



# REPUBLIC OF CONGO

April 2026

## POST-FINANCING ASSESSMENT—PRESS RELEASE; STAFF REPORT; AND STATEMENT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR REPUBLIC OF CONGO

In the context of the Post-Financing Assessment, the following documents have been released and are included in this package:

- A **Press Release** summarizing the views of the Executive Board as expressed during its March 16, 2026 consideration of the staff report that concluded the post-financing assessment for the Republic of Congo.
- The **Staff Report** prepared by a staff team of the IMF for the Executive Board's consideration on March 16, 2026, following discussions that ended on December 15, 2025, with the officials of the Republic of Congo on economic developments and policies. Based on information available at the time of these discussions, the staff report was completed on February 27, 2026.
- A **Debt Sustainability Analysis** prepared by the staffs of the IMF and International Development Association.
- A **Statement by the Executive Director** for the Republic of Congo.

The IMF's transparency policy allows for the deletion of market-sensitive information and premature disclosure of the authorities' policy intentions in published staff reports and other documents.

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## IMF Executive Board Concludes 2026 Post-Financing Assessment with the Republic of Congo

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

- *Congo's economic recovery has softened in 2025 as weak public investment and energy supply disruptions weighed on the non-hydrocarbon sector. Medium-term growth prospects hinge on improvement in the business environment and increased economic diversification.*
- *In the context of heightened sovereign-bank nexus vulnerabilities and liquidity tensions in regional treasury markets, fiscal discipline weakened in 2025. Spending overruns together with lower oil prices exacerbated fiscal pressures. The 2026 budget plans indicate a renewed commitment to fiscal consolidation, alongside a rebalancing of spending toward pro-growth and pro-poor outlays.*
- *The Republic of Congo's capacity to repay the IMF is adequate but subject to significant risks.*

**Washington, DC – March 16, 2026:** The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the 2026 Post-Financing assessment (PFA) with the Republic of Congo.<sup>1</sup>

The Republic of Congo's economy grew in 2024 by 2.1 and in 2025 by an estimated 2.4 percent. Weak public investments, energy supply disruptions, and lackluster hydrocarbon activity acted as impediment to stronger economic growth. The current account deficit increased in 2025 to 5.8 percent of GDP reflecting lower oil prices and high imports partly related to investments in the natural gas sector. After initial price pressures, inflation decelerated, averaging 2.6 percent over 2025.

Fiscal discipline has weakened in 2025 against the backdrop of a high sovereign-bank nexus and liquidity tensions in regional treasury markets. Congo's 2025 non-hydrocarbon primary deficit has widened to 8.7 percent of non-hydrocarbon GDP. An unexpected surge in spending on goods and services crowded out capital expenditures and transfers, while revenues were compressed by lower oil prices despite stronger non-hydrocarbon revenue mobilization amid improved tax administration. The approved 2026 budget aims to restore fiscal discipline and enhance spending quality through stronger non-hydrocarbon revenue mobilization and a reallocation of resources towards investment and social transfers. Debt vulnerabilities have remained elevated, with total public debt estimated to have reached 97.2 percent of GDP at end-2025. Newly accumulated domestic and external arrears point to persistent weaknesses in debt management, which the authorities are gradually addressing by leveraging technical assistance from the Fund and other development partners.

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<sup>1</sup> After completing an IMF lending program, a country may be subject to a Post Financing Assessment (PFA). It aims to identify risks to a country's medium-term viability and provide early warnings on risks to the IMF's balance sheets. For more details click [here](#).

The Republic of Congo's capacity to repay the IMF is assessed as adequate but subject to significant risks. Sizeable funding gaps could challenge this capacity, in the event of a decline in regional banks' appetite for Congolese treasuries and lower oil prices.

### **Executive Board Assessment<sup>2</sup>**

Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They noted that Congo's fiscal, external, and debt vulnerabilities have intensified as a result of fiscal slippage in 2025, mounting liquidity pressures against the backdrop of a heightened sovereign-bank nexus, and slow structural reform implementation. Against this background, Directors stressed the importance of strengthening budget discipline, sustaining fiscal consolidation, and stepping up transformative structural reforms, to entrench macroeconomic stability, catalyze development partner support, and lay the foundations for higher, more resilient, and more inclusive growth. Directors urged the authorities to continue strong engagement with the Fund, which would remain critical in this effort.

Directors agreed that Congo's capacity to repay the Fund is adequate, but noted elevated risks, particularly from large rollover needs and tight regional credit markets, or in the event of a significant decline in oil prices.

Directors welcomed the authorities' commitment to restore fiscal discipline and avoid future fiscal slippages. They underscored the need to strengthen domestic revenue mobilization, including through broadening the tax base, streamlining tax exemptions, and strengthening tax administration. They emphasized that these efforts should be complemented by improving expenditure controls and prioritizing growth-enhancing public investment and social spending targeted to the most vulnerable. Directors also called for continued progress in public financial management, notably the full implementation of the financial management information system (SIGFIP), as a key step toward more sustainable public finances.

Directors emphasized that, with debt still classified as in distress, strengthened debt management is critical to prevent the recurrence of new arrears and ensure debt sustainability. They called for improved planning of debt service, arrears clearance, and debt issuance, supported by improved coordination among government agencies and enhanced transparency of public debt. Reliance on concessional financing is paramount.

Directors encouraged the authorities to press ahead with reforms to further strengthen governance, transparency, and anti-corruption frameworks, to foster private sector investment and job-rich growth. They also underscored the importance of enhanced oversight of banks and enforcement of prudential standards given rising sovereign exposures.

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<sup>2</sup> At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chair of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country's authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: <http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm>.



# REPUBLIC OF CONGO

## POST-FINANCING ASSESSMENT

February 27, 2026

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Congo's economic performance and outlook remain fragile.** 2025 growth remained well below potential as weak public investment and energy supply disruptions weighed on the non-hydrocarbon sector, and medium-term growth prospects have softened for similar reasons. Despite heightened sovereign-bank nexus vulnerabilities and liquidity tensions in regional treasury markets, fiscal discipline weakened significantly in 2025. Sizeable overspending took place, while revenues were compressed by lower oil prices. These developments, as well as arrears accumulation and debt rollovers at unfavorable terms, are slowing the pace of public debt reduction.

**The authorities should maintain a carefully balanced fiscal consolidation, underpinned by structural reforms.** This requires strengthening non-hydrocarbon revenue mobilization and prioritizing capital and social expenditures that support sustainable and inclusive economic growth.

- Accelerating Congo's ongoing efforts to broaden the tax base, and streamlining of tax and customs exemptions, would significantly strengthen revenues. Continued digitization of the tax and customs administrations will enhance efficiency, freeing up resources for debt service and critical pro-poor spending. At the same time, spending rationalization, supported by tighter control of goods and services, wages and energy subsidies, remains essential for achieving sustained and growth-friendly consolidation.
- Intensified prudential monitoring of banks and robust application of effective prudential standards are key to mitigating vulnerabilities around the currently high sovereign-bank nexus. Looking ahead, financial deepening efforts may help with diversifying Congo's financial system.

- Structural reforms should tackle weaknesses in public financial and debt management as well as governance. Fully operationalizing the treasury single account, the financial management information system (SIGFIP), and the reorganized debt management office will be critical for more effective fiscal planning and debt management. Further advances in transparency and governance would promote private sector investment incentives and improve the business environment.

**Congo's capacity to repay the Fund is adequate, though subject to significant risks in the outer years under both the baseline and downside scenarios.** The country's capacity to repay is supported by overall fiscal surpluses, the commitment to correct recent fiscal slippages and continue with consolidation, and Congo's track record in repaying the Fund. Sizeable funding gaps could, however, challenge this capacity, should regional banks' willingness to absorb Congolese treasuries dry up and oil prices decline considerably.

Approved By  
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Discussions were held in Washington during October 14–16, 2025; in Brazzaville during November 3–11, 2025; and virtually during December 14–15, 2025. The staff team comprised Mr. Kpodar (head), Ms. El Idrissi, Mr. Hespeler, Mr. Okou (all AFR), Ms. Azizirad (SPR), Mr. Coulibaly (FAD), Mr. Kaffo, (Resident Representative), Mr. Rafolisy (LEG), and Mr. Nsongui Tonadio (local economist). Ms. Joseph and Mr. Qi assisted in the preparation of the staff report. The mission held discussions with the Hon. Mr. Makosso, Prime Minister, Hon. Mr. Yoka, Minister of Finance and Budget, Hon. Mr. Ngatsé, Minister of the Economy, Planning, and Regional Integration, Hon. Mr. Mavoungou, President of the Economic, Finance and Budget Execution Control Commission of the National Assembly and other senior officials. The mission met with representatives of the private sector, civil society, and development partners.

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## CONTEXT

**1. Persistent liquidity constraints have intensified fiscal, external, and debt vulnerabilities.** Lower oil prices and continued oil production shortfalls have undermined hydrocarbon revenues. Combined with elevated domestic debt service, this has constrained budget execution, in particular for public investment and social spending. Acute liquidity tensions in regional treasury markets—along with heightened sovereign-bank nexus—have been exacerbated by fiscal slippages on recurrent spending, with further spending pressures ahead of the March 2026 elections being a notable additional risk. On the external front, weakened hydrocarbon export proceeds have eroded Congo’s contribution to regional reserves.

**2. Congo’s economic growth potential remains largely untapped, holding back job creation and worsening social fragility.** Since 2021, Congo’s economy has recorded positive growth, but the pace of recovery—averaging 1.7 percent in 2021–24—has remained well below potential. Consequently, per capita GDP contracted by 0.8 percent during 2021–24, underscoring the urgent need for stronger and more inclusive growth to decisively tackle widespread poverty—about half of the population lives below the international poverty line of USD 2.15 per day. Limited success with revenue mobilization and the need for fiscal consolidation have constrained public investment, underscoring the critical role the private sector should play as a driver for growth and job creation. The structural agenda has suffered from delays, hindering progress toward robust public finance and debt management and a conducive business environment. Higher non-hydrocarbon growth coupled with adequate social safety nets are essential to tackle the root causes of social fragility, while accelerating governance reforms remains key to tackling persistent institutional fragility.

## RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND OUTLOOK

**3. Economic growth remained subdued in 2024–25.** Real GDP growth settled at 2.1 percent in 2024, reflecting lackluster hydrocarbon activity. In 2025, economic growth is estimated to have reached 2.4 percent, with non-hydrocarbon growth at 2.1 percent—1.6 percentage point (pp) short of expectations on the back of weak public investment and energy supply disruptions—and hydrocarbon growth at 3.3 percent.

**4. Inflationary pressures have softened but the inflation rate has remained volatile.** Inflation eased in 2024—with the average annual inflation rate falling to 3.1 percent, down from 4.3 in 2023. Subsequently, it bounced back to 4.2 percent by April 2025 before easing over the remainder of 2025. Increasing non-food prices, particularly for excise-taxed and energy-sensitive goods, offset decelerating food inflation for most of 2025.

**5. Fiscal slippages in 2025 have eroded budget discipline and intensified fiscal and debt vulnerabilities.** The liquidity-driven fiscal restraint observed in 2024 started unravelling last year. Preliminary end-September data reveal substantial slippages that more than offset the prior year’s adjustment (Text Table 1): the 2025 non-hydrocarbon primary deficit is projected to have widened

to CFAF 640 billion (8.7 percent of non-hydrocarbon GDP), and the overall balance to have shrunk to a marginal surplus of CFAF 30 billion (about 0.3 percent of GDP). This deterioration reflected a temporary surge in current spending, which also crowded out domestically financed capital expenditure, while sizeable payment floats accumulated.<sup>1,2</sup> Rationalization of transfers to public entities with autonomous budgets partially offset the higher spending on goods and services. On the revenue side, improved tax administration resulted in an encouraging uptick in non-hydrocarbon revenue mobilization, but this was not sufficient to compensate for the downward surprise in oil revenues resulting from lower oil prices.

**Text Table 1. Republic of Congo: Budget: 2024 Actuals, and 2025 Full-Year Estimates**  
(CFAF billion, otherwise indicated)

	2024			2025		
	CR 25/75	Actual	Difference	CR 25/75	PFA	Difference
<b>Total Revenue and grants</b>	<b>2,293</b>	<b>2263</b>	<b>-30</b>	<b>2460</b>	<b>2197</b>	<b>-263</b>
Hydrocarbon	1,223	1213	-10	1258	995	-263
Non-hydrocarbon	1,011	1010	-1	1129	1167	38
<b>Expenditure</b>	<b>2,059</b>	<b>1939</b>	<b>-120</b>	<b>2108</b>	<b>2167</b>	<b>59</b>
Wages	427	403	-24	430	425	-5
Goods and services	198	205	7	210	560	350
Transfers	583	571	-12	590	465	-125
o/w Social transfers	245	218	-27	231	230	-1
Oil-related transfers	74	82	8	47	83	36
Interest payments	358	419	61	331	325	-6
Capital expenditure	371	264	-107	418	267	-151
<b>Non-hydrocarbon primary balance</b>	<b>-631</b>	<b>-471</b>	<b>161</b>	<b>-575</b>	<b>-640</b>	<b>-65</b>
<b>Primary balance</b>	<b>592</b>	<b>743</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>683</b>	<b>355</b>	<b>-328</b>
<b>Overall balance</b>	<b>234</b>	<b>324</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>352</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>-322</b>

Sources: Congolese Authorities; and IMF staff estimates and calculations.


**6. Debt vulnerabilities have remained elevated.** At end-2025, Congo's total debt stock is projected to have exceeded previous projections (CR25/75) by 6.8 percent of GDP, with total public debt reaching 97.2 percent of GDP (58.9 percent of GDP for domestic debt). While external public debt had declined by about 3.6 percent in 2024, reaching USD 5.4 billion (37.5 percent of GDP), it rose again to 38.4 percent of GDP in 2025, pointing to increased debt vulnerabilities from the eurobond issuance (see below) and the accumulation of external arrears (Table 9)—including CFAF 60 billion (about 0.7 percent of GDP) to bilateral and multilateral lenders and CFAF 87 billion to

<sup>1</sup> Although the authorities provided fiscal data allocating a portion of the additional outlays to investments following the Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM) 2014, there is still significant uncertainty on the nature of the extra spending. This report preserves the initial classification under goods and services to maintain consistency with historical data compiled under GFSM 1986.

<sup>2</sup> Payment floats—i.e., expenditures committed but not yet paid—stood at CFAF 238 billion (about 2.6 percent of GDP) at end-September 2025. Payment floats, i.e. unpaid bills, turn into arrears once remaining unpaid at the end of the fiscal year. Tables 1–2c report expenditures based on budget commitments, hence including also not yet paid expenditures.

commercials.<sup>3</sup> The new arrears highlight persistent operational and coordination challenges in debt management, as well as ongoing liquidity pressures.

**7. Treasury debt service pressures and rollover risks have remained high.** Faced with sizeable domestic debt service, Congo issued in November and December 2025 USD 930 million (6 percent of GDP) in new eurobonds priced at distressed yields.<sup>4</sup> This followed the reprofiling of CFAF 1136 billion (12.7 percent of GDP) of domestic debt in late 2024 (CR 25/75). The authorities intend to use the proceeds of the eurobond to repay an equivalent amount of domestic debt due during November 2025–February 2026. Nonetheless, gross issuance of new securities on the regional market remained elevated in Q4 2025, thereby limiting the easing of bank liquidity pressures that the eurobond issuance would otherwise have provided. As a result, the sovereign-bank nexus remains elevated and financing conditions on the regional treasury markets continue to be tight. At end-2025



Congo's total debt stock exceeded previous projections (CR25/75) by 6.8 percent of GDP. The debt service due in 2026 remains sizeable, reflecting in part the shorter maturities of domestic securities. Combined with Congo's weak debt and liquidity management capacity, and constrained absorption capacity of regional and local lenders (121–22), these factors have increased debt service pressures and funding costs (Text Fig. 1), and heightened rollover risks.

**8. The external position weakened over 2024–25.** The current account is estimated to have recorded deficits of 3 and 5.8 percent of GDP in 2024 and 2025, respectively. This deterioration reflected lower global oil prices which curtailed expected gains from hydrocarbon exports, an increase in private sector imports driven by an investment project in the natural gas sector, and elevated external payments obligations. Consequently, Congo's contribution to the region's net foreign assets has remained modest, amounting to CFAF 52 billion at end-2024 and a projected 144 billion for end-2025.

<sup>3</sup> The arrears to commercials stemmed from anticipated debt restructuring that did not materialize.

<sup>4</sup> The November issuance (USD 670 million) featured a coupon rate of 9.875 percent (with a 13.7 percent yield), and a maturity of 7 years, including a 2-year grace period. While coupon and maturity remained unchanged for the December issuance (USD 260 million), the yield improved somewhat to 13 percent. For both tranches, the principal will be repaid in five equal installments between November 7, 2028, and November 7, 2032. In February 2026, the authorities announced an additional Eurobond issuance of USD 700 million (maturing in 2035 with a yield of 11.625 percent), the proceeds of which are intended to partially buy back the November bond and redeem maturing regional market debt. As information on the amount of debt redeemed was not available at the time of finalization of this report, the transaction is not included in the macroeconomic tables and DSA.

**9. The outlook has deteriorated since the previous staff report (CR 25/75) and is still subject to significant downside risks.**

- Growth prospects have softened, amid weak public investment and lingering technical challenges in the hydrocarbon sector.** Growth is anticipated to reach 2.8 percent in 2026—0.6 pp lower than expected at the 6<sup>th</sup> ECF review. In the hydrocarbon sector, growth is projected at 0.3 percent, as technical challenges are expected to continue impeding oil production. Non-hydrocarbon growth is projected to reach 3.4 percent, as power outages subside and investment picks up moderately. Staff projects medium-term economic growth (2027–30) to average 3.6 percent, contingent on improvement in the business environment and increased economic diversification.
- Inflationary pressures are expected to ease further,** as the passthrough effects of higher excise taxes and fuel prices diminish. Inflation is projected to subside to 2.8 and 3 percent in 2026 and 2027, respectively. Downside risks could, however, reignite inflation, if energy supply faces further disruptions or inflation imported through food and energy items resurfaces.
- The fiscal outlook assumes a recalibration following the 2025 slippages.** Based on the authorities' stated commitment to addressing the overspending and further advance fiscal consolidation, staff projects the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit at 7.9 percent of non-hydrocarbon GDP in 2026. Revenue assumptions remain, however, more prudent than in authorities' budget, with staff projecting less revenues from grants, domestic taxes, non-tax income and the hydrocarbon sector than authorities. Staff also projects expenditures to be more gradually rebalanced towards investments and social spending. Relative to the authorities' targets, goods and services spending and the interest bill are higher to reflect downside risks, while capital expenditures and social transfers are lower, consistent with past execution rates. Over the medium term, the deficit is projected to narrow further, supported by stronger non-hydrocarbon revenue mobilization and continued prioritization of spending toward high-return capital investment and social sectors. This fiscal path would contribute to a gradual decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio. Sizable risks, however, persist. Externally, lower oil prices could significantly affect the fiscal and debt dynamics. Lack of spending discipline and unfavorable debt rollover in a context of high debt service are also significant risks.
- Congo's current account is projected to remain in deficit over the medium term.** Softer hydrocarbon exports reflect subdued oil prices and weak prospects for oil production. On the other hand, faster import growth—driven by a projected recovery in public capital expenditure and resilient non-hydrocarbon activity—will continue to weigh on Congo's external position, thereby exposing high external vulnerabilities, especially with reserve accumulation projected to remain modest.

### **Authorities' Views**

**10. The authorities broadly shared staff's views but expressed greater optimism regarding near-term growth.** They project Congo's near-term growth potential more optimistically, citing

buoyant prospects in services, non-oil extractive industries, cement production, and agriculture. They forecast 3.1 percent growth for 2025 and 3.6 percent for 2026. While maintaining a slightly stronger optimism for future hydrocarbon exports—highlighting favorable prospects for gas production—the authorities agreed that the current account could weaken further as high demand for imports, including investment goods, is expected to accompany economic diversification.

## RISKS AND POLICY DISCUSSIONS

*Tighter-than-expected fiscal resources, large domestic repayment needs, and constraints on funding available from banks highlight the need for continued fiscal consolidation. More intense efforts to mobilize non-hydrocarbon revenues are needed to bolster fiscal resources and help prevent arrears. Rationalized public expenditures should gradually refocus on high-quality investments and social transfers. More efficient and better coordinated public financial and debt management are critical to underpin durable adjustment and reduce debt vulnerabilities.*

### A. Fiscal Policy

**11. Sustaining fiscal discipline is critical to safeguarding debt sustainability, strengthening external stability, and managing financing pressures arising from large rollover needs and constrained liquidity.** Against the backdrop of elevated debt levels and heightened regional vulnerabilities, firmly anchoring fiscal policy within a credible medium-term consolidation strategy is paramount to safeguard macroeconomic stability, create fiscal space for priority investment and social spending, and maintain investor confidence. A decisive consolidation effort would reduce financing needs, thereby easing liquidity tensions and persistent rollover risks, while supporting a stronger contribution to the buildup of regional reserve buffers.

**12. The 2026 budget aims to restore fiscal discipline and improve spending quality through stronger non-hydrocarbon revenue mobilization and a reallocation of resources towards investment and social transfers.** The budget envisages a non-hydrocarbon primary deficit of 7.9 percent of non-hydrocarbon GDP, about 0.8 pp below the estimated end-2025 deficit—reflecting plans for buoyant revenue collection and spending restraint. Goods and services spending is budgeted to revert close to the projections prior to the 2025 slippages, while resources are redirected to capital investment and social transfers. Hydrocarbon receipts are budgeted at 11.1 percent of GDP, supported by favorable assumptions on gas and oil production, while non-hydrocarbon revenues are projected at 14.1 percent of GDP. The authorities anticipate 1.3 pp in gains from tax reforms, while staff projects yields of 0.8 pp (Text Table 2). Respective measures include: (i) continued efforts to digitalize the tax administration and invoicing, leveraging Unique Identification Numbers to monitor transactions; (ii) removal of corporate income tax (CIT) exemptions; and (iii) broadening the excise tax base alongside higher rates on selected items and reducing VAT exemptions (e.g., remove exemptions for machinery, agricultural equipment, and agropastoral and fish farming inputs). Although staff's projection for the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit is broadly aligned with the budget, it features more conservative revenue projections and interest payments (Text Table 2) and a more gradual rebalancing of expenditure (¶19, Text Table 2).

Revenue gains from tax reforms are expected to materialize more gradually, as the elimination of CIT exemptions is projected to largely offset the reduction in the CIT rate;<sup>5</sup> while adjustments to excise tax bases and rates are expected to yield only modest revenue gains (0.07 percent of GDP). On the spending side, lingering election-related spending could weigh on goods and services outlays, whereas liquidity tensions and absorption capacity constraints are likely to restrain capital spending. Finally, staff also incorporates a significantly higher interest bill, reflecting a more realistic assessment of gross financing needs and rollover conditions. Taken together, these factors result in a projected overall fiscal deficit of 0.1 percent of GDP, compared to a budgeted surplus of 2.4 percent of GDP. This underscores the limited fiscal space to service sizeable debt obligations and rebuild fiscal buffers.

**Text Table 2. Republic of Congo: 2026 Fiscal Adjustment**  
(Percent of GDP)

2026 Fiscal Adjustments			
	Planned by Authorities	Projected by IMF staff	Difference
<b>Total Revenue and Grants</b>	1.8	0.6	-1.2
Revenue	1.4	0.4	-1.0
Hydrocarbon revenue	0.1	-0.2	-0.4
Non-hydrocarbon revenue	1.3	0.6	-0.6
Domestic taxes	1.0	0.5	-0.5
Direct taxes	-	0.1	-
Taxes on goods and services	-	0.4	-
Customs Receipts	0.3	0.3	0.0
Non-tax revenue	-0.1	-0.3	-0.2
Grants	0.5	0.2	-0.2
<b>Expenditure</b>	-0.3	1.0	1.3
Current expenditure	-3.3	-1.3	2.0
Wages	-0.1	0.0	0.1
Other primary current expenditure	-2.3	-2.2	0.1
Goods and services	-3.6	-2.8	0.9
Transfers	1.5	0.9	-0.6
Social Transfers (Lisungi, COVID-19 and others)	1.0	0.5	-0.5
Oil-related transfers	-0.4	-0.5	0.0
Other transfers	0.9	0.8	-0.1
Common charges	-0.2	-0.3	-0.1
Annex budgets and special accounts	0.7	0.4	-0.2
Interest	-1.5	0.6	2.1
Domestic	-1.8	-0.1	1.7
External	0.3	0.7	0.4
Capital expenditure	3.0	2.3	-0.7
Domestically financed	2.0	1.3	-0.6
Externally financed	1.0	0.9	-0.1
<b>Non-hydrocarbon primary balance</b>	0.5	0.4	-0.1
<b>Primary balance</b>	0.6	0.2	-0.4
<b>Overall balance, cash basis</b>	2.1	-0.4	-2.5

Sources: Congolese authorities; and IMF staff estimates and calculations.

**13. Looking beyond 2026, staff recommends a continued prudent fiscal stance aimed at bolstering debt sustainability and restoring external buffers.** The non-hydrocarbon primary deficit is projected to narrow gradually, mirroring continued fiscal consolidation to support a steady reduction in public debt. This trajectory is predicated on sustained efforts to boost non-hydrocarbon revenue mobilization, strict control of recurrent outlays, and further reprioritization of expenditure

<sup>5</sup> The 2026 budget introduces a reduction in the statutory CIT rate from 30 percent to 27 percent. The authorities indicated that the measure aims to boost private-sector activity, stimulate job creation, and strengthen tax compliance.

toward high-return capital investment and social sectors. Full implementation of ongoing reforms—including the modernization of tax and customs administrations and the rationalization of the remaining tax exemptions, including those granted under new establishment conventions, complemented by enhanced audit and monitoring capacity—is essential to unlock significant additional revenue and strengthen the consolidation effort.<sup>6</sup> Tighter control of goods and services spending, containment of the wage bill, streamlining of energy subsidies—while supporting vulnerable groups with targeted safety nets, and strengthened public financial management (¶14) are critical to place public spending on a firm downward path. As a result, the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit is projected to decline over the medium-term, reaching 2.4 percent of non-hydrocarbon GDP by end-2030 and supporting a gradual reduction in public debt relative to GDP—albeit at a slower pace than envisaged in the last staff report ([CR 25/75](#)). The medium-term outlook remains, however, highly uncertain, reflecting fragile liquidity conditions, risks to reform implementation, and commodity price volatility.

