## 1autea2026006 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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### Major findings and assessment
- Austria’s macroprudential framework has matured since the pandemic but requires continued vigilance and proactive adaptation to safeguard financial stability.
- Institutional setup: collaborative arrangement among Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB), Financial Market Authority (FMA), and Ministry of Finance (BMF), with the Financial Market Stability Board (FMSB) as the central decision-making body.
- Financial sector resilience:
  - CET ratio of 18.6 of risk-weighted assets.
  - Leverage ratio increased to 9 percent, described as three times the EU minimum requirement.
  - Record level profits in 2024 bolstered banks’ capital levels.
- Active macroprudential measures in use: systemic risk buffers (SyRB), a sectoral SyRB for CRE exposures, and KIM-V borrower-based measures introduced in 2022.
- Rising risks: commercial real estate (CRE) sector (notably NPLs from lending to residential real estate development projects by commercial developers), geopolitical tensions, and evolving European regulatory requirements underline the need for a strong, adaptive framework.

### Institutional framework: willingness, ability, coordination
- Macroprudential strategy updated 2021: shared responsibility among FMA, OeNB, and BMF with primary objective to contribute to financial system stability.
- FMSB voting structure and governance:
  - BMF and the Fiscal Advisory Council (FAC) hold disproportionate voting power in the FMSB, limiting the formal influence of the central bank relative to European peers.
  - Recommendation: reduce FAC voting power and increase OeNB voting power; clarify that BMF consent should be limited to legal compliance rather than substantive policy decisions.
- Legal and procedural constraints:
  - Under the SSM, national authorities can initiate and implement macroprudential measures but must notify the ECB; the ECB can “top up” measures.
  - CRD/CRR establish EU-level tools (e.g., CCyB, SyRB, capital surcharges) but leave many borrower-based and other measures to national legislation.
  - Decision-making timeline: at least two successive FMSB meetings are required for new macroprudential policy; decision-making usually takes at least two quarters.

### Legal basis and precautionary action
- Current law precludes precautionary macroprudential measures; FMA can act only when clear signs of systemic risks exist.
- Consequences cited:
  - Expiration of the BBMs in July 2025.
  - Austria has not activated the CCyB above 0 percent since its inclusion in law in 2014 (prior to 2025 change).
- Key recommendation:
  - Amend the Banking Act to allow FMA regulations to be taken on a precautionary basis for capital and borrower-based measures (amend Article 23a and Article 23h).

### Borrower-based measures (BBMs)
- Experience and effectiveness:
  - Mandatory BBMs (LTCs, DSTI caps, and loan term limits) improved lending standards without constraining mortgage lending overall.
  - Specific KIM-V parameters introduced August 2022 (see below) were effective; lapses in binding measures can lead to rapid deterioration in credit standards.
- KIM-V design and evolution:
  - Cap on LTC ratios: 90 percent (with a 20 percent exception quota).
  - Cap on DSTI ratios: 40 percent (10 percent exception quota).
  - Maximum loan term limit: 35 years (with exemption limits within each bucket subject to an overall limit of 20 percent).
  - Financing below EUR 50,000 for renovations and energy transitions excluded (maximum 2 percent of new lending).
  - KIM-V expired automatically on 30 June 2025.
- Empirical outcomes:
  - Share of new loans for owner occupied housing with LTVs below 90 percent rose from 13 percent to 85 percent between 2020Q2 and 2025Q2.
  - Share of all current mortgages with LTVs below 90 percent rose from about 35 percent in 2020Q2 to about 70 percent in 2025Q2.
  - Share of new mortgages with DSTI ratios below 40 percent rose from 75 percent to 93 percent over the same period.
- Policy stance:
  - Near-term: strengthen guidelines-based framework by improving transparency and monitoring, including bank-wise credit standards.
  - Medium-term: as the Banking Act is amended to permit precautionary regulations, reintroduce permanent, binding BBMs (LTC, DSTI and loan term limit).

### Macroprudential space and capital buffers
- Releasable buffer space is low compared to European peers despite high bank capitalization and large management buffers.
  - Releasable buffer space around 0.5 percent of RWA.
- Recommendations:
  - Build up releasable capital buffers, with a positive-neutral CCyB as the preferred instrument, ideally on top of existing buffers, and apply gradually when the cycle permits.
  - New CCyB methodology is welcomed for earlier identification of cyclical risks and supporting gradual build-up of a positive-neutral buffer.
- Sectoral SyRB sequencing for CRE (FMSB recommendations and FMA actions):
  - Initial sectoral SyRB of 1 percent as of July 1, 2025.
  - sSyRB raised to 2 percent as of July 1, 2026.
  - sSyRB raised to 3.5 percent as of July 1, 2027.
- Releasable buffer contributions (domestic releasable buffers, share of domestic RWA, 2025Q4):
  - sSyRB at 1% (valid until 30/06/2026): 0.54%
  - sSyRB at 2% (valid from 01/07/2026 to 30/06/2027): 0.73%
  - sSyRB at 3.5% (valid from 01/07/2027 onwards): 1.02%

### Operational framework for systemic risk monitoring and data
- OeNB responsibilities: daily systemic risk analysis; FMA contributes expertise on nonbank financial institutions.
- Data progress and timelines:
  - Launch of granular residential real estate (RRE) indicators in December 2025.
  - Launch of commercial real estate (CRE) indicators by mid-2026; first CRE dashboard released in 2026Q1.
  - CRE price index expected in 2026Q2 with historical data from 2015 onwards (2012 onwards for other indices).
- Data gaps and next steps:
  - Major CRE data gaps: CRE prices, yields, ability to distinguish CRE categories (office, retail, industrial).
  - Recommended actions: improve granularity of data collection, enhance data sharing between OeNB and FMA, and further develop systemic risk assessment tools, particularly for real estate.

### Commercial Real Estate (CRE) and sectoral SyRB
- Drivers of concern:
  - NPLs in CRE lending have increased; NPLs on loans secured by commercially developed residential real estate reached 12.8 percent in mid-2025.
- Policy response:
  - FMSB advised introduction and subsequent increases of a sectoral SyRB for CRE exposures (1 percent → 2 percent → 3.5 percent across 2025–2027).
  - FMSB will re-evaluate need for further increases when related supervisory reporting data become available.

### Nonbank Financial Sector (NBFI)
- Size and composition (end-2024):
  - NBFI accounted for one third of the total financial system.
  - Investment funds: 12 percent.
  - Insurance sector: 7 percent.
  - Pension funds: 2 percent.
- Recent vulnerability:
  - Real estate fund market shifted to net cash outflows since 2023, creating liquidity risks from asset–liability mismatches.
- Policy action:
  - Austrian Real Estate Investment Fund Act amended to introduce a 12-month notice period effective 1 January 2027.

