sequential seasonally-adjusted basis, driven by slowdown in externally-oriented sectors like manufacturing and wholesale trade.
- Nominal goods exports: +5.7 percent in 2024 and +3.6 percent in 2025Q1.
- Goods imports: +7.8 percent in 2024 and +6.4 percent in 2025Q1, largely due to machinery and transport equipment re-exports and imports.
- NODX: miscellaneous manufactured goods grew by 12.1 percent in 2024; integrated circuits grew by 13.9 percent in 2024.
- Geographical pattern in 2024: NODX increased to Asia and declined for the United States and Europe, indicating higher regional integration.

### Labor market
- Annual average employment growth: 1.5 percent in 2024, down from 4.5 percent in 2023.
- Unemployment rate remained stable at around 2.0 percent throughout 2023–24, below its pre-pandemic level.
- Nominal wage growth: declined from a peak of 7.8 percent in 2022Q1 to 4.3 percent in 2024Q3.
- Vacancy to unemployed person ratio: declined from 2.5 in June 2022 to 1.6 in December 2024; both vacancy and employment rates remained above pre-pandemic average levels.
- Advance estimate unemployment rate increased from 1.9 percent in December 2024 to 2.1 percent in March 2025 due to lower employment growth in externally-oriented sectors like manufacturing.

### Inflation and expectations
- Average annual headline inflation: 2.4 percent in 2024, down from 4.8 percent in 2023.
- MAS core inflation (excludes costs of accommodation and private transport but includes food and energy): decreased from a peak of 5.6 percent in January 2023 to 0.7 percent in April 2025.
- Disinflation drivers: lower inflation in non-tradable sectors (healthcare and education) due to easing labor market and administered prices, lower oil and tradables prices, declines in private transport costs, and disinflation in accommodation aided by increased supply of vehicle owner certificates and completed housing units.
- Two-year ahead inflation expectations based on consensus forecasts remain anchored just under 2 percent.

### Fiscal developments
- FY2024 (April 2024–March 2025) overall fiscal balance (IMF presentation) recorded a surplus of 1.1 percent of GDP, following a surplus of 0.9 percent of GDP in FY2023; budgeted surplus was 0.2 percent.
- Cyclically-adjusted primary balance improved by 0.2 percent of potential GDP relative to FY2023.
- Larger-than-budgeted surplus mainly due to stronger-than-anticipated economic activity boosting revenue, including Corporate Income Tax; vehicle ownership certificate revenues rose; GST receipts picked up after GST rate increase from 8 to 9 percent in January 2024.
- Higher outlays included higher operating grants to HDB and special transfers including enhanced top-ups to citizens’ healthcare expenditure accounts at the Central Provident Fund (CPF).
- FY2025 budget (approved February 2025) envisages an overall fiscal surplus of 0.5 percent of GDP, implying an expansionary fiscal policy stance with the cyclically-adjusted primary deficit increasing by 0.8 percent of potential GDP relative to FY2024.

### Monetary policy and external reserves
- MAS operates a basket, band, and crawl (BBC) exchange rate framework managing the NEER against an undisclosed currency basket.
- After a tight stance since early 2022, MAS loosened the monetary policy stance in early 2025 by reducing the slope of its policy band in January and April 2025; width of the band and midpoint unchanged.
- Net FX purchases: US$4 billion in 2024H2, down from US$25 billion in 2024H1.
- Gross international reserves: US$389 billion at end-April 2025, up from US$371 billion at end-2024 and US$351 billion at end-2023 (68 percent of GDP).

### Financial conditions and the financial sector
- Domestic financial conditions eased in 2024 driven by easing corporate and sovereign debt spreads and less restrictive global conditions.
- 3-month compounded SORA declined from 3.6 percent in August 2024 to 2.5 percent in April 2025, broadly in line with U.S. interest rates.
- Domestic private credit (resident non-bank loans) broad-based increase of 2.6 percent year-on-year in 2024Q3; credit-to-GDP gap remained negative.
- April U.S. tariff announcements triggered global equity selloffs and a sharp rise in the VIX; Singapore’s stock market dropped by 12.1 percent in the first week of April 2025, causing sharp tightening in domestic financial conditions in April 2025, which have since eased.
- Banking system sound: capital adequacy ratio at 18.9 percent in 2025Q1; good asset quality and adequate provisioning; banks profitable; liquidity strong with LCR and net stable funding ratio of Domestically Systemic Banks comfortably meeting minimum 100 percent; foreign currency LCR close to 100 percent or more for D-SIBs.
- Corporate and household balance sheets remain strong with low non-performing loan ratios.

### Outlook and projections
- Baseline assumption: series of U.S. and trading partner tariffs applied through April 4 are permanent after the 90-day pause; expected to negatively affect net exports, private consumption, and investment mainly via confidence effects and tighter financial conditions.
- Annual real GDP growth projected to fall from 4.4 percent in 2024 to 1.7 percent in 2025, reflecting a sequential contraction that turned negative in 2025Q1 and bottoms out in 2025H2.
- Growth in 2026 expected to remain low at 1.7 percent.
- Small positive output gap in 2024 expected to turn negative in 2025, widening further in 2026.
- Subsequent tariff announcements, including the May 12 temporary de-escalation with China, are not expected to materially alter baseline given persistent elevated uncertainty.
- Medium-term projection: growth recovers to 2.5 percent driven by gradual recovery in external demand, solid private consumption, and increased capital accumulation and total factor productivity growth; negative output gap in 2025–26 will close over the medium term.
- Scarring: medium-term output roughly 1.6 percent below the level anticipated prior to the recent tariff measures.
- Inflation forecast: headline and MAS core inflation expected to remain below 2 percent in 2025, at 1.1 and 1.0 percent respectively.

### Risks
- Risks to growth are firmly tilted to the downside and mainly external:
  - Further escalation in trade barriers could rapidly reduce external demand, disrupt FDI and supply chains, and cause outsized sectoral impacts on output and employment.
  - Early signs that the global technology cycle may have peaked in late 2024.
  - Policy uncertainty and market volatility could trigger tighter global financial conditions, asset repricing, market dislocations, and U.S. dollar appreciation, with spillovers to Singapore’s financial resiliency and investment.
  - Conversely, reduction in tariffs or faster negotiation resolution could shorten uncertainty; stronger-than-expected external demand (e.g., boosted AI demand, stronger global technology cycle, easing conflicts, stimulus, or structural reforms) could provide upside.
- Medium-term risks:
  - Deepening geoeconomic fragmentation threatening financial interconnectedness and Singapore’s role as a global financial center.
  - AI adoption presents upside (productivity) and downside (labor disruption, cyberthreats) risks.
  - Climate change and aging population threaten growth prospects and fiscal pressures.
- Inflation risks: on net tilted to the downside due to downside growth risks and widening negative output gap; upside inflation risks include supply-chain disruptions raising tradable prices, commodity market volatility, and higher-for-longer global inflation.

### Authorities’ views and staff policy discussions
- Authorities project 2025 annual growth to range between 0 to 2 percent and inflation to stay low; MAS forecasts headline and MAS core inflation in the range of 0.5–1.5 percent in 2025, with a small increase in 2025H2 due to higher retail goods and essential services inflation.
- MAS expects nominal wage growth to moderate with easing labor market tightness.
- Staff view: scope for further monetary easing given weak inflation, slowing growth, and forecasted negative output gap, but caution on speed and magnitude due to elevated uncertainty.
- Expansionary fiscal stance in FY2025 is appropriate to support activity and vulnerable households and businesses.
- Singapore’s strong fiscal framework and ample fiscal space will enable prompt government action if downside risks materialize.
- Financial sector resilience is affirmed but vigilance recommended amid heightened global uncertainty.
- Staff welcome Forward Singapore implementation including temporary financial support for involuntarily unemployed individuals and measures to step up AI adoption and workforce re-skilling.

*Source: IMF staff analysis (content unit: 3. Growth accelerated in 2024 but has since slowed due to recent trade actions.)*

### 15.      Staff sees scope for further easing of monetary policy but vigilance is needed with

### 15.      Staff sees scope for further easing of monetary policy but vigilance is needed with

### Monetary policy assessment and staff recommendation
- Staff sees scope for further easing of monetary policy but vigilance is needed with respect to the speed and magnitude of easing amid elevated uncertainty.
- Staff analysis suggests that the current monetary policy stance has become broadly neutral following the reductions in the slope of NEER appreciation in January and April 2025.
- Ongoing disinflationary pressure will come from lower tradable inflation and continued labor market rebalancing.
- Given recent weak inflation outturns, slowing growth, and a forecasted negative output gap, staff recommends further monetary policy easing in the near term.
- MAS should remain vigilant and data dependent with respect to the speed and magnitude of easing in light of the large uncertainty, as well as both upside and downside risks around the inflation outlook.
- MAS should stand ready to increase its pace of easing should downside inflation risks begin to materialize.

### Authorities’ views on monetary policy
- The authorities concurred with the need for a cautious and data-dependent approach for monetary policy.
- In light of weakening cyclical conditions, MAS loosened the monetary policy stance in January and April 2025 in a measured and staggered manner.
- MAS assessed the current monetary policy stance as appropriate, with the NEER on a modest appreciating slope as of late May 2025.
- Given the large uncertainty surrounding the growth and inflation outlook, MAS agreed with the need for vigilance and adopting a data-dependent approach going forward.
- In the event that downside inflation risks materialize, MAS stands ready to further loosen monetary policy.
- The authorities noted that heightened global trade tensions may cause structural change to the economy, and that the appropriate policy response should consist of coordinated and complementary policy actions including fiscal measures and supply-side structural reforms, while monetary policy should seek to ensure price stability.

### Fiscal policy stance and FY2025 budget
- The expansionary fiscal stance presented in the FY2025 budget is appropriate against the backdrop of slowing growth in 2025 and elevated downside risks.
- The stance is in line with staff’s recommendations in previous Article IV consultations to gradually reduce fiscal surpluses to accommodate rising spending needs.
- With muted inflation, the output gap turning negative, and risks to growth tilted to the downside, the looser fiscal stance will support economic activity amid a more challenging external environment.
- The overall composition of the budget will support economic activity, with additional revenue coming in part from higher investment returns, and additional spending going toward infrastructure, healthcare, and transfers to households and businesses.