**14. Staff underscores the critical importance of accelerating public financial management (PFM) reforms to avert a deterioration in the fiscal outlook.**

The off-budget nature of the 2025 fiscal slippages has revealed significant weaknesses in PFM practices that need to be urgently addressed. Measures include: (i) strictly adhering to budget appropriation ceilings; (ii) limiting recourse to exceptional procedures and reinforcing commitment controls; and (iii) planning for contingency funds in annual budgets to cope with unforeseen spending pressures. Staff also stressed that budgetary processes and PFM would benefit from the full implementation of Congo’s structural reform of its Financial Management Information System (SIGFIP), a completed operationalization of multi-year budgeting, and reinforced internal budget controls. However, progress on SIGFIP has remained limited since early 2025, particularly regarding finalization of the budgetary and accounting modules and their integration with related applications. In this regard, the recruitment of international experts early this year to relaunch the project is a welcome step. Additionally, bolstering cash management will help clear and prevent arrears and entrench fiscal discipline. This requires (i) integrating arrears clearance into treasury planning, (ii) enhancing procurement, commitment and cash-flow plans and their articulation, and (iii) ensuring budgets align with realistic revenue and cash-flow forecasts. Further, treasury operations could be enhanced by fully leveraging the treasury committee tasked with improving public financial entities’ coordination on cash and budget management, alongside completing structural reforms ensuring the rollout of the Treasury Single Account (TSA). While the TSA has been formally established under the agreement between BEAC and Congo, its full operationalization remains constrained by technical delays. Over the medium term, strengthened public investment management tuned to improve investment efficiency, as envisaged in the forthcoming investment law, would facilitate the scaling up of capital spending and stimulate private investment. Further, reforming state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—including the adoption and implementation of the law on SOEs governance—is paramount to mitigate fiscal risks.

<sup>6</sup> Key reforms, supported by UNCTAD and World Bank, include modernizing the customs IT system *Sydonia World*. More broadly, the full application of reliable state accounting and a functional material accounting system could help improve Congo’s public accounting and asset management.

## Authorities' Views

### 15. The authorities broadly agreed with staff's assessment and policy recommendations.

While underscoring the need for an ambitious budget to advance the strategic priorities of the National Development Plan 2022–26, they reaffirmed their commitment to prudent fiscal management. They underlined their desire to further advance public financial management reforms (¶14) and highlighted the strong revenue mobilization potential stemming from the continued modernization of customs and tax administrations. In this regard, they pointed to the performance contracts signed between the cabinet of the Ministry of Finance and the revenue collection administrations which set specific and monitorable revenue targets. Recognizing uncertainty around the expected yield from tax administration reforms, the authorities reiterated their commitment to align budget execution with available resources, including through a supplementary budget, if the need arises.

### 16. The authorities acknowledged delays in structural PFM, while noting that capacity and resource constraints have contributed to the slower pace of progress.

They expressed concerns regarding the reliability and stability of SIGFIP and have requested a Fund-supported assessment mission to evaluate the progress and efficiency of SIGFIP. In preparation for the rollout of the TSA, the authorities are working with development partners and the Fund to set up the treasury's banking function, which should enable the closure of public agencies' accounts held in commercial banks and the centralization of the funds at the treasury.

## B. Debt Management

17. Congo's overall and external debt continues to be classified as "in distress" yet "sustainable" conditional on the authorities' commitment to—and effective implementation of—significant and sustained fiscal adjustment going forward. The assessment of debt distress stems from ongoing audit and restructuring of domestic arrears and recurring temporary external arrears. By July 2024, all legacy external arrears—except disputed and pre-HIPC claims—were resolved but temporary recurring arrears accumulation has persisted. Preliminary data indicate that starting in 2025, new external arrears well exceeded the threshold of 1 percent of GDP, which remained the case until February 2026. This breach of threshold is driven largely by newly recognized arrears owed to two private companies, and newly accumulated arrears to official bilateral and multilateral creditors (DSA ¶20). In addition, continued accumulation of domestic arrears points to domestic debt vulnerabilities and liquidity risks. Overall, debt sustainability relies critically on prudent debt management and authorities' adherence to significant and sustained fiscal adjustment over the medium-term (¶5, 12–13). Thus, setbacks to fiscal consolidation, such as fiscal slippages observed in 2025, and increased debt vulnerabilities—partially driven by the new eurobond—pose a significant threat to debt sustainability.

18. Persistent debt vulnerabilities underscore the urgency of accelerating reforms to strengthen debt management. Longstanding weaknesses in Congo's debt management persist—including the frequent recognition of contingent liabilities, recurrent accumulation of domestic and

external arrears, and weak institutional coordination—amid large debt service pressures and heightened liquidity vulnerabilities (DSA ¶11,3–5, 17–22). Transparency gaps also linger, notably regarding the coverage, timeliness, and accuracy of debt statistics. Despite the reorganization of the debt management office (CCA), the authorities have yet to fully operationalize its revamped internal procedures and debt management manual, with formalized roles and timelines. Likewise, the newly established inter-institutional debt monitoring and fiscal risk assessment committees—intended to enhance liquidity management and debt planning, and support timely debt servicing—should also be urgently operationalized so they can fully play their intended roles. In this context, the planned issuance of a circular clarifying debt management responsibilities would alleviate coordination challenges. Training of newly hired CCA staff in debt management operations and software (*Système de Gestion et d'Analyse de la Dette*), supported by technical assistance from the IMF, is ongoing. Staff encouraged the authorities to promptly complete several pending structural reforms. The revamp of the medium-term debt management strategy needs to be finalized, by leveraging technical assistance from the IMF and other international partners, to align amortization, arrears clearance, and issuance plans. The early 2026 quarterly debt bulletin is expected to publish data from ongoing debt surveys of all SOEs, thereby improving the coverage, timeliness, and accuracy of public debt statistics, and the assessment of contingent liabilities. External audits of SOEs would further improve debt transparency.<sup>7</sup> In the meantime, the authorities have requested Fund technical assistance to strengthen the monitoring of fiscal risks stemming from SOEs.

### Authorities' Views

**19. While pointing to the progress made toward strengthening the CCA, the authorities acknowledged the significant debt vulnerabilities, weaknesses in debt management, and the need to accelerate reforms to address these challenges.** They also highlighted that the benefits from institutional reforms typically take time to materialize. They committed to further engage in coordination efforts aiming to improve debt servicing and to avoid accumulating arrears, including by better aligning debt amortization, arrear clearance, and debt issuance plans. The authorities shared staff's view that debt sustainability is at risk and hinges on a prudent fiscal stance and continued debt management reforms (¶13, 18). They reiterated their commitment to clear outstanding external arrears, prioritizing the oldest obligations.

## C. Financial Sector

**20. Significant sovereign exposures of Congolese banks have intensified funding risks amid limited regional market absorption and crowding out of private sector credit.**

Congo's banking sector outgrew GDP, with assets reaching 48 percent of GDP at end-October 2025, largely driven by increased holdings of treasury securities, including some issued by other CEMAC countries. Exposures to CEMAC sovereigns rose from 25 to 30 percent of bank assets since end-2021, with several Congolese banks reporting sovereign exposures exceeding 30 percent of assets. Banks' profitability was solid in 2024, with returns on equity (assets) averaging 37 (3.1) percent

<sup>7</sup> Drawing on ongoing FAD technical assistance on fiscal risks from SOEs.

according to end-2024 preliminary data but displayed signs of rapid softening thereafter. As of August 2025, banks largely adhered to prudential requirements, and asset quality remained broadly adequate.<sup>8</sup> Some banks, however, fell short of maturity and individual exposure standards. The situation of the two banks recently subjected to prudential concerns has improved somewhat, as fewer prudential standards were breached. Available end-2023 data indicated that non-performing loans (NPL) moderated to a still elevated 15.2 percent of risk-weighted assets and provisioning holding stood at a decade-high (65 percent).<sup>9</sup>

**21. Regional banks' capacity to absorb additional Congolese treasuries is approaching its limits.** With regional banks' exposure to the Congolese sovereign already well beyond CFAF 2 trillion, banks face a growing sovereign-bank nexus and will need to manage any further exposure increases cautiously, especially also due to limits on exposures to single borrowers (Annex 2) and pent-up demand from other CEMAC countries.

**22. Staff recommended addressing Congo's growing financial stability risks through fiscal consolidation, proactive debt management, and enforcement of prudential standards.** The authorities have stepped up communication with primary dealers, which facilitated the rollover of domestic debt service peaks in April and October 2025, by allowing participating banks to better anticipate the impact on their liquidity positions. Fiscal prudence is needed to further reduce financing needs and reliance on regional treasury markets (¶9, ¶11). Congo's significant sovereign-bank nexus calls for enhanced prudential and financial stability monitoring, and improved crisis preparedness, including timely, high-frequency prudential reporting of adequate quality and stress tests to assess hidden risks ([CR 25/171](#)). Proactive debt and budget management (¶12, 18) will be essential to managing the government's liquidity pressures and preventing spillovers to individual banks or the broader sector when sizable domestic debt amortizations fall due. Staff also encouraged the authorities to advocate for the gradual removal of zero risk weights on regional sovereign exposures and to diligently enforce prudential concentration limits for domestic and regional securities. In the longer term, staff recommended working with the regional institutions to promote further diversification of the financial system, by creating competitive market conditions to attract a non-bank investor base.

**23. Safeguards assessment.** The BEAC's implementation of 2022–23 safeguards recommendations has been slow. Recommendations included the need to strengthen internal audit and risk management practices as well as governance arrangements, including the onboarding of new members of senior management and the Board, and enhancing the delegation framework for executive management's decision-making. BEAC is making efforts to implement these recommendations, notably in governance, and staff is continuing to follow up on these issues.

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<sup>8</sup> Capital-based prudential thresholds appear effectively softened by the application of zero risk weights on substantive parts of the sovereign treasuries issued.

<sup>9</sup> The lack of timely data has hindered the assessment of the soundness of the financial sector. The authorities' efforts to address this gap are being supported by Fund technical assistance.

## Authorities' Views

**24. The authorities shared staff's concerns over regional and domestic banks' sovereign exposures and related liquidity tensions in regional treasury markets.** They highlighted that they had started to adapt by intensifying proactive communication with primary dealers, targeting emissions at primary dealers with lower exposure and tapping into international market funding. The authorities agreed that current debt vulnerabilities required more robust debt management while preserving the domestic bank sector's stability.

## D. Governance Reforms

**25. More decisive progress toward strengthening transparency and accountability would support the authorities' private sector development and diversification goals.**

Transparency gaps in natural resources management and inconsistent application of laws continue to hinder private investment. Still progress has been made in governance and anti-corruption reforms under the authorities' 2024–25 [action plan](#), even as several missed objectives imply implementation shortcomings. The authorities adopted the statute for Court of Accounts (CCDB) magistrates, the 2023 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) report was released, and a committee is preparing draft texts to operationalize the Transparency Code. However, delays in publishing EITI compliant mining and forestry concession registers and beneficial ownership information have persisted, mainly due to financing constraints. The urgency of progress with anti-corruption reforms is also highlighted by Congo's performance in the World Bank's control of corruption indicator that has deteriorated since 2019 and remains lower than for most other CEMAC countries. Additional **transparency measures**, such as the publication of financial statements and production statistics for public enterprises and extractive projects, disaggregated by permit and site, also remain outstanding. Data exchange among the High Authority for Anti-Corruption Activities (HALC), CCDB, the Transparency Commission (CNTR), and the National Financial Investigation Agency (ANIF) has improved through new information-sharing agreements, but the formalization of the planned coordination mechanism under the Prime Minister's office is still pending. Looking ahead, staff advised strengthening legal protection for civic space and whistleblowers, requiring cabinet members to submit conflict-of-interest disclosures, and ensuring the timely publication of detailed reports by HALC and CNTR. Concerning **anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism** (AML/CFT), the authorities charged a commission with developing the implementing regulation for a beneficial ownership register, but completing this task will require financial support (as requested by [SecFin Africa](#)) and technical assistance. Efforts to strengthen the capacity of ANIF are ongoing. They include fostering engagement with designated non-financial businesses and professions to ensure they comply with regional regulations.

## Authorities' Views

**26. The authorities remain committed to accelerating governance, transparency, and accountability reforms, which they consider essential for fostering inclusive and sustainable growth.** They reaffirmed their commitment to implementing the remaining actions under the

governance action plan and indicated their intention to seek additional Fund technical assistance as needed.


## CAPACITY TO REPAY

**27. Congo’s capacity to repay (CtR) the Fund is adequate under the baseline scenario but subject to significant risks (Table 10).** Outstanding Fund credit is broadly in line with the median of other countries with an UCT arrangement

(Figure 3). After having increased more than tenfold since 2021, it reached a maximum of 3 percent of GDP in 2025 (SDR 349.9 million, 216 percent of quota), and is projected to gradually decline through 2034, while its share in external debt remains below 10 percent. Indicators of debt service to the Fund are generally comfortable. At its peak, debt service to the Fund is expected to reach 0.4 percent of GDP, 1.9 percent of tax revenue, and 1.3 percent of exports of goods and services. It is projected to increase to 14 percent of total external debt service in 2031 before declining again. Risks have worsened relative to the last staff report (CR 25/75), with weaker CtR

indicators pointing to more uncertainty surrounding Congo’s capacity to repay the Fund over the medium term, particularly concerning external liquidity and rising total external debt service. The possibility of further fiscal slippages, only partial repatriation of export revenues, and continuing delays in completing the regional assurances compound these risks, given potential implications for fiscal and debt aggregates, reserves, and financial stability. If duly implemented, the proposed mitigating measures—including the fiscal consolidation planned in the 2026 budget (¶12; continued mobilization of revenues through rationalization of tax exemptions and ongoing reforms of the tax and customs administrations (¶12); sustained PFM reforms (¶13); further progress in strengthening debt management (¶17); enhanced prudential financial sector regulation (¶21), and governance (¶24)—would provide sufficient cushion.

**Text Figure 2. Deviation in Total Financing Needs**  
(Percentage of GDP, Risk-Baseline)



Source: IMF staff estimates.


**28. Under an adverse scenario, Congo’s financing needs could rise substantially.**

Staff’s downside scenario is based on shocks comprising a 10 percent oil price decline from 2026 onwards—a one standard deviation of the Brent oil price during 2023–25,<sup>10</sup> combined with bank lending capacity being restricted to the existing 25 percent of assets exposure limit to the Congolese sovereign over 2025–26, before gradually fading out afterwards. Assuming no policy response, the resulting additional financing needs are sizeable (3.8 and 1.9 percent of GDP over 2026–27; Text Figure 2; and for more details, see Annex 2).<sup>11</sup> Lower fiscal revenues worsen the primary balance by 0.8 percent of GDP in 2026, before gradually improving over the medium term. The shocks dampen growth over 2026–30. Central bank net foreign assets projected for end-2026 would decline by 47 percent, reducing Congo’s contribution to regional reserves in the near term, with the decline narrowing to 15 percent by end-2030. The additional financing needs could constrain the ability of the authorities to mobilize the local currency resources needed for foreign exchange purchases to meet external debt obligations, with delays in renewing regional policy assurances possibly further intensifying related risks. Similarly, risks for further fiscal slippages exceeding those regarded as additional risk factors in the baseline could push additional financing needs even higher.

**29. Congo’s capacity to repay the Fund would weaken under the downside scenario but remain adequate (Text Figure 3, Table 11).** Outstanding Fund credit would stand at 12.5 percent of tax revenue and 7.7 percent of exports of goods and services in 2026—compared with 11.9 percent and 7 percent, respectively, in the baseline—while continuing to account for less than 10 percent of external debt. Moreover, debt service to the Fund ratios would rise marginally. During 2028–33, they would increase by about 0.1 percentage point on average for exports and tax revenue, and by 0.5 pp for imputed gross reserves. Consistent with the baseline scenario, the recent deterioration in debt management and accumulation of arrears (¶16–17) represent a significant vulnerability to Congo’s repayment capacity, highlighting the need for vigilant monitoring and engagement. To ward off such vulnerabilities, authorities are encouraged to follow up on their commitment to fiscal consolidation and efforts to strengthen debt management. Authorities’ track record of repaying the Fund provides an additional mitigating factor that can help containing these risks.

<sup>10</sup> This timeframe excludes the exceptional oil price volatility driven by the COVID-19 pandemic.

<sup>11</sup> The scenario does not account for any compensating policy responses.

**Text Figure 3. Total Obligations Based on Existing Credit**

## STAFF APPRAISAL

**30. Fiscal slippages and mounting liquidity pressures in 2025 have intensified Congo's debt vulnerabilities, while growth prospects have weakened.** Overspending resulted in a setback to fiscal consolidation, slowing down the reduction in debt and heightening financing challenges against a backdrop of a more challenging sovereign-bank nexus. It also slowed down the authorities' ability to rebalance spending toward outlays more supportive of inclusive growth. In addition, softer-than-expected non-hydrocarbon growth and under-executed public capital spending have reduced medium-term growth prospects. Volatility in oil prices, continued technical challenges with some oil fields, and lingering issues with the provisioning of electricity imply additional downside risks for the growth outlook, compounding concerns over Congo's fiscal stance and debt sustainability.

**31. Congo's capacity to repay the Fund is adequate, though subject to significant downside risks.** Total external debt service is projected to remain contained at its 2026 maximum

of 4 percent of GDP, with debt service to the Fund representing at its peak less than a sixth of this (¶126, Table 10). The authorities' stated commitment to correcting fiscal slippages and sustained consolidation and their strong track record of repaying the Fund buttress Congo's capacity to repay the Fund. However, against the backdrop of tight regional markets and large rollover needs in the years ahead, risks to this capacity remain significant. Sizeable funding gaps could further challenge this capacity, should regional banks' willingness to absorb Congolese treasuries dry up and oil prices decline considerably.

**32. This underscores the criticality of fiscal consolidation and reforms.** Sustaining fiscal discipline is paramount to safeguarding debt sustainability, strengthening external stability, and managing financing pressures arising from large rollover needs and constrained liquidity. After the 2025 fiscal slippages, priority should be given to better controlling expenditure. Implementation of the revenue reforms foreseen in the 2026 budget law (¶19, 12) reinforced by spending rationalization should anchor a return to growth-friendly fiscal prudence. Higher revenue and prioritizing high-quality capital and essential social spending will be key to easing liquidity tensions, preserving debt sustainability, and fostering more inclusive growth. These efforts should be underpinned by an acceleration of fiscal structural reforms to enhance tax administration and public financial management efficiency.


**33. High liquidity tensions and an elevated sovereign-bank nexus call for improved debt management and macroprudential alertness.** To mitigate persistent debt management weaknesses, all steps related to the late CCA reorganization need to be fully implemented (¶117). The revision of Congo's medium-term debt management strategy should ensure realistic arrear clearance, debt service, and emission plans (¶118). Proactive coordination with primary dealers may help soften liquidity tensions, especially when combined with intensified prudential monitoring and robust application of effective prudential standards (¶122).

**34. Progress toward enhancing governance and transparency is critical to improve business conditions and encourage a more dynamic private sector.** Progress with improving PFM (¶113), additional transparency on extractive industries and SOEs (¶17, 24), adequate resourcing of anti-money laundering policies, and stronger legal protection of the civic space (¶124) should be prioritized.

**Figure 1. Republic of Congo: Recent Economic Developments, 2013–25**


Real GDP growth has lost some momentum, yet remains underpinned by the non-hydrocarbon sector.

**Real GDP Growth (Percent)**




Inflation rose in early 2025, primarily due to non-food items, but fell back in the second half of the year

**Inflation (Average YoY; Percent Change)**




Continued oil price declines implied lower oil revenues...

**Oil**



...while the current account deficit continues to deepen.


**Balance of Payments (Percent of GDP)**



Overall discretionary spending remained controlled, though at the expense of lower capital expenditures.

**Adjustable Public Spending**


(Percent of Non-hydrocarbon GDP)



Sustained reforms in tax policy and administration bolster non-hydrocarbon revenues.

**Non-hydrocarbon Revenue**

(Percent of Non-hydrocarbon GDP)




Sources: Congolese authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

**Figure 2. Republic of Congo: Selected Indicators of Financial Soundness and Financial Developments**


Excess liquidity in banks has been gradually declining since early 2024.

**Banks' Credits and Deposits (CFAF billions)**




The credit-to-deposit ratio seems to stabilize, after deposit growth outpaced sluggish loan activity for several years.

**Credit-to-Deposit Ratio (Percent)**




Bank's sovereign debt exposures continue to be elevated.

**Banks' Claims on Government – Share of Total Assets (Percent)**




Capital adequacy remains sound, though below pre-pandemic levels.

**Capital Adequacy (Percent)**




Non-performing loans, while still elevated, show signs of gradual improvement in 2023.

**Non-Performing Loans (Percent of total loans)**




Overall, banks continue to meet liquidity requirements.

**Liquidity Ratio (Percent)**



Sources: Congolese authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

**Figure 3. Republic of Congo: Fund Credit Outstanding and External Debt Service Compared to PRGT UCT-Quality Arrangements-Baseline Scenario<sup>1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10</sup>**



1/ T = date of arrangement approval. PPG = public and publicly guaranteed.  
 2/ Red lines/bars indicate the CtR indicator for the arrangement of interest.  
 3/ The median, interquartile range, and comparator bars reflect arrangements (including blends) approved for PRGT countries between 2014 and 2024.  
 4/ The comparator group "All PRGT" excludes arrangements that never had a UCT between 2014 and 2024.  
 5/ PRGT countries in the control group with multiple arrangements are entered as separate events in the database.  
 6/ Comparator series is for PRGT arrangements only and runs up to T+10.  
 7/ Debt service obligations to the Fund reflect prospective payments, including for the current year.  
 8/ In the case of blenders, the red lines/ bars refer to PRGT+GRA. In the case of RST, the red lines/ bars refer to PRGT+GRA+RST.  
 9/ Gross International Reserves refer to gross imputed reserves for the Republic of Congo.  
 10/ For the Republic of Congo, revenue refers to non-hydrocarbon revenue.

**Table 1. Republic of Congo: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2024–31**

	2024	2025	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031
	Prel.	CR 25/75				Proj.			
(Annual percentage change unless otherwise indicated)									
<b>Production and prices</b>									
GDP at constant prices	2.1	3.7	2.4	2.8	3.3	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.6
Hydrocarbons	0.8	3.6	3.3	0.3	-0.6	0.1	-0.4	-0.7	-0.9
Non-hydrocarbon	2.5	3.7	2.1	3.4	4.0	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.3
GDP at current prices	4.2	4.9	1.2	3.9	6.3	6.9	6.9	6.7	6.7
GDP deflator	2.1	1.2	-1.1	1.0	2.9	3.1	3.1	3.0	3.0
Non-hydrocarbon	3.1	3.3	3.6	3.2	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
Consumer prices (period average)	3.1	3.3	2.6	2.8	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
Consumer prices (end of period)	6.3	3.2	-1.0	5.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0
<b>External sector</b>									
Exports, f.o.b.	1.4	-4.1	-14.6	-9.9	2.5	2.8	2.2	2.0	2.0
Imports, f.o.b.	-6.2	0.6	-9.6	-4.8	2.3	6.7	3.9	3.4	3.9
Export volume	-5.9	3.3	1.2	-2.5	1.3	0.1	-0.1	-0.6	-0.7
Import volume	-4.9	5.3	2.3	2.0	2.3	5.4	2.8	2.3	3.0
Terms of trade (deterioration -)	9.2	-2.7	-4.0	-0.9	1.1	1.5	1.3	1.6	2.0
Current account balance (percent of GDP)	-3.0	0.3	-5.8	-7.1	-6.0	-5.9	-5.5	-5.1	-4.3
BEAC's net foreign assets	4.2	82.2	178.7	-12.6	29.4	22.7	55.5	55.3	39.2
External public debt (percent of GDP)	37.5	31.9	38.4	34.4	31.8	28.7	25.9	23.6	21.4
<b>Monetary sector</b>									
Broad money	16.5	5.8	-3.9	17.8	11.2	6.2	7.8	6.3	3.1
Credit to the private sector	3.6	3.8	2.9	3.5	4.6	5.3	5.9	6.7	6.9
(Percent of GDP)									
<b>Investment and saving</b>									
Gross national saving	24.1	28.2	21.8	22.3	22.7	22.3	22.0	21.9	22.5
Gross investment	27.1	27.9	27.5	29.4	28.6	28.2	27.5	27.1	26.8
(Percent of non-hydrocarbon GDP, unless otherwise indicated)									
<b>Central government finances</b>									
Total revenue	32.4	32.7	29.7	29.7	29.7	29.3	28.8	28.3	27.8
Hydrocarbon revenue	17.4	16.7	13.5	12.8	12.8	12.3	11.6	10.9	10.2
Non-hydrocarbon revenue (including grants)	15.0	16.0	16.3	16.9	16.9	17.0	17.2	17.4	17.5
Total expenditure	27.8	28.0	29.3	29.7	26.3	24.7	23.5	22.8	22.4
Current	24.0	22.4	25.7	23.5	20.1	18.4	17.4	16.8	16.5
Capital	3.8	5.5	3.6	6.2	6.2	6.3	6.1	6.0	5.9
Overall balance (deficit -, payment order basis)	4.6	4.7	0.4	-0.1	3.4	4.6	5.3	5.5	5.4
Overall balance (deficit -, payment order basis, percent of GDP)	3.6	3.7	0.3	-0.1	2.9	3.9	4.5	4.7	4.7
Non-hydrocarbon primary balance (- = deficit)	-6.7	-7.6	-8.7	-7.9	-5.1	-3.9	-3.1	-2.4	-2.3
Basic primary fiscal balance (- = deficit) <sup>1</sup>	10.6	9.1	4.8	4.9	7.7	8.3	8.5	8.4	7.9
Basic non-hydrocarbon primary balance (- = deficit) <sup>2</sup>	-5.7	-5.9	-7.1	-5.6	-3.0	-1.5	-0.7	-0.2	0.0
Reference fiscal balance (percent of GDP) <sup>3</sup>	3.0	3.2	2.6	-0.8	0.7	1.2	2.1	2.6	2.7
Primary balance (percent of GDP)	8.3	7.2	3.9	4.1	6.5	7.1	7.3	7.3	6.8
Financing gap (in percent of GDP)	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total public debt (percent of GDP)	98.0	90.4	97.2	93.0	86.9	80.0	73.0	66.7	61.0
(Percent of total government revenue excluding grants)									
External public debt service	23.9	15.9	14.2	16.5	13.9	16.5	15.2	14.0	13.4
(Billions of CFA francs, unless otherwise indicated)									
Nominal GDP	8,956	9,470	9,063	9,415	10,007	10,700	11,437	12,202	13,015
Nominal hydrocarbon GDP <sup>4</sup>	1,969	1,937	1,672	1,528	1,560	1,616	1,669	1,707	1,743
Nominal non-hydrocarbon GDP	6,988	7,533	7,391	7,887	8,447	9,084	9,769	10,494	11,272
Nominal GDP in US\$ (millions)	14,774	15,409	15,591	16,620	17,623	18,817	20,100	21,399	22,861
World oil price (U.S. dollars per barrel)	79	70	68	62	62	63	64	65	67
Congolese oil price (U.S. dollars per barrel)	78	69	66	62	62	63	65	66	67
Brent Price (U.S. dollars per barrel)	80	71	68	63	63	64	66	67	68
Oil production (Millions of barrels)	95	100	97	97	98	98	97	96	95
Nominal Exchange rate (CFA/USD, period average)	606	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
REER (percentage change)	3.1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...