### Exposures to CESEE and structural vulnerabilities
- Foreign exposures and geography (2024):
  - Total foreign exposure EUR 551 billion, equivalent to 44 percent of total assets.
  - Around two-thirds of foreign exposure are located in CESEE.
  - Czechia and Slovakia account for more than half of Austrian SIs’ assets in CESEE, followed by Romania, Hungary and Croatia.
- Subsidiary funding and profitability:
  - Subsidiaries are locally funded and well-capitalized.
  - In 2024, subsidiaries accounted for around 40 percent of consolidated profits of the Austrian banking system.
- Structural banking sector vulnerabilities:
  - Large CESEE exposure, high concentration and interconnectedness, and low domestic profitability.
  - Five largest banking groups account for over 80 percent of the domestic market share.
  - Cross-sector arrangements (Raiffeisen, Sparkassen, Volksbanken) can propagate shocks domestically.

### Household and corporate sector risks
- Household sector:
  - Household debt under 50 percent of GDP.
  - Only one third of households in privately owned housing market have mortgages.
  - Share of variable rates in stock of mortgages: 37 percent.
  - Share of variable rates (up to 1 year, Euribor-linked) for new loans: around 20 percent.
  - FX rate loans: 3 percent of total outstanding loans to private households.
  - Stock of loans: nearly 50 percent have interest fixation in excess of 10 years.
  - Homeownership rate around 54 percent.
- Corporate sector:
  - Corporate loan demand weak; annual growth of loans to businesses hovered at around 2 percent in the first eight months of 2025.
  - NPLs in NFC sector increased by more than 50 percent since 2022, up to 4.9 percent in the first quarter of 2025.
  - NPLs on loans secured by commercially developed residential real estate reached 12.8 percent in mid-2025.
  - GBVs / LPHAs account for around 22 percent of domestic CRE loans and have very low default rates.

### Key policy recommendations (selected and verbatim from Table 1)
- Strengthen the macroprudential framework by increasing the voting power of the OeNB and reducing the voting power of the Fiscal Advisory Council — Authority: BMF — Time: ST.
- Amend the Banking Act to allow FMA to set macroprudential policy regulations on a precautionary basis for capital and borrower-based measures — Authority: BMF — Time: ST.
- The Banking Act should clarify that the consent of the Ministry of Finance (BMF) related to the adoption of FMA regulations concerning macroprudential measures only covers the determination of whether FMA regulations comply with legal requirements — Authority: BMF — Time: MT.
- Continue closing data gaps with respect to CRE, RRE and further develop risk assessment indicators to enhance systemic CRE risk monitoring — Authority: OeNB, FMA — Time: ST.
- Make the borrower-based measures (LTC, DSTI and loan term limit) a permanent regulation — Authority: BMF — Time: ST.
- Take measures to increase the macroprudential space in Austria, including by gradually applying a positive-neutral CCyB ideally on top of existing buffers when the cycle permits — Authority: FMSB — Time: MT.
- Timing key: I Immediate (Less than a 1 year); ST Short Term (within 1-2 years); MT Medium Term (within 3-5 years).

### Implementation priorities and monitoring
- Near-term priorities (ST):
  - Amend the Banking Act to enable precautionary FMA regulations for macroprudential use.
  - Reintroduce permanent, binding borrower-based measures once the legal basis exists.
  - Close data gaps (RRE, CRE) and enhance CRE risk monitoring tools.
- Medium-term priorities (MT):
  - Clarify BMF consent scope to focus on legal compliance.
  - Gradually build up releasable buffers, including a positive-neutral CCyB when appropriate.
- Ongoing operational improvements:
  - Strengthen cooperation mechanisms and information sharing between OeNB and FMA.
  - Maintain transparency and accountability to counter inaction bias and support timely macroprudential interventions.

*Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1autea2026006) — IMF technical note on Austria*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY __________________________________________________________________________ 6

### 1autea2026006 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Major findings and assessment
- Austria’s macroprudential framework has matured since the pandemic, but continued vigilance and proactive adaptation are needed to safeguard financial stability.
- The authorities have built a collaborative institutional setup involving the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB), Financial Market Authority (FMA), and Ministry of Finance (BMF), with the Financial Market Stability Board (FMSB) as the central decision-making body.
- Financial sector resilience is strong:
  - CET ratio of 18.6 of risk-weighted assets.
  - Leverage ratio increased to 9 percent, described as three times the EU minimum requirement.
  - Record level profits in 2024 bolstered banks’ capital levels.
- Active use of macroprudential measures has supported resilience, including systemic risk buffers (SyRB), a sectoral SyRB for CRE exposures, and the KIM-V regulation introduced in 2022 related to borrower-based measures.
- Rising risks in the commercial real estate (CRE) sector (notably NPLs from lending to residential real estate development projects by commercial developers), ongoing geopolitical tensions, and evolving European regulatory requirements underscore the need for a strong, adaptive macroprudential framework.

### Institutional framework: willingness, ability, coordination
- The macroprudential policy strategy (updated 2021) affirms a shared responsibility among FMA, OeNB, and BMF, with the primary objective to make a significant contribution to safeguarding the stability of the Austrian financial system.
- Unique voting structure in the FMSB:
  - BMF and the Fiscal Advisory Council (FAC) hold disproportionate voting power in the FMSB, limiting the formal influence of the central bank relative to European peers.
  - Recommendation: reduce FAC voting power and increase OeNB voting power; clarify BMF consent should be limited to legal compliance rather than substantive policy decisions.
- Legal and operational constraints:
  - Under the SSM, national authorities can initiate and implement macroprudential measures but must notify the ECB; the ECB can “top up” measures when deemed necessary.
  - CRD/CRR establish EU-level tools (e.g., CCyB, SyRB, capital surcharges) but leave implementation of several borrower-based and other measures to national legislation.

### Legal basis and precautionary action
- The legal basis for precautionary macroprudential action should be strengthened.
- Key recommendation: amend the Banking Act to allow FMA regulations to be taken on a precautionary basis for capital and borrower-based measures.

### Borrower-based measures (BBMs)
- Austria’s experience with mandatory BBMs (LTCs, DSTI caps, and loan term limits) demonstrated success in improving lending standards without constraining mortgage lending overall.
- International evidence indicates that lapses in binding measures can quickly lead to deterioration in credit standards and renewed risk build-up.
- The shift to a guidelines-based approach raises enforcement challenges given the large number of banks.
- Near-term actions:
  - Strengthen the guidelines-based framework by improving transparency and monitoring, including bank-wise credit standards.
- Medium-term action:
  - As the Banking Act is amended to permit precautionary regulations, reintroduce permanent, binding BBMs (LTC, DSTI and loan term limit) to ensure robust and sustainable lending practices.

### Macroprudential space and capital buffers
- Austria’s macroprudential space is low compared to European peers, with limited releasable buffers despite high bank capitalization and large management buffers.
- Releasable buffers such as the CCyB and SyRB are important for cushioning shocks and supporting credit provision during stress.
- Recommendation: build up releasable capital buffers, with a positive-neutral CCyB as the preferred instrument, ideally on top of existing buffers, and apply gradually when the cycle permits.
- The new methodology for setting the CCyB (allowing earlier identification of cyclical risks and supporting gradual build-up of a positive-neutral buffer) is welcomed.