### Support for households and businesses; Special Transfers
- To alleviate still high cost of living, the FY2025 budget supports households and businesses through both targeted and untargeted measures.
- Key household measures include vouchers, utility rebates, expanded support for families, and education account top-ups. Select pensioners and lower-income households will benefit from higher allowances.
- Business measures include a Corporate Income Tax rebate (with minimum benefits for smaller firms) and higher co-funding under the Progressive Wage Credit Scheme.
- The separate “SG60” package contains additional vouchers, personal income tax rebates, credits for cultural and sporting activities, as well as rental support for market stalls.
- Special Transfers total 0.5 percent of GDP in FY2025, relative to 0.4 percent of GDP in FY2024.
- Staff recommendation: As cost-of-living pressures fade and real wages continue to rise, currently untargeted transfers should be phased out or better targeted to vulnerable households and firms over the medium term.

### Structural and medium-term spending priorities
- The budget devotes significant resources to structural spending measures advancing the Forward Singapore agenda.
- Top-ups to the Changi Airport Development Fund, Coastal and Flood Protection Fund, and Future Energy Fund are S$5bn each, totaling 2 percent of GDP.
- The National Productivity Fund is 0.4 percent of GDP.
- Measures target future-proof infrastructure, climate transition management, and investment attraction in high-tech areas such as biotech and semiconductors.
- The government introduced a temporary financial support scheme for involuntarily unemployed individuals and increased allowances for reskilling and upskilling programs for mid-career workers, as well as workforce transformation expenses for businesses.
- Staff recommends periodically updating and publishing medium-term fiscal projections.

### Fiscal space and contingent fiscal capacity
- Singapore has substantial fiscal space that can be deployed in the event of downside risks materializing.
- Automatic stabilizers originating from income taxes and unemployment benefits should continue to operate.
- Beyond automatic stabilizers, support for affected businesses and households could be financed by budgetary reallocation or a supplementary budget.
- Staff estimates that the government owns large financial assets (net of government debt) amounting to 85 percent of GDP as of end-March 2024.
- The authorities have demonstrated the willingness and ability to access fiscal space during crises (Global Financial Crisis and COVID-19 pandemic) and stand ready to provide prompt and time-bound targeted support if conditions worsen significantly.

### External sector assessment
- Singapore’s external position in 2024 is assessed as substantially stronger than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
- The current account (CA) balance recorded a surplus of 17.5 percent of GDP in 2024, decreasing from 17.7 percent of GDP in 2023 and led by a decline in the goods surplus.
- Adjusting for cyclical and country-specific factors, staff assesses the CA gap to be in the range of 3.1–7.1 percent of GDP.
- Main drivers of the external position: financial center status, high household savings related to rapid aging, and a relatively stronger fiscal position and larger negative credit gap compared to the rest of the world.
- REER appreciated by 2.9 percent in 2024 relative to 2023, resulting in a cumulative REER appreciation by 16.7 percent since 2020.
- The need for an appreciation of the REER over the medium term should not have a direct bearing on short-term movements in the NEER, which is controlled to achieve price stability under the BBC monetary policy framework.
- Higher public spending and stronger social safety nets are expected to help gradually reduce external imbalances by reducing precautionary household savings and catalyzing private investment.

### Authorities’ views on external position
- The authorities expressed concern about the external balance assessment (EBA), citing nonstandard factors and significant uncertainty.
- They noted Singapore’s limited domestic investment opportunities given its 284 square miles area, faster pace of aging, stronger per capita income growth, vulnerability to external shocks, and role as a regional trade and financial hub, all of which justify large external assets as a buffer.
- Authorities agreed that the saving-investment gap would narrow in the medium- and long-run as population ages, labor force participation falls, public spending rises (e.g., healthcare), and social safety nets strengthen.
- They concurred that the REER should remain on an appreciating path going forward but noted cyclical circumstances may drive temporary REER weakness.

### Adverse macroeconomic scenarios and contingent policies
- Staff develops two illustrative adverse scenarios based on the April 2025 WEO global downside scenario:
  - Adverse scenario I: Sharp drop in external demand associated with downside price pressures (disinflationary).
  - Adverse scenario II: Sharp drop in external demand coupled with an increase in inflation associated with supply chain pressures (inflationary, less likely).
- Under adverse scenario I:
  - Monetary policy should be eased at a faster pace.
  - Fiscal stance should be further loosened with targeted fiscal support for affected and vulnerable entities.
- Under adverse scenario II:
  - Inflationary pressures rise sharply beyond levels consistent with price stability (e.g., from broad-based and persistent critical supply chain disruptions).
  - Monetary policy may need to stay on hold or be tightened to anchor inflation expectations despite weaker growth.
  - Targeted temporary support for affected and vulnerable entities should be provided; the need for fiscal loosening should be weighed against fueling inflationary pressures.
- In both scenarios:
  - Singapore’s financial sector could come under pressure from a further tightening of global financial conditions (higher FX borrowing costs, reduction of cross-border capital flows, worsening credit quality).
  - Liquidity support to banks may be needed if the shock and its impact deepen.
  - Macroprudential policies should be adjusted to safeguard financial stability.

### Box 1 — Illustrative macro outcomes and numerical scenario details
- Global adverse scenario channels: higher tariffs, a further spike in uncertainty, tighter financial conditions; global GDP growth declines and global headline inflation falls in the near term.
- For Singapore under the global adverse scenario:
  - Growth could decline to 0.2 percent in 2025 and 0.7 percent in 2026.
  - MAS core inflation alternatives:
    - Adverse scenario I: core inflation could be lower with inflation falling by 20 bps in 2025 and 40 bps in 2026 relative to the baseline.
    - Adverse scenario II (low-likelihood): an inflationary surge that builds in 2025 and peaks in 2026 around 4 percent (close to its 2023 level).

### Authorities’ views on contingency planning
- The authorities agreed with the need for contingency planning.
- A special tripartite taskforce is monitoring the impact of global trade tensions and policy uncertainty on the economy and devising contingent policy measures for affected firms and workers.
- In both adverse scenarios, Singapore has ample fiscal space to respond as necessary.
- Support measures will be tailored to the nature of the shocks and should allow viable firms to adapt to a new global environment; measures may not be as extensive as those implemented during the pandemic era.
- While the authorities considered the stagflation scenario unlikely for now, they noted that in such a scenario monetary and fiscal policies need to balance accommodating a temporary increase in inflation and supporting economic activity.

*SINGAPORE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND*

### 28.      Singapore’s financial sector remains resilient, and systemic risks are contained. Banks

### 1sgpea2025001-source-pdf - 28.      Singapore’s financial sector remains resilient, and systemic risks are contained. Banks

### Financial sector resilience and systemic risk overview
- Banks are described as "well capitalized, liquid, and profitable (¶10)."
- Continued vigilance is needed against "the risk of a rapid tightening in financial conditions (¶12)."
- Potential vulnerabilities highlighted: rising demand for private housing, cross-border credit risks, FX funding risks, financial sector interconnectedness (including between banks and NBFIs), small segments of highly leveraged corporates and households, and exposure to the commercial real estate (CRE) sector (¶30, ¶31, ¶32, ¶34, ¶35).
- Ongoing priorities: mitigate cybersecurity, AML/CFT, and climate risks.
- In response to 2019 FSAP recommendations, MAS has: enhanced supervision to ensure U.S. dollar liquidity for D-SIBs, strengthened resolution tools, devoted more resources to oversee payment systems, and taken steps to mitigate cyber risks (see Annex VII). A recent IMF capacity development mission discussed options to refine MAS’s climate risk analysis framework.

### Domestic Systemically Important Banks (D-SIBs) — capitalization, liquidity, and stress testing
- D-SIBs account for about 66 percent of total banking sector assets.
- CET1 capital adequacy ratio (CAR) for D-SIBs: 16.6 percent in 2024Q3.
- Regulatory minimum CET1 CAR (including capital conservation buffer of 2.5 percent): 9 percent.
- MAS stress tests under a severe shock (intensified geopolitical conflicts, trade tensions, global recession, tightening financial conditions) indicate D-SIBs’ CET1 ratio would remain above the regulatory minimum during the three years after the shock.
- MAS stress tests include cashflow-based liquidity tests showing D-SIBs have sufficient FX liquidity buffers on a daily basis, against all currencies including the U.S. dollar.
- MAS offers liquidity facilities including Emergency Liquidity Assistance and access to U.S. dollars through the Federal Reserve's FIMA Repo Facility (secured by U.S. Treasuries).

### Cross-border and FX funding risks
- Cross-border lending: about 43 percent of banks’ loan portfolios in 2024Q4.
  - Of this, about 37 percent directed to non-banks.
  - Cross-border non-bank loans diversified across Asia, Europe, the Americas, and other regions; emerging Asia largest share.
- Banks exposed to cross-border liquidity risks from interbank borrowing and non-resident deposits.
- MAS stress tests analyze cross-border interbank contagion using a tail scenario of default of a single country’s banking sector; tests suggest D-SIBs can withstand such shocks in terms of capital and liquidity regulatory requirements.
- Recommendation: consider broadening stress tests’ scope for macro-financial spillover impacts beyond interbank exposure.
- MAS engages closely with banks on contingent FX financing plans and coordinates monitoring of key funding markets with central banks globally. MAS should stand ready to provide liquidity during market stress.

### Corporate and household vulnerabilities
- Non-financial corporate debt:
  - Declined from a peak of about 160 percent of GDP in March 2021.
  - Stabilized at about 120 percent of GDP since 2022Q4.
- MAS November 2024 corporate stress tests: resilient to a 10 percent decline in earnings and a 300-basis point rise in interest rates.
  - Firms’ debt-at-risk (debt held by firms with ICR below one) under stress: 7 percent of overall corporate debt in 2024Q2.
- Household sector:
  - Ratio of household debt to personal disposable income: 1.1 in 2025Q1.
  - Mortgage debt: three-quarters of household debt and about 20 percent of non-bank loans.
  - MAS household stress test (immediate increase in mortgage rates to 5.5 percent together with a simultaneous income loss of 10 percent): over 90 percent of households can service mortgage loans under the stress scenario.
  - A small segment of highly leveraged borrowers (estimated to be less than 10 percent of households) may face repayment difficulty; debt held by such borrowers accounts for less than 4 percent of total household debt.
- Policy focus: continued close monitoring of overleveraged corporates and households and maintenance of adequate provisioning coverage.