Sources: Congolese authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

<sup>1</sup> Revenue excluding grants minus total expenditures (excluding interest payments and foreign-financed public investment).<sup>2</sup> Non-hydrocarbon revenue excluding grants minus total expenditures excluding interest payments and foreign-financed investment.<sup>3</sup> Overall balance minus 20 percent of oil revenues and minus 80 percent of the oil revenue in excess of the average observed during the three previous years.<sup>4</sup> Since 2024 the hydrocarbon sector includes the oil and gas sectors, before 2024 the gas sector was in a state of infancy and hence negligible.

**Table 2a. Republic of Congo: Central Government Operations, 2024–31**  
(CFAF billions)

	2024		2025		2026		2027	2028	2029	2030	2031
	Prel.	CR 25/75	Proj.	PFA PN	Budget	Proj.			Proj.		
Total Revenue and Grants	2,263	2,460	2,197	2,359	2,455	2,340	2,511	2,660	2,809	2,970	3,131
Revenue	2,223	2,387	2,162	2,281	2,375	2,282	2,426	2,568	2,710	2,861	3,019
Hydrocarbon revenue	1,214	1,258	995	1,055	1,044	1,011	1,080	1,114	1,133	1,144	1,153
<i>of which: oil transfers</i>	82	47	83	44	47	43	43	43	43	43	43
Non-hydrocarbon revenue	1,010	1,129	1,167	1,226	1,331	1,271	1,346	1,454	1,577	1,718	1,865
Domestic taxes	771	894	876	953	1,005	960	1,021	1,114	1,214	1,329	1,449
Direct taxes	449	473	466	493	-	493	520	569	620	680	745
Taxes on goods and services	322	421	410	460	-	467	500	545	594	649	710
Customs Receipts	176	181	211	214	250	251	263	280	300	322	356
Non-tax revenue	63	55	81	59	76	60	63	60	64	67	54
Grants	40	73	34	78	80	58	84	92	99	108	113
Expenditure	1,939	2,108	2,167	2,188	2,224	2,346	2,222	2,243	2,293	2,392	2,525
Current expenditure	1,675	1,690	1,900	1,653	1,666	1,856	1,701	1,670	1,702	1,765	1,862
Wages	403	430	425	459	435	440	472	491	509	526	570
Other primary current expenditure	850	880	1,124	837	948	958	853	824	860	918	997
Goods and services	205	210	560	204	240	320	292	249	257	278	298
Transfers	571	590	465	565	626	567	487	499	525	559	616
Social Transfers (Lisungu, COVID-19 and others)	218	231	230	243	332	287	300	308	331	359	409
Oil-related transfers	82	47	83	44	47	43	43	43	43	43	43
Other transfers	271	311	152	278	247	237	144	148	151	157	163
Common charges	74	81	99	69	82	71	74	76	78	80	83
Annex budgets and special accounts <sup>1</sup>	3	49	27	27	90	67	17	16	14	13	11
Interest	419	331	325	330	193	390	359	339	319	309	284
Domestic	288	279	276	285	117	276	262	252	240	237	218
External	131	52	48	45	76	114	97	86	78	72	67
Capital expenditure	264	418	267	535	559	490	521	573	591	627	663
Domestically financed	153	215	118	300	307	248	259	260	266	280	292
Externally financed	112	202	149	235	252	243	262	314	325	346	371
Non-hydrocarbon primary balance <sup>2</sup>	-471	-575	-640	-554	-621	-627	-432	-358	-298	-257	-263
Basic non-hydrocarbon primary balance <sup>3</sup>	-399	-445	-525	-397	-448	-442	-254	-136	-73	-19	-5
— excluding oil-related transfers <sup>4</sup>	-316	-398	-442	-353	-401	-399	-211	-93	-29	24	39
Primary balance	743	683	355	501	423	384	648	756	835	887	890
Overall balance, payment order basis											
Excluding grants	284	279	-4	93	151	-64	204	325	417	470	493
Including grants	324	352	30	172	230	-6	289	417	516	578	606
Overall balance, cash basis	324	352	30	172	230	-6	289	417	516	578	606
Financing	-410	-428	-102	-172	-230	6	-289	-417	-516	-578	-606
Foreign (net, excluding budgetary support)	-425	-354	187	-197	116	-207	-192	-247	-242	-228	-184
Drawings	211	129	587	157	411	185	178	222	226	238	258
Amortization (paid)	-496	-327	-259	-219	-296	-263	-240	-336	-332	-328	-337
Others	-140	-156	-141	-134	0	-128	-130	-132	-135	-138	-105
Domestic (net, excluding IMF-ECF)	16	-74	-289	25	-346	213	-97	-171	-274	-350	-422
Banking system (net)	43	-4	-322	276	-123	455	242	81	144	-6	-176
Central bank	3	-211	-121	-147	-15	23	-111	-154	-182	-240	-323
Commercial banks <sup>5</sup>	39	207	-201	423	-109	432	353	235	326	234	147
Nonbank financing <sup>6</sup>	-27	-70	33	-251	-223	-243	-339	-252	-418	-345	-247
<i>Of which: Repayment of domestic arrears</i>	-88	-155	-155	-150	-290	-150	-232	-182	-357	-231	-209
Financing gap (= surplus)	86	76	72	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Expected financing (excluding IMF)	60	49	47	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IMF-ECF	26	26	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Residual financing gap	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Memorandum items:											
Stock of domestic arrears <sup>6</sup>	1,761	1,409	1,690	1,548	-	1,549	1,317	1,044	733	448	239
<i>Of which: Social arrears</i>	554	441	485	...	-	...	...	...	...	...	...
Stock of government deposits	129	503	236	453	-	198	294	433	599	823	1,129
CEMAC Reference fiscal balance <sup>7</sup>	270	301	239	64	-	-74	67	126	238	322	357
GDP at current market prices	8,956	9,470	9,063	9,512	9,415	9,415	10,007	10,700	11,437	12,202	13,015
Non-hydrocarbon GDP at market prices <sup>8</sup>	6,988	7,533	7,391	7,918	7,887	7,887	8,447	9,084	9,769	10,494	11,272

Sources: Congolese authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

<sup>1</sup> Includes net spending (i.e. spending minus revenues) associated with decentralized government entities.<sup>2</sup> Revenue and grants excluding hydrocarbon revenues minus total primary expenditures (excluding interest payments).<sup>3</sup> Non-hydrocarbon revenue excluding grants minus total expenditures excluding interest payments and foreign-financed investment.<sup>4</sup> Basic non-hydrocarbon primary balance minus oil revenue and oil-related transfers.<sup>5</sup> Include resident and non-resident creditors from the CEMAC region.<sup>6</sup> Net of restructured contingent liabilities.<sup>7</sup> Includes estimates of domestic arrears audited by the the Caisse Congolaise d'Amortisation (CCA) and reported but not yet audited arrears.<sup>8</sup> CEMAC definition: overall balance minus 20 percent of hydrocarbon revenues and minus 80 percent of the hydrocarbon revenue in excess of the average observed during the three previous years.<sup>9</sup> Since 2024 the hydrocarbon sector includes the oil and gas sectors, before 2024 the gas sector was in a state of infancy and hence negligible.

**Table 2b. Republic of Congo: Central Government Operations, 2024–31**  
(Percent of non-hydrocarbon GDP)

	2024		2025		2026		2027	2028	2029	2030	2031
	Prel.	CR 25/75	Proj.	Budget	Proj.			Proj.			
Total Revenue and Grants	32.4	32.7	29.7	31.1	29.7	29.7	29.3	28.8	28.3	28.3	27.8
Revenue	31.8	31.7	29.3	30.1	28.9	28.7	28.3	27.7	27.3	26.8	26.8
Hydrocarbon revenue	17.4	16.7	13.5	13.2	12.8	12.8	12.3	11.6	10.9	10.2	10.2
<i>of which: oil transfers</i>	1.2	0.6	1.1	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Non-hydrocarbon revenue	14.5	15.0	15.8	16.9	16.1	15.9	16.0	16.1	16.4	16.5	16.5
Domestic taxes	11.0	11.9	11.9	12.7	12.2	12.1	12.3	12.4	12.7	12.9	12.9
Direct taxes	6.4	6.3	6.3	-	6.3	6.2	6.3	6.3	6.5	6.6	6.6
Taxes on goods and services	4.6	5.6	5.5	-	5.9	5.9	6.0	6.1	6.2	6.3	6.3
Customs receipts	2.5	2.4	2.9	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.2
Non-tax revenue	0.9	0.7	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.5
Grants	0.6	1.0	0.5	1.0	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Expenditure	27.8	28.0	29.3	28.2	29.7	26.3	24.7	23.5	22.8	22.4	22.4
Current expenditure	24.0	22.4	25.7	21.1	23.5	20.1	18.4	17.4	16.8	16.5	16.5
Wages	5.8	5.7	5.7	5.5	5.6	5.6	5.4	5.2	5.0	5.1	5.1
Other primary current expenditure	12.2	11.7	15.2	12.0	12.2	10.1	9.1	8.8	8.7	8.8	8.8
Goods and services	2.9	2.8	7.6	3.0	4.1	3.5	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.6
Transfers	8.2	7.8	6.3	7.9	7.2	5.8	5.5	5.4	5.3	5.5	5.5
Social Transfers (Lisungi, COVID-19 and others)	3.1	3.1	3.1	4.2	3.6	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.6	3.6
Oil-related transfers	1.2	0.6	1.1	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Other transfers	3.9	4.1	2.1	3.1	3.0	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4
Common charges	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7
Annex budgets and special accounts <sup>1</sup>	0.0	0.6	0.4	1.1	0.9	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Interest	6.0	4.4	4.4	2.4	4.9	4.2	3.7	3.3	2.9	2.5	2.5
Domestic	4.1	3.7	3.7	1.5	3.5	3.1	2.8	2.5	2.3	1.9	1.9
External	1.9	0.7	0.7	1.0	1.4	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6
Capital expenditure	3.8	5.5	3.6	7.1	6.2	6.2	6.3	6.1	6.0	5.9	5.9
Domestically financed	2.2	2.9	1.6	3.9	3.1	3.1	2.9	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.6
Externally financed	1.6	2.7	2.0	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.5	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3
Non-hydrocarbon primary balance <sup>2</sup>	-6.7	-7.6	-8.7	-7.9	-7.9	-5.1	-3.9	-3.1	-2.4	-2.3	-2.3
Basic non-hydrocarbon primary balance <sup>3</sup>	-5.7	-5.9	-7.1	-5.7	-5.6	-3.0	-1.5	-0.7	-0.2	0.0	0.0
— excluding oil-related transfers <sup>4</sup>	-4.5	-5.3	-6.0	-5.1	-5.1	-2.5	-1.0	-0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3
Primary balance	10.6	9.1	4.8	5.4	4.9	7.7	8.3	8.5	8.4	7.9	7.9
Overall balance, payment order basis											
Excluding grants	4.1	3.7	-0.1	1.9	-0.8	2.4	3.6	4.3	4.5	4.4	4.4
Including grants	4.6	4.7	0.4	2.9	-0.1	3.4	4.6	5.3	5.5	5.4	5.4
Overall balance, cash basis	4.6	4.7	0.4	2.9	-0.1	3.4	4.6	5.3	5.5	5.4	5.4
Financing	-5.9	-5.7	-1.4	-2.9	0.1	-3.4	-4.6	-5.3	-5.5	-5.4	-5.4
Foreign (net, excluding budgetary support)	-6.1	-4.7	2.5	1.5	-2.6	-2.3	-2.7	-2.5	-2.2	-1.6	-1.6
Drawings	3.0	1.7	7.9	5.2	2.3	2.1	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3
Amortization (paid)	-7.1	-4.3	-3.5	-3.7	-3.3	-2.8	-3.7	-3.4	-3.1	-3.0	-3.0
Others	-2.0	-2.1	-1.9	0.0	-1.6	-1.5	-1.5	-1.4	-1.3	-0.9	-0.9
Domestic (net, excluding IMF-ECF)	0.2	-1.0	-3.9	-4.4	2.7	-1.1	-1.9	-2.8	-3.3	-3.7	-3.7
Banking system (net)	0.6	-0.1	-4.4	-1.6	5.8	2.9	0.9	1.5	-0.1	-1.6	-1.6
Central bank	0.0	-2.8	-1.6	-0.2	0.3	-1.3	-1.7	-1.9	-2.3	-2.9	-2.9
Commercial banks <sup>5</sup>	0.6	2.7	-2.7	-1.4	5.5	4.2	2.6	3.3	2.2	1.3	1.3
Nonbank financing <sup>5</sup>	-0.4	-0.9	0.4	-2.8	-3.1	-4.0	-2.8	-4.3	-3.3	-2.2	-2.2
<i>Of which: Repayment of domestic arrears</i>	-1.3	-2.1	-2.1	-3.7	-1.9	-2.7	-2.0	-3.7	-2.2	-1.9	-1.9
Financing gap (- = surplus)	1.2	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Expected financing (excluding IMF)	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
IMF-ECF	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Residual financing gap	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Memorandum items:											
Stock of domestic arrears <sup>6</sup>	25.2	18.7	22.9	-	19.6	15.6	11.5	7.5	4.3	2.1	2.1
<i>Of which: Social arrears</i>	7.9	5.9	6.6	-	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Stock of government deposits	1.8	6.7	3.2	-	2.5	3.5	4.8	6.1	7.8	10.0	10.0
CEMAC Reference fiscal balance <sup>7</sup>	3.9	4.0	3.2	-	-0.9	0.8	1.4	2.4	3.1	3.2	3.2
GDP at current market prices (CFAP billion)	8,956	9,470	9,063	9,415	9,415	10,007	10,700	11,437	12,202	13,015.3	13,015.3
Non-hydrocarbon GDP at market prices (CFAP billion) <sup>8</sup>	6,988	7,533	7,391	7,887	7,887	8,447	9,084	9,769	10,494	11,272.3	11,272.3

Sources: Congolese authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

<sup>1</sup> Includes net spending (i.e. spending minus revenues) associated with decentralized government entities.

<sup>2</sup> Revenue and grants excluding oil revenues minus total primary expenditures (excluding interest payments).

<sup>3</sup> Non-hydrocarbon revenue excluding grants minus total expenditures excluding interest payments and foreign-financed investment.

<sup>4</sup> Basic non-hydrocarbon primary balance minus hydrocarbon revenue and oil-related transfers.

<sup>5</sup> Include resident and non-resident creditors from the CEMAC region.

<sup>6</sup> Net of restructured contingent liabilities.

<sup>7</sup> Includes estimates of domestic arrears audited by the the Caisse Congolaise d'Amortisation (CCA) and reported but not yet audited arrears.

<sup>8</sup> CEMAC definition: overall balance minus 20 percent of hydrocarbon revenues and minus 80 percent of the hydrocarbon revenue in excess of the average observed during the three previous years.

<sup>9</sup> Since 2024 the hydrocarbon sector includes the oil and gas sectors, before 2024 the gas sector was in a state of infancy and hence negligible.

**Table 2c. Republic of Congo: Central Government Operations, 2024–31**  
(Percent of GDP)

	2024	2025		2026		2027	2028	2029	2030	2031
	Prel.	CR 25/75	Proj.	Budget	Proj.		Proj.			
Total Revenue and Grants	25.3	26.0	24.2	26.1	24.9	25.1	24.9	24.6	24.3	24.1
Revenue	24.8	25.2	23.9	25.2	24.2	24.2	24.0	23.7	23.5	23.2
Hydrocarbon revenue	13.5	13.3	11.0	11.1	10.7	10.8	10.4	9.9	9.4	8.9
Non-hydrocarbon revenue	11.3	11.9	12.9	14.1	13.5	13.5	13.6	13.8	14.1	14.3
Domestic taxes	8.6	9.4	9.7	10.7	10.2	10.2	10.4	10.6	10.9	10.9
Direct taxes	5.0	5.0	5.1	-	5.2	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.6	5.7
Taxes on goods and services	3.6	4.4	4.5	-	5.0	5.0	5.1	5.2	5.3	5.5
Customs Receipts	2.0	1.9	2.3	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.7
Non-tax revenue	0.7	0.6	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.4
Grants	0.4	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9
Expenditure	21.7	22.3	23.9	23.6	24.9	22.2	21.0	20.0	19.6	19.4
Current expenditure	18.7	17.8	21.0	17.7	19.7	17.0	15.6	14.9	14.5	14.3
Wages	4.5	4.5	4.7	4.6	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.4	4.3	4.4
Other primary current expenditure	9.5	9.3	12.4	10.1	10.2	8.5	7.7	7.5	7.5	7.7
Goods and services	2.3	2.2	6.2	2.5	3.4	2.9	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.3
Transfers	6.4	6.2	5.1	6.6	6.0	4.9	4.7	4.6	4.6	4.7
Social Transfers (Lisungi, COVID-19 and others)	2.4	2.4	2.5	3.5	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.9	3.1
Oil-related transfers	0.9	0.5	0.9	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3
Other transfers	3.0	3.3	1.7	2.6	2.5	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3
Common charges	0.8	0.9	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6
Annex budgets and special accounts <sup>1</sup>	0.0	0.5	0.3	1.0	0.7	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Interest	4.7	3.5	3.6	2.1	4.1	3.6	3.2	2.8	2.5	2.2
Domestic	3.2	2.9	3.0	1.2	2.9	2.6	2.4	2.1	1.9	1.7
External	1.5	0.5	0.5	0.8	1.2	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.5
Capital expenditure	3.0	4.4	2.9	5.9	5.2	5.2	5.4	5.2	5.1	5.1
Domestically financed	1.7	2.3	1.3	3.3	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.2
Externally financed	1.2	2.1	1.6	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.9
Non-hydrocarbon primary balance <sup>2</sup>	-5.3	-6.1	-7.1	-6.6	-6.7	-4.3	-3.3	-2.6	-2.1	-2.0
Basic non-hydrocarbon primary balance <sup>3</sup>	-4.5	-4.7	-5.8	-4.8	-4.7	-2.5	-1.3	-0.6	-0.2	0.0
— excluding oil-related transfers <sup>4</sup>	-3.5	-4.2	-4.9	-4.3	-4.2	-2.1	-0.9	-0.3	0.2	0.3
Primary balance	8.3	7.2	3.9	4.5	4.1	6.5	7.1	7.3	7.3	6.8
Overall balance, payment order basis										
Excluding grants	3.2	2.9	0.0	1.6	-0.7	2.0	3.0	3.6	3.8	3.8
Including grants	3.6	3.7	0.3	2.4	-0.1	2.9	3.9	4.5	4.7	4.7
Overall balance, cash basis	3.6	3.7	0.3	2.4	-0.1	2.9	3.9	4.5	4.7	4.7
Financing	-4.6	-4.5	-1.1	-2.4	0.1	-2.9	-3.9	-4.5	-4.7	-4.7
Foreign (net, excluding budgetary support)	-4.7	-3.7	2.1	1.2	-2.2	-1.9	-2.3	-2.1	-1.9	-1.4
Drawings	2.4	1.4	6.5	4.4	2.0	1.8	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0
Amortization (paid)	-5.5	-3.5	-2.9	-3.1	-2.8	-2.4	-3.1	-2.9	-2.7	-2.6
Others	-1.6	-1.6	-1.6	0.0	-1.4	-1.3	-1.2	-1.2	-1.1	-0.8
Domestic (net, excluding IMF-ECF)	0.2	-0.8	-3.2	-3.7	2.3	-1.0	-1.6	-2.4	-2.9	-3.2
Banking system (net)	0.5	0.0	-3.6	-1.3	4.8	2.4	0.8	1.3	0.0	-1.3
Central bank	0.0	-2.2	-1.3	-0.2	0.2	-1.1	-1.4	-1.6	-2.0	-2.5
Commercial banks <sup>5</sup>	0.4	2.2	-2.2	-1.2	4.6	3.5	2.2	2.9	1.9	1.1
Nonbank financing <sup>5</sup>	-0.3	-0.7	0.4	-2.4	-2.6	-3.4	-2.4	-3.7	-2.8	-1.9
Of which: Repayment of domestic arrears	-1.0	-1.6	-1.7	-3.1	-1.6	-2.3	-1.7	-3.1	-1.9	-1.6
Financing gap (= surplus)	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Expected financing (excluding IMF)	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
IMF-ECF	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Residual financing gap	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Memorandum items:										
Stock of domestic arrears <sup>6</sup>	19.7	14.9	18.6	-	16.5	13.2	9.8	6.4	3.7	1.8
Of which: Social arrears	6.2	4.7	5.3	-	...	...	...	...	...	...
Stock of government deposits	1.4	5.3	2.6	-	2.1	2.9	4.0	5.2	6.7	8.7
CEMAC Reference fiscal balance <sup>7</sup>	3.0	3.2	2.6	-	-0.8	0.7	1.2	2.1	2.6	2.7
GDP at current market prices	8,956	9,470	9,063	9,415	9,415	10,007	10,700	11,437	12,202	13,015
Non-hydrocarbon GDP at market prices <sup>8</sup>	6,988	7,533	7,391	7,887	7,887	8,447	9,084	9,769	10,494	11,272

Sources: Congolese authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

<sup>1</sup> Includes net spending (i.e. spending minus revenues) associated with decentralized government entities.

<sup>2</sup> Revenue and grants excluding hydrocarbon revenues minus total primary expenditures (excluding interest payments).

<sup>3</sup> Non hydrocarbon revenue excluding grants minus total expenditures excluding interest payments and foreign-financed investment.

<sup>4</sup> Basic non-hydrocarbon primary balance minus hydrocarbon revenue and oil-related transfers.

<sup>5</sup> Include resident and non-resident creditors from the CEMAC region.

<sup>6</sup> Includes estimates of domestic arrears audited by the the Caisse Congolaise d'Amortisation (CCA) and reported but not yet audited arrears.

<sup>7</sup> CEMAC definition: overall balance minus 20 percent of hydrocarbon revenues and minus 80 percent of the hydrocarbon revenue in excess of the average observed during the three previous years.

<sup>8</sup> Since 2024 the hydrocarbon sector includes the oil and gas sectors, before 2024 the gas sector was in a state of infancy and hence negligible.

**Table 3. Republic of Congo: Medium-Term Balance of Payments, 2024–31**  
(Billions of CFA francs)

	2024	2025	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031
	Proj.	CR 25/75					Proj.		
Current account	-270	27	-522	-665	-596	-636	-625	-625	-559
<i>of which non-hydrocarbon</i>	-1,947	-1,162	-1,735	-1,733	-1,783	-1,847	-1,916	-1,975	-2,031
Trade balance	2,112	2,543	1,676	1,390	1,429	1,381	1,372	1,362	1,341
Exports, f.o.b.	4,718	4,622	4,031	3,631	3,724	3,829	3,914	3,992	4,072
Hydrocarbon sector <sup>1</sup>	4,430	4,197	3,724	3,296	3,358	3,419	3,477	3,509	3,539
Non-hydrocarbon sector	288	425	307	335	365	410	438	483	533
Imports, f.o.b.	-2,606	-2,080	-2,355	-2,242	-2,294	-2,448	-2,543	-2,629	-2,731
Hydrocarbon sector	-860	-970	-800	-686	-684	-762	-794	-809	-836
Government	-332	-444	-358	-329	-337	-362	-372	-393	-415
Non-hydrocarbon private sector	-1,414	-665	-1,197	-1,227	-1,273	-1,324	-1,377	-1,428	-1,479
Balance of services	-1,479	-1,741	-1,464	-1,391	-1,387	-1,334	-1,290	-1,286	-1,163
Hydrocarbon sector	-1,030	-1,266	-1,010	-919	-886	-798	-717	-680	-522
Non-hydrocarbon sector	-449	-475	-454	-472	-502	-536	-573	-606	-641
Income	-938	-858	-772	-725	-727	-779	-811	-815	-856
Labor income	-13	-12	-10	-8	-8	-9	-9	-9	-9
Investment income	-925	-847	-762	-718	-719	-771	-802	-806	-846
Current transfers (net)	35	84	38	62	88	97	105	114	119
Capital account	40	73	34	58	84	92	99	108	113
Official grants	40	73	34	58	84	92	99	108	113
Debt cancellation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Non-financial non-produced assets	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Financial account	172	-83	534	588	549	581	636	688	635
Direct investment (net)	442	496	461	580	565	576	627	662	509
Portfolio investment	149	142	614	244	168	176	182	175	175
Other investment	-419	-721	-542	-234	-183	-170	-173	-149	-49
Medium and long term	-338	-277	-223	-146	-106	-145	-140	-135	-88
Public sector	-446	-354	-285	-207	-192	-247	-242	-228	-184
Drawings	69	129	115	185	178	222	226	238	258
Project	69	129	115	185	178	222	226	238	258
Program	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other (collateralized)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Amortization <sup>2</sup>	-428	-327	-259	-263	-240	-336	-332	-328	-337
Net change in arrears	53	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others	-140	-156	-141	-128	-130	-132	-135	-138	-105
SDR Allocation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Private sector	109	77	80	60	86	101	102	93	96
Oil	46	36	30	35	43	49	50	50	53
Non-oil	62	41	50	25	43	53	51	43	43
Short term	-81	-444	-319	-88	-77	-25	-33	-14	40
Errors and omissions	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Overall balance of payments	-58	17	46	-18	37	37	111	172	189
Financing	-28	-93	-118	18	-37	-37	-111	-172	-189
Reserve financing (- = increase)	-28	-87	-112	23	-22	13	-26	-79	-89
Exceptional financing <sup>3</sup>	0	-6	-5	-5	-15	-50	-85	-93	0
Financing gap (- = surplus)	86	76	72	0	0	0	0	0	0
Expected financing (excluding IMF)	60	49	47	0	0	0	0	0	0
IMF-ECF	26	26	25	0	0	0	0	0	0
Residual financing gap	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Sources: Bank of Central African States (BEAC) and IMF staff estimates and projections.

<sup>1</sup> Since 2024 the hydrocarbon sector includes the oil and gas sectors, before 2024 the gas sector was in a state of infancy and hence negligible.

<sup>2</sup> Includes stock debt relief of the HIPC completion point and the repayment of the G20 loan moratorium.

<sup>3</sup> Includes repurchases/repayments to the Fund.