### Operational framework for systemic risk monitoring and data
- OeNB is responsible for daily systemic risk analysis; FMA contributes expertise on nonbank financial institutions.
- Data progress and timelines:
  - Launch of granular residential real estate (RRE) indicators in December 2025.
  - Launch of commercial real estate (CRE) indicators by mid-2026.
- Recommended next steps:
  - Improve the granularity of data collection.
  - Enhance data sharing between OeNB and FMA.
  - Further develop systemic risk assessment tools, particularly for real estate.

### Key policy recommendations (selected and verbatim from Table 1)
- Strengthen the macroprudential framework by increasing the voting power of the OeNB and reducing the voting power of the Fiscal Advisory Council — Authority: BMF — Time: ST.
- Amend the Banking Act to allow FMA to set macroprudential policy regulations on a precautionary basis for capital and borrower-based measures — Authority: BMF — Time: ST.
- The Banking Act should clarify that the consent of the Ministry of Finance (BMF) related to the adoption of FMA regulations concerning macroprudential measures only covers the determination of whether FMA regulations comply with legal requirements — Authority: BMF — Time: MT.
- Continue closing data gaps with respect to CRE, RRE and further develop risk assessment indicators to enhance systemic CRE risk monitoring — Authority: OeNB, FMA — Time: ST.
- Make the borrower-based measures (LTC, DSTI and loan term limit) a permanent regulation — Authority: BMF — Time: ST.
- Take measures to increase the macroprudential space in Austria, including by gradually applying a positive-neutral CCyB ideally on top of existing buffers when the cycle permits — Authority: FMSB — Time: MT.
- Timing key: I Immediate (Less than a 1 year); ST Short Term (within 1-2 years); MT Medium Term (within 3-5 years).

### Implementation priorities and monitoring
- Near-term priorities (ST):
  - Amend the Banking Act to enable precautionary FMA regulations for macroprudential use.
  - Reintroduce permanent, binding borrower-based measures once the legal basis exists.
  - Close data gaps (RRE, CRE) and enhance CRE risk monitoring tools.
- Medium-term priorities (MT):
  - Clarify BMF consent scope to focus on legal compliance.
  - Gradually build up releasable buffers, including a positive-neutral CCyB when appropriate.
- Ongoing operational improvements:
  - Strengthen cooperation mechanisms and information sharing between OeNB and FMA.
  - Maintain transparency and accountability to counter inaction bias and support timely macroprudential interventions.

*Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1autea2026006) — IMF technical note on Austria*

### 1. Macroprudential authority established in accordance with Recommendation ESRB/2011/3

### 1. Macroprudential authority established in accordance with Recommendation ESRB/2011/3

### Institutional framework and roles
- Austria’s macroprudential supervision is built on a collaborative institutional framework involving the FMA, OeNB and the BMF.
- The FMA is the competent and designated authority for macroprudential policy.
- The OeNB provides analyses of systemic risks and proposes recommendations and risk warnings when systemic risks are identified.
- The BMF defines the regulatory framework and is consulted in public consultation proceedings on FMA administrative regulations.
- The three authorities regularly meet in the Financial Market Stability Board (FMSB), a body chaired by the BMF.
  - The role of the FMSB is to discuss issues related to financial stability, issue expert opinions and recommendations should systemic risks be identified, and to issue warnings about risks that may have an adverse impact on financial stability.
  - The FMSB links the OeNB’s macroprudential monitoring function with the FMA’s supervisory responsibilities.
  - The FMSB is the macroprudential authority in accordance with ESRB recommendation (ESRB/2011/03).
- The OeNB hosts the FMSB secretariat; a Risk Workshop is held before each regular FMSB meeting; a steering group of senior FMA and OeNB staff drafts the meeting agenda.
- Decisions in the FMSB are made by a simple majority.

### Voting structure and comparative context
- The FMSB voting structure:
  - The Ministry of Finance and the Fiscal Advisory Council (FAC) have four votes in total.
  - The OeNB and FMA have one vote each.
  - Four out of six members in the FMSB are from the political side.
- The voting structure makes Austria an outlier in a European context and is not in line with the ESRB recommendation in this area nor with IMF principles in this area.
- International and EEA context:
  - Since ESRB recommendation ESRB/2011/3, 23 countries in the EEA have established dedicated financial stability councils or committees.
  - In 14 of the 23 jurisdictions, the central bank is the chair of the committee.
  - Of the 23 countries having established committees, 9 are chaired by Ministries of Finance.
  - Across EEA countries, in 21 jurisdictions it has been decided to have the same authority as both macroprudential and designated authority.
    - Of these 21 jurisdictions, 15 are central banks.
  - In 8 of the EEA countries, the central bank plays a stronger role in terms of having the jurisdiction of setting capital buffer rates, while the introduction of BBMs is within the realm of the Ministry of Finance.
  - Noted country examples: Belgium, Netherlands (designated authority central bank with MoF role on borrower-based measures); Germany (MoF chair and secretariat but Bundesbank and BaFin have equal voting representation).

### Ability to act and procedural timelines
- Principle: designated macroprudential authority should have sufficient powers to act (information collection, rulemaking and calibration, designation powers).
- FMSB has authority to take macroprudential policy action; the FMA is the designated authority for applying macroprudential instruments and follows FMSB’s recommendations on a comply-or-explain basis.
  - The FMA must implement FMSB’s recommendations as soon as practical or explain in writing why it has not done so.
  - Under the Austrian Banking Act (BWG) the BMF’s consent is necessary for adoption of an FMA regulation concerning macroprudential measures; the law does not specify whether BMF approval is limited to legal requirements or applies also to the substance of the FMA regulation.
  - The OeNB is tasked with assessment of the implementation of FMSB recommendations by the FMA.
- Decision-making timeline:
  - At least two successive meetings of the FMSB are required for new macroprudential policy to be implemented.
  - Decision-making usually takes at least two quarters since there needs to be a first meeting to acknowledge that a measure needs to be taken and a second meeting to decide on the specific recommendation.
  - Following an FMSB recommendation, the FMA needs to ask the OeNB for an expert opinion.
  - Risk: this process can delay measures and risk that measures are taken too late in the cycle.

### Legal constraints on precautionary measures and recent outcomes
- The ability to take precautionary macroprudential measures is precluded in the law.
  - For the FMA to take macroprudential measures (e.g., setting the CCyB buffer rate above 0 percent or introducing BBMs), there have to be clear signs of systemic risks building up.
  - Consequences:
    - Expiration of the BBMs in July 2025.
    - Austria has not activated the CCyB above 0 percent since its inclusion in law in 2014.
  - Recommendation: Amend Article 23a (CCyB) and Article 23h (borrower-based measures) in the Banking Act to allow for taking more proactive, precautionary steps.
  - Note: For O-SII buffer, criteria based on factors such as size of total assets could be argued to allow more permanent/precautionary perspective; for BBMs this is not the case. Under current legal framework it is not possible to set PNR in the absence of signs of increased risk build-up.
  - In view of reliance on the SyRB, if this buffer becomes unavailable, authorities will need to rely on the CCyB to maintain existing capital requirements.

