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2026 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION, FIFTH REVIEW UNDER THE EXTENDED CREDIT FACILITY ARRANGEMENT, REQUESTS FOR AUGMENTATION OF ACCESS AND MODIFICATION OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA, AND FINANCING ASSURANCES REVIEW, AND FIRST REVIEW UNDER THE RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABILITY FACILITY ARRANGEMENT—PRESS RELEASE; STAFF REPORT; AND STATEMENT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR BURKINA FASO

In the context of Burkina Faso's 2026 Article IV Consultation, Fifth Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, Requests for Augmentation of Access and Modification of Performance Criteria, and Financing Assurances Review, and First Review under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility Arrangement, the following documents have been released and are included in this package:

- A **Press Release** including a statement by the Chair of the Executive Board and summarizing the views of the Executive Board as expressed during its June 26, 2026, consideration of the staff report on issues related to the Article IV Consultation and the IMF arrangements.
- The **Staff Report** prepared by a staff team of the IMF for the Executive Board's consideration on June 26, 2026, following discussions that ended on May 25, 2026, with the officials of Burkina Faso on economic developments and policies underpinning the IMF arrangements under the Extended Credit Facility and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility. Based on information available at the time of these discussions, the staff report was completed on June 11, 2026.
- An **Informational Annex** prepared by the IMF staff.
- A **Debt Sustainability Analysis** prepared by the staffs of the IMF and the World Bank.
- A **Statement by the Executive Director** for Burkina Faso.

The IMF's transparency policy allows for the deletion of market-sensitive information and premature disclosure of the authorities' policy intentions in published staff reports and other documents.

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PRESS RELEASE

PR26/226

IMF Executive Board Concludes the 2026 Article IV Consultation, Completes the Fifth Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Approves the Request for Augmentation, and Completes the First Review under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility Arrangement with Burkina Faso

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

- The IMF Executive Board concluded the 2026 Article IV consultation with Burkina Faso and completed the fifth review of Burkina Faso's Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and approved the request for its augmentation by fifty percent of quota (SDR 60.20 million), raising the total access under the arrangement to SDR 288.96 million, and enabling an immediate disbursement of SDR 60.20 million.
- The Executive Board also completed the first review of the Resilience and Sustainability Facility arrangement, enabling an immediate disbursement of SDR 16.42 million.
- Economic growth reached 5.3 percent in 2025, buoyed by a rise in mining activity spurred by the gold price boom on the international market. Commendable budget discipline enabled a reduction of the overall fiscal deficit from 5.8 percent of GDP in 2024 to 1.8 percent in 2025 creating welcome policy space amid heightened global volatility.
- The sharp increase in the international prices of fertilizer and petroleum products in the wake of the conflict in the Middle East has weakened the near-term macroeconomic outlook while posing an immediate challenge to the balance of payments and food security, underscoring the need to protect the most vulnerable while preserving fiscal sustainability.

Washington, DC – **June 26, 2026:** The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the fifth review under the 48-month Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement, which was approved on September 21, 2023, and approved an augmentation of access under the ECF arrangement. The augmentation of fifty percent of quota (SDR 60.20 million) brings total access under the arrangement to 240 percent of quota (SDR 288.96 million). The completion of the 5th review under the ECF arrangement and approval of the augmentation enable the immediate disbursement of SDR 60.20 million, bringing the total IMF financial support disbursed under the ECF arrangement to SDR 180.60 million. The Executive Board also completed the first review under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangement, which was approved by the IMF Executive Board on February 18, 2026 for a total amount of SDR 90.30 million, enabling the disbursement of SDR 16.42 million. The

Executive Board also completed the 2026 Article IV Consultation.[1] The authorities have consented to the publication of the Staff Report prepared for this consultation.[2]

High gold prices, combined with reforms in the mining sector, energized economic activity in Burkina Faso in 2025. Real GDP growth reached 5.3 percent while average inflation receded to -0.5 percent, reflecting a drop in food and energy prices. Strong gold exports also supported the external position, which improved from a deficit of 3.5 percent of GDP in 2024 to a surplus of 6.3 percent in 2025.

Fiscal adjustment exceeded expectations. The overall fiscal deficit narrowed from 5.8 percent of GDP in 2024 to 1.8 percent of GDP in 2025, compared with the program objective of 4.0 percent. This created welcome policy space for shock mitigation in the current volatile global and regional environment.

Program performance under the ECF arrangement has been strong. All quantitative performance criteria and all but two indicative targets were met. The authorities implemented all structural benchmarks and made notable progress on their broader public financial management and governance agenda. The two reform measures slated for the first review under the RSF arrangement were implemented, and the work on future reform measures remains on track.

The macroeconomic outlook remains subject to significant downside risks. Burkina Faso's reliance on imported petroleum products and fertilizers exposes it to the commodity price shock stemming from the conflict in the Middle East. Global supply disruptions, rising prices for oil, gas, and fertilizers, funding cuts for humanitarian aid, and heightened security risks cloud near-term prospects. The agreed policy measures in support of the approved augmentation of the ECF arrangement therefore aim to ensure that the additional Fund resources serve to alleviate the socio-economic impact of the shock, while preserving the reform momentum to foster fiscal sustainability.

At the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Kenji Okamura, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:

“Burkina Faso’s economy has remained resilient amid security and humanitarian pressures. Prudent economic policies have helped create fiscal space, support growth, keep inflation contained, and maintain public debt sustainability.

“The authorities’ program supported by the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement remains firmly on track. They have advanced reforms to strengthen governance and domestic revenue mobilization, while promoting strategic investment and social safety nets. The augmentation of access under the ECF arrangement will help offset fertilizer and energy supply shocks linked to the war in the Middle East.

“Fiscal consolidation remains critical to preserving macroeconomic stability. To make growth more inclusive, energy subsidies should be targeted and temporary, while health, education, and social protection spending should be protected and prioritized in multiyear plans. Continued gains in public investment efficiency, together with steadfast implementation of the

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[1] Under Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country's economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

[2] Under the IMF's Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires the member consent. The staff report will be shortly published on the www.imf.org/en/countries/bfa page.

governance action plan, will support the authorities' development objectives. Improving the business environment and limiting exposure to commodity price volatility will be essential to sustaining broad-based growth.

"The authorities have also completed planned reforms under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangement: adopting a National Disaster Risk Finance Strategy and publishing climate hazard and risk maps. Continued implementation of the RSF reform agenda will help reduce climate risks and mobilize investment to strengthen resilience."

Executive Board Assessment[3]

Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They welcomed the strong economic performance and substantial fiscal consolidation achieved in 2025, supported by the gold price boom and the Burkinabè authorities' steadfast implementation of their Fund-supported programs. Directors noted, however, that the challenging security and humanitarian situation has been aggravated by the fertilizer and energy supply shocks from the war in the Middle East, regional insecurity, and lower humanitarian aid. Against this backdrop, they called on the authorities to sustain medium-term fiscal consolidation and the implementation of governance and transparency reforms to support macroeconomic resilience, unlock additional financing, and promote inclusive growth and diversification.

Directors agreed that a temporary relaxation of the fiscal stance is warranted to cushion the impact of recent external shocks, while remaining firmly committed to medium-term convergence to the WAEMU deficit criterion to safeguard debt sustainability. They stressed the need to further strengthen domestic revenue mobilization and to maintain strong transparency, procurement, and reporting practices in the use of crisis-related resources. Directors also emphasized the importance of contingency plans and expenditure rationalization in response to the commodity price shock, notably to ensure that energy subsidies are targeted and temporary and that adequate fiscal space is preserved for priority social and development spending. They recommended strengthening debt management and a prudent approach to external borrowing that prioritizes concessional financing. Directors also encouraged the authorities to adopt a countercyclical fiscal framework to insulate fiscal policy from gold price volatility.

Directors called for sustained implementation of structural reforms to foster inclusive growth and diversification as well as to enhance climate resilience. They welcomed advances in social protection and recent governance reforms, and emphasized that steadfast progress, particularly in implementing the recommendations of the Governance Diagnostic Assessment report —despite its non-publication—is essential to bolster reform credibility. Directors recommended strengthening banking supervision, addressing asset quality, and reducing sovereign-bank linkages, alongside efforts to support credit recovery and enhance financial inclusion. They welcomed the progress made on enhancing climate resilience and looked forward to further efforts on this front.

[3] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chair of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country's authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

It is expected that the next Article IV consultation with Burkina Faso will be held in accordance with the Executive Board decision on consultation cycles for members with Fund arrangements.

Table 1. Burkina Faso: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2023–30

Population (2024): 23.5 million — Gini Index (2021): 37.4
Per capita GDP (2024): 982 USD — Life Expectancy (2021): 62 years
Share of population below the poverty line (2022): 43.7% — Literacy rate (2023): 41%

	2023	2024	2025	2025	2026	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
	Act.	Prel.	ECF 4th Review	Prel.	ECF 4th Review	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.
	(Annual percentage change, unless otherwise indicated)									
GDP and Prices										
GDP at constant prices	3.0	4.8	5.0	5.3	4.9	3.6	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8
GDP deflator	2.0	9.7	7.0	8.9	4.4	6.2	7.5	3.9	2.1	2.0
Consumer prices (annual average)	0.9	4.2	-0.5	-0.5	1.4	4.2	4.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Consumer prices (end of period)	1.0	4.9	-2.2	-2.2	2.9	5.8	3.7	2.0	2.0	2.0
Money and Credit										
Broad money (M3)	-3.0	7.2	5.9	18.3	9.6	9.5	9.4	8.2	8.5	7.0
Net domestic assets (banking system) 1/	5.3	0.4	0.7	-0.4	7.4	0.5	4.2	4.5	4.6	3.2
Credit to the government (banking system) 1/	3.0	3.7	1.7	7.0	3.0	2.5	2.5	2.0	1.3	1.2
Credit to private sector	5.9	-2.2	-2.8	-4.1	5.7	-3.7	2.8	4.8	6.5	4.3
Private sector credit/GDP	31.9	27.2	23.5	22.7	22.7	19.9	18.2	17.5	17.4	17.0
External Sector										
Exports (f.o.b.; valued in CFA francs)	-3.1	12.3	43.2	62.5	5.9	11.8	3.8	0.5	2.2	2.2
Imports (f.o.b.; valued in CFA francs)	-1.5	8.4	16.6	12.0	5.7	39.6	-0.5	2.7	5.6	5.8
Current account (percent of GDP)	-5.1	-3.5	1.1	6.3	0.8	-2.0	-1.1	-3.2	-2.4	-2.9
	(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)									
Central Government Finances										
Current revenue	20.8	20.7	21.4	22.5	19.9	19.9	20.2	20.5	20.7	20.8
Of which: Tax revenue	18.4	18.4	17.8	19.2	17.5	17.7	18.2	18.6	18.7	18.9
Total expenditure and net lending	29.3	27.8	26.1	25.4	24.6	25.0	24.6	24.6	24.8	24.9
Of which: Current expenditure	18.1	16.4	16.5	16.3	15.7	16.7	15.2	14.5	14.5	14.5
Overall fiscal balance, incl. grants (commitments)	-6.8	-5.8	-3.5	-1.8	-3.5	-4.0	-3.3	-3.0	-3.0	-3.0
Total public debt	56.8	57.2	52.1	53.4	51.2	52.8	50.3	49.0	48.6	48.3
Of which: External debt	26.2	25.5	21.3	23.9	20.5	23.6	22.4	21.3	21.2	21.2
Of which: Domestic debt	30.6	31.8	30.8	29.5	30.6	29.1	27.9	27.7	27.4	27.1
Memorandum Items:										
Nominal GDP (CFAF billion)	12,200	14,022	15,750	16,077	17,255	17,682	19,920	21,689	23,213	24,832
Nominal GDP per capita (US$)	874	982	1,127	1,149	1,250	1,290	1,417	1,504	1,573	1,645
Nominal exchange rate (CFAF/US$, period average)	606	606	580	581	560	556	558	559	559	559
Gold price (US$/troy ounce)	1,943	2,387	3,218	3,440	3,472	4,023	4,164	4,164	4,164	4,164
Oil price (US$/barrel)	81	79	69	68	66	129	91	74	74	74

Sources: Burkinabé authorities; IMF staff estimates and projections.
1/ Annual change in percent of beginning-of-period broad money.

BURKINA FASO

June 11, 2026

STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2026 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION, FIFTH REVIEW UNDER THE EXTENDED CREDIT FACILITY ARRANGEMENT, REQUESTS FOR AUGMENTATION OF ACCESS AND MODIFICATION OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA, AND FINANCING ASSURANCES REVIEW, AND FIRST REVIEW UNDER THE RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABILITY FACILITY ARRANGEMENT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Context. Burkina Faso (BFA) continues to operate in a highly fragile environment. Although the incidence of terrorist attacks has diminished, terrorism-induced internal displacement and food insecurity persist. Fiscal consolidation and the gold price boom provided the authorities with some policy space; however, a triple shock reflecting a surge in fertilizer and energy prices, spillovers from the terrorist offensive in Mali, and a drop in foreign humanitarian aid presented them with an unexpected challenge, which prompted them to request augmentation of access under the ECF arrangement.

Program Performance. Macroeconomic indicators evolved favorably in 2025. Growth reached 5.3 percent and inflation dropped to -0.5 percent, on the back of lower food and energy prices. Thanks to the surge in the price of gold, the current account posted a surplus of 6.3 percent of GDP. Against this background, the authorities made significant progress on fiscal consolidation. The overall fiscal deficit narrowed to 1.8 percent of GDP (compared with 5.8 percent in 2024 and the 2025 program objective of 4.0 percent). All quantitative performance criteria (QPCs) were met, and only two indicative targets (ITs) were missed at end-December 2025 and one at end-March 2026. As anticipated at the fourth ECF review, the ceiling for current spending was exceeded, reflecting higher-than-programmed energy subsidies and security-related spending. Domestic arrears resurfaced temporarily (0.2 percent of GDP at end-December 2025 and less than 0.1 percent of GDP at end-March 2026) due to delays in processing VAT refunds to mining operators. The underlying issues have been addressed. The authorities attained key structural benchmarks (SBs) on strengthening public procurement and wage bill control, and on fostering integrity in revenue administration. Seven out of eleven GDA priority recommendations have been implemented and three partially implemented. Two RSF-related reform measures slated for the first review were adopted.

Outlook and Risks. The triple shock has weakened the outlook materially. Real GDP growth is expected to decrease to 3.6 percent in 2026, as agricultural output is projected to contract by 5.0 percent. Inflation is expected to increase to 4.2 percent in 2026, as rising food and energy prices exert upward pressures. The current account (CA) balance is projected to swing back to a deficit of 2.0 percent of GDP in 2026. The fiscal deficit objective is relaxed from 3.5 percent of GDP (retained at the 4th ECF review) to 4.0 percent. The difference reflects an estimated cost of temporary and targeted subsidies to meet the additional cost of fertilizer imports to mitigate food security concerns. The associated additional financing need is expected to be met by ECF augmentation and emergency support from other IFIs. This moderate countercyclical easing is accompanied by a fiscal adjustment of about 1.2 percent of GDP (relative to the path projected at the 4th ECF review) via petroleum price adjustments and reallocation of spending necessary to observe the new fiscal deficit target. Downside risks emanate from the volatile security situation in the region and from the possibility that the terms-of-trade deterioration could prove more persistent than anticipated.

Article IV consultation. Policy discussions focused on maintaining macroeconomic stability amid multiple shocks, while advancing structural reforms. Discussions concentrated on measures and contingency plans to respond to the commodity price shock as an immediate priority, albeit with a clear view toward medium-term convergence to the WAEMU deficit criterion. To this end, strengthening domestic revenue mobilization and maintaining spending discipline, including over the wage bill and energy subsidies, will be essential. The authorities and staff also discussed the merits of adopting a countercyclical fiscal framework to insulate fiscal policy from the revenue impact of gold price volatility, and its potential role in stabilizing public investment execution. Supportive structural policies should aim to alleviate bottlenecks in the mining sector and ensure that the increased state involvement in the economy is conducted within a transparent and fiscally sustainable framework. Efforts to enhance social spending efficiency and financial inclusion should continue. Staying the course of governance reforms remains critical.

Staff's view. Staff support the completion of the fifth review under the ECF arrangement and the first review under the RSF arrangement. They support the request for an augmentation of access under the ECF arrangement equivalent to 50 percent of quota to cover half of the financing gap of 0.5 percent of GDP and the associated balance-of-payments (BoP) need created by the sharp increase in fertilizer prices. Staff also support the related modification of the end-December 2026 performance criterion on the primary fiscal deficit. The additional Fund resources will be used to support policy measures that are targeted and temporary. Appropriate safeguards around fertilizer procurement and distribution will help ensure a transparent and efficient use of additional funds. Policies outlined in the attached MEFP are adequate to achieve the program's goals.

Approved By
Vitaliy Kramarenko (AFR) and Koshy Mathai (SPR)

An IMF team comprising Mr. Wieczorek (head), Mr. Cook, Ms. Langowski, and Mr. Stuermer (all AFR), Messrs. Maher and Vellutini (FAD), and Mr. Coble (SPR) assisted by Messrs. Gbohoui (Resident Representative) and Sebre (Local Economist), held discussions with the authorities in Ouagadougou during May 4 to 13, 2026. Mr. Abdoulaye Tall (OED) participated in the meetings. The mission met with the Minister of Economy and Finance, Mr. Aboubakar Nacanabo and the BCEAO National Director, Mr. Armand Badiel; other senior government officials, as well as representatives of the private sector and development partners. Discussions continued remotely until May 25, 2026. Mmes. Dereje and Kiggundu (all AFR) provided administrative support.

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APPENDIX

CONTEXT

1. **The authorities have undertaken ambitious reforms since the last Article IV consultation in the Spring of 2024.** They have achieved a remarkable fiscal consolidation with the fiscal deficit reduced from 5.8 percent of GDP in 2024 to 1.8 percent of GDP in 2025. They have also embarked on reforms to raise agricultural productivity, to elevate growth, combat poverty, and strengthen climate resilience. Finally, they have made commendable progress on governance, enhanced fiscal transparency, and advanced a broad-based PFM reform agenda. Overall, they have been successful in implementing the 2024 Article IV recommendations (Annex I).

2. **The economy is highly exposed to the fertilizer and energy price shocks emanating from the war in the Middle East.** Petroleum and fertilizers, which represented 35 percent of imports in 2025, are not produced domestically. All commercial agriculture and 98 percent of individual farmers rely on fertilizers, while 80 percent of the population depends on subsistence farming for their livelihood. Higher prices of imported fuel, especially diesel fuel, also exert economy-wide cost pressures, including on prices of food.

Text Figure 1. Fatalities from Terrorism Incidents, 2018–26 (monthly)



Sources: ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data); and IMF staff calculations.

Note: Terrorism fatalities are those from attacks on civilians, suicide bombings, or remote explosions/IEDs. 2026 is through April.

3. **While relations with some regional and international partners have improved, external support remains scarce at this critical juncture.** BFA has taken a bigger role in the WAEMU with its finance minister chairing the Council of Ministers since October 2025. The fallout from the ECOWAS exit was limited. Budget support has not yet resumed. Multilateral humanitarian aid is severely underfunded due to a sharp decline in bilateral contributions.

4. **Spillovers from the escalating conflict in Mali could compound the already severe security, political, and humanitarian challenges**. Since 2024, terrorism-related fatalities and incidents have decreased, but BFA is still ranked second only to Pakistan on the Global Terrorism Index.[1] About 2.1 million people remain internally displaced,[2] and 2.3 million face acute food

[1] Global Terrorism Index 2026. This source is external and used for background only; it does not represent a Fund assessment or ranking.

[2] https://www.unhcr.org/media/burkina-faso-operational-update-october-december-2025.

insecurity.[3] An uptick in attacks occurred in late 2025, and terrorism continues to weigh on economic activity, especially in agriculture and mining.

5. In early 2026, the authorities formalized the *de facto* transitional power arrangements pending the return to a constitutional order. In March 2026, parliament adopted the Charter of the Progressive Popular Revolution, which replaced the Transition Charter and confirmed elections in 2029. It formalizes the dissolution of political parties and hundreds of civil society organizations. In April 2026, following the terrorist upsurge in Mali, the authorities tightened security protocols and launched the process to expand the reservist forces.

RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

6. Growth accelerated in 2025 on the back of the mining boom. Real GDP growth reached 5.3 percent, with the rising contribution of gold mining and related services reinforcing a trend since the 2024 Article IV consultation. By contrast, the contribution of agriculture increased only by 0.3 percentage points of GDP compared to 2024, as rainfall normalized and cotton production fell. Mining growth rebounded from -6.7 percent in 2024 to 1.9 percent in 2025, though it was reportedly muted by the adoption of the new mining code, including changes to state participation, permit duration, and local content requirements.

7. Inflation turned negative in 2025 due to base effects. Compared to 4.2 percent CPI inflation in 2024, average CPI dropped by 0.5 percent in 2025, largely reflecting lower food prices due to better cereal availability across WAEMU. In 2026, 12-month average inflation remained negative and continued to fall through April, whereas year-over-year inflation became positive in all months except April. Month-over-month changes have also turned positive, signaling an upturn consistent with inflation running at about 2.4 percent annually.

8. The surge in gold prices boosted exports and pushed the current account to a surplus, mirroring a 70-percent rise in the gold/oil price ratio in 2025. Following a 44-percent rise in gold prices, exports rose by 63 percent, with gold accounting for nearly 90 percent of the total. Imports, driven by strong demand for petroleum products, increased by 12 percent. Consequently, the current account swung from a deficit of 3.5 percent of GDP in 2024 to a 6.3 percent surplus in 2025. Mining attracted large FDI inflows, while placements of government securities on the regional market explain the rebound in portfolio inflows. Overall, the external sector in 2025 was substantially stronger than warranted by fundamentals and desirable policies (Annex III).

[3] https://www.wfp.org/countries/burkina-faso.

9. The 2025 fiscal adjustment exceeded expectations. While the fiscal deficits in 2023–24 exceeded 6.0 percent of GDP on average, the 2025 budget ended with a deficit of 1.8 percent of GDP. This was well below the 4.0 percent target set at the third ECF review (Text Table 1). Strong budget discipline enabled a 4.0-ppts of GDP adjustment relative to 2024 yielding a primary surplus of 0.4 percent of GDP. Total revenue and grants rose by 1.6 ppts of GDP due to higher gold mining revenue and revenues from regulated petroleum product prices (plus-values). The authorities adhered to the public investment ceiling in the supplementary 2025 budget, dedicating excess gold and energy revenues to deficit reduction. Expenditure and net lending declined by 2.4 ppts of GDP, driven by a 2.5 ppts drop in domestically financed investment. Wage-bill control contributed 0.5 ppts, while unplanned higher electricity and butane gas subsidies reduced the extent of consolidation. This was already anticipated at the fourth ECF review prompting the authorities to tighten the monitoring of butane gas subsidies, destined solely for household use, which is difficult to enforce. Tight budget execution continued in Q1 2026 with a reported surplus of 0.6 percent of GDP.

Text Figure 2. Gold-to-Oil Price Ratio, 2023–26



Source: IMF staff Calculations.

Note: Brent Crude Oil used for oil price is US$/barrel; Index: $75=100. Gold price is US$/troy ounce; Index: $2,500=100.

2026 baseline ratio equal to 63.7.

Data as of June 1, 2026.

10. Domestic and regional financing conditions eased somewhat. Average yields on new government securities decreased from 9.3 percent since March 2024 (the reading reported at the 2024 Article IV consultation) to 8.2 percent in 2025 and as low as 7.1 percent in April 2026. Nonetheless, the average maturity also decreased, from 4.6 years in May 2024 to 3 years in April 2026 (Text Figure 3). Consistent with the medium-term debt strategy, non-syndicated bonds with maturities over one year accounted for 53 percent of the 2025 issuance, up from 45 percent in 2024, allowing the Burkinabè treasury to extend marginally the average public debt maturity from 6.6 years in 2024 to 6.7 years in 2025. A sharp decrease in net domestic financing needs (reflecting lower deficit and foreign financing of 1.3 percent of GDP covering three-quarters of it) contributed to this effect. As investor interest remains strong with bids exceeding targets, further improvement in the domestic debt profile could be expected in 2026, unless the headwinds from the Middle East negatively affect the regional climate. Improved liquidity conditions regionwide and a gradual monetary easing (BCEAO cut rates by 25 bps on March 4, 2026) have supported the demand.

Text Table 1. Fiscal Performance and Outlook, 2024–26
(in percentage of GDP)

	2024	2025		2026			
		4th Review		4th Review	Initial		Q1
	Outturn	Proj.	Outturn	Proj.	Budget	Proj.	Outturn
Total revenue and grants	**22.0**	**22.5**	**23.6**	**21.1**	**20.5**	**21.0**	**4.7**
Total revenue	20.7	21.4	22.5	19.9	19.3	19.9	4.6
Of which: Non-VAT mining revenue	2.7	4.3	4.2	3.3	…	4.4	0.7
Tax revenue	18.4	17.8	19.2	17.5	17.2	17.7	4.1
Of which: Gold Mining CIT	0.9	1.3	1.3	1.3	…	1.6	0.2
Of which: Plus values	0.5	1.0	1.3	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.3
Nontax revenue	2.3	3.6	3.3	2.4	2.1	2.2	0.4
Of which: Royalties	0.7	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.7	1.1	0.3
Grants	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.1	0.1
Project	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.1	0.1
Expenditure and net lending	**27.8**	**26.1**	**25.4**	**24.6**	**23.3**	**25.0**	**4.1**
Current expenditure	16.4	16.5	16.3	15.7	14.8	16.7	3.2
Wages and salaries	8.4	8.1	7.9	7.8	7.6	7.6	1.8
Goods and services	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.0	1.9	2.0	0.3
Interest payments	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.1	0.4
Domestic	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.8	1.8	0.3
External	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.1
Current transfers	3.6	3.9	4.0	3.7	3.1	4.9	0.7
Of which: Energy subsidies	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.0	0.4	1.7	0.0
Investment expenditure	11.4	9.6	8.8	9.0	8.5	8.3	0.9
Domestically financed	8.1	6.6	5.6	5.6	5.7	5.1	0.4
Externally financed	3.4	3.0	3.2	3.4	2.7	3.2	0.5
Net lending	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Overall balance	**-5.8**	**-3.5**	**-1.8**	**-3.5**	**-2.8**	**-4.0**	**0.6**
Financing	6.0	3.5	1.8	3.5	2.7	4.0	-0.6
Foreign financing	1.3	1.0	1.3	0.9	0.5	1.6	0.2
Domestic financing	4.7	2.5	0.5	2.6	2.2	2.4	-0.8
Bank financing	3.5	2.0	1.5	1.6	0.5	1.3	-0.7
Nonbank financing	1.1	0.5	-1.1	1.0	1.7	1.2	0.0
Errors and Omissions	-0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
Memorandum							
Overall Balance excl. mining revenue	-8.5	-7.9	-6.0	-7.4	…	-8.4	-0.1
Primary Fiscal balance (including grants)	-3.6	-1.3	0.4	-1.3	-0.5	-1.9	0.2

11. **Domestic bank liquidity has also rebounded but non-performing loans (NPL) and regional security developments continue to weigh on credit dynamics.** Broad money rose by 18.3 percent in 2025, driven by cash flow from the mining sector; however, financial soundness indicators deteriorated. The NPL ratio reached 10.9 percent at end-June 2025 (above the WAEMU average), up from 8.9 percent at end-2024. This deterioration likely reflects inadequate screening and monitoring of borrower quality, as well as delayed effects from the COVID-19 crisis and the ongoing security crisis. Private sector credit contracted 4.1 percent in 2025 after a 2.2 percent drop in 2024. This continued decline reflected a combination of factors: (i) amortization of advances outstanding from the COVID-19 period, some of which benefitted from maturity extension;

(ii) abundant liquidity in the mining sector and its tributaries now largely reliant on own resources for financing; (iii) a relatively weak appetite for credit outside the mining sector due to security concerns; and (iv) banks' reluctance to lend beyond established sectors like cotton and mining. Local banks rolled over maturing debt of Niger and Senegal, which for most banks represents a small share of their balance sheet. The government created but has not yet operationalized the holding company Yennenga Holding BFA to consolidate stakes in three banks and a reinsurance firm to improve performance and facilitate syndication of lending for large public projects.

Text Figure 3. Security Issuances: Volumes, Yields, and Maturities, 2022–26
(monthly)



Sources: UMOA Titres; and IMF staff calculations.

Note: 2026 data are through April.

12. Risks of external and public debt distress are moderate. The DSA indicates "low" risks of distress for external public debt and overall public debt based on mechanical signals. Due to strong dependence on gold exports, downside fiscal risks, vulnerability to extreme weather events, and the volatile security situation, staff continue to apply judgement and assess risks as "moderate."

PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

13. Quantitative targets. The authorities met all end-December QPCs and continuous QPCs. All but two ITs at end-December 2025 and all but one IT at end-March 2026 were observed: (i) domestic arrears exceeded the ceiling by 0.2 percent of GDP at end-December 2025 (Text Table 2) and by less than 0.1 percent at end-March 2026—the authorities aim to resolve these (VAT) arrears; and (ii) current spending exceeded the ceiling by 0.7 percent of GDP due to additional energy subsidies and security outlays. The latter was anticipated with appropriate forward-looking understandings reached at the fourth review.

Text Table 2. Arrears and Floating Debt Reconciliation (at end-December 2025)

	Arrears (More than 3 Months)		Floating debt (Less than 3 Months)	
	Billion FCFA	Percent of 2025 GDP	Billion FCFA	Percent of 2025 GDP
VAT reimbursements	36.0	0.2	13.6	0.1
Non-VAT	0.0	0.0	26.5	0.2
Total	**36.0**	**0.2**	**40.0**	**0.3**

14. Structural benchmarks. Three SBs—on procurement, wage control, and tax revenue administration integrity—and all continuous SBs have been met.

15. RSF reforms. Two RSF reform measures—publication of the adopted disaster risk financing strategy and publication of climate risk data—have been met. Progress on future reform measures remains on track.

OUTLOOK AND RISKS

16. The supply shocks from the war in the Middle East, funding cuts for humanitarian aid, and rising security risks from the crisis in Mali are weighing on the short-term outlook. Based on the deteriorating conditions in the international market, staff assume that import prices for some categories of fertilizer will increase by more than 100 percent in 2026, while import prices for petroleum products could rise by 42 percent to average US$128.8 per barrel (Text Table 3). A sharp decline in foreign humanitarian assistance and the possibility of the security crisis in Mali spilling over to BFA are posing major risks to the budget and economy.

17. The surge in fertilizer prices created an urgent financing gap of 0.5 percent of GDP. The World Bank analysis shows that a 20-percent rise in domestic fertilizer prices alone could reduce maize yields by up to 12 percent. Subsidization of domestic fertilizer use is seen as a policy priority. While all efforts are made to import an adequate amount of fertilizer, inflated prices notwithstanding, physical shortages of fertilizers can occur, especially for the second "dry" planting season in late 2026. Without timely support, fertilizer use would drop sharply, causing a collapse in crop output due to the short rainy season and poor soil. This would force large-scale food imports, straining the current account. Financing for about 360,000 tons of fertilizer (out of a 500,000-ton need) is therefore time-critical, while its costs exceed the government's capacity to mobilize the needed financing on short notice.[4] The need creates a financing gap of about CFAF 92.2 billion (0.5 percent of GDP). While some stocks of locally produced food are still available, if the October

[4] Only 140,000 metric tons of fertilizers were secured by contracts signed before the global shock occurred.

harvest fails, the number of food-insecure people will rise, forcing the government to finance food imports, especially if foreign aid continues to disappoint. The situation will get even worse if fertilizer shortages affect the second crop cycle.

Text Table 3. Energy, Mining and Fertilizer Fiscal Indicators

(in percentage of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

	2025	2026		2027	
	Prel.	ECF 4th Review	Proj.	ECF 4th Review	Proj.
Energy					
Revenue 1/	2.6	...	1.0	...	0.9
Plus-values SONABHY	1.3	0.3	...	...	...
Dividendes SONABHY	0.1	...	...	...	...
Dividendes SONABEL	0.0	...	...	...	...
Petroleum product tax	1.1	...	1.0	...	0.9
Import duties 1/	...	...	...	...	...
VAT tax 1/	...	...	...	...	...
Expenditure on Energy Subsidies	1.2	1.0	1.7	1.0	0.9
Subsidies for fuels for electricity production 2/	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.6
Subsidies for cooking gas 3/	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.3
Moins-values (non-industry diesel, mostly transportation) SONABHY 4/	...	...	0.3	...	...
Mining Revenue 5/	4.2	3.3	4.4	3.2	4.0
CIT	1.3	1.3	1.6	1.3	1.5
Royalties	1.0	0.9	1.1	0.9	1.0
Other fiscal and non-fiscal	1.9	1.1	1.6	1.1	1.5
Fertilizer Expenditure	...	...	0.5	...	0.2
Fertilizer Subsidy	...	...	0.5	...	0.2
Memorandum					
Oil price (unadjusted) (US$/barrel) 6/	67.7	65.9	109.0	65.7	85.0
Oil price (adjusted) (US$/barrel) 7/	90.6	N/A	128.8	N/A	90.8
Subsidy rate: Fuel for electricity and cooking gas	0.7	N/A	0.7	N/A	0.7
Plus-values in 2026 Q1	N/A	N/A	0.3	N/A	N/A
Estimated moins-values (non-industry diesel) 2026 Q2-Q4	N/A	N/A	0.7	N/A	N/A
Gold price (unadjusted) (US$/ounce) 8/	3,440.0	3,472.5	4,780.4	4,500.0	4,948.0
Gold price (adjusted) (US$/ounce) 9/	2,895.0	N/A	4,023.2	N/A	4,164.2
NPK price (US$/mt) 10/ 11/	...	...	760.0	...	760.0
Urea price (US$/mt)	...	...	1,061.0	...	1,061.0
Diammonium phosphate (DAP) price (US$/mt)	...	...	750.0	...	750.0
Other fertilizers (average) price (US$/mt)	...	...	760.0	...	760.0
NPK import quantity (thousand tons)	263.0	263.0	263.0	263.0	263.0
Urea import quantity (thousand tons)	150.0	150.0	150.0	150.0	150.0
DAP import quantity (thousand tons)	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0	55.0
Other fertilizers imports (thousand tons)	32.0	32.0	32.0	32.0	32.0
Nominal GDP (CFAF billions)	16,077.0	17,254.6	17,682.0	18,574.0	19,920.1

Sources: Burkinabé authorities; IMF staff estimates and projections.

Note: "..." represents an unknown or negligible value. N/A represents a non-applicable value.

1/ Does not include import duties and VAT due to a lack of data and estimates.

2/ Estimates based on the expected increase in adjusted oil prices and on the authorities' projected share of fuel for electricity production subsidies in total energy subsidies.

3/ Estimates based on the expected increase in adjusted oil prices and on the authorities' projected share of cooking gas subsidies in total energy subsidies.

4/ Estimate based on Q1 moins-values data (see memo item) and Q2-4 estimated moins-values of 250 FCFA per liter for non-industry diesel consumption.

5/ Corrected mistake in PN that assumed VAT mining revenue was net when it was indeed gross of VAT refunds.

6/ Projections based on the four-week average (April 8th to May 7th, 2026) dated and generic Brent futures prices.

7/ Adjusted by an BFA oil product-consumption weighted markup of West African oil product prices over Brent prices. The markup was 30 percent in 2025 and 15 percent during the first 4 months of 2026.

8/ Projections based on the four-week average (April 8th to May 7th, 2026) CMX gold futures prices.

9/ Adjusted by a negative margin due to 16 percent lower gold export prices (based on trade data averages in 2024 and 2025) than international prices. BFA exports unrefined gold, while international prices refer to refined gold.

10/ NPK refers to a broad category of compound fertilizers containing nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P), and potassium (K).

11/ Out of the 500,000 metric tons needed for the year, 140,000 were contracted at pre-shock prices. The financing gap accounts for the 360,000 still needed to be financed at higher prices.

18. Growth in 2026 is projected to weaken due to an expected agricultural production decline. Real GDP growth is forecast at 3.6 percent, as agricultural output is expected to contract by 5.0 percent. The fertilizer shock is not expected to be fully mitigated while rainfall will likely normalize after two exceptionally good years. Staff assume that even if financing for all fertilizer needed is ensured, some of it may arrive later than needed for a full impact, as the first "humid" planting season has already started in May. Distribution logistics may become rushed and more complex, leading to additional inefficiencies. Higher fuel costs will also dampen agricultural output through increased machinery operating costs and reduce aggregate output more broadly, even if import price increases are only partially passed through to consumers. As the external environment is assumed gradually to normalize, growth is expected to reach 4.8 percent in 2027 and over the medium term, driven primarily by gold mining. Agricultural growth is expected to rebound modestly in 2027 amid improved fertilizer supplies, and services are expected to support growth, pending security improvements.

19. Inflation is projected to rise in 2026 due to higher food and energy prices. CPI inflation is expected to increase to 4.2 percent in 2026 and remain elevated at 4.0 percent in 2027. Staff assume that the passthrough of higher import prices to domestic prices of diesel fuel used in transportation and agriculture is partially mitigated through subsidies. Recent data show that food prices have already been picking up month-to-month and are expected to rise further, consistent with recent FAO global food price index data. For 2028 and beyond, inflation is expected to return to the WAEMU target range of 1–3 percent.

20. The current account surplus of 0.8 percent of GDP projected for 2026 at the 4th ECF review has been revised to a deficit of 2.0 percent of GDP. Most of the deterioration reflects upward revisions to import prices for petroleum products and downward revisions in relevant gold export prices. These price effects primarily affect private-sector export receipts and import costs and do not give rise to a commensurate fiscal financing need. In addition, assuming higher import prices of fertilizer and constant volumes, the fertilizer import bill rises significantly. This translates one-for-one into a further deterioration of the current account balance and creates an immediate BoP financing gap of US$165.8 million (CFAF 92.2 billion or 0.5 percent of GDP) in 2026, in the absence of offsetting adjustment measures or external support.

21. The authorities' 2026 initial budget includes sizable margins that will help the authorities to meet the additional fiscal needs.

- The initial 2026 budget targets an overall deficit of 2.8 percent of GDP, relaxed by 1.0 ppt compared to the 2025 outturn, primarily due to conservative assumptions about the fiscal revenues from the gold mining sector and regulated petroleum product prices.

- The revenue-to-GDP ratio drops by 3.1 ppts, reflecting assumed losses of SONABHY's plus-value (1.3 ppts of GDP) and gold mining dividends (0.7 ppts), which is tantamount to treating these items as windfall revenues. Part of the decline results from a mechanical drop in the revenue-to-GDP ratio due to the nominal GDP being inflated by the rise in the price of gold.

- The expenditure-to-GDP ratio falls by 2.1 ppts (partly from the denominator effect): due to (i) reductions in current transfers and externally financed investment (the latter excludes projects awaiting creditor approval); (ii) flat spending on goods and services; and (iii) public wage bill growth as per the medium-term strategy.

22. To enable an appropriate response to the external shocks, the authorities and staff agreed to relax the 2026 fiscal deficit objective by 0.5 percent of GDP. Accordingly, it is proposed that the program's deficit objective for 2026 will be relaxed from 3.5 to 4.0 percent of GDP).[5] This relaxation would accommodate less than one-third of the total fiscal impact of the fertilizer and oil shocks estimated at 1.7 percent of GDP (relative to the 4th review projection), while the bulk of it (1.2 percent of GDP) would be addressed by petroleum price adjustments and spending reallocations:

- The increase in fertilizer import prices is fully transmitted to the budget to keep retail fertilizer prices constant for food-security reasons. This will create a temporary unforeseen need for fertilizer subsidy spending of about CFAF 92.2 billion or 0.5 percent of GDP (Text Table 3).

- On a gross basis (i.e., before price adjustments), the additional energy subsidy needs are estimated at 1.2 percent of GDP and are assumed to be reduced to 0.7 percent of GDP if the price shock is partially passed through to consumers (as described in ¶30).

- To meet the additional energy subsidy needs of 0.7 percent of GDP (after price adjustments), the authorities plan to take additional fiscal measures. To this effect, savings of 0.5 percent of GDP are expected to come from cuts in the domestically financed capex while savings of 0.2 percent of GDP are expected to come from tightening the wage bill.

- As shown in Text Table 3, higher gold prices are expected to boost mining revenue, but—even though all applicable fuel-related customs duties, taxes, margins and fees are expected to be collected—elevated international oil prices will eliminate the possibility of raising any additional fuel price-related revenue previously generated from the markup between import prices and higher domestic pump prices (*plus-value*). This possibility was discounted in the 2026 budget, which was based on appropriately conservative assumptions, although a plus-value of about

[5] Since the BFA budget incorporates only the loans approved for disbursement at the time of budget preparation, under the program approved at the 4th ECF review, a fiscal deficit of 3.5 percent of GDP was permitted to accommodate additional foreign financing of nearly 0.7 percent of GDP relative to what was reflected in the draft budget. Staff now project that foreign financing (including project and emergency-related disbursements and, by definition, excluding the IMF) will exceed that level by another 0.5 percent of GDP. This allows to keep the net domestic financing projection and the related IT and QPC unchanged relative to the 4th review.

0.3 percent of GDP accrued in Q1 2026 before petroleum import prices increased. This margin is now expected to be reversed to meet the cost of fuel subsidies.

- As a result, the 2026 deficit will increase by only 0.5 percent of GDP relative to the fourth ECF review (from 3.5 to 4.0 percent of GDP).

23. A sharp decline in foreign humanitarian assistance has intensified the emergency. Of the US$207.2 million that the World Food Programme expected for 2026 (deemed sufficient to provide humanitarian aid for 1.5 million people), only US$16.1 million was disbursed in Q1 2026. The picture is similar for a broader set of international organizations, which provided US$271 million (about 34 percent of needs) in 2025, but only US$94.0 million (about 14 percent of needs) by end-May 2026. While no budget reallocations are currently envisaged, the authorities have reiterated their commitment to support the most vulnerable populations. BoP effects from reduced foreign aid are expected to be muted, due to foreign aid's high import content nearing 100 percent. Thus, lower foreign aid inflows would be offset by a proportional reduction in aid-financed imports.

24. As the regional and global shocks could affect the regional bond market conditions, the authorities took steps to profit from the current relatively favorable terms. The 2026 securities issuance plan targets CFAF 1,180 billion via auctions on a gross basis (compared with CFAF 1,189 billion raised in 2025) and aims to lengthen average portfolio maturity to 8 years by 2028. To reduce rollover risk, the authorities plan a market-based liability management operation targeting non-WAEMU foreign creditors for euro-denominated medium-term debt to replace costly CFAF short-term borrowing. In May 2026, they launched a "diaspora bond" aimed at mobilizing CFAF 125 billion from citizens living abroad to finance national development projects, such as the Bagré Aval hydroelectric plant, with bonds available at either 6.75 percent interest for a duration of 5 years or 6.85 percent for 7 years with constant amortization.

25. Staff's medium-term baseline is more guarded than the outlook featured in the authorities' Plan national de développement (PND) 2026–2030. Staff's outlook assumes a gradual recovery accompanied by fiscal consolidation, while the PND envisages faster growth and structural transformation (Text Table 4). Staff's outlook emphasizes debt sustainability and domestic revenue mobilization as preconditions for gradual transformation, given limits to public investment efficiency from security, financing, and implementation constraints. This reflects historically low investment efficiency, with the ICOR estimated at 6–7 over the past decade. Uncertainty is also higher than in past cycles, reflecting security risks, volatile external conditions, and higher energy costs. By contrast, the PND envisages faster, security-led transformation driven by a state-led investment push in energy and industry for a larger electricity capacity and manufacturing share.

Text Table 4. Burkina Faso Medium-term Outlook: Staff Baseline versus Authorities' PND

	Staff medium-term baseline
Growth	Real GDP growth stabilizes at around 4.5–5 percent over the medium-term, supported by mining, services, and a gradual recovery in non-extractive activity, but constrained by security conditions and capacity limitations.
Inflation	Remains below the WAEMU convergence criterion (3 percent) over the medium term, supported by easing food price growth and prudent macroeconomic policies.
Fiscal position	The overall fiscal deficit converges to the WAEMU norm of 3 percent of GDP by 2028, underpinned by fiscal consolidation and domestic revenue mobilization.
Public investment	Rising from 9 percent of GDP in 2025 to 10.4 percent of GDP by 2030 but remaining below the scale envisaged in the PND, reflecting financing and absorption constraints.
Debt	Remains sustainable with a moderate risk of debt distress.
Structural transformation	Proceeds at a moderate pace, with incremental gains in energy and industry rather than a step-change and progressive buildup of value chains in the areas of Burkina Faso's comparative advantage (agribusiness, mining).
	Authorities' PND / Plan RELANCE (objectives by 2030)
Anchor	Full reconquest of the national territory by 2030.
Growth and transformation	Rapid acceleration driven by a large, state-led investment push.
Energy	Installed electricity capacity scaled up to about 2,585 MW from about 680 MW in 2024.
Industry	Manufacturing share of GDP rises to about 17–18 percent (from about 10 percent).
Poverty	Incidence reduced to about 25 percent by 2030.
Financing position	Relies heavily on mobilizing innovative resources (domestic and foreign).

26. **Downside risks predominate (Annex II).** Security and political conditions remain challenging, and possible spillovers from the escalating armed conflict in Mali could worsen the situation. The economy is vulnerable to declines in gold prices and more persistent oil and fertilizer price increases and, possibly, shortages of fertilizer persisting throughout the entire 2026/27 cultivation cycle. As a result, subsidies for fuel and fertilizer could exceed baseline assumptions, which would need to be addressed by further reducing capital expenditure. Regionally, debt pressures in some WAEMU countries add risks. Rising inflation could call for reversing monetary policy easing and higher interest rates. Higher global interest rates may compound this pressure. Private sector credit could decline further, which may hinder investment and growth outside mining. Natural disasters threaten infrastructure and could harm external and fiscal balances.

Authorities' Views

27. **The authorities generally share staff's perspective on the impact of fertilizer and energy price shocks on the economy.** They expect a similar decline in real GDP growth in amplitude but from a higher projected pre-crisis growth level. Their medium-term outlook is more optimistic about economic growth and structural transformation. This is partially based on more positive assumptions about the security environment, the development of domestic manufacturing, and the mobilization of domestic and foreign financing.

POLICY DISCUSSIONS

28. **Policy discussions focused on recent shocks and related ECF-supported program priorities and medium-term reforms.** Reforms include creating fiscal space for priority spending, advancing governance reforms, fostering inclusive growth, and making the economy more climate resilient. For both short- and medium-term priorities, the program review and the surveillance

agendas were closely aligned. The Article IV consultation provided an opportunity to engage the authorities on their new development strategy, strategic economic policies, and discuss the merits of implementing a countercyclical fiscal framework to insulate the budget from revenue vagaries caused by gold price volatility.

A. Policies for Creating Fiscal Space and Ensuring Debt Sustainability

29. The response to the commodity price shocks justifies a relaxation of the fiscal policy stance. After a commendable fiscal adjustment of 4.0 ppts of GDP in 2025, the fiscal deficit will need to widen in 2026, likely beyond 3.5 percent of GDP retained at the fourth ECF review, to enable the government to implement shock-mitigating measures. This countercyclical relaxation is justified on social policy grounds, primarily to cope with the surge in fertilizer prices.

30. Regulated fuel prices would need to be adjusted upward selectively to preserve fiscal space while protecting vulnerable households. While, as of May 2026, regulated fuel retail prices were held constant for more than a year, in 2025, they remained well above cost-recovery levels, allowing the government to collect substantial revenue that will not accrue in 2026 due to the rise in international prices. A full passthrough of the oil price shock would imply raising retail prices of gasoline and diesel fuel by 42 percent on average. The authorities are considering differentiated price adjustments to limit the social impact:

- The authorities will not implement a full passthrough in the case of diesel fuel for transportation, as this would raise food price inflation. Staff assume that the passthrough is reduced by CFAF 250 per liter (see Text Table 3). Under this assumption the domestic price of subsidized diesel fuel would still need to increase by 20 percent on average in 2026 to keep fuel subsidies within the projected envelope.

- The authorities will keep the subsidies in place for cooking gas and fuel used in electricity production, implying temporarily rising subsidy costs.

- To preserve fiscal space, full price-passthrough would need to be implemented in case of diesel fuel used in mining operations and in other industries and, if necessary, also for gasoline for passenger cars and motorcycles. The authorities will decide, based on the work of the Interministerial Committee for the Determination of Hydrocarbon Prices, about adjustments based on regional market conditions on an ongoing basis using region- and product-specific pricing formulas.

- Without these price increases, energy subsidies would need to be revised upward from 1.0 percent of GDP projected for 2026 during the fourth ECF review to 2.2 percent of GDP for 2026, according to government estimates (Text Table 3). With the price adjustments, energy subsidies could be contained at 1.7 percent of GDP in 2026 and are expected to decrease to 0.9 percent of GDP in 2027, if import prices for petroleum products decline as projected.

- Flexibility in the capital budget, supported by appropriate contingencies reflecting prioritization of capital spending, is important to accommodate pressures, including on account of persistently high fertilizer and energy prices, while maintaining fiscal discipline. The authorities will adjust their supplementary budget accordingly.

- If additional costs were absorbed in the balance sheets of SONABEL and SONABHY, fiscal risks would still increase and eventually materialize, which would require a contingency plan.

31. Following the authorities' request, staff propose an augmentation of the ECF arrangement by 50 percent of quota to help meet the additional BoP need created by the sharp increase in fertilizer prices. The requested augmentation would increase the level of access from 190 percent to 240 percent of quota. The case for augmentation is supported by the strong performance under the ECF program and the capacity to repay the Fund that remains adequate. The additional Fund resources would cover 50 percent of the financing gap of about CFAF 92.2 billion or 0.5 percent of GDP. The rest of the financing gap would likely be covered by other IFIs, namely the World Bank and the AfDB.

32. The authorities are committed to implementing safeguards around fertilizer procurement and distribution and the use of additional IFI funds. They will publish information on the contractors and beneficial owners of public procurement contracts for the purchase of fertilizers during May to July 2026 (SB for end-September 2026, see MEFP Table 2b). The High Authority for State Control and Anti-Corruption (ASCE-LC) will conduct an audit of fertilizer procurement for the 2026–27 agricultural season (April 2026 to March 2027) and publish the audit report on the website of the Ministry of Economics and Finance (SB for end-July 2027). Furthermore, as the World Bank is expected to finance urgent import needs, including fertilizers, through the IFP/CERP process, Bank staff will have access to contracts and the standard IFP safeguards (related to governance, environmental and social impact, and safety) apply.