### Housing-related systemic risks and macroprudential policy
- Private residential property price growth: 3.9 percent in 2024 from 6.8 percent in 2023.
- Government expanding private housing supply via Government Land Sale program.
- Demand for private residential mortgage loans rose in 2024, reflecting a decline in mortgage interest rates.
- Public housing:
  - Comprises about 70 percent of residential dwelling units.
  - Resale price growth of public housing: 4.9 percent in 2023 to 9.7 percent in 2024.
  - LTV ratio for HDB loans tightened to 75 percent from 80 percent in August 2024.
- Tight housing-related macroprudential policy stance remains appropriate to contain housing-related systemic risks.
- MAS maintains macroprudential measures:
  - Loan-to-value ratio currently at 15-75 percent, differentiated by borrower characteristics.
  - Total debt servicing ratio at 55 percent.
  - Additional Buyer’s Stamp Duty (ABSD) rates unchanged since April 2023.
- Recommendation: continue ensuring steady supply of public and private housing and analyze impact of potential rapid tightening in domestic financial conditions on private housing.

### Commercial Real Estate (CRE)
- Local D-SIBs allocate approximately 20 percent of their loan portfolios to CRE.
- Office valuations declined by about 20 percent in 2024Q2 from 2019.
- CRE loan characteristics and buffers:
  - Most CRE loans secured with LTV ratios at or below 50 percent.
  - Banks’ total property-related exposures capped at 35 percent of eligible assets.
  - CRE non-performing asset coverage across local D-SIBs: 100 percent to 155 percent.
  - Office vacancy rate: about 11 percent in 2024H1 (broadly similar to 2019-2023 average).
- MAS reviewed credit risk stress-testing frameworks among major banks, focusing on CRE exposures and sharing best practices.

### Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs)
- NBFI sector: 20 percent of Singapore’s domestic financial system assets at end-2023 (up from 14 percent in 2014).
- Composition:
  - Insurers: one-third of total NBFI assets; have large capital buffers.
  - Investment funds: one-fourth of total NBFI assets.
- Recent episodes: investment funds met investor redemptions during high volatility in August 2024 and April 2025.
- Linkages with banks:
  - About 15 percent of banks’ assets and 19 percent of liabilities linked to the NBFI sector (mainly through loans and deposits).
- Vulnerabilities: rapid tightening of global financial conditions and FX funding pressures, rising leverage among hedge funds, crowded/concentrated positions in OTC derivatives markets.
- MAS progress: upgrading regulatory frameworks for NBFIs, stress testing showing banks and insurers have sufficient buffers; liquidity stress simulations indicate some fixed income funds (7 percent of total net assets of assessed funds) could face liquidity shortfalls under stress.
- Recommendation: continue strengthening monitoring/reporting and more frequent data collection on NBFI domestic and cross-border interlinkages.

### Digital financial services and regulatory measures
- MAS explored wholesale CBDCs to facilitate cross-border securities settlement and support tokenized assets; retail CBDC explored since 2016 but concluded no pressing need at this point.
- Payment connectivity: bilateral fund transfers and small-value payments with Asian partners; Project Nexus connecting domestic instant payment systems into a multilateral cross-border network.
- Virtual bank licenses issued to promote financial inclusivity and efficiency.
- MAS finalized a stablecoin regulatory framework and is working on legislative amendments to formalize it in the Payment Services Act; payment service legislation expanded in 2024 to cover crypto custody services.
- MAS implements a balanced, risk-based regulatory approach focused on consumer access, business conduct, and technology/cyber risk management.

### AML/CFT and supervisory priorities
- Continue improving AML/CFT framework and supervision given Singapore’s role as a global/regional financial center.
- Enhance analysis on impact of financial integrity events on financial and macroeconomic stability, including flows from higher risk jurisdictions with identified ML/TF risks.
- Ongoing efforts: enhance risk-based supervision of banks, NBFIs, and gatekeepers using data-driven risk analysis; strengthen oversight of digital payment token service providers and asset management sector (including monitoring non-resident Single Family Offices).
- Supervisory focus areas: source of funds, effective customer due diligence, beneficial ownership checks, thematic inspections on geographic risk assessment and high-net-worth customer treatment.

### Authorities’ views and planned next steps
- Authorities agree financial sector remains stable but are vigilant to risks from tightening financial conditions and policy uncertainty.
- MAS actions and views:
  - Stepping up vigilance on corporate sector (highly leveraged firms and SMEs), refining methodology, and developing more severe corporate stress testing scenarios.
  - Stress test framework captures evolving risks, including NBFI linkages and cross-border contagion; D-SIBs resilient to more severe cash-flow based liquidity stresses across all currencies including U.S. dollars.
  - Close monitoring of U.S. dollar liquidity conditions and readiness to act during funding stresses, including engagement with the U.S. Federal Reserve.
  - Desirable next steps: develop more holistic macro-financial and contagion-based scenarios capturing credit-liquidity stress interactions and second-round effects.
  - Confidence in macroprudential framework for housing, with targeted measures varying by borrower segment; view that spillover from HDB resale market to private housing market is limited.
  - Regular assessment of local D-SIBs' CRE exposures and annual stress tests; D-SIBs have sufficient capital to withstand shocks.
  - Strengthened regulatory measures for digital payment token services; minimal digital asset exposure in banking system limits financial stability impacts.

*SINGAPORE — INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (excerpt).*

### 39.      Staff welcomes the steady implementation of the Forward Singapore initiative toward

### Staff welcomes the steady implementation of the Forward Singapore initiative toward stronger inclusive growth in Singapore

### Forward Singapore implementation and social policies
- Forward Singapore, unveiled in 2023, refreshes Singapore’s social compact and covers public education, healthcare, housing; social protection and family support; and labor market policies.
- Measures implemented during 2024-25 include:
  - longer paid parental leave and more affordable preschool education to support young families;
  - stepping up new public housing construction and enhanced grants for low-income, first-time home buyers to improve housing affordability;
  - topping up CPF retirement accounts for low-income workers and retirees to improve their pension adequacy;
  - enhanced co-funding support for the Progressive Wage Model, which sets out sector-specific minimum salaries for selected sectors such as retail, food services, and security.

### SkillsFuture Jobseeker Support scheme (temporary financial support for involuntary unemployed)
- Launched in mid-April 2025; non-contributory and financed by general government revenue.
- Targeting criteria:
  - average monthly income of S$5,000 (US$3,800) or less;
  - reside in a property with an annual value of S$31,000 (US$23,000) or less.
- Benefit design:
  - benefit and duration capped at S$6,000 (US$4,500) over six months to minimize disincentives to re-enter the workforce.
  - integrates active labor market programs requiring recipients to take part in training, career coaching, and job searching.
- Expected effects and considerations:
  - temporarily mitigates income losses for families and helps reduce their incentive for precautionary saving.
  - over the medium term, the scheme’s coverage, level, and duration could be further refined considering the tradeoff between efficiency and adequacy and Singapore’s labor market characteristics.
- Contextual statistic:
  - In 2024, the median gross monthly income from employment (including employer CPF contributions) of full-time employed residents was S$5,500.

### AI adoption, readiness, and workforce policy
- IMF’s AI Preparedness Index (AIPI) ranks Singapore the highest among 174 countries.
- National AI Strategy 2.0 (launched in 2023) and recent tools:
  - GenAI Playbook (Ministry of Digital Development and Information) and GenAI Navigator to guide firms and SMEs on AI applications.
  - builds on initiatives such as SMEs Go Digital.
- Government actions and capacity building:
  - expanding training programs for re-skilling and up-skilling under the SkillsFuture program to ameliorate disruptive labor market impact of AI and facilitate AI adoption toward stronger potential growth.
  - authorities topped up the National Research Fund in the FY2025 budget to promote R&D in AI.
  - in 2024, about 26 AI Centre of Excellences were launched in Singapore (example: Sectoral AI Centre of Excellence of Manufacturing).
  - MAS’s AI adoption strategy focuses on workforce development and strengthening institutional capabilities for responsible AI adoption in the financial sector.
- Labor market exposure:
  - Singapore’s large share of skilled workers makes the labor market highly exposed to AI as both a complement and potential substitute to existing skilled workers.

### Macroeconomic outlook, inflation, and monetary policy advice
- Growth projections:
  - Growth is projected to slow to 1.7 percent in 2025 and 2026 due to lower net exports and weaker consumption and investment, weighed down by higher uncertainty, tighter financial conditions, and worsening sentiment.
  - Over the medium term, growth is expected to gradually recover to 2.5 percent as external demand recovers and uncertainty subsides.
  - Real GDP recorded a strong recovery, growing by 4.4 percent in 2024 (figure caption).
- Inflation projections:
  - Headline inflation projected to moderate to 1.1 percent in 2025.
  - MAS core inflation projected to moderate to 1.0 percent in 2025.
  - Projections reflect a decline in global commodity prices and other tradables due to slowing global growth, and increasing slack in the domestic economy.
- Staff recommendations on monetary policy:
  - Staff sees scope for further easing of monetary policy in the near term given ongoing disinflationary pressure, recent weak inflation outturns, slowing growth, and a forecasted negative output gap.
  - MAS should remain vigilant and data dependent with respect to the speed and magnitude of easing given large uncertainty, and be ready to increase its pace of easing should downside inflation risks begin to materialize.

### Fiscal policy assessment and recommendations
- The FY2025 budget is expansionary, including targeted and untargeted measures to support households and businesses and structural spending on high-quality and resilient infrastructure.
- Recommendations:
  - Accommodate rising medium-term spending needs by reducing the fiscal surplus over time within the government’s balanced budget rule.
  - Gradually phase out or better target currently untargeted transfers.
  - Increase spending on high-quality infrastructure projects, including by issuing bonds under SINGA.
  - If downside risks to growth materialize, Singapore has substantial fiscal space to deploy temporary and targeted support.