### Information-collection powers and data gaps
- Legally binding data-sharing arrangements exist:
  - The OeNB must provide the FMA access to both microprudential and macroprudential data on banking supervision.
  - The FMA must provide the OeNB with all relevant data from financial institutions needed for monitoring and assessment of financial stability risks.
- Authorities are making progress in closing real-estate data gaps; OeNB and FMA can adjust reporting requirements and collect additional data through bank surveys.

### Coordination and cooperation
- Domestic coordination:
  - Preparatory process for FMSB meetings (Risk Workshop, Steering Committee) promotes cooperation; OeNB prepares and leads meetings in close collaboration with the FMA; BMF supports preparations with regulatory updates.
- European coordination:
  - As a euro area member and part of the SSM:
    - Macroprudential policy is a shared competency between national authorities and the ECB (Council regulation (EU) No 1024/2013).
    - The ECB can top-up national capital buffer requirements but cannot set lower requirements.
    - Borrower-based limits are within exclusive remit of national authorities; ECB can suggest use of these powers but lacks a binding mechanism.
  - Austrian institutions collaborate with European institutions, share supervisory data, adhere to reciprocity framework; formal notification and review mechanisms under EU law are followed.
  - Reciprocation: SyRB in place since 2016; reciprocation requested via ESRB only with implementation of sectoral SyRB for CRE exposures.
- Regional cooperation:
  - OeNB maintains ongoing macroprudential supervisory dialogue with six CESEE countries with large Austrian bank presence.
  - Cooperation continued through the Vienna Initiative.
  - FMA is part of BSCEE (Banking Supervision in Central Eastern Europe).

### Accountability and communication
- Accountability framework:
  - FMSB is obliged to prepare an annual report and a publicly accessible strategy.
  - After each FMSB meeting, a press release summarizes discussions and outcomes.
  - Risk warnings and recommendations are made publicly available on FMSB’s website.
  - The macroprudential policy strategy is evaluated every two years and is published on the FMSB website.
  - Authorities are updating the policy and expect to have a revised strategy concluded by 2026; no material changes envisaged compared to current strategy.
- Communication improvements:
  - Since 2024, the OeNB offers more in-depth information on macroprudential tools on its webpage and proactively publishes topical blogs relevant to financial stability.
  - The FMA is proactive in communicating using various channels.
  - Austria's new Freedom of Information Act (Informationsfreiheitsgesetz - IFG) came into force on September 1, 2025, replacing the previous principle of official secrecy and introducing a general right to access information held by government agencies and state-owned companies.

### Operational framework for systemic risk monitoring
- Effective macroprudential framework requires comprehensive monitoring, access to high-quality data, varied indicators, econometric and modelling tools, cost-benefit analysis and regular ex-post evaluation.
- OeNB responsibilities:
  - OeNB is responsible for conducting systemic risk monitoring on a daily basis.
  - FMA contributes to monitoring the NBFIs on an individual basis, providing supervisory expertise and data.
  - The monitoring process centers around preparations for FMSB meetings; it is well-structured and provides sufficient opportunities for exchange.
- Organization within OeNB and FMA:
  - The OeNB Department for Financial Stability and the Supervision of Less Significant Institutions focuses on risk analysis.
  - Main work is done in the Financial Stability and Macroprudential Supervision Division (FINMA) which analyses and monitors developments which could affect financial stability in Austria.
  - FINMA is organized into three units: macroprudential policy; financial market analysis and coordination; and financial market infrastructure and NBFIs.
  - In total the financial stability work involves 28 full-time employees (FTEs).

### Key recommendations (from the source)
- Enhance accountability by:
  - Reducing the voting power of the FAC and increasing the voting power of the OeNB.
  - Considering transferring the role as designated macroprudential authority from the FMA to the OeNB to further strengthen the formal role of the central bank in macroprudential policy.
- Amend the Banking Act to allow FMA regulations on macroprudential policy to be introduced on a precautionary basis (i.e., enable taking measures before clear signs of systemic risk buildup).
- Limit the consent of the Ministry of Finance when adopting FMA regulations to determining compliance with legal requirements; BMF consent should not be a precondition for adoption on substantive grounds.

*International Monetary Fund, 1. Macroprudential authority established in accordance with Recommendation ESRB/2011/3*

### 31. In the FMA, macroprudential supervision is a shared responsibility between the

### 1autea2026006 - 31. In the FMA, macroprudential supervision is a shared responsibility between the

### Governance and Institutional Roles
- Macroprudential supervision is shared between the department for banking supervision and the department for integrated supervision in the FMA.
- Division for horizontal supervision (banking supervision department):
  - In charge of work related to ECB committees.
  - Implements macroprudential measures and communicates with the banking industry.
- Division for financial stability (department for integrated supervision):
  - Charged with work related to the ESRB committees and substructures.
  - Coordinates and prepares FMSB meetings and performs data analysis.
- Legal support provided by the legislative affairs division.
- Information-sharing arrangements:
  - Banking Act provides legal basis for sharing information between OeNB and FMA.
  - FMA can commission OeNB for analyses and on-site examinations and request data from individual banks.
  - FMA can ask OeNB for expert opinions related to macroprudential measures.
  - Interconnections between banks and NBFIs are being mapped by OeNB; FMA is developing a dashboard to integrate internal data and analyze bank–non-bank interconnections.

### Risk Monitoring (Section B)
- Authorities’ risk monitoring relies on comprehensive quantitative and qualitative information deepened since the 2020 FSAP.
- Framework features:
  - OeNB monitors a broad range of indicators to assess the build-up of risks.
  - Monthly internal financial stability factsheet provides metrics related to the Austrian financial sector.
  - CCyB indicators evaluated quarterly to gauge systemic risks.
  - Findings and assessments presented in OeNB’s twice-yearly FSR.
  - Longer-term risks evaluated within longer-term risk assessment when analyzing size of the SyRB.
- OeNB monitoring of corporate and housing sectors:
  - Uses macroprudential indicators, granular credit data and stress testing frameworks.
  - Household indicators: net disposable income, savings ratio, consumption behavior.
  - Debt sustainability assessed by tracking household indebtedness relative to income and asset values decomposed by asset classes.
  - Mortgage risk indicators: LTV, DSTI and LTI ratios.
  - Housing overheating indicators: price dynamics, credit growth, affordability metrics.
  - NFCs monitored across industries: debt position, financing conditions, insolvencies; focus on corporate leverage, liquidity buffers, and sectoral vulnerabilities.
  - Foreign currency exposures considered, particularly in CESEE subsidiaries.
- NBFI sector:
  - OeNB and FMA assess systemic risks in line with legal mandates and coordinate closely.
  - Stability, structural weaknesses, and potential risks from investment funds, insurance companies, pension funds and other intermediaries are assessed.