33. While building the annual budgets on conservative gold price assumptions served the authorities well, staff recommend moving toward a fully articulated countercyclical fiscal framework over the medium term. Staff commend the 2025 budget discipline that built buffers under the program and the use of a conservative framework based on average gold price growth. They encourage the authorities to develop a countercyclical fiscal framework to mitigate fiscal risks from gold price volatility, including a possible downward correction in its long-term trend. Annex VI analyses BFA's mining sector and provides avenues for a simple countercyclical fiscal framework based on a minimum stock of net liquid financial assets relative to annual mining revenues. In May 2026, the BFA Council of Ministers adopted a decree establishing a sovereign mining investment fund (FSMIB). The fund is designed to channel surplus mining revenues into long-term infrastructure and industrial projects. Its governance framework and operational modalities are being developed. Staff stand ready to support the authorities with technical assistance.

34. Domestic revenue mobilization remains key to creating fiscal space. Recent tax measures have raised revenue, mainly through short-term tools—rate increases, new levies, and broader withholding—rather than broad structural reform. Broadening the tax base should be a priority to improve efficiency, equity, and sustainability. This includes rationalizing tax expenditures, exemptions, and preferential regimes. Recent steps—such as extending VAT to e-commerce—move in the right direction, but more is needed to simplify the tax system and strengthen neutrality. VAT withholding warrants caution: while it can support compliance in some cases, overuse risks weakening the VAT's fractional payment mechanism, increasing refund claims, and turning the VAT into a less efficient sales tax. There is also potential to improve taxation in the mining sector, including through adequate transfer pricing rules.[6]

35. Continued focus on fiscal consolidation is critical to converge to the 3.0 percent of GDP WAEMU deficit target by 2028. In addition to revenue mobilization efforts, staff recommend maintaining strict control over the public wage bill, rationalizing capital expenditures, and strengthening subsidy management, thereby creating fiscal space for social protection, security, and other priority needs. Staff underscored the need for structural reforms to enhance efficiency and transparency in public service delivery, including through digitalization and use of e-government.

Authorities' Views

36. The authorities remain committed to fiscal consolidation while preserving fiscal space for priority spending. They will continue to pursue domestic revenue mobilization efforts, maintain strict control over the public wage bill, rationalize capital expenditures, and strengthen subsidy management. They are analyzing the impact of the fertilizer and oil prices shocks, while examining the incoming gold mining revenue. Given the social and political realities, the authorities are not in a position to commit to specific energy price increases at this moment, though they are planning some adjustments in the near future to narrow the gap with regional peers to eliminate the scope for cross-border arbitrage and smuggling. The authorities are interested in exploring further the options for a countercyclical fiscal framework, especially to ensure adequate resources for and insulate the implementation of the ambitious development plan from the impact of revenue shocks caused by gold and energy price volatility.

B. Advancing Governance Reforms

37. BFA scores above the Sub-Saharan African average on anti-corruption and governance indicators. Despite being a low-income country besieged by daunting humanitarian challenges and security threats, it scores close to the global average and substantially above the sub-Saharan African average in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index.[7] The

[6] See IMF-FAD Technical Assistance Report, *Burkina Faso: Review of the Draft New Mining Code*, January 2024.

[7] In 2024, Burkina Faso's score is 41, while the global average is 43, and the Sub-Saharan African countries' average is 33. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2024 - Transparency.org and CPI2024-Results-and-trends.xlsx.

government conducts its own fiscal governance-related assessments and audits,[8] and participates in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).[9]

38. A key building block of the ECF-supported program from the beginning, the authorities have made remarkable progress on governance reforms. The authorities have made governance and anti-corruption a priority.[10] While governance and anti-corruption frameworks are broadly in line with international standards, the Governance Diagnostic Assessment (GDA) identified shortcomings in their implementation. To address these shortcomings, the authorities have developed their own action plan based on the eleven GDA priority recommendations. As of May 2026, they have implemented seven of them and have partially implemented another three (Text Table 5).

39. The authorities also took steps to strengthen integrity in tax administration. They have shared and adopted operational plans with timelines for each action to foster integrity at the General Directorate of Taxes (DGI) and the General Directorate of Customs (DGD) (SB for end-December 2025). These plans draw on the codes of conduct of the two directorates. Staff underscored that steadfast implementation of this reform will foster citizen's trust in tax administration, improve the business environment, and support domestic revenue mobilization.

40. The authorities continue to implement reforms to foster integrity in public procurement. They have shared with staff an implementation report on the reforms to address issues in public procurement identified through the audit of the five largest public procurement contracts (and thus met the corresponding SB for end-December 2025). Even though the audit had only been finished two months earlier, the authorities have already implemented 78 percent of the reforms. The authorities will also strengthen competitive procurement by operationalizing a digital procurement platform to support the publication of tenders and contract award information as a new SB for the seventh ECF review (MEFP Table 2b).

41. The authorities will include all remaining GDA priority recommendations into their program. The newly proposed SBs for the sixth and seventh ECF review will lead to the full implementation of the three partially implemented and the last outstanding recommendations:

- The authorities will establish an annual internal auditing mechanism on the mining permitting process as an SB for the sixth ECF review (end-October 2026). The audits will allow for the verification of the timeliness of permit issuance, adherence to procedural steps and other internal controls, consistency of decisions, and transparency of outcomes.

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[8] See RGAA_2024_IGF.pdf, Rapports généraux annuels d'Activités - ASCE-LC, and Rapports d'audits – Cour des comptes.

[9] See Burkina Faso | EITI.

[10] See Déclaration de politique générale du Premier ministre Jean Emmanuel Ouédraogo.

Text Table 5. Priority Recommendations from GDA and their Implementation

No.	Measure	Objective	Status	Time 1/
1	Regularly prepare an exhaustive list of treasury deposit accounts with balances including the identification of those opened for the benefit of non-personalized government services and include the net position of the government.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	Implemented. This is related to the PA for the 3rd ECF review and the continuous SB. The authorities have also shared an interim report on the ongoing audit of the treasury deposit accounts as a proposed PA for the 4th ECF review.	IM
2	Strengthen the application of public procurement regulations in order to increase the percentage of competitive contracts, while taking into account the security and humanitarian context.	Strengthen accountability and rule of law.	Partially implemented. The authorities have conducted and shared a value-for-money audit of public procurement, including competitive contracts, as SB for the 4th ECF review. They have also shared an action plan (SB, 4th ECF review, end-October 2025), and submitted an implementation report (SB, 5th ECF review, end-December 2025). The authorities will implement a digital procurement platform as a proposed SB for the 7th ECF review.	MT
3	Plan and execute judgments of government officers guilty of mismanagement.	Strengthen accountability.	Implemented.	IM
4	Cease the current practice of opening deposit accounts for non-personalized government services.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	Partially implemented. The authorities' March 2024 decree restricts the opening of treasury deposit accounts by non-personlized services to exceptions that can only be authorized by the Minister and require a public accountant or otherwise authorized person. The authorities are also auditing and working to close existing accounts in line with the decree. See also the PAs for the 4th ECF review. The authorities will amed the order on treasury depost accounts to limit exemptions as a proposed SB for the 7th ECF review.	IM
5	Implement integrity measures in the gold mining sector to limit interference by politically exposed persons. This should include publishing beneficial ownership of partner entities, contracts, and transactions with licensed cooperatives.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	Partially implemented. The authorities will share an implementation note as a proposed SB for the 7th ECF review.	IM/ST
6	Evaluate the implementation of operational plans for initiatives on corruption and ethics for the DGI and DGD.	Strengthen accountability.	Implemented as a SB for the 5th ECF review (end-December 2025). The SB is broader and includes concrete actions.	ST
7	Establish a mechanism for periodic audits to assess the regularity, transparency, and effectiveness of mining permit management.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	Proposed SB for the 6th ECF review (end-October 2026).	ST
8	Fully implement the national electronic register of beneficial owners, including networking of local registers and other competent authorities.	Fight against money laundering and terrorism financing.	Implemented as SB for the 4th ECF review.	IM
9	Ensure that supporting documents for expenses managed under the deposit account procedure are regularly submitted to the public accounting officer of the Treasury. 2/	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	Implemented.	MT
10	Develop a plan to conduct regular (external) audits of all ministries relative to their risk and publish reports on a regular basis as well.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	Implemented. Additionally, the authorities will publish the first five audit reports as a proposed SB for the 6th ECF review (end-October 2026).	ST
11	Adopt and implement an action plan to clear payment arrears.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	Implemented. See the related PA for the 3rd ECF review. The authorities have reduced arrears to less than 0.1 percent of GDP at end-March 2026.	ST

1/ IM – Immediate – implementation from 1-3 months, ST – Short Term – implementation up to twelve months, MT – Medium Term – may require 13-24 months for implementation, LT– Long Term – extend beyond 24 months for implementation.
2/ As a good practice, this should include expenses of the FSP and the Ministry of Defense. However, reporting of these expenses is not expected to be included in the action plan on the implementation of the recommendations.

- The authorities have already proactively adopted the plan for the ministerial audits and launched the audit of the first five ministries that have been identified based on risk. They are committed to publishing reports on these audits as an SB for the sixth ECF review (end-October 2026). This key step will foster transparency. The reported findings could inspire further actions to strengthen governance, including at the highest levels of public administration.

- The authorities will share with IMF staff a note on the implementation of integrity reforms in the gold mining sector to strengthen disclosure requirements, namely through the annual publication of beneficial ownership information for partner entities, contracts, and transactions with licensed cooperatives as well as the annual publication of audit reports of mining-related SOEs. This is proposed as an SB for the seventh ECF review (end-December 2026).

- To limit exemptions under which non-personalized accounts may be opened, the Cabinet of Ministers will amend the decree on treasury deposit accounts to explicitly define and limit exemptions. This proposed SB for the seventh ECF review (end-December 2026) establishes a formal approval process for granting such exemptions, and systematic reporting on the number, beneficiaries, and duration of approved exemptions.

- The Ministry of Economics and Finance, pursuant to a legal provision, committed to publishing an annual comprehensive report on tax expenditures as an annex to the Budget (Loi de finance), which is a SB for the seventh ECF review (end-December 2026).

42. On the assets side of Treasury management, progress has continued in operationalizing the Treasury Single Account (TSA). The legal foundation was established by the 2016 public accounting decree,[11] in line with the WAEMU public financial management framework and operationalized through the 2019 decree.[12] A major milestone was reached in 2020 with the Treasury's effective connection to the BCEAO's STAR-UEMOA payment platform, enabling real-time visibility over government cash balances and greater consolidation of public liquidity. Since then, the authorities have progressively rationalized public bank accounts, including the closure of regional treasury accounts at the BCEAO and in commercial banks, and streamlined revenue collection arrangements for tax and customs administrations.

43. A key remaining challenge is the complete extension of the TSA perimeter to all relevant public entities. The authorities have initiated audits and rationalization efforts—including the review of 1,853 deposit accounts by the Inspectorate General of Finance—and have begun closing some accounts in commercial banks. The migration of public cash resources into the TSA remains gradual and operationally complex. While important implementation challenges remain—notably the full migration of project accounts and strengthening information systems—the reform has improved the Treasury's control over the asset side of the public balance sheet, providing the foundation for more efficient liquidity management. Staff encourage finalization of these reforms.

44. On the liabilities side of Treasury management, reforms were also initiated through the creation of the *Banque des Dépôts du Trésor* (BDT), operational since January 2024. The BDT was established as a Treasury-owned deposit institution serving primarily civil servants—reportedly around 150,000 potential clients—as well as NGOs and other customers, marking an expansion of the Treasury's role in deposit-taking activities. This reform offers potential benefits but requires

[11] Décret No. 2016-598.

[12] Décret No. 2019-1022.

careful implementation. As a deposit-taking institution, staff recommend further implementing robust governance, risk management, and operational systems.

45. The BDT raises some competition policy considerations, given the entry of a state-owned institution into segments traditionally served by private banks, particularly if it benefits from privileged access to certain customer groups. These concerns are somewhat mitigated by the fact that BDT is not authorized to extend credit to its depositors, and its balance sheet is relatively small compared with the overall Treasury balances; however, BDT is currently not subject to prudential banking supervision by the BCEAO, which underscores the importance of ensuring an appropriate oversight framework. Maintaining transparent governance arrangements, clear institutional guardrails, and a level playing field with private financial institutions will be important to preserve confidence in the financial sector and avoid market distortions. The BCEAO has indicated that the payment of civil servant salaries into BDT accounts would not result in monetary creation, but this will depend on ensuring appropriate balance-sheet treatment of these transactions. Staff recommend clear institutional arrangements and sound oversight to ensure that the BDT supports broader public financial management objectives.

Authorities' Views

46. The authorities emphasized their commitment to their governance action plan and broader anti-corruption agenda. They are prioritizing these reforms because they support the efficient use of public resources, enhance citizens' trust in the government, and foster growth over the long term. At the same time, the authorities noted that the effectiveness and sustainability of governance reforms depend on concomitant improvements in the security situation and emphasize the importance of a gradual, well-sequenced approach to reform implementation to maximize impact over the medium term.

C. Financial Sector Health and Inclusion

47. Banking sector vulnerabilities warrant close monitoring and timely policy action. Although liquidity conditions have improved, financial soundness indicators have weakened, with nonperforming loans rising, private sector credit contracting for a second consecutive year, and banks remaining exposed to sovereign and regional spillovers, including through holdings of government securities and cross-border exposures within WAEMU. Staff encouraged the authorities, in coordination with the BCEAO and the Banking Commission, to closely monitor capitalization, asset quality, liquidity, and concentration risks, ensure that weak institutions are addressed promptly, and strengthen capital buffers where needed. Over time, reducing the sovereign-bank nexus and fostering a healthier expansion of credit to the private sector will be important to safeguard financial stability and support growth.

48. Broad-based growth and private sector development require financial development. The assessment of financial inclusion is broadly unchanged since the previous Article IV. Limited access to finance for households and firms continues to constrain private sector development and the potential for sustained inclusive medium-term growth. Discussions emphasized the importance of deepening financial markets and strengthening financial inclusion, including by promoting greater use of digital and mobile banking solutions. Building on the review of the national strategy for 2019–2023 and BCEAO's 2025–2030 regional strategy, staff recommend enhancing regulatory frameworks and financial support to help microfinance companies scale up their services and strengthening their credit risk management, alongside efforts to improve financial literacy, market knowledge, and digital adoption.

Authorities' Views

49. The authorities concurred with staff's assessment that the banking system faces vulnerabilities. They noted that weak credit growth reflects a combination of tighter financial conditions, subdued demand outside the mining sector, and security-related uncertainties, emphasizing that liquidity has improved and that some financial soundness indicators are expected to strengthen. They reaffirmed their commitment—together with the BCEAO and the Banking Commission—to closely monitor vulnerabilities and advance outstanding financial sector reforms.

D. Fostering Inclusive Growth

50. The ongoing operationalization of the universal health insurance scheme (RAMU) marks an important structural reform in social protection. Beyond its direct social objectives, the gradual rollout of the system could generate positive spillovers for economic formalization. Because eligibility and contribution collection rely on the identification of workers, employers, and beneficiaries, the expansion may strengthen incentives for formal registration of firms and employees, improve administrative databases, and support broader state capacity, including for tax and social contribution collection. The reform could contribute over time to widening the formal tax base and improving compliance. As of early March 2026, the records show that 507,766 individuals had been registered with 411 employers, while under the pilot phase 80,267 beneficiaries (including 31,116 contributing public employees and 49,151 eligible dependents) had access to healthcare.

51. As coverage expands, however, the macro-fiscal implications of the scheme will need close monitoring. The benefit package is broad, with the general reimbursement framework covering 70 percent of eligible healthcare costs, including hospitalization and medicines. The remaining 30 percent is borne by beneficiaries "out-of-pocket." Certain items such as optical and dental care are excluded. The financing model, based on payroll contributions from employees and employers (2.5 percent each), supplemented by public support, provides an initial anchor. Nevertheless, the long-run financial balance of the system remains uncertain, especially as coverage broadens to larger segments of the population and healthcare utilization increases. Staff recommend regular actuarial assessments, calibration of contribution rates, benefit design, and expenditure controls to preserve financial sustainability.

52. BFA has advanced in deploying its Single Social Registry (SSR), which is becoming a core tool for social targeting and the modernization of social protection delivery. As of end-2025, the SSR covered 10 regions, 20 provinces, and 99 communes, 362,698 poor and vulnerable households (about 25.5 percent of the targeted population), representing 2.2 million individuals.

The registry is increasingly used by government entities, local authorities, and development partners to identify beneficiaries for interventions, including on food security grounds, education assistance, social inclusion, and support for internally displaced persons. The growing use suggests that the SSR is evolving from a standalone database into a national social targeting platform. However, the system is still being scaled up and faces implementation challenges. National coverage remains partial, leaving scope for expansions. Ongoing interoperability with other systems—notably the West Africa Unique Identification for Regional Integration and Inclusion and *Conseil national de secours d'urgence et de réhabilitation* (CONASUR) databases (supporting digital identification and emergency/social assistance targeting, respectively)—should reduce fragmentation and improve targeting. If expanded, the SSR could make social spending more efficient, responsive, and equitable. Staff recommend continuous data collection and updating to preserve system reliability.

53. The National Program for the Empowerment of Poor and Vulnerable Households (PAMPV)[13] is moving from design toward operational deployment as a key component of the social protection strategy. As of end-2025, the program's operational manual had been validated and adopted by stakeholders, the steering committee had been formally established, and the legal instruments creating and staffing the Program Management Unit were awaiting final signature. Additional progress was recorded by end-March 2026, including partner support from the WFP-UNICEF consortium (financed by KfW) for analytical work on gender dimensions and implementation mechanisms for economic inclusion measures, with both studies validated at national workshops. Capacity building has delivered training to 30 trainers and 153 social workers, who will support practical implementation. Regional dissemination workshops across all 17 regions are planned during the first half of 2026.

54. The PAMPV is intended to complement the broader social protection architecture by shifting part of the policy focus from emergency support toward the economic empowerment and resilience of poor and vulnerable households. Its effectiveness will depend in part on close integration with the SSR to ensure robust beneficiary targeting and avoid fragmentation across social programs. As the program moves toward implementation, key challenges include predictable financing, translating the institutional framework into effective service delivery, and ensuring that economic inclusion measures generate durable improvements.

55. The Burkinabè authorities are assigning the state a central role in scaling up investment to address infrastructure gaps, support structural transformation, and advance sovereignty. This is reflected in expanded public investment through line ministries and the launch of the *initiatives présidentielles*, coordinated by *the Bureau national des grands projets du Burkina Faso* (BNGPB), attached to the Presidency. They cover transport, agriculture, health, education, and community infrastructure, with initiatives such as *Faso Mêbo* illustrating a more direct state role in

[13] *Programme national d'appui à l'autonomisation des ménages pauvres et vulnérables*.

execution.[14] This approach could help address development bottlenecks where private investment is constrained by insecurity and weak infrastructure but requires careful fiscal management. Budget-financed scaling-up could put strains on limited fiscal space, while PPPs may create contingent liabilities if not properly assessed and integrated into fiscal planning. This underscores the importance of strong public investment management, procurement transparency, clear institutional guardrails, and monitoring of off-budget commitments. Maintaining a predictable policy environment and transparent investment decision-making will also be important to preserve private sector confidence and encourage complementary private investment. Private sector representatives and some development partners raised concerns about higher state involvement in the economy and limited transparency in public investment.

Authorities' Views

56. They view the scaling-up of social and public investment as essential to addressing development needs, security-related challenges, and infrastructure gaps, and to supporting economic sovereignty and structural transformation. On social protection, including the PAMPV, they favor mechanisms that strengthen household resilience and productive capacity rather than large-scale unconditional cash or mobile transfers, which they view with reservations because of concerns about sustainability and alignment with their objective of promoting economic inclusion and self-reliance. They view the scaling-up of public investment, including the *initiatives présidentielles*, as essential to addressing infrastructure gaps and advancing sovereignty and structural transformation. They emphasized that the fiscal implications of these programs will be closely monitored to preserve consistency with the program's fiscal objectives. They also indicated that projects under the presidential initiatives are *accélérateurs* of the RELANCE program and are therefore integrated within that broader framework. Accordingly, they are to be implemented through the relevant line ministries and subject to standard public procurement and budgetary procedures, to maintain consistency with established public financial management frameworks.

E. Making the Economy Climate Resilient

57. The authorities have demonstrated a strong commitment to climate reforms. Their RSF-supported reform agenda is based on four reform pillars: (i) fiscal transparency and resilience, (ii) climate-proofing public investments, (iii) resilient utilities provision and management, and (iv) enhancing climate data and catalyzing public and private climate financing (see MEFP Table 3). Over the medium term, these measures will help prevent large current account deteriorations, reserve drawdowns, or sudden financing gaps, and catalyze private and public sector investment. Staff

[14] The presidential initiatives, which form a central pillar of the RELANCE program, comprise six flagship initiatives: (i) the Presidential Initiative for Agricultural and Food Production; (ii) the Presidential Initiative for Industrial Development; (iii) the Presidential Initiative for Energy Development; (iv) the Presidential Initiative for Transport and Logistics Infrastructure (including *Faso Mêbo*, focused on road construction and urban development works); (v) the Presidential Initiative for Social Infrastructure; and (vi) the Presidential Initiative for Strategic Sovereignty Projects.

commend the authorities' efforts, recommend continuing reform implementation, and encourage the preparation of new reforms for the time after the completion of the RSF.

58. The two reform measures slated for the first RSF review were implemented. The authorities, supported by IMF capacity development, are also advancing reforms for future reviews (Table 12).

- **The MEF and the Ministry of Humanitarian Action and National Solidarity adopted the National Disaster Risk Finance Strategy in May 2026 (MEFP ¶23).**[15] The strategy, supported by FAD CD, institutionalizes a multi-layered financing framework structured around three pillars: fiscal resilience through pre-positioned buffers and contingent instruments as well as streamlining existing disaster funding mechanisms for efficiency; social resilience via agricultural insurance expansion and digital financial inclusion; and institutional strengthening via bringing disaster response mandates in alignment with existing legislation. The strategy also strengthens the integration of fiscal resilience into the medium-term fiscal framework via alignment of the fiscal risks statement (FRS) and the medium-term budget plan, in addition to broadening the analysis of natural disasters in the FRS. The strategy is expected to alleviate prospective BoP pressures by reducing the probability of abrupt external financing needs resulting from disaster-driven fiscal volatility.

- **The MEF and the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Mobility (MATM) adopted a joint ministerial order establishing mandatory continuous publication of climate hazard and risk maps in May 2026 (MEFP ¶23).**[16] The order requires the National Meteorological Agency to publish on a continuous basis climate risk maps on the MATM website, as well as other communication platforms accessible to rural households (e.g., Facebook and text) with regular updates and archiving prior versions. The order also requires the MEF to integrate climate information into fiscal risk analysis and planning. By improving access to climate risk information, the reform will strengthen the risk-return profile for climate-exposed investment, reduce import-intensive reconstruction costs following disasters, supporting external stability over the medium term.

Authorities' Views

59. The authorities stressed that strengthening resilience remains a core objective of their reform agenda, given Burkina Faso's vulnerability to climate shocks. The recurrent droughts and floods weigh on agricultural output, food security, infrastructure, and mining activity. These shocks exacerbate import needs and further compound the country's fragility and security challenges. The authorities therefore see the reform agenda under the RSF as an important complement to the ECF program, helping reduce fiscal and external vulnerabilities over time and

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[15] See: Stratégie de financement des risques de catastrophe du Burkina Faso et son Plan d'actions opérationnel.

[16] See: Arrêté portant institution et modalités de publication des cartes des dangers et des risques météorologiques et climatiques.

supporting more durable growth. They reiterated their commitment to implementing all reform measures under the RSF program and, building on the RSF agenda, they are exploring a new set of reforms for 2028 and beyond.

PROGRAM MODALITIES, FINANCING ASSURANCES, AND OTHER ISSUES

60. Program monitoring. The proposed augmentation will add 30 percent of quota (SDR 36.12 million, 0.2 percent of GDP) to the already planned disbursement for the fifth ECF review, and 20 percent of quota (SDR 24.08 million, 0.1 percent of GDP) to the following review (Table 7b). This will increase the level of access from 190 percent of quota (SDR 228.76 million) to 240 percent of quota (SDR 288.96 million). The augmentation resources are allocated toward budget support. As a result, the disbursement upon completion of the fifth ECF review would total SDR 60.2 million (0.3 percent of GDP) and the one upon completion of the sixth review SDR 48.16 million (0.2 percent of GDP). The completion of the first RSF review, including reform measures 1 and 10, will release disbursements of SDR 16.42 million (0.1 percent of GDP) (Table 8). Future ECF reviews will continue to rely on semiannual QPCs and quarterly ITs. New QPCs and ITs for end-March and end-June 2027 are proposed for the seventh review (MEFP Table 1b). The QPC on the ceiling of external debt contracted in PV terms will be raised by 0.6 percent of GDP in 2027 when compared with 2026, leaving space to contract higher levels of concessional financing, if available. Three new SBs on fiscal governance for the sixth review, five new SBs for the seventh review, and one new SB for the eighth ECF review are being proposed (MEFP Table 2b).

61. The authorities request a modification of a performance criterion. The proposed relaxation of the 2026 fiscal deficit objective needs to be reflected in corresponding changes to the quarterly primary deficit path. It is proposed that the ceilings for the primary fiscal deficit, including grants, be raised by CFAF 85 billion and CFAF 125 billion for end-September (IT) and end-December (QPC), respectively (MEFP Table 1b). With the additional deficit expected to be fully financed from external sources, there is no need to change the path for net domestic financing.

62. Staff support the authorities' request for a modification of the indicative ceiling on current expenditure. To ensure headroom for planned emergency outlays early on and additional social spending (which may need to increase), as well as limited additional subsidies, it is proposed to revise upward the ceiling on primary current expenditure for end-June, end-September, and end-December 2026 by CFAF 125, 200, and 270 billion, respectively, which is equivalent to 0.7, 1.1, and 1.5 percent of GDP, respectively (MEFP Table 1b).

63. Exchange system, Article VIII obligations, capital flows, and trade restrictions. The authorities confirmed that there have been no changes to the exchange system, relevant regulations, or their implementation since the fourth ECF review. Staff are not aware of any measures that would give rise to exchange restrictions or multiple currency practices under Article VIII, impose new or intensify limitations on capital flows requiring review under the Fund's

Institutional View. The authorities reaffirmed their commitment not to impose or intensify import restrictions for balance of payments reasons. Recent trade measures, including the import ban on rice and the export ban on livestock, were introduced to support domestic supply conditions, including strengthening food security, and were not motivated by balance-of-payments considerations. Accordingly, the existing assessment remains unchanged, as the authorities have observed the standard continuous PCs (footnote 2 in MEFP Tables 1a and 1b).

64. Pre-HIPC initiative legacy external arrears. Arrears totaled US$6.9 million to Libya and US$47.1 million to Côte d'Ivoire at end-2024 (0.03 and 0.2 percent of BFA's 2025 GDP). BFA and Libya signed a debt rescheduling agreement in October 2025. The authorities have taken steps to implement the rescheduling agreement, with the first payment completed in June 2026. Negotiations with Côte d'Ivoire are ongoing.[17]

65. Burden sharing. The IMF program has a catalytic effect. Several multilateral institutions will likely provide financing, especially to alleviate the emergency due to the fertilizer crisis. The cumulative ECF financing gap for 2026–27 is CFAF 285.4 billion, with partners covering CFAF 137.8 billion (Text Table 6, Table 6), leaving the Fund to cover the remaining 51.7 percent of BoP needs. RSF disbursements in 2026–27 do not count toward closing the gap.

- The World Bank (WB) disbursed US$53.8 million under its Human Capital Protection Project (HCPP), and the OPEC Fund provided US$30 million in concessional financing in 2025. Both disbursements are retroactive gap-filling, reimbursing audited government expenses. In October 2025, the WB approved follow-up support for 12 months, disbursing US$50 million in early 2026, with US$50.5 million expected by December 2026. However, the HCPP is not expected to be renewed in 2027. At the same time, the WB is currently preparing a new operation under the Contingent Emergency Response Project (CERP) to finance the increase in the fertilizer import bill. The CERP allows for a rapid reallocation of uncommitted resources in the IDA portfolio towards emergency expenditures over a period of up to 12 months without formal WB Executive Board approval. The WB is also exploring an envelope of US$10 million from a new agricultural project to support fertilizer acquisitions, with the amount subject to the evolution of the crisis. Both of these project financing programs would constitute additionality that contribute to filling the financing gap as: (i) they are explicitly linked to additional crisis-related spending; (ii) are not foreseen in the budget law and in the staff baseline projection for the fourth ECF review; and (iii) do not add to spending commitments.

[17] Legacy arrears were reclassified as regular debt in the latest end-2025 debt data from the authorities and are now included in the DSA.

- The African Development Bank (AfDB) works toward activating its Crisis Response Facility. This is expected to accelerate the consideration of the authorities' request for CFAF 100 billion in budget support, originally projected to start in 2027 under the new medium-term Development Support Program (DSP) which is being prepared to succeed the current DSP that will expire in 2026. Under the CRF, a portion of the contemplated budget support could be advanced to 2026. Other options, including project financing or guarantee scheme, are also possible. Following consultation with AfDB counterparts, Fund staff assume that 10 percent (CFAF 10 billion) will be advanced to 2026 to help finance the fertilizer need. The rest is assumed to be evenly distributed between 2027 and 2031. If AfDB financing takes the form of budget support, as expected, this will count toward burden sharing among development partners.

Text Table 6. Burden Sharing Under the Program (CFAF billions)

	2026	2027	Total	Percent
Total Projected Budget Support	**212.8**	**72.6**	**285.4**	**100.0**
IMF ECF	101.4	46.3	147.6	51.7
Of which IMF augmentation	46.1			
Other Donors (including IDA)	111.5	26.4	137.8	48.3
Of which: WB (CERP and other agricultural projects)	36.2			
Of which: AfDB (Crisis Response Facility)	10.0			
Residual Financing Gap	0	0	0	
IMF RSF	18.8	50.5	69.3	

Source: IMF staff data and projections.

- The OPEC Fund approved a new US$30 million package for 2026 with disbursements possibly extending until 2027. IMF staff assumes even disbursements between these two years. Staff also discussed with OPEC Fund counterparts the possibility of advancing a portion of their recurrent cost financing approved for a lump-sum disbursement in 2027. This possibility needs to be examined further and is not reflected in current staff projections.

66. The Fund-supported ECF program remains fully financed with firm commitments in place over the next 12 months. Staff have ascertained firm commitments of financial support from the World Bank and the African Development Bank. Together with the proposed augmentation, these commitments are expected to fully close the identified financing gap, thereby ensuring that the program is fully financed for at least 12 months after the completion of the fifth ECF review, with good prospects of financing for the remaining period of the program.

67. BFA's capacity to repay the Fund remains adequate but is subject to risks. With the prospective augmentation, Fund credit outstanding will peak at 434.5 percent of quota, 2.0 percent of GDP and 5.4 percent of exports of goods and services by end-2027 (Table 10). Annual Fund obligations will peak in 2033 at 54.7 percent of quota, 0.2 percent of GDP, 0.5 percent of exports of goods and services, and 2.3 percent of total public debt service. The capacity to repay dashboard (Figure 1) shows that total outstanding Fund credit as a share of GDP stays below the median of comparable PRGT arrangements through 2030, only rising to the 75th percentile in 2032. Fund credit outstanding as a share of PPG external debt remains below the median before peaking at 8.9 percent in 2027. The three indicators of total debt service remain mostly below the median through 2030. BFA does not feature among the 38 largest peaks of Fund credit exposure (Figure 1, Panel C). Downside risks to the capacity to repay include debt rollover risk in the WAEMU market, and an intensification of terrorist attacks could weigh on growth and fiscal balances. They are mitigated by the authorities' strong track record of servicing Fund obligations and their commitment to reducing vulnerabilities through liability management operations to secure better terms (lower interest and longer maturities). Moreover, pooled WAEMU reserves could support Fund debt service, provided local currency counterpart funds are available and other union members are not simultaneously drawing on reserves. These reserves are shared under the solidarity principle with no exclusive allocation per country, even though WAEMU's Fund obligations are set to rise and remain high in the medium term.

68. Risks to the program. Major risks include sustained higher than expected energy and fertilizer prices, worsening regional insecurity, and tighter financial conditions. Though the GDA highlights governance weaknesses, the authorities have implemented seven of eleven priority recommendations and partially implemented another three. The proposed SBs for the sixth and seventh ECF review will lead to implementation of all eleven. Strong track record, ongoing engagement, conditionality, and BFA's strong IMF debt servicing record mitigate exposure risks.

69. IMF Safeguards assessment. The most recent assessment, completed in August 2023, found that the BCEAO continued to have well-established audit arrangements and a strong control environment. Implementation of a priority recommendation, to align the BCEAO's Statute with the Cooperation Agreement of December 21, 2019, signed between the WAEMU member States and the French Republic, remains pending, as it requires ratification of the said agreement by all WAEMU member countries. To date, four out of the eight member States have ratified the Agreement. Nevertheless, several of its provisions are already being applied. Staff continue to engage with the authorities on follow-up efforts.

70. Data provision has improved but some shortcomings persist (Annex IV). Since the last consultation, the authorities have improved the quality of real sector data. Improvements include regular quarterly GDP data, gold sector data reconciliation, updated fiscal statistics, and better price coverage. While national accounts are being rebased, gaps in artisanal mining data remain, requiring further monitoring and surveys. External sector data suffer from lags, poor trade data quality, large revisions, and gaps in informal trade and remittances. Ongoing technical assistance addresses these shortcomings. Monetary and financial statistics, including financial soundness indicators and banking data, face delays that hinder macro-financial surveillance. The authorities have included a proposed SB on publishing the rebased GDP series on their webpage for the seventh ECF review (end-December 2026).

71. Capacity development to support program objectives remains critical. Targeted TA, including fiscal resilience, PFM, revenue mobilization, and statistics, will be crucial, particularly for fiscal consolidation and RSF program implementation (Annex V). The authorities have also expressed interest in ICD and FAD support for natural resource revenue projections, management, and on other CD topics.

STAFF APPRAISAL

72. The economy faces a large negative impact from the triple shock due to the war in the Middle East, insurgent terrorism in Mali, and a drop in humanitarian aid. The surge in fertilizer prices could lead to widespread food insecurity and an urgent financing gap of 0.5 percent of GDP. Staff expect real GDP growth to slow from 5.3 percent in 2025 to 3.6 percent in 2026, as agricultural output is expected to contract by 5.0 percent due to the combined petroleum and fertilizer shock. Inflation is projected to increase from -0.5 percent in 2025 to 4.2 percent in 2026. The current account balance is expected to swing from a surplus of 6.3 percent of GDP in 2025 to a deficit of 2.0 percent of GDP in 2026 due to higher oil and fertilizer import prices. The risk of external and overall public debt distress remains moderate.

73. Downside risks predominate. Security conditions remain fragile, with potential spillovers from escalating conflict in Mali. The outlook is vulnerable to lower gold prices, sustained oil price increases, and possible fertilizer shortages in the 2026/27 season, which could raise subsidy costs and require further cuts to capital spending. Regional debt pressures and rising inflation in WAEMU countries may tighten financing conditions. Higher global interest rates could add to these pressures. Weaker private credit would weigh on investment and non-mining growth. Natural disasters also pose risks to infrastructure and external and fiscal balances. Beyond the near term, there is a good chance that the outlook will improve as the government is expected to implement resolute policies to entrench fiscal consolidation gains, support human capital development, and address infrastructure gaps, which will be critical to unlocking the medium-term growth potential.

74. Fiscal policy remains anchored by the WAEMU deficit target. Commendable budget discipline enabled a decisive reduction in the fiscal deficit from 5.8 percent of GDP in 2024 to 1.8 percent of GDP in 2025, which helped entrench sustainability and created welcome buffers. However, amid the surge in fertilizer and energy prices triggered by the war in the Middle East, it was appropriate to postpone the convergence to the WAEMU deficit criterion of 3.0 percent of GDP until 2028 and relax the 2026 fiscal deficit objective from 3.5 percent of GDP (projected at the fourth ECF review) to 4.0 percent of GDP. This partial accommodation is accompanied by an adjustment of about 1.2 percent of GDP to mitigate the total fiscal impact of higher fertilizer and energy prices estimated at 1.7 percent of GDP. To this end, the authorities will allow for the partial passthrough of energy prices, press on with domestic revenue mobilization, and advance the mining tax reform. On the expenditure side, they intend to increase poverty-reducing interventions, tighten wage bill control and optimize borrowing costs via proactive domestic debt management.

75. Program performance under the ECF and RSF arrangements has been strong. All end-December 2025 QPCs, continuous QPCs, structural benchmarks, and all but two ITs were met. All end-March ITs, except for the IT on domestic arrears, which was breached by less than 0.1 percent of GDP, have been met. The authorities achieved key structural benchmarks on public procurement, wage bill control, and tax administration integrity. Seven out of eleven GDA priority recommendations have been implemented and three have been partially implemented. The remaining reform commitments, building on the GDA recommendations and the authorities' action plan are proposed to become SBs for the sixth and seventh ECF reviews. Staff encourage continued efforts not only on the action plan but also the broader anti-corruption agenda. This will support the efficient use of public resources, the restoration of donors' trust, the catalyzing of concessional financing, and growth over the long term. The two initial reform measures under the RSF, foundational for the medium-term resilience agenda, were implemented.

76. Reforms to foster inclusive growth, deepen financial development, and strengthen climate resilience remain critical to raising medium-term growth and reducing vulnerabilities. Staff welcome progress on the universal health insurance scheme, the Single Social Registry, and the PAMPV, which should improve the targeting of social spending while supporting household resilience. Staff encourage efforts to deepen financial inclusion, particularly through digital finance, microfinance frameworks, and financial literacy, and to support private sector development. Continued implementation of the RSF-supported reform agenda, including disaster risk financing, climate-proofing public investment, resilient utilities, and climate data, will be essential to reduce macro-critical climate risks and catalyze investment.

77. Staff support the authorities' request for augmentation of access under the ECF arrangement and the related request for modification of the performance criterion. The augmentation in the amount of SDR 60.2 million (50 percent of quota) would cover 50 percent of the financing gap of 0.5 percent of GDP and the related additional BoP need created by the sharp increase in fertilizer prices. The rest is assumed to be covered by the World Bank and the AfDB. Standard safeguards would ensure sound governance and transparency in procurement.

78. Given the authorities' achievements on reforms and strong program performance, staff support the completion of the fifth review under the ECF arrangement, the first review under the RSF arrangement, and the Financing Assurances Review. The next Article IV consultation is expected to be held on the 24-month cycle in accordance with the Executive Board decision on consultation cycles for members with Fund arrangements.

Table 1. Burkina Faso: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2023–30

Population (2024): 23.5 million | Gini Index (2021): 37.4
Per capita GDP (2024): 982 USD | Life Expectancy (2021): 62 years
Share of population below the poverty line (2022): 43.7% | Literacy rate (2023): 41%

	2023	2024	2025	2025	2026	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
	Act.	Prel.	ECF 4th Review	Prel.	ECF 4th Review	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.
	(Annual percentage change, unless otherwise indicated)									
GDP and Prices										
GDP at constant prices	3.0	4.8	5.0	5.3	4.9	3.6	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8
GDP deflator	2.0	9.7	7.0	8.9	4.4	6.2	7.5	3.9	2.1	2.0
Consumer prices (annual average)	0.9	4.2	-0.5	-0.5	1.4	4.2	4.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Consumer prices (end of period)	1.0	4.9	-2.2	-2.2	2.9	5.8	3.7	2.0	2.0	2.0
Money and Credit										
Broad money (M3)	-3.0	7.2	5.9	18.3	9.6	9.5	9.4	8.2	8.5	7.0
Net domestic assets (banking system) 1/	5.3	0.4	0.7	-0.4	7.4	0.5	4.2	4.5	4.6	3.2
Credit to the government (banking system) 1/	3.0	3.7	1.7	7.0	3.0	2.5	2.5	2.0	1.3	1.2
Credit to private sector	5.9	-2.2	-2.8	-4.1	5.7	-3.7	2.8	4.8	6.5	4.3
Private sector credit/GDP	31.9	27.2	23.5	22.7	22.7	19.9	18.2	17.5	17.4	17.0
External Sector										
Exports (f.o.b.; valued in CFA francs)	-3.1	12.3	43.2	62.5	5.9	11.8	3.8	0.5	2.2	2.2
Imports (f.o.b.; valued in CFA francs)	-1.5	8.4	16.6	12.0	5.7	39.6	-0.5	2.7	5.6	5.8
Current account (percent of GDP)	-5.1	-3.5	1.1	6.3	0.8	-2.0	-1.1	-3.2	-2.4	-2.9
	(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)									
Central Government Finances										
Current revenue	20.8	20.7	21.4	22.5	19.9	19.9	20.2	20.5	20.7	20.8
Of which: Tax revenue	18.4	18.4	17.8	19.2	17.5	17.7	18.2	18.6	18.7	18.9
Total expenditure and net lending	29.3	27.8	26.1	25.4	24.6	25.0	24.6	24.6	24.8	24.9
Of which: Current expenditure	18.1	16.4	16.5	16.3	15.7	16.7	15.2	14.5	14.5	14.5
Overall fiscal balance, incl. grants (commitments)	-6.8	-5.8	-3.5	-1.8	-3.5	-4.0	-3.3	-3.0	-3.0	-3.0
Total public debt	56.8	57.2	52.1	53.4	51.2	52.8	50.3	49.0	48.6	48.3
Of which : External debt	26.2	25.5	21.3	23.9	20.5	23.6	22.4	21.3	21.2	21.2
Of which : Domestic debt	30.6	31.8	30.8	29.5	30.6	29.1	27.9	27.7	27.4	27.1
Memorandum Items:										
Nominal GDP (CFAF billion)	12,200	14,022	15,750	16,077	17,255	17,682	19,920	21,689	23,213	24,832
Nominal GDP per capita (US$)	874	982	1,127	1,149	1,250	1,290	1,417	1,504	1,573	1,645
Nominal exchange rate (CFAF/US$, period average)	606	606	580	581	560	556	558	559	559	559
Gold price (US$/troy ounce)	1,943	2,387	3,218	3,440	3,472	4,023	4,164	4,164	4,164	4,164
Oil price (US$/barrel)	81	79	69	68	66	129	91	74	74	74

Sources: Burkinabé authorities; IMF staff estimates and projections.

1/ Annual change in percent of beginning-of-period broad money.

Table 2. Burkina Faso: Balance of Payments, 2023–30

	2023	2024	2025	2026	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
	Act.	Prel.	Prel.	ECF 4th Review	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.
	(CFAF billions, unless otherwise indicated)								
Current Account	-617.0	-488.5	1,015.6	130.3	-351.6	-215.2	-688.2	-557.6	-720.1
Trade balance	-56.7	64.2	1,890.0	1,103.3	1,009.4	1,284.0	1,167.7	1,002.4	807.0
Exports of goods	3,209.1	3,602.9	5,854.6	5,462.6	6,544.0	6,792.2	6,827.0	6,976.6	7,127.7
Of which: Cotton	153.9	203.4	142.8	159.4	138.7	156.3	164.7	172.6	179.5
Of which: Gold	2,409.2	2,965.2	5,322.2	4,911.2	6,020.9	6,246.3	6,263.3	6,391.9	6,520.8
Imports of goods	-3,265.8	-3,538.7	-3,964.6	-4,359.2	-5,534.6	-5,508.3	-5,659.3	-5,974.3	-6,320.7
Of which: Oil	-710.2	-812.4	-823.8	-897.5	-1,852.1	-1,522.8	-1,394.3	-1,456.0	-1,522.3
Services, net	-502.7	-476.7	-546.6	-586.6	-642.9	-724.3	-788.6	-844.0	-902.8
Primary income, net	-544.4	-564.8	-663.2	-731.8	-1,063.5	-1,129.9	-1,417.6	-1,066.0	-980.5
Secondary income, net	486.9	488.8	335.4	345.4	345.3	355.0	350.2	350.0	356.3
Of which: Official transfers, net	269.0	269.0	134.5	134.5	134.5	134.5	134.5	134.5	134.5
Capital Account	262.6	237.6	229.4	274.3	256.2	278.8	298.4	315.2	333.0
Project grants	203.5	178.5	170.3	215.2	197.1	219.7	239.2	256.1	273.9
Financial Account	609.7	561.0	-389.3	-409.5	627.9	237.0	609.8	521.6	688.1
Direct investment	39.0	224.9	268.8	183.1	333.1	253.8	223.9	260.9	268.1
Portfolio investment	299.5	171.3	30.2	144.9	181.4	174.6	168.9	167.9	163.9
Other investment	271.1	164.8	-688.3	-737.5	113.5	-191.3	217.0	92.8	256.1
Commercial banks	555.9	-47.6	40.0	-58.5	-38.9	-41.8	-43.4	-45.2	-47.0
General government	158.1	185.9	211.7	148.1	274.6	205.0	179.1	342.8	379.8
Project loans	295.1	292.2	346.6	364.4	373.7	356.5	337.5	500.4	535.3
Of which: WB (CERP and other agricultural projects)	-	-	-	-	36.2	-	-	-	-
Program loans	0.0	29.1	47.1	72.8	75.3	26.4	18.0	18.0	18.0
Of which: AfDB (Crisis Response Facility)	-	-	-	-	10.0	-	-	-	-
Amortization of public loans (excl. IMF)	-136.9	-135.4	-182.1	-289.1	-174.5	-177.9	-176.4	-175.7	-173.6
Other private	-442.9	26.4	-939.9	-827.2	-122.2	-354.5	81.3	-204.8	-76.7
Errors and Omissions	(4.40)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Overall Balance	250.8	310.0	855.8	-4.9	532.5	300.6	219.9	279.1	301.0
Net change in foreign assets of the central bank	-250.8	-310.0	-855.8	4.9	-532.5	-300.6	-219.9	-279.1	-301.0
Of which: IMF net financing	-56.7	-26.0	5.4	-21.6	-67.3	-14.5	34.6	46.4	37.4
Disbursements (past and prospective)	68.2	38.8	18.9	55.7	101.4	46.3	-	-	-
of which IMF augmentation	-	-	-	-	46.1	-	-	-	-
Repayments (excluding charges)	-11.5	-12.7	-24.3	-34.0	-34.1	-31.8	-34.6	-46.4	-37.4
Of which: SDR allocation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Residual Financing Gap	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RSF disbursement	-	-	-	19.0	18.8	50.5	-	-	-
	(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)								
Memorandum Items:									
Exports of goods	26.3	25.7	36.4	31.7	37.0	34.1	31.5	30.1	28.7
Imports of goods	-26.8	-25.2	-24.7	-25.3	-31.3	-27.7	-26.1	-25.7	-25.5
Trade balance (goods)	-0.5	0.5	11.8	6.4	5.7	6.4	5.4	4.3	3.2
Trade balance (services)	-4.1	-3.4	-3.4	-3.4	-3.6	-3.6	-3.6	-3.6	-3.6
Trade balance (goods and services)	-4.6	-2.9	8.4	3.0	2.1	2.8	1.7	0.7	-0.4
Current account (– = deficit)	-5.1	-3.5	6.3	0.8	-2.0	-1.1	-3.2	-2.4	-2.9
GDP at current prices (CFAF billions)	12,199.7	14,021.6	16,077.1	17,254.6	17,681.8	19,920.1	21,689.2	23,213.0	24,831.6
BCEAO Reserves (without RSF financing)									
In billion USD	15.6	22.3	39.3	32.4	45.7	49.8	53.6	57.8	62.8
In months of next year's WAEMU imports	3.5	4.6	7.0	5.6	7.3	7.6	7.8	7.9	8.1
In percent of broad money	20.0	26.2	37.6	28.8	37.1	35.9	34.4	33.2	32.2
Total RSF disbursements (CFAF billions)	-	-	-	19.0	18.8	50.5	-	-	-

Sources: Burkinabè authorities; BCEAO; IMF staff estimates and projections.