**Table 4. Republic of Congo: Monetary Survey, 2024–31**  
(Billions of CFA francs, unless otherwise specified)

	2024	2025	2025				2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031
	Prel.	CR 25/75	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.	Proj.
		Prel.	Prel.	Proj.	Proj.								
Net foreign assets	403	401	343	301	317	531	531	565	659	781	944	1,201	1,485
Central bank	52	147	-85	-67	-144	144	144	126	163	200	311	483	673
Deposit money banks	351	254	429	368	462	386	386	439	496	580	633	717	812
Net domestic assets	2,792	3,146	2,943	2,981	2,867	2,541	2,541	3,054	3,364	3,493	3,664	3,697	3,566
Net domestic credit	3,252	3,496	3,319	3,383	3,359	3,001	3,001	3,515	3,824	3,953	4,124	4,158	4,026
Net credit to the public sector	1,724	1,883	1,736	1,682	1,601	1,422	1,422	1,872	2,099	2,130	2,189	2,091	1,815
Net credit to the Government	1,725	1,929	1,734	1,676	1,587	1,423	1,423	1,873	2,101	2,132	2,190	2,092	1,816
Central bank	909	591	941	866	903	808	808	826	700	496	228	-104	-527
Claims	1,038	1,094	1,052	1,007	1,006	1,044	1,044	1,024	994	928	828	719	602
Use of IMF Credit	267	280	285	272	268	287	287	282	267	217	132	39	-61
Deposits	-129	-503	-112	-141	-103	-236	-236	-198	-294	-433	-599	-823	-1,129
Deposit money banks	816	1,338	793	811	684	615	615	1,047	1,401	1,636	1,962	2,196	2,343
Claims on public agencies, net	-1	-46	3	5	15	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Credit to the economy <sup>1</sup>	1,528	1,613	1,583	1,702	1,757	1,579	1,579	1,643	1,725	1,823	1,935	2,067	2,211
Credit to the private sector	1,296	1,337	1,320	1,372	1,423	1,333	1,333	1,380	1,444	1,520	1,610	1,717	1,836
Other items, net	-460	-350	-376	-402	-491	-460	-460	-460	-460	-460	-460	-460	-460
Broad money	3,195	3,547	3,287	3,282	3,184	3,072	3,072	3,620	4,023	4,273	4,608	4,898	5,050
Currency outside banks	544	582	520	516	526	523	523	616	685	727	784	833	859
Demand deposits	1,828	2,031	1,802	1,821	1,675	1,756	1,756	2,075	2,311	2,456	2,651	2,820	2,909
Time deposits	791	910	908	917	965	760	760	896	996	1,058	1,140	1,212	1,250
(Changes in percent of beginning-of-period broad money)													
Broad money	16.5	5.8	2.9	2.7	-0.3	-3.9	-3.9	17.8	11.2	6.2	7.8	6.3	3.1
Net foreign assets	7.0	3.3	-1.9	-3.2	-2.7	4.0	4.0	1.1	2.6	3.0	3.8	5.6	5.8
Net domestic assets	9.5	2.5	4.7	5.9	2.4	-7.9	-7.9	16.7	8.6	3.2	4.0	0.7	-2.7
Net domestic credit	7.8	2.5	2.1	4.1	3.3	-7.9	-7.9	16.7	8.6	3.2	4.0	0.7	-2.7
Net credit to the public sector	6.5	0.5	0.4	-1.3	-3.8	-9.5	-9.5	14.7	6.3	0.8	1.4	-2.1	-5.6
Credit to the economy	1.3	2.0	1.7	5.4	7.2	1.6	1.6	2.1	2.3	2.4	2.6	2.9	2.9
Credit to the private sector	1.6	1.5	0.8	2.4	4.0	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.4
Other items, net	1.7	0.0	2.6	1.8	-1.0	--	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
(Annual percent changes, unless otherwise indicated)													
Broad money	16.5	5.8	7.5	9.5	9.4	-3.9	-3.9	17.8	11.2	6.2	7.8	6.3	3.1
Reserve money	-4.3	8.4	-9.7	6.8	3.5	9.6	9.6	17.8	11.2	6.2	11.5	10.1	6.9
Credit to the economy	2.4	4.4	2.5	13.2	20.0	3.3	3.3	4.0	5.0	5.7	6.2	6.8	7.0
Credit to the private sector	3.6	3.8	-3.5	5.2	14.0	2.9	2.9	3.5	4.6	5.3	5.9	6.7	6.9
Velocity (Non-hydrocarbon GDP/average M2)	2.4	2.1	2.4	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.4	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2
(Percent)													
Total nominal GDP growth	4.2	4.9	1.2	3.9	6.3	6.9	1.2	3.9	6.3	6.9	6.9	6.7	6.7
Non-hydrocarbon nominal GDP growth <sup>2</sup>	5.7	7.1	5.8	6.7	7.1	7.5	5.8	6.7	7.1	7.5	7.5	7.4	7.4
Credit to the economy/Non-hydrocarbon GDP	21.9	21.4	21.1	20.1	20.1	19.3	21.4	20.8	20.4	20.1	19.8	19.7	19.6
Memorandum Items:													
Gross imputed official reserves (CFA billion)	560	663	402	401	331	672	672	649	671	658	684	764	853
In months of imports	1.7	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.4
Central bank liabilities to non-residents	508.1	515.8	487.1	468.7	476.0	528.1	528.1	523.1	508.0	458.0	373.1	280.5	180.5

Sources: BEAC, and IMF staff estimates and projections.

<sup>1</sup> Private sector and public enterprises.

<sup>2</sup> Since 2024 the hydrocarbon sector includes the oil and gas sectors, before 2024 the gas sector was in a state of infancy and hence negligible.

**Table 5. Republic of Congo: Financial Soundness Indicators for the Banking Sector, 2015–23**

(Percent, unless otherwise indicated)

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
<b>Core FSIs</b>									
<b>Capital Adequacy<sup>1, 2</sup></b>									
Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets	19.5	19.1	22.8	24.9	29.6	18.8	21.8	23.1	17.4
Nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital	15.4	28.3	53.1	71.8	74.7	61.1	30.2	27.9	26.4
<b>Asset Quality</b>									
Nonperforming loans to total gross loans	5.0	8.0	16.2	22.5	27.5	21.0	16.9	16.8	15.2
Provisions to nonperforming loans	51.9	38.6	35.8	36.7	35.9	53.0	64.2	62.4	65.5
<b>Earnings and Profitability</b>									
Return on assets	2.1	1.6	1.5	1.2	0.6	1.1	2.2	2.4	3.1
Return on equity	16.2	8.0	7.2	4.6	1.2	6.3	12.0	13.0	19.4
<b>Liquidity</b>									
Liquid assets to total assets	21.1	16.7	22.7	26.8	23.8	26.9	27.2	30.9	32.1
Liquid assets to short-term liabilities	116.1	104.4	146.6	176.0	152.0	174.4	175.9	173.6	195.0
<b>Additional FSIs</b>									
Large exposures to capital	187.2	154.2	157.5	157.2	133.6	126.0	104.7	107.8	97.1
Trading income to total income	11.1	6.8	40.1	47.3	38.6	20.3	-7.1	-21.5	73.5
Personnel expenses to noninterest expenses	22.1	24.2	13.8	10.5	11.1	2.4	23.4	24.2	3.9
Customer deposits to total (noninterbank) loans	125.5	102.8	93.6	91.5	104.3	112.1	111.2	133.1	144.6
FX loans to total loans	2.4	2.2	5.0	3.0	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
Residential real estate loans to total gross loans	1.7	1.5	0.7	0.6	0.7	1.5	2.4	2.9	2.4
Commercial real estate loans to total gross loans	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.9	0.3	0.1	0.1

Sources: IMF Financial Soundness Indicators.

<sup>1</sup> Current year profits are excluded from the definition of regulatory capital, following the Basel I capital accord guidelines. General provisions are included in Tier 2 capital up to an amount equal to 1.25% of risk-weighted assets. Regulatory capital is the sum of Tier 1 capital, and the minimum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital.

<sup>2</sup> The risk-weighted assets are estimated using the following risk weights: 0% - cash reserves in domestic and foreign currency and claims on the central bank; 100% - all other assets.

**Table 6. Republic of Congo: Gross Fiscal Financing Needs, 2024–31**  
(Billions of CFA francs)

	2024 Prel.	2025	2026	2027 Proj.	2028	2029	2030	2031
A. Overall fiscal balance (cash basis) [=surplus]	-324	-30	6	-289	-417	-516	-578	-606
B. Financing needs	2002	2753	1736	2044	2191	2416	2647	2685
Amortization (including arrears)	1890	2485	1626	1799	1900	2094	2265	2252
External	532	259	263	240	336	332	328	337
Of which: Amortization due	584	259	263	240	336	332	328	337
Domestic	1357	2227	1363	1558	1564	1761	1936	1915
Amortization due	1269	2072	1213	1326	1382	1404	1673	1706
Repayment of domestic arrears	88	155	150	232	182	357	264	209
BEAC	-46	121	-23	111	154	182	240	323
Repayment of statutory advances	0	14	15	15	16	16	16	17
Change in government deposits (+ = an increase)	-46	107	-38	96	139	167	223	306
Commercial Banks	-84	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Change in government deposits (+ = an increase)	-84	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Other external financing	140	141	128	130	132	135	138	105
Errors and omissions	102	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C=A+B Total financing needs	1678	2723	1742	1756	1774	1900	2069	2079
D. Identified sources of financing	1592	2651	1742	1756	1774	1900	2069	2079
External	247	587	185	178	222	226	238	258
Of which: Project financing	72	115	185	178	222	226	238	258
Other	139	472	0	0	0	0	0	0
Domestic	1345	2064	1558	1578	1552	1675	1831	1821
Of which: Commercial bank and non-bank financing	1388	1980	1549	1577	1552	1698	1874	1821
E=C-D Financing gap (=overfinancing)	86	72	0	0	0	0	0	0
F. Exceptional external financing (excl. IMF)	60	47	0	0	0	0	0	0
Multilateral	48	47	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bilateral	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
G=E-F Residual financing needs	26	25	0	0	0	0	0	0
IMF-ECF	26	25	0	0	0	0	0	0

Sources: Congolese authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

**Table 7. Republic of Congo: Public Debt by Creditor, 2024–26<sup>1/</sup>**  
(Year-end; Millions of USD, unless otherwise indicated)

	Debt Stock (end of period)			Debt Service					
	2024			2024	2025	2026	2024	2025	2026
	(USD Million)	(Percent total debt)	(Percent GDP) <sup>5</sup>	(USD Million)			(Percent GDP)		
<b>Total</b>	14,026	100.0	98.0	3,579	4,858	3,584	24.2	31.2	21.6
<b>External</b>	5,362	38.2	37.5	870	528	664	5.9	3.4	4.0
Multilateral creditors <sup>2</sup>	1,724	12.3	12.0	50	78	82	0.3	0.5	0.5
IMF	374	2.7	2.6	...	...	...	...	...	...
World Bank	734	5.2	5.1	...	...	...	...	...	...
ADB/AfDB/IADB	495	3.5	3.5	...	...	...	...	...	...
Other Multilaterals	121	0.9	0.8	...	...	...	...	...	...
o/w: BDEAC	83	0.6	0.6	...	...	...	...	...	...
IFAD	24	0.2	0.2	...	...	...	...	...	...
Bilateral Creditors	2,442	17.4	17.1	357	316	262	2.4	2.0	1.6
Paris Club	462	3.3	3.2	43	50	48	0.3	0.3	0.3
o/w: France	274	2.0	1.9	...	...	...	...	...	...
Belgium	77	0.6	0.5	...	...	...	...	...	...
Non-Paris Club	1,980	14.1	13.8	313	266	213	2.1	1.7	1.3
o/w: China	1,593	11.4	11.1	...	...	...	...	...	...
India	77	0.5	0.5	...	...	...	...	...	...
Commercial creditors	1,196	8.5	8.4	462	135	320	3.1	0.9	1.9
o/w: Bonds	179	1.3	1.2	19	42	138	0.1	0.3	0.8
Other international creditors	1,017	7.3	7.1	443	92	182	3.0	0.6	1.1
o/w: Largest two creditors	176	1.3	1.2	...	...	...	...	...	...
Others	841	6.0	5.9	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>Domestic</b> <sup>3</sup>	8664	61.8	60.6	2710	4330	2921	18.3	27.8	17.6
T-Bills and Bonds <sup>4</sup>	4265	30.4	29.8	2520	3940	2549	17.1	25.3	15.3
Loans	1494	10.7	10.4	27	53	54	0.2	0.3	0.3
<b>Memo items:</b>									
Collateralized debt <sup>4</sup>									
o/w: Related	227	...	1.6	...	...	...	...	...	...
o/w: Unrelated	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Contingent liabilities									
o/w: Public guarantees	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
o/w: Other explicit contingent liabilities <sup>5</sup>	257	...	1.8	...	...	...	...	...	...
Nominal GDP	14,774	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...

<sup>1</sup> As reported by Country authorities according to their classification of creditors, including by official and commercial. Debt coverage is the same as the DSA.

<sup>2</sup> Multilateral creditors are simply institutions with more than one official shareholder and may not necessarily align with creditor classification under other IMF policies (e.g.

<sup>3</sup> Domestic debt service includes arrears repayment.

<sup>4</sup> Debt is collateralized when the creditor has rights over an asset or revenue stream that would allow it, if the borrower defaults on its payment obligations, to rely on the asset or revenue stream to secure repayment of the debt. Collateralization entails a borrower granting liens over specific existing assets or future receivables to a lender as security against repayment of the loan. Collateral is "unrelated" when it has no relationship to a project financed by the loan. An example would be borrowing to finance the budget deficit, collateralized by oil revenue receipts. See the joint IMF-World Bank note for the G20 "Collateralized Transactions: Key Considerations for Public Lenders and Borrowers" for a discussion of issues raised by collateral.

<sup>5</sup> Includes other one-off guarantees not included in publicly guaranteed debt (e.g. credit lines) and other explicit contingent liabilities not elsewhere classified (e.g. potential legal claims, payments resulting from PPP arrangements).

<sup>6</sup> Calculated with debt stock and GDP in local currency units.

**Table 8. Republic of Congo: External Arrears, 2022–25**  
(End-of-period; Billions of CFAF, unless otherwise Indicated)

	December 2022 stock			December 2023 stock			December 2024 stock			September 2025 stock			September 2025 (Excl. unstructured pre-HIPC arrears)		
	CFAF billion	USD million	percent of GDP	CFAF billion	USD million	percent of GDP	CFAF billion	USD million	percent of GDP	CFAF billion	USD million	percent of GDP	CFAF billion	USD million	percent of GDP
<b>Total</b>	<b>312.4</b>	<b>504.3</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>297.8</b>	<b>495.1</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>355.3</b>	<b>567.6</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>449.5</b>	<b>773.2</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>167.9</b>	<b>288.8</b>	<b>1.9</b>
Multilateral and other creditors	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.5	12.0	0.1	9.7	16.6	0.1	9.7	16.6	0.1
Bilateral	86.7	140.0	1.0	72.2	120.0	0.8	110.4	176.4	1.2	127.2	218.8	1.4	62.4	107.3	0.7
Paris Club	11.9	19.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	23.2	37.1	0.3	10.4	17.9	0.1	10.4	17.9	0.1
Brazil	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	4.2	0.0	4.1	7.1	0.0	4.1	7.1	0.0
Belgium	5.7	9.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.8	15.7	0.1	6.2	10.7	0.1	6.2	10.7	0.1
France	6.2	10.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.8	17.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0
Switzerland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Russia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Non-Paris Club	74.9	120.9	0.9	72.2	120.0	0.8	87.2	139.3	1.0	116.8	200.9	1.3	52.0	89.4	0.6
United Arab Emirates	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Libya	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	2.3	0.0	2.8	4.4	0.0	1.3	2.2	0.0	1.3	2.2	0.0
Angola	69.8	112.6	0.8	69.0	114.8	0.8	73.2	116.9	0.8	64.8	111.5	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
China	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	39.6	68.1	0.4	39.6	68.1	0.4
India Exim Bank	1.9	3.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	3.6	0.0	4.9	8.5	0.1	4.9	8.5	0.1
Kuwait	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Saudi Arabia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Turkey	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.3	8.5	0.1	3.1	5.3	0.0	3.1	5.3	0.0
Postal debt	3.1	5.1	0.0	3.1	5.2	0.0	3.1	5.0	0.0	3.1	5.4	0.0	3.1	5.4	0.0
Private Creditors	225.7	364.3	2.6	225.7	375.1	2.6	237.3	379.1	2.6	312.6	537.8	3.4	95.8	164.8	1.1
CMEC and other companies	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	87.0	149.6	1.0	87.0	149.6	1.0
Eurobond	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.7	18.7	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Afreximbank	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Oil traders	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Suppliers	225.7	364.3	2.6	225.7	375.1	2.6	225.7	360.5	2.5	225.7	388.2	2.5	8.9	15.2	0.1

Source: Congolese authorities and IMF staff estimates.

**Table 9. Republic of Congo: External Arrears to Official Creditors, March 2025–February 2026<sup>1/</sup>**

(Billions of CFAF)

<b>Total</b>	<b>60.0</b>
<b>Multilateral</b>	<b>21.8</b>
World Bank	4.6
AfDB	3.1
EIB	0.0
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa	0.3
OPEC	0.4
BDEAC	12.4
FAD	0.0
IFAD	0.9
<b>Bilateral</b>	<b>38.2</b>
EXIMBANK India	9.9
Saudi Arabia	0.8
France	2.2
Brazil	5.0
UAE	0.3
Kuwait	0.2
Belgium	12.5
Russia	0.0
Libya	1.3
CMEC China	0.0
Turkey	6.1

<sup>1</sup> The figures shown are estimates provided by the authorities and do not include late fees or interest on arrears. Final outstanding arrears are those reported by creditors in their routine notifications of pending payments.

**Table 10. Republic of Congo: Indicators of Capacity to Repay the IMF, 2024–38: Baseline Scenario**  
(Millions of SDRs, unless otherwise indicated)

	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035	2036	2037	2038
<b>IMF obligations based on existing credit</b>															
Principal	0.0	6.5	6.5	19.4	38.9	58.3	61.6	64.8	51.8	32.4	13.0	3.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Charges and interest	9.0	6.9	6.1	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
<b>Total obligations based on existing credit</b>															
SDR millions	9.0	13.4	12.5	25.5	44.9	64.4	67.6	70.8	57.9	38.4	19.0	9.3	6.0	6.0	6.0
CFAF billions	7.3	10.5	9.7	19.8	35.0	50.2	53.0	55.4	45.3	30.1	14.9	7.3	4.7	4.7	4.7
Percent of exports of goods and services	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.9	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.0	0.7	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
Percent of debt service <sup>1</sup>	1.2	3.4	2.6	6.0	8.4	12.3	13.4	14.0	11.5	11.7	6.5	2.9	1.8	1.7	1.6
Percent of GDP	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Percent of tax revenue	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.8	1.4	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.4	0.9	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
Percent of quota	5.6	8.3	7.7	15.7	27.7	39.7	41.7	43.7	35.7	23.7	11.7	4.5	2.9	2.9	2.9
Percent of imputed gross official reserves	1.3	1.6	1.5	2.9	5.2	7.2	6.7	6.3	4.5	2.6	1.2	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3
<b>Outstanding IMF credit based on existing drawings</b>															
SDR millions	324.0	349.9	343.4	324.0	285.1	226.8	165.2	100.4	48.6	16.2	3.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
CFAF billions	260.7	274.4	265.2	251.3	221.9	176.9	129.5	78.6	38.0	12.7	2.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Percent of exports of goods and services	5.4	6.6	7.0	6.5	5.6	4.3	3.1	1.8	0.9	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Percent of debt service <sup>1</sup>	41.6	89.3	70.5	76.7	53.1	43.5	32.8	19.9	9.7	4.9	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Percent of GDP	2.9	3.0	2.8	2.5	2.1	1.5	1.1	0.6	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Percent of External debt	7.8	7.9	8.2	7.9	7.5	6.4	5.0	3.3	1.7	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Percent of tax revenue	12.1	13.2	11.9	10.6	8.9	6.7	4.6	2.7	1.2	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Percent of quota	200.0	216.0	212.0	200.0	176.0	140.0	102.0	62.0	30.0	10.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<i>Memorandum items:</i>															
Exports of goods and services (CFAF billions)	4,853	4,167	3,771	3,869	3,981	4,074	4,163	4,257	4,370	4,456	4,550	4,548	4,458	4,331	4,238
External Debt service (CFAF billions) <sup>1</sup>	627	307	376	327	418	407	394	395	393	257	230	247	260	282	294
External Debt (CFAF billions)	3,357	3,476	3,240	3,193	2,979	2,770	2,583	2,399	2,231	2,394	2,599	2,794	2,951	3,091	3,217
Nominal GDP (CFAF billions)	8,956	9,063	9,415	10,007	10,700	11,437	12,202	13,015	13,886	14,815	15,866	16,945	18,061	19,246	20,546
Tax revenue (CFAF billions)	2,160	2,082	2,222	2,363	2,508	2,646	2,795	2,965	3,156	3,342	3,556	3,789	3,980	4,174	4,399
Quota (SDR millions)	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162
Imputed gross official reserves (Billions of CFA francs)	560	672	649	681	672	702	787	885	1016	1136	1246	1361	1471	1602	1749

Sources: IMF staff estimates and projections.

<sup>1/</sup>Total external debt service includes IMF repurchases and repayments.

**Table 11. Republic of Congo: Indicators of Capacity to Repay the IMF, 2024–38: Downside Scenario**  
(Millions of SDRs, unless otherwise indicated)

	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035	2036	2037	2038
<b>IMF obligations based on existing credit</b>															
Principal	0.0	6.5	6.5	19.4	38.9	58.3	61.6	64.8	51.8	32.4	13.0	3.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Charges and interest	9.0	6.9	6.1	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0
<b>Total obligations based on existing credit</b>															
SDR millions	9.0	13.4	12.5	25.5	44.9	64.4	67.6	70.8	57.9	38.4	19.0	9.3	6.0	6.0	6.0
CFAF billions	7.3	10.5	9.7	19.8	35.0	50.2	53.0	55.4	45.3	30.1	14.9	7.3	4.7	4.7	4.7
Percent of exports of goods and services	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.9	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.0	0.7	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
Percent of debt service <sup>1</sup>	1.2	3.4	2.6	5.9	8.3	12.2	13.2	13.7	11.6	11.6	6.2	2.9	1.8	1.7	1.6
Percent of GDP	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Percent of tax revenue	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.8	1.4	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.4	0.9	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
Percent of quota	5.6	8.3	7.7	15.7	27.7	39.7	41.7	43.7	35.7	23.7	11.7	4.5	2.9	2.9	2.9
Percent of imputed gross official reserves	1.3	1.6	1.5	2.9	5.3	7.3	6.9	6.5	4.6	2.7	1.2	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.3
<b>Outstanding IMF credit based on existing drawings</b>															
SDR millions	324.0	349.9	343.4	324.0	285.1	226.8	165.2	100.4	48.6	16.2	3.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
CFAF billions	260.7	274.4	265.2	251.3	221.9	176.9	129.5	78.6	38.0	12.7	2.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Percent of exports of goods and services	5.4	6.6	7.0	6.5	5.6	4.3	3.1	1.8	0.9	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Percent of debt service <sup>1</sup>	41.6	89.3	70.5	74.5	52.5	43.1	32.4	19.5	9.7	4.9	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Percent of GDP	2.9	3.0	2.8	2.5	2.1	1.5	1.1	0.6	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Percent of External debt	7.8	7.9	8.2	7.9	7.2	6.0	4.5	2.8	1.4	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Percent of tax revenue	12.1	13.2	11.9	10.6	8.9	6.7	4.6	2.7	1.2	0.4	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Percent of quota	200.0	216.0	212.0	200.0	176.0	140.0	102.0	62.0	30.0	10.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
<i>Memorandum items:</i>															
Exports of goods and services (CFAF billions)	4,853	4,167	3,771	3,870	3,982	4,074	4,164	4,258	4,370	4,456	4,550	4,549	4,459	4,331	4,239
External Debt service (CFAF billions) <sup>1</sup>	627	307	376	337	423	411	400	404	391	260	240	250	260	282	294
External Debt (CFAF billions)	3,357	3,476	3,240	3,183	3,070	2,964	2,877	2,791	2,731	2,799	2,897	2,994	3,061	3,112	3,217
Nominal GDP (CFAF billions)	8,956	9,063	9,415	10,007	10,700	11,437	12,202	13,015	13,886	14,815	15,866	16,945	18,061	19,246	20,546
Tax revenue (CFAF billions)	2,160	2,082	2,222	2,363	2,508	2,646	2,795	2,965	3,156	3,342	3,556	3,789	3,980	4,174	4,399
Quota (SDR millions)	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162
Imputed gross official reserves (Billions of CFA francs)	560	672	649	671	658	684	764	853	984	1,098	1,197	1,308	1,417	1,547	1,657

Sources: IMF staff estimates and projections.

<sup>1/</sup>Total external debt service includes IMF repurchases and repayments.

Annex I. Risk Assessment Matrix<sup>1</sup>

Risks	Likelihood	Impact if Realized	Policy Response
<b>Conjunctural risks</b>			
<p><b>Fiscal vulnerabilities and higher long-term interest rates.</b> Rising public debt and deficit levels may put upward pressure on long-term interest rates and increase the risk of sovereign bond market disruptions. These developments could amplify capital flow volatility, tighten financial conditions, threaten sovereign debt sustainability, and trigger global spillovers. Market imbalances (such as reduced investor capacity to absorb sovereign debt) could emerge, exacerbating risks from a close sovereign-financial nexus.</p>	<b>High</b>	<p><b>High</b></p> <p>Congo's limited fiscal spaces and recent fiscal slippages threaten to weaken the country's fiscal medium-term discipline. Incomplete implementation of the currently committed fiscal consolidation path would very likely exacerbate debt vulnerabilities, threaten debt sustainability, and deteriorate the country's capacity to repay the Fund.</p>	<p>Mitigation efforts should focus on broadening the revenue base, improving spending efficiency, and strengthening debt management, while advancing PFM and governance reforms to bolster confidence and resilience. Priority should also be given to fiscal and structural reforms aimed at preserving debt sustainability, enhancing competitiveness, deepening regional integration, alongside measures to improve the business environment to strengthen investor confidence.</p>
<p><b>Commodity price volatility.</b> Shifts in supply and demand—driven by geopolitical tensions and conflicts, OPEC+ actions, or the green transition—may fuel commodity price swings, intensifying external and fiscal pressures, social unrest, and macroeconomic instability.</p>	<b>High</b>	<p><b>High</b></p> <p>Given Congo's heavy reliance on oil revenue and export proceeds, weaker than expected commodity prices are a downside risk that could amplify external and fiscal pressures, reduce the country's capacity to repay the Fund, and overall, contribute to domestic economic instability.</p> <p>Conversely, higher oil prices are an upside risk that could increase oil revenues and alleviate fiscal and external vulnerabilities.</p> <p>Persistent food price pressures could add to domestic inflation and worsen food insecurity.</p>	<p>Strengthen non-oil revenue mobilization and further rationalize non-priority spending.</p> <p>Leverage high oil revenues: (i) to build up fiscal buffers and accelerate structural reforms to diversify the economy, enhance competitiveness, and deepen regional integration; and (ii) continue with reform measures that reduce Congo's vulnerabilities and attract investments to the country.</p> <p>Bolster social assistance programs to help the most</p>

<sup>1</sup> The Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) shows events that could materially alter the baseline path. The relative likelihood is the staff's subjective assessment of the risks surrounding the baseline ("low" is meant to indicate a probability below 10 percent, "medium" a probability between 10 and 30 percent, and "high" a probability between 30 and 50 percent). The RAM reflects staff views on the source of risks and overall level of concern as of the time of discussions with the authorities. Non-mutually exclusive risks may interact and materialize jointly. The conjunctural shocks and scenarios highlight risks that may materialize over a shorter horizon (between 12 to 18 months) given the current baseline. Structural risks are those that are likely to remain salient over a longer horizon.