### Data and Information (Section C)
- Corporate sector and CRE analysis:
  - Uses granular loan-level data of non-financial corporates domiciled in Austria and balance sheet data from real estate firms.
  - AnaCredit provides detailed information on individual bank loans in the euro area, harmonized across member states.
  - Granular loan-level data available monthly for all loans to non-financial corporates exceeding EUR 20,000; micro data on balance sheets is not widely available.
- Improvements and reporting requirements:
  - Legal requirement introduced in 2024 mandates that non-financial firm data be provided in a machine-readable format.
  - Data also collected under the Foreign Exchange Act with a legally binding reporting obligation.
  - OeNB collects household assets and liabilities as part of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) conducted every three years in Austria.
- Gaps in real estate lending data:
  - Residential real estate: OeNB relies on ECB’s data portal, Statistics Austria and prudential reporting.
  - Micro data at household level not available; most granular systemic risk monitoring of RRE financing is lending standards data based on FMA regulation.
  - Bucketed LTV data collection started in 2020 and was made more frequent in 2025.
  - CRE data gaps extensive: lack of information on CRE prices and yields; cannot distinguish categories of CRE (office, retail, industrial) related to collateral and property price development.
- Actions to close data gaps:
  - OeNB developed an RRE dashboard, launched in December 2025, with extensive data on housing supply, demand, and prices (including by region and market segment) and lending standards indicators.
  - OeNB expects to launch a CRE dashboard with 50-60 CRE indicators of supply, demand, and prices across segments (commercial housing, tourism, retail, logistics and industrial CRE) and is working on categorial break-down of CRE collateral.
  - Statistics Austria finalizing work on a commercial real estate price index with several subcategories from the first half of 2026.
  - The first CRE dashboard was released in 2026Q1.
  - A CRE price index is expected in 2026Q2, with historical data from 2015 onwards (2012 onwards for other indices).

### Quantitative Tools (Section D)
- OeNB models and applications:
  - Uses several quantitative models to identify build-up of systemic risks and assess impacts.
  - Tools include a TUI (Tool for Unobserved-event Investigation) structural model (based on IMF work), House-price at risk and indicator-based approaches for the RRE sector.
  - TUI model has been used three times in expert opinions related to decisions for borrower-based measures.
  - For CRE, OeNB conducted an empirical strategy to project CRE companies’ probability of financial stress in an adverse scenario and possible losses from real estate financing.
  - Determination of appropriate SyRB level involves a four-step approach.
- NFC sector analytics:
  - OeNB establishing a micro dataset merging balance sheet and credit data.
  - Work to increase periodicity of insolvency register and further firm-level data to better assess NFC financing risks.

### Macroprudential Policy Settings and Systemic Risks
- Overview:
  - Analysis follows IMF Staff Guidance Note on Macroprudential Policy across five vulnerability categories: (1) broad-based credit booms, (2) housing sector, (3) corporate sector, (4) non-bank financial sector, (5) structural vulnerabilities.
- Tool coverage and recent changes:
  - Capital-based tools (CCyB, SyRB and capital add-ons for OSIIs) in legislation since 2016.
  - Borrower-based measures (KIM-V) introduced in 2022 included LTC limit of 90 percent, DSTI limit of 40 percent and maximum term of 35 years.
  - KIM-V lapsed in 2025 per Austrian banking regulation: BBMs can be introduced up to three years and prolonged up to two years if elevated systemic risks from real estate mortgage financing are identified.
  - KIM-V expired in July 2025 as RRE risks were assessed as no longer elevated; FMSB expects banks to continue to comply with KIM-V lending standards after expiration.
  - Reporting frequency for lending standards increased to quarterly reporting.
- Sectoral SyRB for CRE:
  - FMSB advised FMA at October 2024 meeting to introduce a sectoral systemic risk buffer of 1 percent initially as of July 1, 2025 for CRE lending.
  - Level re-evaluated in November 2025: FMA raised the sSyRB to 2 percent as of July 2026, and it will be raised to 3.5 percent as of July 2027.

### Findings on Broad-Based Vulnerabilities and Financial Soundness
- Credit growth and mortgage demand:
  - Credit growth generally low due to weak demand and tight monetary policy, but mortgage loan growth turned positive in July 2025 (first time since mid-2023).
  - Corporate sector credit growth remained subdued.
- Banking sector soundness (end-2025 / H1 2025 figures):
  - CET1 ratio of Austrian banks stood at 19 percent (end-2025).
  - Leverage ratio increased to 9 percent (end-2025), which is three times the EU minimum requirement of 3 percent.
  - Liquidity coverage ratio for unconsolidated banking sector: 177 percent in H1 2025.
  - Net stable funding ratio: 130 percent in H1 2025.
- Releasable buffers:
  - Releasable buffer space around 0.5 percent of RWA (lower than most European peers).
  - Gradual increase of sectoral SyRB to 3.5 percent will increase releasable buffer space but is still lower than most European countries.
- CCyB framework:
  - CCyB introduced in 2014; never set above 0 percent prior to 2025.
  - New OeNB framework for setting CCyB used first in June 2025.
  - New indicator set: five dimensions (financial sector, private sector, macroeconomics, financial market, credit-to-GDP gap) with several indicators per dimension; indicators weighted equally.
  - Credit-to-GDP gap includes two indicators: standardized (ESRB) credit-to-GDP gap and credit-to-GDP gap with pure new loans.
  - High cyclical risk determined when both gap indicators or at least six other indicators indicate cyclical risks.
  - New methodology allows identifying risks earlier and opens possibility to set a positive neutral rate (PNR) for the buffer.
  - Setting of a PNR could be possible if banking act revised to allow CCyB from a precautionary perspective.

### Household Sector Risks
- Household indebtedness and structure:
  - Household debt under 50 percent of GDP (below EA average).
  - Only one third of households in privately owned housing market have mortgages.
  - Share of variable rates in stock of mortgages: 37 percent.
  - Share of variable rates (up to 1 year, Euribor-linked) for new loans: around 20 percent.
  - FX rate loans stand at 3 percent of total outstanding loans to private households.
  - Stock of loans: nearly 50 percent have interest fixation in excess of 10 years.
- Housing market features:
  - Homeownership rate around 54 percent (well below EU average of over 70 percent).
  - Austria has a prominent rental market and social housing; these features reduce household exposure to house price and mortgage rate fluctuations.
- Recent developments:
  - Demand for housing loans picked up due to lower interest rates and higher real household incomes.
  - Housing market appears stabilized with improved credit standards and high household savings rates.