Table 3a. Burkina Faso: Consolidated Operations of the Central Government, 2023–30

(CFAF billions)

	2023	2024	2025	2025	2026	2026	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
	Act.	Prel.	ECF 4th Review	Prel.	ECF 4th Review	Initial Budget	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.
Total Revenue and Grants	**2,746.9**	**3,083.4**	**3,551.2**	**3,787.7**	**3,645.4**	**3,624.3**	**3,714.4**	**4,236.5**	**4,687.2**	**5,052.1**	**5,442.0**
Total revenue	2,543.4	2,904.9	3,363.4	3,617.4	3,430.1	3,409.3	3,517.3	4,016.8	4,447.9	4,796.1	5,168.1
Tax revenue	2,246.0	2,575.8	2,801.6	3,090.3	3,011.4	3,046.0	3,128.3	3,628.3	4,025.0	4,343.4	4,683.8
Of which: Gold Mining CIT	139.0	126.4	206.5	209.5	221.0	...	291.1	296.2	300.6	306.8	313.0
Nontax revenue	297.4	329.1	561.7	527.0	418.7	363.3	389.0	388.4	422.9	452.7	484.2
Of which: Royalties from gold	68.7	98.8	148.8	162.8	157.2	119.3	199.6	206.6	213.0	217.3	221.7
Grants	203.5	178.5	187.8	170.3	215.2	215.0	197.1	219.7	239.2	256.1	273.9
Project	203.5	178.5	187.8	170.3	215.2	215.0	197.1	219.7	239.2	256.1	273.9
Program	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Expenditure and Net Lending 1/	**3,578.6**	**3,899.9**	**4,108.7**	**4,076.4**	**4,249.3**	**4,111.1**	**4,421.6**	**4,893.9**	**5,337.9**	**5,748.5**	**6,186.9**
Current expenditure	2,211.5	2,301.4	2,598.7	2,620.1	2,704.2	2,622.0	2,949.3	3,029.6	3,140.4	3,354.6	3,593.8
Wages and salaries	1,096.9	1,170.8	1,274.6	1,272.8	1,342.0	1,342.0	1,342.0	1,399.1	1,458.6	1,520.6	1,639.3
Goods and services	221.3	313.4	361.5	348.9	343.4	343.5	360.4	398.4	433.8	464.3	496.6
Interest payments	290.4	310.5	346.9	359.5	379.6	389.6	372.4	392.8	430.6	476.9	503.6
Domestic	247.0	263.2	307.0	304.8	342.3	326.0	326.0	345.1	383.8	431.9	455.2
External	43.5	47.2	39.9	54.7	37.3	63.7	46.4	47.7	46.8	45.0	48.4
Current transfers	602.8	506.7	615.7	638.9	639.2	547.0	874.5	839.4	817.4	892.9	954.3
Of which: Fertilizer subsidies	-	-	-	-	-	...	92.2	46.1	-	-	-
Of which: Energy subsidies 2/	189.3	120.4	176.0	192.4	178.0	76.0	307.4	178.2	195.0	206.0	205.2
Investment expenditure	1,378.5	1,600.3	1,510.0	1,411.2	1,545.0	1,496.3	1,472.4	1,864.3	2,197.5	2,393.9	2,593.1
Domestically financed	880.0	1,129.6	1,034.4	894.2	965.4	1,015.9	901.6	1,288.0	1,620.8	1,637.4	1,783.8
Externally financed	498.6	470.7	475.6	517.0	579.6	480.3	570.8	576.3	576.7	756.5	809.3
Net lending	-11.5	-1.8	-	45.1	-	-7.2	-	-	-	-	-
Overall Balance 1/	**-831.7**	**-816.5**	**-557.6**	**-288.7**	**-603.9**	**-486.8**	**-707.3**	**-657.4**	**-650.7**	**-696.4**	**-744.9**
Financing	**867.6**	**841.6**	**557.6**	**285.9**	**603.9**	**477.4**	**707.3**	**657.4**	**650.7**	**696.4**	**744.9**
Foreign financing	158.1	185.9	160.2	211.7	148.1	85.9	274.6	205.0	179.1	342.8	379.8
Drawings	295.1	321.3	328.3	393.8	437.2	338.2	449.0	382.9	355.5	518.4	553.3
Project loans	295.1	292.2	287.8	346.6	364.4	265.3	373.7	356.5	337.5	500.4	535.3
Of which: World Bank (CERP and other agricultural projects)	-	-	-	-	-	-	36.2	-	-	-	-
Program loans	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other loans 3/	-	29.1	40.6	47.1	72.8	72.9	75.3	26.4	18.0	18.0	18.0
Of which: African Development Bank (Crisis Response Facility)	-	-	-	-	-	-	10.0	-	-	-	-
Amortization (excl. IMF)	-136.9	-135.4	-168.2	-182.1	-289.1	-252.3	-174.5	-177.9	-176.4	-175.7	-173.6
Domestic financing	709.5	655.7	397.4	74.3	455.8	391.5	432.7	452.3	471.5	353.6	365.2
Bank financing	584.8	496.1	311.0	244.1	281.2	92.1	227.4	293.0	284.4	213.6	220.4
Central bank	114.6	-30.0	-5.4	49.4	21.6	57.3	67.3	14.5	-34.6	-46.4	-37.4
Of which: IMF net financing	56.7	26.0	-5.4	-5.4	21.6	57.3	67.3	14.5	-34.6	-46.4	-37.4
Disbursements	68.2	38.8	18.9	18.9	55.7	91.4	101.4	46.3	-	-	-
Of which: IMF augmentation	-	-	-	-	-	-	46.1	-	-	-	-
Repayments	-11.5	-12.7	-24.2	-24.3	-34.0	-34.1	-34.1	-31.8	-34.6	-46.4	-37.4
RSF disbursement (total)	-	-	-	-	19.0	-	18.8	50.5	-	-	-
Commercial banks	470.2	526.7	316.3	194.7	259.6	34.7	160.1	278.5	319.0	260.0	257.8
Nonbank financing 4/	124.7	159.5	86.4	-169.9	174.6	299.5	205.3	159.3	187.2	140.0	144.7
Errors and omissions	-35.9	-25.1	-	2.8	-	9.3	-	-	-	-	-
Financing Gap	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**
Memorandum Items:											
Mining revenue 5/	354.2	371.7	684.1	678.3	570	**...**	776.0	793.1	797.1	813.4	829.8
Overall Balance excl. mining revenue	-1,186.0	-1,188.2	-1,241.7	-967.0	-1,284.6	**...**	-1,483.3	-1,450.5	-1,447.7	-1,509.8	-1,574.8
Primary Fiscal balance (including grants)	-541.3	-506.1	-210.6	70.8	-224.3	-97.1	-334.9	-264.6	-220.0	-219.5	-241.4

Sources: Burkinabè authorities; IMF staff estimates and projections.

Note: "..." represent an unknown value.

1/ Commitment basis (base d'engagement).

2/ Energy subsidies consist of subsidies for purchases of heavy fuel oil and distillate diesel oil by SONABEL for electricity production and of butane gas by households for cooking and lighting.

3/ Other loans include the new IDA financing modality and financing from OPEC.

4/ Nonbank financing represents (i) the treasury float, (ii) balance changes of Treasury accounts outside the banking system, (iii) revenues from the Patriotic Support Fund in 2023, (iv) the repayment of arrears, and (v) other net advances, including securities placed outside the domestic banking system.

5/ Mining VAT is reimbursed. Previous versions included gross instead of net VAT revenue (with the latter being zero).

Table 3b. Burkina Faso: Consolidated Operations of the Central Government, 2023–30

(in percentage of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

	2023	2024	2025	2025	2026	2026	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
	Act.	Prel.	ECF 4th Review	Prel.	ECF 4th Review	Initial Budget	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.
Total Revenue and Grants	**22.5**	**22.0**	**22.5**	**23.6**	**21.1**	**20.5**	**21.0**	**21.3**	**21.6**	**21.8**	**21.9**
Total revenue	20.8	20.7	21.4	22.5	19.9	19.3	19.9	20.2	20.5	20.7	20.8
Tax revenue	18.4	18.4	17.8	19.2	17.5	17.2	17.7	18.2	18.6	18.7	18.9
Of which: Gold Mining CIT	1.1	0.9	1.3	1.3	1.3	…	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.3
Nontax revenue	2.4	2.3	3.6	3.3	2.4	2.1	2.2	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Of which: Royalties from gold	0.6	0.7	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.7	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9
Grants	1.7	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1
Project	1.7	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1
Program	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Expenditure and Net Lending 1/	**29.3**	**27.8**	**26.1**	**25.4**	**24.6**	**23.3**	**25.0**	**24.6**	**24.6**	**24.8**	**24.9**
Current expenditure	18.1	16.4	16.5	16.3	15.7	14.8	16.7	15.2	14.5	14.5	14.5
Wages and salaries	9.0	8.4	8.1	7.9	7.8	7.6	7.6	7.0	6.7	6.6	6.6
Goods and services	1.8	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.0	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Interest payments	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.0
Domestic	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.8
External	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Current transfers	4.9	3.6	3.9	4.0	3.7	3.1	4.9	4.2	3.8	3.8	3.8
Of which: Fertilizer subsidies	-	-	-	-	-	…	0.5	0.2	-	-	-
Of which: Energy subsidies 2/	1.6	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.0	0.4	1.7	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8
Investment expenditure	11.3	11.4	9.6	8.8	9.0	8.5	8.3	9.4	10.1	10.3	10.4
Domestically financed	7.2	8.1	6.6	5.6	5.6	5.7	5.1	6.5	7.5	7.1	7.2
Externally financed	4.1	3.4	3.0	3.2	3.4	2.7	3.2	2.9	2.7	3.3	3.3
Net lending	-0.1	-0.0	-	0.3	-	-0.0	-	-	-	-	-
Overall Balance 1/	**-6.8**	**-5.8**	**-3.5**	**-1.8**	**-3.5**	**-2.8**	**-4.0**	**-3.3**	**-3.0**	**-3.0**	**-3.0**
Financing	**7.1**	**6.0**	**3.5**	**1.8**	**3.5**	**2.7**	**4.0**	**3.3**	**3.0**	**3.0**	**3.0**
Foreign financing	1.3	1.3	1.0	1.3	0.9	0.5	1.6	1.0	0.8	1.5	1.5
Drawings	2.4	2.3	2.1	2.4	2.5	1.9	2.5	1.9	1.6	2.2	2.2
Project loans	2.4	2.1	1.8	2.2	2.1	1.5	2.1	1.8	1.6	2.2	2.2
Of which: World Bank (CERP and other agricultural projects)	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.2	-	-	-	-
Program loans	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other loans 3/	-	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Of which: African Development Bank (Crisis Response Facility)	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	-	-	-
Amortization (excl. IMF)	-1.1	-1.0	-1.1	-1.1	-1.7	-1.4	-1.0	-0.9	-0.8	-0.8	-0.7
Domestic financing	5.8	4.7	2.5	0.5	2.6	2.2	2.4	2.3	2.2	1.5	1.5
Bank financing	4.8	3.5	2.0	1.5	1.6	0.5	1.3	1.5	1.3	0.9	0.9
Central bank	0.9	-0.2	-0.0	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.1	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2
Of which: IMF net financing	0.5	0.2	-0.0	-0.0	0.1	…	0.4	0.1	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2
Disbursements	0.6	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.2	-	-	-
Of which: IMF augmentation	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	-
Repayments	-0.1	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2
RSF disbursement (total)	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	0.1	0.3	-	-	-
Commercial banks	3.9	3.8	2.0	1.2	1.5	0.2	0.9	1.4	1.5	1.1	1.0
Nonbank financing 4/	1.0	1.1	0.5	-1.1	1.0	1.7	1.2	0.8	0.9	0.6	0.6
Other domestic financing	2.9	1.9	-1.1	-2.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Errors and omissions	-0.3	-0.2	-	0.0	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	-
Financing Gap	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**-**
Memorandum Items:											
Nominal GDP (CFAF billion)	12,199.7	14,021.6	15,750.3	16,077.1	17,254.6	17,681.8	17,681.8	19,920.1	21,689.2	23,213.0	24,831.6
Mining revenue 5/	2.9	2.7	4.3	4.2	3.3	…	4.4	4.0	3.7	3.5	3.3
Overall Balance excl. mining revenue	-9.7	-8.5	-7.9	-6.0	-7.4	…	-8.4	-7.3	-6.7	-6.5	-6.3
Wage bill to tax revenue ratio (percent) 6/	48.8	45.5	45.5	41.2	44.6	44.1	42.9	38.6	36.2	35.0	35.0
Primay fiscal balance (including grants)	-4.4	-3.6	-1.3	0.4	-1.3	-0.5	-1.9	-1.3	-1.0	-0.9	-1.0

Sources: Burkinabè authorities; IMF staff estimates and projections.

Note: "…" represent an unknown value.

1/ Commitment basis (base d'engagement).

2/ Energy subsidies consist of subsidies for purchases of heavy fuel oil and distillate diesel oil by SONABEL for electricity production and of butane gas by households for cooking and lighting.

3/ Other loans include the new IDA financing modality and financing from OPEC.

4/ Nonbank financing represents (i) the treasury float, (ii) balance changes of Treasury accounts outside the banking system, (iii) revenues from the Patriotic Support Fund in 2023, (iv) the repayment of arrears, and (v) other net advances, including securities placed outside the domestic banking system.

5/ Mining VAT is reimbursed. Previous versions included gross instead of net VAT revenue (with the latter being zero).

6/ Wage bill to tax revenue ratio in 2023 is adjusted to exclude Patriotic Support Fund (FSP) resources.

Table 4. Burkina Faso: Monetary Survey, 2023–30

	2023	2024	2025	2026	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
	Act.	Prel.	Prel.	ECF 4th Review	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.
	(CFAF billions, unless otherwise indicated)								
Net Foreign Assets	1,627.7	2,073.5	3,102.1	2,573.9	3,745.7	4,165.6	4,509.6	4,917.8	5,353.0
BCEAO 1/	-371.1	-61.1	794.6	319.8	1,327.1	1,627.7	1,847.7	2,126.8	2,427.8
Assets	524.2	910.5	1,630.3	1,380.9	2,243.9	2,618.6	2,835.4	3,134.0	3,472.2
Liabilities	895.4	971.6	835.7	1,061.1	916.8	990.9	987.8	1,007.2	1,044.4
Commercial banks	1,998.8	2,134.7	2,307.5	2,254.0	2,418.6	2,537.9	2,662.0	2,791.0	2,925.2
Net Domestic Assets	4,087.0	4,106.9	4,085.9	4,591.2	4,120.9	4,427.0	4,789.1	5,187.7	5,484.7
Domestic credit	4,771.3	4,956.1	5,085.3	5,413.1	5,116.5	5,422.5	5,784.7	6,183.3	6,480.3
Net Bank credit to government	450.0	646.2	1,041.2	919.4	1,204.6	1,386.2	1,543.0	1,652.6	1,769.9
BCEAO	206.3	178.3	120.9	105.9	188.2	202.7	168.1	121.8	84.3
Commercial banks	243.7	468.0	920.3	813.5	1,016.4	1,183.5	1,374.9	1,530.9	1,685.6
Credit to other sectors	4,321.2	4,309.8	4,044.1	4,493.7	3,911.9	4,036.3	4,241.7	4,530.7	4,710.4
Of which: Credit to private sector	3,893.0	3,807.9	3,652.6	3,912.8	3,517.5	3,617.1	3,790.5	4,035.4	4,210.1
Other items (net)	-228.5	-70.0	40.6	-97.2	36.8	36.8	36.8	36.8	36.8
Shares and other equities	912.8	919.2	958.8	919.2	958.8	958.8	958.8	958.8	958.8
Broad Money Liabilities	5,257.0	5,637.2	6,668.0	6,540.3	7,302.2	7,989.4	8,645.5	9,383.5	10,037.8
Narrow Money	3,182.8	3,452.6	4,306.7	3,983.4	4,716.3	5,160.1	5,583.9	6,060.5	6,483.1
Currency outside depository corporations	992.7	1,261.6	1,608.4	1,463.7	1,761.4	1,927.1	2,085.4	2,263.4	2,421.3
Transferable Deposits	2,190.2	2,191.0	2,698.2	2,519.7	2,954.9	3,232.9	3,498.5	3,797.1	4,061.9
Other Deposits	2,074.1	2,184.6	2,361.3	2,512.4	2,585.9	2,829.3	3,061.6	3,323.0	3,554.7
	(Annual percentage change, unless otherwise indicated)								
Memorandum Items:									
Net foreign assets	-17.6	27.4	49.6	6.7	20.7	11.2	8.3	9.1	8.9
Net domestic assets 2/	5.3	0.4	-0.4	7.4	0.5	4.2	4.5	4.6	3.2
Net credit to government 2/	3.0	3.7	7.0	3.0	2.5	2.5	2.0	1.3	1.2
Credit to Private Sector	5.9	-2.2	-4.1	5.7	-3.7	2.8	4.8	6.5	4.3
Private sector credit (percentage of GDP)	31.9	27.2	22.7	22.7	19.9	18.2	17.5	17.4	17.0
Money supply	-3.0	7.2	18.3	9.6	9.5	9.4	8.2	8.5	7.0
Velocity of money (GDP/M2) 3/	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.6	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5

Sources: Burkinabè authorities; IMF staff estimates and projections.

1/ Only includes current reserves in BCEAO Ouagadougou. It does not include all regional reserves.

2/ Annual change as a percentage of broad money from 12 months earlier.

3/ End-of-period average.

Table 5. Burkina Faso: Selected Financial Soundness Indicators, 2021–25
(in percent)

	Dec-21	Dec-22	Jun-23	Dec-23	Jun-24	Dec-24	Jun-25 [1]
Capital Adequacy							
Reg. capital to risk-weighted assets	13.68	14.08	14.66	14.28	15.57	14.64	15.17
Asset Quality							
Gross NPLs / Total loans	7.38	5.58	6.29	7.37	8.39	8.94	10.93
Provisions / NPLs	71.39	80.16	72.40	68.12	64.65	65.36	59.37
Loan Concentration							
5 largest clients / equity	66.84	82.67	91.03	68.44	80.19	76.05	68.11
By Sector: (share of total)							
Agriculture	2.30	2.40	2.44	2.02	2.79	1.65	2.57
Extractive Industries	4.29	6.31	6.38	5.80	5.69	6.61	5.18
Manufacturing	11.23	11.22	11.29	11.73	11.56	10.71	9.48
Electricity, gas, water	2.83	2.11	2.13	2.27	1.99	1.99	2.92
Buildings/Public Works	16.06	12.41	12.49	11.08	9.55	10.81	9.79
Commercial (restaurants, hotels)	18.18	28.55	27.82	24.83	26.67	27.78	28.03
Transportation/communication	8.98	1.81	1.85	7.82	6.88	6.39	6.59
Insurance, real estate, business services	9.93	6.50	6.54	6.96	7.87	8.05	8.05
Other	26.19	28.70	29.06	27.48	27.00	26.01	27.4
Liquidity							
Loans to deposits	71.34	81.92	84.83	85.29	82.25	82.69	78.24
Liquid assets / total assets	18.67	21.23	22.43	22.92	21.72	21.54	20.98

Sources: Central bank (BCEAO) authorities; IMF staff estimates.

1/ June 2025 data are preliminary.

Table 6. Burkina Faso: External Financing Requirements, 2023–30

(CFAF billions)

	2023	2024	2025	2026	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
	Act.	Prel.	Prel.	ECF 4th Review	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.
Financing Need	**-528.2**	**-471.5**	**132.9**	**-825.9**	**-282.2**	**-468.2**	**-543.9**	**-676.2**	**-757.2**
Current account balance (excl. official transfers)	-886.0	-757.5	881.1	-4.2	-486.1	-349.7	-822.7	-692.1	-854.6
IMF repayments	-11.5	-12.7	-24.3	-34.0	-34.1	-31.8	-34.6	-46.4	-37.4
Private capital flows	506.2	434.1	-541.8	-498.6	412.5	91.1	489.8	237.9	308.3
Amortization of public loans (excl. IMF)	-136.9	-135.4	-182.1	-289.1	-174.5	-177.9	-176.4	-175.7	-173.6
Financing	**528.2**	**442.4**	**-198.9**	**697.4**	**105.5**	**395.6**	**525.9**	**658.2**	**680.1**
Project loans:	295.1	292.2	346.6	364.4	373.7	356.5	337.5	500.4	535.3
Of which: WB (CERP and other agricultural projects)					36.2				
Official transfers, net	269.0	269.0	134.5	134.5	134.5	134.5	134.5	134.5	134.5
Change in NFA central bank (excl. prospective IMF disbursements and repayments)	-307.5	-336.0	-850.4	-16.7	-599.8	-315.2	-185.3	-232.7	-263.6
Past IMF financing	68.2	38.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Project grants	203.5	178.5	170.3	215.2	197.1	219.7	239.2	256.1	273.9
Errors and Omissions	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Financing Gap	**-**	**36.9**	**66.0**	**128.5**	**176.7**	**72.6**	**18.0**	**18.0**	**77.1**
IMF Financing (prospective)	-	-	18.9	55.7	101.4	46.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Of which IMF augmentation	-	-	-	-	46.1	-	-	-	-
Other Donors (including IDA)	-	36.9	47.1	72.8	75.3	26.4	18.0	18.0	18.0
Of which: AfDB (Crisis Response Facility)	-	-	-	-	10.0	-	-	-	-
Residual Financing Gap (after IMF and Donor Financing)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RSF disbursement (not linked to RM BoP costs)	-	-	-	19.0	18.8	50.5	-	-	-
Memorandum items									
Total RSF disbursements	-	-	-	19.0	18.8	50.5	-	-	-

Sources: Burkinabè authorities; IMF staff estimates and projections.

Table 7a. Burkina Faso: Schedule of Disbursements and Phasing Under the Four- year ECF Arrangement, 2023–27

Amount	Percent of Quota	Availability Date	Conditions for Disbursement[1]
SDR 24.08 million	20.0	21-Sep-23	Executive Board Approval of a new arrangement under the Extended Credit Facility
SDR 24.08 million	20.0	31-Mar-24	Observance of continuous and end-December 2023 performance criteria, and completion of the first review under the arrangement
SDR 24.08 million	20.0	30-Sep-24	Observance of continuous and end-June 2024 performance criteria, and completion of the second review under the arrangement
SDR 24.08 million	20.0	31-Mar-25	Observance of continuous and end-December 2024 performance criteria, and completion of the third review under the arrangement
SDR 24.08 million	20.0	30-Sep-25	Observance of continuous and end-June 2025 performance criteria, and completion of the fourth review under the arrangement
SDR 24.08 million	20.0	31-Mar-26	Observance of continuous and end-December 2025 performance criteria, and completion of the fifth review under the arrangement
SDR 24.08 million	20.0	30-Sep-26	Observance of continuous and end-June 2026 performance criteria, and completion of the sixth review under the arrangement
SDR 30.10 million	25.0	31-Mar-27	Observance of continuous and end-December 2026 performance criteria, and completion of the seventh review under the arrangement
SDR 30.10 million	25.0	31-Aug-27	Observance of continuous and end-June 2027 performance criteria, and completion of the eighth review under the arrangement
Total			
SDR 228.76 million	190.0		

Sources: Burkinabè authorities; IMF staff estimates.

1/ In addition to the generally applicable conditions under the Extended Credit Facility.

Table 7b. Burkina Faso: Proposed Schedule of Disbursements and Phasing Under the Four-year ECF Arrangement with Proposed Augmentation, 2023–27

Amount	Percent of Quota	Availability Date	Conditions for Disbursement[1]
SDR 24.08 million	20.0	21-Sep-23	Executive Board Approval of a new arrangement under the Extended Credit Facility
SDR 24.08 million	20.0	31-Mar-24	Observance of continuous and end-December 2023 performance criteria, and completion of the first review under the arrangement
SDR 24.08 million	20.0	30-Sep-24	Observance of continuous and end-June 2024 performance criteria, and completion of the second review under the arrangement
SDR 24.08 million	20.0	31-Mar-25	Observance of continuous and end-December 2024 performance criteria, and completion of the third review under the arrangement
SDR 24.08 million	20.0	30-Sep-25	Observance of continuous and end-June 2025 performance criteria, and completion of the fourth review under the arrangement
SDR 60.20 million	50.0	31-Mar-26	Observance of continuous and end-December 2025 performance criteria, and completion of the fifth review under the arrangement
SDR 48.16 million	40.0	30-Sep-26	Observance of continuous and end-June 2026 performance criteria, and completion of the sixth review under the arrangement
SDR 30.10 million	25.0	31-Mar-27	Observance of continuous and end-December 2026 performance criteria, and completion of the seventh review under the arrangement
SDR 30.10 million	25.0	31-Aug-27	Observance of continuous and end-June 2027 performance criteria, and completion of the eighth review under the arrangement
Total			
SDR 288.96 million	240.0		

Sources: Burkinabè authorities; IMF staff estimates.

1/ In addition to the generally applicable conditions under the Extended Credit Facility.

Table 8. Burkina Faso: Schedule of Disbursements and Phasing Under the RSF Arrangement, 2026–27

Amount	Percent of Quota	Availability Date	Conditions for Disbursement
SDR 8.21 million	6.8	31-Mar-26	Implementation of reform measure 1.
SDR 8.21 million	6.8	31-Mar-26	Implementation of reform measure 10.
SDR 8.21 million	6.8	30-Sep-26	Implementation of reform measure 4.
SDR 8.21 million	6.8	31-Mar-27	Implementation of reform measure 2.
SDR 8.21 million	6.8	31-Mar-27	Implementation of reform measure 3.
SDR 8.21 million	6.8	31-Mar-27	Implementation of reform measure 5.
SDR 8.21 million	6.8	31-Mar-27	Implementation of reform measure 6.
SDR 8.21 million	6.8	31-Mar-27	Implementation of reform measure 8.
SDR 8.21 million	6.8	31-Aug-27	Implementation of reform measure 7.
SDR 8.21 million	6.8	31-Aug-27	Implementation of reform measure 9.
SDR 8.20 million	6.8	31-Aug-27	Implementation of reform measure 11.
Total			
SDR 90.30 million	75.0		

Sources: IMF staff estimates.

Table 9. Burkina Faso: Decomposition of Public Debt and Debt Service by Creditor, 2025–27

	Debt Stock (end of period)			Debt Service					
	2025			2025	2026	2027	2025	2026	2027
	(CFAF, billions)	*(Percent total debt)*	*(Percent GDP)*	*(CFAF billions)*			*(Percent GDP)*		
Total	**8,584.5**	**100**	**53.4**	**1,472.8**	**1,941.8**	**1,183.2**	**9.2**	**11.0**	**5.9**
External	**3,845.0**	**44.8**	**23.9**	**232.6**	**254.9**	**252.9**	**1.4**	**1.4**	**1.3**
Multilateral creditors 1/	*3,491.6*	*40.7*	*21.7*	*177.8*	*201.3*	*210.8*	*1.1*	*1.1*	*1.1*
IMF	354.1	4.1	2.2	24.6	37.4	35.0	0.2	0.2	0.2
World Bank	1,813.1	21.1	11.3	45.5	56.1	65.2	0.3	0.3	0.3
Other Multilaterals	1,324.4	15.4	8.2	107.7	107.8	110.6	0.7	0.6	0.6
Bilateral Creditors	*353.4*	*4.1*	*2.2*	*54.8*	*53.7*	*42.1*	*0.3*	*0.3*	*0.2*
Paris Club	148.4	1.7	0.9	16.9	19.8	15.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
o/w: France	135.6	1.6	0.8	13.4	19.1	14.4	0.1	0.1	0.1
Japan	3.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	-	0.0	-	-
Non-Paris Club	125.9	1.5	0.8	14.5	16.2	13.9	0.1	0.1	0.1
o/w: China	23.9	0.3	0.1	-	1.5	1.5	-	0.0	0.0
Kuwait	29.5	0.3	0.2	2.7	2.5	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Commercial creditors	79.2	0.9	0.5	23.5	17.7	13.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
Bank of China	24.2	0.3	0.2	5.0	4.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
International Business Bank of Togo	29.4	0.3	0.2	13.7	8.6	4.4	0.1	0.0	0.0
UniCredit Bank of Austria	3.7	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.1	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Société Générale Belgique (SGB)	21.8	0.3	0.1	3.8	4.0	3.8	0.0	0.0	0.0
Domestic	**4,739.5**	**55.2**	**29.5**	**1,240.2**	**1,686.9**	**930.3**	**7.7**	**9.5**	**4.7**
T-Bills	*429.9*	*5.0*	*2.7*	*308.0*	*503.2*	-	*1.9*	*2.8*	*0.0*
Bonds	*3,732.7*	*43.5*	*23.2*	*628.6*	*957.6*	*781.2*	*3.9*	*5.4*	*3.9*
Loans	*576.9*	*6.7*	*3.6*	*303.6*	*226.1*	*149.0*	*1.9*	*1.3*	*0.7*

Sources: IMF estimates and projections, based on data based on Burkinabe authorities, according to their classification of creditors. Debt coverage is the same as the DSA.

1/ Multilateral creditors" are simply institutions with more than one official shareholder and may not necessarily align with creditor classification under other IMF policies (e.g. Lending Into Arrears).

Table 10. Burkina Faso: Indicators of Capacity to Repay the IMF, 2026–46

	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035	2036	2037	2038	2039	2040	2041	2042	2043	2044	2045	2046
	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.
Fund Obligations (Debt Service) Based on Existing Credit (millions of SDRs)																					
Principal	42.2	39.4	40.9	52.4	44.5	33.7	36.1	30.1	16.9	7.2	2.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Charges and interest	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Fund Obligations (Debt Service) Based on Existing and Prospective Credit (millions of SDRs)																					
Principal	42.2	39.4	40.9	52.4	44.5	39.7	60.8	63.8	50.6	40.9	30.9	13.5	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	8.2
PRGT	42.2	39.4	40.9	52.4	44.5	39.7	60.8	63.8	50.6	40.9	30.1	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
RSF	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	4.5	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	8.2
Charges and interest	0.1	1.2	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.6	1.4	1.2	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.2
Fund Obligations (Debt Service) Based on Existing and Prospective Credit																					
Millions of SDRs	42.3	40.6	43.0	54.4	46.6	41.8	62.8	65.8	52.6	43.0	33.0	15.5	10.9	10.7	10.5	10.3	10.1	9.9	9.7	9.5	8.4
Millions of U.S. dollars	58.2	56.0	59.3	75.2	64.5	57.9	87.1	91.3	73.0	59.6	45.7	21.6	15.1	14.8	14.5	14.2	14.0	13.7	13.4	13.1	11.7
Percent of exports of goods and services	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Percent of total public debt service 1/	2.6	2.9	2.0	2.4	1.9	1.5	2.1	2.3	1.7	1.3	0.9	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1
Percent of GDP	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Percent of gross international reserves	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
Percent of quota	35.1	33.7	35.7	45.2	38.7	34.7	52.2	54.7	43.7	35.7	27.4	12.9	9.0	8.9	8.7	8.5	8.4	8.2	8.0	7.9	7.0
Principal	35.0	32.7	34.0	43.5	37.0	33.0	50.5	53.0	42.0	34.0	25.7	11.3	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	6.8
PRGT	35.0	32.7	34.0	43.5	37.0	33.0	50.5	53.0	42.0	34.0	25.0	7.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
RSF	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	3.8	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	6.8
Fund Credit Outstanding (Debt Stock) Based on Existing and Prospective Credit																					
Millions of SDRs	436.7	523.1	482.2	429.8	385.3	345.5	284.7	220.9	170.4	129.4	98.5	85.0	75.9	66.9	57.9	48.8	39.8	30.8	21.8	12.7	4.5
PRGT	412.1	432.8	391.9	339.5	295.0	255.2	194.4	130.6	80.1	39.1	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
RSF	24.6	90.3	90.3	90.3	90.3	90.3	90.3	90.3	90.3	90.3	89.5	85.0	75.9	66.9	57.9	48.8	39.8	30.8	21.8	12.7	4.5
Millions of U.S. dollars	600.8	721.0	665.5	593.9	533.3	479.3	394.9	306.4	236.3	179.5	136.6	117.8	105.3	92.8	80.3	67.7	55.2	42.7	30.2	17.6	6.3
Percent of exports of goods and services	4.7	5.4	5.0	4.3	3.8	3.2	2.5	1.8	1.3	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
Percent of total public debt service 1/	26.6	37.3	22.8	19.1	15.9	12.3	9.6	7.6	5.5	4.0	2.8	2.3	1.9	1.6	1.3	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.1
Percent of GDP	1.9	2.0	1.7	1.4	1.2	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Percent of gross international reserves	9.0	9.8	8.3	6.8	5.6	4.7	3.6	2.6	1.9	1.4	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0
Percent of quota	362.7	434.5	400.5	357.0	320.0	287.0	236.5	183.5	141.5	107.5	81.8	70.6	63.1	55.6	48.1	40.6	33.1	25.6	18.1	10.6	3.8
PRGT	342.2	359.5	325.5	282.0	245.0	212.0	161.5	108.5	66.5	32.5	7.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
RSF	20.5	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	74.3	70.6	63.1	55.6	48.1	40.6	33.1	25.6	18.1	10.6	3.8
Net Use of Fund Credit (millions of SDRs)	114.9	86.4	-40.9	-52.4	-44.5	-39.7	-60.8	-63.8	-50.6	-40.9	-30.9	-13.5	-9.0	-9.0	-9.0	-9.0	-9.0	-9.0	-9.0	-9.0	-8.2
Disbursements and purchases	157.1	125.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Repayments and repurchases	42.2	39.4	40.9	52.4	44.5	39.7	60.8	63.8	50.6	40.9	30.9	13.5	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	9.0	8.2
Memorandum Items:																					
Exports of goods and services (millions of U.S. dollars)	12,746.1	13,286.0	13,410.0	13,754.6	14,111.8	14,946.7	15,827.3	16,761.6	17,752.9	18,804.8	19,921.1	21,105.7	22,363.0	23,697.5	25,114.1	26,617.9	28,214.4	29,909.4	31,709.1	33,620.2	34,669.1
Total public debt service (millions of U.S. dollars)	2,259.6	1,934.0	2,917.9	3,102.6	3,349.2	3,910.0	4,104.8	4,054.4	4,332.0	4,505.6	4,839.4	5,161.8	5,433.6	5,856.5	6,224.5	6,611.5	7,077.8	7,494.1	8,041.8	8,576.8	9,142.6
Gross International Reserves (millions of U.S. dollars)	6,650.9	7,385.9	7,978.1	8,699.8	9,471.8	10,172.1	10,895.3	11,627.3	12,362.7	13,116.9	13,914.3	14,763.3	15,664.9	16,622.7	17,640.8	18,887.0	20,038.3	21,263.5	22,567.6	23,956.4	25,436.0
Nominal GDP (millions of U.S. dollars)	31,786.8	35,728.1	38,795.8	41,499.5	44,386.3	47,437.9	50,800.6	54,414.1	58,297.9	62,473.1	66,962.4	71,790.5	76,984.0	82,571.8	88,585.1	95,057.4	102,025.4	109,528.4	117,609.1	126,313.7	135,692.3
Quota (millions of SDRs)	120.4	120.4	120.4	120.4	120.4	120.4	120.4	120.4	120.4	120.4	120.4	120.4	120.4	120.4	120.4	120.4	120.4	120.4	120.4	120.4	120.4

Source: IMF staff calculations.

1/ Total external debt service includes IMF repurchases and repayments.

Table 11. Burkina Faso: Summary Table of Actual External Borrowing Monitor, January–December 2025

PPG External Debt	Volume of New Debt in 2025 1/		PV of New Debt in 2025 (Program Purposes) 1/	
	USD million	Percent	USD million	Percent
Sources of Debt Financing	**1074.3**	**100.0**	**531.7**	**100.0**
Concessional Debt, of which 2/	**848.3**	**79.0**	**339.7**	**63.9**
Multilateral debt	828.7	77.1	328.5	61.8
Bilateral debt	19.6	1.8	11.2	2.1
Other	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Non-Concessional Debt, of which 3/	**226.0**	**21.0**	**192.0**	**36.1**
Semi-concessional	226.0	21.0	192.0	36.1
Commercial terms 4/	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
By Creditor Type	**1074.3**	**100.0**	**531.7**	**100.0**
Multilateral	1054.7	98.2	520.5	97.9
Bilateral - Paris Club	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bilateral - Non-Paris Club	19.6	1.8	11.2	2.1
Other	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Uses of Debt Financing	**1074.3**	**100.0**	**531.7**	**100.0**
Infrastructure	700.2	65.2	381.0	71.7
Social Spending	166.6	15.5	62.9	11.8
Budget Financing	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other	207.5	19.3	87.8	16.5
Memorandum Items:				
Indicative Projections 5/				
2026	**655.5**		**415.8**	
2027	**749.3**		**475.3**	

Source: Burkinabè authorities and IMF Staff Calculations

Note: No collateralized debt was contracted.

1/ Contracting and guaranteeing of new debt. The present value of debt is calculated using the terms of individual loans and applying the 5 percent program discount rate.

2/ Debt with a grant element that exceeds a minimum threshold. This minimum is typically 35 percent, but could be established at a higher level.

3/ Debt with a positive grant element which does not meet the minimum grant element.

4/ Debt without a positive grant element. For commercial debt, the present value would be defined as the nominal/face value.

5/ IMF staff estimates.

Table 12. Burkina Faso: Timeline of Reform Measures Under the RSF

	1st RSF / 5th ECF Review (March 2026)	2nd RSF / 6th ECF Review (September 2026)	3rd RSF / 7th ECF Review (March 2027)	4th RSF / 8th ECF Review (August 2027)
Pillar 1: **Strengthen Fiscal Transparency and Resilience**	**RM1 (Disaster risk finance strategy).** The MEF and the MAHSN (SP CONASUR) in collaboration with other relevant agencies will draft, adopt by ministerial order, and publish on their website a National Disaster Risk Finance Strategy, with an implementation plan including actions to strengthen agricultural resilience.		**RM2 (Fiscal data on disaster impacts).** The MEF and the MAHSN (SP CONASUR) in collaboration with other relevant agencies will establish and maintain a database tracking the fiscal costs of climate-related disaster response. A summary of the database will be published in the climate chapter of the Fiscal Risks Statement. The database will initially be populated with at least two past disaster events. **RM3 (Fiscal Risk Statement).** Starting with the 2027 budget, the MEF will prepare and include in the published fiscal risk statement (FRS) annexed to the budget a quantitative assessment of medium-term fiscal risks related to natural disasters.	
Pillar 2: **Resilient Public Investment**		**RM4 (Integrate climate into PIM guide).** The MEF & MEEA issue a joint ministerial order providing mandatory and explicit guidelines on taking climate considerations into account in the appraisal and selection of major infrastructure projects, in line with C-PIMA recommendations.	**RM5 (Integrate climate into PIM guide).** Following integration of the guidelines, at least three major infrastructure projects with climate exposure will be appraised under the revised process, receive a notice of compliance from CNV, and be selected by CTA for inclusion in the PIP. **RM6 (Integrate climate into asset maintenance).** The MEF, in collaboration with DGAIE, the Ministry of Infrastructure and the MATM, develops and adopts a methodology for assessing maintenance needs and costs in at least three ministries with climate-exposed projects, and integrates climate risk considerations into the methodology, in line with C-PIMA recommendations.	**RM7 (Integrate climate into asset maintenance).** Apply the adopted methodology in three pilot ministries with major infrastructure projects exposed to climate risks.
Pillar 3: **Resilient Utilities Provision and Management**			**RM8 (Expand storage of renewable energy).** The MEF, in collaboration with the MEMC and ARSE, will publish the 2027 budget with a revised package of fiscal incentives for renewable energy projects, with a focus on integrated storage.	**RM9 (Water SOE Reform).** Produce an evaluation report by ASCE-LC confirming that the accounting, financial, and administrative weaknesses identified in the 2023 Annual General Activity Report (RAGA) concerning ONEA have been corrected, in order to strengthen the company's financial sustainability and institutional governance.
Pillar 4: **Climate Data and Finance**	**RM10 (Strengthen Hazard Data).** The MEF and the MATM adopt a ministerial order mandating the publication of hazard and climate risk maps developed by government entities on the MATM website including the requirement for continuous disclosure.			**RM11 (Climate Finance).** The MEEA, the MEF and other relevant agencies to: (i) adopt and implement a ministerial order extending the measuring, reporting, and verification (MRV) system to allow, in coordination with the National Institute of Statistics and Demography (INSD) and other relevant entities, the collection of data on climate investments from government agencies and non-financial private companies; and (ii) create a centralized national database of climate mitigation and adaptation projects as of end-2025 and in line with the country's updated NDC, where data may be made available to interested stakeholders.

Legend:	
	Completed
	Delayed
	Future Reviews

Figure 1. Burkina Faso: Capacity to Repay Indicators Compared to UCT Arrangements for PRGT Countries

(in percent of the indicated variable)

A. Total Fund Credit Outstanding



B. Total Debt Service to the Fund



C. Largest Peaks



Notes:

1) T = date of arrangement approval. PPG = public and publicly guaranteed.
2) Red lines/bars indicate the CtR indicator for the arrangement of interest.
3) The median, interquartile range, and comparator bars reflect arrangements (including blends) approved for PRGT countries between 2014 and 2024.
4) The comparator group "All PRGT" excludes arrangements that never had a UCT between 2014 and 2024.
5) PRGT countries in the control group with multiple arrangements are entered as separate events in the database.
6) Comparator series is for PRGT arrangements only and runs up to T+10.
7) Debt service obligations to the Fund reflect prospective payments, including for the current year.
8) In the case of blenders, the red lines/ bars refer to PRGT+GRA. In the case of RST, the red lines/ bars refer to PRGT+GRA+RST.
9) International reserves are proxied by imputed reserves as measured by net foreign assets.

Annex I. Burkina Faso: Status of Key 2024 Article IV Consultation Recommendations

Recommendation	Status
Fiscal consolidation. Gradual consolidation has been deemed necessary to create fiscal space for priority spending, to reduce borrowing costs, improve primary balances, and preserve debt sustainability.	The authorities made exceptional progress in this area with a fiscal adjustment of 4.0 ppts between 2024 and 2025, while increasing social spending, reducing borrowing costs, and preserving debt sustainability.
Domestic revenue mobilization. Key reforms included (i) taking steps to broaden the tax base and strengthen tax auditing; (ii) further strengthening the interconnectivity between the tax and customs directorates (DGI and DGD) IT systems and data matching; (iii) strengthening customs goods valuation and combating fraud; and (iv) scaling-up efforts to digitalize tax and customs procedures.	The authorities were successful in their reforms to improve domestic revenue mobilization, raising total revenues from 20.8 percent of GDP in 2023 to 22.5 percent of GDP in 2025. This was based on a broad set of reforms by the DGI, DGD and DGTCP, including the reforms (i)-(iv).
Rationalization and control of current expenditure. Recommended reforms focused on the control of wage bill growth, the rationalization of government operating costs, and reducing current transfers, especially energy subsidies.	Reform outcomes are positive but need to be sustained. Consequent wage bill reforms reduced public wages from 9.0 percent of GDP in 2023 to 8.1 percent in 2025, while current transfers declined from 4.9 percent of GDP in 2023 to 4.0 percent in 2025. Energy subsidies also fell from 1.6 percent of GDP to 1.2 percent, while transportation fuel consumption became effectively taxed in 2025 (plus-values). However, recent energy price increases risk a rebound in energy subsidies.
Higher resilience to macro-critical climate shocks and agricultural productivity. Recommendations included a focus on climate adaptation, the adoption of productivity-enhancing techniques in agriculture, building capacity among farmers, and strengthening agricultural policies.	The government has adopted and started to implement ambitious reforms within an RSF supported program to strengthen fiscal resilience to disasters, resilient public investment, and utilities, as well as climate data and finance. It has been very active in promoting agricultural productivity with a broad set of reforms, contributing to a strong harvest in 2025.
Prepare a new medium-term debt strategy. A robust MTDS was recommended as a key precondition to diversify external financing, in addition to significant capacity building, particularly in the middle-office analysis function.	Since the last Article IV Consultation, capacity in the Ministry of Finance's Debt Unit has been reinforced. In September 2025, the authorities published the new MTDS for 2026 – 2028. Interest rates have been reduced and maturities shortened.
Enhance public financial management. Staff recommended auditing the stock of domestic arrears and floating debts, enhancing public investment prioritization, selection, and efficiency, as well as making further progress on the rollout of the TSA.	The authorities have made ample progress on PFM reforms. Among a broad set of reforms, they have audited arrears and floating debts, developed an arrears clearance strategy, and reduced them to almost zero. They have also advanced the operationalization of the TSA. The advancement of public investment prioritization is still outstanding to staff knowledge.
Improve fiscal governance and transparency. Staff noted that a governance diagnostics assessment (GDA would assess the severity of corruption and identify governance weaknesses associated with corruption vulnerabilities in six key state functions.	While the authorities have not published the GDA report, they have developed and published their own governance strategy document including an action plan to implement all eleven GDA priority recommendations. Seven have already been implemented, three are partially implemented, and the remaining reform commitments are proposed to become SBs for the sixth and seventh ECF reviews.

Annex II. Risk Assessment Matrix (February 2026)[1]

Source of Risks	Likelihood	Expected Impact if Realized	Possible Policy Response
External			
Geopolitical Tensions	**High**	**High**	
Rising geopolitical tensions, and a weakening of multilateralism, raise the risk of an escalation in military conflicts, accompanied by damage to key physical and financial infrastructure, disruptions in major transit routes and supply chains, higher migration pressures, additional financial frictions, and market volatility.		Drop in investments from increased uncertainty and lower FDI. Higher food and energy prices.	Reaffirm commitment to multilateralism. Increased diplomatic activity to prevent conflicts and develop bilateral partnerships. Sectoral reforms to stimulate investments. Rationalize food and energy price subsidies.
Protectionism and Trade Disruptions	**High**	**Medium**	
Tariff and nontariff measures disrupt global supply chains, weighing on activity while increasing inflation. Trade diversion triggers broader protectionism.		Drop in export volume and investments from lower global demand and FDI. Deterioration in the fiscal balance from subsidies on energy and food prices.	Sectoral reforms to stimulate investment. Rationalize food and energy price subsidies. Seek concessional financing.
Commodity Price Volatility	**Medium**	**High**	
Supply and demand imbalances—triggered by geopolitical tensions, coordinated production decisions, shifts in investor preferences, or structural changes in demand—fuel commodity price swings, amplifying external and fiscal pressures, social unrest, and macro instability.		Higher oil prices deteriorate the fiscal and external balances as well as real GDP growth.	Activate the fuel price mechanism to reduce subsidies to preserve fiscal space. Pursue energy sector reforms.
Disorderly AI Correction	**High**	**High**	
An abrupt revision in expectations of strong AI-led productivity gains causes a sharp market correction, investment decline, and wealth loss, which suppress demand and tighten financial conditions globally.		Higher interest rates for sovereign debt, less fiscal space for priority spending.	Fiscal consolidation to create fiscal space. Lengthen maturities of sovereign debt. Seek concessional emergency financing.
Fiscal Vulnerabilities and Higher Long-Term Interest Rates	**High**	**High**	
Higher public debt and deficit levels put further upward pressure on long-term interest rates, sharply tightening global financial conditions, amplifying currency volatility, and reducing consumption and investment that exacerbate adverse debt dynamics. Disruptions are amplified by increased role of price-sensitive investors and leveraged NBFIs in sovereign debt markets, limited market absorption capacity when NBFIs offload debt securities, higher roll-over needs on shorter sovereign debt maturities, and strong sovereign-financial nexus. Concurrently, capital outflows from emerging and developing economies elicit a sharp increase in short-term rates.		Lower public investments and social spendings, higher unemployment, lower production, fiscal balance deterioration.	Fiscal consolidation to create fiscal space. Reform financial sector. Seek concessional emergency financing.

[1] The Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) shows events that could materially alter the baseline path. The relative likelihood is the staff's subjective assessment of the risks surrounding the baseline ("low" is meant to indicate a probability below 10 percent, "medium" a probability between 10 and 30 percent, and "high" a probability between 30 and 50 percent). The RAM reflects staff views on the source of risks and overall level of concern as of the time of discussions with the authorities. Non-mutually exclusive risks may interact and materialize jointly. The conjunctural shocks and scenarios highlight risks that may materialize over a shorter horizon (between 12 to 18 months) given the current baseline. Structural risks are those that are likely to remain salient over a longer horizon.

Source of Risks	Likelihood	Expected Impact if Realized	Possible Policy Response
Decline in International Support	**High**	**High**	
A further sharp reduction in international financial assistance, including development aid and humanitarian support, could severely affect low-income and fragile countries. Such an additional aid withdrawal would strain public finances, worsen current accounts, increase debt vulnerabilities, and lead to a further deterioration in living conditions and food security.		Increase in food insecurity and deterioration of health and education outcomes.	Sectoral and governance reforms to attract private investments. Improve social safety nets for targeted social spendings.
New Trade Agreements	**Low**	**High**	
Tangible progress in trade talks reduces uncertainty and trade barriers. Wider cooperation on services, FDI, and taxation boosts investment and bolsters public finances.		Reduced uncertainty could push downward gold price.	Reforms to diversify exports.
Extreme Climate Events	**High**	**High**	
Extreme climate events and rising temperatures could cause loss of life, damage to infrastructure, food insecurity, supply disruptions, and heighten economic and financial instability		Lower agricultural output and exports; food insecurity and rising energy prices; rising poverty and internally displaced people.	Re-prioritize spending to address food emergencies; seek concessional financing to invest in infrastructure to enhance resilience to climate-related shocks.
Deterioration of security situation in region	**Medium**	**High**	
Intensification of terrorist attacks in neighboring countries could spill over to Burkina Faso, generating social discontent, more insecurity, and political instability.		Regional trade disruption and pressures to increase security spending.	Promote security, strengthen social safety nets, and facilitate job creation in the private sector. Create fiscal space by accelerating revenue mobilization reforms and reprioritizing non-priority spending.
Regional financial sector spillovers	**Medium**	**Medium**	
Public debt pressures in the region could affect the regional debt market and exposed domestic banks.		Reduced liquidity in public debt markets, tightening of financing conditions, and an increase in debt service. Profitability, liquidity, and solvency issues for fragile banks.	Strengthen banks' capital and liquidity buffer, proactive monetary policy response.

Source of Risks	Likelihood	Expected Impact if Realized	Possible Policy Response
		Domestic	
Security Disruptions	**High**	**High**	
Intensification of terrorist attacks generates social discontent and political instability.		Adverse impact on activity, revenues, and FDI; risk of higher fiscal deficits and financing needs.	Re-prioritize spending to address social emergencies; implement social and financial inclusion; seek support from the international community.
Spending Pressures	**High**	**High**	
Pressures on higher spending on energy, fertilizers, public sector wages, subsidies, and security.		Crowding out of investment spending; pressures on fiscal deficit targets and prices.	Contain the wage bill by pursuing civil service reform; reform energy subsidies; step up revenue mobilization.
Rollover and Interest Rate Risks	**Medium**	**High**	
Higher interest rates, lack of regional bond market access		Pressures on fiscal deficit targets and prices; accumulation of domestic arrears.	Accelerate fiscal adjustment, prioritize spending, seek concessional financial support from bilateral/multilateral partners.
Insufficient Revenue Collection	**Medium**	**High**	
Delays in revenue mobilization.		Reduced fiscal space and risk of higher fiscal deficits and financing needs.	Pursuing tax policy reforms, optimizing current spending, and re-prioritizing public investment, identifying contingencies to facilitate course correction.
Loss of Public Trust in Reforms	**Medium**	**High**	
Reforms lead to social discontent and political instability.		Negative impact on capacity to pursue reforms.	Clear communication and early engagement in fostering public trust in reforms.

Annex III. External Sector Assessment

Final 2025 current account data are not available at time of writing. All 2025 figures quoted in this ESA are based on staff estimates. The latest available actuals are for 2023.

Overall Assessment: *The external position of Burkina Faso in 2025 was substantially stronger than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. The current account balance in 2025 increased sharply compared to 2024, reflecting strong gold exports after the historical surge in global gold prices. Both industrial and artisanal/semi-mechanized gold production increased in 2024, and further in 2025, leading to high export volumes amid historically high prices.*

Despite the high level of gold price forecasts for 2026 and 2027, the current account balance is expected to turn to a deficit amid the higher import prices for petroleum products and fertilizers. Cotton exports are expected to stabilize in 2026 and 2027 despite lower cotton prices. Over the medium term, unless gold prices stay at historically elevated levels, the current account balance is likely to gradually align with its fundamental medium-term trajectory. The adjustment will occur as gold and cotton production and exports grow, supported by an anticipated improvement in the security environment, sustained fiscal discipline, and the structural reforms.