Risks	Likelihood	Impact if Realized	Policy Response
			vulnerable cope with food inflation.
<p><b>Geopolitical tensions.</b> Intensification of conflicts, coupled with the weakening of multilateralism, may trigger commodity price volatility, increase migration pressures, reignite inflation, and weigh on growth by undermining confidence, investment, tourism, trade, and supply chains.</p>	<b>High</b>	<b>High</b> Negative spillovers could fuel inflation, and weigh negatively on investment, trade, and economic growth, exacerbate debt sustainability pressures, and thereby, weigh on Congo's capacity to repay the Fund. In addition, security issues in the Central African region could generate further fiscal pressures, compounding these adverse effects.	Accelerate fiscal and structural reforms to reduce external imbalances, build buffers, enhance competitiveness, deepen regional integration, and effectively allocate resources to safeguard the most vulnerable populations.
<p><b>Escalating trade measures and prolonged uncertainty.</b> Rising trade barriers and prolonged policy uncertainty could reduce trade, investment, and growth. Inflationary pressures may re-emerge—especially in countries imposing tariffs. These effects can be amplified by strategic complementarities or bottlenecks in global value chains or inventory overhang.</p>	<b>High</b>	<b>Medium</b> Higher import bill, reduced exports revenues, and weaker capacity to repay the Fund, as trade restrictions limit cross-border movements of food, basic goods, and refined fuels, triggering shortages and fueling imported inflation.	<p>Strengthen the efficiency and prioritization of public spending by enhancing procurement practices and improving resource allocation to sectors most affected by shortages.</p> <p>Renew efforts to diversify the economy and improve inventories and distribution management to reduce reliance on imports.</p> <p>Improve efficiency of custom administration and ease bottlenecks at borders would help lower trade costs.</p>
<p><b>Decline in International Aid.</b> A further sharp reduction in international financial assistance, including development aid and humanitarian support, could severely affect low-income and fragile countries. Such an additional aid withdrawal would strain public finances, worsen current accounts, increase debt vulnerabilities, and lead to a further deterioration in living conditions and food security.</p>	<b>High</b>	<b>Medium</b> This could further constrain fiscal space, weigh on Congo's capacity to repay, and delay and scale back the implementation of social programs providing access to health, safe water, sanitation, and education.	Continue fiscal and structural reforms to free up the fiscal space needed to roll out targeted social programs to protect the most vulnerable populations and leverage remittances to fund and promote development projects.

Risks	Likelihood	Impact if Realized	Policy Response
<i>Structural risks</i>			
<p><b>Climate change.</b> Extreme climate events and rising temperatures could cause loss of life, damage to infrastructure, food insecurity, supply disruptions, and heighten economic and financial instability.</p>	<b>Medium</b>	<p><b>Medium/ High</b></p> <p>Lower domestic production in the agricultural sector, forced population displacement, increased diversion of critical development resources towards climate disaster emergency response, weakened capacity to repay the Fund, and negative implications for food security and incomes.</p>	<p>Strengthen food security and rural development programs.</p> <p>Promote investment in climate resilient infrastructure and address infrastructure gaps and income disparities among regions, while establishing shock-responsive social safety nets.</p> <p>Engage in prevention, preservation, and make budgetary room for catastrophe contingency planning.</p> <p>Promote economic diversification and carefully consider public investment in hydrocarbon sector.</p>

## Annex II. Downside Scenario

**1. A risk scenario featuring lower oil prices and constraints on the lending capacity of the banking sector results in significant additional financing needs over 2026–27.** The scenario assumes (i) 10 percent lower oil prices relative to the January 2026 World Economic Outlook update assumptions, starting in 2026 through the medium term, in line with the historical volatility of the Brent oil price in 2023–25, and (ii) limits on the regional banking system’s capacity to absorb Congo’s debt. The limits on the regional banking system assume that banks expand their exposure to the Congolese sovereign only up to 25 percent of assets,<sup>1</sup> bank assets will grow over September 2025 to December 2026 at the nominal GDP growth rate, and 66 percent of Congo’s domestic sovereign debt is held by non-resident regional banks.<sup>2</sup> The resulting losses in fiscal revenues and access to funding lead to substantive additional financing needs over 2026–27: 3.8 percent in 2026, and 1.9 percent in 2027 (Figure 1). Additional financing needs could arise should the 2025 fiscal slippage (¶15, main text) prove more persistent than projected in the baseline.

**2. The potential for sizable additional funding needs points to high risks around fiscal and debt management, the sovereign-bank nexus, and liquidity needs.** More than two thirds of the 2026 additional financing needs—3 percent of GDP—stem from the domestic financing constraints of a heavily exposed banking system’s (¶19–20). Recurrent episodes of unsuccessful or only partially successful treasury auctions, tightening regional financial conditions, and rising gross financing needs across CEMAC ([CR 25/171](#), Text Table 4) highlight the challenges of meeting these needs in the regional treasury market. Given Congo’s elevated debt level, alternative strategies to cover additional financing needs—without resorting to non-concessional debt issuance—would be preferable (see ¶14 below). Should such strategies prove insufficient, budget execution and amortization plans could be compromised.

**3. Potential additional financing needs come with lower growth, current account deterioration over 2026–30, a looser fiscal stance, and smaller increases in banks’ assets and sovereign exposures.** Lower oil prices would slow down hydrocarbon export revenues and domestic aggregate income and demand, reducing growth in 2026 by an annual 18 to 29 bps over 2026–30 (Figure 1). The decline in public revenues would deteriorate the primary fiscal balance by 0.8 pp of GDP in 2026 compared to the baseline, with the effect moderating subsequently (Figure 1). Central bank net foreign assets projected for end-2026 decline by 47 percent, reducing Congo’s contribution to regional reserves in the near term, with the decline narrowing to 15 percent by end-2030.<sup>3</sup> Reduced net borrowing from commercial banks—reductions are 3 and 1.2 percent of GDP in

<sup>1</sup> The assumption sidesteps the softening of capital-based thresholds on sovereign exposures by proxying risk-weighted exposures to the sovereign over tier 1 capital with unweighted exposures to the sovereign over total assets.

<sup>2</sup> Starting from 2027, additional treasury issuance partially closes funding gaps, with a gradual transition to fully meeting any financing needs through treasury issuance by 2031

<sup>3</sup> Synchronous lower oil prices and restricted bank lending capacity across all CEMAC member countries would likely intensify pressures on the region’s reserve pool absent commensurate and synchronized fiscal adjustment across the region.

2026 and 2027 respectively—reflects their restricted lending capacity. The lower growth in banks' sovereign exposures implies more moderate growth in bank assets and deposits over 2026–27.


**4. The authorities could mitigate the risks around potential funding gaps by additional fiscal tightening and access to donors' concessional funding sources.** Sustained fiscal consolidation remains the primarily recommended line of defense against the risks associated with funding gaps, considering the official development assistance (ODA) challenges and the scarcity of multilateral financing, particularly in the absence of a Fund-supported program. While measures supporting domestic revenue mobilization should be reinforced, for example, through promoting private sector-led growth, in particular in the non-hydrocarbon sector, the urgency of the potential for funding gaps calls for additional spending rationalization by reducing non-prioritized expenditures. Full market pricing of the gas used by CEC for electricity generation could reduce oil-related transfers and would help to preserve recent successes with the fuel subsidies reform.<sup>4</sup> The authorities would need to consider additional expenditure rationalization for the wage bill, the administrative consumption of goods and services, and non-social policy transfers, while safeguarding appropriate public employment in priority sectors. They could also seek funding from domestic and/or regional nonbank investors. This, however, requires the promotion of a sizeable regional non-bank investor base, which, given the currently limited size of the non-bank financial sector, is likely achievable only over the medium term.

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
<sup>4</sup> This would in turn require reforms enforcing full and regular billing of CEC clients for their electricity consumption.

**Figure 1. Republic of Congo: Potential Additional Financing Needs and their Macroeconomic Impact**


**Total Additional Financing Needs**  
(Percentage of GDP)




**Primary Fiscal Balance**  
(Percentage of GDP)



**Real GDP Growth**  
(Percent)



**Congolese Oil Price**  
(U.S. dollars per barrel)



Source: IMF staff estimates and calculations.



# REPUBLIC OF CONGO

## POST-FINANCING ASSESSMENT—DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

February 27, 2026

Republic of Congo: Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analysis	
<b>Risk of external debt distress</b>	<i>In Debt Distress</i>
<b>Overall risk of debt distress</b>	<i>In Debt Distress</i>
<b>Granularity in the risk rating</b>	<i>Sustainable</i>
<b>Application of judgement</b>	<i>No</i>

Approved By  
**Stéphane Roudet and  
Niamh Sheridan (IMF)  
and Manuela Francisco  
and Abebe Adugna  
(IDA)**

The Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) has been prepared jointly by IMF and International Development Association staff, in consultation with the authorities, using the debt sustainability framework for low-income countries approved by the Boards of both institutions.

*The overall and external debt<sup>1</sup> of the Republic of Congo are classified as “in distress”, reflecting the ongoing restructuring, audit, and accumulation of domestic arrears as a result of liquidity pressures, as well as the recurrent accumulation of temporary external arrears. Preliminary data suggest that as of end-February 2026, USD103.2 million (0.66 percent of GDP) new external arrears to official creditors were accumulated and additional USD149.6 million (0.96 percent of GDP) arrears to commercial creditors were recognized. This reinforces the in-debt distress rating for external and overall debt. Debt is assessed as “sustainable”, but with high risks surrounding this assessment (see below).*

*Progress to improve debt management (including the authorities’ resolve to prioritize concessional loans), adhere to fiscal discipline, and resolve and prevent arrears are needed to help all external liquidity and solvency indicators fall below their*

<sup>1</sup> Most of the external debt is defined on a currency basis, except for the creditors whose residency can be tracked, which are defined on a residency basis. An example is the Regional Development Bank, BDEAC.

thresholds by 2030 under the baseline scenario.<sup>2</sup> The 2024 domestic debt reprofiling and related maturity extensions partly postponed the amortization of government Treasury obligations amid persistent debt service pressures, including the domestic debt amortization peak in October 2025. The proceeds of new eurobonds issued in November and December 2025 are intended to fund exclusively an equivalent amount of debt service on domestic treasuries maturing from November 2025 to February 2026.<sup>3</sup> Nonetheless, these debt operations highlight Congo's continued liquidity constraints and pose challenges for debt management. Elevated liquidity pressures and debt vulnerabilities could, if unaddressed, evolve into medium-term financing pressures and intensify the risks to debt sustainability. Several factors will help reduce the high debt-to-GDP ratio and recurrence of arrears over the medium term, including softer but still robust oil prices in the near term (based on the October 2025 WEO assumptions) and resilient non-hydrocarbon growth supported by faster progress in the implementation of the authorities' reform agenda.

Nevertheless, there are major overall and external debt-related risks, as signaled by the PV of the public debt-to-GDP indicator exceeding its benchmark through 2036 as well as recurring accumulation of external arrears.<sup>4</sup> Both domestic debt solvency and liquidity indicators point to debt vulnerabilities in the medium term. Even though the PV of overall public debt-to-GDP ratio breaches its benchmark extensively, debt is assessed as sustainable given that the risks are mitigated by (i) steady and significant declines in the relevant ratios going forward; and (ii) authorities' commitment to increase government deposits at the Central Bank over the medium term. However, this assessment assumes continued steady fiscal consolidation. The significant fiscal slippages in 2025 therefore underscore the significant risks around this sustainability assessment.

There are several other risks to debt sustainability. The debt sustainability assessment is highly vulnerable to downside risks of oil price shocks, which have intensified lately. Conditions in regional markets (CEMAC banking systems) may tighten further for the reasons beyond Congo's control or if the government's financing needs exceed the current baseline projections, exacerbating recent funding challenges.

Going forward, the authorities should continue pursuing fiscal consolidation, underpinned by deep fiscal structural reforms, enact economic diversification policies to reduce risks and prepare for reduced long-term oil production and demand, clear domestic arrears, and continue enhancing debt management.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The composite index (CI), estimated at 2.5 and based on the January 2026 World Economic Outlook (WEO) update and 2024 World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) data, indicates a weak debt carrying capacity for Congo, below IDA average.

<sup>3</sup> This DSA does not incorporate the additional Eurobond issuance of USD 700 million announced in February 2026, as information on the amount of debt buybacks for the November Eurobond and the regional market debt was not available at the time of completion of this report.


<sup>4</sup> The PV of external debt-to-GDP breaches the threshold in 2025 in the baseline and not at all in the historical scenarios. The PV of debt service-to-exports breaches the threshold in 2028 in the baseline and 2026–32 in the historical scenarios. The PV of debt service-to-revenue breaches its relative threshold in 2026–29 in the baseline and in 2026–32 in the historical scenario.

<sup>5</sup> The increased vulnerabilities and potential elevated risk-weighting on domestic debt borrowing may hinder the country's capacity to secure financing from the market at reasonable borrowing costs.

## PUBLIC DEBT COVERAGE

**1. Public debt in this DSA is limited to central government debt, including the oil-backed debts, due to data gaps.** Local governments in Congo are not allowed to borrow but collect local taxes and receive transfers from the central government. The analysis includes debt from oil-backed pre-financing arrangements contracted with oil traders through the national oil company (SNPC). The non-publicly guaranteed debts of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), including SNPC, are incorporated in the DSA as contingent liabilities, due to data limitations.<sup>6</sup> Under the completed ECF, the authorities adopted a comprehensive debt management strategy and completed the 2024 reorganization of the debt management. Additional efforts are, however, needed to fully operationalize the revamped internal monitoring and reporting procedures, as well as the newly created inter-institutional coordination and fiscal risk assessment committees—intended to strengthen liquidity management and debt planning, and to support timely servicing of public debt. Congo’s social security system includes two entities: (i) a more autonomous Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale (CNSS) that collects contributions to pay retirees from both the private sector and public enterprises; and (ii) the Caisse de Retraite des Fonctionnaires (CRF) for public administration employees. Both are under the stewardship of the Ministry of Labor. The unpaid and verified social debt pertaining to the two pension funds are added to the stock of domestic debt. In 2023 for instance, CFAF 269 billion (3 percent of GDP) of unpaid debt from the CNSS has been recognized and repaid by the government through securitization, on top of the CFAF 360 billion (4.1 percent of GDP) of social arrears that materialized earlier in the same year.

**2. Domestic debt is identified primarily on a currency basis, rather than a residency basis.** This is because large amounts of Congo’s debt are subscribed by banks within the regional CEMAC market (i.e., within the currency union), where the BEAC is not yet able to accurately monitor the holder of these instruments within CEMAC. Treasury debt is defined on a residency basis for creditors whose residency can be tracked. About half of the 2025 treasury auctions excluding buybacks were subscribed by non-resident banks. However, inferring the actual holdings of Congolese debt by the non-resident banks is challenging due to lacking data on post-subscription treasury bond trades.



**3. Contingent liabilities are elevated and pose a risk.** The contingent liability (CL) stress test of 22.3 percent of GDP is customized to account for possible missing general government debt due to legally disputed claims of domestic arrears (about 0.8 percent of GDP), revised arrears under audit not included in

<sup>6</sup> There are 31 SOEs in Congo, with government ownership ranging from 50 to 100 percent.

the forecast assumptions (2.5 percent of GDP) and litigated external debt (2.05 percent of GDP,<sup>7</sup> Text Table 1). Non-guaranteed debt of the 10 largest SOEs is estimated at 31 percent of GDP,<sup>8,9</sup> and under the stress test, it is assumed that one third of this amount could end up on the central government balance sheet (10 percent of GDP), while the rest could be paid through the liquidation of SOEs' assets. The latter assumption is calibrated based on the SOEs' liabilities and potential asset liquidation values because large SOEs such as the commercially run SNPC operate in profitable sectors, consistent with what was done under the completed ECF arrangement. In addition, Congo's total PPP capital stock is estimated at 5.7 percent of GDP, with 35 percent of this stock assumed to end up on the government balance sheet under the stress test (2 percent of GDP). To account for a financial sector crisis, the default value of 5 percent is applied to the government balance sheet given the limited size of the banking system. In total, the calibration of the CL stress adds up to 22.3 percent of GDP.

**Text Table 1. Republic of Congo: Coverage of Public-Sector Debt and Design Stress Tests of Contingent Liability<sup>1,2</sup>**

Subsectors of the public sector	Check box
1 Central government	X
2 State and local government	
3 Other elements in the general government	
4 o/w: Social security fund	X
5 o/w: Extra budgetary funds (EBFs)	
6 Guarantees (to other entities in the public and private sector, including to SOEs)	X
7 Central bank (borrowed on behalf of the government)	X
8 Non-guaranteed SOE debt	

1 The country's coverage of public debt	The central government plus social security, central bank, government-guaranteed debt		
	Default	Used for the analysis	Reasons for deviations from the default settings
2 Other elements of the general government not captured in 1. of which: litigated external debt	0 percent of GDP	5.35	Litigated debt, contested domestic debt under audit, rejected domestic arrears
of which: contested domestic claim under audit		2.05	
of which: rejected domestic arrears		2.5	
of which: domestic arrears to residents swapped for forex debt		0.8	
of which: domestic arrears to residents swapped for forex debt		0	
3 SoE's debt (guaranteed and not guaranteed by the government) 1/	2 percent of GDP	10	SOE's debt not guaranteed by the government
4 PPP	35 percent of PPP stock	2.00	
5 Financial market (the default value of 5 percent of GDP is the minimum value)	5 percent of GDP	5	
<b>Total (2+3+4+5) (in percent of GDP)</b>		<b>22.3</b>	

<sup>1</sup>The contingent liability (CL) shocks include a CL shock applied only to external debt to consider the impact of a situation where foreign currency debt service to foreign-owned resident companies are repatriated to the parent companies abroad.

<sup>2</sup>The default shock of 2 percent of GDP will be triggered for countries whose government-guaranteed debt is not fully captured under the country's public debt definition (1.). If it is already included in the government debt (1.) and risks associated with SoEs' debt not guaranteed by the government is assessed to be negligible, a country team may reduce this to 0 percent.

<sup>7</sup> The authorities continue to dispute this external claim to a foreign construction company. Disputed claims are not included in the baseline, as they are included when calibrating the contingent liability stress test.

<sup>8</sup> The DSA contingent liability stress test only considers the debt of the 10 largest (based on balance sheet size) SOEs due to lack of financial information on other SOEs. The authorities published the first quarterly bulletin on public debt in March 2024, reporting details on the 10 largest SOEs' debt. However, additional efforts, including the establishing of a single electronic repository for SOEs debt information managed by the *Caisse Congolaise d'Amortissement*, are needed to improve the timeliness, coverage, and accuracy of the SOEs data and bolster the assessment of contingent liabilities.

<sup>9</sup> In line with continued improvements in compilation of statistics, supported by technical assistance from the IMF and other development partners, historical GDP and BOP statistics have been revised (see SR for the Second ECF Review).

## BACKGROUND

### A. Evolution and Composition of Public Debt

#### 4. Public debt is estimated to have reached 97.3 percent in 2025 and expected to remain high.

Despite falling by 5.7 percentage points from its end-2023 peak of 102.9 percent of GDP (Table 3), Congo's total public debt remained elevated in 2025, reflecting significant domestic government borrowing, the accumulation of domestic arrears, and materialization of contingent liabilities. Domestic debt is projected to have reached an estimated 58.8 percent of GDP in 2025—8.3 percentage points higher than at the start of the 2022 ECF arrangement completed in early 2025. Despite the authorities' efforts to curb external borrowing under the completed ECF arrangement, external debt stood at an estimated 38.5 percent of GDP at end-2025—1 pp higher than in 2024—amid recurring external arrears and issuance of new eurobonds. Total public debt is projected to reach 94.8 percent of GDP in 2026, of which domestic debt would account for 58.6 percent of GDP, and remain high in the outer years.

- External debt decreased from 39.4 percent of GDP at end-2023 to 37.5 percent of GDP by end-2024. Limits on new external financing in the debt-related conditionality under the 2022 ECF arrangement contributed to the reduction of external public debt in 2024. Subsequently, Congo issued in November and reopened in December 2025, USD 930 million (6 percent of GDP) in new eurobonds amid significant domestic debt service pressures. The November and December issuances featured the same coupon rate of 9.875 percent and maturity of 7 years, including a 2-year grace period, implying that the principal for both tranches will be repaid in five equal installments between November 7, 2028, and November 7, 2032. While the eurobond's yield improved from 13.7 percent in November 2025 to 13 percent in December 2025, both issuances were conducted at distressed terms.<sup>10</sup> The operation's proceeds of USD 812.4 million (CFAF 472.3 billion; 5.2 percent of GDP) are intended to be used exclusively for amortizing an equivalent amount of domestic treasury debt due between November 2025 and February 2026. Nominal external debt projected for 2025 onwards remains higher than in the previous DSA, as a result. Subsequently, in February 2026, the authorities announced an additional Eurobond issuance of USD 700 million (maturing in 2035 with a yield of 11.625 percent), the proceeds of which are intended to partially buy back the November bond and redeem maturing regional market debt. As information on the amount of debt redeemed was not available at the time of finalization of this report, the transaction is not included in the DSA.
- As of December 2024, a large share of external debt was owed to China (including commercial creditors, 11.1 percent of GDP, see Tables 1a and 1b). The debt owed to oil traders fell significantly from 3.9 percent of GDP in 2023 to 1.6 percent of GDP at end 2024 and

<sup>10</sup> In February 2026, the authorities issued additional USD 700 million in eurobonds which are intended to partially buy back the bonds issued in November 2025 and redeem maturing regional market debt.

0.9 percent of GDP in September 2025. This debt is expected to be fully repaid by the end of 2027.

- Domestic public debt decreased from 63.5 percent of GDP in 2023 to an estimated 60.6 percent of GDP in 2024 and 58.8 percent of GDP projected in 2025. This reflects a decline in net emissions, partially also supported by repayment of domestic treasuries with the proceeds of the new eurobonds, and gradual clearance of domestic arrears (¶15). About half of the domestic debt consists of debt owed to banks and non-bank institutions, one fifth relates to commercial arrears, one-tenth represents social arrears<sup>11</sup>, and the remainder comprises statutory advances from BEAC (the regional central bank) and the use of SDRs.
- By the end of 2024, total arrears amounted to USD 3.38 billion (23.6 percent of GDP, virtually unchanged relative to end-2023 level), including USD 568 million of external arrears (4 percent of GDP, higher than the 3.5 percent of GDP at end-2023) and USD 2.81 billion of audited domestic arrears (19.7 percent of GDP, lower than the 20.2 percent of GDP at the end of 2023). Preliminary data suggests that between April 2025 and February 2026, Congo has accumulated about USD 103.2 million in temporary official external arrears and has recognized USD 149.6 million in commercial arrears.

**5. The authorities reached agreements to resolve external (official bilateral and commercial creditors) and domestic arrears, but temporary external arrears and new domestic arrears continue to surface due to weaknesses in debt management and liquidity pressures.** The DSA incorporates the resolution agreement concluded back in 2021 regarding legacy arrears owed to Exim Bank India, and agreements in principle with Brazil and Russia.<sup>12</sup> As in previous DSAs, the debt sustainability analysis also incorporates the impact of three restructuring agreements concluded with external private commercial creditors (oil traders). The restructuring agreement with the smallest of these three creditors was signed in 2020Q3 and included a substantial nominal haircut on the stock of outstanding debt, a maturity extension, and resolution of USD 61 million in external arrears. This debt was fully repaid by early-2022. The restructuring agreement with the largest creditor was signed in 2021Q1 and that with the next largest creditor was signed in 2022Q1—both agreements include debt service formulated as a function of oil prices, a nominal haircut, a maturity extension, and an interest rate reduction. In December 2024, the debt to one oil trader was repaid by refinancing through two other oil traders, with one of them already having been repaid in full as of September 2025. As a result, all related debts are expected to be fully repaid by 2027. However, the recent recognition of arrears to two companies—originating from foreign-currency denominated debt that had been awaiting restructuring—adds complexity to Congo’s external debt management. One missed payment includes both amortization and interest, while the other relates solely to interest, with amortization scheduled to begin in March 2026.

<sup>11</sup> This mostly relates to the inclusion of previously unpaid pensions and social arrears owed by the central government in the debt stock.

<sup>12</sup> Legacy arrears to Russia and Brazil were resolved through mutual agreements in principle on how to handle repayment.

- The accumulation of domestic arrears and missed external debt services stems from liquidity pressures, capacity constraints, cash-flow management gaps, and prioritization challenges. Full operationalization of the Treasury Single Account—which has been formally established but faces ongoing technical challenges—will help once completed, but further rationalization of revenue earmarking through escrow accounts is needed. Subsequent to the authorities' 2024 roll-out of program budgeting across ministries, the full operationalization of the SIGFIP financial management system will provide additional momentum once remaining issues are resolved with assistance from the IMF, World Bank, and France. Ongoing reforms in public investment management are essential to boost growth impacts and complement previous initiatives like the 2022 public-private partnership law.
- On the external front, ongoing technical and coordination challenges, along with liquidity pressures, have caused temporary external arrears. This highlights the urgency for Congo's debt management office—Caisse Congolaise d'Amortissement (CCA)—to follow the rules revamped in its 2024 reorganization and ensure timely debt service through clear amortization and issuance plans. Increased debt transparency is crucial, requiring the completion of audits on social and domestic arrears, better coordination among CCA, Treasury, and BEAC, full operationalization of the single debt database, and close monitoring of SOE-related contingent liabilities.

**6. External debt service payments are projected at USD 528 million in 2025, including USD 83 million in interest payments (Table 1b).** The largest amortization payments are scheduled to be made to bilateral creditors and commercial creditors, amounting to USD 270.8 million and USD 17.8 million, respectively. Additionally, in 2025, an amortization of USD 56.6 million is due to multilateral creditors. This calls for the urgent acceleration of ongoing reforms to strengthen the debt management framework.

- There have been efforts to clear all pre-HIPC bilateral arrears to several countries, with some fully cleared by now. The authorities continue efforts to resolve the remainder of these arrears, with the largest owed to Angola in the amount of USD 111.5 million (Text Table 3).
- The authorities cleared legacy external arrears of USD 4 million with all except one commercial supplier in 2022 and are engaged in good faith discussions with the last remaining commercial supplier to resolve external arrears (FCFA 8.9 billion equal to USD 14.6 million).
- The authorities contested USD 276.5 million of pre-HIPC arrears owed to a supplier as part of a broader litigation case and requested HIPC treatment for another USD 96.4 million of pre-HIPC arrears, which are included at face value in the DSA.
- Domestic debt service payments reached CFAF 1,643 billion in 2024 (18.3 percent of GDP) and are expected to peak at CFAF 2,517 billion in 2025—27.8 percent of GDP; including CFAF 276 billion in interest payments, CFAF 2,086 billion in principal payments, and CFAF 155 billion in repayments of domestic arrears. The stock of domestic arrears—including payment arrears to suppliers—is expected to remain elevated at CFAF 1,690 billion

(18.6 percent of GDP) at end-2025, reflecting high liquidity pressures that likely contribute to the accumulation of new arrears and delay in the implementation of the domestic arrear clearance plan. Hence, prudent fiscal management, strict adherence to the multi-year arrear clearance plan, continued debt reduction efforts, and enhanced PFM practices are needed to repay existing domestic arrears and prevent the accumulation of new ones. The World Bank FY26 PPAs support these efforts by prioritizing new concessional external debt with a non-concessional borrowing limit PPA, restructuring and empowering the national debt committee, establishing a comprehensive fiscal risk framework with dedicated risk committees and annual disclosure, and expanding annual debt reporting to cover all recorded state-owned enterprises. To improve debt sustainability, World Bank FY26 PPAs also indicate that the government will not enter into any contractual obligations for new external public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) non-concessional debt in FY26 beyond any non-concessional budget support loans that receive waivers under the IMF program, except if the non-concessional debt limit is adjusted by the World Bank to i) reflect any material change of circumstances or ii) in coordination with the IMF, in particular in line with adjustments in the IMF Debt Limit Policy.