### External position and public spending
- Staff assessment:
  - Singapore’s external position in 2024 is assessed as substantially stronger than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
- Recommendation:
  - Continue to raise public spending and strengthen social safety nets to help reduce Singapore’s large external surpluses in the medium and long run.

### Financial sector resilience and supervisory priorities
- Overall resilience:
  - Financial sector remains resilient; banks maintain strong capital and liquidity buffers.
  - Current tight macroprudential policy remains appropriate to prevent buildup of housing-related systemic risks.
- Pockets of vulnerabilities:
  - contagion risks due to banks' cross-border and FX exposures;
  - a small number of highly leveraged corporates and households;
  - exposures to commercial real estate;
  - connections between rapidly evolving NBFIs and banks.
- Supervisory actions and recommendations:
  - MAS has stepped up stress testing and contingency planning, including updating corporate stress testing and conducting cashflow-based FX liquidity stress tests.
  - MAS should stand ready to provide liquidity in the market if market stress occurs.
  - Continued efforts should strengthen capacity to monitor and mitigate cybersecurity, AML/CFT, and climate risks.

### Authorities’ views (summary)
- Authorities note strong progress in Forward Singapore implementation and AI adoption.
- SkillsFuture Jobseeker Support scheme expected to provide greater assurance and help match jobseekers to jobs better aligned with their skills and experiences.
- Government emphasizes re-skilling and upskilling and has increased R&D support for AI.

*Source: International Monetary Fund staff.*

### 17.5 percent of GDP in 2024, reflecting a decline in the

### 1sgpea2025001-source-pdf - 17.5 percent of GDP in 2024, reflecting a decline in the

### External Accounts and International Investment Position
- Current account: 17.5 percent of GDP in 2024, reflecting a decline in the goods surplus that offset a higher services surplus and a lower primary income deficit.
- Net international investment position decreased in 2024 due to valuation effects as the S$NEER appreciated following monetary policy tightening.
- Singapore has a net asset position in portfolio investment and a net liability position in FDI holdings.
- Gross official reserves increased in 2024.
- Net capital outflows increased in 2024, reflecting higher net outflows of “other investment.”
- Official sector net outflows increased in 2024 while banking net outflows declined.
- Financial account balance (2015–2024): chart referenced (In percent of GDP; BPM6 sign convention: negative values imply net inflows).
- International Investment Position & Valuation Changes (2014–2024): chart referenced showing valuation changes (RHS) and IIP (LHS) in percent of GDP.

### Balance of Payments (selected figures)
- Current account balance (US$ billions): 2019: 57.9; 2020: 61.1; 2021: 86.4; 2022: 93.8; 2023: 89.4; 2024: 96.0; 2025: 96.0 (proj); 2026: 98.5 (proj).
- Current account as percent of GDP: 15.4; 17.5; 19.8; 18.4; 17.7; 17.5; 17.1; 16.9 (2019–2026 row).
- Goods balance (US$ billions): 2019: 94.7; 2020: 102.8; 2021: 121.2; 2022: 160.1; 2023: 157.2; 2024: 148.1; 2025: 150.5; 2026: 154.9.
- Services balance (US$ billions): 2019: 15.8; 2020: 7.2; 2021: 37.1; 2022: 42.9; 2023: 32.0; 2024: 44.4; 2025: 50.1; 2026: 52.0.
- Primary income balance (US$ billions): 2019: -45.5; 2020: -44.8; 2021: -65.6; 2022: -102.0; 2023: -93.0; 2024: -89.0; 2025: -97.0; 2026: -100.4.
- Financial account (net) (US$ billions): 2019: 67.9; 2020: -12.8; 2021: 20.8; 2022: 209.4; 2023: 29.3; 2024: 65.9; 2025: 55.2; 2026: 57.1.
- Direct investment (financial account, US$ billions): Assets (2024): 55.3; Liabilities (2024): 151.9.
- Portfolio investment (financial account, US$ billions): Assets (2024): 108.5; Liabilities (2024): 29.8.
- Other investment and financial derivatives (2024): 84.0 (US$ billions).

### Reserves and Exchange Rates
- Gross official reserves (US$ billions): 2019: 279.5; 2020: 362.3; 2021: 417.9; 2022: 289.5; 2023: 351.0; 2024: 371.4.
- Gross official reserves (in months of imports): 6.4; 6.8; 6.7; 4.8; 5.4; 5.5 (2019–2024 row).
- Singapore dollar/U.S. dollar exchange rate (period average) 2024: 1.34 (row shows period averages through 2024).

### Labor Market Developments
- Residents’ labor force participation rate edged down in 2024 to 68 percent due primarily to aging, still above its pre-pandemic level.
- Employment increased in 2024, led by non-residents, but at a slower pace after strong pandemic recovery outturns in 2022-23.
- Wage growth remains above prepandemic levels but continued declining from its 2022 peaks, as labor market tightness eased in 2024.
- Job vacancy to unemployed person ratio continued to decline in 2024 (chart series through 2024Q3).
- Number of retrenched employees, mostly from services sectors, remained broadly unchanged from 2024 levels.
- 2024 expansion in the foreign workforce was primarily work permit holders, who largely filled blue-collar roles.
- Labor force participation rate and hours worked (long series): labor force participation rate around 68–69 percent in recent years; total paid hours worked per week per employee series shown (chart).

### Inflation Developments
- Disinflation advanced in 2024 and early 2025 with both headline and MAS core inflation falling well below 2 percent.
- Declines driven by easing private transportation costs and food inflation.
- Prices of car ownership certificates remained below their 2023 peak as supply expanded, helping ease private transportation costs.
- Residential rents leveled off but remain elevated.
- Services inflation fell in 2024 but remained above prepandemic levels at the time.
- Medium-term inflation expectations based on consensus forecasts remain well anchored.
- Headline and MAS core inflation time series shown through Mar-25 (charts).

### Monetary and Financial Sector Developments
- Singapore dollar interest rates fell after a steep rise in 2022, in tandem with U.S. interest rates.
- Yield curve shifted slightly down in 2024 compared to 2023 and flattened.
- Real government bond yields remain in positive territory, buoyed by disinflation.
- Broad money continued to grow but at a slower rate at end-2024, nearing pre-pandemic rates.
- Singapore stock market performed well in 2024 but became volatile in April 2025 (Straits Times Index and 90-day volatility chart).
- Domestic credit growth near pre-pandemic growth rates and broad-based.
- Three-month rates (charted): 3-month US Treasury Bills Yield, 3-month SIBOR (SGD), 3-month SORA; corporate USD bond spread (CEMBI).

### Banking Sector Developments
- Banks dominate the financial sector, holding nearly 60 percent of financial sector assets.
- Non-bank deposits hold the lion’s share of the funding base.
- Loans to the corporate sector—mostly trade-related—account for more than half of non-bank loans.
- Despite monetary policy tightening, asset quality remained solid: overall NPLs declined, but vulnerabilities remained in the construction sector.
- Share of fixed deposits remained high as deposit holders took up higher yielding fixed deposits.
- Loan-to-deposit ratios, including for foreign currency, stabilized.
- Non-Performing Loans by sector (2024Q3 vs 2024Q4): sectors charted including Construction, Manufacturing, Property & Development, Housing & Bridging Loans, etc.
- Financial soundness indicators (selected): Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (2024): 18.8; Regulatory tier I (2024): 17.4; NPL ratio (local banks, latest available 2024Q3): 1.1; Capital adequacy ratio of local banks (2024Q3): 17.5.

### Housing Market Developments
- Private residential house prices rose in 2024Q4, while rental markets remained relatively muted.
- Residential property transaction activity held strong; vacancy rates in the private market fell in 2024.
- Private housing stock expected to increase significantly due to pipeline completions in coming years.
- Price-to-rent ratio in Singapore has started to pick up; price-to-income ratio broadly stable.
- Households continued to deleverage; indebtedness remained low compared to peers.
- Household balance sheets: net wealth above 400 percent of GDP.
- Liquid assets remained well above household debt positions.
- Banks’ exposure to housing stabilized over past two years; households had low NPLs and existing LTV measures helped build buffers.
- Household debt (2024Q3) in percent of GDP charted; Singapore shown among peers.

### Spillovers and External Exposures
- Singapore depends mainly on foreign final demand from the Chinese mainland, the EU, the US, and regional partners.
- FDI stocks dominated by the U.S. and the EU and concentrated in finance and insurance sector.
- Singapore has large portfolio assets exposing external balance sheet to shocks in the U.S., the Chinese mainland, Japan, and India.
- Major sources of funding for Singapore’s financial sector include East Asian banks (including ASEAN) and European banks.
- Emerging Asia is a large borrower from banks in Singapore.
- Cross-border exposures of Singaporean banks to greater China and other Asian economies remain high.
- Composition of portfolio investment assets (2023): USA; The Chinese Mainland; Japan; India; Korea; Cayman Islands; Australia; UK; Hong Kong SAR; Indonesia; Luxembourg (chart with percent shares).

### Demographics, Social, and Inequality Indicators
- Old-age dependency projected to increase significantly in the medium to long term.
- Labor force participation has risen in recent years particularly for the elderly and women in prime-working age, with scope for further improvement.
- Growth in median nominal wages for low- and medium-skilled workers rose in 2024.
- Median household income in 2024 was broadly in line with 2023 in real terms.
- Inflation disproportionately affected lower income groups in 2024.
- Inequality measured by net Gini index (post-tax and post-transfer) continued to decline in 2024.
- Resident labor force participation rate by gender & age series shown for 2004, 2014, 2024.