Potential Policy Responses: *Since the substantially strong position is largely due to the temporary improvement in terms of trade in 2025, maintaining on-track fiscal consolidation is still warranted. Sustaining the current fiscal discipline is needed to anchor fiscal balances and control debt accumulation, which provides the government with a margin of maneuver to resist headwinds from the Middle East war, including significant commodity price corrections. Continuing to avoid excessive increases in the wage bill and careful discipline in spending—particularly, capital spending—will support the fiscal consolidation trajectory while providing space for priority spending on social security and poverty alleviation. Governance reforms and structural policies support private sector growth, facilitate export growth, and import substitution while encouraging foreign investments.*

Foreign Assets and Liabilities: Position and Trajectory

Background. The assessment of the net international investment position is based on the latest data available from 2023. The NIIP was –42.84 percent of GDP in 2023, consolidating the increase in the negative position over the past three years from -31.9 percent of GDP in 2020 and –39.0 percent of GDP in 2022. This reflects accumulated current account deficits, driven mainly by the rapid increase in total imports from 2020 (26.8 percent of GDP), which persisted until 2023 (34 percent of GDP). The rising deficit in the NIIP reflects growth of gross liabilities towards the rest of the world that outpaced growth of gross assets.

Assessment. BFA’s net international investment position is assessed as sustainable under the baseline. The negative NIIP is driven partly by external debt (around 24 percent of GDP in 2023), as well as other flows to finance the current account deficit. BFA’s external public debt is financed almost entirely by official creditors, and risks stem from slower than projected fiscal consolidation, reduced donor support, a further deterioration in the terms of trade, and a slowdown in real GDP growth. Liabilities on the financial account include both direct and portfolio investment flows. BFA’s external debt is assessed as sustainable, and at medium risk of debt distress as part of the 2026 DSA.

Data for 2023 (% GDP)	NIIP: -42.8	Gross Assets: 66.3	Debt Assets: 25.3	Gross Liab.: 109.1	Debt Liab.: 31.9

Current Account

Background. The 2025 current account surplus reached 6.3 percent of GDP, which is much larger than its historical average. Current account movements have been volatile in the last five years, with surpluses in

2020–21 reflecting high gold prices, shadowed by large deficits in 2022-2024, following the deterioration in the security situation and therefore weak gold production and export volumes. During 2025, the persistent increase in gold prices and the stabilization of the oil price led the external sector to a stronger position than envisioned.

For 2026 and beyond, the current account is anticipated to turn to a deficit, driven by the increased imports bill of petroleum products, but partly compensated by the increased artisan and semi-mechanized gold mining operations, and a gold price that remains higher than historical levels. New industrial mining operations, such as the *Kiaka* mine, will also contribute to increased gold production and exports. Investment income repatriation is expected to increase, as profits materialize in the mining industry. In line with the full implementation of the IMF programs, continued fiscal discipline, governance, and structural reforms are expected to progress. This is additionally supported by an improvement in the security situation.

Assessment. The current account gap is estimated at 10.0 percent of GDP. This calculation adjusts the current account for the business cycle, terms-of-trade and fiscal adjustments, and the ongoing security situation. This allows the comparison of the adjusted current account balance with a current account norm, namely, the current account for BFA that would be expected based on country fundamentals and if policies are adjusted to their desirable stance at home and abroad. As a result, the external position of the country in 2025 is assessed as substantially stronger than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.

Burkina Faso: EBA-Lite Model Estimates 2025
(Percent of GDP)

	CA model 1/	**REER model** 1/
	(in percent of GDP)	
CA-Actual	**6.3**	
Cyclical contributions (from model) (-)	1.6	
Natural disasters and conflicts (-)	0.4	
Adjusted CA	**4.3**	
CA Norm (from model) 2/	**-5.7**	
Adjusted CA Norm	**-5.7**	
CA Gap	**10.0**	**0.1**
o/w Relative policy gap	1.0	
Elasticity	-0.2	
REER Gap (in percent)	**-47.2**	**-0.5**

1/ Based on the EBA-lite 3.0 methodology
2/ Cyclically adjusted, including multilateral consistency adjustments.

Real Exchange Rate

Background. BFA is part of the WAEMU currency union, with the CFA franc pegged to the euro. The country's real effective exchange rate (REER) appreciated in 2025, driven by the strengthening of the Euro against third countries' currencies. The REER started appreciating gradually and consistently starting in 2020, with a 2024 average REER around 7 percent higher than its level in 2020.

Assessment. Consistent with the highly positive current account gap of 10.0 percent of GDP, the EBA-Lite Current Account model suggests a REER undervaluation of 47.2 percent at end-2025. Staff assesses this is largely a result of the rise in the price of gold, which is BFA's main export commodity, accounting for more than 80 of total exports.

Capital and Financial Accounts: Flows and Policy Measures

Background. BFA does not have access to external financial markets; therefore, capital, and financial account flows overwhelmingly comprise funding from donors and official creditors, bond issuances on the WAEMU regional financial market, and foreign direct investment.

BFA's capital and financial account had net outflows of 1.3 percent of GDP in 2025. The main sources of official funding include project grants and loans of 3.3 percent of GDP. Portfolio investment inflows of around 4 percent of GDP reflect sovereign bond issuances on the WAEMU regional financial market. The outlook for 2026 remains uncertain, and capital and financial net outflows are expected to increase, after the strengthening external position of the country. Uncertainty about support from key international organizations creates risks for BoP inflows. Amid global geopolitical and financial uncertainty, and a further deterioration in Burkina Faso's security situation, financing conditions on the regional financial market may slow convergence with WAEMU regional financing terms. BFA's ability to raise funds on the regional market may still be limited by liquidity constraints and uncertainty.

Assessment. Regional financing conditions eased in 2025, but external conditions tightened in March 2026 amid rising geopolitical tensions. These developments could pose additional challenges for Burkina Faso's financing environment. Fund credit and concessional donor support will be essential to meet Burkina Faso's substantial financing needs. Continuing fiscal consolidation efforts will help reduce borrowing needs over the medium term.

FX Intervention and Reserves Level

Background. WAEMU's pooled reserves are expected to rebound sharply for the second year, rising from US$16.0 billion in 2023 (equivalent to 3.5 months of prospective imports) to US$40.8 billion in 2025 (7.4 months of prospective imports). The 2025 buildup reflects the lowest deficit in the trade balance in more than a decade, driven also by favorable terms of trade and the ramp-up in hydrocarbon production in Niger and Senegal. As a share of prospective imports, reserves are projected to decline smoothly over the medium term, as net external inflows moderate amid a reduction in external indebtedness. Burkina Faso's stock of net foreign assets has been positive since 2024, and foreign assets increased over the course of 2024 and 2025 while foreign liabilities were stable. Hence, Burkina Faso has been a positive contributor to WAEMU reserves in 2025.

Assessment. The ARA credit-constrained approach estimates the range for reserve adequate levels at 5.0 to 7.1 months of prospective import coverage for the WAEMU, considering 2024 data. The estimated adequate level represents an increase in comparison with the previous year (0.6 increase for the lower value and 0.7 for the upper value), as holding the same levels of reserves in terms of months of prospective imports is now less costly in GDP terms. The level of reserves observed in 2025 (7.4 months of imports) is above these levels, and medium-term projections (5.9 months of prospective imports by 2030) are above the lower level. Growth-friendly fiscal consolidation, appropriate monetary policy, and implementation of structural reforms will be key to sustaining reserves at adequate levels going forward.

Annex IV. Data Issues

Table 1. Burkina Faso: Data Adequacy Assessment for Surveillance

Data Adequacy Assessment Rating[1]							
C							
Questionnaire Results[2]							
Assessment	National Accounts	Prices	Government Finance Statistics	External Sector Statistics	Monetary and Financial Statistics	Intersectoral Consistency	Median Rating
	B	A	B	C	C	C	C
Detailed Questionnaire Results							
Data Quality Characteristics							
Coverage	B	A	B	C	C		
Granularity[3]	B		B	C	C		
			A		C		
Consistency			B	C		C	
Frequency and Timeliness	C	A	C	D	C		

Note: When the questionnaire does not include a question on a specific dimension of data quality for a sector, the corresponding cell is blank.
[1]The overall data adequacy assessment is based on staff's assessment of the adequacy of the country's data for conducting analysis and formulating policy advice, and takes into consideration country-specific characteristics.
[2]The overall questionnaire assessment and the assessments for individual sectors reported in the heatmap are based on a standardized questionnaire and scoring system (see IMF *Review of the Framework for Data Adequacy Assessment for Surveillance*, January 2024, Appendix I).
[3]The top cell for "Granularity" of Government Finance Statistics shows staff's assessment of the granularity of the reported government operations data, while the bottom cell shows that of public debt statistics. The top cell for "Granularity" of Monetary and Financial Statistics shows staff's assessment of the granularity of the reported Monetary and Financial Statistics data, while the bottom cell shows that of the Financial Soundness indicators.

A	The data provided to the Fund are adequate for surveillance.
B	The data provided to the Fund have some shortcomings but are broadly adequate for surveillance.
C	The data provided to the Fund have some shortcomings that somewhat hamper surveillance.
D	The data provided to the Fund have serious shortcomings that significantly hamper surveillance.

Rationale for staff assessment. Staff assesses that the provision of real sector data (national accounts and prices) to the Fund, despite some shortcomings, is broadly adequate for surveillance purposes but lacks enough specifics for the artisanal gold mining sector. Regarding government finance statistics, the authorities report revenue, expenditure, and financing data in the GFSM 2001/2014 format to STA for the budgetary central government only. They are compiled monthly but published quarterly. The program is still based on GFSM 1984 format, and the authorities provide that data. Monetary and financial statistics are compiled monthly but are released with lags which sometimes can be long, as in the case of FSIs which are released only twice a year. In addition, to facilitate macro-financial surveillance, the authorities should also release banking sector balance sheet data on a monthly basis and there is limited visibility on cross-border banking sector vulnerabilities. Frequency and timeliness of the external sector statistics (ESS) is still a major concern, as annual outturns are received with around two years lag, while the monthly trade data shared with IMF staff are of low quality (subject to large fluctuations and revisions). Trade and current account estimates are subject to often large revisions of historical data. Informal cross-border trade in goods is not estimated and could be large. Information on remittances should be improved. Consistency between balance of payments (BOP) and international investment position (IIP) should be checked. External debt statistics as reported to QEDS cover only public debt. Under the JSA-funded project, sustained TA on external sector statistics has been provided with a view to improving the quality and scope of data produced as well as their frequency.

Changes since the last Article IV consultation The authorities have successfully built capacity to rebase their national accounts periodically (typically every five years). The authorities have continued to make progress in improving the consistency of gold production data across the real sector, the balance of payments, and customs records. Efforts to strengthen information sharing and reconcile administrative sources—notably through a recent committee dedicated to drawing production data, export declarations, and trade statistics—have helped narrow previously observed discrepancies. However, gaps remain, particularly for artisanal and semi-mechanized mining, and it will be important to continue

monitoring progress toward more coherent data on gold sector activity. They have made progress in compiling fiscal statistics using the 2014 Government Finance Statistics Manual and in making fiscal data more consistent. They also share detailed data on mining revenue with staff. For prices statistics, improvements since last IV consultation include updating CPI weights, expanding the collection of prices to five areas, and expanding coverage to include the expenditure of these five areas (include capital and four other areas).
Corrective actions and capacity development priorities Areas for improvement include the extension of TOFE GFSM 1986 coverage to the general government. The authorities are already doing this for their TOFE based GFSM 2014. However, the program is still using the TOFE based on GFSM 1986, the question is whether the authorities can translate their available data in this GFSM 1986 format. Recommendations to improve ESS quality include: (1) compile and disseminate quarterly BOP and IIP; (2) prepare EDS consistent to the IIP and submit these data to the WB QEDS; (3) improve statistical techniques to better use of data sources (for instance, custom data, international transactions reporting system (ITRS), and non-monetary gold data sources); and (4) improve methodologies for the estimation of freight expenses and construction services. Efforts are still needed to strengthen human and IT resources, which are essential for the effective implementation of the recommendations provided by the TA missions.
Use of data and/or estimates in Article IV consultations in lieu of official statistics available to staff. We used satellite data to estimate artisanal gold mining output.
Other data gaps. Data related to labor market (formal and informal sectors), income and gender inequality are not available.

Table 2. Burkina Faso: Data Standards Initiatives

Burkina Faso participates in the Enhanced General Data Dissemination System (e-GDDS) and publishes the data on its National Summary Data Page since December 2018.

Table 3. Burkina Faso: Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance

As of June 01, 2026

	Data Provision to the Fund				Publication under the Data Standards Initiatives through the National Summary Data Page			
	Date of Latest Observation	Date Received	Frequency of Data[7]	Frequency of Reporting[7]	Expected Frequency[7,8]	Announced Frequency[9]	Expected Timeliness[7,8]	Announced Timeliness[9]
Exchange Rates			NA	NA	D	M	...	2M
International Reserve Assets and Reserve Liabilities of the Monetary Authorities[1]			NA	NA	M	M	1W	1M
Reserve/Base Money	2026-03	2026-05	M	M	M	M	2W	2M
Broad Money	2026-03	2026-05	M	M	M	M	1M	2M
Central Bank Balance Sheet	2026-03	2026-05	M	M	M	M	2W	2M
Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Banking System	2026-03	2026-05	M	M	M	M	1M	2M
Total assets of other depository corporations[2]	2026-02	2026-05	M	M	M	M	1M	2M
Total credit from other depository corporations[2]	2026-02	2026-05	M	M	M	M	1M	2M
Interest Rates[3]	2026-02-27	2026-05-04	M	M	D	M	...	2M
Consumer Price Index	2026-04	2026-05	M	M	M	M	1M	2M
Revenue, Expenditure, Balance and Composition of Financing[4]-General Government[5]	2026-03	2026-05	Q	Q	A	...	2Q	...

Table 3. Burkina Faso: Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance (Continued)

As of June 01, 2026

	Data Provision to the Fund				Publication under the Data Standards Initiatives through the National Summary Data Page			
	Date of Latest Observation	Date Received	Frequency of Data[7]	Frequency of Reporting[7]	Expected Frequency[7,8]	Announced Frequency[9]	Expected Timeliness[7,8]	Announced Timeliness[9]
Revenue, Expenditure, Balance and Composition of Financing[4]-Central Government	2026-03	2026-05	Q	Q	M	A	1M	12M
Stocks of Central Government and Central Government-Guaranteed Debt[6]	2025-12	2026-03	A	SA	Q	Q	1Q	12M
Total stock of General Government Debt[5]	2025-12	2026-03	A	SA	Q	...	4M	...
External Current Account Balance	2024-12	2026-05	A	I	Q	A	1Q	12M
Exports and Imports of Goods and Services	2024-12	2026-05	A	I	M	A	8W	12M
GDP/GNP	2025-12	2026-04	Q	Q	Q	Q	1Q	1Q
Gross External Debt	2025-12	2026-03	A	SA	Q	Q	1Q	12M
International Investment Position	2024-12	2026-05	A	I	Q	A	1Q	12M

[1] Any reserve assets that are pledged or otherwise encumbered should be specified separately. Also, data should comprise short-term liabilities linked to a foreign currency but settled by other means as well as the notional values of financial derivatives to pay and to receive foreign currency, including those linked to a foreign currency but settled by other means.

[2] Other depository corporations include all deposit-taking corporations (except for the central bank) and money market funds.

[3] Both market-based and officially determined, including discount rates, money market rates, rates on treasury bills, notes and bonds.

[4] Foreign, domestic bank, and domestic non-bank financing.

[5] The general government consists of the central government (budgetary funds, extra-budgetary funds, and social security funds) and state and local governments. The total stock of general government debt is required for SDDS Plus countries and encouraged for SDDS and e-GDDS countries.

[6] Including currency and maturity composition.

[7] Frequency and timeliness: ("D") daily; ("W") weekly or with a lag of no more than one week after the reference date; ("M") monthly or with lag of no more than one month after the reference date; ("Q") quarterly or with lag of no more than one quarter after the reference date; ("A") annual; ("SA") semi-annual; ("I") irregular; ("NA") not available or not applicable; and ("NLT") not later than.

[8] Encouraged frequency of data and timeliness of reporting under the e-GDDS and required frequency of data and timeliness of reporting under the SDDS and SDDS Plus. Any flexibility options or transition plans used under the SDDS or SDDS Plus are not reflected. For those countries that do not participate in the IMF Data Standards Initiatives, the required frequency and timeliness under the SDDS are shown for New Zealand, and the encouraged frequency and timeliness under the e-GDDS are shown for Eritrea, Nauru, South Sudan, and Turkmenistan. Indicators that are not in the IMF Data Standards Initiatives are shown as "...".

[9] Based on the information from the Summary of Observance for SDDS and SDDS Plus participants, and the Summary of Dissemination Practices for e-GDDS participants, available from the IMF Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board (https://dsbb.imf.org/). For those countries that do not participate in the Data Standards Initiatives, as well as those that do have a National Data Summary Page, the entries are shown as "...".

Annex V. Capacity Development Strategy

Background

The authorities are intense users of Fund technical assistance (see Table 1 and Figure 1) and appreciate the support provided through AFRITAC-West, FAD, and STA missions.

Key Reform Priorities

1. **Macro-Fiscal Resilience:** CD will support reforms operationalizing a national disaster risk financing strategy (RM1), improving the systematic collection and publication of fiscal data on disaster impacts (RM2), and embedding quantitative climate shock analysis in the Fiscal Risks Statement (RM3) under the RSF. Further CD will support the use of fiscal incentives to scale up renewable energy investment, including storage, to reduce exposure to energy price and climate shocks (RM8).

2. **Revenue Mobilization:** CD will focus on (i) assisting with the continuation of tax administration reforms within the framework of the implementation of the post-TADAT action plan; (ii) developing a tax arrears/collection strategy, (iii) expanding data sources and improving data crosschecking for VAT and PAYE audit-planning purposes; (iv) strengthening the management and control of extractive industries; (v) improving customs goods valuation function; (vi) strengthening the regional transit and suspensive regimes monitoring and exemptions and controls; (vii) reinforcing selected aspects of tax policy, including transfer pricing controls and tax expenditures rationalization.

3. **Public Financial Management:** The reform agenda prioritizes support for the implementation of PFM RMs under the RSF, with a focus on strengthening climate fiscal risk analysis and climate sensitive PIM (RMs 4-7). Additional support will focus on treasury management and fiscal transparency.

4. **Debt Management:** In the area of debt management, the focus is on training in the use of the IMF LIC-DSF currently in discussion with the authorities, tentatively scheduled for June 2026.

5. **Statistics:** Support to BFA's National Institute of Statistics and Demography aims to consolidate the annual and quarterly national accounts following their recent rebasing. At the same time, support is being provided to extend the institutional coverage of the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) beyond the general government (GG) sector to include market state-owned enterprises (SOEs), based on the GFS Manual 2014 (GFSM 2014) methodology. Assistance is also being provided to improve the quality of public sector debt statistics for the budgetary central government (BCG) and to extend this coverage to SOEs. Finally, support will be provided to develop processes to coordinate data collection and understanding statistical standards which can be used for the MRV system (RM11).

Table 1. Burkina Faso: Completed Technical Assistance Activities by Fund Department, FY2023–2025

FY	Completed TA Activity	Department
2023	Tax and revenue mobilization	FAD
	Public financial management	FAD
	Cash management and TSA	FAD
	External Sector Statistics	STA
	Real sector - National accounts	STA
	Government finance	STA
2024	Tax and revenue mobilization	FAD
	Public financial management	FAD
	Cash management and TSA	FAD
	Debt management	MCM
	Real sector - National accounts	STA
	Government finance	STA
	Strategy standards and review	STA
2025	Tax and revenue mobilization	FAD
	Public financial management	FAD
	Cash management and TSA	FAD
	Fuel subsidies	FAD
	C-PIMA	FAD
	GDA	FAD
	Debt management	MCM
	Investor relations	MCM
	Real sector - National accounts	STA
	Government finance	STA

Figure 1. Burkina Faso: Overview of CD Spending

CD spending over time



CD Spending by Sector



Main workstreams in FY26



FY26 CD delivery by department



FY26 CD spending between AFR FCS (Fragile and Conflict-Affected States) and non-FCS countries



FY26 CD projects and spending across WAEMU countries



Source: IMF staff calculations based on CDMAP data
Notes: 1) Years denote fiscal years. 2) Data for FY22 to FY25 is actual data, data for FY26 - FY28 is based on planned activities in CDMAP as of April 2026. 3) Only projects in the stages "Approval", "Execution" and "Complete" are included. 4) Number of CD projects is distinct count of Project IDs. 5) Average spending includes all single country spending in AFR divided by 45. 6) Sector was defined by CD departments. 6) Under groups, spending directed to countries belonging to that group is included. Spending directed towards regional bodies (such as WAEMU is always excluded).

Annex VI. The Gold Mining Boom and Fiscal Policy[1]

Gold has become macro-critical for Burkina Faso; however, major data gaps—especially on artisanal production—obscure the extent of its importance in terms of output, the balance of payments, income for the population, and the government's revenue potential. While industrial gold production has declined, artisanal mining appears to have expanded. Gold-related fiscal revenues, supported by high prices and the 2024 mining reform, have risen, contributing to the improvement in the fiscal position. At the same time, exposure to gold-price volatility has also increased, carrying a risk of revenue shocks necessitating frequent fiscal policy adjustments. A countercyclical framework based on a minimum stock of net liquid financial assets relative to annual mining revenues can cushion the budget from gold price-induced revenue shocks.

Gold Output and Exports

1. **The mining sector is of strategic importance to Burkina Faso's economy.** Mining accounted for 21 percent of nominal GDP in 2025. As gold prices doubled between 2020 and 2025, gold's share of total exports rose to nearly 90 percent, up from 74 percent in 2022. Government and industry representatives report that industrial gold mining employs relatively few employees (around 23,000) directly. More importantly, an estimated 3 million people work in artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) out of the country's total population of 23.5 million, with another 2 million in the sector elsewhere in the wider region around Burkina Faso. Gold mining has also important domestic spillovers in terms of employment and income through the network of suppliers, providing goods and services for mining. It also is a source of bank liquidity of critical importance for financial intermediation, government debt carrying, and private and public investment. As of December 2025, fifteen industrial mines were operating, with ownership largely concentrated among Australian, UK, and Canadian companies, with the latter accounting for about half. The total number of ASM sites in the country is estimated to be between 1000 and 1500.

2. **Industrial gold production declined from a peak of 66.9 tons in 2021 to 51.5 tons in 2025 (Figure 1).** Part of this decline likely reflects reported higher operational costs for fuel, transportation, and security, with mining sites particularly exposed to terrorist activity. In addition, mines in Burkina Faso generally have lower gold yields and lower reserves compared to other countries in the region, further increasing production costs. Regulatory and tax reforms introduced since 2024[2] aimed at boosting state revenue and local community benefits through greater state involvement in the mining sector. These reforms may have also affected investment decisions and output by introducing temporary regulatory uncertainty for companies. The latter also cite

[1] Authors are David Coble, Colin Cook, Friederike Langowski, Martin Stuermer, Charles Vellutini, and Richard Wild.

[2] See Annex about the 2024 Mining Code Reform in [Burkina Faso: Second Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Financing Assurances Review-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Burkina Faso; IMF Country Report No. 25/81; December 5, 2024].

constraints on prospecting and delays in permit approvals as issues hampering investments and translating with a lag into a slowdown of industrial output and thus dampening the outlook.

Figure 1. Burkina Faso: Industrial and Artisanal and Small-Scale (ASM) Gold Production: 2016–2025; Projections for 2026–2029
(annual)



Source: Burkinabe Authorities, Fund Staff Calculations.

Note: Data provided by DGMG (Ministry of Mines and Geology), SONASP (National Precious Substances Company), and INSD (National Institute of Statistics and Demography).
1/ For 2015 - 2024: Difference between 30 tons and reported ASM production value; based on EITI report estimated 15 - 30 tons per year for Burkina Faso. For 2025 onward, assume ASM production quantity = reported industrial quantity.

3. **Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) gold production has likely grown over time, though data are discontinuous and unreliable.** Before the February 2024 ban on direct artisanal gold exports and the establishment of the state company SONASP (which has a monopoly in ASM gold exports), ASM data were not systematically collected. This creates a structural break in the data series starting in 2024, with reported ASM output rising sharply, especially in 2025. However, this increase may indicate that gold was already mined at a higher level in earlier years and only now does a notable share of this production enter the formal market through SONASP. Still, formalization, organization into cooperatives, legal protection, and increasing use of semi-mechanized excavation technology likely contributed to the increase additionally stimulated by the rising price of gold. Meanwhile, a significant volume of ASM gold continues to flow via informal channels from the Sahel to the Middle East for refining, complicating efforts to accurately measure total ASM production. Certain key production inputs, such as mercury, are also often imported informally, further obscuring the scale of ASM activity. There is a range of estimates for total ASM production (Figure 2):

- The Ministry of Mines (DGMG) reports under one ton per year between 2015 and 2023.

- For the mining value-added estimates in the National accounts, INSD (National Institute of Statistics and Demography) had been estimating ASM production growth by applying a constant growth rate assumption of 2.3 percent per year to the level of production from a 2017 survey, which was 9.5 tons in 2016 and thus grew to 11.4 tons in 2024.

- The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) provides an estimate of recent production between 15 to 30 tons annually.[3] Similarly, a 2018 OECD study estimated ASM gold production in Burkina Faso at between 20-25 metric tons per year by looking at mercury emissions.[4]

- Local industry contacts estimate that ASM gold production was around 10 tons annually as early as 2013. More recently, they consider it comparable to, or exceeding, industrial gold production, based on studies conducted in other countries in the region.

Figure 2. Burkina Faso: Artisanal Mining (ASM) Production Measures



Source: Burkinabe Authorities, Fund Staff Calculations.
Note: Data provided by DGMG (Ministry of Mines and Geology), SONASP (National Precious Substances Company), and INSD (National Institute of Statistics and Demography).

4. Unconventional data analysis of satellite imagery suggests that the footprint of existing industrial gold mining activity has remained stable since 2016. Given the gaps in traditional data on mining activity in Burkina Faso, spatial analysis can be used as a supplement by separating satellite imagery into mining and non-mining regions. Using the Sepin, Vashold and Kuschnig (2025) dataset, such analysis suggests that most mining in Burkina Faso occurs in the same locations year after year with some additional expansion but no significant growth trend in the aggregate mining area (Figure 3). However, this analysis has two key limitations: 1) it mostly tracks the development of known large mines and small mines in their vicinity, (2) it has difficulties in identifying mining sites that are imprecisely delineated in the ground like ASM. It will therefore be important for the authorities to continue their work on identifying mining sites with personnel on the ground through the ongoing mining survey.

[3] EITI Data Use Case: Burkina Faso: Quantifying illicit financial flows in mining.

[4] OECD: L'or à la croisée des chemins. Étude d'évaluation des chaînes d'approvisionnement en or produit au Burkina Faso, au Mali et au Niger..

Figure 3. Burkina Faso: Mining Activity Measured by Satellites



Source: Sepin, P., Vashold, L. & Kuschnig, N. Mapping mining areas in the tropics from 2016 to 2024. Nat Sustain 8, 1400–1407 (2025). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-025-01668-9.

5. **Investment in mining exploration permits has sharply declined from a peak of around 40 billion FCFA in 2021 despite the recent rise in gold prices.** According to the BFA *Chambre des Mines*, exploration of new mining sites in Burkina Faso has been sluggish for approximately a decade, and nearly all existing mines require renovation (Figure 4), reducing future production potential. The investment climate has been adversely affected by the operational challenges linked to terrorism and increased security expenditures as well as uncertainties surrounding the new regulatory mining framework. Notably, the 2024 mining code increased the government's free state participation in mining companies from 10 to 15 percent, with an option to buy a minimum additional 30 percent. Royalties have increased, and the state's mining holding company SOPAMIB is increasing its stake in mines such as Kiaka mine (see also discussion of mining code reform in Annex III of SR for 2nd ECF review). Some companies decided to withdraw, such as Semafo through its 2019 merger with Endeavour following a terrorist attack on a convoy near the Boungou mine, and Fortuna Mining's exit from BFA in April 2025. As a result, industrial production is expected to decline as shown in Figure 1, according to projections by the Ministry of Mines.

Figure 4. Burkina Faso: Investments in Mining Exploration Permits and Gold Price



Source: Burkinabe Authorities, Fund Staff Calculations.

6. Production and export data are not aligned. Apart from the data challenges regarding ASM, production data also does not match export data (Figure 5), with the Ministry of Mining production numbers slightly below customs export data since 2023. While the gaps are not large, this highlights the importance of CD for improving BoP data. The authorities are also currently working on a note regarding data reconciliation between the two sources.

Figure 5. Burkina Faso: Total Production versus Total Exports (metric tons)



Source: Burkinabe Authorities, Fund Staff Calculations.
Note: Data provided by DGMG (Ministry of Mines and Geology), DGD (Customs).

Government Revenues from the Gold Mining Sector

7. The government publishes mining revenue data with great granularity. It provides rich, disaggregated monthly data, differentiating between mining revenue streams from 36 different tax and non-tax measures (Figure 6). This level of comprehensiveness is commendable and sets an example for other countries.

8. Mining revenues are raised through a multitude of tax and non-tax measures. The largest income is derived from royalties and corporate income taxes. While royalties are typically the largest revenue source from the extractive sector for oil-producing countries, they only represent roughly 21 percent of the revenue from gold in Burkina Faso. After the mining tax reform of 2024, dividends have become a major source of government revenue. Other revenues are derived from fuel customs duties, custom duties on equipment and other imports, and other smaller taxes and charges.[5] Overall, mining revenues represented 18.9 percent of all revenues and 4.2 percent of GDP in 2025, with the mining sector representing one of the largest sources of revenue for the budget.

[5] VAT revenues are refundable for registered exporters and therefore not shown in the figures.

Figure 6. Burkina Faso: Mining Revenues, 2014-2025
(Percentage of GDP)



Source: Burkinabe Authorities, Fund Staff Calculations.

9. **Government revenue has increased roughly in line with gold prices, with notable exceptions.** While the data indicate a generally positive relationship (higher prices tend to coincide with higher revenues), this relationship is neither linear nor even proportional. From 2021 to 2022 prices stayed constant, but revenue increased by about 26 percent. An opposite example occurred in 2024, when prices rose 23 percent, but revenue only rose marginally. In 2025 again, revenue increased by far more than prices. While royalties, which tax gross revenues, move directly in line with prices, other taxes, such as corporate profits or dividend payments to the state, are more complex and may only react with a lag. In addition to these complications, the mining tax reform of 2024 likely caused a structural break, but this is hard to judge given data limitations. Some of the high revenue streams in 2025 may be the result of deferred payments from 2024 when the mining tax reform was enacted over the year.

10. **Monthly mining revenue data show a strong cyclical or, on occasion, a one-off nature of some types of revenue (Figure 7).** Royalties and VAT revenue provide a steady and predictable stream of income over the year. Corporate and income tax revenue are highly cyclical, arriving at the treasury in quarterly installments and spiking in less predictable ways. Other non-tax revenues, mostly driven by dividend payments to the state, appear to represent the most unpredictable components. Other taxes, which include a tax on dividends, are similarly volatile, notably in 2025.

Figure 7. Burkina Faso: Monthly Mining Revenue, Jan 2018 – Sep 2025
(CFAF billions)



Source: Burkinabe Authorities, Fund Staff Calculations.

Towards a Countercyclical Management of Gold Mining Revenues

11. The overall fiscal balance has been less positively correlated with the gold price than gold mining revenues alone. Naturally, the correlation is smaller than for the gold mining revenues, as the gold mining revenues are only one of many contributors to the overall balance, which are likely not correlated to gold prices. Noteworthy periods, when the overall fiscal balance decoupled from gold prices include, for example, the years leading up to 2022. Lately, the gold price has increased sharply, while the fiscal balance has strengthened in a less pronounced way.

12. Burkina Faso's fiscal balance has been increasingly exposed to gold-price volatility. Comparing the overall fiscal balance to the non-mining balance shows the growing contribution of mining revenues. The difference between the two is the mining revenue in terms of GDP as shown in Figure 6. Although the difference may appear stable at first glance, it has risen significantly—from around 1 percent of GDP in 2010 to about 4.2 percent in 2025—pointing to a rising impact of mining-related income.

Figure 8. Burkina Faso: Fiscal Balance and Gold Price, 2009-2025



Source: Burkinabe Authorities, Fund Staff Calculations

13. To stabilize the fiscal balance and avoid a "stop-and-go" pattern in critical expenditures programs, the authorities could introduce a simple countercyclical fiscal framework. Given the growing macro-fiscal importance of gold revenues and their high volatility, Burkina Faso could benefit from a countercyclical fiscal framework that better insulates expenditure policy from gold price fluctuations. The framework would remain anchored in debt sustainability and the WAEMU fiscal deficit norm of 3.0 percent of GDP, while using conservative gold-revenue projections and saving a part of revenue windfalls in a treasury-managed stabilization buffer. Withdrawals would be limited to address clearly defined adverse shocks, including declines in gold revenues or increases in oil import costs, and be accompanied by a medium-term convergence path to baseline spending.

14. Such a framework could involve a simple fiscal anchor to ensure a minimum stock of net liquid financial assets relative to annual mining revenues.[6] Under such an approach, revenue overperformance relative to the budget baseline would only be partially spent, with the remainder saved in a stabilization buffer that could be drawn down in the event of adverse commodity price shocks. Illustrative simulations suggest that such a mechanism can materially smooth expenditure over the commodity price cycle, allowing temporary revenue shortfalls to be absorbed without abrupt fiscal adjustment, while avoiding excessive expenditure expansion during booms (see Table 1). Compared with more sophisticated structural balance rules, such as the one developed in Chile (see Box 1), such a simple approach would have the advantage of transparency, ease of

[6] See Luc Eyraud, William Gbohoui, and Paulo Medas (2023). *A New Fiscal Framework for Resource-Rich Countries*. IMF Working Paper 23/230.

communication, and lower institutional demands. IMF staff stand ready to assist in the related capacity development.

Table 1. Burkina Faso: Illustration of a simple, reserve-based fiscal rule

Year	Baseline Budget Revenue	Actual Revenue	Revenue Surplus	1/4 of Surplus is Spent	Expenditure (=baseline revenue +1/4 surplus)	Budget Balance	Net Financial Assets	Net Financial Assets / Expenditure
1	10.0	10.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	0.0	30.0	3.0
2	10.0	13.0	3.0	0.8	10.8	2.3	32.3	3.0
3	10.8	13.0	2.3	0.6	11.3	1.7	33.9	3.0
4	11.3	13.0	1.7	0.4	11.7	1.3	35.2	3.0
5	11.8	13.0	1.3	0.3	12.1	0.9	36.1	3.0
6	12.1	13.0	0.9	0.2	12.3	0.7	36.8	3.0
7	12.1	13.0	0.9	0.2	12.3	0.7	37.5	3.0
8	12.1	9.0	-3.1	0.0	12.1	-3.1	34.4	2.9
9	12.1	9.0	-3.1	0.0	12.1	-3.1	31.4	2.6
10	12.1	9.0	-3.1	0.0	12.1	-3.1	28.3	2.3
11	12.1	9.0	-3.1	0.0	12.1	-3.1	25.2	2.1
12	12.1	9.0	-3.1	0.0	12.1	-3.1	22.1	1.8

Rising Prices

Falling Prices

Number of Years of Reserves

Source: Luc Eyraud, William Gbohoui, and Paulo Medas (2023). *A New Fiscal Framework for Resource-Rich Countries*. IMF Working Paper 23/230.

Note: This is a fictitious example where 3 years of current expenditures are kept as reserve. During rising international prices of gold, ¾ of the revenue windfall is set aside as reserve or used to pay back debt, while ¼ is spent. During periods of falling prices, the reserve (Net Financial Assets) is used to stabilize expenditures. In this illustration, expenditure remains around 12 despite large swings in actual revenue due to swings in prices.

Box 1. Chile's Structural Balance Rule

Chile's experience supports the case for fiscal frameworks that delink public expenditure from volatile commodity revenues. Its fiscal rule anchors expenditure decisions on structural rather than current copper revenues. This framework is widely regarded as having contributed to fiscal credibility, lower debt accumulation, and macroeconomic stability. While Burkina Faso's institutional capacity and economic structure differ significantly, and Chile's institutional experience is unlikely to be directly replicable, the broader policy lesson remains relevant: resource windfalls are best treated as volatile and partly saved rather than fully absorbed into current spending – which could also be implemented through a simple mechanism well adapted to Burkina Faso's specific institutional environment (see text).

The savings generated under the rule are accumulated to build fiscal buffers, historically through sovereign wealth and stabilization funds (IMF, 2023). Revenue windfalls, largely driven by commodity price booms, are saved in a stabilization fund, while these accumulated assets can be drawn down to finance fiscal deficits during downturns and smoothing public expenditure over the cycle. This mechanism has enabled countercyclical fiscal support during major shocks (e.g., the global financial crisis, COVID-19 pandemic) without abrupt expenditure cuts or excessive reliance on costly borrowing. More broadly, the stabilization fund acts as a buffer that allows fiscal policy to respond flexibly to shocks while preserving medium-term sustainability. For commodity-dependent economies such as Burkina Faso, where fiscal revenues are subject to large and volatile terms-of-trade movements, such a framework can help transform temporary resource windfalls into a stable financing buffer, reduce procyclicality, and support more predictable priority spending.

The evidence from counterfactual simulations confirms that Chile's fiscal rule materially altered fiscal outcomes by constraining discretionary responses to commodity-driven revenue cycles. The comparison between actual and simulated paths shows that the rule helped generate larger fiscal surpluses during boom periods, reflecting a policy choice to save rather than spend windfall revenues, and contained the buildup of public debt relative to a no-rule counterfactual, where debt would have remained significantly higher (Fuentes, Schmidt-Hebbel and Soto, 2021). At the same time, deviations observed during major shocks underscore that the benefits of the rule depend critically on sustained adherence over time.

Figure 9. Chile: Fiscal Balance and Public Debt Indicators, 1990–2020

Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)



Public Debt (% of GDP)



Sources: (1) IMF (2023). *Chile: Technical Assistance Report—Fiscal Considerations in Managing Stabilization Funds*. (IMF Staff Country Report No. 2023/249). https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400249037.002. (2) Fuentes, J.R., Schmidt-Hebbel, K., & Soto, R. (2021). *Fiscal Rule and Public Investment in Chile*. https://doi.org/10.18235/0003105.

15. Implementation would nevertheless require careful institutional design. Clear deposit and withdrawal rules, strong governance and decision-making arrangements (ideally based on independent expert opinion), transparent reporting, and appropriate integration with the broader public financial management framework would be essential to ensure credibility. Calibration would need to reflect Burkina Faso's financing constraints, development needs, and exposure to security-related shocks, potentially including well-defined escape clauses for exceptional circumstances. Over time, as fiscal institutions deepen and revenue forecasting capacity improves, the framework could evolve toward more sophisticated arrangements, but a *simple* stabilization mechanism would represent an important step toward addressing fiscal procyclicality.

16. By not increasing spending in 2025 on the back of rising revenues from gold mining, the authorities have already demonstrated the understanding for the need and the capacity to take a countercyclical posture. Putting in place a simple but rigorous framework would strengthen this capacity in a systematic way, which will be critical for an orderly implementation of the ambitious medium-term public investment program embedded in *Plan Relance*. If exposed to revenue volatility, the implementation of the plan may suffer from a harmful "stop-and-go" pattern with attendant fiscal costs.

17. In parallel, reducing reliance on gold revenues should be a central objective. Continued strengthening of domestic revenue mobilization—through broadening the VAT base, rationalizing tax expenditures, improving excise design (including fuel), and enhancing property and income taxation would help diversify the revenue mix and reduce exposure to commodity cycles. Over time, the diversification of the real economy toward a broader set of sectors, and a more diversified tax base would increase the effectiveness of the countercyclical framework and limit the need for large buffers. Given exposure to oil price volatility, the framework could also be complemented by a transparent fuel pricing mechanism that limits ad hoc subsidies, while allowing temporary, targeted support to smooth the pass-through of large price shocks.

18. Recent policy measures aim to allocate mining revenues towards sustainable development. In addition to the existing Mining Fund for Local Development (FMDL), which finances communal and regional development plans, the Council of Ministers adopted a decree on May 21, 2026, creating the Sovereign Mining Investment Fund of Burkina Faso (FSMIB) named "Siniyan-Sigui". The FSMIB will operate as a Special Appropriation Account (SDA) dedicated to financing strategic industrial and infrastructure projects, with first investments expected from 2027. The authorities intend to replenish the fund with additional revenues from mining activity whenever commodity prices exceed reference levels set by the authorities. Surpluses generated above these thresholds will be returned to the fund to finance long-term investments.

Appendix I. Letter of Intent

Ms. Kristalina Georgieva
Managing Director
International Monetary Fund
Washington, D.C. 20431
USA

Ouagadougou, June 11, 2026

SUBJECT: Letter of Intent on Economic and Financial Policies

Dear Madam Managing Director:

I am pleased to inform you through the attached Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) of recent developments in the Burkinabè economy, the progress made in implementing our programs supported by the IMF's Extended Credit Facility (ECF) and Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF), and the macroeconomic and structural reforms that we plan to implement in the short and medium term.

Promoting resilient, inclusive, and job-generating macroeconomic growth, driven by increased productivity and investment in human and physical capital, remains the priority objective of our development policies. Our new development framework for the period 2026-2030, called the RELANCE RECOVERY plan, aims to promote an endogenous development model for a sovereign and prosperous nation. With an estimated total cost of about CFAF 36,000 billion, the RELANCE plan is organized around four main pillars: (i) consolidation of security and peace; (ii) rebuilding of the state and governance; (iii) development of human capital; and (iv) structural transformation of the economy through infrastructure and industrialization.

In 2025, the Burkinabè economy remained resilient, and we performed very well in achieving the objectives of our ECF-supported program. **In addition, Burkina Faso has committed to a new program supported by the RSF, which was approved on February 18, 2026, by the IMF's Executive Board**. The reforms implemented by the government, coupled with high international gold prices, have helped to maintain a path of fiscal sustainability while supporting the most vulnerable. Despite security challenges, economic growth in 2025 accelerated to 5.3 percent, from 4.8 percent in 2024. The fiscal deficit narrowed to 1.8 percent of GDP, from 5.8 percent in 2024, and average annual inflation was -0.5 percent, compared to 4.2 percent in 2024. Gold exports helped improve the external balance, with the current account changing from a deficit of 3.5 percent of GDP in 2024 to a surplus of 6.3 percent in 2025.

Under the ECF, almost all the quantitative targets have been met, and all the structural benchmarks have been achieved. All six quantitative performance criteria, as well as four of the six indicative targets, were met at end-December 2025. The indicative target for the current primary expenditure ceiling was exceeded by 0.7 percent of GDP, mainly due to the expenditure covered by the Patriotic Support Fund (FSP), which operates independently using its own revenues generated in response to the demands of the security situation. The indicative target related to the non-accumulation of domestic arrears was not met due to precautionary measures taken in connection with tax audit operations carried out on certain mining companies that delayed the reimbursement of certain VAT credit claims amounting to 0.2 percent of GDP. The three structural benchmarks at end-December 2025 were met, as were the four continuous structural benchmarks.

Under the RSF, the two reform measures resulting from the first program review were also implemented in May 2026. The National Disaster Risk Financing Strategy, with an implementation plan comprising measures to strengthen agricultural resilience, was adopted and published online (RM1) on May 29, 2026. Similarly, the ministerial order mandating the continued publication of climate hazard and risk maps developed by government agencies (RM10) on the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Mobility (MATM) website was adopted on May 26, 2026. We have also published all existing maps of climate hazards and risks as of the date the decree was signed. We remain committed to continuing the implementation of the reform measures planned for the next reviews.

In addition, almost all indicative targets and structural benchmarks for end-March 2026 have been met. A total of 11 of the 12 quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets at end-March 2026 have been met. The only indicative target that has not been met is the one on domestic arrears, which amounted to CFAF 12.9 billion (0.07 percent of GDP) against a ceiling of CFAF 0 billion at end-March 2026 due to tax audit operations undertaken with regard to certain mining companies. The amount is down, however, from the level seen at end-December 2025. All four continuous structural benchmarks have been met.

We reaffirm our commitment to continuing to strengthen governance and budget transparency. As part of the sixth review, we will share with IMF staff a report on annual reconciliations between personnel and payroll records covering about 50 percent of the civil service excluding the security sector **(structural benchmark at end-September 2026 already agreed during the fourth ECF review).** We will set up an annual internal audit mechanism for the compliance, transparency, and efficiency of the processes for obtaining mining permits through the Inspectorate of Energy and Mines (IDEM) in accordance with the standards of the Institute of Internal Auditors **(proposed structural benchmark at end-October 2026).** We will also publish the audit report of five ministries selected according to their risk, carried out by the Supervising Authority for State Oversight and Combating Corruption (ASCE-LC) **(proposed structural benchmark at end-October 2026).**

As part of the seventh review, we will provide IMF staff with a note outlining the integrity and transparency measures adopted in the gold mining sector to strengthen disclosure requirements **(proposed structural benchmark at end-December 2026).** We will amend the decree on Treasury deposit accounts in order to explicitly define, limit, and effectively monitor exemptions allowing the opening of accounts for non-personalized government entities **(proposed structural benchmark at end-December 2026).** We will improve transparency in the public procurement process by launching a digital procurement platform to enable the online publication of calls for tenders and contract award information **(proposed structural benchmark at end-December 2026).** We will also publish the current rebased GDP series **(proposed structural benchmark at end-December 2026)**, as well as the full report on tax expenditures annexed to the draft 2027 Budget Law **(proposed structural benchmark at end-December 2026).**

The conflict in the Middle East is a major negative external shock to our economy due to its heavy dependence on energy and fertilizer imports. Global supply disruptions and soaring oil, fertilizer, and gasoline prices are putting strong pressure on economic growth—particularly in agriculture, on the budget, and on the external account, posing major risks to food security and macroeconomic stability. The government is putting in place adequate measures to protect the most vulnerable and prevent inflationary pressures due to rising oil prices from increasing the cost of living and exacerbating poverty.

Simulations of the adjustment of prices for petroleum products at the pump are underway to analyze their social and fiscal impacts. The existence of forward supply contracts, combined with the relatively high level of oil prices at the pump before the outbreak of the war, allows us to temporarily cushion the impact of higher global energy prices on the budget. We recognize, however, that upward adjustments in domestic prices for petroleum products may be necessary to preserve fiscal and debt sustainability. Scenarios are being simulated to inform appropriate decision-making.

Conversely, the government will have to increase subsidies to mitigate the effects of the sharp increase in fertilizer prices on food security as a result of the high dependence of our agriculture on fertilizers. In our view, it would be excessively costly, economically and socially, to absorb these upward pressures on fertilizer prices into the fiscal framework of the current program. Consequently, we call for the relaxation of the fiscal deficit objective for end-December 2026 from 3.5 percent to 4 percent of GDP, as well as the associated quantitative criteria and indicative targets, in order to implement this countercyclical fertilizer subsidy policy, which we hope to be able to finance with the support of development partners.

Given the strength of our program, we call for the completion of the fifth review of the arrangement under the ECF and the first review under the RSF, the disbursement of SDR 24.08 million under the ECF and SDR 16.42 million under the RSF, and the definition of new structural benchmarks for end-September and end-October 2026 (sixth review) and for end-December 2026 (seventh review).

To mitigate the effects of additional BoP needs created by the sharp increase in fertilizer prices, we request an increase in access under the ECF arrangement by an amount equivalent to 50 percent of our quota (SDR 60.2 million), which would bring the level of access to 240 percent of the quota. To align the program's framing with the need to use these additional resources from the IMF on an urgent basis, we call for an increase in the fiscal deficit ceiling for end-December 2026 to 4 percent of GDP; a modification of the quantitative performance criterion for the primary deficit at end-December 2026 and the indicative targets

for the current expenditure ceiling at end-June 2026, end-September 2026, and end-December 2026, and the primary deficit ceiling at end-September 2026. Given the urgency of the situation, we request a disbursement of SDR 36.12 million (or 30 percent of the quota) in additional access during the fifth review under the ECF over and above the SDR 24.08 million initially planned. The remaining 20 percent could be disbursed upon completion of the sixth review under the ECF.

We commit to remaining within the deficit ceiling of 4 percent of GDP in 2026, as set out in the MEFP, in order to deploy all appropriate responses to external shocks arising from the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. We also commit to publishing information on the contract awardees and beneficial owners of fertilizer procurement contracts and other agricultural inputs for the 2026-7 agricultural campaign on the website of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance. A box on procurement procedures and the execution of expenditures related to the acquisition of fertilizers and other inputs for the 2026–2027 agricultural campaign will also be included in the budget execution report, published quarterly on the website of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Consequently, we have agreed with IMF staff that the publication of the list of contract awardees and beneficial owners of fertilizer procurement contracts awarded between May 2026 to July 2026 constitutes a **proposed structural benchmark at end-September 2026**. Furthermore, the ASCE-LC will conduct an audit of fertilizer acquisition expenses for the 2026-2027 agricultural season (April 2026 to March 2027), and the audit report will be published on the website of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance by end-July 2027 **(proposed structural benchmark at end-July 2027).** Moreover, we commit to including a section on procurement and on the execution of expenditures related to the acquisition of fertilizers and other inputs for the 2026–2027 agricultural campaign in the State budget execution report as of end-June 2026.

We believe that the policies described in the attached MEFP are adequate to achieve the objectives of the program supported by the ECF and RSF in future reviews. We stand ready to take additional measures should they be needed to meet the objectives of both IMF programs, and we will consult with the IMF in advance of any necessary revisions to the policies described in this letter and the attached memorandum, in line with Fund policies on such matters. We also undertake to improve the timetable for providing IMF staff with all the data and information needed to assess the results of implementing these policies, in particular those mentioned in the TMU.

In line with our commitment to transparency, we agree to the publication of this Letter of Intent and the attached Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies and Technical Memorandum of Understanding, as well as the IMF Staff Report on the IMF Article IV Consultation, on the fifth review under the 48-month Extended Credit Facility arrangement, and on the first review under the 18-month Resilience and Sustainability Facility arrangement, following their approval by the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund.