### Corporate Sector Risks
- Loan demand and portfolio quality:
  - Corporate loan demand weak; declined in 2024 and remained weak in 2025.
  - Annual growth of loans to businesses hovered at around 2 percent in the first eight months of 2025.
  - Quality deterioration driven by increasing NPLs in CRE sector.
  - Share of NPLs in total loans increased to 3 percent in the first quarter of 2025.
  - NPLs in non-financial corporate sector increased by more than 50 percent since 2022, up to 4.9 percent in the first quarter of 2025.
  - NPLs on loans secured by commercially developed residential real estate reached 12.8 percent in mid-2025.
- Role of Limited-profit housing associations (GBVs / LPHAs):
  - GBVs account for around 22 percent of domestic CRE loans; largest share in “real estate activities” sector.
  - LPHAs have very low default rates and favorable financing conditions; provide 1 million units of the 4.2 million dwelling units in Austria (70 percent rented, remainder owner-occupied).
  - Rents in LPHA-provided housing about 30 percent lower than private rentals.

### Recommendations (Section E)
- Continue to close remaining data gaps, including in real estate sector.
- RRE and CRE dashboards (RRE launched December 2025; CRE dashboard released in 2026Q1) are welcome steps toward closing data gaps in line with ESRB (2016) recommendations to develop indicators covering:
  - (i) the physical CRE market (prices, yields, vacancies, construction activity),
  - (ii) credit exposures (credit flows, NPLs, provisioning),
  - (iii) CRE lending standards (LTVs, interest coverage, and debt service ratios).
- In light of ESRB (2022) recommendations to strengthen systemic CRE risk monitoring, authorities may consider enhancing the CRE dashboard with:
  - Risk assessments pertaining to CRE prices,
  - Income flows generated by CRE activity,
  - Financing sources and conditions,
  - Interconnectedness between CRE and other sectors,
  - Cross-border spillovers.

_Italic: International Monetary Fund — Austria (excerpts provided in the source content)._

### 56. Following increased risks related to commercial real estate lending, the FMSB has

### 1autea2026006 - 56. Following increased risks related to commercial real estate lending, the FMSB has

### Commercial Real Estate (CRE) — sectoral SyRB
- The FMSB recommended in October 2024 the introduction of a sectoral SyRB for CRE lending of 1 percent effective July 1, 2025, subsequently raised to 3.5 percent, effective July 1, 2027.
- When the related supervisory reporting data will become available for the first time, the FMSB will evaluate the need for further increases.
- Figure reference: Austria: NPLs and Lending to Nonfinancial Corporations (NFC) — NPLs have increased recently for NFCs; MFI loans to Real Estate Activities are large.
- Sources for underlying data cited: OeNB and FMA.

### Nonbank Financial Sector (NBFI)
- Size and composition:
  - The Austrian non-bank financial sector accounted for one third of the total financial system at the end of 2024.
  - Investment funds: 12 percent.
  - Insurance sector: 7 percent.
  - Pension funds: 2 percent.
- Trends and vulnerabilities:
  - After a long period of net cash inflows, since 2023 the real estate fund market shifted to net cash outflows, creating significant liquidity risks from the liquidity mismatch of assets and fund shares.
- Policy response:
  - The Austrian Real Estate Investment Fund Act was amended to introduce a 12-month notice period that will be in effect from 1 January 2027 to reduce the liquidity mismatch.

### Exposures to Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (CESEE)
- Magnitude and geography:
  - In 2024, total foreign exposure amounted to EUR 551 billion, equivalent to 44 percent of total assets.
  - Around two-thirds of the foreign exposure are located in CESEE.
  - Czechia and Slovakia account for more than half of Austrian SIs’ assets in CESEE, followed by Romania, Hungary and Croatia.
- Funding and profit contribution:
  - The subsidiaries are locally funded and well-capitalized, limiting contagion risk compared to direct cross-border business.
  - In 2024, the subsidiaries accounted for around 40 percent of the total consolidated profits of the Austrian banking system.
- Exposure breakdown:
  - The exposure to non-EU CESEE countries is 15 percent and declined since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
- Ongoing developments:
  - One of Austria’s SI is acquiring a bank in Poland, which will contribute to a markedly higher exposure in the region.
- Risk drivers and channels:
  - Continued geopolitical risks and economic uncertainties, including trade tensions and the war in Ukraine.
  - Potential increase in non-performing loans (NPLs) due to the delayed impact of higher interest rates.
  - Exposures to non-financial corporations (NFCs) and secured household loans are primary contributors to credit risk.
  - Lower policy rates in CESEE could contribute to a decline in net interest margins with a time lag.

### Systemic Risk Buffer (SyRB) and Other Macroprudential Buffers
- SyRB overview:
  - The SyRB was introduced in 2016 to address systemic risks from structural characteristics of the Austrian banking system, including CESEE lending.
  - Methodology was revised in 2022 following the 2020 FSAP recommendation to reflect high profit-dependence on the CESEE region.
- Calibration and application:
  - The SyRB is calibrated in a four-step approach: systemic risk analysis; selection of banks in risk components; calibration of general buffer size; calibration of individual banks’ buffer size.
  - Potential overlaps of the SyRB with the O-SII buffer are calibrated in detail and considered when determining individual banks’ buffer size.
  - The OeNB conducts an ex-ante impact assessment to assess potential economic costs and trade-offs.
- Coverage and timing:
  - As of October 10, 2025, 12 banks were subject to an SyRB buffer at the consolidated level, and 11 also at unconsolidated level.
  - The next regular evaluation of the SyRB takes place in 2026 and the evaluation of the calibration of the sectoral SyRB is planned for the second half of 2027.
- O-SII buffers:
  - Identification follows a two-step approach in accordance with EBA guidelines (indicator assessment and supervisory judgement).
  - As of October 10, 2025, seven banks were subject to an O-SII buffer (ranging from 0.45 to 1.75 percent of RWA) at the consolidated level, and eight also at unconsolidated level.
  - The new ECB methodology for an O-SII floor began on January 1, 2025; it introduced a national floor and a Banking Union (BU) floor and applies the higher of the two floors. The new methodology has not affected the calibration of the O-SII in Austria; identified O-SIIs and buffer amounts remain unchanged in 2026 compared with 2025.

### Structural Vulnerabilities of the Banking Sector
- Key structural risks:
  - Large exposure to CESEE, high concentration and interconnectedness in the banking sector, and low domestic profitability.
  - The five largest banking groups account for over 80 percent of the domestic market share.
  - Developments in the three “decentralized segments” (Raiffeisen, Sparkassen, and Volksbanken) or in Austrian foreign subsidiaries can spread into the domestic system due to significant equity cross-holdings and collaboration arrangements (for example, IPS in the Raiffeisen sector and cross-guarantee schemes).
- Policy tools in use:
  - Authorities use both the O-SII and SyRB buffers to address institution-specific and system-wide risks.
  - Since Austria implemented the amended EU Capital Requirements Directive in domestic law in 2021, the SyRB is cumulative with the O-SII buffer (i.e., the SyRB must be held in addition to the O-SII/G-SII buffer and vice versa).