### Key Summary Indicators and Projections (selected from Table 1)
- Nominal GDP (2024): US$547.5 billion.
- Population (2024): 6.0 million.
- Real GDP growth: 2019: 1.3; 2020: -3.8; 2021: 9.8; 2022: 4.1; 2023: 1.8; 2024: 4.4; 2025: 1.7; 2026: 1.7.
- Gross national saving (percent of GDP): 2019: 39.9; 2020: 40.3; 2021: 43.8; 2022: 40.6; 2023: 38.9; 2024: 39.7; 2025: 39.2; 2026: 39.0.
- CPI inflation (period average): 2024: 2.4; 2025 (proj): 1.1; 2026 (proj): 1.5.
- MAS core inflation (period average): 2024: 2.8; 2025 (proj): 1.0; 2026 (proj): 1.4.
- Unemployment rate (period average): 2024: 1.9; 2025 (proj): 2.0; 2026 (proj): 2.3.
- Public Debt to GDP (Table 1): 2024: 170.8; 2025: 173.1; 2026: 174.9; 2027: 176.0 (multi-year row).
- GDP per capita (2024): US$90,689.
- Top three destinations for goods exports (2024, percent of gross goods exports): The Chinese mainland (14.0 percent); Hong Kong SAR (11.0 percent); and Malaysia (10.4 percent).
- Main goods exports (2024, percent of total non-oil goods exports): machinery & transport equip. (65.0 percent); chemical products (12.4 percent); misc. manuf. articles (10.3 percent).

*Source: IMF staff compilation from the provided PDF content.*

### Annex I. Staff Policy Advice from the 2024 Article IV Consultation

### Annex I. Staff Policy Advice from the 2024 Article IV Consultation

### Fiscal Policy
- Assessment and stance
  - The fiscal stance in 2024 is appropriate.
  - The broadly neutral fiscal stance, coupled with targeted support measures, will help moderate price pressures, while also assisting vulnerable households and firms in addressing cost of living concerns.
  - The fiscal stance in FY2024 was tight, appropriately and successfully helping the disinflationary process.
  - The FY2025 budget continues to effectively support vulnerable households and businesses.
- Capacity and rules
  - Should downside risks to growth materialize, Singapore has substantial fiscal space to deploy temporary and targeted support.
  - Given strong public finance and fiscal institutions, Singapore is well-positioned to address its medium- and long-term challenges.
  - A slower pace of fiscal surplus accumulation within the government’s balanced budget rule would be warranted in the coming years to accommodate the rising spending needs.
  - The government may draw on sizeable reserves in large shocks; past reserves have been drawn down only twice: during the 2008 global financial crisis and for responding to the COVID-19 pandemic.
- Recent and planned measures
  - The fiscal stance in the FY2025 budget is expansionary and envisages additional spending, including on healthcare.
  - A new temporary financial support scheme for involuntarily unemployed workers was introduced in April 2025, strengthening the social safety net.
  - The authorities have mobilized additional revenue, for instance through the increase in the GST from 7 to 9 percent, to support higher spending over the medium term.
- Policy recommendations
  - Higher public spending and stronger social safety nets will help reduce Singapore’s large external surpluses.

### Monetary, Exchange Rate, and Financial Policies
- Monetary policy guidance
  - Monetary policy should be kept tight until inflationary pressures firmly recede.
  - Once the envisaged disinflation is firmly in sight, monetary policy should be adjusted in a timely manner to address risks to price stability, continued to be guided by data and articulated through clearly communicated policy decisions.
- Recent actions
  - After both headline and MAS core inflation fell firmly below 2 percent by end-2024, MAS loosened monetary policy by slightly reducing the slope of its policy band in January and April 2025.
- FX liquidity and supervision
  - Given the importance of U.S. dollar funding and liquidity for the banking system, the option of introducing minimum requirements for foreign currency liquidity coverage ratios (LCR) should remain open, in addition to its current supervisory approach.
  - MAS could also consider increasing the stress test horizon (e.g., a 5-year horizon like the 2019 FSAP).
  - MAS continues to engage regularly with banks to strengthen their U.S. dollar liquidity risk management practices and contingency funding planning.
  - MAS has introduced granular cashflow-based FX liquidity stress tests separately for U.S. dollar cashflows, while there is no minimum requirement for foreign currency LCR. Stress tests are conducted over 3-year horizons.
- Macroprudential stance
  - The tight macroprudential policy stance remains appropriate and should continue to play a key role in containing housing-related systemic risks.
  - The macroprudential stance based on existing macroprudential measures (MPMs) remained unchanged for the private residential housing sector.
  - To further encourage financial prudence, the Loan-to-Value limit for public housing loans provided by HDB was tightened from 80 percent to 75 percent.
  - A countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB), loan to value ratio (LTV), total debt servicing ratio (TDSR), and loan tenure limits are in the MPM toolkit. However, MAS has kept the Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) at 0 percent for 2025.
  - Staff recommend phasing out the additional residency-based differentiation resulting from the April 2023 increase in the ABSD rates in a way that does not disrupt the market, and then continuing phasing out the remaining residency-based differentiation once systemic risks from the housing market clearly dissipate.
  - The ABSD continues to retain its residency-based distinction.

### Structural Policies
- Direction and initiatives
  - Staff welcome the authorities’ efforts to promote a more inclusive, resilient, and greener economy.
  - The government's Forward Singapore report outlines reforms, including enhanced social safety nets and lifelong learning programs, aimed at fostering inclusive growth amid rapid population aging and AI advancements.
- Implemented measures (2024–25)
  - A new financial support scheme for voluntarily employed workers was introduced in April 2025, strengthening the social safety net.
  - Other measures implemented in 2024-25 include:
    - (i) longer paid parental leave and more affordable preschool education to support young families;
    - (ii) stepping up new public housing construction and enhanced grants for low-income, first-time home buyers to improve housing affordability;
    - (iii) topping up Central Provident Fund (CPF) retirement accounts for low-income workers and retirees to improve their pension adequacy; and
    - (iv) enhanced co-funding support for the Progressive Wage Model, which sets out sector-specific minimum salaries for selected sectors such as retail, food services, and security.
- Policy recommendation
  - Accelerate implementation of structural reforms to transform Singapore into a knowledge-based, innovation-driven economy.

### Annex II — Trade and Cross-Border Investment Linkages with the United States
- Tariff developments and exposure
  - Prior to recent trade tensions, Singapore’s effective tariff rate was nearly zero percent under the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement that began in 2004.
  - In early 2025, the U.S. administration imposed a series of new tariffs on certain sectors (e.g., automobiles, steel, and aluminum) and varying levels of economy-wide tariffs, including a 10 percent tariff on Singapore.
  - Many of Singapore’s main exports to the U.S. have been exempted from the trade actions thus far (e.g., petroleum products, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductor goods).
  - As a result, Singapore’s estimated effective tariff rate is roughly 5 percent, which is lower than the regional average effective rate of 21 percent, as of April 4th.
- Trade exposure statistics
  - Singapore’s 2023 direct exposure value to U.S. demand: 11 percent of GDP.
  - Singapore’s 2023 indirect exposure (Singapore’s value added embedded in other countries’ exports to the U.S.): 3 percent of GDP.
  - Total 2023 exposure to U.S.: 14 percent of GDP (5 percent of GDP for goods only).
  - Exposure increased from a total of 8 percent of GDP in 2017.
  - Over half of Singapore’s indirect U.S. export exposures are via regional supply chains.
  - Highly exposed goods sectors include electronics (e.g., semiconductor-related goods), transport equipment (e.g., aircraft parts), and chemicals (e.g., pharmaceuticals).
  - While there have been fewer actions on services trade, negative spillovers are expected to Singapore’s trade-related services (e.g., wholesale trade) and financial services.
- Cross-border investment linkages
  - Total foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to Singapore: US$102 billion in 2017 to US$152 billion in 2024.
  - The U.S. is the main contributor to Singapore’s FDI stock, and its share has gradually increased over time.
  - Singapore’s total portfolio investment inflows: US$25 billion in 2017 to US$30 billion in 2024.
  - In contrast to FDI, the U.S.’s share of the portfolio investment liabilities stock has declined.

### Annex III — Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM): Key Risks, Likelihoods, Impacts, and Policy Responses
- Note on likelihood labels
  - “Low” indicates a probability below 10 percent, “medium” a probability between 10 and 30 percent, and “high” a probability between 30 and 50 percent.
- External conjunctural risks
  - Trade policy and investment shocks
    - Likelihood: High
    - Impact: High — Singapore is particularly vulnerable as a trade and financial hub; reshoring and less trade would hit external demand and reduce growth; disruptive supply chain shifts may increase near-term price pressures; tighter global financial conditions could exacerbate financial vulnerabilities.
    - Policy response: Provide targeted fiscal support to affected sectors and workers; monetary policy should remain data dependent and focused on preserving price stability; adjust macro-prudential policies while safeguarding financial stability; accelerate structural reforms.
  - Commodity price volatility
    - Likelihood: Medium
    - Impact: Medium — as a larger importer of commodities this would damage confidence and increase inflationary pressures.
    - Policy response: Monetary policy remain data dependent and focused on price stability; provide temporary and targeted support to vulnerable groups.
  - Tighter financial conditions and systemic instability
    - Likelihood: Medium
    - Impact: Medium — asset repricing, market dislocations, weak bank and NBFI distress, U.S. dollar appreciation could worsen global imbalances and capital outflows from EMDEs.
    - Policy response: Monetary policy data dependent; adjust macro-prudential policies while safeguarding financial stability, including liquidity support to banks as needed; provide targeted support to vulnerable groups.
  - Regional conflicts
    - Likelihood: Medium
    - Impact: Medium — trade and supply chain disruptions; risk to domestic food security; slowdown in key export markets.
    - Policy response: Extend targeted fiscal support to affected households and businesses; monetary policy remain data dependent; adjust macro-prudential policies while safeguarding financial stability.
  - Global growth acceleration
    - Likelihood: Low
    - Impact: Medium — would boost Singapore’s growth.
    - Policy response: Maintain countercyclical policies; adjust macro-prudential policies to avoid increased vulnerabilities; leverage strong growth to accelerate structural reforms.
- External structural risks
  - Deepening geoeconomic fragmentation
    - Likelihood: High
    - Impact: High — reshoring, less trade, costly financial frictions would reduce potential growth.
    - Policy response: Accelerate structural reforms; use monetary policy to respond to cyclical slowdown; use temporary and targeted fiscal stimulus if domestic demand weakens substantially.
  - Cyberthreats
    - Likelihood: High
    - Impact: Low — cyberattacks could lead to loss of confidence and concerns about protection of critical data.
    - Policy response: Assess IT risk management adequacy and prepare contingency plans; coordinate with global financial regulators; provide temporary emergency liquidity support if disruptions occur.
  - Climate change
    - Likelihood: Medium
    - Impact: Medium — extreme events could damage infrastructure, lower growth, and increase inflationary pressures.
    - Policy response: Enhance climate change adaptation and preparedness; improve inter-agency collaboration; provide targeted fiscal support to vulnerable groups.
- Domestic risks
  - Disorderly correction in property prices
    - Likelihood: Low
    - Impact: Medium — decline in collateral values could trigger fall in activity and bank lending.
    - Policy response: Adjust macro-prudential policies while safeguarding financial stability; provide targeted assistance to vulnerable households with impaired debt servicing capacity.
  - Resurgence in domestic inflationary pressures
    - Likelihood: Low
    - Impact: Medium — expansionary FY2025 budget or upside growth could reverse disinflation.
    - Policy response: Tighten monetary policy stance and ensure clear communication of policy decisions.
  - Artificial Intelligence (AI)
    - Likelihood: Medium
    - Impact: Medium — AI adoption could displace workers in occupations with high exposure and low complementarity with AI.
    - Policy response: Provide training programs to re-skill and upskill workers; enhance active labor market policies; improve social safety nets to assist affected workers in transitioning to new jobs.