Very truly yours,

/s/

Aboubakar Nacanabo

Minister of Economy and Finance

Officer of the Order of the Stallion

Attachments:

- Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies
- Technical Memorandum of Understanding

Attachment I. Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies

INTRODUCTION

1. The Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP) provides an overview of the implementation of Burkina Faso's economic and financial program, agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This program is based on the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) for the period 2023-2027, as well as the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF), adopted on February 18, 2026. The MEFP provides information on the economic and financial policies implemented by the government of Burkina Faso under this program. It also describes information on reforms undertaken in line with the objectives of macroeconomic stability, inclusive growth, and poverty reduction.

2. The ECF-supported program is organized around three main pillars: (i) creating a fiscal space for priority spending and reducing debt vulnerabilities; (ii) strengthening resilience to shocks while reducing poverty and inequality; and (iii) strengthening fiscal discipline, governance, and anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). As for the RSF, it aims to reduce climate-related vulnerabilities and strengthen macroeconomic resilience and external stability and is built around four pillars: i) strengthening fiscal resilience and transparency by institutionalizing disaster risk management and financing; ii) anchoring climate resilience in public investment management; (iii) promoting resilience in the provision and management of public services; and (iv) attracting climate finance by publishing data on climate risks and improving the dissemination of information in this space.

3. This Memorandum describes recent trends in the Burkinabè economy. It reports on the progress made in implementing the economic and financial program as of end-December 2025 and end-March 2026. It also outlines the program's outlook and commitments for the remainder of 2026 and for the 2027-2029 period.

4. This MEFP also presents the status as of end-March 2026 of the policies and commitments made by the Burkinabè government under the RSF, which is expected to run until September 20, 2027, corresponding to the remaining period of the ECF-supported program.

RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

A. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK AS AT END-DECEMBER 2025 AND END-MARCH 2026

5. Economic activity in 2025 took place in an international environment marked by heightened geostrategic and trade tensions, new directions in United States policy, the geopolitical situation in the West African subregion, and the strong foothold of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) confederation. At the national level, security and humanitarian challenges, the momentum of efforts to regain control of territory, and the favorable agricultural-pastoral season also influenced economic activity. As a result, economic growth stood at 5.3 percent in 2025, following growth of 4.8 percent in 2024. This growth was driven by all of the sectors: the primary sector (+11.5 percent), the secondary sector (+4.7 percent), and the tertiary sector (+2.6 percent).

6. On an annual average basis, inflation stood at -0.5 percent at end–December 2025, compared to 4.2 percent at end–December 2024, a decline of 4.7 percentage points. This downward trend is linked to declines recorded primarily in the "housing, water, electricity, and gas" sector (-3.9 percent) compared to 6.1 percent in December 2024; the "information and communications" sector (-1.7 percent) compared to 0.3 percent; the "recreation, sports, and culture" sector (-0.4 percent) compared to 0.5 percent; and the "educational services" sector (-0.6 percent) compared to 2.1 percent. The measures taken by the government to curb rising prices contributed to this trend.

7. In 2025, a shift was seen in the current account balance. The balance changed from a deficit of CFAF 556.8 billion in 2024 to a surplus of CFAF 1,857.6 billion due to strong growth in exports of 77.0 percent; exports reached CFAF 6,562.6 billion in 2025, compared to CFAF 3,708.3 billion in 2024. This historic export growth was driven, among other things, by a rise in the value of gold shipments by CFAF 2,967.8 billion, or 101.8 percent. The value of gold exports rose from CFAF 2,914.4 billion in 2024 to CFAF 5,882.2 billion in 2025 as a result of a 31.3 metric ton increase in volume (+46.1 percent) and a 38.1 percent year-over-year increase in selling prices. The value of exports of cashew nuts and sesame also rose by CFAF 72.6 billion and CFAF 15.2 billion, respectively. As for imports, they saw more moderate growth of 9.3 percent, reaching CFAF 3,859.1 billion in 2025. This upward trend was driven by growth in the acquisition of capital goods by CFAF 284.5 billion, intermediate goods by CFAF 172.5 billion, other everyday consumer goods by CFAF 74.8 billion, and food by CFAF 60.0 billion.

8. The monetary situation at end-December 2025 was marked by the continued recovery in the money supply that began in October 2024. This development shows that the volume of liquidity in the economy continues to grow, mainly thanks to financial flows from the rest of the world. In fact, the economy's overall liquidity stood at CFAF 6,963.0 billion in December 2025, an increase of

CFAF 1,030.8 billion compared to end-December 2024. Such a rate of growth had not been seen since July 2021 when annual growth of 19.1 percent was recorded. On the money supply side, it is worth noting that this growth was driven primarily by net foreign assets, which increased by CFAF 1,025.2 billion over the course of 2025. Domestic receivables also rose by CFAF 129.2 billion, or 2.6 percent, compared to end-December 2024.

9. In terms of public finances, the execution of the 2025 budget was carried out in an environment marked, among other things, by an easing of monetary policy by central banks at the global level and the continuation of efforts to reconquer the entire national territory.

- **In terms of resource mobilization**, mining code reforms, as well as the favorable price of gold, contributed to a significant increase in mining revenues. In addition, the continued implementation of actions and reforms in revenue management contributed to improved mobilization of internal resources. These reforms include, among other things: (i) widespread digitization of tax and customs procedures; (ii) improved management of tax arrears; (iii) improved handling and valuation of goods; (iv) enhanced tracking of goods in transit; and (v) increased coverage of the national territory through intensified joint anti-fraud operations.

- To build on this positive momentum in mobilizing domestic resources for implementation of the 2026 state budget, the following fiscal measures will be implemented, in addition to the actions and reforms already under way: (i) an increase in the weapons tax rates and in the scope of the value-added tax (VAT) withholding tax; (ii) non-deductibility of the special contribution on corporate after-tax profits; (iii) adjustment of the filing deadlines for the special contribution; (iv) implementation of an integrated system for issuing customs valuation notices; (v) implementation of a "SMART CUSTOMS" system at the Ouaga Route office; and (vi) strengthening of escort and satellite tracking systems for goods in transit.
- The mobilization of total revenues and grants, including resources from the Patriotic Support Fund (FSP), stood at CFAF 3,787.7 billion at end-December 2025, compared to CFAF 3,083.4 billion at end-December 2024, an increase of 22.8 percent. This performance is due to a 20.0 percent increase in tax revenue collections and a 60.2 percent increase in non-tax revenue, while grants declined by 4.6 percent.
- **In terms of spending**, priority is given to defense and security as well as to the response to the humanitarian crisis. Fiscal policy has mainly consisted of the streamlining of administrative costs. Total expenditure and net lending stood at CFAF 4,076.4 billion at end-December 2025, compared to CFAF 3,899.9 billion at end-December 2024, an increase of 4.5 percent. This increase is attributable to growth in current expenditure and net lending, with capital expenditure falling by CFAF 189.1 billion (-11.8 percent).
- At end-December 2025, the **overall balance** on a commitment basis showed a deficit of CFAF 288.7 billion, compared to a deficit of CFAF 816.5 billion over the same period in 2024, an improvement of CFAF 527.8 billion.
- At end-March 2026, the overall balance on a commitment basis showed a surplus of CFAF 104.9 billion, compared to a deficit of CFAF 71.6 billion over the same period in 2025, an improvement of CFAF 176.5 billion.

10. The audit of the payroll records for employees listed in the Integrated Administrative and Payroll Management System for Government Personnel (*Système intégré de gestion administrative et salariale du personnel de l'Etat* – SIGASPE) resulted in the recovery, as of end-December 2025, of CFAF 3.8 billion from the adjusted total of CFAF 6.5 billion in overpayments of compensation received by certain registered employees, a recovery rate of 58.0 percent. As a reminder, this initiative resulted in estimated savings of CFAF 12.7 billion on the projected personnel budget for fiscal year 2024. Payment orders totaling CFAF 8.5 billion were also issued to unregistered employees who were not in compliance with regulations. In addition, the government has implemented the following actions: (i) the launch of a digital platform for monitoring the attendance of government employees, known as DigiCoP; and (ii) the introduction of job descriptions at ministries and institutions, the rate of which rose from 42.4 percent in 2024 to 71.88 percent in September 2025.

11. **As for the SIGASPE audit**, the firm selected to perform the audit began its work on January 9, 2025, and submitted its report on May 8, 2025. A fact sheet summarizing the final report is now available.

12. **To reconcile the personnel records of the former Ministry of National Education, Literacy, and the Promotion of National Languages (MENAPLN) with the SIGASPE payroll,** the technical staff of the Directorate General of the Budget (DGB) and of the Human Resources Directorates (DRHs) of the two ministries resulting from the division of the former MENAPLN held a series of working sessions in the fourth quarter of 2024 to analyze the consistency between the records kept by the DRH and the payroll for government personnel. The results of this records reconciliation were adopted by the Council of Ministers on April 24, 2025.

In December 2025, the technical departments of the Ministry of Public Service and the Ministry of the Economy and Finance held a workshop to draft a report on the consolidation of staff numbers across all ministries and institutions for the first half of 2025. This draft report has been submitted to the authority.

A draft report is currently being prepared on the comprehensive integration of the SIGASPE administrative database, the SIGASPE payroll database, and the attendance tracking database.

13. With regard to **public debt management**, the government is continuing to implement its debt strategy in accordance with debt sustainability targets. The outstanding public debt stood at CFAF 8,692.7 billion as of December 31, 2025, marking an annual increase of 8.3 percent compared to end-December 2024. As of March 31, 2026, it stood at CFAF 8,826.6 billion.

14. As of end-December 2025, public debt service stood at CFAF 1,343.7 billion, up 16.6 percent from the previous year. This increase is primarily attributable to domestic debt, which accounted for 84 percent of total debt service at that time. As of March 31, 2026, public debt service amounted to CFAF 399.2 billion, an increase of 28.9 percent compared to the same period in 2025.

15. The ratio of "external debt service to budget revenue" stood at 5.9 percent at end-December 2025 and at 1.9 percent at end-March 2026, below the reference threshold of 18.0 percent.

16. The implementation of the mechanism for adjusting fuel prices at the pump in Burkina Faso remained incomplete in 2025. By freezing the wholesale prices of hydrocarbons, the government sought to pre-empt a sharp rise in petroleum product prices. International oil prices remained lower than expected, however, resulting in plus-values of CFAF 211.7 billion as of end-December 2025. As of March 31, 2026, the plus-values recorded in 2025 continued, reaching CFAF 66.4 billion. In this case, the mechanism established by the government generates plus-values that temporarily boost budget revenues.

17. Subsidies on butane gas and national electricity company (*Société Nationale d'électricité du Burkina Faso* – SONABEL) fuels totaled CFAF 192.4 billion at end-December 2025, including CFAF 96.2 billion for SONABEL fuels and CFAF 96.2 billion for butane gas. At end-March 2026, the cumulative amount was provisionally CFAF 35.3 billion, including CFAF 21.1 billion for butane gas and CFAF 14.3 billion for SONABEL fuels.

18. Efforts to control hydrocarbon subsidies in the country have continued through the enhanced targeting of beneficiary social groups.[1] Public awareness efforts, monitoring, and enforcement actions will accompany the implementation of this targeting. In addition, the regulations that govern all activities related to the sale of hydrocarbons in the country are being reviewed in order to better adapt them to the current context and effectively combat fraud.

19. As for the refund of VAT credits, at end-December 2025 the amount paid was CFAF 123.4 billion and the balance of the Transition Services Support Account (CAST) was CFAF 95.1 billion. The stock remaining to be paid (T-MEF) consists of 95 certificates amounting to CFAF 49.6 billion, of which CFAF 39.6 billion are more than one month old (CFAF 36.0 billion are more than three months old) and CFAF 10.0 billion are less than one month old.

20. With regard to land management, 2025 saw a sweeping reform, marked by the adoption of Law No. 015-2025/ALT of October 21, 2025, on Agrarian and Land Reorganization (RAF). This reform places the government at the center of land governance in order to combat speculation and conflicts. It also enhances the protection of state-owned land with the support of the National Agency for Public Land and Property (ANDFOP) and the effective implementation of public interest procedures and well-regulated land speculation. The gradual digitization of all procedures related to the issuance of land titles (etitre1, etitre2, SYC@D, e-cadastre, etc.) has generated CFAF 9.1 billion.

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[1] The adoption of Joint Decree No. 2024-003/MDICAPME/MEFP of February 6, 2024, stating that henceforth "the sale of gas contained in cylinders weighing 1 to 12.5 kg, subsidized by the government, is exclusively reserved for domestic use by households residing within the national territory" and the issuance of Circular Letter No. 2026-010/PRIM/SG/CIDPH of February 23, 2026, stating that "the sale of gas contained in cylinders weighing 1 to 12.5 kg, subsidized by the government, is exclusively reserved for domestic use by households residing within the national territory."

The second one-stop land services center, which opened in Ouagadougou on April 2, 2025, has processed transactions worth CFAF 2.7 billion, issuing 3,581 land titles and 1,844 Real Rights Certificates (EDR) to users.

21. Implementation of public-private partnership (PPP) contracts. The total face value of PPP contracts awarded in 2025 is CFAF 84.8 billion, out of a total limit of CFAF 200 billion. This amount consists of funding for the project to build a solar photovoltaic power plant in Nobéré (CFAF 74.8 billion) and the project to build 38 luxury triplexes on the SONATUR Cissin site in Ouagadougou (CFAF 10.0 billion).

B. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

22. Implementation of the program remains satisfactory, despite the security and humanitarian challenges. Almost all structural benchmarks and quantitative criteria were met at end-December 2025 and end-March 2026:

- Regarding the quantitative performance criteria, all six were met (see Table 1a).
- As for the indicative targets, most of them were met, with the exception of the ceiling on the accumulation of domestic arrears at end-December 2025 and end-March 2026, and the ceiling on current primary expenditures. In fact, there is an accumulation of domestic arrears of CFAF 36.0 billion (0.23 percent of GDP) at end-December 2025, and CFAF 12.9 billion (0.07 percent of GDP) at end-March 2026, while the ceiling is set at CFAF 0 billion. These arrears are related to VAT credit refunds (Table 1a). Steps are being taken to resolve these issues. Furthermore, current primary expenditure amounts to CFAF 2,260.6 billion, while the ceiling is set at CFAF 2,150 billion, representing a difference of CFAF 110.6 billion (approximately 0.7 percent of GDP). This overspending is due to higher levels of operating expenses for the FSP as well as higher expenditures on hydrocarbon subsidies.
- With regard to the structural benchmarks, all four of the continuous benchmarks have been fully observed (Table 2a), as well as the three measures with a deadline of end-December 2025 (Table 2b). In fact, the public procurement action plan and the operational integrity plans of the Directorate General of Taxes and the Directorate General of Customs were all developed and submitted to the IMF office on time. In addition, the "payroll-to-tax-revenue" ratio was met.

23. Regarding the implementation of the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) measures, on February 18, 2026, a new agreement with the IMF aimed at strengthening long-term balance of payments stability and resilience to climate change, while promoting fiscal transparency and improving energy and fiscal resilience, was approved by the IMF Executive Board up to end-September 2027. As a result, two technical assistance missions conducted by the IMF helped to identify robust reforms designed to strengthen Burkina Faso's capacity to adapt to the effects of climate change and to support a sustainable green transition. The proposed reform measures are organized into four key areas (Table 3): (i) enhancing fiscal transparency and resilience; (ii) resilient public investment; (iii) the resilience of public service delivery and management; and (iv) climate data and finance. These proposed reforms will help strengthen long-term resilience to climate change at the macroeconomic, fiscal, and external levels.

In connection with the monitoring of the implementation of reform measures (RMs) as of end-March 2026, the following assessment can be made: two reform measures, RM1 and RM10, were scheduled to be implemented in March 2026, with another reform measure (RM4) scheduled to be implemented by September 15, 2026. To this end, a technical assistance mission was deployed to build the capacity of the entities responsible for implementing these measures, particularly measure RM1.

- **Under RM1: "*The Ministry of Family and Solidarity (MFS) (through the Permanent Secretariat of the National Council for Emergency Relief and Rehabilitation, or SP-CONASUR), in collaboration with the Ministry of the Economy and Finance (MEF) and other relevant agencies, will develop, adopt by ministerial order, and publish on its website a national strategy for disaster risk financing, including an implementation plan with measures to strengthen agricultural resilience*."** To this end, a technical assistance mission was held from March 25 to April 3, 2026, in Ouagadougou as part of the RSF-supported program to bolster the authorities' efforts to strengthen macroeconomic stability and the balance of payments outlook. The objective of this initial mission was to assist and build the capacity of the entities responsible for implementing these reforms in developing a disaster risk financing strategy in accordance with relevant standards and best practices.

- At the conclusion of the mission, progress in disaster risk financing in Burkina Faso was acknowledged, and relevant recommendations were made to strengthen the existing framework and bring it into line with international norms and standards. These recommendations focused on areas related to the fiscal policy response, social resilience, and enabling data and institutions. In addition, the national authorities have prepared a draft strategy for disaster risk financing, on which IMF staff have provided comments. These comments were incorporated to align the strategy with best practices. The strategy was subsequently adopted by ministerial order on May 26, 2026. The strategy was also published on the website of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance.

- **Regarding RM10: *"The Ministry of Territorial Administration and Mobility (MATM), in collaboration with the MEF, has adopted a ministerial order requiring the publication on the MATM website of climate hazard and risk maps developed by government agencies, including a requirement for ongoing disclosure."*** *The ministerial order was adopted on May 26, 2026. The government published all existing climate hazard and risk maps at the time that the ministerial order was posted on the MATM website and will update the maps that the MEF will incorporate into its analysis and planning of fiscal risks.*

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY AS AT DECEMBER 31, 2025

24. The National Development Policy for the period 2021-2025 was implemented through the Action Plan for Stabilization and Development (PA-SD), which is organized around four strategic pillars: (i) combating terrorism and restoring territorial integrity; (ii) responding to the humanitarian crisis; (iii) rebuilding the state and improving governance; and (iv) working towards national reconciliation and social cohesion.

25. As of December 31, 2025, the government's interventions have made it possible to achieve major gains in relation to: (i) combating terrorism; (ii) the response to the humanitarian crisis; (iii) the promotion of good political, economic, and financial governance; (iv) strengthening decentralization and good administrative and local governance; (v) improvement of the living environment, access to drinking water and sanitation; (vi) the sustainable development of a productive and resilient agricultural-forestry-pastoral, wildlife, and fisheries sector; and finally, (vii) national reconciliation and social cohesion.

26. In **combating terrorism**, the main results relate to: (i) strengthening the operational capabilities of the defense and security forces; (ii) intensifying the fight against crime and organized crime through the organization of 77,425 security patrols (including 35,250 by the National Police, 21,863 by the Gendarmerie, and 20,312 in forested areas); (iii) improving the participation of Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) in combating terrorism, notably through the recruitment of 4,840 VDPs; (iv) the continued efforts to cut off terrorists' sources of supply of resources of all kinds and Burkina Faso's removal from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list.

27. With regard to **the response to the humanitarian crisis**, the government's efforts have made it possible to gradually return internally displaced populations to their places of origin. Thus, the main achievements include: (i) support for the voluntary return of displaced persons to their areas of origin, including food assistance for 1,910,658 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the provision of essential household items (EHIs) to 58,637 households; (ii) ensuring educational continuity (opening/reopening schools, providing grants/support to students, and training stakeholders); and (iii) the implementation of urgent measures that helped to contain inflation, which stood at -0.5 percent.

28. In addition, as **part of the implementation of a plan to support the resettlement of IDPs and others affected by terrorism**, the interventions have resulted in the construction of 1,473 boreholes equipped with hand-pump systems (HPS), 1,177 stand-alone water stations (SAS), and 2,009 community and institutional latrines. In addition, electrification efforts have resulted in the connection of 160,555 households, the integration of 131 new rural communities into the grid, and the construction of 880 km of power lines. With regard to improving the continuity of care, basic emergency services, and nutrition for the benefit of populations affected by terrorism, 116,669 children under five years of age have been treated for malaria in areas facing significant security challenges.

29. As for the **promotion of sound political, economic, and financial governance,** notable achievements include: (i) continuous improvement of court operations; (ii) enhanced access to justice through the provision of legal aid to 2,105 individuals (including 455 women and 93 minors); (iii) improvement of human rights, marked by the provision of support to 850 IDPs at their reception sites, as well as the processing and follow-up of 100 percent of all reported complaints, violations, and abuses of human rights; (iv) establishment of an electronic platform for the Beneficial Ownership Register to strengthen fiscal governance and transparency (see paragraph 86 below for further details); (v) optimization of the mobilization of internal resources, budget management, and control over state assets; (vi) continued deployment and modernization of financial and economic information systems, notably the successful integration of the SI-N@folo platform; and (vii) the granting of loans to 172 small and medium-sized enterprises and small and medium-sized industries (SMEs/SMIs) for a total amount of CFAF 1.93 billion.

30. In terms of **strengthening decentralization and good administrative and local governance**, there have been major achievements in the following areas: (i) the continued development of local economies through the construction of 150 street-side shops, the installation of street lighting along 5 km of roadways, and the upgrading of 51 health facilities for the benefit of local governments; (ii) the improvement of local governance by awarding 100 scholarships to local government employees for advanced training at public vocational training institutions; (iii) the effective management of human resources in public administration through the timely signing of 100 percent of hiring documents, 92.9 percent of reclassification documents, and 96.5 percent of retirement documents, as well as the full digitization (online submission of applications) of direct competitive exams and the online administration of all professional competitive exams.

31. In terms of **improving living conditions and access to safe drinking water and sanitation**, in addition to the achievements made under the plan to support the resettlement of IDPs, other accomplishments include: (i) expanding access to water and sanitation through the construction of 325 boreholes equipped with hand-pump systems, 180 stand-alone water stations, and 390 community and institutional latrines; (ii) expanding public lighting through the deployment of 2,028 solar streetlights; (iii) promoting social inclusion through housing by constructing 300 social housing units for internally displaced persons and host communities; (iv) transforming the urban landscape through the development, beautification, and sanitation of cities based on implementation of the "Faso Mêbo" Presidential Initiative; and (v) promoting public health through urban sanitation initiatives led by the "Laabal Brigade."

32. With regard to the **sustainable development of a productive and resilient agricultural-forestry-pastoral, wildlife, and fisheries sector**, the key results relate to: (i) the development of water-managed production, as evidenced by the development of 24,414 hectares of low-lying land and the expansion of 3,900 hectares of irrigated areas; (ii) improved access to inputs, marked by the provision to producers, at subsidized prices, of 80,310 metric tons of fertilizer, 17,203 metric tons of seeds, and 2,078 pieces of motorized equipment, as well as the establishment of 505 private enterprises for fish farming; (iii) improved animal health, achieved through the vaccination of 19.3 million poultry against Newcastle disease, and the production of 10,405 metric tons of livestock feed, 4,358 metric tons of poultry feed, 2,506 metric tons of fish feed, and 1,175 metric tons of seeds for fodder crops.

33. In the context of **national reconciliation and social cohesion, and major achievements in the areas of peacebuilding and social harmony,** the key accomplishments relate to: (i) promoting interfaith and intercultural dialogue by completing the mapping of religious pilgrimage sites in Burkina Faso; (ii) expediting the processing of court cases and adjudicating 8,702 pending cases as part of the national "Clear the Backlog" initiative; (iii) holding 93 criminal hearings resulting in 145 decisions, as well as the adjudication of 133 cases by the economic and financial (ECOFI) branches of the first instance courts; and (iv) child protection through the placement of 264 children at risk or in conflict with the law in appropriate rehabilitation centers.

34. In January 2026, Burkina Faso adopted a new development framework for the 2026-2030 period, known as the "**RELANCE RECOVERY Plan 2026-2030**." This framework reflects the government's commitment to implementing far-reaching reforms aimed at bringing about lasting change in the economy and in society.

35. The vision of this framework is "**Burkina Faso, a sovereign and prosperous nation, fostering endogenous and sustainable development for the well-being of all**." The plan aims to foster endogenous and inclusive socioeconomic development based on patriotic commitment and national sovereignty in an environment of security and peace. Its framework is based on four strategic pillars: security, governance, human capital, and economic transformation. These pillars comprise 20 operational programs.

36. The total cost of implementing the plan is estimated at CFAF 36,190.7 billion. It will be funded in the amount of CFAF 23,135.7 billion, 63.9 percent of which will come from domestic resources, and CFAF 2,099.8 billion, or 5.8 percent, from external resources. The additional funding required amounts to 30.3 percent of the total budget. To ensure that results are achieved quickly, the plan relies on accelerators, which are operational tools designed to catalyze and energize the implementation of national programs. These include presidential initiatives, community-led projects, full digitization, etc.

37. The plan is implemented through a program-based approach that ensures vertical and horizontal coherence in interventions, prioritizing budget support and the common basket as financing instruments.

MACROECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE REST OF 2026

A. MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK

38. In our initial framework, prior to the Middle East crisis, economic growth for 2026 was expected to continue accelerating, with growth projected as 5.7 percent, after 5.3 percent in 2025. Economic growth in 2026 is expected to be driven by all sectors primary (+9.4 percent), secondary (+5.0 percent), and tertiary (+4.5 percent).[2]

39. Meanwhile, for the whole of 2026, inflation is expected to be at 1.5 percent, up 2.0 percentage points compared to 2025. This projected increase is linked to the escalating geopolitical tensions stemming from the conflict in the Middle East, despite the expectation of a good harvest, an improvement in the national security situation, and the continuation of government measures to combat rising living costs.

40. Since February 28, 2026, geopolitical tensions in the Middle East have escalated sharply following the conflict between Israel and the United States on one side and the Islamic Republic of Iran on the other. The scope and duration of the conflict remain highly uncertain, and significant consequences have been observed in the energy (crude oil and petroleum products), liquefied natural gas, and fertilizer markets, notably including the shutdown of major energy infrastructure and the near-complete halt of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz.

41. An analysis of recent developments in the global economic environment has negatively impacted the baseline macroeconomic projections contained in paragraphs 38 and 39. In response to these shocks, three scenarios are proposed. First, we examine the trajectory of key international prices over the first months of 2026 to highlight the trends observed in commodity markets. Next, we revise the macroeconomic framework assumptions for 2026 in light of these economic developments. Finally, a simulation of the impacts of the revised assumptions is conducted to assess the potential macroeconomic consequences and inform economic policy directions. The government has shared its analysis of the situation with IMF staff.

42. These imbalances, linked to rising production costs, are likely to persist in the medium term, reflecting a lasting impact of the shock across the entire economy. The growth rate is projected to decline by 1.15 percentage points, reaching 4.5 percent in 2026, compared with the 5.7 percent initially projected. The general price level is expected to rise by 2.78 percentage points to 4.28 percent, exceeding the 3 percent threshold of the WAEMU convergence framework. This is a direct consequence of the pass-through of higher energy and agricultural costs to consumer prices, as well as lower agricultural output linked to declining agricultural productivity. This inflation erodes

[2] The six presidential initiatives are referred to in the RELANCE Plan as "accelerators." The priority sectors benefiting from these accelerators are: (i) agriculture and food self-sufficiency (IPAA); (ii) community development (IPDC); development of socio-economic infrastructure at the request of communities (roads, reforestation, training, etc.); (iii) quality education for all (EQPT); (iv) health; (v) sports; and (vi) urban development (new urban infrastructure).

household purchasing power, particularly for those whose spending is concentrated on food and energy despite public subsidies.

43. Of the 500,000 metric tons of fertilizer needed for the 2026 growing season in Burkina Faso, only 28 percent is available, creating a shortfall of 360,000 metric tons (72 percent of the total requirement). The crisis has significantly impacted the prices of various types of fertilizer, causing a 165.0 percent increase, raising the cost of urea from approximately US$400 to US$1,060 per metric ton. Covering this shortfall at post-crisis prices represents an estimated subsidy of CFAF 213.9 billion, or an additional cost of CFAF 92.2 billion compared to the initial price.

44. Without government intervention, the price of a 50 kg bag could exceed CFAF 35,000, a threshold considered critical. This situation risks causing a 20–40 percent drop in yields for maize and cotton, or worse without any fertilizer use. Producers might reduce their planted acreage, while cotton companies (SOFITEX, FASO COTON) would face higher input costs.

45. From a macroeconomic perspective, rising fertilizer prices are driving up the cost of imported food products, exacerbating local food inflation. In total, approximately 2.2 million people, or 10 percent of the population, are expected to face further threats to their food security. This trend undermines the recent progress toward food sovereignty achieved during the last agricultural season.

46. With regard to hydrocarbons, three scenarios for setting fuel prices, exclusively targeting households and excluding productive sectors (mining, construction, and manufacturing) from the subsidy mechanism were analyzed based on an oil price of US$103.5:

Scenario 1 – Status quo (maintenance of administered prices): The total budget subsidy amounts to CFAF 387.1 billion, 79 percent of which is attributable to diesel alone (CFAF 307.2 billion), due to a very high unit loss of CFAF 374.59 per liter compared to just CFAF 69.48 per liter for Super 91.

Scenario 2 – Moderate adjustment of administered prices: A moderate increase in administered prices (Super 91 to CFAF 875, diesel to CFAF 700) reduces the subsidy to CFAF 337.9 billion, but diesel remains structurally dominant, accounting for 85 percent of the total. This scenario represents a compromise between protecting purchasing power and fiscal consolidation.

Scenario 3 – liberalization of retail fuel prices: Full alignment with market prices eliminates all subsidies, freeing up more than CFAF 300 billion in budgetary savings. In return, the cost is fully passed on to households, with risks of inflation, rising transportation costs, and erosion of purchasing power.

47. As for natural gas, total subsidies are expected to exceed CFAF 147 billion, and no adjustments are planned in the short term given the impact on the population.

48. In 2026, foreign trade is characterized by a challenging international environment, largely due to the war in Iran, which has led to a sharp rise in the prices of imported goods. In particular, hydrocarbon prices are projected to rise by 50.0 percent, and fertilizer prices are expected to increase by 60.6 percent in 2026. Gold, the main export product, is expected to see a smaller increase in its price, which is projected to reach US$4,700 per ounce in 2026, up from US$3,437.90 per ounce in 2025, a 36.7 percent increase compared to the initial forecast of 45.9 percent. The price of cotton, on the other hand, is expected to rise by 11.2 percent.

49. Based on these assumptions, the main foreign trade balances are expected to improve. Thanks to a CFAF 585.3 billion increase in the trade surplus, the current account surplus is expected to increase by CFAF 457.9 billion, to CFAF 2,315.5 billion in 2026, representing 12.8 percent of GDP, compared to 11.4 percent in 2025. The overall balance of payments surplus is expected to increase to 8.7 percent of GDP in 2026, compared to 6.3 percent in 2025.

B. FISCAL POLICY

50. The government will continue its policy of streamlining expenses as well as consolidating reforms and actions aimed at strengthening the mobilization of internal resources; the financing requirement in 2026 is estimated at 2.5 percent of GDP, compared to 1.8 percent in 2025, representing an increase of 0.7 percentage points of GDP.

51. Revenues are projected to be CFAF 3,722.0 billion at end-December 2026 (19.6 percent of GDP), up 0.2 percent compared to the CFAF 3,714.2 billion reached in 2025. The tax burden is projected to be 16.2 percent in 2026, down 2.8 percentage points from 2025. Expenditure, meanwhile, is expected to increase by 6.8 percent to reach CFAF 4,199.3 billion (22.1 percent of GDP). Current expenditures as a share of total expenditures are projected to decline by 1.3 percentage points to 63.7 percent in 2026.

52. In 2026, the oil market is severely disrupted by geopolitical tensions, particularly in the Middle East, leading to significant volatility in the price of a barrel of Brent crude, which rose from US$71.12 in February to US$99.82 in March (an increase of more than 40 percent and 52 percent compared to January), while the U.S. dollar rose slightly. Two scenarios are being considered: an easing of tensions with an average oil price of US$90 per barrel, generating estimated plus values of CFAF 37 billion; or a prolonged escalation of the conflict leading to a significant rise in the price of oil (to US$155 per barrel), which would result in moins values of CFAF 156 billion without consumer price adjustments.

Debt Policy

53. For end-2026, based on planned disbursements and debt service, the total outstanding public debt is projected to be CFAF 9,179.1 billion, up 5.6 percent compared to end-2025. In relation to GDP, this outstanding amount would represent 48.3 percent in 2026, compared to 53.7 percent in 2025, a decline of 5.4 percentage points.

54. Public debt service is projected to reach CFAF 1,954.8 billion, compared to CFAF 1,343.7 billion in 2025, representing a 45 percent increase, in line with the repayment profile of the existing portfolio. The “external debt service-to-budget revenue” ratio is projected to stand at 10.0 percent in 2026, remaining within sustainability thresholds.

55. The government intends to use financing instruments consistent with its debt strategy to meet these needs. To this end, it will continue to implement its program to issue government securities on the regional financial market, incorporating innovative instruments, including Sukuk and diaspora bonds, with the aim of raising CFAF 1,180 billion.

56. Given the high volatility of the international environment and the uncertainty surrounding its impact on the Burkinabè economy, we have agreed to use the macroeconomic framework proposed by Fund staff for program monitoring purposes. In 2026, real GDP growth is projected at 3.6 percent, after 5.3 percent in 2025. This deceleration in economic growth in 2026 would be driven by a 5 percent decline in agricultural production, resulting in negative growth in the primary sector (-2.7 percent). Growth will nonetheless continue to be supported by the secondary (+5.5 percent) and tertiary (+4.7 percent) sectors. Regarding inflation, it is projected at 4.2 percent for the full year 2026, an increase of 4.7 percentage points compared to 2025. This projected rise reflects heightened geopolitical tensions stemming from the conflict in the Middle East and their anticipated effects on food and petroleum product prices. On public finances, we have agreed with IMF staff to remain within the fiscal framework, which presumes a maximum deficit of 4.0 percent of GDP in 2026. We have also reached agreement with IMF staff on the overall envelope for energy and fertilizer subsidies as set out in the fiscal framework. We commit to maintaining all subsidies granted in the energy sector within the allocated budget envelope. This constraint will be applied as necessary to ensure that the fiscal deficit remains below 4.0 percent of GDP.

MACROECONOMIC POLICY FOR 2027–2029

57. In our initial macroframework, economic activity was expected to remain robust over the period, assuming a good harvest, an improvement in the national security situation, the continuation of government measures to combat rising living costs, an easing of geopolitical tensions, the continued implementation of the RELANCE Plan 2026-2030, and favorable weather conditions.

58. Assuming the conflict persists in the medium term, the imbalances linked to rising production costs would continue, resulting in a lasting impact of the shock across the entire economy. The effects would include a slowdown in growth and significant inflationary pressure.

A. MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK

59. Economic growth is projected to be 6.1 percent in 2027. All of the sectors are expected to contribute to this growth: the primary sector (+6.3 percent), the tertiary sector (+6.3 percent), and the secondary sector (+5.2 percent). For 2028 and 2029, economic growth is projected to reach 5.5 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively. These trends are expected to be driven primarily by the tertiary sector (+6.5 percent), the primary sector (+4.6 percent), and the secondary sector

(+4.0 percent) in 2028. Growth is projected to be driven by the tertiary sector (+5.7 percent), the secondary sector (+4.4 percent), and the primary sector (+4.2 percent) in 2029.

60. In connection with the crisis, the growth rate is projected to decline by 1.1 percentage points, reaching 5.0 percent in 2027. It is then projected to reach 4.5 percent in 2028.

61. Inflation is projected to reach 1.7 percent in 2027 and for the remainder of the period. It is expected to remain below 3 percent throughout 2027-2029. Assuming that the conflict in the Middle East continues, the overall inflation rate is projected to be 2.1 percent in 2027.

62. Based on the assumption that the crisis in the Middle East will ease, projections anticipate an 8.0 percent decline in the price of a barrel of oil in 2027 and a 1.2 percent decline in 2028 and 2029. On the export side, the price of gold is expected to rise over the 2027-2029 period, but at a more moderate pace than in 2026—4.6 percent in 2027, 1.8 percent in 2028, and 4.7 percent in 2029. These favorable trends would lead to a steady increase in the current account surplus with the rest of the world over the 2027-2029 period. Thus, in 2027, the current account surplus is expected to increase to CFAF 3,035.3 billion, up from CFAF 2,315.5 billion in 2026. As a percentage of GDP, it would represent 15.7 percent, after 12.8 percent in 2026. It would remain stable in 2028 and stand at 17.3 percent in 2029.

B. FISCAL POLICY

63. Fiscal policy during the period is consistent with the guidelines of the 2027-2029 Multiyear Fiscal and Economic Programming Document (DPBEP). Strategic choices continue to be based on increasing the proportion of budget expenditure covered by internal revenues and the use of other forms of financing, in particular external financing in the form of budget support, the subregional financial market, and public-private partnerships.

64. **With regard to mobilizing internal resources**, the aim will be to continue modernizing procedures within revenue authorities in order to optimize tax yields, on the one hand, and to complete reforms aimed at substantially increasing the tax base, on the other.

65. The government will implement measures to improve the performance of revenue authorities. These reforms include the following, inter alia:

- overhaul of the information system used by the Directorate General of Taxes (DGI) for better interoperability of business software in order to drastically reduce tax loopholes;
- regular monitoring of the clearance of outstanding receivables;
- continuation of the rollout of certified electronic invoicing;
- continuation of the process of offsetting receivables and payables;
- enhancement of the operational capabilities of the SYC@D platform;
- routing of loads from interconnected networks;
- implementation of the integration of the customs IT system with scanners;

- rollout of the interconnection of Burkina Faso's customs IT systems with neighboring countries (Benin and Ghana);
- establishment of the Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) program;
- continuation of efforts aimed at the full computerization of customs offices;
- interfacing of the computer systems of the Directorate General of Customs, the Directorate General of Land and Maritime Transport, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Burkina Faso, the Burkinabè Shippers' Council, and the Custom Declaration System (CDS) of the BF Post;
- a bond for goods in transit to guarantee the duties and taxes due on the goods being transported from the office of departure.

66. **In terms of mobilizing external resources**, the assumption of an easing of financial conditions, compliance with commitments made with the IMF and other partners, access to various climate funds, and recourse to the regional financial market would give new impetus to the mobilization of additional resources. Cooperation with technical and financial partners will continue and be strengthened.

67. In 2027, revenues and expenditures are expected to represent 19.4 percent and 22.3 percent of GDP, respectively, leading to a financing requirement of 2.8 percent of GDP. Revenues are expected to reach CFAF 4,074.1 billion after CFAF 3,722.0 billion in 2026, an increase of 9.5 percent. This rise would be due to tax and other revenues.

68. **As for expenditures**, they are projected to reach CFAF 4,670.1 billion in 2027, up from CFAF 4,031.3 billion in 2026. Strategic choices are based primarily on optimizing the allocation of resources and improving the quality of budgeting for effective budget execution. Thus, efforts in priority sectors will be stepped up to ensure adequate production levels, in terms of both quantity and quality, of basic goods and services for the general population, particularly for the most disadvantaged groups. This will be done through the continued implementation of presidential initiatives, among other things. In addition, emphasis will be placed on the "defense and security" sector in order to make available the resources needed to address the security crisis. The modernization of public spending procedures will involve continuing the digitization of government contract award processes and of documents in the public expenditure chain.

69. **With regard to controlling payroll costs**, the main areas of focus are: (i) take recourse against supervisors who are too lax; (ii) train managers in disciplinary procedures, as well as rules regarding incompatibility and incapacity, so that they can take appropriate measures based on the situations observed; (iii) establish a mechanism to monitor and evaluate the measures taken by supervisors to ensure the effective application of the procedures set forth in the regulations; (iv) adopt a legal text to better regulate the system for monitoring the attendance of public officials; and (v) establish regular audits of the development, adoption, and implementation of HR tools within ministries and institutions, with a view to identifying gaps, best practices, and areas for improvement.

We will provide IMF staff with annual reconciliations between personnel records and payroll records at the Ministry of Education and other ministries covering approximately 50 percent of the civil service workforce (excluding the defense and security sector), or, on an alternating basis, at the

Ministry of Health and other ministries covering the remaining 50 percent of the civil service workforce (excluding the defense and security sectors) (end-September 2026 – new structural benchmark for the sixth review).

Debt Policy

70. The government intends to continue managing public debt prudently and efficiently through the implementation of the 2026-2028 Medium-Term Debt Strategy (MTDS), while strengthening the capacity of national stakeholders to adapt to changes in the international financial environment with a view to improving resource mobilization. The use of, among other things, a variety of instruments available in the financial market will be a key tool for meeting financing needs.

71. Accordingly, the outstanding public debt is projected to rise from CFAF 9,727.9 billion in 2027 to CFAF 11,254.5 billion in 2029, an increase of 15.7 percent. As a percentage of GDP, the debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to reach 46.6 percent in 2029, below the EU threshold of 70 percent, indicating a sustainable trajectory.

72. The implementation of the 2026-2028 MTDS will enable the government to mobilize adequate financial resources on terms consistent with debt sustainability in order to support the financing of structural investments, while contributing to the deepening of the regional financial market. Accordingly, the MTDS will aim to achieve an optimal balance between cost and risk, prioritizing concessional financing and diversifying funding sources.

73. The government's issuance policy for the period 2026-2028 will be geared towards reducing financing costs and extending the average maturity of the debt portfolio. It will also rely on stepped-up communications and investor relations efforts to enhance the visibility and attractiveness of the government's credit rating. The sovereign bond known as the Diaspora Bond, for example, aims to raise CFAF 125 billion from Burkinabés living abroad to help finance national development projects. This product also offers long maturities, with subscription rates of 6.75 percent for a five-year term and 6.85 percent for a seven-year term.

74. The main aims of the strategy can be summarized as follows: (i) continued use of concessional resources to finance the needs of the economy; (ii) use of non-concessional external borrowing, which will be used primarily to refinance the short part of the domestic debt and productive investments; and (iii) prioritization of the issuance of long-term securities on the regional financial market.

75. As for 2026, we have agreed to use the IMF staff's macro-budgetary framework for program monitoring purposes for the 2027–28 period, given the uncertainty surrounding the potential medium-term impact of the conflict in the Middle East on the Burkinabè economy. Based on IMF assumptions, real GDP growth is projected at 4.8 percent in 2027, supported by an improvement in the external environment. This growth in 2027 would be driven by all three sectors, with respective growth rates in the tertiary (5.2 percent), secondary (4.6 percent), and primary (3.2 percent) sectors. For the period 2028–30, the economy is also expected to record average growth of 4.8 percent.

Inflation is projected at 4.0 percent in 2027, before declining to 2.0 percent (and thus below 3 percent) over the period 2028–30.

OTHER STRUCTURAL REFORMS

A. PUBLIC FINANCE REFORMS

76. As part of the monitoring of the situation of payment institutions and the implementation of the debt clearance strategy, the government has developed an action plan and a clearance schedule with a view to implementing the recommendations resulting from the audit of all of the government's arrears and floating debts. A monitoring committee chaired by the Directorate General of the Treasury and Public Accounting (DGTCP) will ensure the implementation of the plan under the supervision of oversight bodies. The government has no payment arrears other than those related to VAT refunds (CFAF 36.0 billion). At the same time, the government will continue its efforts to improve cash management, planning, and transparency in order to avoid periods of tension and minimize the risk of further accumulation of payment arrears.

77. The government will continue efforts to launch the Treasury Single Account (TSA) and the Treasury Deposit Bank (BDT) and will strengthen information systems.

- **The scope of the TSA** will be broadened through the gradual integration of accounts for projects and programs and other public services by closing their accounts at commercial banks and through the repatriation of cash to the TSA. This expansion will be implemented in accordance with the conclusions of the impact study of the closure of project and program accounts at banks and the recommendations of the report to the Council of Ministers on the centralization of public funds. To date, the General Inspectorate of Finance has audited 1,853 deposit accounts. The streamlining of accounts opened at commercial banks for the benefit of financial administration tax collectors will continue.

- **Under the auspices of the Treasury Deposit Bank**, the e-banking system and the new deposit management information system have been implemented to streamline customer transactions. Additional measures are still being implemented to strengthen the banking sector. These include the issuance of debit cards, the launch of the Bank-to-Wallet service, the deployment of payment terminals at collection points, and the opening of ATMs.

  To limit the possible negative effects of the launching of the BDT on the national banking system, discussions will continue with the banking sector for a concerted effort aimed at the repatriation of term deposits from state-owned companies deposited in commercial banks. The deposits of state-owned enterprises held at the BDT will be remunerated on terms to be negotiated with the companies concerned.

- **With regard to information systems** (digitization, remote procedures, etc.), configuration work will continue to ensure the full operationalization of the transaction accounts of public accountants (customs and tax collectors) to supplement bank accounts within the framework of the Automated Interbank Clearing System (SICA) and Automated Transfer and Settlement System (STAR) of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).

78. To forecast, manage, and monitor cash flow and liquidity, the Ministry of the Economy and Finance has several mechanisms at its disposal, including the Weekly Cash Flow Committee and the Committee for Monitoring Budget Execution and Cash Flow (CSEBT). These various bodies use several tools, including the cash flow plan, the public securities issuance plan, and the state expenditure commitment plan. Meetings of these committees are held regularly and will be further strengthened.

79. In the area of governance and budget transparency, reforms were discussed during the sixth and seventh reviews of the ECF program. To this end, the proposed benchmarks are as follows:

Proposed Structural Benchmarks for the Sixth Review

- Provide IMF staff with annual reconciliations between personnel records and payroll records, on an alternating basis, either at the Ministry of Education and other ministries covering approximately 50 percent of the civil service (excluding the security sector) or at the Ministry of Health and the remaining ministries covering the other 50 percent of the civil service (excluding the security sector). (Proposed SB for end-September 2026)

- The Ministry of Mines has established a mechanism for the performance of annual internal audits by the Inspectorate of Energy and Mines (IDEM) in accordance with the internal audit standards of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the purpose of which is to audit the compliance, transparency, and effectiveness of the mining permit issuance processes. This mechanism should, among other things, allow for verification of the timely issuing of permits, adherence to procedural steps and other internal controls, the consistency of decisions, and the transparency of results. (Proposed SB for end-October 2026)

- The Supervising Authority for State Oversight and Combating Corruption (ASCE-LC) publishes the audit reports for the top five ministries (selected based on their risk level, as measured by the number of whistleblower reports and complaints per ministry) on its website. (Proposed SB for end-October 2026)

- The Ministry of Economics and Finance publishes on its webpage information on the contractors and beneficial owners of public procurement contracts for the purchase of fertilizers during May to July 2026. (Proposed SB for end-September 2026)

Proposed Structural Benchmarks for the Seventh Review

- The Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Quarries (MEMC), in conjunction with the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, implements integrity and transparency measures in the gold mining sector by strengthening disclosure requirements, specifically: the annual publication of information on the beneficial owners of contracts and transactions with state-owned companies involved in mining operations, as well as the annual publication of a summary report of the main conclusions and recommendations of independent audit reports of state-owned companies involved in mining operations. The authorities will provide IMF staff with an implementation note describing the adopted measures. (Proposed SB for end-December 2026)

- The Council of Ministers amends the decree regarding Treasury deposit accounts to explicitly define and limit the exemptions allowing for the opening of non-personalized accounts, to establish a formal written approval process for granting these exemptions, and to implement systematic reporting on the number, beneficiaries, and the duration of approved exemptions. (Proposed SB for end-December 2026)

- The Ministry of the Economy and Finance strengthens the enforcement of public procurement regulations by launching a digital procurement platform to facilitate the publication of calls for tenders and information on contract awards with the aim of increasing transparency and fostering competition in the market. (Proposed SB for end-December 2026)

- The National Institute of Statistics and Demography publishes the rebased GDP series on its website. (Proposed SB for end-December 2026)

- The Ministry of the Economy and Finance, required by law, publishes an annual comprehensive report on tax expenditures as an annex to the Budget Law. (Proposed SB for end-December 2026)

Proposed Structural Benchmarks for the Eighth Review

- The Autorité Supérieure de Contrôle d'État et de Lutte contre la Corruption (ASCE-LC) conducts an audit of the expenses on the purchase of fertilizers for the agricultural season 2026-27 (April 2026 to March 2027). The Ministry of Economics and Finance publishes the report on its webpage. (Proposed SB for end-July 2027)

80. Regarding deposit accounts for non-personalized services, the government adopted a decree in March 2024 to make the opening of such accounts subject to exceptions requiring the explicit authorization of the Minister of the Economy and Finance. To streamline existing accounts, an audit of the Treasury's deposit accounts was initiated, and a progress report on this audit was shared with IMF staff on January 12, 2026 (prior action). Finally, a note was shared with IMF staff on January 12, 2026 (prior action) regarding the details, implementation status, and overall objective of the streamlining.

81. Furthermore, the government reaffirms its commitment to promoting good governance in public financial management. In this context, the Court of Auditors will strive to publish the Annual Public Report on a regular basis in accordance with the deadlines set by the Organic Law. In addition, it commits to preparing its 2025 report on schedule and submitting it to the President of Burkina Faso. Following this, the report will be officially published on the Court of Auditors website. In February 2026, the Court began developing its new strategic plan (2026-2030) and action plan (2026-2028), with the aim of strengthening oversight of the proper and effective use of public resources.

Program Budget

82. The government will continue actions to implement the reforms introduced by Organic Law No. 073/CNT of November 6, 2015, on Budget Laws (LOLF) through the program budget. A total of 27 major innovations have been selected. In terms of results, 15 innovations have been fully implemented (55.6 percent), 9 are in the process of being implemented (33.3 percent), and 3 are awaiting implementation (11.1 percent).

New Mining Code and Local Content

83. Several major innovations have been introduced through **the revision of the mining code** in order to revitalize and strengthen the sector with a view to taking advantage of dividend yields and the sector's potential. To this end, the 19 decrees implementing the mining code have already been adopted. Among other things, these decrees address the procedures for opening up the capital of mining companies; the establishment of Burkina Faso's national gold reserve; the organization, regulation, and methods of artisanal mining; and the security of mining sites and mining activities. Pursuant to these decrees, two executive orders have been adopted, and 10 others are currently being drafted.

84. **The adoption of the law on local content** in 2024 will strengthen the gains made by the application of national preference through the 2015 mining code. Pursuant to Law No. 17-2024/ALT of July 18, 2024, all five of the five implementing decrees were adopted by the Council of Ministers. Two executive orders (concerning the establishment of a list of goods and services and the creation of a tripartite framework (government-mining companies-suppliers)) are already in effect. A draft executive order is currently being prepared to supplement the legal framework of the implementing regulations on local content.