### Text Table 2a. Republic of Congo: Summary Table of Projected External Borrowing Program

January 1, 2025– December 31, 2025 (Projected)

PPG external debt	Volume of new debt, Jan 1, 2025 to December 31, 2025 (projected)		
	USD million	CFAF Billion	Percent
<b>By sources of debt financing</b>	<b>1053.6</b>	<b>612.5</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Concessional debt, of which</b>	<b>241.2</b>	<b>140.2</b>	<b>23</b>
Multilateral debt	169.8	98.7	16
Bilateral debt	71.4	41.5	7
Other	0.0	0.0	0
<b>Non-concessional debt, of which</b>	<b>812.4</b>	<b>472.3</b>	<b>77</b>
Semi-concessional <sup>1</sup>	0.0	0.0	0
Commercial terms	812.4	472.3	77
<b>By Creditor Type</b>	<b>1053.6</b>	<b>612.5</b>	<b>100</b>
Multilateral	169.8	98.7	16
Bilateral - Paris Club	0.0	0.0	0
Bilateral - Non-Paris Club	71.4	41.5	7
Other	812.4	472.3	77
<b>Uses of debt financing</b>	<b>1053.6</b>	<b>612.5</b>	<b>100</b>
Infrastructure	197.7	115.0	19
Social Spending	0.0	0.0	0
Budget Financing	43.5	25.2	4
Other	812.4	472.3	77

<sup>1</sup> Semi-concessional loans are loans with positive grant elements but that are below the minimum threshold of 35 percent grant element used in Fund/WB/OECD definition.

**Text Table 2b. Republic of Congo: Type of New External Debt**  
(Millions of USD)  
January 1, 2025–December 31, 2025 (Projected)

	USD Million	CFAF Billion
<b>By the type of interest rate</b>		
Fixed Interest Rate	1053.6	612.5
Variable Interest Rate	0.0	0.0
Unconventional Loans	0.0	0.0
<b>By currency</b>		
USD denominated loans	875.1	532.3
Loans denominated in other currency	178.5	80.2

Note: All loans are on contracting basis.

**7. Congo continues to use escrow accounts for the service of external public debt to its largest bilateral creditor.** In 2025, the escrow account used to serve this debt is expected to have been funded with CFAF 141 billion (1.6 percent of GDP). It is critical that any accumulation of excess balances in the escrow account, which guarantees the payment of three future semi-annual debt service installments, be repatriated to alleviate ongoing funding stress.<sup>13</sup>

**8. Despite issuing a new eurobond in November and December 2025 and reprofiling part of its domestic debt at end-2024, Congo's high debt service pressures and liquidity tensions persist.** Faced with significant domestic debt service pressures, the authorities reprofiled CFAF 1,136 billion (12.7 percent of GDP; including CFAF 191 billion in Treasury bills and CFAF 945 billion in Treasury bonds) in government treasuries and issued CFAF 250 billion in new short-term treasuries at end-2024.<sup>14</sup> With the end-2025 eurobonds' proceeds expected to be used entirely to repay domestic treasuries maturing until February 2026 (14), the projected increase in external debt stock would be partly offset by the reduction in domestic debt.<sup>15</sup> Nonetheless, the impact was limited as gross issuance of new securities on the regional market remained elevated in 2025Q4.

**9. Addressing public debt management and reporting challenges remains a key priority.** Ongoing efforts to improve debt management should be complemented with faster and broader progress to enhance prioritization, internal communication, and coordination to avoid missed debt service payments and ensure timely clearance arrears. The authorities are committed to resolving these issues and related cash-flow management challenges by accelerating debt management and public financial management (PFM) reforms with support from ongoing IMF and World Bank technical assistance. These efforts include

<sup>13</sup> Excess balances are not required by contractual obligations.

<sup>14</sup> For the first phase of the PNOT, the authorities announced CFAF 1,236 billion worth of treasuries to be exchanged, of which CFAF 1136 billion were executed. The reprofiling operation extended the average maturity of exchanged treasuries from 2.4 years to 6.3 years.

<sup>15</sup> The term sheet of the eurobond indicates that the proceeds will be fully used to retire domestic treasuries maturing between November 2025 and February 2026.

the operationalization of the medium-term debt management strategy—geared towards the prioritization of concessional borrowing, reduction of public debt, and proactive management of potential exchange rate risks, the implementation of credible amortization and emission plans, the prioritization of timely debt service and arrears clearance, and the full operationalization of the Treasury Single Account which has been formally established under an agreement between Congo and BEAC but remains subject to technical delays. Limited capacity, delays in information sharing, weak communication and data sharing arrangements between relevant entities that collect debt information, and the continued audit of arrears complicate domestic debt reporting and management. Institutional weaknesses continuing to negatively affect the effectiveness of the CCA even after its recent reorganization should be resolved without any further delays.

Text Table 3. Republic of Congo: External Arrears Situation

	December 2022 stock			December 2023 stock			December 2024 stock			September 2025 stock			September 2025 (Excl. unstructured pre-HIPC arrears)		
	CFAF billion	USD million	percent of GDP	CFAF billion	USD million	percent of GDP	CFAF billion	USD million	percent of GDP	CFAF billion	USD million	percent of GDP	CFAF billion	USD million	percent of GDP
<b>Total</b>	<b>312.4</b>	<b>504.3</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>297.8</b>	<b>495.1</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>355.3</b>	<b>567.6</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>449.5</b>	<b>773.2</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>167.9</b>	<b>288.8</b>	<b>1.9</b>
Multilateral and other creditors	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.5	12.0	0.1	9.7	16.6	0.1	9.7	16.6	0.1
Bilateral	86.7	140.0	1.0	72.2	120.0	0.8	110.4	176.4	1.2	127.2	218.8	1.4	62.4	107.3	0.7
Paris Club	11.9	19.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	23.2	37.1	0.3	10.4	17.9	0.1	10.4	17.9	0.1
Brazil	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	4.2	0.0	4.1	7.1	0.0	4.1	7.1	0.0
Belgium	5.7	9.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.8	15.7	0.1	6.2	10.7	0.1	6.2	10.7	0.1
France	6.2	10.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.8	17.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0
Switzerland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Russia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Non-Paris Club	74.9	120.9	0.9	72.2	120.0	0.8	87.2	139.3	1.0	116.8	200.9	1.3	52.0	89.4	0.6
United Arab Emirates	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Libya	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	2.3	0.0	2.8	4.4	0.0	1.3	2.2	0.0	1.3	2.2	0.0
Angola	69.8	112.6	0.8	69.0	114.8	0.8	73.2	116.9	0.8	64.8	111.5	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
China	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	39.6	68.1	0.4	39.6	68.1	0.4
Strategic Partnership		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0
Preferential		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0
other		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0
India Exim Bank	1.9	3.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3	3.6	0.0	4.9	8.5	0.1	4.9	8.5	0.1
Kuwait	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Saudi Arabia	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Turkey	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.3	8.5	0.1	3.1	5.3	0.0	3.1	5.3	0.0
Postal debt	3.1	5.1	0.0	3.1	5.2	0.0	3.1	5.0	0.0	3.1	5.4	0.0	3.1	5.4	0.0
Private Creditors	225.7	364.3	2.6	225.7	375.1	2.6	237.3	379.1	2.6	312.6	537.8	3.4	95.8	164.8	1.1
CMEC and Chinese companies	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	87.0	149.6	1.0	87.0	149.6	1.0
Eurobond	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.7	18.7	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Afreximbank	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Oil traders	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Suppliers	225.7	364.3	2.6	225.7	375.1	2.6	225.7	360.5	2.5	225.7	388.2	2.5	8.9	15.2	0.1

Source: Congolese authorities and IMF staff estimates.

## B. Macroeconomic Outlook

### 10. Box 1 summarizes the main assumptions for key macroeconomic variables in the scenario underpinning the DSA:

- Real GDP growth reached 2.1 percent in 2024, as the growth momentum in the non-hydrocarbon sector softened (2.5 percent) and activity in the oil sector decelerated (0.8 percent). In 2025, Congo's economy grew at an estimated 2.4 percent—1.3 percentage point short of initial projections, as under-executed public investment and energy supply disruptions continued to weigh on activity in the non-hydrocarbon sector. Growth is expected to pick up to 2.8 percent in 2026. Over the medium term, Congo's economy is projected to

grow on average at 3.6 percent in 2027–30, as the business environment improves and economic diversification takes hold. This trajectory masks divergent growth dynamics between the hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon sectors. Growth in the hydrocarbon sector is expected to reach an average of 1.8 percent in 2025–26, before losing some momentum, as oil production from maturing fields starts declining from 2027 onwards amid softer oil prices. In the non-hydrocarbon sector, however, economic growth is projected to average 2.7 percent over 2025–26 followed by an average of 4.3 percent over 2027–30. The outlook is supported by prudent debt and liquidity management, public spending in priority sectors including infrastructure and education, growth friendly reforms, financing from development partners, and efforts to accelerate diversification. Inflation moderated to 3.1 percent in 2024—almost in line with the CEMAC inflation target, before edging up in early 2025, driven by excise-tax hikes, and higher prices for energy-sensitive goods.

- Spending-side fiscal tightening has narrowed the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit to 6.7 percent of non-hydrocarbon GDP in 2024, 2.3 percentage points (pp) more than initially targeted during the sixth review of the completed 2022 ECF arrangement. The projected non-hydrocarbon primary deficit widened in 2025 to 8.7 percent of non-hydrocarbon GDP, reflecting fiscal slippages from higher recurrent spending (Box 1), together with significant under-execution of capital expenditures and accumulation of payment floats that eroded budget discipline. In 2026, the deficit is expected to narrow to 7.9 percent, supported by gradual expenditure reprioritization and strengthened revenue mobilization. Over the medium term (2027–31), consolidation is expected to continue, with the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit declining cumulatively by 6.3 pp until end-2031.
- Gross financing needs (GFN), predominantly funded through issuances of treasury and bond securities in the regional markets, declined marginally from about 16.4 percent of GDP in 2023 to 16.0 percent in 2024. In 2025 they jumped to an estimated 27.2 percent of GDP, driven by substantial domestic debt service obligations on maturing government treasuries (¶6). Subsequently GFN are projected to start sliding to 9.2 percent of GDP by 2035, as total amortization declines.<sup>16</sup>
- The budgetary support from Congo’s development partners excluding IMF (African Development Bank, France, and World Bank) reached in 2025 an estimated USD 81 million (Text Table 4), down from USD 99 million in 2024.
- The DSA assumes that Congo continues to obtain the bulk of new external financing on concessional terms, including concessional Shorter-Maturity Loans (PBA-SMLs) from many

<sup>16</sup> The higher-than-expected gross financing need of 2025 is attributed to short-term public domestic debt stemming from the PNOT.

IDA windows, complemented with a new blend credit financing in 2026; the grant element remains around 33 percent over 2029–44.<sup>17</sup>

- The impacts of the *Programme National d'Optimisation de la Trésorerie* (PNOT) on banks' demand for medium-term government securities is accounted in the medium-term domestic financing mix, which is tilted towards short-term treasury bills (less than 1-year maturity) and long-term (more than a 3-year term) treasury bonds, in line with the IMF [CR 25/75](#). The DSA assumes the following for the domestic financing profile: 50 percent of Congo's projected domestic financing in 2024–2029 is short-term (less than 1-year term), 10 percent is up to a term of 3 years and the remaining 40 percent have a term of more than 4 years, reflecting the expected reduction in demand of medium term treasury bonds after the PNOT and prioritization of long dated treasury issuance. As debt is reduced and financial conditions improve, the debt profile gradually shifts towards longer maturities, converging to a composition where more than 90 percent of Congo's domestic financing is medium- or long-term, of which more than 60 percent is long-term (more than a 3-year term).
- Over the medium term, the DSA assumes that short-term financing (up to a term of 1 year) is obtained at the average interest rate of 6.5 percent, and medium- and long-term financing are obtained at the average interest rate of 9.0 percent. It also assumes that the average interest rates for medium term financing (terms up to 3 years) converge over time to 6.5 percent, reaching that level in 2030.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, all domestic financing is denominated in local currency.

**Text Table 4. Republic of Congo: Projected Loan Disbursements**  
(USD Million)

	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032
<b>Total External Bilateral and Multilateral</b>	<b>321</b>	<b>333</b>	<b>321</b>	<b>394</b>	<b>401</b>	<b>422</b>	<b>454</b>	<b>479</b>
<b>Project Financing</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>333</b>	<b>321</b>	<b>394</b>	<b>401</b>	<b>422</b>	<b>454</b>	<b>479</b>
Of which:								
Multilateral and other creditors	126	252	240	295	303	324	349	372
IMF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IDA	62	154	126	136	146	146	150	154
IBRD	41	93	107	126	145	164	183	202
AfDB	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others	23	5	7	33	11	14	16	16
Official bilateral	72	81	81	98	98	98	105	107
Paris Club	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Non-Paris Club	71	81	81	98	98	98	105	107
of which: China	68	81	81	98	98	98	105	107
<b>General Budget Financing</b>	<b>124</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
IMF	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Development Partners	81	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Sources: IMF and WB staff calculations and projections.

<sup>17</sup> China has historically provided the bulk of Congo's external financing on fairly concessional terms. The increased grant element after the end of planned budget support disbursements from multilateral partners reflects an assumption that China would remain the main creditor in the long term.

<sup>18</sup> The same interest rate profile is assumed for longer-dated domestic government debt instruments maturing between 3 and 7 years based on 2025H1 domestic debt issuance data. Moreover, the issuance of long maturity (4–7 years) debt is limited, with little interest rate variation due to the thin market.

### Box 1. Main Macroeconomic Assumptions<sup>1</sup>

**Economic momentum is projected to firm up in the medium and long term, albeit at a slower pace than expected, driven by stronger activity in the non-hydrocarbon sector.**

- **Real GDP growth** settled at 2.1 percent in 2024 and at an estimated 2.4 percent in 2025—1.3 pp lower than projected at the 6<sup>th</sup> ECF review—before edging up to 2.8 percent in 2026. Growth anticipated for the medium term has softened to an average 3.6 percent over 2027–30. Growth drivers continue to include the repayment of domestic arrears, a reliable energy supply, prioritized investment in infrastructure, healthcare, and education, the implementation of structural reforms to expand fiscal space, enhance the business environment, and accelerate economic diversification.
- **Non-hydrocarbon growth** has decelerated on the back of weak public investment and energy supply disruptions, settling at 2.1 percent in 2025—1.6 pp below 6<sup>th</sup> ECF review projections. Stronger activity in mining, manufacturing, and telecommunications is projected to lift growth to 3.4 percent in 2026. Subsequently, activity in the non-hydrocarbon sector is expected to firm up to an average 4.3 percent over 2027–30.
- **Hydrocarbon growth** slowed in 2025 to an estimated 3.3 percent—0.3 pp short of initial expectations—before decelerating to 0.3 percent in 2026. The further outlook is shaped by a modest and fleeting recovery of the oil sector, and a nascent gas industry featuring delays in the expected take-off, with medium term hydrocarbon activity projected to contract by an average 0.4 percent in 2027–30. Linger technical issues, such as transportation and electricity supply disruptions, moderate **oil sector** activity in the medium term, while aging oil fields and lower oil prices weigh on longer term expectations. After modest production in 2024 and 2025, the **gas industry** is expected to expand over the medium to long term. The new gas code requires hydrocarbon extractors to use associated gas more efficiently and provides incentives to establish an integrated gas value chain utilizing associated and non-associated gas resources in the domestic market and for export. While prices are projected to decline in the longer term, investment and external demand will spur up output, as developed economies look to diversify their gas import sources.

In the long-term Congo's economic activity will primarily be driven by the **non-hydrocarbon sector**. Economic diversification forms the main driver for this sector and is expected to be propelled by:

- **New sector development:** Helped by stronger institutions, diversification is expected to continue to drive growth in the long run, as new sectors (including mining and exports of manufactured goods and services) continue to grow. Agribusiness, mining, manufacturing (cement and processed wood products), and services (telecommunications, tourism, banking, and transport) gain further weight in the economy supported by development partners' funding, government support, and training.
- **Business friendly reforms:** Several recent legal standards, including the 2022 Public-Private Partnership (PPP) law, the 2024 competition policy laws, the 2022 anti-corruption law and the 2025 inspections law, as well as their effective and stringent use, are expected to improve business conditions.<sup>2</sup> These improvements are projected to facilitate investment into growth-oriented infrastructure, including access to affordable broadband, transportation, irrigation, water, and sanitation. They will also facilitate private sector engagement thereby promoting market efficiency, a more inviting business climate, and economic diversification. However, the authorities have put on hold the reform granting a concession for electricity distribution to a private operator, as they have requested additional time for implementation in response to union demands.
- **Targeted fiscal spending:** growing fiscal space—underpinned by the authorities' commitment to a revenue-led fiscal consolidation, prioritization of productive capital and social expenditures, proactive liquidity management, planned lengthening of the domestic debt maturity, and reduction in

### Box 1. Main Macroeconomic Assumptions (continued)

government domestic debt—will facilitate the development of public infrastructure, education, and health, and support productivity and growth in the non-hydrocarbon sector.

**The outlook is subject to significant downside risks, including:** (i) intensifying regional conflicts, persistent technical issues in oil production and weaker oil prices, which could harm growth as well as fiscal and external balances; (ii) the recurrent buildup of domestic arrears and delays in the 2023 multi-year domestic arrear clearance plan, undermining debt reduction efforts; (iii) lingering liquidity management issues and funding pressures, especially if compounded by reduced absorption capacity or appetite for government debt within the regional banking system, thereby implying further delays in public investment and social spending execution and exacerbating fiscal challenges; (iv) slow progress in fiscal and debt management reforms; (v) social pressure in the wake of upcoming elections and (vi) recurring climate events and delayed adaptation strategies, weakening economic resilience and fiscal stability.

**Inflation:** Inflation eased to 3.1 percent in December 2024, before picking up again in early 2025, driven by higher energy costs and excise-tax increases. Projections suggest that inflation will return to CEMAC inflation target of 3 percent at end 2027.

**Current account balance:** The current account deficit is estimated at 3 percent of GDP in 2024. The current account persisted in deficit in 2024, as hydrocarbon sector growth remained subdued at 0.8 percent, with oil production declining by 1 percent to 95 million of barrels and natural gas output falling short of expectations amid lingering technical issues. The current account deficit is estimated to have worsened to 5.8 percent of GDP in 2025, as oil prices declined and oil production saw moderate growth. Over 2026–45 the deficit is projected to an average of 5.1 percent of GDP, reflecting: i) a long-term decline in oil production, only partly offset by LNG exports, and ii) growing imports that reflect an investment-driven diversification and are only partly offset by higher non-oil exports. While diversification efforts are expected to gradually boost non-hydrocarbon exports, they are unlikely to outweigh the downward forces on the current account by 2045. However, diversification benefits could materialize earlier through faster job creation, higher household incomes, and private consumption, thereby supporting domestic absorption and GDP growth and generating upside risk.

#### **Fiscal policy aims to reduce debt and support growth.**

- The non-hydrocarbon primary deficit printed at 6.7 percent of non-hydrocarbon GDP in 2024, reflecting under-executed investment and social spending as hydrocarbon revenues fell short of expectations and liquidity tensions continued. In 2025, it has widened to projected 8.7 percent, driven by significant fiscal slippages—particularly higher recurrent spending on security and election-related outlays—that outweighed the 2024 fiscal adjustment.
- Fiscal adjustment is expected to resume over the medium, with the non-hydrocarbon primary deficit narrowing to 7.9 percent of non-hydrocarbon GDP in 2026 and cumulatively by 6.3 pp to 2.3 percent in 2031. The adjustment is anchored in reforms designed to bolster revenue mobilization and expenditure efficiency. Key measures include further strengthening of tax and customs administration, adjustments to excise tax base and rates, and continued reprioritization of expenditure toward high-return capital investment and social sectors. Full implementation of ongoing reforms—the introduction of VAT on upstream hydrocarbons, elimination of CIT exemptions granted under establishment conventions, and modernization and digitalization of tax and customs administrations—will unlock additional revenue, complemented by rationalized tax incentives, reinforced audit capacity, and improved monitoring. Expenditure discipline should be further reinforced through SOE reforms to reduce transfers and contingent liabilities, alongside a continued gradual phase-out of fuel subsidies and well-targeted social protection for vulnerable households.

### Box 1. Main Macroeconomic Assumptions (concluded)

- A revenue-based fiscal adjustment, supported by disciplined expenditure management, is essential to strengthen medium-term debt sustainability, mitigate liquidity risks, free up fiscal space for increased targeted social transfers and public investment, and support the government's economic diversification strategy that aims for stronger and more inclusive growth.
- **Domestic arrears payments:** Arrears repayments continued with a reimbursement of CFAF 88 billion (1 percent of GDP) in 2024 and CFAF 155 billion (1.7 percent of GDP) estimated in 2025, in line with Congo's debt reduction efforts. The authorities' medium-term fiscal strategy prioritizes domestic arrears repayments—critical for alleviating economic and policy uncertainty—while safeguarding social and domestically-financed capital spending in line with commitments to enhance debt sustainability. Domestic arrears repayments could be delayed if revenues fall short of expectations. The gradual clearance of domestic arrears should free up more liquidity to the private sector and banks, stimulating private investment and growth in particular in the non-hydrocarbon sector. It is also helping alleviate macro-financial risks by reducing liquidity pressures and NPLs.

<sup>1</sup> The main macroeconomic assumptions discussed here are based on the PFA staff report's macro-framework.

<sup>2</sup> This law, which was adopted by parliament in 2025 and subsequently promulgated by the President of the Republic, limits arbitrary inspections and reduce transaction costs for businesses.

**11. Realism tools flag risks around the forecast, but there are mitigating factors.** The fiscal adjustment-growth realism tool suggests that the projected overall real GDP growth path could be lower, but staff assesses the projected growth and the fiscal paths to be realistic. This is because overall real GDP growth is composed of two separate parts: hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon growth, where the impact of the more volatile hydrocarbon growth on overall real GDP dominates given the country's oil dependence. Notably, only non-hydrocarbon growth is impacted by fiscal adjustment policies, and the path of non-hydrocarbon growth is consistent with the realism tool. Concurrently, hydrocarbon growth is driven by oil production, which is independent of fiscal adjustment policies. Risks from negative oil price shocks are mitigated, as repayments to the largest external commercial creditors—those linked to oil prices—are largely completed and expected to be finalized by end-2027. Plans to gradually increase government deposits at BEAC provide an additional buffer, helping to mitigate financial risks. The DSA also incorporates interest rates for domestic financing consistent with the historical trends and current market conditions. Further international capital markets have already been tapped as a source of financing, with additional access possible in long term, once structural and governance reforms are successfully implemented. Over the medium and long term, economic diversification efforts are supporting economic activity. The new developments in the gas sector and improvements in the business climate underscore a permanent improvement in private investment projections. Improvements in the primary surplus (owing to oil revenues in the near- and medium-terms and sustained consolidation efforts) are the main drivers in reducing total public debt, with real GDP growth also contributing marginally (Figure 3). The primary balance realism tool suggests a realistic 3-year adjustment of 3.96 percent of GDP, larger than the 2.64 adjustment suggested in the previous DSA (IMF [CR 25/75](#)). The realism tools

also show a history of large unexplained increases for external debt due to revisions to debt stock and debt service statistics.

	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029-2032	2033-2042
<b>New Loan Disbursements (billions FCFA)</b>						
Current DSA	684.6	188.7	182.4	223.9	244.8	262.8
ECF 6th Review	209.0	171.6	132.0	135.8	141.3	185.0
<b>Grant Element of New External Borrowing (in percentage points)</b>						
Current DSA	4.4	29.7	27.6	27.1	25.4	25.3
ECF 6th Review	25.2	30.6	35.0	33.6	33.2	33.0
<b>Primary balance (percent of GDP)</b>						
Current DSA	3.9	4.1	6.5	7.1	6.9	2.5
ECF 6th Review	7.2	6.6	7.1	7.6	7.2	2.9
<b>Real GDP growth (percent)</b>						
Current DSA	2.4	2.8	3.3	3.7	3.6	3.7
ECF 6th Review	3.7	3.4	3.4	3.8	3.8	3.6
<b>Current Account Balance (percent of the GDP)</b>						
Current DSA	-5.8	-7.1	-6.0	-5.9	-5.0	-5.2
ECF 6th Review	0.3	0.3	0.5	-0.6	-1.9	-4.7
<b>Congolese Oil prices (US dollars per barrel)</b>						
Current DSA	66.0	61.6	62.0	63.1	65.7	76.2
ECF 6th Review	69.0	68.3	67.7	67.5	68.3	78.5
<b>Brent Oil prices (US dollars per barrel)</b>						
Current DSA	68.5	63.1	63.1	64.2	66.8	77.4
ECF 6th Review	71.4	69.7	68.9	68.6	69.4	79.7

Sources: Congolese authorities; IMF and WB staff calculations and projections.

## C. Country Classification and Determination of Stress Test Scenarios

**12. The composite index (CI) is assessed at 2.5 based on the January 2026 World Economic Outlook (WEO) update and 2024 World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) data, indicating a weak debt carrying capacity for Congo.** The methodology relies on computing a composite indicator (CI) based on information from the CPIA score, external conditions as captured by world economic growth, and country-specific factors, including import coverage of reserves. The Republic of Congo's low CI score indicates a weak debt carrying capacity, reflecting mainly a low CPIA score and a low level of foreign reserves (Text Table 6). The CI score is similar to that in the previous DSA.