### Housing market risks and Borrower-Based Measures (BBMs)
- House price dynamics:
  - Nominal annual house price growth was about 3¾ percentage points higher on average than in the euro area between 2010 and the peak in 2022.
  - At peak, real house prices in Austria were nearly 70 percent higher in 2022Q1 than in 2010; for the euro area as a whole real house prices were 18 percent higher over the same period.
  - Since the peak, real house prices have fallen but remain [43 percent] higher in real terms than in 2010.
- Drivers:
  - Mortgage interest rates fell following the policy rate easing cycle in 2011 and a prolonged period of low interest rates.
  - Mortgage credit expanded by about 5 percent annually.
  - Population growth of 0.7 percent annually over 2012-2025 (faster by about 0.4 pp annually than in the euro area).
  - Household real disposable incomes grew slower by about 0.25 percent annually compared to 0.7 percent in the euro area.
  - Sharp rise in construction costs following COVID-19 and energy price shocks.
- Misalignment and affordability:
  - OeNB and ECB estimates suggest house prices may have been overvalued by as much as 40-50 percent at the peak; staff estimates (SIP 2024) suggest around 30 percent overvaluation.
  - House price-to-income and rent-to-income ratios rose sharply, with affordability pressures particularly in Vienna, Tyrol, Salzburg and Vorarlberg.
- Mortgage credit quality:
  - For a subset of banks (accounting for at least 1/3 of new lending volumes), over 2011-2019 the share of new mortgages with LTV ratios over 80 percent doubled from about 20 percent to nearly 40 percent.
  - In 2020Q2, in the full sample of Austrian banks, the share of new mortgages for owner-occupied houses with LTVs above 90 percent was more than 60 percent (about half of all outstanding mortgages).
- Borrower-Based Measures (KIM-V) history and status:
  - KIM-V introduced mandatory BBMs in August 2022:
    - Cap on LTC ratios: 90 percent (with a 20 percent exception quota).
    - Cap on DSTI ratios: 40 percent (10 percent exception quota).
    - Maximum loan term limit: 35 years (with exemption limits within each bucket subject to an overall limit of 20 percent).
    - Up to 20 percent of all loans could exceed these limits.
    - Financing below EUR 50,000 for renovations and energy transitions was excluded (maximum 2 percent of new lending).
  - Legislative adjustments:
    - Amendments in early 2023 introduced exemptions for bridging loans and minimum exemption buckets of EUR 1 million.
    - In April 2024, indicator-specific exemption buckets were abolished; only the institution-specific 20 percent exemption remained.
  - Sunset and supervisory transition:
    - KIM-V was subject to a sunset clause limiting duration to three years, with a possible two-year extension if elevated systemic risks persisted.
    - The OeNB reassessed systemic risks in private residential real estate financing in autumn 2024 and concluded no elevated systemic risks were present.
    - KIM-V expired automatically on 30 June 2025.
    - After expiry, the FMSB (December 2024 and February 2025) and the FMA (circular on sound private residential real estate lending on 26 June 2025) emphasized that credit institutions should continue adhering to the lending standards established by KIM-V; compliance is framed as a supervisory expectation and linked to binding microprudential standards on loan origination.

*Italic: Source: IMF — Austria Financial Sector Assessment excerpt (content unit: 1autea2026006).*

### 73. The mandatory measures helped restore sound lending standards. Following the

### 1autea2026006 - 73. The mandatory measures helped restore sound lending standards. Following the

### Effectiveness of mandatory borrower-based measures (BBMs)
- Share of new loans for owner occupied housing with LTVs below 90 percent rose from 13 percent to 85 percent between 2020Q2 and 2025Q2.
- Share of all current mortgages with LTVs below 90 percent rose from about 35 percent in 2020Q2 to about 70 percent in 2025Q2.
- Share of new mortgages with DSTI ratios below 40 percent rose from 75 percent to 93 percent over the same period.
- In Austria, these measures were implemented in August 2022; the mandatory measures expired in June 2025 and were described as having lapsed in July 2025 in accompanying notes.

### Transition from mandatory BBMs to supervisory guidelines
- Fall 2024: OeNB concluded BBMs were effective and systemic risks were no longer elevated amid high bank capitalization and historically low lending volumes.
- BBMs were not renewed and expired in June 2025 in accordance with the law.
- Replacement: FMA guidelines maintained the caps as regulatory expectations with adjustments:
  - (i) consideration of interest rate risk for loans with fixed rate fixation less than the entire term of the loan, which would result in lower DSTI than 40 percent;
  - (ii) somewhat relaxed collateral requirements taking into account guarantees such as subsidies from Länder toward purchasing housing;
  - (iii) a 20 percent exemption limit as in place under KIM-V.

### International context and cross-country comparison
- LTVs and DSTIs are common in several advanced economies; some countries have DTI or LTI limits.
- Austria’s LTV and DSTI caps were broadly comparable to settings in other countries.
- Only a few European countries rely on non-binding guidelines; examples:
  - Belgium: supervisory expectations on LTVs (no binding measures from borrower-based suite).
  - Portugal: recommendations on LTVs, DSTIs, and loan maturities (comply-or-explain).
- Austria’s mortgage lending guidelines can be adjusted relatively quickly (around 2 months).

### Mitigating factors in Austria’s housing vulnerabilities
- Austria has relatively low rates of home ownership: around 50 percent (second lowest after Germany).
- Household debt relative to disposable income is below the EU average.
- Only a third of homeowners have active mortgages.
- High share of social housing with regulated rents helps keep housing costs moderate.

### Risks from lapsing binding measures and international experience
- Temporary suspensions or loosening of BBMs can lead to rapid deterioration in lending standards (New Zealand example: suspension in Apr 2020 led to high-LVR lending nearly tripling for investors; LVRs reinstated in 2021).
- Other loosening episodes cited: Sweden, Australia, Korea, Ireland, with varying observed outcomes (Table 5 summary).

### Rationale for legislative change to allow permanent BBMs
- Binding measures worked well in Austria without constraining mortgage lending; exemption limits were not exhausted:
  - More than 60 percent of banks did not exhaust even half their exemption volumes 2 years following introduction of binding measures.
- Microsimulation counterfactual (2021 HFCS data):
  - Mandatory LTV limits of 90 percent materially lower mortgage default probabilities.
  - Reduction in cumulative default probabilities after 5 years is as much as 3-4 percent including under severe shocks.
  - This translates into lower defaulted mortgages by almost 9 billion euros over 5 years relative to the counterfactual with no binding LTV limits.
- Binding measures would economize supervisory resources in a jurisdiction with over 400 banks.
- Under current law, implementation lags for binding BBMs can be long; quarterly reporting has shortened detection to two quarters, but operationally implementation could still take a year and political approval could cause further delays.

### Near-term recommendations to strengthen guidelines-based framework
- Shorten risk identification lags by increasing scope for timely indicators and expert judgment in addition to model-based evidence.
- Increase transparency on banks’ lending standards to strengthen adherence to non-binding measures.