### Annex IV — Singapore’s Fiscal Framework and Rules
- Core features
  - The fiscal framework is anchored by constitutional safeguards, multi-year planning, and a focus on long-term sustainability.
  - Under Singapore’s balanced-budget framework, enshrined in the Constitution, the government may not borrow to fund its operating expenses.
  - The government must maintain a balanced budget over each term in office by ensuring that spending in each year does not exceed accumulated surpluses from the current term.
  - At the end of each term, any accumulated surpluses become part of Singapore’s “past reserves.” FY2025 is the last year under the current administration. Any remaining surplus at the end of this term will become protected as part of past reserves and cannot directly be used by future governments.
- The “two key” mechanism
  - The government (first key) proposes budgets and, if it seeks to use reserves accumulated in previous terms, must obtain approval from the president (second key).
  - Past reserves can only be drawn down under exceptional circumstances—such as a severe crisis—and only with presidential consent.
  - This high threshold preserves an intergenerational store of wealth, enabling Singapore to respond swiftly to economic shocks without incurring debt.

*Source: Annex I. Staff Policy Advice from the 2024 Article IV Consultation (from the supplied PDF).*

### 3. The Net Investment Returns   Framework allows the government to include up to half

### 3. The Net Investment Returns   Framework allows the government to include up to half

### Net Investment Returns Framework (NIRF) — design and fiscal role
- The Framework allows the government to include up to half of expected long-term real investment returns from the past reserves as revenue in the budget.
- The other half is continuously reinvested to preserve intergenerational equity.
- Purpose and effects:
  - Helps keep the tax burden manageable as expenditure needs increase.
  - Ensures accumulated surpluses of the past serve as a buffer for hard times.
  - Is complemented by robust revenue strategies, such as a progressively structured tax system, to provide a stable fiscal foundation for aging population, increased social spending, and other national priorities without compromising overall fiscal sustainability.

### Significant Infrastructure Government Loan Act (SINGA) — scope and fiscal accounting
- SINGA permits the government to issue debt specifically to finance nationally significant infrastructure (examples: public transit and climate-resilience projects).
- Eligibility criteria for projects under SINGA:
  - Minimum scale: at least SGD 4 billion (equivalent to 0.5 percent of 2024 GDP).
  - Useful life: 50 years or more.
  - Ownership: by the government.
  - Importance: projects must be important to national interests.
- Borrowing limits and thresholds:
  - Overall gross borrowing limit of SGD 90 billion.
  - Annual interest threshold of SGD 5  billion.
- Fiscal treatment and intergenerational equity:
  - Under SINGA, the government may capitalize the resulting infrastructure asset when computing the annual budget balance, and must then depreciate it over its useful life once the asset is available for use.
  - By spreading costs over the asset’s multi-decade life, SINGA helps to achieve intergenerational equity.
- Interaction with balanced budget rule:
  - Borrowed funds cannot go toward operating expenses, preserving the principle that day-to-day public services must be funded from within each government’s resources.
  - Because capitalization and subsequent depreciation is not done under the IMF presentation of fiscal accounts, this could lead to overall fiscal deficits being shown under the IMF presentation even though the government is complying with its balanced budget rule.

### External sector assessment — overall assessment and drivers
- Overall Assessment: The external position in 2024 was substantially stronger than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. The assessment is subject to wide uncertainty due to Singapore’s openness and role as a global trading and financial center.
- Medium-term dynamics: CA surplus is projected to narrow gradually alongside higher public spending, stronger social safety nets, and an increase in household consumption as the share of the prime working age population actively saving for retirement declines.
- Potential Policy Responses:
  - Planned execution of major high-quality and resilient infrastructure projects and continued strengthening of social safety nets should help reduce external imbalances in the near term.
  - Higher public investment is expected to catalyze private investment.
  - Over the medium term, higher public investment on health care, green and other physical infrastructures, and human capital, alongside reforms to strengthen social safety nets, would help reduce external imbalances by reducing net saving in both the public and private sectors.

### Foreign asset and liability position — key statistics and assessment
- Background facts:
  - NIIP stood at 146.9 percent of GDP in 2024, down from 179.3 percent of GDP in 2023 and below the 2019-2023 average of 224.7 percent of GDP.
  - Gross assets and liabilities are high; over half of foreign liabilities are in FDI (53.5 percent) and about a fifth are in the form of currency and deposits.
  - In 2024, valuation effects (mainly appreciation in S$NEER under MAS’s exchange rate-based monetary policy) drove the decline in the NIIP.
  - Large positive NIIP partly reflects private savings accumulated in foreign assets for old-age consumption, expected to be gradually unwound over the long term.
- Assessment:
  - Large gross non-FDI liabilities (433.9 percent of GDP in 2024) — predominantly cross-border deposit taking by foreign bank branches — present some liquidity risks, but are mitigated by:
    - Large gross asset positions,
    - Banks’ large short-term external assets,
    - Authorities’ close monitoring of banks’ liquidity risk profiles,
    - Large official reserves and other official liquid assets.
- 2024 (% GDP) headline figures (exactly as reported):
  - NIIP: 146.9
  - Gross Assets:  1079.9
  - Res. Assets: 68.1
  - Gross Liab.:  932.9
  - Debt Liab.:  319.1

### Current Account (CA) — levels, drivers, and gap assessment
- CA facts:
  - CA surplus was 17.5 percent of GDP in 2024, down from 17.7 percent in 2023.
  - CA balance broadly in line with the average of 17.4 percent since 2018 and lower than the post-global-financial-crisis peak of 22.9 percent in 2010.
  - In 2024, private and public sector savings surpluses manifested as a strong goods balance and a small services surplus partly offset by an income account deficit.
- Structural drivers:
  - Singapore’s status as a financial center, consecutive fiscal surpluses in most years, rapid aging, and a mandatory defined-contribution pension program (whose assets were about 83.3 percent of GDP in 2024) are main drivers of the strong external position.
- Projections and recent behavior:
  - CA surplus is projected to narrow over the medium term on the back of increased infrastructure and social spending.
  - In 2024, public saving increased as the fiscal balance improved further due to stronger-than-anticipated economic activity, while private saving decreased slightly.
- CA gap assessment (guided by EBA framework):
  - Staff assesses the 2024 CA gap to be in the range of 3.1-7.1 percent of GDP, with a midpoint of 5.1 percent.
  - Identified contributions to the staff-estimated CA gap of about 5.1 percent of GDP:
    - Fiscal gap: about 1.5 percent of GDP
    - Credit gap: about 1.6 percent of GDP
    - Public health spending: about 0.2 percent of GDP
    - Reserves: about 0.2 percent of GDP
  - Adjustments to EBA-based norm noted in staff approach:
    - Downward adjustment of 1 percentage point to EBA’s implied contribution of public health expenditures to reflect Singapore’s high health efficiency.
    - Downward adjustment of -3.4 percentage points to better account for NFA composition and component-specific return differentials.
    - Downward adjustment of -2.1 percentage points of GDP to account for measurement biases due to inflation and portfolio equity retained earnings (-5.5 and +3.4 percent of GDP respectively).

### Real Exchange Rate (REER) — evolution and assessment
- Background:
  - REER appreciated by 2.9 percent in 2024 reflecting NEER appreciation of 2.4 percent.
  - Between 2020 and 2023, REER appreciated by 13.5 percent (cumulative) and NEER by 5.3 percent (cumulative).
  - As of January 2025, the REER remained in line with its 2024 average.
- Assessment:
  - Staff assesses the REER to be undervalued in the range of 6.2 to 14.2 percent, with a midpoint of 10.2 percent in 2024 (applying an estimated elasticity of 0.5).

### Capital and financial accounts; FX intervention and reserves
- Capital and financial account:
  - Singapore has an open capital account; as a trade and financial center, market sentiment shifts can produce inflows or outflows.
  - Financial account activity reflects reinvestment abroad of income from official foreign assets, sizable net inward FDI, and smaller but more volatile net bank-related flows.
  - In 2024, capital and financial account featured lower outflows of 12.0 percent of GDP compared to 41.1 percent in 2022 (outflows ranged from 4.8 to 41.1 percent in 2021–23).
  - Assessment: Financial account is likely to remain in deficit as long as the trade surplus remains large.
- FX intervention and reserves:
  - With the NEER as the intermediate monetary policy target, intervention is undertaken to achieve inflation and output objectives; net FX purchases are endogenous to Singapore’s monetary policy framework.
  - Aggregate FX intervention data: in 2024H1, net FX purchases increased to US$25 billion, up from US$12 billion in 2023H1 and broadly in line with 2023H2 interventions of US$24 billion.
  - Official reserves: held by MAS reached US$371 billion (68 percent of GDP) in 2024.
  - Assessment: In addition to MAS FX reserves, Singapore has access to other official foreign assets managed by Temasek and GIC. Current level of official external assets appears adequate; there is no clear case for further accumulation for precautionary purposes.