**Text Table 6. Republic of Congo: Debt Carrying Capacity, Composite Indicator, and Thresholds**

<b>Country</b>	Congo, Republic of		
<b>Country Code</b>	634		
<b>Debt Carrying Capacity</b>	Weak		
Final	Classification based on current vintage	Classification based on the previous vintage	Classification based on the two previous vintage
Weak	Weak 2.5	Weak 2.5	Weak 2.4

**Calculation of the CI Index**

Components	Coefficients (A)	10-year average values (B)	CI Score components (A*B) = (C)	Contribution of components
CPIA	0.385	2.832	1.09	44%
Real growth rate (in percent)	2.719	1.678	0.05	2%
Import coverage of reserves (in percent)	4.052	35.344	1.43	58%
Import coverage of reserves^2 (in percent)	-3.990	12.492	-0.50	-20%
Remittances (in percent)	2.022	0.287	0.01	0%
World economic growth (in percent)	13.520	3.035	0.41	17%
<b>CI Score</b>			<b>2.5</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>CI rating</b>			<b>Weak</b>	

**Applicable thresholds**

APPLICABLE		APPLICABLE	
<b>EXTERNAL debt burden thresholds</b>		<b>TOTAL public debt benchmark</b>	
PV of debt in % of		PV of total public debt in percent of GDP	35
Exports	140		
GDP	30		
Debt service in % of			
Exports	10		
Revenue	14		

Source: LIC DSA estimations. The CI cutoff value for medium debt carrying capacity is 2.69.

**13. In addition to standardized stress tests, the DSA considers three tailored tests**, including commodity price, natural disasters, and market financing shocks. Since oil exports represent more than 80 percent of Congo's exports, the commodity price tailored stress test is triggered. Given susceptibility to natural disasters like floods, the natural disaster module is also triggered. Similarly, having issued a eurobond (in the context of HIPC debt restructuring) causes the market financing shock to be activated. This scenario assesses rollover risks resulting from a deterioration in global risk sentiment, temporary nominal depreciation, and shortening of maturities of new external

commercial borrowing. The calibrations of the shocks correspond to default values generated by the DSA template.

## DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS

### A. External Debt Sustainability Analysis

**14. Under the baseline scenario, some indicators breach their thresholds, pointing to external debt vulnerabilities.** The PV of debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds its threshold in 2025 and falls below it for the remainder of the projection period. The debt service-to-exports ratio breaches its threshold of 10 percent only in 2028 and remains under the threshold for the rest of the projected period. The debt service-to-revenues ratio, estimated at 14 percent in 2025, is projected to increase to 16 percent in 2026 before falling back to the threshold of 14 percent in 2029 and below for the remainder of the projection period. The PV of external debt-to-exports ratio is below its indicative threshold of 140 percent and is projected to decline to an average of 57.5 percent over 2029–35.

**15. All indicators of external public debt breach their indicative thresholds in stress test scenarios by 2026 and remain above the threshold in the medium term (Figure 1).** Standard shock scenarios examine the implications of various shocks to the external debt and debt-service paths based on the historical volatility of the country's economic indicators. These stress test shocks result in sharp increases in the debt burden and liquidity indicators in all cases, highlighting the elevated debt vulnerabilities under the stress test scenario. The exports shock stress test is the most extreme for all indicators, reflecting the Republic of Congo's high dependence on oil exports and high volatility of oil exports. A decline in exports to a level equivalent to one standard deviation below their historical average in the second year of the projection period would cause the PV of the external debt-to-exports ratio to rise and remain elevated over the medium term, while the PV of the external debt-to-GDP ratio would peak at 78.1 percent in 2027. While this shock is intended to simulate the impact of reduced oil export receipts (oil is about 80 percent of exports) that could arise from a decline in oil prices, it does not account for debt service to the largest external commercial creditors being tied to oil prices (i.e., debt service each year declines with reduced oil prices).

**16. Reflecting weak debt management, the external and overall debt is still assessed to be in-distress but sustainable, conditional on the authorities' commitment to—and effective implementation of—significant and sustained fiscal adjustment going forward (see 121).** Weaknesses in debt management have caused recurrent delays in paying external debt service and triggered Congo's external debt being assessed as in distress. The authorities remain fully committed to strengthening their debt management systems, with support from the World Bank and the IMF. The restructuring of the debt management office in June 2024 and the comprehensive quarterly debt bulletin covering stock and flow data published since end-March 2024 were key milestones in that regard, but more needs to be done, including the full operationalization of the key reforms of the CCA reorganization.<sup>19</sup> Debt is assessed to be

<sup>19</sup> While the publication of the quarterly debt bulletin has been delayed since July 2025 to ascertain the accuracy and consistency of Congo's public debt data it is expected to resume in the first quarter of 2026.

sustainable as debt ratios decline gradually towards their indicative thresholds over the long-term. Looking forward, debt sustainability is predicated on sustained fiscal consolidation momentum and faster implementation of debt management reforms. However, significant risks such as the 2025 fiscal slippages (Box 1) could threaten debt sustainability and set back the debt reduction progress achieved during the ECF program completed in early 2025.

## B. Public Debt Sustainability Analysis

**17. An analysis of Congo’s overall public debt highlights heightened overall debt vulnerabilities (Figure 2).** The projected evolution of debt burden indicators suggests heightened vulnerabilities arising from public debt. Under the baseline scenario, the ratio of the present value of public and publicly guaranteed debt-to-GDP (including domestic arrears and past direct financing from BEAC prior to the initiation of the ECF arrangement) extensively exceeds the 35 percent benchmark level associated with heightened vulnerabilities for countries with a weak debt carrying capacity until 2037. It then remains below the threshold for the remainder of the horizon. As the PV of public debt breaches its benchmark until 2037, and the authorities frequently recognize audited payment floats and domestic arrears as debt, Congo’s overall debt is still assessed as in distress but sustainable assuming that liquidity risks are mitigated by i) its downward path going forward and ii) the expected accumulation of government deposits at the Central Bank. The stress tests underscore the importance of debt vulnerabilities and the urgency of accelerating debt and liquidity management reforms. The growth shock stress test is the most extreme for public debt burden indicators, highlighting downside risks related to an inability to clear arrears if growth remains subdued, constraining the fiscal space to repay domestic arrears. In contrast, the PV of debt-to-GDP and PV of debt-to-revenue ratios gradually rise under the historical scenario (Figure 2), reflecting large historical residuals<sup>20</sup> and low growth rates. Nevertheless, the baseline PV of debt-to-revenue is declining going forward, and the debt service-to-revenue ratio declines going forward.

**18. Debt service pressures and rollover risks remain elevated amid tight liquidity constraints and weak fiscal discipline.** Subsequent to the 2024 domestic debt reprofiling, Congo’s public debt remained high, and its debt service profile concentrated. This prompted the authorities to issue a new eurobond in November 2025 and second tranche in December 2025, with the aim to fund significant domestic debt service expected for end-2025 and early 2026 (¶4, 9). Substantial fiscal slippages in 2025 and continued weaknesses in debt and liquidity management have eroded Congo’s capacity to promptly meet its debt obligations. Liquidity pressures and rollover risks, hence, persist and could intensify should domestic borrowing conditions tighten amid limited absorption capacity from regional and local creditors.

**19. Domestic debt remains largely above the median level across LICs, reflecting substantial domestic debt vulnerabilities.** Domestic debt-to-GDP ratio peaked at 60.6 percent in 2024 amid continued liquidity pressures, driven by heavy reliance on domestic borrowing and the accumulation of domestic social and commercial arrears alongside payment floats. Subsequently, it fell from an estimated 58.8 percent in 2025 onwards, returning gradually over the medium term to the median of 17.2 percent of GDP across peer countries using the LIC DSF (Figure 5). The domestic debt service-to-revenue follows a

<sup>20</sup> Historical residuals largely comprise the accumulation of external and domestic arrears.

similar trajectory. After picking up in the recent years, it is projected to decline driven, owing to fiscal consolidation and improved liquidity and debt management, but will remain largely above the median level of LICs in the forecast period. The net domestic debt issuance (as a ratio to GDP and domestic debt stock in the previous year) turned negative in 2025 and expected to remain negative in 2026 onwards, reflecting the planned fiscal consolidation over the medium term.<sup>21</sup> Both domestic debt solvency (debt-to-GDP ratio) and liquidity (debt service-to-revenue) indicators exceed their comparator median values for LICs beyond 2035, signaling additional domestic debt risks in the medium term.

## RISK RATING AND VULNERABILITIES

	2024	2025	2027	2032
<b>PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio</b>				
Current DSA	28.4	32.4	26.8	17.2
ECF 6th Review	27.3	25.2	20.9	13.9
<b>PV of Debt-to-Exports Ratio</b>				
Current DSA	52.4	70.4	69.4	54.8
ECF 6th Review	49.7	50.1	46.8	39.4
<b>Debt Service-to-Exports Ratio</b>				
Current DSA	10.9	7.2	9.1	7.4
ECF 6th Review	11.5	8.0	5.6	4.1
<b>Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio</b>				
Current DSA	23.9	14.0	14.5	10.1
ECF 6th Review	25.5	16.0	10.1	6.2

Sources: Congolese authorities; IMF and WB staff calculations and projections.

**20. The overall and external debt of the Republic of Congo are assessed to be sustainable, but debt is currently “in distress”.** The assessment of debt distress is a result of the weaknesses in debt management that have resulted in several instances of temporary accumulation and recognition of external arrears, coupled with the uncertainty in the exact nature and volume of domestic debt pending the

<sup>21</sup> The projected net domestic issuance contraction, driven by the medium-term fiscal consolidation, would not necessarily hinder the deepening of the domestic debt security market. The regional monetary and financial authorities (BEAC, COBAC) have undertaken reforms to develop a secondary market for government securities by: (i) improving the predictability and transparency of CEMAC member government securities’ issuance; (ii) developing the regulatory framework; (iii) enhancing transparency by providing the market with an adequate infrastructure; and iv) diversifying the investor base.

authorities' ongoing efforts of auditing and recognizing domestic arrears. The recurrence of delays in debt service payments reinforce the assessment that the Congolese debt is "in distress". Nevertheless, legacy external arrears to all bilateral and commercial creditors, excluding disputed debts and pre-HIPC claims, have been resolved. End-September 2025 debt data indicate that the external arrears have significantly exceeded the threshold of 1 percent of GDP, mainly due to newly recognized arrears to two companies and newly accumulated arrears to bilateral creditors; this trend continued until February 2026. The accumulation of external arrears and the new eurobond issued at distressed yields have intensified debt vulnerabilities and deteriorated Congo's debt outlook (¶4, 8, 21). After peaking at 16 percent in 2026, the external debt service-to-revenue indicator is projected to be back to its threshold level by 2029 and decline afterwards under the baseline scenario. All this results in the overall and external debt being assessed as sustainable, however, in distress.

**21. Risks of overall and external debt distress remain high, given liquidity risks and vulnerability to negative oil price shocks.** Heightened liquidity risks associated with an elevated total public debt-to-GDP ratio (peaking at 90 percent in 2026 and exceeding the threshold through 2036 under the baseline scenario) and a large external debt service-to-revenue ratio (the indicator exceeds the threshold over 2026–29 under the baseline scenario) should be closely monitored. Such risks could be mitigated by the steady and significant declines in these ratios going forward, availability of financing from Congolese financial markets, expected accumulation of government deposits with the Central Bank, and diversification efforts that will bear dividends in the form of non-hydrocarbon exports and higher contribution of non-hydrocarbon sectors towards GDP growth. Congo's financing challenges are near-term, but if left unaddressed, they could jeopardize medium-term debt sustainability. Going forward, the authorities are encouraged to continue pursuing fiscal consolidation, enact policies for diversification to reduce risks and prepare for reduced long-term oil production and demand, clear arrears, and enhance debt management. Nevertheless, the Debt Sustainability Assessment also remains vulnerable to oil price shocks and to imported inflation stemming from elevated global prices for food and other imports. Lower oil prices could obstruct the authorities' structural reforms and diversification efforts, whereas high global fuel and food prices could prompt more spending on subsidies for both items, jeopardizing the authorities' plans of fiscal consolidation. Opposition to reforms (including due to social discontent) could slow fiscal consolidation and payment of domestic arrears, weighing on banks' ability to lend to the private sector and subsequently economic growth prospects. Unfavorable oil production or price outcomes pose a significant downside risk to the DSA assessment. Such a scenario can materialize if foreign direct investments fall below the required levels and could also materialize with an unfavorable response from the oil companies on authorities' efforts for tax reforms in the oil sector.<sup>16</sup> In conjunction with underdeveloped secondary markets, elevated sovereign exposure implies a sovereign-bank nexus that can, in case risks should materialize, quickly spread default and liquidity risks.

**22. The market financing risk module indicates elevated liquidity pressures.** A breach of one indicator would signal moderate market financing pressures. In the case of Congo, the lack of data on EMBI complicates a full assessment of the liquidity pressures. However, compared to the previous DSA, the near-

<sup>16</sup> However, thus far, the recently agreed new tax concessions have played in favor of increased investment by oil producers since the concessions have leveled the playing field across producers.


term liquidity needs as measured by the projected baseline public gross financing needs over the next three years are now breaching their threshold, reflecting heightened market financing pressures following the 2025 eurobond issuance. An increased reliance on non-concessional debt, as Congo continues to tap in the eurobond markets, could exacerbate the already elevated external debt vulnerabilities in the medium term.

**23. The tailored tests show greater sensitivity of public debt than external debt burden indicators.** While the commodity price shock triggers a breach in the PV of external debt-to-GDP indicator, the tailored natural disaster test does not breach external debt indicators (Table 4). However, all tailored stress tests further lengthen the period with a breach of the PV of public debt-to-GDP ratio (Table 5).

## AUTHORITIES' VIEWS

**24. The authorities concurred with Staff's assessment that Congo remains in debt distress, while debt sustainability requires continued and steady fiscal consolidation, with additional support coming from the projected economic recovery.** They reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening debt management by improving interdepartmental coordination and communication, as well as enhancing cash flow management to prevent the recurrence of external arrears. The recent restructuring of the CCA is a key step in this effort. The authorities acknowledged ongoing coordination and liquidity challenges within the debt management framework. They also reemphasized their determination to resolve domestic arrears and manage domestic debt issuance prudently in line with Congo's financing needs. Their objective is to clear most outstanding domestic arrears by the end of the decade while advancing public financial management (PFM) reforms to avoid new arrears. They reiterated their commitment to prioritizing concessional financing, while noting that the Eurobond issuances were one-off debt management operations intended to smooth peaks in domestic debt obligations amid tight regional liquidity conditions.

**Figure 1. Republic of Congo: Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt Under Alternative Scenarios, 2025–35<sup>2/</sup>**



Customization of Default Settings		
	Size	Interactions
<b>Tailored Stress</b>		
Combined CL	Yes	
Natural disaster	No	No
Commodity price	No	No
Market financing	No	No

Note: "Yes" indicates any change to the size or interactions of the default settings for the stress tests. "n.a." indicates that the stress test does not apply.

Borrowing assumptions on additional financing needs resulting from the stress tests*		
	Default	User defined
<b>Shares of marginal debt</b>		
External PPG MLT debt	100%	
<b>Terms of marginal debt</b>		
Avg. nominal interest rate on new borrowing in USD	3.3%	3.3%
USD Discount rate	5.0%	5.0%
Avg. maturity (incl. grace period)	20	20
Avg. grace period	5	5


\* Note: All the additional financing needs generated by the shocks under the stress tests are assumed to be covered by PPG external MLT debt in the external DSA. Default terms of marginal debt are based on baseline 10-year projections.

Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio in or before 2035. The stress test with a one-off breach is also presented (if any), while the one-off breach is deemed away for mechanical signals. When a stress test with a one-off breach happens to be the most extreme shock even after disregarding the one-off breach, only that stress test (with a one-off breach) would be presented.

2/ The magnitude of shocks used for the commodity price shock stress test are based on the commodity prices outlook prepared by the IMF research department.

**Figure 2. Republic of Congo: Indicators of Total Public Debt Under Alternative Scenarios, 2025–37**




Borrowing assumptions on additional financing needs resulting from the stress tests*	Default	User defined
<b>Shares of marginal debt</b>		
External PPG medium and long-term	14%	14%
Domestic medium and long-term	48%	48%
Domestic short-term	38%	38%
<b>Terms of marginal debt</b>		
<b>External MLT debt</b>		
Avg. nominal interest rate on new borrowing in USD	3.3%	3.3%
Avg. maturity (incl. grace period)	20	20
Avg. grace period	5	5
<b>Domestic MLT debt</b>		
Avg. real interest rate on new borrowing	7.4%	7.4%
Avg. maturity (incl. grace period)	4	4
Avg. grace period	0	0
<b>Domestic short-term debt</b>		
Avg. real interest rate	4.9%	4.9%

\* Note: The public DSA allows for domestic financing to cover the additional financing needs generated by the shocks under the stress tests in the public DSA. Default terms of marginal debt are based on baseline 10-year projections.

Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

1/ The most extreme stress test is the test that yields the highest ratio in or before 2035. The stress test with a one-off breach is also presented (if any), while the one-off breach is deemed away for mechanical signals. When a stress test with a one-off breach happens to be the most extreme shock even after disregarding the one-off breach, only that stress test (with a one-off breach) would be presented.

**Figure 3. Republic of Congo: Drivers of Debt Dynamics—Baseline Scenario**




Sources: Congolese authorities and IMF staff projections.

1/ Difference between anticipated and actual contributions on debt ratios.


2/ Distribution across LICs for which LIC DSAs were produced.

3/ Given the relatively low private external debt for average low-income countries, a ppt change in PPG external debt should be largely explained by the drivers of the external debt dynamics equation.



**Figure 4. Republic of Congo: Realism Tools**



1/ Data cover Fund-supported programs for LICs (excluding emergency financing) approved since 1990. The size of 3-year adjustment from program inception is found on the horizontal axis; the percent of sample is found on the vertical axis.




1/ Bars refer to annual projected fiscal adjustment (right-hand side scale) and lines show possible real GDP growth paths under different fiscal multipliers (left-hand side scale).



Source: IMF staff calculations and estimates.

**Figure 5. Republic of Congo: Indicators of Domestic Public Debt, 2020–34**  
(Percent)



Borrowing Assumptions (average over 10-year projection)		Value
<b>Shares in new domestic debt issuance</b>		
Medium and long-term		56%
Short-term		44%
<b>Borrowing terms</b>		
<b>Domestic MLT debt</b>		
Avg. real interest rate on new borrowing		7.4%
Avg. maturity (incl. grace period)		4
Avg. grace period		0
<b>Domestic short-term debt</b>		
Avg. real interest rate		4.9%

-- Before PNOT  
-- After PNOT

Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.


1/ Net domestic debt issuance is an estimate based on the calculated public gross financing need net of gross external financing, drawdown of assets, other adjustments and domestic debt amortization. It excludes short-term debt that was issued and matured within the calendar year.

**Figure 6. Republic of Congo: Market-Financing Risk Indicators**

	GFN	1/	EMBI	2/
Benchmarks	14		570	
Values	27		n.a.	
Breach of benchmark	Yes		n.a.	
Potential heightened liquidity needs	Moderate			

1/ Maximum gross financing needs (GFN) over 3-year baseline projection horizon.

2/ EMBI spreads correspond to the latest available data.



Note: EMBIG data for the Republic of Congo is not available. The bond, due to mature in 2029, was trading at a discount of 14.5 percent over par with a yield to maturity of 11.6 percent and a spread of 804 bps over 7-year US treasury bond as on April 24, 2023. (Sources: Bloomberg, <https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/>)

Table 1a. Republic of Congo: Gross Public Debt by Creditor, 2022–25

	Dec 31, 2022			Dec 31, 2023			June 30, 2024			Dec 31, 2024 Prel.			Sep 30, 2025 <sup>1</sup> Prel.		
	CFAF billion	USD million	percent of GDP	CFAF billion	USD million	Percent of GDP	CFAF billion	USD million	Percent of GDP	CFAF billion	USD million	Percent of GDP	CFAF billion	USD million	Percent of GDP
<b>Total public debt</b>	<b>8130</b>	<b>13124</b>	<b>93.5</b>	<b>8843</b>	<b>14698</b>	<b>102.9</b>	<b>8714</b>	<b>13921</b>	<b>97.3</b>	<b>8780</b>	<b>14026</b>	<b>98.0</b>	<b>8428</b>	<b>14875</b>	<b>93.0</b>
<b>External debt</b>	<b>3743</b>	<b>6042</b>	<b>43.1</b>	<b>3382</b>	<b>5622</b>	<b>39.4</b>	<b>3291</b>	<b>5257</b>	<b>36.7</b>	<b>3357</b>	<b>5362</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>3094</b>	<b>5461</b>	<b>34.1</b>
<i>Of which: arrears</i>	312	504	3.6	298	495	3.5	310	495	3.5	355	568	4.0	450	793	5.0
Multilateral and other creditors	781	1261	9.0	944	1569	11.0	1032	1648	11.5	1079	1724	12.0	1161	2050	12.8
Official bilateral	1753	2830	20.2	1588	2639	18.5	1496	2391	16.7	1529	2442	17.1	1307	2307	14.4
Paris Club	282	455	3.2	293	488	3.4	247	394	2.8	289	462	3.2	236	417	2.6
Brazil	56	91	0.6	50	83	0.6	47	74	0.5	49	79	0.5	42	75	0.5
Belgium	81	131	0.9	56	93	0.7	37	59	0.4	48	77	0.5	39	69	0.4
France	123	199	1.4	168	280	2.0	144	229	1.6	171	274	1.9	137	241	1.5
Russia	19	31	0.2	19	32	0.2	20	31	0.2	20	32	0.2	18	32	0.2
Switzerland	2	3	0.0	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
Non-Paris Club	1472	2376	16.9	1294	2151	15.1	1250	1997	14.0	1240	1980	13.8	1071	1890	11.8
China	1222	1973	14.1	1060	1763	12.3	1029	1644	11.5	997	1593	11.1	866	1528	9.6
India	52	84	0.6	50	84	0.6	43	69	0.5	48	77	0.5	42	74	0.5
Kuwait	34	54	0.4	32	54	0.4	28	45	0.3	34	54	0.4	30	54	0.3
Saudi Arabia	49	79	0.6	47	79	0.6	48	77	0.5	50	80	0.6	44	78	0.5
Turkey	36	58	0.4	26	43	0.3	21	34	0.2	22	34	0.2	17	29	0.2
Abu Dhabi	6	9	0.1	6	9	0.1	6	9	0.1	6	10	0.1	5	9	0.1
Pre-HIPC arrears (not restructured)	73	118	0.8	72	120	0.8	74	119	0.8	76	122	0.9	67	118	0.7
African countries										7	10	0.1	0	0	0.0
Private Creditors	1208	1950	13.9	851	1414	9.9	763	1218	8.5	749	1196	8.4	626	1104	6.9
Oil-prepurchased debt	625	1009	7.2	336	559	3.9	265	423	3.0	142	227	1.6	79	139	0.9
Afreximbank	32	52	0.4	6	10	0.1	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
Suppliers	226	364	2.6	226	375	2.6	226	360	2.5	226	360	2.5	226	398	2.5
<b>Domestic debt</b>	<b>4387</b>	<b>7082</b>	<b>50.5</b>	<b>5461</b>	<b>9076</b>	<b>63.5</b>	<b>5423</b>	<b>8664</b>	<b>60.6</b>	<b>5423</b>	<b>8664</b>	<b>60.6</b>	<b>5334</b>	<b>9414</b>	<b>58.8</b>
BEAC advances and SDR	735	1187	8.5	735	1223	8.6	735	1175	8.2	735	1175	8.2	728	1285	8.0
Commercial banks and non-banks	2115	3413	24.3	2991	4972	34.8	2927	4675	32.7	2927	4675	32.7	2915	5145	32.2
Audited and validated arrears reported by CCA	1537	2481	17.7	1734	2882	20.2	1761	2813	19.7	1761	2813	19.7	1690	2983	18.6

Sources: Congolese authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

<sup>1</sup>Data updated until the end of September 2024.

The USD 930 million Eurobond issued in November–December 2025 will be incorporated into end-2025 debt statistics upon completion of the forthcoming data updates.

**Table 1b. Republic of Congo: Decomposition of Public Debt and Debt Service by Creditor, 2024–26<sup>1/</sup>**

	Debt Stock (end of period)			Debt Service					
	2024			2024	2025	2026	2024	2025	2026
	(USD Million)	(Percent total debt)	(Percent GDP) <sup>6</sup>	(USD Million)			(Percent GDP)		
<b>Total</b>	14,026	100.0	98.0	3,579	4,858	3,584	24.2	31.2	21.6
<b>External</b>	5,362	38.2	37.5	870	528	664	5.9	3.4	4.0
Multilateral creditors <sup>2</sup>	1,724	12.3	12.0	50	78	82	0.3	0.5	0.5
IMF	374	2.7	2.6	...	...	...	...	...	...
World Bank	734	5.2	5.1	...	...	...	...	...	...
ADB/AfDB/IADB	495	3.5	3.5	...	...	...	...	...	...
Other Multilaterals	121	0.9	0.8	...	...	...	...	...	...
<i>o/w: BDEAC</i>	83	0.6	0.6	...	...	...	...	...	...
IFAD	24	0.2	0.2	...	...	...	...	...	...
Bilateral Creditors	2,442	17.4	17.1	357	316	262	2.4	2.0	1.6
Paris Club	462	3.3	3.2	43	50	48	0.3	0.3	0.3
<i>o/w: France</i>	274	2.0	1.9	...	...	...	...	...	...
Belgium	77	0.6	0.5	...	...	...	...	...	...
Non-Paris Club	1,980	14.1	13.8	313	266	213	2.1	1.7	1.3
<i>o/w: China</i>	1,593	11.4	11.1	...	...	...	...	...	...
India	77	0.5	0.5	...	...	...	...	...	...
Commercial creditors	1,196	8.5	8.4	462	135	320	3.1	0.9	1.9
<i>o/w: Bonds</i>	179	1.3	1.2	19	42	138	0.1	0.3	0.8
Other international creditors	1,017	7.3	7.1	443	92	182	3.0	0.6	1.1
<i>o/w: Largest two creditors</i>	176	1.3	1.2	...	...	...	...	...	...
Others	841	6.0	5.9	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>Domestic<sup>3</sup></b>	8664	61.8	60.6	2710	4330	2921	18.3	27.8	17.6
T-Bills and Bonds <sup>4</sup>	4265	30.4	29.8	2520	3940	2549	17.1	25.3	15.3
Loans	1494	10.7	10.4	27	53	54	0.2	0.3	0.3
<b>Memo items:</b>									
Collateralized debt <sup>4</sup>									
<i>o/w: Related</i>	227	...	1.6	...	...	...	...	...	...
<i>o/w: Unrelated</i>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Contingent liabilities									
<i>o/w: Public guarantees</i>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<i>o/w: Other explicit contingent liabilities<sup>5</sup></i>	257	...	1.8	...	...	...	...	...	...
Nominal GDP	14,774	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...

<sup>1</sup> As reported by Country authorities according to their classification of creditors, including by official and commercial. Debt coverage is the same as the DSA.

<sup>2</sup> Multilateral creditors are simply institutions with more than one official shareholder and may not necessarily align with creditor classification under other IMF policies (e.g.

<sup>3</sup> Domestic debt service includes arrears repayment.