### Releasable capital buffers and macroprudential space
- Releasable buffers can cushion procyclical impacts; gradual build-up keeps long-term costs modest.
- Releasable buffers can be built using the CCyB or the SyRB; both are considered releasable by ECB and ESRB.
- Positive neutral CCyB (PNR CCyB) is common in Europe: 17 of 30 EEA member countries have set a positive-neutral CCyB.
- Austria’s releasable macroprudential space:
  - Around 0.5 percent of releasable capital buffers (percent of RWA), lower than most European peers.
  - Recent introduction of a sectoral SyRB for commercial real estate exposures will increase releasable buffer space.
- Specifics on sectoral SyRB (sSyRB) and releasable buffer shares (domestic releasable buffers, share of domestic RWA, 2025Q4):
  - sSyRB at 1% (valid until 30/06/2026): 0.54%
  - sSyRB at 2% (valid from 01/07/2026 to 30/06/2027): 0.73%
  - sSyRB at 3.5% (valid from 01/07/2027 onwards): 1.02%
- Austria’s SyRB framework:
  - General SyRB introduced in 2016, consisting of:
    - systemic vulnerability buffer up to 1 percent of RWA; and
    - systemic cluster risk buffer of up to 1 percent of RWA for CESEE concentration.
  - As of October 2025, 12 banks were subject to an SRB buffer at consolidated level, and 11 also at unconsolidated level.
  - Sectoral SyRB introduced in June 2025 with 1 percent for CRE exposures in Austria (unconsolidated) for all banks.
  - FMSB advised FMA to raise the sectoral SyRB rate in two steps: first to 2% as of July 1, 2026, and then one year later to 3.5%.

*Source: IMF staff summary of the Austria chapter (selected excerpts).*

### 91. The application of Article 458 CRR has been considered by the Austrian authorities.

### The application of Article 458 CRR has been considered by the Austrian authorities

### Application of Article 458 CRR
- After the expiration of the FMA-regulation on legally binding borrower-based measures (KIM-V) by 30 June 2025, the application of Article 458 CRR was considered by the OeNB.
- Assessment findings:
  - The KIM-V was effective in establishing sound lending standards.
  - The banking system exhibited high capitalization.
  - Lending volumes were historically low.
  - No elevated systemic risks stemming from residential real estate financing were identified over an appropriate time horizon.
- Legal and policy conclusion:
  - Since such systemic risks are a prerequisite for the application of Article 458 CRR, an application was not considered legally viable.
  - It is unclear that an application of Article 458 (by means of targeting risk weights or LGDs, Articles 124 and 164) would increase releasable capital buffers, because these measures would target structural risks.

### Revised framework for the Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB)
- Background:
  - Since its introduction in 2014, the CCyB in Austria has never been set above 0 percent.
  - A new framework for setting the buffer rate was developed by the OeNB and used for the first time when setting the buffer rate in June 2025.
- New methodology features:
  - Broader analysis of cyclical risks to better account for the relationship between real economic development and lending to detect procyclical risks early on.
  - Indicator set consists of five dimensions: financial sector, private sector, macroeconomics, financial market, and credit-to-GDP gap.
  - The credit-to-GDP gap includes two indicators: the standardized (ESRB) credit-to-GDP gap, and the credit-to-GDP gap with pure new loans.
  - Indicators are weighted equally.
  - If indicators exceed predefined thresholds this would indicate increased procyclical systemic risks.
  - A particularly high cyclical risk is determined when both gap indicators or at least six other indicators indicate cyclical risks.
  - Note on thresholds: Cyclical risks are identified based on whether indicators exceed or fall below thresholds defined by empirical 10 percent or 90 percent quantiles.
- Back-testing:
  - OeNB has analysed the application of the revised framework in a back-tracking perspective and concluded that in 2017 the revised framework would have signalled the need to raise the buffer rate.

### Implications of the new CCyB methodology
- The new methodology allows identification of risks early in the cycle, opening the possibility to set a positive neutral rate (PNR) for the buffer.
- Compared with the previous credit-to-GDP gap focused methodology, the revised framework in principle opens up for a PNR CCyB should the methodology signal the build-up of risks.
- Benefits of using the CCyB to increase macroprudential space:
  - The buffer is intended to be releasable by design.
  - It targets domestic exposures.
  - It has become a well-used buffer across European jurisdictions.

### Comparison: CCyB versus Systemic Risk Buffer (SyRB)
- Pros and cons identified:
  - CCyB
    - By definition releasable (+)
    - Covers domestic exposures (+)
    - Predominantly used in the EEA (+)
    - Limited experience (Covid-19) (+)
    - Effectiveness is being discussed (+)
  - SyRB
    - Can be used to address sectoral, targeted risks (+)
    - Covers exposures on a consolidated level (+) and is flexible: considered releasable although release is not explicitly defined in EU legislation (+)
    - More difficult to release from a cyclical perspective if targeting structural risks (-)
    - May target structural risks such as CESEE exposures (-)
- Policy insight:
  - If buffers need to be released from a cyclical perspective, releasing a SyRB might be more difficult if the structural risks it targets persist; for releasability, a PNR CCyB intuitively makes more sense.

### Calibration and sequencing of buffers
- Setting a positive CCyB in Austria should come on top of existing releasable buffers.
  - The CCyB calibration is intended to cover domestic exposures.
  - Given the large number of domestic banks with excess capital in Austria, it is important to set a positive CCyB buffer rate on top of already existing buffer requirements in order not to reduce their excess capital.
  - Setting a positive CCyB rate should not lead to the reduction of other buffer requirements, such as the SyRB.
- Simplification proposal:
  - Austria could benefit from a simplification of the framework for releasable buffers by considering a single buffer that accounts for CESEE exposures as well as other unexpected risks.
  - A single releasable buffer would likely be higher than the current SyRB and a release might only be partial to continue accounting for structural risks arising from CESEE exposures.
  - If approval for a merged CCyB and SyRB is considered, it will be important to retain the ability to impose a sectoral SyRB (for example, related to CRE).

### Key statistics and cross-country context (as presented)
- Austria: SyRB level 0.5-1.0% (All, bank specific) ; sSyRB level 1.0% (CRE, domestic) ; CCyB 0.0%
- Table source: ESRB, national central banks, as of June 2026.

### Recommendations (excerpted)
- Austria needs to increase its macroprudential space and using a PNR CCyB should be the first-best option for Austria over the medium-term.
  - The new methodology has made it possible for the authorities to work towards a PNR CCyB.
  - While the SyRB framework is appropriate to cover structural risks and risks in separate areas such as CRE, a release of the SyRB could be made difficult if structural risks are still assessed as relevant.
  - A gradual build-up of a PNR CCyB in line with Austria’s peer countries would be the most appropriate buffer to augment macroprudential space, ideally on top of already applied buffers.

*International Monetary Fund — The application of Article 458 CRR has been considered by the Austrian authorities (excerpt).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1autea2026006.pdf_