### Sovereign risk and debt sustainability — structure and assessment
- Key points on public debt and assets:
  - Singapore’s debt-to-GDP is high: 173 percent of GDP at end-FY2024.
  - Large public financial assets result in a positive net asset position for Singapore.
  - Public debt is primarily issued for non-spending purposes (development of Singapore’s debt market, meeting investment needs of the CPF, and facilitating transfer of excess official foreign reserves from MAS to the government using Reserves Management Government Securities (RMGS)).
  - As of end-FY2024, only about 1 percent of public debt comprised debt issued for spending purposes under SINGA.
  - Large increase in public debt in FY2022 was primarily driven by RMGS issuance; MAS’s outstanding holdings of RMGS amounted to S$274.1 billion at end-FY2024.
- DSA summary assessment:
  - Overall risk of sovereign stress: Low.
  - Near term: Not applicable for disbursing IMF arrangement; for surveillance-only cases the near-term assessment is performed but not published.
  - Medium term: Low.
  - Long term: Low.
  - Commentary: Public debt is sustainable and large public financial assets are important risk-mitigating factors. Strong post-pandemic rebound, tightened fiscal policy, and large net assets imply low risk of sovereign stress.
  - Singapore is a low scrutiny country in the debt sustainability analysis framework for market access countries.
- Debt coverage and composition notes:
  - The DSA’s fiscal assumptions are based on central government debt.
  - Debt issuance motives: deepen domestic debt market, meet CPF investment needs, provide long-term saving options for individual investors, facilitate transfer of official foreign reserves via RMGS.
- Public debt metrics and projections (percent of GDP, exact reported series):
  - Public debt:
    - Actual 2024: 173.3
    - 2025: 175.5
    - 2026: 176.2
    - 2027: 176.9
    - 2028: 177.7
    - 2029: 178.1
    - 2030: 178.5
    - 2031: 179.0
    - 2032: 179.4
    - 2033: 179.9
    - 2034: 180.8
  - Change in public debt (year-on-year): 0.5, 2.2, 0.7, 0.7, 0.8, 0.4, 0.4, 0.5, 0.4, 0.5, 0.9 (series aligned with years above).
  - Contribution of identified flows (percent of GDP): -11.7, 2.2, 0.7, 0.7, 0.8, 0.4, 0.4, 0.5, 0.4, 0.5, 0.9.
  - Primary deficit series (percent of GDP): -6.5, -0.5, 0.0, 0.3, 0.6, 0.8, 0.7, 0.7, 0.7, 0.7, 0.7.
  - Noninterest revenues: 19.0, 19.8, 19.9, 19.9, 19.9, 19.9, 20.0, 20.0, 20.0, 20.0, 20.0.
  - Noninterest expenditures: 12.4, 19.3, 19.8, 20.2, 20.4, 20.7, 20.7, 20.7, 20.7, 20.7, 20.7.
  - Automatic debt dynamics: -12.0, 1.5, -1.6, -2.5, -2.9, -2.9, -2.9, -2.9, -3.0, -3.0, -3.0.
  - Real GDP growth (percent): 4.7, 0.8, 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5, 2.5.
  - Inflation (GDP deflator; percent): 2.6, 1.3, 1.6, 2.0, 2.0, 2.0, 2.0, 2.0, 2.0, 2.0, 2.0.
  - Nominal GDP growth (percent): 7.4, 2.1, 3.8, 4.4, 4.5, 4.5, 4.5, 4.5, 4.5, 4.5, 4.5.
  - Effective interest rate (percent): 0.0, 3.0, 2.9, 2.9, 2.8, 2.8, 2.8, 2.8, 2.8, 2.8, 2.8.
  - Gross financing needs: 11.8, 19.3, 17.5, 18.7, 19.8, 20.2, 22.0, 23.7, 25.7, 27.3, 27.8.
  - Debt service (of which; percent of GDP): 18.3, 19.8, 17.5, 18.3, 19.3, 19.5, 21.2, 23.0, 25.0, 26.6, 27.1.
  - Local currency debt service: same series as debt service; foreign currency: 0.00 across projection horizon.
- Additional structural DSA notes:
  - Singapore does not have any external public debt and issuance is largely unrelated to Government’s fiscal needs.
  - Residual maturity: 6. years (as reported).
  - Projected stabilization: Debt level is projected to stabilize at 180 percent of GDP in the medium-run.

*Source: IMF staff analysis as presented in the chapter.*

### Annex VI. Table 4. Singapore: Baseline Scenario

### Annex VI. Table 4. Singapore: Baseline Scenario

### Extended projection — staff commentary and drivers of public debt change
- Staff commentary: Public debt is projected to stabilize over the medium-term, moderated by positive growth and prudent fiscal management under Singapore’s balanced budget rules. A moderation in investment needs by the CPF, as employment growth slows in line with population aging, will also help limit upward pressures on debt.
- Contribution to Change in Public Debt (Percent of GDP) — graphical series shown for 2015–2033 with components labeled:
  - Primary deficit
  - Real Interest rate and relative inflation
  - Real GDP growth
  - Exch. rate depreciation
  - Other flows
  - Residual
  - Change in public debt

### Debt fanchart, terminal metrics, and risk signals
- ValueContrib 1/; Final Fanchart (Percent of GDP)
- Debt fanchart module details (as presented):
  - Fanchart width77.61.1
  - (percent of GDP)
  - Probability of debt non-22.6 0.2 stabilization (percent)
  - Terminal debt-to-GDP x-3.0-0.1
  - institutions index
  - Debt fanchart index (DFI) 1.2
  - Risk signal: 3/ Moderate

### Gross Financing Needs (GFN) and financeability
- Gross financing needs (GFN) module (percent of GDP):
  - Average baseline GFN19.66.7
  - Initial Banks' claims on the gen. govt (pct bank assets) 13.64.4
  - Chg. In banks' claims in stress (pct banks' assets) 1.00.3
  - GFN financeability index (GFI) 11.4
  - Risk signal: 4/Moderate

### Medium-term risk analysis and composite index
- Medium-Term Index (Index Number) components and signalling:
  - Debt fanchart index 1.2
  - GFN finaceability index 11.4
  - Medium-term index (normalized)
  - Risk signal: 5/ Final assessment: Prob. of missed crisis, 2025-2030, if stress not predicted: 9.1 pct.
  - Prob. of false alarms, 2025-2030, if stress predicted: 42.0 pct.
- Notes on signal thresholds (as presented):
  - 3/ The signal is low risk if the DFI is below 1.13; high risk if the DFI is above 2.08; and otherwise, it is moderate risk.
  - 4/ The signal is low risk if the GFI is below 7.6; high risk if the DFI is above 17.9; and otherwise, it is moderate risk.
  - 5/ The signal is low risk if the GFI is below 0.26; high risk if the DFI is above 0.40; and otherwise, it is moderate risk.

### Medium-term tools commentary and outcomes
- Commentary: The two medium-term tools, the Debt Fanchart Module and the GFN Financeability Module, suggest low and moderate levels of risk, respectively. The normalized medium-term index suggests low level of risk.
- Final normalized signals and percentiles (as displayed):
  - 0.30.50.1 / 0.20.50.1 (normalized display elements)
  - Percentiles in peer group 2/ shown across graphics.

### Realism of baseline assumptions (Annex VI. Table 6)
- Commentary: The realism tools do not indicate any major concerns: the projected debt reduction and fiscal adjustment is within norms.
- Selected metrics and distributions (as shown):
  - 3-year debt reduction distribution; Max. 3-year reduction
  - 3-year debt reduction above 75th percentile (5.9 ppts of GDP)
  - percentile rank 36.3
  - 3-year adjustment distribution; 3-year adjustment above 75th percentile (2 ppts of GDP) percentile rank 22
  - Baseline real growth, baseline real potential growth, 10-yr avg. real growth, output gap trajectories (2014–2030) presented in charts.
- Implied spread, Laubach rule 4/ (visualized as spread vs 10-yr US Treas.).

### Status of main recommendations of the 2019 FSSA (selected items, authorities’ status update as of May 2025)
- Recommendation 1: The MAS should strengthen U.S. dollar liquidity among D-SIBs.
  - Time: MT
  - Status: Completed.
  - Key points: MAS engaged banks, undertook reviews in 2023 on liquidity stress test practices and contingency funding plans; industry sound practices issued; proportion of more stable USD funding sources increased between 2018 to March 2025; MAS’ Industry-wide Stress Test 2024 showed D-SIBs have sufficient buffers and funding options.
- Recommendation 2: Establish a core staff within the MAS Resolution Unit (RSU) dedicated to resolution work and transfer resolution planning to RSU.
  - Time: I
  - Status: Completed.
  - Key points: MAS established a new Resolution Office (RSO) in October 2023, staff dedicated to resolution work, RSO to steer development of resolution toolkit and capabilities.
- Recommendation 3: Expand scope of bail-in to include senior unsecured debt securities.
  - Time: MT
  - Status: Ongoing.
  - Key points: Authorities weighing trade-offs; MAS preference for narrower scope but will consider inclusion of senior unsecured debt securities with contractual bail-in clauses as TLAC instruments.
- Recommendation 4: Continue to develop guidelines and playbooks for new resolution tools; staff training and process testing.
  - Time: I
  - Status: Completed.
  - Key points: Tabletop walkthroughs, updates to “Handbook on Management of Distressed Banks,” ongoing updates on valuation, resolution fund trustee and bridge entity, bail-in execution, I-Team operational procedures.
- Recommendation 5: Formalize MAS’ ability to require pre-notification of material outsourcing arrangements where outsourcing risk is inadequately managed.
  - Time: MT
  - Status: Completed.
  - Key points: Revised Outsourcing Guidelines issued on December 11, 2023; MAS may require pre-notification where supervisory expectations are not met.
- Recommendation 6: Devote more resources to oversight and supervision of payment systems.
  - Time: NT
  - Status: Completed.
  - Key points: From 2019, MAS allocated an additional 40 percent of dedicated resources; Payments and Infrastructure Division expanded to Payments Department in 2020.
- Recommendation 7: Enhance cyber resiliency of the central bank and MEPS+ by clarifying CCSO role and strengthening cyber resilience.
  - Time: I
  - Status: (i) Completed; (ii) Completed.
  - Key points: CCSO role clarified as an independent second line of defense; CCSO office set up; cybersecurity initiatives implemented (Netflow, Database Activity Monitoring, User Behavioral Analytics); cybersecurity transformation roadmap under way.
- Recommendation 8: Develop a cyber network map that includes financial linkages and ICT connections for cyber risk surveillance.
  - Time: MT
  - Status: Completed.
  - Key points: MAS mapped cyber interconnections of key FIs, integrated relative financial importance metrics, used map to prioritize surveillance, engage FIs on outsourcing and supply chain risk, and reach out to fellow regulators (example: engagement with FSB on concentration risks of major cloud providers).