85. In addition, the creation of the National Precious Substances Company (SONASP) in 2023, improvements in the security arrangements for production sites through the launch of the National Office for Mine Site Security (ONASSIM) in 2024, and better organization of artisanal mining have had positive effects on the sector in terms of total export volume and budgetary resources.

86. Looking ahead, the government will continue to adopt the remaining implementing regulations for the new mining code and local content requirements and will carry out information and awareness-raising initiatives regarding the changes introduced by these laws for stakeholders in the mining sector (suppliers of goods and services to mines, mining companies, subcontractors involved in mining operations, etc.).

Strengthening Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism

87. Following Burkina Faso's removal from the FATF grey list in October 2025, the National Financial Intelligence Unit (CENTIF) is consolidating its efforts in accordance with the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), with a focus on capacity development and the processing of suspicious activity reports (AML/CFT/FP).

88. The electronic platform for reporting beneficial ownership was officially launched on September 23, 2024, and went live in April 2025 in Burkina Faso to strengthen fiscal governance and transparency. Prior to its rollout, training sessions were organized for the relevant authorities, reporting entities, chambers of commerce, and legal, accounting, and tax professionals, covering the technical use of the platform as well as procedures for managing and verifying reports. A public service announcement was also aired to raise awareness among the general public and economic operators. The platform, accessible at rbe.gov.bf, includes two interfaces: a user interface for reporting entities and partners, and an administrative interface for managing departments. Three types of declarations are provided for: initial, corrective, and amended, accompanied by supporting documents (articles of incorporation, tax identification number, Commercial and Personal Property Credit Registry, identification documents). Access to the platform is open and free of charge. Between June 2025 and March 2026, 179 access requests were processed, primarily from banks, investigative agencies, and private sector entities, while 137 physical requests were received at the registry of the Ouagadougou Commercial Court.

Strengthening Social Protection and Resilience to Shocks while Reducing Poverty and Inequality

89. We have increased social spending, with a growing focus on capital expenditures. Social spending has risen steadily in recent years. The share of capital expenditures is rising, from 32.5 percent in 2023 to 43.2 percent in 2026, while the share of operating expenditures is falling, from 67.5 percent to 56.8 percent over the same period. This shift reflects the new vision of the highest authorities, which prioritizes structural projects that strengthen the resilience of vulnerable populations over interventions that amount to permanent welfare, thereby justifying a shift from current expenditures to capital expenditures. These trends are notably reflected in the following projects: (i) public health emergency actions and measures through the National Agency for Primary Health Care Management (AGSP); (ii) food security reserves, livestock food security, Project 2 of the Program to Strengthen Resilience to Food and Nutrition Insecurity in the Sahel (P2-P2RS); and (iii) Project to Support the Resilience of Populations Affected by the Humanitarian Crisis (PARPAH).

90. The implementation of the National Social Protection Strategy (SNPS), adopted in 2024, is being carried out under the auspices of the Permanent Secretariat of the National Council for Social Protection (SP-CNPS), the body responsible for coordinating social protection initiatives at the national level.

91. As of **December 31, 2025,** the following have taken place: (i) validation and adoption of a glossary of common concepts in the field of social protection in Burkina Faso; (ii) development and national validation of a conceptual and analytical framework for social protection in Burkina Faso; (ii) dissemination of the National Social Protection Strategy (SNPS) and its Operational Action Plan (OAP) to the Association of Regions of Burkina Faso (ARBF), the Association of Municipalities of Burkina Faso (AMBF), journalists and communicators in the field of social protection, as well as regional stakeholders; (iii) preparation of the 2023-2024 report on the state of social protection in Burkina Faso; (iv) convening of a session of the specialized interministerial unit responsible for social safety nets; (v) revitalization of regional social protection units; (vi) consultation forums between the SP-CNPS and NGOs/civil society organizations that are members of the Permanent Secretariat of NGOs (SPONG), as well as the SP-CNPS and government actors, and the SP-CNPS and the Forum of International Humanitarian Non-Governmental Organizations (FONGIH); and (vii) capacity development for stakeholders in the social protection sector.

92. Looking ahead to 2026, the following events are planned: (i) meetings of specialized interministerial working groups, regional social protection working groups, the Technical Committee of the National Council for Social Protection (CT-CNPS), and the CNPS, chaired by the Prime Minister; capacity development for social protection stakeholders; (ii) a framework for consultation between the SP-CNPS and the technical support teams in the social protection sector; (iii) a workshop on the adoption and dissemination of the conceptual and analytical framework for social protection; and (iv) a workshop to present the findings of the 2023-2024 report on the state of social protection in Burkina Faso.

93. Regarding the deployment of the Single Social Registry (RSU), its coverage has been extended. As of December 31, 2025, it is operational in 10 regions of Burkina Faso, namely Kadiogo, Nakambé, Nando, Yaadga, Djôrô, Oubri, Guiriko, Nazinon, Bankui, and Tannounyan, in 20 provinces, namely Boulgou, Kadiogo, Kourittenga, Koulpélogo, Boulkiemdé, Sanguié, Ziro, Sissili, Yatenga, Passoré, Poni, Noumbiel, Bougouriba, Bassitenga, Ganzourgou, Tuy, Bazèga, Mouhoun, Balé, and Léraba, and in 99 municipalities, including 74 rural ones.

94. In terms of households affected, 362,698 households living in poverty and vulnerability were recorded in the RSU database out of the 1,423,473 households targeted under the national plan, a gross rate of 25.5 percent as of end-December 2025. Of the registered households, 157,045 live in urban areas and 205,653 in rural areas. In terms of individuals, the RSU registered a total of 2,217,518 people, including 1,025,659 men and 1,191,859 women.

95. Looking ahead, plans are in place to continue: (i) the registration of 71,913 poor and vulnerable households in 11 municipalities, including three in Gourma Province, four in Sandbondtenga, one in Passoré, one in Zondoma, and two others in Bam; (ii) interoperability efforts with the West Africa Unique Identification for Regional Integration and Inclusion (WURI) project; (iii) efforts to integrate the SP/CONASUR and Technical Secretariat for the Single Social Registry (ST/RSU) databases to ensure the consistency and effectiveness of national systems; and (iv) the development of a methodology for continuous data collection by social workers and the operational rollout of this system.

96. To date, 27 requests for data sharing and use have been submitted to the ST/RSU. In total, 27,033 households are potential beneficiaries of support across the following areas of intervention: food security and household resilience, agricultural-forestry-pastoral production and livestock farming, education and the provision of scholarships, economic and social inclusion, child protection, and support for internally displaced persons. Users of RSU data include international organizations and NGOs (World Food Programme, UNICEF, Danish Refugee Council, Welthungerhilfe (WHH), Helen Keller International, Red Cross, Youth, Population, and Development Association in Burkina Faso (AJPOD/BF)) and government sectoral projects (Livestock Resilience and Competitiveness Project, or PRECEL, Executive Secretariat of the National Food Security Council, or SE-CNSA). Local authorities are increasingly using the RSU as a tool for social targeting, particularly for school scholarships, reflecting a gradual adoption of the system at the local level.

97. The status of the National Program to Support the Empowerment of Poor and Vulnerable Households (PAMPV) as of December 31, 2025, is as follows: (i) the operating manual was approved and adopted at a workshop held on December 29, 2025, by all stakeholders involved in the implementation; (ii) the order establishing the Program Management Unit (PMU), defining its responsibilities, and setting forth its operating procedures, as well as the order appointing members of the PMU, have been finalized and submitted through the administrative process for signature; and (iii) the Steering Committee has been established through an order on the creation of the Steering Committee, which has been signed and is available.

98. As of **March 31, 2026, the status of the PAMPV**, in addition to the achievements mentioned above, is as follows:

- As part of efforts to support the implementation of the PAMPV, the Ministry of Family and Solidarity received support from partners such as the World Food Programme-United Nations Children's Fund (WFP-UNICEF) consortium, funded by the German Development Cooperation (KfW), to carry out two studies, namely *a gender analysis study in its target areas and a study on the mechanisms for implementing economic inclusion measures in social protection in Burkina Faso*. The two studies were completed by consultants, and the draft reports were approved at a national workshop on March 17 and 18, 2026, respectively.
- As part of the implementation process, a train-the-trainer session was held for 30 national stakeholders, and three additional sessions on economic inclusion measures were conducted for 153 social workers from the Ministry of Solidarity. These social workers will be responsible for supporting the practical implementation of the program in the field.

99. **Looking ahead,** regional workshops for discussion and outreach on the PAMPV implementation process are scheduled for the first half of 2026 across all 17 regions of the country.

Rollout of the Universal Health Insurance Program (RAMU)

100. As part of the rollout of the RAMU, in addition to the decrees establishing the National Universal Health Insurance Fund (CNAMU) and approving its specific status, nine decrees on implementing the RAMU were adopted. In addition, three implementing orders for these decrees were also issued, as well as an order establishing a framework for consultation between the CNAMU and the Armed Forces Health Insurance Fund (CAMA) to ensure better communication.

101. As of March 4, 2026, a total of 507,766 insured individuals had been registered in the Integrated Management System for the Universal Health Insurance Program (SIGRAMU). As of that date, 411 employers had been registered with the RAMU.

The collection of contributions from 31,116 public employees enrolled in the RAMU began in September 2025, and after three months of contributions in accordance with the provisions of Article 58 of the RAMU Law, the entitlement to benefits for contributing insured persons in the pilot phase and their dependent family members has been in effect since February 1, 2026. As of February 28, 2026, a total of 80,267 people are eligible for RAMU health care benefits, including 31,116 contributing insured members and 49,151 dependent family members.

Funding for the implementation of the pilot phase comes from contributions by eligible individuals, a government grant, and support from technical and financial partners (SHSPRP[3] and the ILO project Building Social Protection Floors for All). It should be noted that agreements have also been signed with health care providers throughout the country.

102. Nevertheless, challenges remain regarding the full implementation of the RAMU, including the need to increase funding for its operations, digitize procedures, strengthen its information system and management tools, and gradually expand the RAMU's health care services to all public employees and other categories of insured individuals, etc.

Furthermore, the financial stability of the National Universal Health Insurance Fund (CNAMU) once it is fully operational is based on a principle of strict management of stable resources and healthcare expenditures, coupled with an external actuarial assessment at least every five years, which would allow for adjustments to contribution rates or the scope of reimbursed care in order to ensure long-term financial sustainability in the face of changing healthcare needs among the population.

B. REFORMS TO BUILD RESILIENCE TO CLIMATE CHANGE SHOCKS

103. As part of the ongoing implementation of the reform measures under the RSF-supported program, efforts to secure technical assistance from the IMF will continue in order to support the institutions affected by the reform measures. Thus, the technical assistance to be mobilized in the coming weeks involves RM2, RM6, RM7, and RM8 as shown in the reform measures matrix (Table 3).

- A tentative schedule of technical assistance field visits was shared by the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department with the government delegation during the 2026 Spring Meetings held in Washington from April 13 to 18, so that the necessary arrangements could be made to ensure

[3] Strengthening Health System Performance and Resilience Project, funded by the World Bank.

the missions proceeded smoothly. Thus, for the RM3 assessment, the technical assistance took place from April 22 to 30, and for RM4/RM5, the technical assistance is scheduled for May 11 to 22, 2026, to develop capacity for integrating climate considerations into public investment management guidelines. As for RM2/RM6/RM7/RM8, the tentative dates for technical assistance have been proposed between late June and early September 2026.

C. OTHER REFORMS

Energy Sector

104. One of the government's top priorities is to increase electricity production in order to avoid load shedding during the hot season and to support growth in the years to come. With regard to interconnections, the government will continue its electricity interconnection policy with Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and the Togo/Benin CEB.[4] In terms of energy policy in 2026 and in the medium term, the energy sector strategy is in line with Burkina Faso's commitments at the international, regional, and subregional levels, which are focused on guaranteeing sustainable access to modern energy services supporting sustainable development. To this end, a new national energy strategy aimed at energy sovereignty is being adopted for the period 2026-2030, after the evaluation of the previous one.

105. To increase energy supply, the following measures will strengthen Burkina Faso's resilience: (i) the expansion of the Komsilga power plant through two phases of 50 MW each; (ii) the construction, under a PPP arrangement, of a 200 MW power plant at Ouagadougou, a 100 MW power plant at Bobo-Dioulasso, and solar power plants at Donsin, Koudougou, Matourkou, Pâ, Dédougou, and Zagtouli 2 with a combined capacity of 160 MW including storage; and (iii) the continuation of interconnections with neighboring countries. In the medium and long term, there are also plans to strengthen production capacity and the evacuation system.

106. With regard to the improvement of commercial management, completion of the study of customer segmentation will make it possible to differentiate among the categories of customers according to how electricity is used and to propose pricing that optimizes the subsidy provided by the state while consolidating SONABEL's financial situation.

Implementation of Performance Contracts

107. With regard to **the government–SONABEL agreement**, an interministerial monitoring committee has been established, and a report evaluating the achievements of the first year has been submitted to that committee for approval. In addition, to better address issues related to energy sovereignty, a revision of the contractual plan is slated for 2026.

In terms of implementing the contractual plan, the following flagship projects will help strengthen the power system: (i) the actual commissioning of the 50 MW Pabré power plant under a PPP

[4] The Benin Electricity Community (CEB) is the power system shared by Togo and Benin.

arrangement in May 2026; (ii) the ongoing construction of the first phase of the 50 MW Komsilga power plant expansion project, which is scheduled to come online by the end of 2026; (iii) the ongoing construction of PPP power plant projects at Bobo 2 (24 MW), Koudougou (25 MW), and Kaya (25 MW), which are scheduled to come online in the second quarter of 2026; and (iv) the digitization of several services through digital platforms and a complaint management mechanism (SONABEL e-service desk, call center, e-recruitment, etc.).

108. The contractual plan between the government and the National Hydrocarbons Company of Burkina Faso (SONABHY) for the period 2023-2027 came into force on January 1, 2023. The implementation of the plan over the period 2023-2025 shows that SONABHY has substantially increased its operational capacity by (i) constructing tanks and storage spheres for petroleum products in Péni and Bingo; (ii) acquiring the Tema Multi-Purpose Terminal in Ghana to strengthen its off-site storage capacity; and (iii) continuing construction work on the depots in Kaya, Koupéla, and Pô.

In addition, SONABHY is streamlining the organization of hydrocarbon transportation in Burkina Faso by implementing its new transportation policy. Among the measures taken, we can highlight driver training, the introduction of new trucks, the optimization of fleet size by carrier, and the tracking of tanker trucks.

Furthermore, SONABHY regularly carries out safety and awareness-raising activities through thematic workshops in the different regions of Burkina Faso to defend its monopoly and combat hydrocarbon fraud.

109. The government, meanwhile, continues to streamline its financial relations with SONABHY while providing regular support to help secure funding from financial partners.

Tariff Policy and Trade Restrictions

110. A 0.5 percent import tax, decided on jointly by the AES member countries and referred to as the PC-AES, came into force on March 31, 2025, and it is now in effect. It is intended solely to finance AES activities. The pre-existing trade restrictions, namely: (i) the extension of import quotas to all similar products manufactured or produced locally; (ii) the suspension of exports of shea nuts, raw cashews, and tomatoes; (iii) the ban on the export of grains, cowpeas, and grain flour; (iv) the ban on the import of weaving yarns and woven fabrics; and (v) the ban on the import of wheat flour remain in effect. All of these trade restrictions are intended to support local industry and ensure food security.

111. On April 29, 2026, a ban on rice imports was introduced to protect domestic production, support local producers, and facilitate the sale of stocks accumulated during recent crop seasons. This measure was not adopted for balance of payments reasons. All of these trade restrictions are intended to support local industry as well as food security and do not constitute restrictions based on balance of payments considerations.

Furthermore, the government has lifted the suspension of exports of raw cashews and tomatoes. It is exploring other options to support and strengthen local industry.

112. The government has a National Industrialization Strategy (SNI 2026-2030) with the overall objective of "promoting the development and consolidation of a competitive, diversified industrial base that creates decent jobs and value-added for a resilient economy." The SNI is organized around four key areas:

Key Area 1: Development of value chains in the manufacturing subsector
Key Area 2: Development of support infrastructure tailored to the manufacturing industry
Key Area 3: Financing the development of the manufacturing subsector
Key Area 4: Strengthening governance in the manufacturing subsector

The SNI has a total cost of CFAF 390.4 billion, and funding will be provided by the state budget, development partners, and beneficiaries.

Improvement of Macroeconomic Monitoring

113. With the support and financial assistance of the World Bank, through the Harmonizing and Improving Statistics in West Africa (HISWA) project, and technical assistance from the Economic and Statistical Observatory for Sub-Saharan Africa (AFRISTAT), the government has made significant progress in modernizing the national statistical system. The National Institute of Statistics and Demography (INSD) initiated the process of updating the base year for the national accounts, with 2022 as the new base year. The rebasing work began in 2023 and continued through 2024 and 2025. In September 2025, the provisional accounts for the new 2022 base year were available and underwent peer review at a workshop held from September 8 to 12, 2025, in Ouagadougou. This assessment involved two peer countries (Senegal and Togo) and partner institutions at the international level (AFRISTAT, IMF, World Bank, African Development Bank, UN Economic Commission for Africa, WAEMU, and African Union Institute for Statistics) and at the national level (Central Bank of West African States/National Directorate, DGTCP, and Directorate General of the Economy and Planning). The final results of the 2022 accounts have been available since December 2025 on the INSD website.[5] The final accounts for the first current year 2023 are currently being validated. Backcasting work has been under way since October 2025 and will continue throughout 2026 in order to establish a long-term time series using the new base year. Work will begin on aligning the quarterly national accounts (QNAs) with a view to switching them to the new base year in the course of the same year.

114. In addition, actions are being implemented to strengthen the automated forecasting instrument (AFI). The micro-simulation module (Microsim), integrating the recent results of the Harmonized Survey on Household Living Standards (EHCVM), has now been implemented and is

[5] https://www.insd.bf/sites/default/files/20262/CNA_2022Base2022_Key%20results%20and%20analysis%20of%20the%20impacts%20of%20the%20revision%20on%20GDP%20level_0.pdf.

operational. It measures the impact of the growth projected in the macroeconomic framework on socio-economic indicators, particularly poverty. In addition, with technical assistance (from AFRITAC/IMF and the World Bank) work is under way to develop a methodology for quantifying the fiscal risks associated with natural disasters.

This work is expected to result in the incorporation of natural disasters and climate change into forecasting and simulation tools (AFI, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models) in order to enable simulations of the impact of these risks on the economy and, in particular, on public finances. In addition, the release of final data for the first year of the current period (2023) and backcast series for the new base year (2022) of the national accounts will enable work to begin on incorporating them into the AFI model, thereby providing macroeconomic forecasts based on the new economic structure.

A model for forecasting quarterly GDP is currently being implemented as well. This model uses QNA data and will complement the AFI by providing sub-annual macroeconomic projections for monitoring economic conditions.

115. The growing importance of gold mining in Burkina Faso's economy underscores the need to strengthen monitoring and data collection regarding gold mining operations, whether industrial, artisanal, or semi-mechanized. First, we recognize the need to update the survey of the mining sector and the methodology used to transform sector-level data into aggregates that can be used to track the impact of gold mining (and mining in general) on GDP and other components of the national accounts. We requested technical assistance from the IMF in this area during the first quarter of 2026 and express our interest in continuing the IMF staff's analysis of this issue as part of the 2026 Article IV consultations (including a review of options for managing windfall revenues related to the current upturn in the gold sector and the development of appropriate hedging strategies against a potential slowdown in the gold market).

Timeliness in the Transmission of Data

116. Efforts will be stepped up to improve compliance with the schedule for publication of budget data and the frequency of publication of external data and to increase budget allocations for the reimbursement of VAT credits.

PROGRAM ARRANGEMENTS

117. The government will take all measures required to achieve the targets and meet the criteria as presented in Tables 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, and 3 of this Memorandum. The program will be evaluated on the basis of these tables in accordance with the Technical Memorandum of Understanding, which defines the quantitative performance criteria and the requirements with regard to communication of data to IMF staff. The sixth and seventh reviews are expected to be completed on or after September 30, 2026, and March 31, 2027, respectively.

118. In the event of a shock, to achieve the fiscal anchoring of the program, the government undertakes to review its fiscal policy by basing it on one of the alternative scenarios (pessimistic or optimistic) in the 2027-2029 DPBEP. More specifically, given an adverse scenario in which it is not possible to meet the quantitative performance criteria (due to disruptions in economic activity, increased spending pressures, and rising borrowing costs on the regional market), the government is ready to implement measures, including fiscal adjustment (or even possible reductions in public investments), to mitigate risks to public finance and debt sustainability and to reach a fiscal deficit of 3.3 percent of GDP by 2027, in line with the fiscal anchoring of the program.

MEFP Table 1a. Burkina Faso: Quantitative Performance Criteria and Indicative Targets for ECF Arrangement, 2025

(CFAF billions)

	2025															
	Mar. 1/			June				Sept. 1/				Dec.			
	Prog.	Prel.	Status	Prog.	Prog. (Adj.)	Prel.	Status	Prog.	Prog. (Adj.)	Prel.	Status	Prog.	Prog. (Adj.)	Prel.	Status
Quantitative Performance Criteria 2/															
Ceiling on net domestic financing of the government 3/ 4/	140.6	32.0	Met	220.0	220.0	150.6	Met	340.0	340.0	155.9	Met	418.0	410.3	73.2	Met
Ceiling on the amount of external debt contracted or guaranteed by the government (PV) 3/ 5/ 6/ 7/	410.0	74.5	Met	410.0	410.0	289.7	Met	410.0	410.0	357.5	Met	410.0	410.0	297.2	Met
Ceiling on the accumulation of external payment arrears by the government 8/	-	-	Met	-	-	-	Met	-	-	-	Met	-	-	-	Met
Ceiling on the guaranteeing of new domestic loans to suppliers and contractors by the government 8/	-	-	Met	-	-	-	Met	-	-	-	Met	-	-	-	Met
Ceiling on government guarantees of new bank pre-financing for public investments 8/	-	-	Met	-	-	-	Met	-	-	-	Met	-	-	-	Met
Ceiling on the primary fiscal deficit including grants 3/ 4/	90.4	0.9	Met	100.0	141.3	83.3	Met	140.0	241.8	46.5	Met	280.0	280.0	70.8	Met
Indicative Targets															
Ceiling on the accumulation of domestic arrears by the government 8/	-	61.4	Not met	50.0	50.0	21.0	Met	30.0	30.0	10.2	Met	-	-	36.0	Not met
Floor on total government revenue 3/	661.3	655.1	Not met	1,450.0	1,450.0	1,529.2	Met	2,200.0	2,200.0	2,462.8	Met	3,080.0	3,080.0	3,617.4	Met
Floor on poverty-reducing current social expenditures 3/	82.8	79.5	Not met	140.0	140.0	174.7	Met	220.0	220.0	245.1	Met	290.0	290.0	307.3	Met
Ceiling on the stock of unpaid, certified VAT refunds older than 30 days	40.0	57.1	Not met	40.0	40.0	34.7	Met	40.0	40.0	43.0	Not met	40.0	40.0	39.6	Met
Ceiling on primary current expenditure 3/	492.4	460.8	Met	1,050.0	1,050.0	1,059.9	Not met	1,600.0	1,600.0	1,577.9	Met	2,150.0	2,150.0	2,260.6	Not met
Ceiling on domestically financed investment expenditure 3/					-				-						
Ceiling on the value of PPPs contracted 3/	200.0	-	Met	200.0	200.0	-	Met	200.0	200.0	84.7	Met	200.0	200.0	84.8	Met
Memorandum Item															
Net external financing 4/	N/A	31.8	N/A	52.0	52.0	93.3	N/A	52.0	52.0	147.6	N/A	204.0	204.0	211.7	N/A

Sources: Burkinabè authorities; IMF staff estimates and projections.

1/ March and September figures are indicative targets, except for continuous performance criteria. June and December figures are performance criteria.

2/ The Standard Continuous Performance Criteria will also apply: (i) not to impose new or modify existing restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions; (ii) not to introduce new or intensify existing multiple currency practices; (iii) not to conclude bilateral payments agreement that are inconsistent with the IMF's Articles of Agreement (Article VIII); and (iv) not to impose new or intensify existing import restrictions for balance of payments reasons.

3/ Cumulative from beginning of the year.

4/ Targets for June, Septmeber, and December 2025 are subject to adjustment in relation to net external financing, as defined in the TMU.

5/ The limit is not tied to specific projects.

6/ Will be increased by the present value of the full amount of any concessional loan used for debt management purposes as specified in the TMU.

7/ Any borrowing in FX will be converted to CFAF using the year average exchange rate.

8/ To be observed continuously.

MEFP Table 1b. Burkina Faso: Proposed Quantitative Performance Criteria and Indicative Targets for ECF Arrangement, 2026-27

(CFAF billions)

	2026							2027	
	Mar. 1/				June	Sept. 1/	Dec.	Mar. 1/	June
	Prog.	Prog. (Adj.)	Prel.	Status	Prog.	Prog.	Prog.	Prog.	Prog.
Quantitative Performance Criteria 2/									
Ceiling on net domestic financing of the government 3/ 4/	160.0	160.0	-133.5	Met	270.0	330.0	470.0	160.0	270.0
Ceiling on the amount of external debt contracted or guaranteed by the government (PV) 3/ 5/ 6/ 7/ 8/	410.0	410.0	97.1	Met	410.0	410.0	410.0	510.0	510.0
Ceiling on the accumulation of external payment arrears by the government 9/	-	-	-	Met	-	-	-	-	-
Ceiling on the guaranteeing of new domestic loans to suppliers and contractors by the government 9/	-	-	-	Met	-	-	-	-	-
Ceiling on government guarantees of new bank pre-financing for public investments 9/	-	-	-	Met	-	-	-	-	-
Ceiling on the primary fiscal deficit including grants 3/ 4/	190.0	137.0	-168.2	Met	230.0	325.0	375.0	190.0	225.0
Indicative Targets									
Ceiling on the accumulation of domestic arrears by the government 9/	-	-	12.9	Not met	-	-	-	-	-
Floor on total government revenue 3/ 10/	710.0	710.0	763.2	Met	1,560.0	2,360.0	3,250.0	780.0	1,720.0
Floor on poverty-reducing current social expenditures 3/ 11/	75.0	75.0	75.0	Met	150.0	225.0	300.0	75.0	150.0
Ceiling on the stock of unpaid, certified VAT refunds older than 30 days	40.0	40.0	12.9	Met	40.0	40.0	40.0	45.0	45.0
Ceiling on primary current expenditure 3/ 10/	510.0	510.0	465.9	Met	1,225.0	1,870.0	2,520.0	650.0	1,300.0
Ceiling on the value of PPPs contracted 3/	200.0	200.0	-	Met	200.0	200.0	200.0	205.0	205.0
Memorandum Item									
Net external financing 4/	80.0	80.0	27.0	N/A	125.0	225.0	274.6	65.0	120.0

Sources: Burkinabè authorities; IMF staff estimates and projections.

1/ March and September figures are indicative targets, except for continuous performance criteria. June and December figures are performance criteria.

2/ The Standard Continuous Performance Criteria will also apply: (i) not to impose new or modify existing restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions; (ii) not to introduce new or modify existing multiple currency practices; (iii) not to conclude bilateral payments agreement that are inconsistent with the IMF's Articles of Agreement (Article VIII); and (iv) not to impose new or intensify existing import restrictions for balance of payments reasons.

3/ Cumulative from beginning of the year.

4/ Targets for March, June, September, and December 2026 and March and June 2027 are subject to adjustment in relation to net external financing, as defined in the TMU.

5/ The limit is not tied to specific projects.

6/ Will be increased by the present value of the full amount of any concessional loan used for debt management purposes as specified in the TMU.

7/ Any borrowing in FX will be converted to CFAF using the year average exchange rate.

8/ The program exchange rate to be applied in evaluating this performance criterion for the end-March and end-June 2026 targets is 580.53 CFA francs per U.S. dollar, as specified in the TMU.

9/ To be observed continuously.

10/ Excludes the Patriotic Support Fund in 2026.

11/ Validated committed amount in 2026.

MEFP Table 2a. Burkina Faso: Continuous Structural Benchmarks, 2023–27

Benchmarks	Objective	Timeline	Progress
Do not grant any new wage agreement (except for the security sector) that could impact the wage bill trajectory and push it beyond 45 percent of tax revenues by 2027.	Wage bill control.	Continuous structural benchmark.	Met.
Publish information on the beneficial owners of entities awarded public procurement contracts to address food insecurity on the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Perspective's website on a quarterly basis the quarter after the contract is awarded.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	Continuous structural benchmark.	Met. The information is published in the Revue des marchés publics (No. 4223 (September 9, 2025), and No. 4315 (January 15, 2026).
Publish on the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Perspective's website annual (and to the extent possible, quarterly) budget execution reports.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	Continuous structural benchmark.	Met.
Share an exhaustive list of treasury deposit accounts ("comptes de dépôts du trésor") with balances and the net position of the government as standard annexes to the TOFE on a quarterly basis, allowing the identification of those opened for the benefit of non-personalized services.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	Continuous structural benchmark. Starting with the data for end-June 2025.	Met.

MEFP Table 2b. Burkina Faso: Structural Benchmarks and Prior Actions, 2023–26

Benchmark	Objective	Completion date	Status
First Review			
Adopt performance contracts with SONABHY and SONABEL.	Improve efficiency in the energy sector.	End-December 2023.	Not met. Implemented with delay in June and October 2024.
Second Review			
Adopt the tripartite performance contract between the government, SONABHY and SONABEL.	Improve efficiency in the energy sector.	Prior action	Met on December 3, 2024.
Conduct a review of energy subsidies and an assessment of the application of the price mechanism to move towards a reduction in subsidies over the program period.	Improve efficiency in the energy sector and reduce fiscal risks.	End-June 2024.	Met
Publish an audit of all the government arrears and floating spending on the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Perspective's website.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	End-June 2024.	Not met. Implemented with delay in November 2024.
Raise the ceiling on VAT credit reimbursements to the CAST account to a level consistent to avoid accumulation of arrears.	Reduce fiscal risks.	End-June 2024.	Met
Third review			
Clear arrears that have been audited, amounting to CFAF 43.4 billion at end-December 2023 (ASCE-LC audit report)	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	**Prior action**	Met on May 28, 2025.
Share the exhaustive list of Treasury Deposit Accounts as of March 2025, including their balances and the government's net position.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	**Prior action**	Met on May 22, 2025.
Prepare and adopt a strategy for clearing government arrears.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	**Prior action**	Met on May 22, 2025.
Submit the draft budget for the next fiscal year in line with program objectives, including a budget document or annex detailing plans to combat climate change and climate-related budget appropriations, based on an agreed climate budget tagging methodology.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	End-December 2024.	Met.
Adopt a new strategic plan for revenue mobilization for the period 2024–27, based on the 2021 self-assessment.	Improve domestic revenue mobilization.	End-December 2024.	Met.
Contain wage bill growth to ensure that the wage bill to tax revenue ratio is below 51.8 percent.	Wage bill control.	End-December 2024.	Met.
Present to IMF staff alternating annual reconciliations between personnel registers and payroll registers either at the level of the Ministry of Education and other ministries covering around 50 percent of the civil service workforce (excluding the security sector), or, in alternation, at the level of the Ministry of Health and the rest of other ministries covering the remaining around 50 percent of the civil service workforce (excluding the security sector).	Wage bill control.	End-December 2024.	Met. The report on the reconciliation covering 2024 was submitted to Fund staff on March 26, 2025. 1/

MEFP Table 2b. Burkina Faso: Structural Benchmarks and Prior Actions, 2023–26 (Continued)

Benchmark	Objective	Completion Date	Status
Fourth Review			
Share with IMF staff an interim report on the ongoing audit of the treasury deposit accounts.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	**Prior action**	Met on January 12, 2026.
Share with IMF staff a progress note on decisions taken by the government to rationalize treasury deposit accounts that have been audited and the status of the process at end-December 2025.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	**Prior action**	Met on January 12, 2026.
Publish a governance strategy document that includes the action plan, prepared in consultation with IMF staff, to implement priority recommendations of the GDA report.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	**Prior action**	Met on January 14, 2026.
Put in place a beneficial ownership registry accessible to government authorities and financial institutions with customer due diligence obligations.	Improve governance and the fight against money laundering and terrorism financing.	End-June 2025	Met.
Present a concrete energy sector reform to rationalize energy subsidies, enhance transparency, and improve energy sector efficiency, including an implementation timeline.	Improve efficiency in the energy sector and reduce fiscal risks.	End-June 2025	Not met. Implemented with delay in July 2025.
Publish the final report of the IMF Governance Diagnostic Assessment (GDA) mission.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	End-June 2025	Not met. Dropped in the fourth ECF Review.

MEFP Table 2b. Burkina Faso: Structural Benchmarks and Prior Actions, 2023–26 (Continued)

Benchmark	Objective	Completion date	Status
Fourth Review (Concluded)			
Prepare, in consultation with IMF staff, and adopt a time-bound action plan to implement priority recommendations from the GDA report.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	End-October 2025	Met.
Share with IMF staff the report on a value-for-money audit of public procurement by the High Authority for State Control and the Fight Against Corruption (ASCE-LC) of the five largest public procurement contracts, covering at least two different ministries outside the defense and security sectors, to assess their legality and value for money.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	End-June 2025	Met.
Adopt and share with IMF staff an action plan to implement key recommendations of the public procurement audit, including the responsible institutions and an implementation timeline, within a maximum period of 4 months fromthe availability of the final report.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	End-October 2025	Met.
Fifth Review			
Submit to IMF staff a report on the implementation of the action plan to address issues in public procurement identified through the audit of the five largest public procurement contracts.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	End-December 2025	Met.
Adopt and share with IMF staff operational plans with timelines for each action to foster integrity at the General Directorate of Taxes (DGI) and the General Directorate of Customs (DGD). These plans will include: (i) the dissemination and training of all staff on the codes of ethics of the tax and customs administration; (ii) the publication of these codes on the websites of the two general directorates; (iii) disciplinary councils and the anti-corruption committees of those structures; as well as (iv) maintaining annual statistics on offenses and disciplinary measures.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	End-December 2025	Met.
Contain wage bill growth to ensure that the wage bill to tax revenue ratio is below 49.5 percent.	Wage bill control.	End-December 2025	Met.
Sixth Review			
Present to IMF staff alternating annual reconciliations between personnel registers and payroll registers either at the level of the Ministry of Education and other ministries covering around 50 percent of the civil service workforce (excluding the security sector), or, in alternation, at the level of the Ministry of Health and the rest of other ministries covering the remaining around 50 percent of the civil service workforce (excluding the security sector).	Wage bill control.	End-September 2026	

MEFP Table 2b. Burkina Faso: Newly Proposed Structural Benchmark, 2026 (Continued)

Benchmark	Objective	Completion date	Status
Sixth Review			
The Ministry of Mines establishes an annual internal auditing mechanism by the Inspection de l'Énergie et des Mines (IDEM) in conformity with the standards of the International Institute of Internal Audit (IIA). The audit's object is the compliance, transparency, and efficiency of mining permit processes. The auditing mechanism will notably allow for the verification of the timeliness of permit issuance, adherence to procedural steps and other internal controls, consistency of decisions, and transparency of outcomes.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	End-October 2026	
The Autorité Supérieure de Controle d'État et de Lutte Contre la Corruption (ASCE-LC) publishes its reports on the audits of the first five ministries (which were selected relative to their risk as measured by the number of whistleblower reports and complaints per ministry) on its webpage.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	End-October 2026	
The Ministry of Economics and Finance publishes on its webpage information on the contractors and beneficial owners of public procurement contracts for the purchase of fertilizers during May to July 2026.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	End-September 2026	
Seventh Review			
The Ministry of Mines jointly with the Ministry of Economics and Finance implements integrity and transparency measures in the gold mining sector by strengthening disclosure requirements, namely the annual publication of beneficial ownership information for contracts, and transactions with state-owned companies (SOEs) involved in mining operations as well as the annual publication of a summary report of the main conclusions and recommendations of independent audit reports of SOEs involved in mining operations. The authorities will share with IMF staff an implementation note describing the measures adopted.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	End-December 2026	
The Cabinet of Ministers amends the order on treasury deposit accounts to explicitly define and limit the exemptions under which non-personalized accounts may be opened; establish a formal written approval process for granting such exemptions; and put in place systematic reporting on the number, beneficiaries, and duration of approved exemptions.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	End-December 2026	
The Ministry of Economics and Finance strengthens the application of public procurement regulations by operationalizing a digital procurement platform to support the publication of tenders and contract award information, with the objective of increasing transparency and competitive procurement.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	End-December 2026	
The National Institute of Demography and Statistics publishes the rebased GDP series on its webpage.	Improve macroeconomic data transparency.	End-December 2026	
The Ministry of Economics and Finance, pursuant to a legal provision, publishes an annual comprehensive report on tax expenditures as an annex to the Budget (*Loi de finance*).	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	End-December 2026	

MEFP Table 2b. Burkina Faso: Newly Proposed Structural Benchmark, 2027 (Concluded)

Benchmark	Objective	Completion date	Status
Eighth Review			
The Autorité Supérieure de Contrôle d'État et de Lutte contre la Corruption (ASCE-LC) conducts an audit of the expenses on the purchase of fertilizers for the agricultural season 2026-27 (April 2026 to March 2027). The Ministry of Economics and Finance publishes the report on its webpage.	Improve fiscal transparency and governance.	End-July 2027	

1/ As the reconciliation was based on data for all of 2024, the authorities submitted the report in the shortest possible time.

MEFP Table 3. Burkina Faso: Reform Measures under the RSF

Reform Measures			Target Date	Review Timeframe	Diagnostic Reference	TA provider 1/	Prospective BoP risk reduction
Pillar 1: Strengthen Fiscal Transparency and Resilience							
RM1	Disaster risk finance strategy	The MEF and the MAHSN (SP CONASUR) in collaboration with other relevant agencies will draft, adopt by ministerial order, and publish on their website a National Disaster Risk Finance Strategy, with an implementation plan including actions to strengthen agricultural resilience.	15-Mar-26	1st RSF / 5th ECF Review	CPD (IMF), Economic Update 2023 (WB), CCIA (WB), CCDR (WB)	FAD CP	*Fiscal and external stability.* A data-driven and transparent approach to climate-related fiscal risks is expected to reduce the likelihood of abrupt fiscal adjustments or external emergency financing needs, lowering the probability of sharp current account deteriorations or reserve drawdowns. The disaster risk finance strategy will improve access to external financing on more favorable terms. The publication of the fiscal impacts of shocks and strengthening of the fiscal risks statement will support fiscal planning and more effective integration of disaster risks into macro-fiscal policy, which will contribute to a more stable external position by smoothing the fiscal-external transmission of climate shocks.
RM2	Fiscal data on disaster impacts	The MEF and the MAHSN (SP CONASUR) in collaboration with other relevant agencies will establish and maintain a database tracking the fiscal costs of climate-related disaster response. A summary of the database will be published in the climate chapter of the Fiscal Risks Statement. The database will initially be populated with at least two past disaster events.	15-Mar-27	3rd RSF / 7th ECF Review	CPD (MF), Economic Update 2023 (WB), CCIA (WB), CCDR (WB)	FAD CP	
RM3	Fiscal Risk Statement	Starting with the 2027 budget, the MEF will prepare and include in the published fiscal risk statement (FRS) annexed to the budget a quantitative assessment of medium-term fiscal risks related to natural disasters.	15-Mar-27	3rd RSF / 7th ECF Review	C-PIMA (IMF)	WB & FAD M2	

MEFP Table 3. Burkina Faso: Reform Measures under the RSF (Continued)

Pillar 2: Resilient Public Investment							
RM4	Integrate climate into PIM guide	The MEF & MEEA issue a joint ministerial order providing mandatory and explicit guidelines on taking climate considerations into account in the appraisal and selection of major infrastructure projects, in line with C-PIMA recommendations.	15-Sep-26	2nd RSF / 6th ECF Review	C-PIMA (IMF)	FAD M2	*Fiscal and external stability.* Through embedding climate criteria into the appraisal of large infrastructure projects, the reforms aim to ensure that public capital is directed toward resilient infrastructure that protects export capacity and reduces vulnerability to import surges (due to infrastructure equipment imports after disasters). Asset maintenance reforms that account for climate risks are expected to help preserve infrastructure functionality and avoid costly reconstruction needs as well as potential imports.
RM5	Integrate climate into PIM guide	Following integration of the guidelines, at least three major infrastructure projects with climate exposure will be appraised under the revised process, receive a notice of compliance from CNV, and be selected by CTA for inclusion in the PIP.	15-Mar-27	3rd RSF / 7th ECF Review	C-PIMA (IMF)	FAD M2	
RM6	Integrate climate into asset maintenance	The MEF, in collaboration with DGAIE, the Ministry of Infrastructure and the MATM, develops and adopts a methodology for assessing maintenance needs and costs in at least three ministries with climate-exposed projects, and integrates climate risk considerations into the methodology, in line with C-PIMA recommendations.	15-Mar-27	3rd RSF / 7th ECF Review	C-PIMA (IMF)	FAD M2	
RM7	Integrate climate into asset maintenance	Apply the adopted methodology in three pilot ministries with major infrastructure projects exposed to climate risks.	15-Aug-27	4th RSF / 8th ECF Review	C-PIMA (IMF)	FAD M2	

MEFP Table 3. Burkina Faso: Reform Measures under the RSF (Continued)

Pillar 3: Resilient Utilities Provision and Management							
RM8	Expand storage of renewable energy	The MEF, in collaboration with the MEMC and ARSE, will publish the 2027 budget with a revised package of fiscal incentives for renewable energy projects, with a focus on integrated storage.	15-Mar-27	3rd RSF / 7th ECF Review	CPD (FMI), Eco Update 2025 (WB), CCIA (WB)	WB & FAD CP	*Fiscal and external stability.* The revised fiscal incentives for renewables with integrated storage are expected to help lead to more reliable domestic power production and private investment. This is expected to reduce reliance on imported fossil fuels and electricity. In parallel, financial sustainability and governance of the public water utility is expected to strengthen water service provision, moderate fiscal pressures, and improve the efficiency of public investment in water infrastructure as well as its ongoing management, all contributing to strengthening external sustainability.
RM9	Water SOE Reform	Produce an evaluation report by ASCE-LC confirming that the accounting, financial, and administrative weaknesses identified in the 2023 Annual General Activity Report (RAGA) concerning ONEA have been corrected, in order to strengthen the company’s financial sustainability and institutional governance.	15-Aug-27	4th RSF / 8th ECF Review	CPD, Eco Update 2025 (WB), CCIA (WB)		

MEFP Table 3. Burkina Faso: Reform Measures under the RSF (Concluded)

Pillar 4: Climate Data and Finance							
RM10	Strengthen Hazard Data	The MEF and the MATM adopt a ministerial order mandating the publication of hazard and climate risk maps developed by government entities on the MATM website including the requirement for continuous disclosure.	15-Mar-26	1st RSF / 5th ECF Review	CPD, CCIA, Sahel CCDR		*Fiscal and external stability*. Publicly available hazard and risk information will strengthen the integration of climate risks into planning for infrastructure and urban development, which is expected to reduce costly reconstruction imports and external financing. Extending the MRV system to capture climate investments will support planning of investments and enable the creation of an investor-friendly environment, helping to attract private and concessional climate financing, reducing reliance on raising public debt and strengthening foreign currency reserve buffers.
RM11	Climate Finance	The MEEA, the MEF and other relevant agencies to: (i) adopt and implement a ministerial order extending the measuring, reporting, and verification (MRV) system to allow, in coordination with the National Institute of Statistics and Demography (INSD) and other relevant entities, the collection of data on climate investments from government agencies and non-financial private companies; and (ii) create a centralized national database of climate mitigation and adaptation projects as of end-2025 and in line with the country's updated NDC, where data may be made available to interested stakeholders.	15-Aug-27	4th RSF / 8th ECF Review	CPD, CCIA, Sahel CCDR, IFC Country Private Sector Diagnostic 2019	STA	

1/ WB = World Bank; CNV = National Committee for the Validation of Feasibility and project documents; CTA = Technical Arbitration Commission

Attachment II. Technical Memorandum of Understanding

1. This Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU) defines the quantitative performance criteria, indicative targets, and structural benchmarks used to assess performance under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF)-supported program during 2026 and the first half of 2027. The TMU establishes the framework and deadlines for reporting data that will enable IMF staff to assess program implementation.

CONDITIONALITY

2. Quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets are set out in Tables 1a and 1b of the MEFP. The structural benchmarks defined in the program are detailed in Tables 2a and 2b.

Definitions

3. Government. Unless otherwise indicated, the term "government" means the central government of Burkina Faso conforming to the definition used in the government's financial reporting table (TOFE) and does not include local governments, the central bank, or any other public or government-owned entity with autonomous legal status not included in the TOFE.

4. TOFE coverage. For program monitoring purposes, the TOFE (GFSM 1986) covers the central government including the Patriotic Support Fund (FSP).

5. Definition of debt. The definition of debt is set out in paragraph 8(a) of the Guidelines on Public Debt Conditionality in Fund Arrangements attached to IMF Executive Board Decision No. 16919-(20/103) (October 28, 2020), as published on the IMF website. The term "debt" will be understood to mean all current (i.e., not contingent) liabilities created under a contractual arrangement through the provision of value in the form of assets (including currency) or services, which require the obligor to make one or more payments in the form of assets (including currency) or services at some future point(s) in time; these payments will discharge the principal and/or interest liabilities incurred under the contract. Debts can take various forms, the primary ones being as follows:

A. loans, i.e., advances of money to the obligor by the lender made on the basis of an undertaking that the obligor will repay the funds in the future (including deposits, bonds (including Treasury bills), debentures, commercial loans, and buyers' credits) and temporary exchanges of assets that are equivalent to fully collateralized loans under which the obligor is required to repay the funds, and usually pay interest, by repurchasing the collateral from the buyer in the future (such as repurchase agreements and official swap arrangements);

B. suppliers' credits, i.e., contracts where the supplier permits the obligor to defer payments until sometime after the date on which the goods are delivered or services are provided; and

C. leases, i.e., arrangements under which property is provided which the lessee has the right to use for one or more specified period(s) of time that are usually shorter than the total expected service life of the property, while the lessor retains the title to the property. For the purposes of these guidelines the debt is the present value (at the inception of the lease) of all lease payments expected to be made during the period of the agreement excluding those payments that cover the operation, repair, or maintenance of the property.

6. Under the definition of debt set out above, arrears, penalties, and judicially awarded damages and interest arising from the failure to make payment under a contractual obligation that constitutes debt are debt. Failure to make payment on a contractual obligation that is not considered debt under this definition (e.g., payment on delivery) will not give rise to debt.

7. **Debt guarantees.** A government debt guarantee means an explicit legal obligation to service the debt in the event of nonpayment by the borrower (through payment in cash or in kind).

8. **Concessional debt.** Debt is considered concessional if it carries a grant element of at least 35 percent.[1] The present value (PV) of debt at the time it is contracted is calculated by discounting the borrower's future debt service payments on the debt.[2] The discount rate used is 5 percent.

9. **External debt.** External debt is debt contracted or serviced in a currency other than the CFA franc. The performance criteria apply to the external debt of the government, public enterprises receiving transfers from the government and other public entities in which the government holds more than 50 percent of the capital, or to any other private debt for which the government has offered a guarantee constituting a contingent liability.

QUANTITATIVE PERFORMANCE CRITERIA

10. The quantitative performance criteria proposed for the test dates at end-June 2026, end-December 2026, and end-June 2027 are as follows:

(i) A ceiling on net domestic financing of the government;
(ii) A ceiling on the amount of external debt contracted or guaranteed by the government in PV terms;
(iii) A ceiling on the accumulation of external debt servicing arrears;
(iv) A ceiling on the guaranteeing of new domestic loans to suppliers and contractors;
(v) A ceiling on government guarantees of new bank pre-financing of public investments, and;
(vi) A ceiling on the primary fiscal deficit (commitment basis), including grants.

The ceilings above at end-March 2026 and end-September 2026 are indicative quantitative targets.

11. **Program exchange rate**. To assess the observance of the ceilings on the amount of external debt contracted or guaranteed by the government in PV terms, the PV of external debt calculated in U.S. dollar terms with the help of the IMF PV Monitoring Tool will be converted to CFA francs at the program exchange rate that shall be set by IMF staff on a semi-annual basis ahead of each period

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[1] This IMF webpage provides a tool to compute the grant element in a large range of financial arrangements: http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/conc/calculator.

[2] The calculation of the grant element reflects all aspects of the debt contracted, including the date of payment, grace period, schedule, commissions and management fees.

under review. To this effect, the program exchange rate (i.e., the conversion rate from U.S. dollars to CFA francs applicable for a semester under review) will be derived using the current period exchange rate assumptions from the relevant Statistical Annex to the IMF's World Economic Outlook (WEO) of the vintage immediately preceding the semester under review. Consequently, the 2025 exchange rate assumption of US$1.130 to the euro, published in the Statistical Appendix B to the October 2025 WEO (Table B10), converted at the fixed rate of 656 CFA francs to the euro yields a program exchange rate of 580.53 CFA francs to the U.S. dollar that will be used to assess the performance with respect to end-March and end-June 2026 ceilings on the amount of external debt contracted or guaranteed.

A. Net Financing of the Government

Definition

12. Net domestic financing of the government is defined as the consolidated amount of (i) net bank credit to the government, including net bank credit to the government vis-à-vis the national banking institutions; (ii) net changes in the stock of unredeemed Treasury bills and bonds (including syndicated issuances) held outside national commercial banks and securitized debt; (iii) privatization receipts and other government claims and debts vis-à-vis national non-bank institutions; (iv) borrowing for VAT refunds; (v) net accrual of all other arrears and floating debts, including payables; and (vi) net change in the position of the Treasury resulting from movements of funds between the Treasury, including its correspondent accounts, and their accounts held in banks and financial institutions outside the Treasury system; and (vii) the net result of all other financial transactions and lags at all stages of the expenditure process that contribute to the reconciliation between the overall fiscal deficit as measured on an accrual basis and on a cash basis. Net bank credit to the government is defined as the balance of government receivables and payables to domestic banking institutions. Government receivables include cash held by the Burkina Faso government, deposits with the central bank, deposits with commercial banks, guaranteed bonds, and government deposits in postal checking accounts (CCP). Government debt to the banking system includes central bank financing (including statutory advances, consolidated advances, and refinancing of guaranteed bonds), government securities held by the central bank, and commercial bank lending (including government securities held by commercial banks). All components of so-defined net domestic financing are calculated based on data in the TOFE and its annexes.

Adjustment

13. The cumulative quarterly ceilings on net domestic financing (NDF) through end-March 2026, end-June 2026, and-September 2026, and end-December 2026 will be adjusted downward if the cumulative amounts of net external financing, defined as disbursements of program loans and project loans and other external financing (excluding IMF) net of amortization, through these dates exceed the amounts projected in Table 1 below. The adjustment will be equal to the difference between the actual amount disbursed and the amount projected. These ceilings will not be adjusted upward if net external financing falls short of the projected amounts.

Table 1. Burkina Faso: Projected Net External Financing (Cumulative, CFAF billion)					
End-March 2026	End-June 2026	End-September 2026	End-December 2026	End-March 2026	End-June 2027
80.0	125.0	225.0	274.6	65.0	120.0

B. New External Debt Contracted or Guaranteed by the Government and Present Value of External Debt Contracted or Guaranteed by the Government

14. This performance criterion applies to external debt as defined in ¶9 of this TMU. It utilizes the concept of concessional debt as defined in ¶8 of this TMU. This performance criterion also applies to any private debt guaranteed by the government that constitutes a contingent liability. Contingent liabilities are obligations that do not arise unless a particular event (or a sequence of events) triggering the obligation occurs in the future. For the purpose of this performance criterion, "government" includes the central government of Burkina Faso, public enterprises that receive government transfers, local governments, and other public sector entities (e.g., administrative, professional, scientific, and technical agencies). However, this performance criterion will not apply to Treasury bills and bonds issued in CFA francs on the WAEMU regional market, to normal import-related commercial debts with a term shorter than one year, or to IMF loans. It is measured on a cumulative basis from the beginning of each year, and no adjustor will apply.

15. For 2026, the government undertakes not to contract or guarantee any external debt (concessional or non-concessional) with a total PV exceeding the ceiling, denominated in billions of CFA francs, as indicated in Table 1 of the MEFP, measured cumulatively from the beginning of the year, i.e., January 1 of each year. In the case of a (concessional or non-concessional) loan for debt reprofiling, the ceiling will be raised by the PV of the total amount of the loan if such debt reprofiling operation constitutes an improvement in the overall debt profile as determined by IMF staff. The authorities will consult the IMF staff in advance when such a debt reprofiling operation is expected to materialize. All other provisions and definitions stipulated in ¶14 will continue to apply.

16. The proceeds of any concessional reprofiling loan referred to in ¶15 will be used only to help finance the government's gross financing requirements that are consistent with the overall budget deficit ceilings established in the program. Any surplus resources will be safeguarded.

C. Non-Accumulation of New External Payment Arrears by the Government

17. The term "external arrears" refers to external debt service payments that are due but unpaid. Under the program, the government agrees not to accumulate external payment arrears, except arrears arising from external payment obligations currently being renegotiated with creditors, including bilateral creditors who are not members of the Paris Club. This performance criterion must be met on a continuous basis**.**

D. Government Guarantee for New Domestic Loans to Suppliers and Service Providers

18. The government undertakes to not provide new financial guarantees for domestic loans to its suppliers or contractors. This performance criterion shall be observed continuously. For this performance criterion, "government" includes the central government, institutions of an industrial or commercial nature (EPIC), public administrative agencies (EPA), public scientific and technical institutes, public vocational establishments, public health agencies, local authorities, public enterprises, national corporations, semi-public corporations (public corporations with financial autonomy, in which the government holds at least 50 percent of the capital), and state agencies.

E. Government Guarantee for New Bank Pre-Financing of Public Investments

19. The government undertakes not to guarantee new bank pre-financing of public investments. In a pre-financing agreement, a private company to which the government awards a public works contract obtains a loan from a national commercial bank or a group of commercial banks. The Ministry of Economy and Finance guarantees this loan and at the same time signs an unconditional and irrevocable agreement to stand in for the debtor to service all principal and interest. For the purposes of this performance criterion, the term "government" includes the central government, public industrial or commercial entities (EPICs), administrative public entities (EPAs), public scientific or technical entities, public professional entities, public health agencies, local governments, government corporations, state-owned enterprises, semi-public corporations (public corporations with financial autonomy in which the government holds at least 50 percent of the capital), and government agencies. This performance criterion shall be met continuously.

F. Primary Fiscal Deficit, Including Grants

Definition

20. For program purposes, the primary fiscal balance is calculated on a commitment basis. It is defined as the difference between domestic revenues (including program and project grants) and public expenditure, less interest payments. Arrears payments are not included in the calculation of the domestic primary balance.

Adjustment

21. The cumulative quarterly ceilings on the primary fiscal deficit through end-March 2026, end-June 2026, end-September 2026, end-December 2026, end-March 2027, and end-June 2027 will be adjusted downward if the actual amounts of net external financing (disbursements of external project and program loans and other external financing (excluding IMF) net of amortization) through these dates fall short of the amounts projected in Table 1 above. The adjustment will be calculated as the difference between the actual amount disbursed and the projected amount. The ceilings on the primary fiscal deficit will not be adjusted if the actual amounts of external financing exceed the amounts projected.

QUANTITATIVE INDICATIVE TARGETS

22. The program also includes quantitative indicative targets for end-March 2026, end-June 2026, end-September 2026, end-December 2026, end-March 2027, and end-June 2027:

(i) A ceiling on the accumulation of domestic arrears by the government;

(ii) A floor on total government revenue;

(iii) A floor on poverty-reducing current social expenditure;

(iv) A ceiling on the stock of certified and unpaid VAT refunds older than 30 days;

(v) A ceiling on primary current expenditure;

(vi) A ceiling on public-private partnerships.

G. Amounts Payable, Including Arrears on Domestic Payments by the Government

23. "Amounts payable" (or "outstanding balances") include domestic arrears and the floating debt and represent overdue obligations of the government. They are defined as expenditures accepted by the government accounting officer but not yet paid. For program purposes, these obligations include (i) public and private nonfinancial enterprise invoices due and unpaid, including VAT refunds, and (ii) domestic debt service.

24. For program purposes, domestic payment arrears are outstanding balances to suppliers and domestic debt service. Arrears to suppliers are defined as overdue obligations of the government to public and private nonfinancial enterprises, including VAT refunds, that are more than the regulatory 90 days overdue; arrears on the domestic debt service refer to debt service obligations that are more than 30 days past the due date stipulated in the agreements, including any applicable grace period.

25. The floating debt corresponds to amounts that are unpaid for less than the regulatory period (90 days for debt to nonfinancial corporations and 30 days for debt service).

26. For program purposes, the ceiling on the accumulation of new domestic payment arrears is zero. This indicative target will be subject to continuous monitoring by the authorities, and any breach will be reported to IMF staff on a quarterly basis.

H. Government Revenue

Definition

27. Government revenues are calculated on a cash basis. They include all tax revenues collected by the Directorate General of Taxes (*Direction Générale des Impôts* – DGI), the Directorate General of Customs (*Direction Générale des Douanes* – DGD), the Burkinabè Treasury (*Trésor Burkinabè* – DGTCP), and other revenue collection units. They also include nontax receipts or receipts from services. For program purposes, the revenues of the FSP will be excluded from the floors on total government revenue and performance with respect to these floors will be assessed excluding the revenues of the FSP, which will continue to be reported in the TOFE for monitoring purposes.

I. Poverty-Reducing Current Social Expenditure

Definition

28. Poverty-reducing current social expenditure is the sum of committed and validated current spending (i.e., "base engagée visée") identified since 2021 in collaboration with the IMF, as contributing to poverty reduction. This definition includes: (i) the provision of education, health, and drinking water; (ii) the expansion of opportunities for income-generating activities and self-employment, development of rural roads, and construction of economic infrastructure (agricultural and pastoral water works); (iii) the promotion of women, social action, information, employment, and vocational training; (iv) access to justice; (v) promoting development of the agricultural economy, with a view to improving the incomes of those involved in the agricultural value chains; (vi) contribution to sustainable growth and diversification of the supply of agricultural products; (vii) sustainable wastewater and excreta sanitation; (viii) meeting the freshwater needs of users and aquatic ecosystems; (ix) the creation of decent jobs for all leading to the improvement of social well-being. Wage bill spending and externally financed social spending are excluded from the definition of poverty-reducing current social expenditure.

J. Certified VAT Refunds and Overdue Payments Over 30 Days

Definition

29. For program purposes, the stock of value-added tax (VAT) refund claims that have been certified but remain unpaid for more than 30 days consists of the amounts of signed refunds. The 30-day period begins on the date the refund certificate is signed by the Director General of Taxes.

K. Current Primary Expenditures

Definition

30. For program purposes, current primary expenditure is defined as the sum of wage bill expenditure, expenditure on goods and services, and current transfers, net of interest payments, and net of expenditures executed through the FSP, which will continue to be reported in the TOFE for monitoring purposes.

Consultation Clause on Wage Bill

31. If, at the end of a quarter (i.e., March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31) during the program period, observed annual growth of the wage bill (measured as a 12-month sliding growth rate) exceeds the wage bill growth rate projected for the respective year in the macroeconomic framework of the program (see Table 2 below), the authorities will consult with IMF staff. To prepare this consultation, the authorities will submit to the IMF a written note that explains the reasons for the discrepancy between the observed growth rate and the projected growth rate in the macroeconomic framework, as well as the corrective measures they intend to implement to bring the wage bill under control.

	Table 2. Burkina Faso: Annual Wage Bill Growth Projections (Percentage)				
Year	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027
Projection	8.7	9.6	8.9	5.4	4.4
Actual	8.7	6.7	…	…	…

L. Public-Private Partnerships

Definition

32. A public-private partnership is defined as a long-term contract between a private party and a government entity for providing a public asset or service in which the private party bears significant risk and management responsibility, and remuneration is linked to performance. It excludes pre-financing and supplier credit arrangements.

Additional Information for Program Monitoring

33. To enable IMF staff to assess program performance, the authorities agree to submit the following data through the local office of the IMF in Burkina Faso, in hard copy and/or MS Excel electronic files, with the frequencies and deadlines specified below.

Table 3. Burkina Faso: Summary of Data Reporting Requirements

Information	Responsible Institution	Data Frequency	Reporting Deadline
Government Finance The government's fiscal reporting table (TOFE) and the customary annexed tables (if data on actual investment financed by external grants and loans are not available in time, a linear estimate of execution based on annual projections will be used) with and without the FSP.	Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF/DGTCP)	Monthly: data on revenue and expenses Quarterly: full dataset	4 weeks 7 weeks
The exhaustive list of treasury deposit accounts (*comptes de dépôts du trésor*) with balances and the net position of the government as standard annexes to the TOFE on a quarterly basis, allowing the identification of those accounts opened for the benefit of non-personalized services.			
Domestic financing of the budget (net bank credit to the government and stock of unredeemed Treasury bonds and bills).	MEF/DGTCP and BCEAO	Monthly	7 weeks
Data on implementation of the public investment program, including details on financing sources.	MEF/DGEP	Semiannual	6 weeks
Stock of external debt, external debt service, and external debt contracted and guaranteed by the government, including terms and creditor details for any loan in currency other than CFA franc contracted or guaranteed by the government.	MEF/DGTCP	Quarterly	6 weeks
Poverty-reducing current social spending in table format.	MEF/DGB	Monthly	6 weeks
Petroleum product prices, consumption, and taxes, including: (i) the price structure for the month concerned; (ii) detailed calculation of the price structure, from the f.o.b. price to the retail price; (iii) volumes purchased and distributed for consumption by the petroleum distributor (SONABHY), with a distinction made between retail and industry sales; and (iv) a breakdown of tax revenue from petroleum products—customs duties, tax on petroleum products (TPP), and value-added tax (VAT); (v) capital gains/losses on the purchases and sales of petroleum products by type of product, and (vi) subsidies payable.	CIDPH, MEF/DGD/DGTCP, SONABHY	Monthly	4 weeks
Quarterly report, including monthly data, on SONABHY's accounts, cash flow statements, and income statements, taking account of all received subsidies and government securities issued or sold to the banking system, etc.	SONABHY	Quarterly	6 weeks

Table 3. Burkina Faso: Summary of Data Reporting Requirements (Continued)

Information	Responsible Institution	Data Frequency	Reporting Deadline
Quarterly report, including monthly data, on SONABEL's accounts comprising its cash flow and income statements and taking into account all received subsidies and project grants and loans from the technical and financial partners.	SONABEL	Quarterly	6 weeks
Monthly DGI revenue projections (on an annualized basis) by type, and report on monthly performance compared to projections.	MEF/DGI	Monthly	7 weeks
Monthly DGD revenue projections (on an annualized basis) by type, and report on monthly performance compared to projections.	MEF/DGD	Monthly	7 weeks
Monthly DGTCP revenue projections (on an annualized basis) by type, and report on monthly performance compared to projections.	MEF/DGTCP	Monthly	7 weeks
Quarterly report on VAT refunds, including transfers received from ACCT, the cumulative amount paid since the beginning of the current year, the stock of certified refund claims (imprest administrators (*régisseurs d'avance*)) and total VAT refund claims handled (DGE, DLC).	MEF/DGI	Quarterly	3 months
Monthly update of the PPP and sovereign guarantee databases.	BN-GPB	Semiannual	6 weeks
Monthly statement of the implicit pump price subsidy.	CIDPH	Monthly	4 weeks
Monthly data on new domestic debt contracted (including bank credit, all sovereign debt issuances, and securitizations) and amortized.	MEF/DGTCP	Monthly	6 weeks

Table 3. Burkina Faso: Summary of Data Reporting Requirements (Concluded)

Information	Responsible Institution	Data Frequency	Reporting Deadline
Consolidated Balance Sheets of Monetary Institutions			
Consolidated balance sheets of monetary institutions.	BCEAO	Monthly	6 weeks
Monetary survey: provisional data.	BCEAO	Monthly	6 weeks
Monetary survey: final data.	BCEAO	Monthly	6 weeks
Lending and borrowing interest rates.	BCEAO	Monthly	6 weeks
Standard bank supervision indicators for banks and non-bank financial institutions.	BCEAO	Monthly	6 weeks
Balance of Payments			
Preliminary annual balance of payments data.	BCEAO	Annual	11 months
Foreign trade statistics.	MEFP/INSD	Quarterly	3 months
Any revision of balance of payments data (including services, private transfers, official transfers, and capital transactions).	BCEAO	When revised	2 weeks
Real Sector			
Provisional national accounts and any revisions.	MEF/INSD	Annual	6 months
Quarterly national accounts and any revisions.	MEF/INSD	Quarterly	3 months
Monthly disaggregated consumer price indices.	MEF/INSD	Monthly	4 weeks
Monthly performance and projections through current year's end-December for mine production by individual mine and by mineral type, exports (volume and value), and the operational status of the existing mines and mines under construction	MEF/DGD and MEMC/DGMG/DGESS	Monthly	3 months
Structural Reforms and Other Data			
Any study or official report on Burkina Faso's economy.	MEF/DGEP		On date published or date of entry into force
Any decision, order, law, decree, ordinance, or circular having economic or financial implications.	MEF/SG		On date published or date of entry into force
Any study or official report on measures taken to combat corruption.	ASCE-LC		On date published or date of entry into force
Annex to the annual budget detailing plans to combat climate change (including resource allocations and assessment of the fiscal latitude for climate friendly infrastructure).	MEF/DGB		On date published or date of entry into force

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

BURKINA FASO

June 11, 2026

STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2026 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION, FIFTH REVIEW UNDER THE EXTENDED CREDIT FACILITY ARRANGEMENT, REQUESTS FOR AUGMENTATION OF ACCESS AND MODIFICATION OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA, AND FINANCING ASSURANCES REVIEW, AND FIRST REVIEW UNDER THE RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABILITY FACILITY ARRANGEMENT—DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS[1]

Approved By
Vitaliy Kramarenko and Koshy Mathai (IMF) and Manuela Francisco and Seynabou Sakho (IDA)

Prepared jointly by the staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Development Association (IDA)

Risk of external debt distress	Moderate
Overall risk of public debt distress	Moderate
Granularity in the risk rating	Limited space to absorb shocks.
Application of judgement	Yes

Burkina Faso (BFA) remains at moderate risk of external and overall public debt distress. Debt levels are sustainable over the medium term. The debt-carrying capacity is consistent with a classification of 'medium'.[2] *All external and public debt indicators show low risk of debt distress based on mechanical signals. Staff apply judgement due to strong dependence on gold exports, economy-wide cost pressures from the recent surge in import prices of petroleum products and fertilizer, downside risks to the fiscal sector, including from domestic debt rollover, vulnerability to severe weather events, and the volatile security situation.*

[1] This DSA was prepared jointly with the World Bank and in collaboration with the Burkina Faso authorities.

[2] Burkina Faso's Composite Indicator (CI) derived from data in the April 2026 WEO and the 2024 World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) is 2.97. This indicates a 'medium' debt-carrying capacity.

PUBLIC DEBT COVERAGE

1. **Public debt covers central government debt, local government debt, non-guaranteed debt of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and central bank debt for the purpose of this DSA** (Text Table 1).[3] Central bank debt contracted on behalf of the government (i.e., credit outstanding to the IMF) is treated as external debt. Local governments and SOEs are authorized to borrow but subject to authorization from the National Committee on Public Debt (CNDP). The baseline includes the one local government that is reported to have external debt and three SOEs accounting for most of SOEs' non-guaranteed financial debt,[4,5] which is estimated at around 1 percent of GDP. Debt on-lent to SOEs is included in the baseline as part of central government borrowing. As data on guarantees to SOEs and to the private sector are not comprehensive, the analysis relies on estimates to calibrate a combined contingent liability stress test.

Text Table 1. Burkina Faso: Coverage of Public Debt

	Subsectors of the public sector	Sub-sectors covered
1	Central government	X
2	State and local government	X
3	Other elements in the general government	
4	o/w: Social security fund	
5	o/w: Extra budgetary funds (EBFs)	
6	Guarantees (to other entities in the public and private sector, including to SOEs)	
7	Central bank (borrowed on behalf of the government)	X
8	Non-guaranteed SOE debt	X

2. **Efforts are under way to increase government capacity to record public sector debt.** With the support of the World Bank's Sustainable Development Finance Policy (SDFP), the authorities expanded the coverage of public debt data[6] provided in a quarterly debt bulletin.[7] This data, however, is not consolidated, i.e., debt owed by the central government to other public entities is included in the total stock of debt. The authorities are working to expand the institutional coverage of debt statistics beyond the budgetary central government to include SOE debt, starting with the debt of SOEs operating on a

[3] Domestic debt is defined as debt denominated in the regional currency, the CFAF. The choice of coverage is based on currency rather than residency, due to the difficulty of monitoring residency. Data on the residency of holders of securities on the UMOA-Titres are incomplete. Borrowing from the West African Development Bank although denominated in CFAF is classified as external debt based on residency definition criteria.

[4] Short-term loans for working capital purposes are not covered by public debt statistics.

[5] The amount corresponding to the debt service of these three SOEs is added to the revenue for the calculation of the external debt service to revenue ratio to consider that they have been servicing their debt and are financially sound.

[6] Why One African Country Opted for Full Disclosure on Debt, World Bank Group, Feature Story, July 10, 2022.

[7] Statistical Debt Bulletin No1-2026.

commercial basis.[8] Further work is also needed to reconcile the discrepancies between the debt data reported to IMF staff and the debt data recorded in the World Bank Debt Reporting System (DRS).[9]

Text Table 2. Burkina Faso: Combined Contingent Liability Shock

1	**The country's coverage of public debt**	The central, state, and local governments, central bank, non-guaranteed SOE debt			
		Default		**Used for the analysis**	**Reasons for deviations from the default settings**
2	**Other elements of the general government not captured in 1.**	0	percent of GDP	1.5	Guarantees to private sector
3	**SoE's debt (guaranteed and not guaranteed by the government) 1/**	2	percent of GDP	2.0	
4	**PPP**	35	percent of PPP stock	0.0	
5	**Financial market (the default value of 5 percent of GDP is the minimum value)**	5	percent of GDP	5.0	
	Total (2+3+4+5) (in percent of GDP)			8.5	

1/ The default shock of 2% of GDP will be triggered for countries whose government-guaranteed debt is not fully captured under the country's public debt definition (1.). If it is already included in the government debt (1.) and risks associated with SoE's debt not guaranteed by the government is assessed to be negligible, a country team may reduce this to 0%.

3. **The contingent liabilities stress test features a combined shock of 8.5 percent of GDP.** The test captures debt that is not covered by the definition of public debt in the baseline. Among its components, it includes a shock of 1.5 percent of GDP as a contingent liability to account for possible guarantees to the private sector (Text Table 2). A standard SOE debt of 2.0 percent of GDP is included as a contingent liability.[10] Staff do not use a shock to account for PPPs, as they are less than 3.0 percent of GDP.[11] For the financial market shock, the test retains the default value of 5.0 percent of GDP, representing the average burden of a financial crisis.

Text Table 3. Burkina Faso: Public Debt Stock, 2018–25

(Percent of GDP)

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Public Debt	**38.1**	**41.7**	**45.0**	**55.5**	**59.2**	**56.8**	**57.2**	**53.4**
External Debt	21.6	23.2	22.9	25.6	26.3	26.2	25.5	23.9
(share of total debt, percentage)	*56.8*	*55.6*	*50.9*	*46.2*	*44.5*	*46.1*	*44.5*	*44.8*
Domestic Debt	16.5	18.5	22.1	29.9	32.9	30.6	31.8	29.5
(share of total debt, percentage)	*43.2*	*44.4*	*49.1*	*53.8*	*55.5*	*53.9*	*55.5*	*55.2*
Memorandum items:								
Overall fiscal balance	-4.3	-3.1	-5.1	-7.5	-10.8	-6.8	-5.8	-1.8
GDP growth (in percent)	6.6	5.9	2.0	6.9	1.6	3.0	4.8	5.3

Sources: Burkinabe authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

[8] A government finance project from the IMF Statistics department has been in progress since May 2024. The authorities compile and disseminate debt statistics for the budgetary central government in accordance with the Public Sector Debt Statistics (PSDS) guide 2011 and the GFSM 2014. But only the debt securities and the loans are recorded and submitted to the joint IMF/World Bank Quarterly PSDS since 2024. The work is ongoing to expand both the institutional and the debt instruments coverage (i.e., including accounts payable and accumulation of arrears). A recent mission also examined data pertaining to debt owed by SOEs.

[9] A debt data reconciliation exercise between the IMF's and the World Bank DRS debt records found some discrepancies (around 0.3 percent of GDP difference in the end-2024 debt stock). Following discussions between the authorities and staff, the debt office of the Ministry of Finance is examining the loan-by-loan records to identify and understand the underlying sources of these discrepancies.

[10] Government guarantees on external debt of SOEs are estimated at 0.6 percent of GDP and debt that could arise from nationalized enterprises in 2024 are estimated not to exceed 0.4 percent of GDP.

[11] According to the World Bank's Private Participation in Infrastructure Database, Burkina Faso's PPP capital stock is estimated at 2.74 percent of GDP in 2024.

DEBT BACKGROUND

A. Recent Debt Developments

4. **Public debt growth has moderated after the pandemic.** While the public debt-to-GDP ratio rose markedly after 2020 and peaked at 59.2 percent in 2022, it subsequently dropped to 53.4 percent of GDP in 2025 on the back of a successful fiscal consolidation and a double-digit increase in nominal GDP in 2025 (Text Table 3). External debt as a share of total public debt declined from 56.8 percent in 2018 to 44.8 percent in 2025. Recourse to the WAEMU bond market has increased to compensate for the dearth of external (concessional) financing options.

5. **The issuance of treasury bills has increased relative to that of treasury bonds.** Total issuance grew from CFAF 1,036 billion in 2024 to CFAF 1,189 billion in 2025 (Text Figure 1). The authorities' issuance plan for 2026 follows this trend with the planned issuance at CFAF 1,180 billion. Data for 2025 indicates that the authorities raised 107 percent of the amount targeted for this period. The share of T-bills increased from 15.5 to 36.2 percent between 2022 and 2025, while the share of longer maturity debt (syndicated bonds) decreased from 37.8 to 11 percent and the share of non-syndicated bonds increased to 52.8 percent in 2025. As a result, the average time to maturity of treasury instruments shortened from 4.5 years at end-2022 to 3.4 years at end-2025.

Text Figure 1. Burkina Faso: Treasury Bills and Bond Issuances 2018–25



Sources: UMOA Titres; Burkinabè authorities; and IMF staff calculations.

6. **Higher reliance on borrowing in the regional market has raised debt service costs.** Total interest payments for debt service amounted to CFAF 359.5 billion in 2025, of which about 85 percent represented interest payments on domestic debt. By comparison, in 2019, interest payments amounted to CFAF 117 billion, of which 82 percent were attributable to domestic debt. From 2022 through early 2025, the regional bond market became less liquid as monetary policy tightened, and investor sentiment shifted adversely. Average yields for Burkinabè securities issued by auction rose steadily from 5.3 percent in 2022 to 9.6 percent in October 2024, driven by both WAEMU-wide and country-specific factors. Following this peak, average monthly yields decreased steadily, reaching 7 percent in April 2026. This decline reflects factors such as improved liquidity conditions across WAEMU, monetary easing by the BCEAO, and improved investor sentiment towards BFA, including its removal from the FATF grey list, which support demand for BFA's sovereign debt.

7. **BFA's recourse to borrowing in the regional financial market is expected to rise.** The BFA government's gross financing needs (GFN) expected to be satisfied by the regional market in 2026 are estimated at 1.1 percent of WAEMU countries' GDP. This exceeds slightly BFA's average annual GFN absorbed by the regional market since 2020, which amounted to about 1.0 percent of WAEMU countries' GDP.[12] Over the medium term (2027–30) GFN are projected to rise to 1.2 percent of WAEMU countries' GDP. This indicates the need for additional access to concessional financing or to reduce borrowing needs. In the medium and long terms, initiatives to deepen the regional financial market are encouraged.

8. **The government is working to prevent the recurrence of domestic payment arrears.** Between end-2024 and end-2025, domestic arrears (outstanding more than 90 days) decreased by 0.3 percentage points of GDP to 0.2 percent of GDP. The arrears outstanding at end-2025 were related to VAT reimbursements (mostly to foreign mining companies). These arrears have since been cleared, and the authorities have taken steps to prevent their recurrence by clarifying and streamlining VAT refund procedures.

9. **World Bank-supported reforms complement and reinforce program support.** The focus of the World Bank's policy engagement through the Sustainable Development Financing Policy (SDFP) FY24 and FY25 Performance and Policy Actions (PPAs) is to reinforce areas of the IMF-supported program, notably reducing debt vulnerabilities by broadening fiscal capacity, lowering fiscal risks, and enhancing resilience to climate shocks. The PPAs cover reforms such as improving tax collection, rationalizing tax expenditures, strengthening oversight of SOEs like SONABEL and SONABHY, and identifying and funding climate-sensitive budget lines. These measures contribute to higher and longer-lasting revenue streams, allow for better identification and management of fiscal risks from contingent liabilities through increased transparency of SOE operations and improved data reporting, and ultimately help enhance domestic revenue collection, limit debt growth, and decrease the proportion of revenues spent on servicing debt.[13]

[12] To put this into perspective, BFA's domestic debt represented on average 13.0 percent of WAEMU's public domestic debt over 2020–25.

[13] See approved PPAs by fiscal year: SDFP FY24 PPAs and SDFP FY25 PPAs.

Text Table 4. Burkina Faso: Decomposition of Public Debt and Debt Service by Creditor

	Debt Stock (end of period)			Debt Service					
	2025			2025	2026	2027	2025	2026	2027
	(CFAF, billions)	*(Percent total debt)*	*(Percent GDP)*	*(CFAF billions)*			*(Percent GDP)*		
Total	**8,584.5**	**100**	**53.4**	**1,472.8**	**1,941.8**	**1,183.2**	**9.2**	**11.0**	**5.9**
External	**3,845.0**	**44.8**	**23.9**	**232.6**	**254.9**	**252.9**	**1.4**	**1.4**	**1.3**
Multilateral creditors 1/	*3,491.6*	*40.7*	*21.7*	*177.8*	*201.3*	*210.8*	*1.1*	*1.1*	*1.1*
IMF	354.1	4.1	2.2	24.6	37.4	35.0	0.2	0.2	0.2
World Bank	1,813.1	21.1	11.3	45.5	56.1	65.2	0.3	0.3	0.3
Other Multilaterals	1,324.4	15.4	8.2	107.7	107.8	110.6	0.7	0.6	0.6
Bilateral Creditors	*353.4*	*4.1*	*2.2*	*54.8*	*53.7*	*42.1*	*0.3*	*0.3*	*0.2*
Paris Club	148.4	1.7	0.9	16.9	19.8	15.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
o/w: France	135.6	1.6	0.8	13.4	19.1	14.4	0.1	0.1	0.1
Japan	3.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	-	0.0	-	-
Non-Paris Club	125.9	1.5	0.8	14.5	16.2	13.9	0.1	0.1	0.1
o/w: China	23.9	0.3	0.1	-	1.5	1.5	-	0.0	0.0
Kuwait	29.5	0.3	0.2	2.7	2.5	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Commercial creditors	79.2	0.9	0.5	23.5	17.7	13.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
Bank of China	24.2	0.3	0.2	5.0	4.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
International Business Bank of Togo	29.4	0.3	0.2	13.7	8.6	4.4	0.1	0.0	0.0
UniCredit Bank of Austria	3.7	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.1	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Société Générale Belgique (SGB)	21.8	0.3	0.1	3.8	4.0	3.8	0.0	0.0	0.0
Domestic	**4,739.5**	**55.2**	**29.5**	**1,240.2**	**1,686.9**	**930.3**	**7.7**	**9.5**	**4.7**
T-Bills	*429.9*	*5.0*	*2.7*	*308.0*	*503.2*	-	*1.9*	*2.8*	*0.0*
Bonds	*3,732.7*	*43.5*	*23.2*	*628.6*	*957.6*	*781.2*	*3.9*	*5.4*	*3.9*
Loans	*576.9*	*6.7*	*3.6*	*303.6*	*226.1*	*149.0*	*1.9*	*1.3*	*0.7*

Sources: IMF estimates and projections, based on data based on Burkinabe authorities, according to their classification of creditors. Debt coverage is the same as the DSA.

1/ Multilateral creditors" are simply institutions with more than one official shareholder and may not necessarily align with creditor classification under other IMF policies (e.g. Lending Into Arrears).

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND MACROECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS

10. **The baseline scenario has been revised relative to the January 2026 DSA to reflect the impact of the commodity price shock triggered by the war in the Middle East.** External conditions (international and regional) have deteriorated. The war in the Middle East and the ensuing blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have provoked a surge in fertilizer and energy prices, weakening the macroeconomic outlook. Security risks have risen and mitigation measures tightened in the wake of the ongoing terrorist and rebel offensive in neighboring Mali, which, like BFA, is a member of the Sahel States Alliance. The revised near-term outlook for the current DSA is therefore markedly weaker, although it is still assumed that key macroeconomic variables will converge to their regional (WAEMU) target levels over the medium term (Text Table 5).

11. **Assumptions on commodity prices have changed since the last DSA.** Compared to the January 2026 DSA, the oil price for 2026 was revised from US$66 per barrel to US$129, and from US$66 per barrel to US$91 per barrel for 2027, based on the four-week average Brent futures curve, with an additional 15-percent regional and refined product markup for West African oil product prices. The effect of rising fertilizer prices is incorporated by using post-shock prices for the three primary fertilizer types (NPK, Urea, DAP) and applying these rates to fertilizer purchases required for the 2026 planting season, resulting in an increased import bill. Compared to the January 2026 DSA, gold export prices are discounted by about

16 percent relative to the 2026–27 price quotes for refined gold to account for the fact that BFA's gold is exported unrefined. This discount was derived from the 2024 and 2025 exports data.[14]

12. Macroeconomic outcomes are expected to weaken. Real GDP growth in 2025 reached 5.3 percent, driven primarily by a rebound in gold mining and related services, whereas the contribution of agriculture increased only slightly relative to 2024, with weaker cotton production weighing on overall performance. Average 12-month inflation turned negative (easing from 4.2 percent in 2024 to -0.5 percent in 2025), due to a decrease in food prices. Real GDP growth is expected to decrease to 3.6 percent in 2026, as agricultural output is expected to contract by 5.0 percent due to dislocations in fertilizer supply and higher fuel costs for machinery. Growth is still expected to reach 4.8 percent in 2027 and over the medium term, as the external environment normalizes, driven primarily by gold mining. Following the recent oil and fertilizer price shocks, average CPI inflation is now expected to rise to 4.2 percent in 2026 and remain elevated at 4.0 percent in 2027 due to higher food and energy prices before stabilizing within the BCEAO target range of 1 to 3 percent in 2028.

13. The surge in fertilizer and petroleum product prices also affected the fiscal consolidation path compared to the January 2026 DSA. After a commendable fiscal adjustment of 4.0 ppts of GDP in 2025, the fiscal deficit is expected to widen in 2026 to 4 percent of GDP to enable the government to implement crisis-mitigating measures, which could not be accommodated within the fiscal deficit objective of 3.5 percent of GDP retained at the 4th ECF review without imposing undue hardship on the population. This relaxation assumes that the increase in the price of imported fertilizer (BFA does not produce it) will be fully absorbed by the budget to keep its retail price constant and ensure its adequate use to stabilize food crops. Nevertheless, a certain degree of adjustment cannot be avoided to ensure that the fiscal deficit stays below 4.0 percent of GDP. To this effect, to prevent an uncontrolled rise in energy subsidies, the authorities are expected to increase selectively the domestic prices of petroleum products, especially the prices of diesel fuel used in mining operations and in other industries. They will also need to rationalize domestically financed capital expenditure and tighten wage bill control to offset the unavoidable rise in fuel subsidies, which shall be targeted and temporary to mitigate the inflationary impact of the shock and assist the vulnerable groups. Following normalization of the external environment, subsidies are expected to decline in 2027, and the overall fiscal deficit is still projected to converge to the WAEMU norm of 3 percent of GDP in 2028.

14. The current account balance will switch to a deficit in 2026. The external position remained strong in 2025, with the current account recording a surplus of 6.3 percent of GDP, driven by robust gold export receipts and favorable commodity prices that outweighed higher capital and intermediate goods imports related to mining activity. While gold prices are assumed to stay above their historical average in 2026 and after, the external current account balance is expected to post a deficit of 2.0 percent of GDP. This change mainly reflects the upward revision to petroleum product prices leading to a higher oil import bill amid stabilized but still elevated gold prices, continued strong mining-related imports, and moderately higher profit repatriation by mining companies. In addition, higher fertilizer prices and temporary import

[14] The application of this discount, assumed to be constant, allows for a more accurate identification of volume and price contributions in estimating and projecting gold output and exports, and the related government revenues. It does not affect the projected year-on-year rates of changes to gold prices, which are based on WEO forecasts.

disruptions are expected to raise the import bill by around 0.5 percent of GDP, as described earlier. The current account deficit is expected to diminish in 2027 but remain persistent.

15. The security situation, natural disasters, and oil and gold price fluctuations represent the largest sources of risk. The security situation is hard to assess. Quantitative indicators show improvements since 2024, but an uptick in attacks occurred in late 2025, and terrorism continues to weigh on economic activity. In this regard, elevated risks emanate from the recent surge in separatist and jihadist groups activity in Mali. In an extreme scenario, an intensification of attacks by terrorist groups could stress the economy, decreasing gold output, exacerbating food insecurity, and raising internal displacement. The economy is also highly vulnerable to droughts and flooding that cause fluctuations in agricultural output and affect infrastructure. On the fiscal side, there are risks to revenue performance, while unexpected spending pressures could emerge, notably on security and social protection. Financing conditions on the regional bond market could deteriorate. Finally, with gold representing nearly 90 percent of exports, the economy is vulnerable to gold price fluctuations with a destabilizing effect on government revenues. Should the petroleum product prices remain elevated for a prolonged period and fertilizer shortages disrupt the 2026/27 cultivation cycle, elevated subsidy needs could crowd out capital expenditure depressing medium-term growth prospects.

16. Climate change risks are unchanged relative to the January 2026 DSA. BFA is among countries highly vulnerable to climate change (see 4th ECF Review SR Annex II). Modelling results from the WB's G5 Sahel CCDR (2022) estimate annual real GDP losses between 3.5 percent and 6.8 percent for the Burkinabè economy by 2050 in a wet (optimistic) scenario and in a dry (pessimistic) scenario, respectively.[15] These losses would mainly occur through reduction in labor productivity from heat stress, destruction of roads and bridges from flooding, and lower yields of rainfed crops. Given the country's vulnerability, scenario analysis conducted as part of the January 2026 DSA suggests that BFA's debt profile, while relatively resilient to one-off shocks, could weaken in the long term. Climate-resilient adaptation and reforms mitigate the impact of a natural disaster event over the medium to long term.[16]

17. This DSA update is consistent with the macroeconomic framework for the ECF-supported program. The program stands on three pillars: (1) creating fiscal space for priority spending; (2) strengthening resilience to shocks and reducing poverty and inequality; and (3) enhancing fiscal discipline, transparency, and governance. The fiscal anchor of the program is based on the WAEMU convergence criterion of maintaining a fiscal deficit of 3.0 percent of GDP by 2028; reducing the wage-bill-to-revenues ratio to 45 percent by 2027 and raising the tax revenue-to-GDP ratio by 1.5 percentage points relative to baseline without reforms.[17]

[15] G5 Sahel Region Country Climate and Development Report (CCDR, 2022)

[16] See Burkina Faso: Fourth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, Financing Assurances Review, and Request for an Arrangement Under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Burkina Faso.

[17] The attainment of the latter objective may be obfuscated by a sharp rise in the nominal GDP associated with the surge in the price of gold reflected in the export price index and thus in the GDP deflator.

Text Table 5. Burkina Faso: Changes in DSA Assumptions Compared with the Jan. 2026 DSA

		2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
						Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.
Gold Price (USD/troy ounce)	Current Forecast	1801.5	1943.1	2387.2	3440.0	4023.2	4164.2	4164.2	4164.2	4164.2
	January 2026 DSA	1801.5	1943.1	2387.2	3218.2	3472.5	3567.8	3578.4	3578.4	3578.4
Cotton Price (USD cts/lb)	Current Forecast	130.1	95.0	86.6	77.4	78.5	84.1	84.2	83.9	83.9
	January 2026 DSA	130.1	95.0	86.6	78.8	82.2	82.0	81.0	80.6	80.6
Real GDP Growth (%)	Current Forecast	1.6	3.0	4.8	5.3	3.6	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8
	January 2026 DSA	1.6	3.0	4.8	5.0	4.9	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8
Current Account (% of GDP)	Current Forecast	-7.5	-5.1	-3.5	6.3	-2.0	-1.1	-3.2	-2.4	-2.9
	January 2026 DSA	-7.5	-5.1	-3.5	1.1	0.8	0.8	-0.4	-1.3	-2.0
Overall Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)	Current Forecast	-10.8	-6.8	-5.8	-1.8	-4.0	-3.3	-3.0	-3.0	-3.0
	January 2026 DSA	-10.8	-6.8	-5.8	-3.5	-3.5	-3.0	-3.0	-3.0	-3.0

Sources: IMF staff estimates; and World Economic Outlook projections

18. This DSA rests on the following assumptions on external and domestic financing:

- The baseline for external financing includes the latest IDA21[18] projections for World Bank financing,[19] and the updated assumptions regarding financing from the OPEC Fund for International Development and the African Development Bank. While the authorities' medium-term debt strategy favors the use of all options for concessional financing before exploring more expensive non-concessional options, financing needs exceed the amount of expected available concessional financing. Based on confirmed concessional financing commitments, the DSA projects that semi-concessional and non-concessional borrowing as a share of PPG external borrowing will cover a similar share of PPG external borrowing over the DSA forecast horizon as in 2025 (21 percent in volume of new debt, or 36 percent in PV terms, Text Table 6). Consistent with their medium-term debt management strategy, the authorities plan to obtain additional financing from such providers as the Bank of China, Afreximbank, or UniCredit Bank Austria.

- Financing conditions in the regional market have evolved favorably and assumptions on the domestic debt strategy have been updated accordingly. The authorities are now assumed to mobilize greater amounts with longer maturities with a view to reducing the rollover risk. Consequently, it is assumed for 2026 that 35 percent of new domestic debt will be in T-bills (previously 45 percent), 20 percent in 1-to 3-year bonds (previously 40 percent), and 45 percent in 4-year or longer maturity bonds (previously 15 percent), with the share of T-bills declining further over time as the share of longer-term debt increases. Assumptions on debt costs for 2026 include an average of 9.7 percent for T-bills (as before), 8.6 percent for bonds up to 3 years (previously 9 percent), 7.2 percent for bonds between 4 to 7 years (previously 7.5 percent), and

[18] World Bank financing is based on IDA21 total indicative country allocations, adjusted for MTR and intra-regional reallocations. IDA21 financing under the 40-year credit category for the first five years of the projection period is reclassified consistent with the status of BFA as non-small state country at moderate risk of external debt distress. Staff assume regular IDA terms afterward.

[19] Burkina Faso is also eligible for the following IDA Windows: Global and Regional Opportunities Window (GROW), Crisis Response Window (CRW), Window for Host Communities and Refugees (WHR), Scale-Up Window Regular, Scale-Up Window-Short Maturity Loan (SML) and Private Sector Window (PSW).

7.2 percent for bonds with longer maturities (previously 7.7 percent). Interest rates are calibrated using realized yields in the past two years, yields projected in the authorities' medium-term debt management strategy and anticipated tighter global financial conditions resulting from the war in the Middle East. Over the medium term, interest rates are expected to return to their historical averages and a normalized yield curve, assuming an improvement in the security situation and the gradual normalization of domestic conditions.

Text Table 6. Burkina Faso: Summary Table of Actual External Borrowing Monitor, January–December 2025

PPG External Debt	Volume of New Debt in 2025 1/		PV of New Debt in 2025 (Program Purposes) 1/	
	USD million	Percent	USD million	Percent
Sources of Debt Financing	**1074.3**	**100.0**	**531.7**	**100.0**
Concessional Debt, of which 2/	**848.3**	**79.0**	**339.7**	**63.9**
Multilateral debt	828.7	77.1	328.5	61.8
Bilateral debt	19.6	1.8	11.2	2.1
Other	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Non-Concessional Debt, of which 3/	**226.0**	**21.0**	**192.0**	**36.1**
Semi-concessional	226.0	21.0	192.0	36.1
Commercial terms 4/	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
By Creditor Type	**1074.3**	**100.0**	**531.7**	**100.0**
Multilateral	1054.7	98.2	520.5	97.9
Bilateral - Paris Club	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bilateral - Non-Paris Club	19.6	1.8	11.2	2.1
Other	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Uses of Debt Financing	**1074.3**	**100.0**	**531.7**	**100.0**
Infrastructure	700.2	65.2	381.0	71.7
Social Spending	166.6	15.5	62.9	11.8
Budget Financing	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other	207.5	19.3	87.8	16.5
Memorandum Items:				
Indicative Projections 5/				
2026	**655.5**		**415.8**	
2027	**749.3**		**475.3**	

Source: Burkinabè authorities and IMF Staff Calculations

Note: No collateralized debt was contracted.

1/ Contracting and guaranteeing of new debt. The present value of debt is calculated using the terms of individual loans and applying the 5 percent program discount rate.

2/ Debt with a grant element that exceeds a minimum threshold. This minimum is typically 35 percent, but could be established at a higher level.

3/ Debt with a positive grant element which does not meet the minimum grant element.

4/ Debt without a positive grant element. For commercial debt, the present value would be defined as the nominal/face value.

5/ IMF staff estimates.

19. The realism tools suggest that the baseline scenario is credible in all but one exercise comparing it to historical experience and cross-country evidence.

- The baseline scenario for external debt is realistic. Figure 1 shows that both historical external debt-creation and 5-year projected external debt dynamics are mostly driven by current account and FDI dynamics, specifically current account deficits. However, five-year projected external debt dynamics also show a larger residual than for the historical dynamics. Given recent higher than usual gold prices, the current account in 2025 switched to a large surplus of 6.3 percent. While it is projected to return to a deficit of 2.0 percent in 2026, its size is still smaller than deficits in recent years and the long-term norm. This structural break results in non-identified debt-creating flows, since the public external debt data used in the DSA do not capture likely large private sector outflows in the financial account corresponding to the 2025 current account surplus (e.g., due to reimbursement of intra-company loans). The residual is also due to the definition of external debt on a currency basis, contrary to the current account data which are compiled on a residency basis. Unexpected changes in external debt are below the median compared to other low-income countries.[20]

- Overall public debt-creating flows over the last 5 years are higher than in the projections due to exceptional pandemic- and security-related spending. The combination of these two effects makes the primary deficit a major driver of these debt flows. It also explains why average unexpected changes in BFA's debt over the last five years were above the median when compared to other low-income countries.

- Figure 2 shows that the fiscal adjustment path with an adjustment of 1.4 ppts of GDP projected over three years is below the upper quartile of LIC countries' experience in Fund-supported programs. Data through December 2025 show that fiscal consolidation exceeded expectations, with a 4.0 ppts of GDP adjustment relative to 2024. This strong performance corroborates the realism of the planned adjustment. The estimated 5-year average economic growth path and contribution from government capital spending to real GDP growth are also in line with the previous DSA. Due to the external shocks affecting the cost of capital spending, private investment is now projected to slow in 2026, which is consistent with a downward revision to real GDP growth in 2026 relative to the previous DSA. Private investment is expected to revert to the previously projected path from 2027 onward as the external shocks dissipate.

[20] Staff expects higher scrutiny on all members of the region after recent cases of misreporting of external debt under the currency-based definition.

COUNTRY CLASSIFICATION AND DETERMINATION OF STRESS TEST SCENARIOS

20. The Composite Indicator index continues to classify BFA's debt-carrying capacity as 'medium' (Text Table 7). The country's Composite Indicator (CI) index, calculated based on the April 2026 WEO and the 2024 CPIA data (released in 2025), is 2.97, above the threshold of 2.69 for 'weak' debt-carrying capacity but below the threshold of 3.05 for 'strong.' The thresholds for external debt in the 'medium' category are 40 percent for the PV of external debt-to-GDP ratio, 180 percent for the PV of debt-to-exports ratio, 15 percent for the debt service-to-exports ratio, and 18 percent for the debt service-to-revenue ratio. The indicative benchmark for the PV of total public debt for medium debt carrying capacity is 55 percent of GDP.

Text Table 7. Burkina Faso: Debt Carrying Capacity and Relevant Indicative Thresholds

Debt Carrying Capacity and Thresholds

Country	Burkina Faso
Country Code	748
Debt Carrying Capacity	Medium

Final	Classification based on current vintage	Classification based on the previous vintage	Classification based on the two previous vintages
Medium	Medium 2.97	Medium 2.88	Medium 2.88

Applicable thresholds

APPLICABLE	
EXTERNAL debt burden thresholds	
PV of debt in % of	
Exports	180
GDP	40
Debt service in % of	
Exports	15
Revenue	18

APPLICABLE	
TOTAL public debt benchmark	
PV of total public debt in percent of GDP	55

Calculation of the CI index

Components	Coefficients (A)	10-year average values (B)	CI Score components (A*B) = (C)	Contribution of components
CPIA	0.385	3.432	1.32	44%
Real growth rate (in percent)	2.719	4.544	0.12	4%
Import coverage of reserves (in percent)	4.052	41.315	1.67	56%
Import coverage of reserves^2 (in percent)	-3.990	17.069	-0.68	-23%
Remittances (in percent)	2.022	2.098	0.04	1%
World economic growth (in percent)	13.520	3.637	0.49	17%
CI Score			2.97	100%
CI rating			Medium	

New framework	Cut-off values			
Weak	CI <	2.69		
Medium	2.69	≤ CI ≤		3.05
Strong	CI >	3.05		

Reference: Thresholds by Classiciation

EXTERNAL debt burden thresholds	Weak	Medium	Strong
PV of debt in % of			
Exports	140	180	240
GDP	30	40	55
Debt service in % of			
Exports	10	15	21
Revenue	14	18	23

TOTAL public debt benchmark	Weak	Medium	Strong
PV of total public debt in percent of GDP	35	55	70

Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections

21. A tailored stress test examines the impact of shocks to commodities trade. Staff employ the test because gold constituted nearly 90 percent of exports over the previous three years.[21] It captures the potential impact of a sudden and extreme 80-percent decline in prices for gold and all agricultural commodities and a parallel increase in fuel import prices of 80 percent. It supplements the contingent liability test and the other standardized stress tests.

[21] According to the 2018 LIC DSF Guidance Note, "[a commodity price shock applies] to LICs where commodities constitute at least 50 percent of total exports (goods and services) over the previous three-year period, per the data provided in the DSF template. The scenario captures the impact of a sudden one standard deviation decline in the export prices of various fuel and non-fuel commodities, as relevant (informed by commodity price distributions), with macro interactions incorporated, based on staff event analysis and recent studies".

EXTERNAL DSA

22. All external PPG debt indicators remain below the policy-relevant thresholds in the baseline. The present value (PV) of the external debt-to-GDP ratio, the PV of the external debt-to-exports ratio, the external debt service-to-exports ratio, and the external debt service-to-revenue ratio are well below thresholds and remain stable or decrease over the medium term (Table 2, Figure 3).

23. The standardized stress tests show that an export shock has the largest negative impact on the debt trajectory but does not cause the breach of any thresholds. The PV of debt-to-exports ratio is significantly impacted by the export shock (nominal export growth is set to historical average minus one standard deviation), increasing to a peak of 116 percent in 2031 (Table 2). However, it remains below the threshold of 180 percent throughout the projection period. The test highlights the need for a sustained effort to improve the economy's potential in exporting goods and services by addressing the security situation, conducting policy reforms in the mining sector, and diversifying the economy. Likewise, under the export shock the PV of debt service-to-exports ratio deteriorates but stays well below its threshold of 15 percent. Other shocks, including the adverse shock to real GDP growth, the primary balance, a one-time 30-percent depreciation of the CFAF, the tailored tests for contingent liabilities and the commodity price shock do not lead to any breaches of the debt thresholds.