### Data adequacy for surveillance (Annex VIII)
- Data Adequacy Assessment for Surveillance — sectoral assessments and ratings (as presented in heatmap):
  - National Accounts, Prices, Government Finance Statistics, External Sector Statistics, Monetary and Financial Statistics, Inter-sectoral Consistency — median rating cells shown (letters A/B).
  - Coverage, Granularity, Consistency, Frequency and Timeliness rated across sectors; summary statement: The data provided to the Fund are adequate for surveillance.
- Rationale and corrective actions:
  - Staff note continued expansion of publicly available data, including on the financial sector.
  - Data gaps that could enhance analysis: (i) government assets held abroad, (ii) financial position of the consolidated public sector, and (iii) sectoral disaggregation of the international investment position as suggested by BPM6 (these are unpublished or partially published).
  - Recommendation: continue discussions to improve coverage and granularity of Monetary and Financial Statistics, including for NBFIs, and report pending MFS data to the Fund using Standard Report Forms (SRFs).
- Use of data and staff practice:
  - Staff do not use data and/or estimates that differ from official statistics.
  - Staff did not observe any notable data-related developments since the last Article IV consultation.

*Source: IMF staff estimates, projections, and the authorities’ self-assessment.*

### Annex VIII. Table 1 . Singapore: Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance

### Annex VIII. Table 1 . Singapore: Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance

### Data dissemination and standards
- Singapore subscribes to the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) since August 1996 and publishes data on its National Summary Data Page.
- As of May 30, 2025: data provision to the Fund and publication under the Data Standards Initiatives through the National Summary Data Page are noted.
- Frequency and timeliness codes used in the table: (“D”) daily; (“W”) weekly or with a lag of no more than one week after the reference date; (“M”) monthly or with lag of no more than one month after the reference date; (“Q”) quarterly or with lag of no more than one quarter after the reference date; (“A”) annual; ("SA") semiannual;  ("I") irregular; ("NA") not available or not applicable; and ("NLT") not later than.
- Footnotes (selected): 
  - Reserve assets include reserve assets pledged or otherwise encumbered, as well as net derivative positions.
  - Interest rates: both market-based and officially determined, including discount rates, money market rates, rates on treasury bills, notes and bonds.
  - Financing: foreign, domestic bank, and domestic nonbank financing.
  - General government includes central government (budgetary funds, extra budgetary funds, and social security funds) and state and local governments.
  - Expected frequencies and timeliness reflect encouraged frequency under the e-GDDS and required frequency under the SDDS and SDDS Plus; flexibility options or transition plans under SDDS/SDDS Plus are not reflected.

### Key macroeconomic developments and outlook
- 2024 real GDP growth: 4.4 percent.
- Official GDP growth forecast for 2025 (April): 0–2 percent.
- Recent activity: signs of softening at start of 2025 driven by weaker trade-related and modern services sectors and tepid domestic-facing industries (retail and food services).
- Trade tensions: sweeping tariffs announced by the US expected to weigh heavily on global trade and economic growth; trade tensions de-escalated slightly since mid-May but growth expected to remain muted.

### Inflation and labor market
- MAS Core Inflation: 0.6 percent y-o-y in May 2025 (from 2.8 percent in 2024).
- CPI-All Items inflation: 0.8 percent y-o-y in May 2025 (from 2.4 percent in 2024).
- Drivers: appreciating Singapore Dollar Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (S$NEER) damping import prices; elevated real exchange rate inducing consumers to switch spending abroad; falling non-core inflation in private transport and accommodation contributed to the decline.
- Outlook: For 2025 as a whole, both MAS Core Inflation and CPI-All Items inflation are projected to average 0.5–1.5 percent.
- Labor market: domestic labor market has cooled amid softening employment demand; easing labor demand expected to drag on nominal wage growth and discretionary spending.

### Exchange rate and monetary policy
- Exchange rate arrangement: de jure "other managed"; de facto classified as "crawl-like." MAS monitors S$NEER against an undisclosed basket and intervenes to maintain an undisclosed target band; U.S. dollar is the intervention currency.
- Policy actions in 2025: MAS reduced the rate of appreciation of the S$NEER policy band slightly in January and April 2025 in view of an output gap expected to turn negative and inflation forecast to remain well below 2 percent in 2025. The S$NEER policy band remains on a mild appreciating path expected to ensure medium-term price stability.

### Fiscal policy and public finances
- FY2025 fiscal stance: fiscal policy tailored to provide additional targeted assistance to households and firms facing cost-of-living and cashflow concerns; fiscal impulse for FY2025 expected to be mildly supportive.
- Budget priorities: productivity-driven growth, building a more equitable society (aligned with Forward Singapore report); significant funds set aside for energy transition infrastructure, clean energy security, strengthening R&D ecosystem, and building know-how for technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI).

### Macroprudential and financial sector resilience
- Banking system: domestic banks are well-capitalized with healthy liquidity and a stable, diversified funding base; capital adequacy ratios for all domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs) remain above minimum regulatory requirements under MAS’ adverse solvency stress test scenario which incorporated intensified trade/geopolitical tensions and sharply tighter global financial conditions.
- Nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs): remain well positioned to withstand unanticipated shocks and are not expected to pose systemic risks.
- Macroprudential stance: currently tight and deemed necessary to dampen speculative housing demand from investors and guard against build-up of excessive housing leverage in the banking system.

### Financial sector policy on digital assets and AML/CFT
- MAS focus: fostering an innovative and responsible digital asset ecosystem while maintaining strong vigilance against money laundering and terrorism financing risks.
- Regulatory measures: strengthened measures for digital payment token services using a risk-centric approach focusing on money laundering and terrorism financing, consumer harm, technology, and cybersecurity risks.

### Medium-term structural and social policies
- Expected government spending increases: healthcare, climate change and clean energy transition.
- Social spending: rising to support lower-income Singaporeans (including retirement) and help workers with job transitions.
- Labor market measures to reduce wage disparity and support lower-wage workers:
  - Progressive Wage Model.
  - Enhanced Progressive Wage Credit Scheme with increased co-funding for wage increases.
  - Permanent GST Voucher Scheme.
  - Workfare Income Supplement.
  - Financial support scheme for the involuntarily unemployed.
  - Upskilling/reskilling programs including SkillsFuture Level-Up Programme (monthly training allowances for Singaporeans aged 40 and above) and enhancements to the Workfare Skills Support Scheme (monthly training allowances for lower-wage workers aged 30 and above).
- Enterprise support and productivity:
  - Incentives for firms to invest in tangible and intangible capital.
  - New Private Credit Growth Fund to offer financing options for high-growth local enterprises and support international M&A and large capital overseas expenditures.
  - Budget allocations for energy transition, R&D, and AI-related capabilities.
- AI and digital transformation:
  - Second National AI Strategy to encourage businesses and workers to leverage AI.
  - Digital Enterprise Blueprint to support companies developing AI capabilities.
  - Company-Led Training Programme and TechSkills Accelerator to equip workers with competencies and real-world use case experience.

### External position and medium-term prospects
- S$REER appreciation: 16.7 percent since 2020.
- Current account: persistent surplus reflecting structural drivers—limited domestic investment opportunities due to severe land constraints and high development level; residents incentivized to invest savings abroad; precautionary saving in safe foreign assets given Singapore’s role as an international financial center.
- Medium-term outlook: current account surplus expected to moderate as household saving rate falls with population ageing, slowing income growth, and increased public spending (including healthcare and climate mitigation/adaptation).

### Institutional and IMF engagement snapshots
- IMF membership: Joined August 3, 1966; Article VIII.
- General Resources Account (SDR Millions / Percent of Quota):
  - Quota: 3,891.90 100.00
  - Fund holdings of currency (exchange rate): 2,848.75 73.20
  - Reserve tranche position: 1,045.77 26.87
- SDR Department (SDR Millions / Percent of Allocation):
  - Net cumulative allocation: 4,474.42 100.00
  - Holdings: 4,739.48 105.92
- Outstanding Purchases and Loans: None.
- Financial Arrangements: None.
- Projected Payments to the Fund: None.
- Article IV cycle: 12-month consultation cycle; 2024 Article IV consultation discussions held May 7–16, 2024; Executive Board concluded consultation on July 31, 2024 (IMF Country Report No. 24/255).
- FSAP Update: missions October 29–November 14, 2018 and February 13–27, 2019; findings presented in the Financial System Sustainability Assessment (IMF Country Report No. 13/325).
- Technical Assistance: None.
- Resident Representative: Ms. Purva Khera posted in Singapore since October 2024.

### Policy implications and recommendations (as reflected in the document)
- Maintain MAS policy band on a mild appreciating path to ensure medium-term price stability while adjusting the rate of appreciation in light of negative output gaps and subdued inflation.
- Use targeted fiscal support to assist households and firms facing cost-of-living and cashflow pressures while prioritizing productivity-enhancing and inclusive measures for medium-term growth.
- Preserve a tight macroprudential stance to mitigate systemic risks and dampen speculative housing demand, while monitoring housing leverage in the banking system.
- Continue vigilance on AML/CFT risks in digital assets and adopt risk-centric regulatory measures for digital payment token services.
- Support structural policies to raise productive capacity: incentives for business investment, financing for high-growth firms, investment in energy transition and R&D, and AI upskilling and deployment.
- Remain committed to the multilateral, rules-based trading system given Singapore’s openness to global trade.

*Source: Annex VIII. Table 1 . Singapore: Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance; Singapore staff report (As of May 30, 2025).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1sgpea2025001-source-pdf.pdf_