24. While the model signals a low risk of external debt distress, in staff's judgement, as in the previous DSA, the risk of external debt distress is moderate. All PPG external debt sustainability indicators are expected to remain below the indicative thresholds, even under the extreme assumptions in the alternative scenario with the fiscal downside and the scenario with multiple commodity price shocks. Nevertheless, vulnerabilities warrant the application of judgement. An escalation of the ongoing security crisis either within the country or through spillovers from instability in neighboring Mali, as well as a prolonged period of heightened geopolitical tensions, could slow down GDP growth, depress tax revenues, and reduce gold production and exports. At the same time, higher military spending could exacerbate spending pressures. The economy remains highly vulnerable to droughts and flooding that cause fluctuations in agricultural output and affect infrastructure. Development partners could continue to stay on the sidelines or withdraw further, which may raise reliance on expensive regional market financing. Finally, a sudden drop in gold prices could lead to a decline in production and exports.

PUBLIC DSA

25. Under the baseline scenario, the PV of public debt-to-GDP ratio remains below the 55-percent benchmark. It is projected to stay well below the benchmark over the horizon of the exercise and exhibits a moderate downward trend after peaking in 2026 (Table 4 and Figure 4). The PV of debt-to-revenue and grants ratio is expected to peak above 200 percent in 2026 and then to decrease gradually over the exercise horizon. The debt service-to-revenue and grants ratio is estimated to peak at about 58 percent in 2031/32 before declining gradually. The projected increase is driven largely by rollover of recent high net domestic debt issuance (see last chart in Figure 5) given the short maturity of domestic financing. The latter raises concerns about liquidity risks, especially given maturity and rollover risks. The authorities plan to reduce these vulnerabilities by prioritizing concessional financing, issuing securities at longer maturities than before, and by targeting foreign creditors outside WAEMU to conduct a liability management operation that replaces costly short-term domestic debt with euro-denominated debt at significantly longer maturities and lower interest rates than in the regional market. In May 2026, they also launched a "diaspora bond" aimed at mobilizing CFAF 125 billion primarily from citizens living abroad to finance national development projects, such as the Bagré Aval hydroelectric plant and the agro-industrial free zone. Bonds with a coupon of 6.75 percent per year were offered for a duration of 5 years or 6.85 percent per year for 7 years with constant amortization. Figure 5 shows that the baseline involves a reduction in the domestic debt-to-GDP ratio, but that the ratio of domestic debt service to government revenues could increase, while net domestic debt issuance as a ratio of GDP could turn negative due to the rollover of existing domestic debt. Although domestic GFNs are projected to increase in the medium term (see ¶7), this will mainly be for the amortization of the maturing domestic debt. BFA, having a relatively small footprint in the regional market, is a price taker but its strong fiscal performance and debt service record help mitigate the rollover risk, especially since liquidity conditions and borrowing terms improved reflecting foreign reserves accumulation at the BCEAO and its recent easing of monetary policy.

26. The standardized stress tests show that a commodity price shock has the largest negative impact on the debt trajectory but does not lead to any breaches. A negative commodity price shock causes the PV of public debt-to-GDP ratio to gradually rise to a peak of 54 percent in 2036, with the ratio staying below the benchmark of 55 percent. The combined contingent liability test results are similar. Other standard and tailored stress tests stay below the benchmark for the entire time horizon. Overall, the mechanical signals point toward a low overall risk of public debt distress.

27. Staff applied judgement toward a moderate risk of public debt distress as the PV of public debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 55 percent in one alternative scenario. When key variables are kept at their 10-year historical averages for 2026-2036, the PV of public debt-to-GDP ratio would breach the 55 percent benchmark starting in 2034 and gradually increase thereafter, leading to higher values than any other scenario or stress test (Table 4 and Figure 4). Therefore, in staff's judgment, the risk of public debt distress is moderate rather than low; this scenario shows that the domestic debt situation is a main downside risk given the recently diminished availability of concessional financing and the still relatively elevated rollover risk associated with the short on average maturity of the domestic public debt. Debt pressures in some WAEMU countries that prompt greater intervention on the regional market add to this risk, while rising inflation could call for reversing monetary policy easing and higher interest rates could lead to a tightening of financing conditions in the regional market.

CONCLUSIONS

28. The risks of external debt distress and overall debt distress remain moderate. The current debt-carrying capacity is consistent with a classification of 'medium.' Staff evaluate all external and public debt indicators at low overall risk of debt distress based on mechanical signals. Judgment was applied due to the high dependence on gold exports, downside risks to the fiscal sector from spillovers from the war in the Middle East, including the rollover of domestic debt, potential severe weather events, and persistent security challenges. The alternative scenario based on averages over the last ten years illustrates the importance of adhering to the ECF-supported program and its fiscal consolidation path for debt sustainability.

29. The consolidation path in the ECF-supported program helps keep debt sustainable over the medium term. To avoid a deterioration of the debt rating, several risks need to be addressed: (i) expenditures related to food security and humanitarian response; (ii) expenditures to contain the security crisis; (iii) risks arising from limited donor support, while a large proportion of the debt portfolio has relatively short maturities, and is therefore vulnerable to rollover and liquidity risks; (iv) increased reliance on the expensive regional financing market; (v) an undiversified export base, with high vulnerability to gold price shocks; and (vi) severe weather events that could become worse with climate change.

30. Staff assess that Burkina Faso has limited space to absorb shocks. Under the granularity assessment module, which allows for qualifying the moderate risk of debt distress, BFA has substantial space to absorb shocks (Figure 6). None of the indicators breach the threshold under a median observed shock scenario, all indicators decrease or stay constant over the medium term. However, by applying judgement, staff assess that space to absorb shocks is limited as there is downside risk due to gold price movements, high domestic debt rollover requirements, rising vulnerability to severe weather events due to climate change, and the security situation.

Authorities' Views

31. We take note of the conclusions of the Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) carried out as part of this review. These assessments confirm that Burkina Faso's risk of debt distress remains maintained at a moderate level, unchanged from the one reported in the previous fiscal year. These findings are consistent with our own analysis of public debt sustainability.

32. We will thus continue to manage public debt prudently and sustainably with particular attention to strengthening control of the primary deficit. To this end, effective implementation of the medium-term debt management strategy remains a priority. This strategy favors the use of concessional resources to finance the government's needs, as well as active liability management, with a view to improving the quality and maturity profile of the public debt portfolio. The continued improvement of public debt statistics also remains a priority.

Table 1. Burkina Faso: External Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2023–2046

(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

	Actual			Projections								Average 8/	
	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2036	2046	Historical	Projections
External debt (nominal) 1/	**26.2**	**25.5**	**23.9**	**23.9**	**22.6**	**21.5**	**21.4**	**21.4**	**21.5**	**21.4**	**27.9**	**24.0**	**21.7**
of which: public and publicly guaranteed (PPG)	**26.2**	**25.5**	**23.9**	**23.9**	**22.6**	**21.5**	**21.4**	**21.4**	**21.5**	**21.4**	**27.9**	**24.0**	**21.7**
Change in external debt	-0.1	-0.7	-1.6	0.0	-1.3	-1.2	-0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	6.3		
Identified net debt-creating flows	**3.5**	**1.7**	**-8.8**	**3.1**	**1.3**	**3.2**	**2.6**	**3.0**	**2.7**	**0.1**	**-5.3**	**1.6**	**1.8**
Non-interest current account deficit	**4.7**	**3.2**	**-6.6**	**1.7**	**0.8**	**3.0**	**2.2**	**2.7**	**2.4**	**0.1**	**-4.8**	**2.1**	**1.5**
Deficit in balance of goods and services	4.6	2.9	-8.4	-2.1	-2.8	-1.7	-0.7	0.4	0.4	0.5	-2.3	**1.8**	**-0.4**
Exports	29.4	28.8	39.5	40.1	37.2	34.6	33.1	31.8	31.5	29.7	33.9		
Imports	34.0	31.7	31.1	38.0	34.4	32.8	32.5	32.2	31.9	30.2	31.6		
Net current transfers (negative = inflow)	-4.0	-3.5	-2.1	-2.0	-1.8	-1.6	-1.5	-1.4	-1.3	-0.9	-0.6	**-3.2**	**-1.4**
of which: official	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Other current account flows (negative = net inflow)	4.1	3.8	3.9	5.8	5.4	6.3	4.4	3.8	3.4	0.6	-2.0	**3.6**	**3.3**
Net FDI (negative = inflow)	**0.3**	**1.6**	**1.7**	**1.9**	**1.3**	**1.0**	**1.1**	**1.1**	**1.0**	**0.7**	**0.5**	**1.1**	**1.0**
Endogenous debt dynamics 2/	**-1.5**	**-3.2**	**-3.9**	**-0.5**	**-0.8**	**-0.8**	**-0.8**	**-0.8**	**-0.8**	**-0.7**	**-1.0**		
Contribution from nominal interest rate	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4		
Contribution from real GDP growth	-0.7	-1.1	-1.1	-0.8	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.0	-1.4		
Contribution from price and exchange rate changes	-1.2	-2.3	-3.1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...		
Residual 3/	**-3.6**	**-2.4**	**7.3**	**-3.1**	**-2.6**	**-4.4**	**-2.7**	**-3.0**	**-2.6**	**0.0**	**11.5**	**-1.5**	**-2.0**
of which: exceptional financing	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Sustainability indicators													
PV of PPG external debt-to-GDP ratio	**...**	**...**	**16.9**	**15.9**	**14.7**	**13.6**	**13.4**	**13.4**	**13.6**	**14.4**	**21.1**		
PV of PPG external debt-to-exports ratio	**...**	**...**	**42.8**	**39.6**	**39.4**	**39.3**	**40.4**	**42.1**	**43.2**	**48.3**	**62.2**		
PPG debt service-to-exports ratio	**5.0**	**4.5**	**3.7**	**3.6**	**3.5**	**3.4**	**3.5**	**3.3**	**3.0**	**3.1**	**4.1**		
PPG debt service-to-revenue ratio	**7.1**	**6.2**	**6.4**	**7.2**	**6.4**	**5.8**	**5.6**	**5.0**	**4.6**	**4.2**	**6.1**		
Gross external financing need (Billion of U.S. dollars)	1.3	1.4	-1.0	1.6	1.2	2.0	1.9	2.1	2.1	1.2	-3.0		
Key macroeconomic assumptions													
Real GDP growth (in percent)	3.0	4.8	5.3	3.6	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.9	5.0	5.2	**4.8**	**4.8**
GDP deflator in US dollar terms (change in percent)	4.6	9.7	13.6	10.8	7.2	3.6	2.0	2.0	1.9	2.1	-23.0	**4.0**	**3.5**
Effective interest rate (percent) 4/	1.7	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.6	**1.1**	**1.1**
Growth of exports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent)	1.5	12.6	64.2	16.6	4.2	0.9	2.6	2.6	5.9	5.9	3.1	**16.1**	**5.7**
Growth of imports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent)	0.9	7.4	17.5	40.2	1.6	3.7	5.8	6.0	6.0	6.0	-6.6	**9.0**	**8.5**
Grant element of new public sector borrowing (in percent)	...	...	...	40.1	44.7	50.9	39.9	38.3	37.8	35.9	7.3	**...**	**39.6**
Government revenues (excluding grants, in percent of GDP)	20.8	20.7	22.5	19.9	20.2	20.5	20.7	20.8	21.0	21.7	22.6	**18.7**	**20.9**
Aid flows (in Billion of US dollars) 5/	295.4	321.6	394.0	0.8	0.9	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9		
Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of GDP) 6/	...	...	...	2.5	2.2	1.9	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.7	0.7	**...**	**1.9**
Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of external financing) 6/	...	...	...	54.7	62.0	70.7	59.8	58.7	58.1	55.0	27.2	**...**	**58.7**
Nominal GDP (Billion of US dollars)	20	23	28	32	36	39	41	44	47	67	102		
Nominal dollar GDP growth	7.8	15.0	19.7	14.8	12.4	8.6	7.0	7.0	6.9	7.2	-19.0	**9.1**	**8.4**
Memorandum items:													
PV of external debt 7/	...	...	16.9	15.9	14.7	13.6	13.4	13.4	13.6	14.4	21.1		
In percent of exports	...	...	42.8	39.6	39.4	39.3	40.4	42.1	43.2	48.3	62.2		
Total external debt service-to-exports ratio	5.0	4.5	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.3	3.0	3.1	4.1		
PV of PPG external debt (in Billion of US dollars)			4.7	5.0	5.2	5.3	5.6	5.9	6.5	9.6	21.6		
(PVt-PVt-1)/GDPt-1 (in percent)				1.3	0.6	0.1	0.7	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.3		
Non-interest current account deficit that stabilizes debt ratio	4.7	4.0	-5.0	1.7	2.1	4.1	2.3	2.7	2.3	0.1	-11.0		

Definition of external/domestic debt	**Currency-based**
Is there a material difference between the two criteria?	**Yes**





Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

1/ Includes both public and private sector external debt.

2/ Derived as [r - g - ρ(1+g)]/(1+g+ρ+gρ) times previous period debt ratio, with r = nominal interest rate; g = real GDP growth rate, and ρ = growth rate of GDP deflator in U.S. dollar terms.

3/ Includes exceptional financing (i.e., changes in arrears and debt relief); changes in gross foreign assets; and valuation adjustments. For projections also includes contribution from price and exchange rate changes.

4/ Current-year interest payments divided by previous period debt stock.

5/ Defined as grants, concessional loans, and debt relief.

6/ Grant-equivalent financing includes grants provided directly to the government and through new borrowing (difference between the face value and the PV of new debt).

7/ Assumes that PV of private sector debt is equivalent to its face value.

8/ Historical averages are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability, whereas projections averages are over the first year of projection and the next 10 years.

Table 2. Burkina Faso: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt, 2026–2036

(In percent)

	Projections 1/										
	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035	2036
PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio											
Baseline	16	14	13	13	13	13	14	14	14	14	14
A. Alternative Scenarios											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2026-2036 2/	16	16	14	13	13	13	13	14	15	16	17
B. Bound Tests											
B1. Real GDP growth	16	15	14	14	14	14	14	15	15	15	15
B2. Primary balance	16	15	15	15	15	16	16	16	17	17	17
B3. Exports	16	20	27	27	26	26	26	26	25	25	24
B4. Other flows 3/	16	16	16	15	15	16	16	16	16	16	16
B5. Depreciation	16	18	16	15	15	16	16	16	16	17	17
B6. Combination of B1-B5	16	18	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
C. Tailored Tests											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	16	15	15	15	15	15	16	16	16	17	17
C2. Natural disaster	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
C3. Commodity price	16	17	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	18
C4. Market Financing	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Threshold	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40
PV of Debt-to-Exports Ratio											
Baseline	39	39	39	40	42	43	44	44	46	47	48
A. Alternative Scenarios											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2026-2036 2/	39	42	40	41	40	40	42	45	48	53	59
B. Bound Tests											
B1. Real GDP growth	39	39	39	40	42	43	44	44	46	47	48
B2. Primary balance	39	40	43	45	48	50	52	53	55	57	58
B3. Exports	39	62	109	112	115	116	116	116	114	113	112
B4. Other flows 3/	39	42	45	47	48	49	50	51	51	52	53
B5. Depreciation	39	39	37	38	39	40	41	42	44	45	46
B6. Combination of B1-B5	39	51	47	59	61	62	63	63	64	65	66
C. Tailored Tests											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	39	41	42	44	47	49	50	52	53	55	57
C2. Natural disaster	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
C3. Commodity price	39	52	60	61	62	63	62	62	63	63	63
C4. Market Financing	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Threshold	180	180	180	180	180	180	180	180	180	180	180
Debt Service-to-Exports Ratio											
Baseline	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
A. Alternative Scenarios											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2026-2036 2/	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
B. Bound Tests											
B1. Real GDP growth	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
B2. Primary balance	4	3	3	4	3	3	3	4	3	3	3
B3. Exports	4	4	6	6	6	6	6	7	8	8	8
B4. Other flows 3/	4	3	4	4	3	3	3	4	3	3	3
B5. Depreciation	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
B6. Combination of B1-B5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	4	4	4
C. Tailored Tests											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	4	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
C2. Natural disaster	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
C3. Commodity price	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
C4. Market Financing	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Threshold	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio											
Baseline	7	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	4	4	4
A. Alternative Scenarios											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2026-2036 2/	7	7	6	6	5	4	4	5	4	4	4
B. Bound Tests											
B1. Real GDP growth	7	7	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	4	4
B2. Primary balance	7	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
B3. Exports	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	7	8	8	8
B4. Other flows 3/	7	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
B5. Depreciation	7	8	7	7	6	6	6	6	5	5	5
B6. Combination of B1-B5	7	7	7	6	6	5	5	6	5	5	5
C. Tailored Tests											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	7	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	4	4	4
C2. Natural disaster	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
C3. Commodity price	7	7	7	7	6	6	5	6	6	6	6
C4. Market Financing	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Threshold	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18

Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.
1/ A bold value indicates a breach of the threshold.
2/ Variables include real GDP growth, GDP deflator (in U.S. dollar terms), non-interest current account in percent of GDP, and non-debt creating flows.
3/ Includes official and private transfers and FDI.

Table 3. Burkina Faso: Public Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2023–2046

(In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

	Actual			Projections								Average 6/	
	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2036	2046	Historical	Projections
Public sector debt 1/	**56.8**	**57.2**	**53.4**	**52.8**	**50.3**	**49.0**	**48.6**	**48.3**	**48.1**	**46.6**	**45.1**	**47.4**	**48.4**
of which: external debt	**26.2**	**25.5**	**23.9**	**23.6**	**22.4**	**21.3**	**21.2**	**21.2**	**21.3**	**21.4**	**21.6**	**24.0**	**21.6**
Change in public sector debt	-2.3	0.4	-3.9	-0.6	-2.5	-1.2	-0.4	-0.3	-0.2	-0.2	-0.1		
Identified debt-creating flows	**3.0**	**-1.1**	**-8.0**	**0.0**	**-1.5**	**-0.7**	**-0.2**	**-0.1**	**-0.1**	**0.3**	**0.3**	**1.4**	**-0.1**
Primary deficit	**4.4**	**3.6**	**-0.4**	**1.9**	**1.3**	**1.0**	**0.9**	**0.9**	**1.1**	**1.1**	**1.2**	**3.9**	**1.2**
Revenue and grants	22.5	22.0	23.6	21.0	21.3	21.6	21.8	21.9	22.1	22.7	23.9	**20.7**	**22.0**
of which: grants	1.7	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.9	0.6		
Primary (noninterest) expenditure	27.0	25.6	23.1	22.9	22.6	22.6	22.7	22.9	23.1	23.8	25.0	**24.6**	**23.1**
Automatic debt dynamics	**-1.3**	**-4.7**	**-7.8**	**-1.9**	**-2.8**	**-1.7**	**-1.1**	**-1.1**	**-1.2**	**-0.9**	**-0.9**		
Contribution from interest rate/growth differential	-1.0	-4.0	-4.1	-1.9	-2.8	-1.7	-1.1	-1.1	-1.2	-0.9	-0.9		
of which: contribution from average real interest rate	0.7	-1.4	-1.2	-0.1	-0.4	0.6	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.4		
of which: contribution from real GDP growth	-1.7	-2.6	-2.9	-1.9	-2.4	-2.3	-2.3	-2.2	-2.2	-2.2	-2.2		
Contribution from real exchange rate depreciation	-0.3	-0.7	-3.7	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...		
Other identified debt-creating flows	**-0.1**	**0.0**	**0.3**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**-0.1**	**0.0**
Privatization receipts (negative)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Recognition of contingent liabilities (e.g., bank recapitalization)	-0.1	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Debt relief (HIPC and other)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Other debt creating or reducing flow (please specify)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Residual	**-5.4**	**1.5**	**4.1**	**-0.6**	**-1.0**	**-0.6**	**-0.2**	**-0.2**	**-0.1**	**-0.5**	**-0.4**	**0.8**	**-0.5**
Sustainability indicators													
PV of public debt-to-GDP ratio 2/	**...**	**...**	**45.8**	**44.8**	**42.4**	**41.2**	**40.7**	**40.3**	**40.2**	**39.6**	**39.9**		
PV of public debt-to-revenue and grants ratio	**...**	**...**	**194.3**	**213.2**	**199.0**	**190.3**	**186.6**	**183.8**	**182.3**	**174.6**	**167.3**		
Debt service-to-revenue and grants ratio 3/	**41.1**	**34.3**	**38.9**	**52.2**	**46.1**	**53.3**	**55.7**	**55.0**	**57.5**	**50.4**	**39.2**		
Gross financing need 4/	16.0	9.0	8.2	12.9	11.1	12.6	13.1	13.0	13.8	12.6	10.6		
Key macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions													
Real GDP growth (in percent)	3.0	4.8	5.3	3.6	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.9	5.0	5.2	**4.8**	**4.8**
Average nominal interest rate on external debt (in percent)	1.7	1.0	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.6	**1.1**	**1.1**
Average real interest rate on domestic debt (in percent)	3.8	-3.5	-2.8	0.7	-0.7	2.9	5.0	5.0	4.8	4.5	4.5	**1.4**	**3.7**
Real exchange rate depreciation (in percent, + indicates depreciation)	-1.2	-2.8	-15.5	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	**-1.1**	**...**
Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent)	2.0	9.7	8.9	6.2	7.5	3.9	2.1	2.0	1.9	2.1	2.1	**3.7**	**3.1**
Growth of real primary spending (deflated by GDP deflator, in percent)	22.9	-16.2	0.3	-2.5	1.4	7.0	6.8	5.3	5.8	5.5	5.7	**6.9**	**4.7**
Primary deficit that stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio 5/	6.8	3.2	3.4	2.5	3.8	2.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.3	**4.5**	**1.8**
PV of contingent liabilities (not included in public sector debt)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		

Definition of external/domestic debt	**Currency-based**
Is there a material difference between the two criteria?	**Yes**

Public sector debt 1/





Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

1/ Coverage of debt: The central, state, and local governments, central bank, non-guaranteed SOE debt . Definition of external debt is Currency-based.

2/ The underlying PV of external debt-to-GDP ratio under the public DSA differs from the external DSA with the size of differences depending on exchange rates projections.

3/ Debt service is defined as the sum of interest and amortization of medium and long-term, and short-term debt.

4/ Gross financing need is defined as the primary deficit plus debt service plus the stock of short-term debt at the end of the last period and other debt creating/reducing flows.

5/ Defined as a primary deficit minus a change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio ((-): a primary surplus), which would stabilizes the debt ratio only in the year in question.

6/ Historical averages are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability, whereas projections averages are over the first year of projection and the next 10 years.

Table 4. Burkina Faso: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public Debt, 2026–2036

(In percent)

	Projections 1/										
	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035	2036
PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio											
Baseline	45	42	41	41	40	40	40	40	40	40	40
A. Alternative Scenarios											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2026-2036 2/	45	46	47	49	50	52	53	54	**55**	**56**	**57**
B. Bound Tests											
B1. Real GDP growth	45	44	45	46	47	48	49	49	50	51	52
B2. Primary balance	45	47	51	50	50	49	49	48	48	47	47
B3. Exports	45	47	53	52	51	51	50	50	49	48	47
B4. Other flows 3/	45	44	43	43	42	42	42	42	41	41	41
B5. Depreciation	45	44	40	39	37	36	35	34	33	32	31
B6. Combination of B1-B5	45	45	45	43	42	41	40	40	39	39	39
C. Tailored Tests											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	45	50	49	48	47	47	47	46	46	46	45
C2. Natural disaster	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
C3. Commodity price	45	44	44	46	48	50	51	52	53	53	54
C4. Market Financing	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
TOTAL public debt benchmark	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55
PV of Debt-to-Revenue Ratio											
Baseline	213	199	190	187	184	182	180	179	177	176	175
A. Alternative Scenarios											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2026-2036 2/	213	216	219	224	229	234	239	243	247	249	251
B. Bound Tests											
B1. Real GDP growth	213	207	209	211	212	216	218	221	223	226	228
B2. Primary balance	213	222	236	231	226	223	220	216	213	211	208
B3. Exports	213	219	243	238	233	230	227	223	217	212	208
B4. Other flows 3/	213	204	201	197	193	192	190	187	185	183	181
B5. Depreciation	213	206	188	179	171	165	158	152	146	141	136
B6. Combination of B1-B5	213	212	206	197	191	187	182	178	175	172	170
C. Tailored Tests											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	213	236	226	221	216	213	210	207	205	202	200
C2. Natural disaster	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
C3. Commodity price	213	228	224	232	234	235	235	232	235	237	240
C4. Market Financing	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio											
Baseline	52	46	53	56	55	58	58	54	53	51	50
A. Alternative Scenarios											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2026-2036 2/	52	48	58	63	66	71	74	73	74	73	73
B. Bound Tests											
B1. Real GDP growth	52	47	57	61	62	67	69	67	66	66	66
B2. Primary balance	52	46	61	71	70	74	73	67	65	62	61
B3. Exports	52	46	54	57	56	58	59	56	56	54	53
B4. Other flows 3/	52	46	53	56	55	58	58	55	53	52	51
B5. Depreciation	52	44	51	52	52	54	54	51	49	47	47
B6. Combination of B1-B5	52	45	52	61	59	61	61	56	54	51	50
C. Tailored Tests											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	52	46	66	67	67	71	68	64	61	59	57
C2. Natural disaster	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
C3. Commodity price	52	51	58	60	63	67	69	68	69	68	69
C4. Market Financing	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

1/ A bold value indicates a breach of the benchmark.

2/ Variables include real GDP growth, GDP deflator and primary deficit in percent of GDP.

3/ Includes official and private transfers and FDI.

Figure 1. Burkina Faso: Drivers of Debt Dynamics - Baseline Scenario – External Debt

External Debt

Gross Nominal PPG External Debt
(in percent of GDP; DSA vintages)

Debt-creating flows
(percent of GDP)

Unexpected Changes in Debt 1/
(past 5 years, percent of GDP)



Public Debt

Gross Nominal Public Debt
(in percent of GDP; DSA vintages)

Debt-creating Flows
(percent of GDP)

Unexpected Changes in Debt 1/
(past 5 years, percent of GDP)



1/ Difference between anticipated and actual contributions on debt ratios.

2/ Distribution across LICs for which LIC DSAs were produced.

3/ Given the relatively low private external debt for average low-income countries, a ppt change in PPG external debt should be largely explained by the drivers of the external debt dynamics equation.

Figure 2. Burkina Faso: Realism Tools

3-Year Adjustment in Primary Balance
(percent of GDP)



1/ Data cover Fund-supported programs for LICs (excluding emergency financing) approved since 1990. The size of 3-year adjustment from program inception is found on the horizontal axis; the percent of sample is found on the vertical axis.

Fiscal Adjustment and Possible Growth Paths 1/



1/ Bars refer to annual projected fiscal adjustment (right-hand side scale) and lines show possible real GDP growth paths under different fiscal multipliers (left-hand side scale).

Public and Private Investment Rates
(percent of GDP)



Contribution to Real GDP growth
(percent, 5-year average)



Figure 3. Burkina Faso: Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt Under Alternative Scenarios, 2026–2036



Customization of Default Settings		
	Size	Interactions
Tailored Stress		
Combined CL	Yes	
Natural disaster	n.a.	n.a.
Commodity price 2/	Yes	No
Market financing	n.a.	n.a.

Note: "Yes" indicates any change to the size or interactions of the default settings for the stress tests. "n.a." indicates that the stress test does not apply.

Borrowing assumptions on additional financing needs resulting from the stress tests*		
	Default	User defined
Shares of marginal debt		
External PPG MLT debt	100%	
Terms of marginal debt		
Avg. nominal interest rate on new borrowing in USD	1.4%	1.4%
USD Discount rate	5.0%	5.0%
Avg. maturity (incl. grace period)	27	27
Avg. grace period	5	5

* Note: All the additional financing needs generated by the shocks under the stress tests are assumed to be covered by PPG external MLT debt in the external DSA. Default terms of marginal debt are based on baseline 10-year projections.

Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio in or before 2036. The stress test with a one-off breach is also presented (if any), while the one-off breach is deemed away for mechanical signals. When a stress test with a one-off breach happens to be the most exterme shock even after disregarding the one-off breach, only that stress test (with a one-off breach) would be presented.

2/ The magnitude of shocks used for the commodity price shock stress test are based on the commodity prices outlook prepared by the IMF research department.

Figure 4. Burkina Faso: Indicators of Public Debt Under Alternative Scenarios, 2026–2036



Borrowing assumptions on additional financing needs resulting from the stress tests*	Default	User defined
Shares of marginal debt		
External PPG medium and long-term	18%	18%
Domestic medium and long-term	54%	54%
Domestic short-term	28%	28%
Terms of marginal debt		
External MLT debt		
Avg. nominal interest rate on new borrowing in USD	1.4%	1.4%
Avg. maturity (incl. grace period)	27	27
Avg. grace period	5	5
Domestic MLT debt		
Avg. real interest rate on new borrowing	4.0%	4.0%
Avg. maturity (incl. grace period)	4	4
Avg. grace period	1	1
Domestic short-term debt		
Avg. real interest rate	3.9%	3.9%

* Note: The public DSA allows for domestic financing to cover the additional financing needs generated by the shocks under the stress tests in the public DSA. Default terms of marginal debt are based on baseline 10-year projections.

Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.
1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio in or before 2036. The stress test with a one-off breach is also presented (if any), while the one-off breach is deemed away for mechanical signals. When a stress test with a one-off breach happens to be the most exterme shock even after disregarding the one-off breach, only that stress test (with a one-off breach) would be presented.

Figure 5. Burkina Faso: Indicators of Domestic Public Debt, 2021–2036

(Percent)



Borrowing Assumptions (average over 10-year projection)	Value
Shares in new domestic debt issuance	
Medium and long-term	65%
Short-term	35%
Borrowing terms	
Domestic MLT debt	
Avg. real interest rate on new borrowing	4.0%
Avg. maturity (incl. grace period)	4
Avg. grace period	1
Domestic short-term debt	
Avg. real interest rate	3.9%

Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

1/ Net domestic debt issuance is an estimate based on the calculated public gross financing need net of gross external financing, drawdown of assets, other adjustments and domestic debt amortization. It excludes short-term debt that was issued and matured within the calendar year.

Figure 6. Burkina Faso: Qualification of the Moderate Category, 2026–2036 1/



Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

1/ For the PV debt/GDP and PV debt/exports thresholds, x is 20 percent and y is 40 percent. For debt service/Exports and debt service/revenue thresholds, x is 12 percent and y is 35 percent.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

BURKINA FASO

STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2026 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION, FIFTH REVIEW UNDER THE EXTENDED CREDIT FACILITY ARRANGEMENT, REQUESTS FOR AUGMENTATION OF ACCESS AND MODIFICATION OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA, AND FINANCING ASSURANCES REVIEW, AND FIRST REVIEW UNDER THE RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABILITY FACILITY ARRANGEMENT—INFORMATIONAL ANNEX

June 10, 2026

Prepared By

The African Department in collaboration with other Departments

CONTENTS

RELATIONS WITH THE IMF

(As of May 31, 2026, unless otherwise indicated)

Membership Status

Joined: May 2, 1963; Article VIII

Financial Position in the Fund

General Resources Account:

	SDR Million	%Quota
Quota	120.40	100.00
IMF's Holdings of Currency (Holdings Rate)	96.80	80.40
Reserve Tranche Position	23.64	19.63

SDR Department:

	SDR Million	%Allocation
Net cumulative allocation	172.98	100.00
Holdings	202.26	116.92

Outstanding Purchases and Loans:

	SDR Million	%Quota
RCF Loans	127.62	106.00
ECF Arrangements	202.15	167.90

Latest Financial Commitments:

Arrangements

Type	Date of Arrangement	Expiration Date	Amount Approved (SDR Million)	Amount Drawn (SDR Million)
RSF	Feb 18, 2026	Sep 20, 2027	90.30	0.00
ECF	Sep 21, 2023	Sep 20, 2027	228.76	120.40
ECF	Mar 14, 2018	Nov 17, 2020	108.36	108.36

Outright Loans[1]

Type	Date of Arrangement	Expiration Date	Amount Approved (SDR Million)	Amount Drawn (SDR Million)
RCF	Mar 27, 2023	Mar 29, 2023	60.20	60.20
RCF	Apr 14, 2020	Apr 16, 2020	84.28	84.28

[1] Undrawn outright disbursements (RFI and RCF) expire automatically 60 days following the date of commitment, i.e. Board approval date.

Overdue Obligations and Projected Payments to Fund:[1/]

(SDR Million; based on existing use of resources and present holdings of SDRs)

	Forthcoming				
	2026	**2027**	**2028**	**2029**	**2030**
Principal	26.07	39.42	40.94	52.37	44.55
Charges/Interest		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total	26.07	39.42	40.94	52.37	44.55

[1/] When a member has overdue financial obligations outstanding for more than three months, the amount of such arrears will be shown in this section.

Implementation of HIPC Initiative:

	Original Framework	Enhanced Framework	Total
I. Commitment of HIPC assistance			
Decision point date	Sep 1997	Jul 2000	
Assistance committed			
by all creditors (US$ Million)[1/]	229.00	324.15	
Of which: IMF assistance (US$ million)	21.70	35.88	
(SDR equivalent in millions)	16.30	27.67	
Completion point date	Jul 2000	Apr 2002	
II. Disbursement of IMF assistance (SDR Million)			
Assistance disbursed to the member	16.30	27.67	43.97
Interim assistance	--	4.15	4.15
Completion point balance	16.30	23.52	39.82
Additional disbursement of interest income[2/]	--	2.01	2.01
Total disbursements	16.30	29.68	45.98

[1/] Assistance committed under the original framework is expressed in net present value (NPV) terms at the completion point, and assistance committed under the enhanced framework is expressed in NPV terms at the decision point. Hence these two amounts cannot be added.

[2/] Under the enhanced framework, an additional disbursement is made at the completion point corresponding to interest income earned on the amount committed at the decision point but not disbursed during the interim period.

Implementation of Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI):

I. MDRI-eligible debt (SDR Million)[1/]	62.12
Financed by: MDRI Trust	57.06
Remaining HIPC resources	5.06

II. Debt Relief by Facility (SDR Million)

	Eligible Debt		
Delivery Date	**GRA**	**PRGT**	**Total**
January 2006	N/A	62.12	62.12

1/ The MDRI provides 100 percent debt relief to eligible member countries that qualified for the assistance. Grant assistance from the MDRI Trust and HIPC resources provide debt relief to cover the full stock of debt owed to the Fund as of end-2004 that remains outstanding at the time the member qualifies for such debt relief.

Implementation of Catastrophe Containment and Relief (CCR):

Date of Catastrophe	Board Decision Date	Amount Committed (SDR million)	Amount Disbursed (SDR million)
N/A	Apr 13, 2020	8.74	8.74
N/A	Oct 02, 2020	10.30	10.30
N/A	Apr 01, 2021	9.65	9.65
N/A	Oct 06, 2021	10.61	10.61
N/A	Dec 15, 2021	0.26	0.26

As of February 4, 2015, the Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief Trust has been transformed to the Catastrophe Containment and Relief (CCR) Trust.

Decision point - point at which the IMF and the World Bank determine whether a country qualifies for assistance under the HIPC Initiative and decide on the amount of assistance to be committed.
Interim assistance - amount disbursed to a country during the period between decision and completion points, up to 20 percent annually and 60 percent in total of the assistance committed at the decision point (or 25 percent and 75 percent, respectively, in exceptional circumstances).
Completion point - point at which a country receives the remaining balance of its assistance committed at the decision point, together with an additional disbursement of interest income as defined in footnote 2 above. The timing of the completion point is linked to the implementation of pre-agreed key structural reforms (i.e., floating completion point).

Safeguards Assessment

The Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) is a common central bank of the countries of the West African Monetary Union (WAEMU). The most recent safeguards assessment conducted in August 2023 confirmed that the BCEAO continues to maintain a robust audit framework and a strong control environment. Progress has been made in aligning its operational practices with evolving institutional frameworks. Implementation of a priority recommendation, to align the BCEAO's Statute with the Cooperation Agreement of December 21, 2019, signed between the WAEMU member States and the French Republic, remains pending, as it requires ratification of the said agreement by all WAEMU member countries. To date, four out of the eight member States have ratified the Agreement. Nevertheless, several of its provisions are already being applied.

Exchange Rate Arrangement

Burkina Faso is a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). The common currency, the CFA franc, is pegged to the Euro at the rate of EUR 1 = CFAF 655.957. The de-jure and de facto exchange rate arrangements are a conventional peg. As of June 1, 1996, Burkina Faso and other members of WAEMU accepted the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Fund's Articles of Agreement. The exchange system, common to all members of the union, has no restrictions on making payments or transfers for current international transactions and the country does not engage in multiple currency practices. The most recent annual discussion on common policies of member countries of the WAEMU was concluded by the IMF's Executive Board on June 23, 2026 (Country Report No. 26/154).

Technical Assistance

Technical assistance on tax and revenue mobilization, energy subsidies, public financial management, C-PIMA, governance diagnostic assessment, debt management, investor relations, and national accounting has been provided through AFRITAC West I, FAD, LEG, MCM, and STA.

Article IV Consultations

The Executive Board concluded the last Article IV consultation with Burkina Faso on July 29, 2024. Burkina Faso follows a 24-month consultation cycle. The authorities' engagement with the Fund continued throughout this period, including through TA; staff visits; discussions on an RSF arrangement approved by the Executive Board in February 2026; and on economic and financial policies in the context of the ongoing ECF arrangement approved in September 2023.

Resident Representative

Fund resident representative, Mr. William Gbohoui, has been in the post since November 2024.

RELATIONS WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

A. World Bank

https://www.worldbank.org/ext/en/country/burkinafaso

B. African Development Bank

https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/west-africa/burkina-faso

BURKINA FASO

June 23, 2026

STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2026 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION, FIFTH REVIEW UNDER THE EXTENDED CREDIT FACILITY ARRANGEMENT, REQUESTS FOR AUGMENTATION OF ACCESS AND MODIFICATION OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA, AND FINANCING ASSURANCES REVIEW, AND FIRST REVIEW UNDER THE RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABILITY FACILITY ARRANGEMENT—WORLD BANK ASSESSMENT LETTER FOR THE RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABILITY FACILITY

A. Country Vulnerability to Climate Change including Human, Social and Economic Costs

1. Burkina Faso's overall climate risk profile remains as described in the January 2026 assessment letter.

B. Government Policies and Commitments in terms of Climate Change Adaptation and Priority Areas to Strengthen Resilience

2. The government advanced the adaptation policy framework from planning toward operational risk management. Building on the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) 2024–2028 framework described in the January 2026 assessment letter, the government shifted toward an impact-based early warning framework in early 2026.[1]

C. Government Policies and Commitments in terms of Climate Change Mitigation and Priority Areas to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions

3. A government restructuring has shifted the institutional anchor for climate change policy. Following the government restructuring of January 2026,

[1] CIMA Research Foundation / World Meteorological Organization. 2026. Extension of Impact-Based Flood Forecast System in Burkina Faso: Operational Capacity Update. Savona: CIMA Research Foundation. https://www.cimafoundation.org.

the Ministry of Agriculture, Water, Animal and Fisheries Resources now oversees policies and commitments related to climate change mitigation, and priority areas to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. A new Permanent Secretary (SP/CSADD) was established to coordinate agricultural sectoral policies and sustainable development, including climate change.

D. Other Challenges and Opportunities

4. The conflict in the Middle East is affecting the country through its exposure to climate-sensitive commodity channels. Petroleum and fertilizers represented 35 percent of imports in 2025 and are not produced domestically. All commercial agriculture and 98 percent of individual farmers rely on fertilizers. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz in the wake of the conflict has led to an increase in fertilizer and energy prices along with disruptions in their respective supply chains, affecting the Burkinabe economy and public finances.

E. World Bank Engagement in Climate Change

5. Relevant Projects since January 2026 Assessment Letter:

- *Burkina Faso Contingent Emergency Response Project (CERP)* (P509526; US$0 million; approved in August 2025). Instrument that can be used to channel up to 10 percent of undisbursed and uncommitted funds in the country portfolio available through the Rapid Response Option (RRO). Government is considering activation to use RRO funds to respond to the fertilizer and oil shock triggered by the conflict in the Middle East.[2]

- *Burkina Faso Agricultural Transformation Project* (P507256; US$216 million; approved in March 2026). Aims to increase production, market access, and climate resilience of smallholder farmers along selected value chains in the project areas.[3]

- *Burkina Faso Economic Opportunities for Resilience Project* (P511652; US$120 million; approved in June 2026). Aims to increase access to economic opportunities and strengthen the adaptive social protection systems, including climate resilience of poor households.[4]

[2] World Bank Project P509526. https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P509526.

[3] World Bank Project P507256. https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P507256.

[4] World Bank Project P511652. https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P511652.

Statement by Mr. Ouattara Wautabouna, Executive Director for Burkina Faso and Mr. Abdoulaye Tall, Senior Advisor to Executive Director
June 24, 2026

I. Introduction and Background

On behalf of Burkina Faso's authorities, we would like to thank the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for its steadfast support to Burkina Faso. The authorities appreciated the productive discussions held recently with Management, Staff and Board Members in Ouagadougou and in Washington in connection with the combined 2026 Article IV consultation, the reviews under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) and Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangements, and the Deputy Managing Director's visit to Burkina Faso. The authorities highly value the Fund's technical assistance and close policy dialogue with the country team led by **Mr. Jaroslaw Wieczorek**.

Burkina Faso's economy remained resilient amidst an exceptionally difficult policy- making environment. While security incidents declined significantly, the country remains exposed to the Sahel region's heightened security challenges and extreme climate events. A significant share of the population is internally displaced, and food security and humanitarian needs are unmet amidst declining official development assistance. The latest war in the Middle East has led to significant disruptions to supply chains in critical fertilizers and fuel markets.

Against such a difficult backdrop, the authorities have maintained strong program ownership, focusing on preserving macroeconomic stability, strengthening governance, while advancing an ambitious homegrown medium-term structural transformation agenda. The recently adopted "Plan Relance" aims to drive the structural transformation of the economy and provide employment opportunities for the population while strengthening security and resilience to climate-related shocks.

Based on their continued record of strong program implementation and sound medium-term policies and frameworks, the authorities are requesting the completion of the 2026 Article IV consultation, the fifth review under the ECF arrangement and the first review under the RSF program. The authorities are also **requesting an augmentation of access under the ECF** to address the increased balance of payments needs stemming from responding to the fuel and fertilizer price shock, while ensuring that the reform momentum and hard-won social and macroeconomic stability gains are not derailed.

II. Recent Economic Developments

Economic performance in 2025 was markedly strong, despite Burkina Faso's fragile security and humanitarian context. Real GDP growth accelerated to 5.3 percent, from 4.8 percent in **2024**, supported by the mining sector and a strong harvest. Inflation fell to - 0.5 percent on average from 4.2

percent in 2024, reflecting lower food and energy prices. The external position strengthened, with the current account shifting from a deficit of 3.5 percent of GDP in 2024 to a surplus of 6.3 percent of GDP in 2025, driven by a surge in gold export receipts.

Fiscal performance was particularly noteworthy, with the overall deficit narrowing sharply to 1.8 percent of GDP from 5.8 percent in 2024. This represented an adjustment of 4 per cent of GDP in a year, well below the program target, reflecting the authorities' strong budget discipline and prudent use of higher-than-expected mining and fuel-related revenues.

Revenue performance was especially strong: total revenue rose to 23.6 percent of GDP in 2025, from 22.0 percent in 2024. Tax revenue **increased** to 19.2 percent of GDP, supported by sustained reforms in tax and customs administration, digitalization of procedures, stronger tax arrears management, and enhanced tax compliance operations.

As revenue performance improved, the authorities have maintained spending discipline, by adhering to the initial public investment **spending** plans and by reducing the deficit rather than increasing current spending. Amidst their fiscal consolidation efforts, the authorities managed to increase social spending in accordance with the ECF program parameters.

Performance under the Fund-supported programs

Program implementation under the ECF and RSF arrangements has been strong. All quantitative performance criteria (PC) and all but two indicative targets for end-2025 were met, for a total of ten (10) out of twelve (12) program conditionality. Minor deviations in **two indicative targets** were due to transitory factors and were promptly addressed. The ceiling on current primary expenditure indicative target was exceeded by about 0.7 percent of GDP, reflecting higher-than-planned energy subsidies, including butane gas and electricity-related fuel subsidies, as well as security-related outlays channeled through the Patriotic Support Fund in response to the security situation. Due to active tax audits, there were temporary holds on processing VAT refunds to mining operators. These holds were worth about 0.2 percent of GDP at end-December 2025 and less than 0.1 percent of GDP at end-March 2026.

The authorities implemented all the **structural benchmarks for the fifth review under the ECF,** including those related to tax administration, expenditure control, and procurement practices. Implementation of the **IMF Governance Diagnostic recommendations are advancing steadily, with 7 out of the 11 priority actions implemented and 3 additional actions partly implemented**. On the RSF, the authorities met all the reform measures scheduled for **the** first review on disaster risk management and the publication of climate risk data to facilitate adaptation and mitigation efforts.

Outlook and Risks

The war in the Middle East had a significant impact on the near-term outlook, notably through dislocations in the supply chains for fertilizers and fuel at the onset of the main agriculture season. Growth is projected to moderate to 3.6 percent in 2026, reflecting pressures on agricultural production, including fertilizer shortages and higher **input** costs. Inflation is expected to rise temporarily to about 4.2 percent before converging to the WAEMU norm. The current account is projected to return to a deficit as import costs increase. Without a timely response, the main agricultural production season currently underway would be severely disrupted with significant implications for food security needs, and second order impacts on prices, balance of payment needs, and social cohesion.

Downside risks also remain tributary to security **developments**, commodity price volatility, global and regional financing conditions, and vulnerability to extreme weather events.

III. Policies for the Remainder of 2026 and beyond

The authorities' medium-term policies will be guided by the "Plan Relance" (2026– 2030), which was adopted as Burkina Faso's medium-term development strategy after broad-based consultations. It represents a strategic departure from previous development frameworks by **emphasizing** self-reliance, homegrown development, and structural transformation. A key goal of the plan is to shift away from an economic model based on the export of raw materials and the import of finished goods toward industrialization and the creation of value chains and jobs.

The plan is organized around four core pillars: i) consolidation of security and peace; ii) rebuilding the **State** and governance with the focus on creating a more efficient, transparent, and accountable governance; iii) development of human capital; and iv) structural transformation of the economy through infrastructure and industrialization.

To accelerate the pace of implementation of priority **projects**, the authorities have established the *Bureau National des Grands Projects* within the President's Office, which will work across line ministries to remove barriers to reforms and steer large-scale projects. The government has also established a *Strategic Orientation Committee*, chaired by the Prime Minister, which is tasked with monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the "Plan Relance."

The ECF and RSF are fully aligned with the newly adopted strategic framework.

Fiscal Policy

The authorities are determined to pursue their fiscal consolidation efforts with a view to creating the fiscal space needed to implement their development strategy while **maintaining** fiscal and debt sustainability. They welcome the flexibility under the program to accommodate necessary spending to mitigate the effects of the ongoing crisis and are resolved to pursue the strong fiscal discipline needed to converge towards the WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union) deficit ceiling of 3 per cent by 2028. Key pillars of the authorities' fiscal strategy include strengthening domestic revenue mobilization by further broadening the tax base and leveraging **digitalization** to improve tax collection. Should the crisis worsen, they are prepared to take additional steps to protect the budget and remain within the program's parameters, including through adjustments to fuel prices. The authorities will deepen reforms aimed at strengthening **public financial management**. They welcome Staff's recommendations aimed to insulate the budget from commodity price volatility.

On spending, the authorities will continue efforts to rationalize current spending and improve the targeting of **subsidies** while controlling the wage bill. They will also scale up social protection through the expansion of the social registry, rollout of the universal health insurance, and targeted support to vulnerable households.

Strengthening Governance and Transparency

Institutional strengthening and governance constitute a key strategic pillar of the "Plan Relance". Priorities **going** forward include actively implementing the remaining action plans of the IMF Governance Diagnostic Assessment. The authorities have made tangible progress under the ECF in enhancing procurement processes, safeguarding tax administration integrity, and advancing beneficial ownership transparency. Reforms to operationalize the Treasury Single Account and rationalize public accounts are progressing, alongside reinforced audit and oversight mechanisms.

Financial Sector Policies

The financial sector remains broadly resilient, with the banking system well capitalized and highly liquid. While the financial soundness indicators are strong and comfortably above regulatory standards, the authorities are nevertheless closely monitoring regional financing conditions in coordination with regional institutions. They are also seeking to promote financial inclusion and improve access to finance for the private sector, notably for small and medium-sized enterprises. In this respect, they will pursue the implementation of the **regional** strategy aimed at deepening financial inclusion, particularly by leveraging digital technology with the broader goal of creating a resilient financial system capable of supporting inclusive growth.

Structural Reforms for Inclusive Growth

To transition toward a more inclusive growth model, Burkina Faso is prioritizing the transformation of its agricultural sector. Beyond agriculture, structural reforms aim to diversify the economy by reducing the reliance on raw commodity exports. This involves fostering a "Made in Burkina" industrial base, investing in human capital, specifically for women and youth, and implementing policies that encourage the formalization of the labor market. The authorities are also pursuing efforts to improve the business climate and foster private sector-led growth. To improve long-term growth prospects, the authorities aim to scale up public investment in critical sectors, particularly health, education, and infrastructure.

Strengthening Resilience to Climate Change

Given Burkina Faso's vulnerability to recurring droughts and floods, building climate resilience is macro-critical. Recognizing that climate vulnerability is a primary driver of fragility, the authorities have integrated climate adaptation and mitigation into the core of Burkina Faso's national development strategy, Plan Relance. The RSF-supported reforms specifically target long-term structural risks to balance-of-payments stability. The reform measures for the first reviews under the RSF aimed to enhance disaster risk management and equip farmers with improved data for managing climate-sensitive cycles. Future reforms measures are geared toward mainstreaming climate considerations into public financial and investment management frameworks. The authorities also aim to protect the population from the adverse effects of drought, floods, and land degradation through sustainable natural resource management and resilient infrastructure, which are essential for long-term food security and stability.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the authorities' strong program implementation and resolute commitment to prudent policies and sound reforms to reinforce macroeconomic stability, enhance economic resilience, and foster inclusive growth, **we seek the Executive Board's support for the proposed augmentation of access under the ECF, the completion of the program reviews under the fifth review under the ECF and the first review under the RSF arrangements, and the completion of the 2026 Article IV consultation**. **We also look forward to the Fund's continued support in catalyzing the resources needed to implement Burkina Faso's transformative national development strategy.**