<sup>4</sup> Debt is collateralized when the creditor has rights over an asset or revenue stream that would allow it, if the borrower defaults on its payment obligations, to rely on the asset or revenue stream to secure repayment of the debt. Collateralization entails a borrower granting liens over specific existing assets or future receivables to a lender as security against repayment of the loan. Collateral is "unrelated" when it has no relationship to a project financed by the loan. An example would be borrowing to finance the budget deficit, collateralized by oil revenue receipts. See the joint IMF-World Bank note for the G20 "Collateralized Transactions: Key Considerations for Public Lenders and Borrowers" for a discussion of issues raised by collateral.

<sup>5</sup> Includes other one-off guarantees not included in publicly guaranteed debt (e.g. credit lines) and other explicit contingent liabilities not elsewhere classified (e.g. potential legal claims, payments resulting from PPP arrangements).

<sup>6</sup> Calculated with debt stock and GDP in local currency units.

**Table 2. Republic of Congo: External Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2022–35**  
(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

	Actual			Projections										Average 8/		
	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035	Historical	Projections
External debt (nominal) 1/ of which: public and publicly guaranteed (PPG)	43.1	39.4	37.5	38.5	36.3	33.5	30.3	27.7	25.6	23.9	22.4	21.7	21.0	20.3	52.6	27.4
Change in external debt	-12.7	-3.7	-1.9	1.0	-2.2	-2.8	-3.1	-2.6	-2.1	-1.8	-1.4	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7	2.4	-0.2
Identified net debt-creating flows	-10.4	-0.4	-3.5	-0.2	-0.1	-0.8	-0.6	-1.1	-1.2	-0.5	-0.4	0.5	1.1	1.3	2.4	-0.2
Non-interest current account deficit	-18.3	3.3	1.9	5.3	5.9	5.0	5.1	4.8	4.5	3.8	3.8	4.1	4.3	4.5	1.3	4.6
Deficit in balance of goods and services	-27.9	-4.6	-7.1	-2.3	0.0	-0.4	-0.4	-0.7	-0.6	-1.4	-1.3	-0.8	-0.2	0.4	-4.8	-0.7
Exports	69.7	56.3	54.2	46.0	40.1	38.7	37.2	35.6	34.1	32.7	31.5	30.1	28.7	26.8		
Imports	41.9	51.7	47.1	43.6	40.1	38.2	36.8	34.9	33.5	31.3	30.2	29.3	28.4	27.2		
Net current transfers (negative = inflow)	-1.5	-1.6	-0.4	-0.4	-0.7	-0.9	-0.9	-0.9	-0.9	-0.9	-0.9	-0.9	-0.9	-1.0	0.3	-0.9
of which: official	-1.6	-1.7	-0.4	-0.3	-0.6	-0.8	-0.8	-0.8	-0.9	-0.8	-0.8	-0.9	-0.9	-0.9		
Other current account flows (negative = net inflow)	11.1	9.5	9.3	8.0	6.5	6.3	6.4	6.4	6.1	6.1	6.0	5.8	5.5	5.1	5.8	6.2
Net FDI (negative = inflow)	9.0	-4.7	-4.9	-5.1	-6.2	-5.6	-5.4	-5.5	-5.4	-3.9	-3.9	-3.3	-2.8	-2.9	-0.7	-4.5
Endogenous debt dynamics 2/	-1.1	1.0	-0.5	-0.4	0.2	-0.2	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4	-0.3		
Contribution from nominal interest rate	1.2	1.6	1.1	0.5	1.2	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4		
Contribution from real GDP growth	-1.0	-0.8	-0.8	-0.8	-1.0	-1.1	-1.2	-1.0	-0.9	-0.9	-0.8	-0.7	-0.8	-0.7		
Contribution from price and exchange rate changes	-1.4	0.2	-0.8	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...		
Residual 3/	-2.3	-3.3	1.7	1.2	-2.1	-2.0	-2.5	-1.5	-0.8	-1.3	-1.0	-1.2	-1.8	-1.9	-1.7	-1.4
of which: exceptional financing	-7.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
<b>Sustainability indicators</b>																
PV of PPG external debt-to-GDP ratio	...	...	28.4	32.4	29.3	26.8	24.0	21.8	20.0	18.4	17.2	16.8	16.3	15.8		
PV of PPG external debt-to-exports ratio	...	...	52.4	70.4	73.1	69.4	64.6	61.1	58.5	56.4	54.8	55.8	56.8	59.0		
PPG debt service-to-exports ratio	15.4	15.4	10.9	7.2	9.9	9.1	10.6	9.4	8.7	8.0	7.4	4.7	4.6	4.8		
PPG debt service-to-revenue ratio	34.5	33.9	23.9	14.0	16.4	14.5	16.4	14.1	12.6	11.3	10.1	6.2	5.7	5.7		
Gross external financing need (Million of U.S. dollars)	203.7	1032.3	422.6	550.0	612.7	506.1	688.3	526.2	441.1	571.3	548.3	581.1	780.1	855.2		
<b>Key macroeconomic assumptions</b>																
Real GDP growth (in percent)	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.4	2.8	3.3	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	4.0	3.7	-1.5	3.4
GDP deflator in US dollar terms (change in percent)	2.5	-0.5	2.1	3.1	3.7	2.7	2.9	3.0	2.8	3.2	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	0.9	3.0
Effective interest rate (percent) 4/	2.3	3.8	3.0	1.3	3.3	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.1	2.0	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.6	2.3
Growth of exports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent)	25.6	-18.1	0.4	-10.5	-7.1	2.4	2.7	2.2	2.0	2.4	2.6	2.0	2.1	0.0	4.5	0.1
Growth of imports of G&S (US dollar terms, in percent)	30.3	25.3	-4.9	-2.3	-2.1	1.2	2.7	1.4	2.2	0.0	2.8	3.5	3.9	2.2	-0.2	1.4
Grant element of new public sector borrowing (in percent)	...	...	...	4.4	29.7	27.6	27.1	26.4	25.2	24.5	23.8	23.1	23.5	23.9	...	23.6
Government revenues (excluding grants, in percent of GDP)	31.2	25.6	24.8	23.9	24.2	24.2	24.0	23.7	23.5	23.2	23.1	23.0	22.8	22.7	23.6	23.5
Aid flows (in Million of US dollars) 5/	86.6	119.0	87.1	127.2	338.8	355.3	396.0	419.1	434.5	452.7	473.8	456.9	482.6	509.0		
Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of GDP) 6/	...	...	...	0.7	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	...	1.3
Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of external financing) 6/	...	...	...	9.0	46.4	50.5	48.3	48.7	48.4	47.5	47.2	49.3	50.6	51.9	...	45.3
Nominal GDP (Million of US dollars)	13,967	14,169	14,774	15,591	16,620	17,623	18,817	20,100	21,399	22,861	24,390	26,021	27,867	29,763		
Nominal dollar GDP growth	4.3	1.4	4.3	5.5	6.6	6.0	6.8	6.8	6.5	6.8	6.7	6.7	7.1	6.8	-0.5	6.6
<b>Memorandum items:</b>																
PV of external debt 7/	...	...	28.4	32.4	29.3	26.8	24.0	21.8	20.0	18.4	17.2	16.8	16.3	15.8		
In percent of exports	...	...	52.4	70.4	73.1	69.4	64.6	61.1	58.5	56.4	54.8	55.8	56.8	59.0		
Total external debt service-to-exports ratio	15.4	15.4	10.9	7.2	9.9	9.1	10.6	9.4	8.7	8.0	7.4	4.7	4.6	4.8		
PV of PPG external debt (in Million of US dollars)	...	...	4197.7	5044.7	4865.0	4728.5	4521.3	4374.2	4270.1	4216.4	4203.5	4364.0	4541.0	4711.6		
(Pvt-Pvt-1)/GDPT-1 (in percent)	...	...	...	5.7	-1.2	-0.8	-1.2	-0.8	-0.5	-0.3	-0.1	0.7	0.7	0.6		
Non-interest current account deficit that stabilizes debt ratio	-5.6	7.0	3.8	4.3	8.1	7.8	8.2	7.3	6.6	5.6	5.2	4.8	5.1	5.2		

Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

1/ Includes both public and private sector external debt.

2/ Derived as  $[r - g - \rho(1+g)] / (1+g+\rho+g)$  times previous period debt ratio, with  $r$  = nominal interest rate;  $g$  = real GDP growth rate, and  $\rho$  = growth rate of GDP deflator in U.S. dollar terms.

3/ Includes exceptional financing (i.e., changes in arrears and debt relief); changes in gross foreign assets; and valuation adjustments. For projections also includes contribution from price and exchange rate changes.

4/ Current-year interest payments divided by previous period debt stock.



5/ Defined as grants, concessional loans, and debt relief.

6/ Grant-equivalent financing includes grants provided directly to the government and through new borrowing (difference between the face value and the PV of new debt).

7/ Assumes that PV of private sector debt is equivalent to its face value.

8/ Historical averages are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability, whereas projections averages are over the first year of projection and the next 10 years.

Definition of external/domestic debt	Currency-based
Is there a material difference between the two criteria?	Yes



**Table 3. Republic of Congo: Public Sector Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario, 2022–35**  
(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

	Actual			Projections							Average 6/	
	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2035	Historical	Projections
<b>Public sector debt 1/</b>	93.5	102.9	98.0	97.3	94.8	88.5	81.6	74.8	68.8	44.3	89.1	70.3
of which: external debt	43.1	39.4	37.5	38.5	36.3	33.5	30.3	27.7	25.6	20.3	52.6	27.4
<b>Change in public sector debt</b>	-4.2	9.4	-4.9	-0.7	-2.5	-6.3	-7.0	-6.8	-6.0	-3.7		
<b>Identified debt-creating flows</b>	-20.2	-5.8	-6.5	-2.8	-1.9	-5.9	-6.7	-7.0	-6.7	-3.6	0.5	-5.2
<b>Primary deficit</b>	-11.6	-9.0	-8.3	-3.9	-4.1	-6.5	-7.1	-7.3	-7.3	-3.9	-1.3	-5.7
Revenue and grants	31.8	26.5	25.3	24.2	24.9	25.1	24.9	24.6	24.3	23.6	24.2	24.3
of which: grants	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9		
Primary (noninterest) expenditure	20.2	17.5	17.0	20.3	20.8	18.6	17.8	17.3	17.1	19.7	22.9	18.5
<b>Automatic debt dynamics</b>	-8.6	3.2	1.8	1.1	2.2	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.2		
Contribution from interest rate/growth differential	-8.2	1.5	0.0	1.1	2.2	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.2		
of which: contribution from average real interest rate	-6.5	3.3	2.1	3.4	4.9	3.5	3.5	3.2	3.1	2.0		
of which: contribution from real GDP growth	-1.7	-1.8	-2.1	-2.3	-2.7	-3.0	-3.2	-2.9	-2.6	-1.7		
Contribution from real exchange rate depreciation	-0.3	1.7	1.7	...	...	...	...	...	...	...		
<b>Other identified debt-creating flows</b>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0
Privatization receipts (negative)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Recognition of contingent liabilities (e.g., bank recapitalization)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Debt relief (HIPC and other)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
Other debt creating or reducing flow (please specify)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
<b>Residual</b>	15.9	15.2	1.7	2.1	-0.6	-0.4	-0.2	0.2	0.7	-0.1	5.0	0.3
<b>Sustainability indicators</b>												
<b>PV of public debt-to-GDP ratio 2/</b>	...	...	89.9	90.4	87.9	81.9	75.3	68.8	63.1	39.8		
<b>PV of public debt-to-revenue and grants ratio</b>	...	...	355.8	372.9	353.5	326.6	303.0	280.3	259.2	168.8		
<b>Debt service-to-revenue and grants ratio 3/</b>	76.7	95.6	96.0	128.3	89.6	95.9	87.9	87.6	89.4	59.2		
Gross financing need 4/	12.8	16.4	16.0	27.2	18.2	17.6	14.8	14.2	14.5	10.1		
<b>Key macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions</b>												
Real GDP growth (in percent)	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.4	2.8	3.3	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.7	-1.5	3.4
Average nominal interest rate on external debt (in percent)	2.4	3.8	3.0	1.4	3.2	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.0	2.6	2.2
Average real interest rate on domestic debt (in percent)	-9.9	6.6	3.1	6.3	7.7	5.5	6.0	6.1	6.6	7.5	1.4	6.6
Real exchange rate depreciation (in percent, + indicates depreciation)	-0.7	3.9	4.5	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	3.6	...
Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent)	15.1	-3.1	2.1	-1.1	1.0	2.9	3.1	3.1	3.0	3.0	2.4	2.5
Growth of real primary spending (deflated by GDP deflator, in percent)	8.8	-11.5	-1.1	22.6	5.1	-7.5	-0.9	0.6	2.4	6.5	-9.7	5.1
Primary deficit that stabilizes the debt-to-GDP ratio 5/	-7.3	-18.4	-3.4	-3.2	-1.6	-0.2	-0.1	-0.5	-1.2	-0.2	-9.7	-0.9
PV of contingent liabilities (not included in public sector debt)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		

Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

1/ Coverage of debt: The central government plus social security, central bank, government-guaranteed debt. Definition of external debt is Currency-based.

2/ The underlying PV of external debt-to-GDP ratio under the public DSA differs from the external DSA with the size of differences depending on exchange rates projections.


3/ Debt service is defined as the sum of interest and amortization of medium and long-term, and short-term debt.

4/ Gross financing need is defined as the primary deficit plus debt service plus the stock of short-term debt at the end of the last period and other debt creating/reducing flows.

5/ Defined as a primary deficit minus a change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio (-): a primary surplus, which would stabilize the debt ratio only in the year in question.

6/ Historical averages are generally derived over the past 10 years, subject to data availability, whereas projections averages are over the first year of projection and the next 10 years.

Definition of external/domestic debt	Currency-based
Is there a material difference between the two criteria?	Yes



**Table 4. Republic of Congo: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt, 2025–35**

(Percent)

	Projections 1/										
	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035
<b>PV of debt-to GDP ratio</b>											
<b>Baseline</b>	32	29	27	24	22	20	18	17	17	16	16
<b>A. Alternative Scenarios</b>											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2025-2035 2/	32	32	33	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	39
<b>B. Bound Tests</b>											
B1. Real GDP growth	32	33	35	31	28	26	24	22	22	21	20
B2. Primary balance	32	31	33	31	30	29	29	29	29	29	29
B3. Exports	32	51	78	74	70	67	64	60	57	53	49
B4. Other flows 3/	32	52	72	68	65	62	60	56	53	49	46
B5. Depreciation	32	37	31	28	25	23	21	19	19	19	18
B6. Combination of B1-B5	32	57	73	69	65	62	59	56	52	49	46
<b>C. Tailored Tests</b>											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	32	32	31	29	28	27	26	26	26	26	26
C2. Natural disaster	32	31	29	27	25	24	23	22	22	22	22
C3. Commodity price	32	36	40	38	36	34	32	30	29	27	26
C4. Market Financing	32	29	27	24	22	20	18	17	17	16	16
<b>Threshold</b>	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30	30
<b>PV of debt-to-exports ratio</b>											
<b>Baseline</b>	70	73	69	65	61	58	56	55	56	57	59
<b>A. Alternative Scenarios</b>											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2025-2035 2/	70	80	85	88	95	103	110	118	128	136	146
<b>B. Bound Tests</b>											
B1. Real GDP growth	70	73	69	65	61	58	56	55	56	57	59
B2. Primary balance	70	77	84	84	84	86	88	91	95	100	106
B3. Exports	70	180	415	406	401	400	399	393	386	378	378
B4. Other flows 3/	70	130	186	183	182	182	183	179	175	171	170
B5. Depreciation	70	73	64	59	56	53	51	49	50	52	54
B6. Combination of B1-B5	70	153	147	220	218	217	216	210	207	203	203
<b>C. Tailored Tests</b>											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	70	80	80	78	78	79	80	82	86	90	97
C2. Natural disaster	70	79	77	74	72	71	71	71	74	78	83
C3. Commodity price	70	108	121	115	110	106	101	99	99	99	100
C4. Market Financing	70	73	69	65	61	58	56	55	56	57	59
<b>Threshold</b>	140	140	140	140	140	140	140	140	140	140	140
<b>Debt service-to-exports ratio</b>											
<b>Baseline</b>	7	10	9	11	9	9	8	7	5	5	5
<b>A. Alternative Scenarios</b>											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2025-2035 2/	7	11	11	13	13	13	13	13	10	11	12
<b>B. Bound Tests</b>											
B1. Real GDP growth	7	10	9	11	9	9	8	7	5	5	5
B2. Primary balance	7	10	9	11	10	10	9	9	7	7	8
B3. Exports	7	17	28	37	34	32	30	35	37	37	38
B4. Other flows 3/	7	10	11	15	14	13	13	16	17	17	17
B5. Depreciation	7	10	9	10	9	8	8	7	4	4	4
B6. Combination of B1-B5	7	12	17	21	19	18	17	21	20	20	20
<b>C. Tailored Tests</b>											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	7	10	9	11	10	9	9	8	6	6	6
C2. Natural disaster	7	10	10	11	10	9	9	8	5	5	6
C3. Commodity price	7	12	12	14	13	11	10	11	9	9	9
C4. Market Financing	7	10	9	11	9	9	8	7	5	5	5
<b>Threshold</b>	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
<b>Debt service-to-revenue ratio</b>											
<b>Baseline</b>	14	16	15	16	14	13	11	10	6	6	6
<b>A. Alternative Scenarios</b>											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2025-2035 2/	14	18	17	21	19	19	18	18	13	14	15
<b>B. Bound Tests</b>											
B1. Real GDP growth	14	19	19	21	18	16	15	13	8	7	7
B2. Primary balance	14	16	15	18	16	14	13	12	9	9	9
B3. Exports	14	19	21	28	25	23	21	23	24	22	22
B4. Other flows 3/	14	16	18	23	21	19	18	22	23	21	21
B5. Depreciation	14	21	18	20	17	15	14	12	7	6	6
B6. Combination of B1-B5	14	19	23	27	24	22	20	24	22	21	20
<b>C. Tailored Tests</b>											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	14	16	15	17	15	14	12	11	7	7	7
C2. Natural disaster	14	16	15	17	14	13	12	11	7	6	6
C3. Commodity price	14	19	18	21	18	16	15	14	11	11	11
C4. Market Financing	14	16	15	16	14	13	11	10	6	6	6
<b>Threshold</b>	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14

Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

1/ A bold value indicates a breach of the threshold.

2/ Variables include real GDP growth, GDP deflator (in U.S. dollar terms), non-interest current account in percent of GDP, and non-debt creating flows.

3/ Includes official and private transfers and FDI.

**Table 5. Republic of Congo: Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public Debt, 2025–35<sup>1/</sup>**  
(Percent)

	Projections 1/										
	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035
<b>PV of Debt-to-GDP Ratio</b>											
<b>Baseline</b>	90	88	82	75	69	63	58	53	48	43	40
<b>A. Alternative Scenarios</b>											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2025–2035 2/	90	93	97	102	108	115	122	130	137	144	152
<b>B. Bound Tests</b>											
B1. Real GDP growth	90	103	116	115	113	113	113	114	114	115	117
B2. Primary balance	90	100	111	105	99	94	89	84	79	75	71
B3. Exports	90	102	116	108	101	95	89	83	75	68	62
B4. Other flows 3/	90	111	127	119	112	105	99	92	84	76	70
B5. Depreciation	90	92	84	76	68	60	54	48	41	35	31
B6. Combination of B1–B5	90	96	105	101	97	94	91	89	86	84	82
<b>C. Tailored Tests</b>											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	90	110	104	98	91	86	81	76	71	66	63
C2. Natural disaster	90	99	94	87	81	76	71	67	62	57	54
C3. Commodity price	90	94	98	101	103	105	107	107	107	108	110
C4. Market Financing	90	88	82	75	69	63	58	53	48	43	40
<b>TOTAL public debt benchmark</b>	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35
<b>PV of Debt-to-Revenue Ratio</b>											
<b>Baseline</b>	373	354	327	303	280	259	241	221	201	183	169
<b>A. Alternative Scenarios</b>											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2025–2035 2/	373	375	387	409	436	466	502	533	566	595	628
<b>B. Bound Tests</b>											
B1. Real GDP growth	373	412	460	457	457	459	465	468	473	478	490
B2. Primary balance	373	403	442	423	404	386	370	351	333	315	302
B3. Exports	373	409	461	436	412	389	370	344	315	287	264
B4. Other flows 3/	373	446	506	480	456	433	413	384	352	321	295
B5. Depreciation	373	369	335	305	276	249	225	199	174	150	131
B6. Combination of B1–B5	373	385	419	406	394	385	378	369	360	352	348
<b>C. Tailored Tests</b>											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	373	441	415	393	372	352	336	316	298	280	266
C2. Natural disaster	373	399	373	352	331	312	296	277	259	242	229
C3. Commodity price	373	418	430	449	453	453	453	443	447	453	464
C4. Market Financing	373	354	327	303	280	259	241	221	201	183	169
<b>Debt Service-to-Revenue Ratio</b>											
<b>Baseline</b>	128	90	96	88	88	89	87	79	74	69	59
<b>A. Alternative Scenarios</b>											
A1. Key variables at their historical averages in 2025–2035 2/	128	92	109	117	137	162	184	199	215	233	239
<b>B. Bound Tests</b>											
B1. Real GDP growth	128	101	131	134	147	162	172	175	179	185	184
B2. Primary balance	128	90	125	147	141	146	144	133	127	121	111
B3. Exports	128	90	98	93	92	94	92	87	85	80	70
B4. Other flows 3/	128	90	99	95	94	96	93	90	89	84	73
B5. Depreciation	128	86	94	86	85	86	84	76	69	64	55
B6. Combination of B1–B5	128	91	109	103	110	118	122	121	121	121	115
<b>C. Tailored Tests</b>											
C1. Combined contingent liabilities	128	90	145	128	128	133	128	118	111	105	94
C2. Natural disaster	128	91	120	108	109	113	110	102	96	91	81
C3. Commodity price	128	101	112	110	129	144	153	155	162	168	169
C4. Market Financing	128	90	96	88	88	89	87	79	74	69	59

Sources: Country authorities; and staff estimates and projections.

1/ A bold value indicates a breach of the benchmark.

2/ Variables include real GDP growth, GDP deflator and primary deficit in percent of GDP.

3/ Includes official and private transfers and FDI.

**Statement by Mr. N'Sonde, Executive Director for Republic of the Congo  
and Ms. Kwizera, Advisor to Executive Director**

**March 11, 2026**

**Introduction**

**On behalf of the Congolese authorities, we thank staff for the constructive engagement during the Post-Financing Assessment discussions.** The authorities value this continued dialogue on appropriate policy reforms, particularly in an environment marked by tight financing conditions, heightened global uncertainty, and strong interlinkages between fiscal, financial, and regional dynamics. They appreciate IMF staff's policy and reform recommendations and look forward to continued engagement.

**The authorities share staff's overall assessment of recent macroeconomic developments and downside risks.** They recognize the fragile outlook of Congo's economy and reaffirm their determination to preserve the hard-won gains achieved under the previous Fund-supported program and strengthen the economy's resilience.

**Building on this foundation, the authorities are advancing a coherent reform agenda anchored in the 2026 budget framework,** centered on decisive corrective measures to restore fiscal discipline, strengthen domestic revenue mobilization through digitalization, reinforce public financial and debt management through enhanced institutional capacity, safeguard financial stability through tighter oversight management tools and practices, and accelerate structural reforms to support economic diversification towards the non-oil sector while integrating climate considerations into policy frameworks.

**Recent Developments and Outlook**

**Economic growth has been constrained by low investment execution and disruptions in energy supply.** Despite these challenges, the authorities are more optimistic about the medium-term outlook, supported by ongoing efforts to strengthen non-hydrocarbon sector, improve capital budget execution and ease infrastructure bottlenecks, particularly in the energy sector.

**Inflation developments remain under close monitoring.** While price pressures have shown volatility, the authorities remain committed to maintaining prudent macroeconomic policies and to working closely with the regional central bank BEAC to support price stability. In

parallel, they continue to address supply-side constraints and cost pressures in a challenging global environment.

**External vulnerabilities remain an important consideration for policy calibration.** The authorities are mindful of the economy's sensitivity to commodity price fluctuations and shifts in global financing conditions. This reinforces their resolve to accelerate diversification efforts, strengthen domestic revenue sources, and carefully balance domestic and external borrowing while continuing to enhance debt management capacity.

### **Implementing Corrective Measures and Strengthening Fiscal Consolidation**

**The authorities concur that fiscal pressures intensified in 2025, driven by acute liquidity constraints, security challenges and long-standing challenges in cash and expenditure management.** In response, they are prioritizing fiscal consolidation through a combination of targeted spending cuts and revenue-enhancing measures to improve public finances, reduce borrowing costs, and restore investor confidence. Policy discipline, including through the 2026 fiscal framework, is required for gradual reductions in the debt-to-GDP ratio.

**Reforms under the Domestic Revenue Mobilization Modernization Initiative are advancing steadily, with a strong emphasis on broadening the tax base and improving compliance.** The rollout of the Integrated Tax and Customs Information System is enhancing data interconnection across administrations, while the digitalization of revenue payments through the "FOUTA" platform is reducing reliance on cash transactions and strengthening transparency and collection efficiency.

**To further strengthen public financial management and prioritize growth-enhancing investment, the authorities are accelerating the full operationalization of program-based budgeting and the Treasury Single Account.** The authorities take note of staff's more conservative baseline assumptions and reaffirm their commitment to safeguarding fiscal credibility as a foundation of macroeconomic stability and to further enhancing investor confidence.

### **Enhancing the Operational Debt Framework**

**The Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy will remain the central policy anchor guiding borrowing decisions, with a disciplined and carefully balanced mix of domestic and external financing.** While the authorities view renewed market access as an indication of improved market confidence, they remain focused on managing debt-related risks, prioritizing concessional resources, extending maturities, and limiting refinancing pressures.

**Recognizing that debt vulnerabilities remain elevated, the authorities are strengthening the operational and institutional foundations of debt management.**

Governance structures and procedures at the debt management office—*Caisse Congolaise d'Amortissement* (CCA)—are being reinforced through tighter internal controls, enhanced risk analysis, and improved inter-agency coordination.

**Debt transparency and risk management issues are being tackled under the Debt Transparency and Reporting Enhancement Initiative, including through regular publication of monthly, quarterly, and annual debt reports.** In parallel, the Comprehensive Public Sector Debt Coverage Program is expanding coverage to capture contingent liabilities, notably from public enterprises. Capacity constraints are being addressed through targeted recruitment, specialized training, and the establishment of dedicated debt and risk committees to systematically monitor risks and close implementation gaps.

**Addressing state-owned enterprise (SOE) risks remains a priority. The authorities are implementing a comprehensive SOE Governance Reform Program anchored in two pillars.** The first pillar consists of strengthening the legislative and regulatory framework through the State Shareholder Policy Implementation Framework, including a draft decree to clarify subsidy rules and enhance fiscal oversight. The second pillar focuses on financial recovery and restructuring, with targeted recapitalization and restructuring measures, notably in *Congo Telecom*. Complementary sectoral reforms are advancing through the Urban Public Transport Sector Initiative, the Insurance Sector Recovery and Stabilization Program, and the Energy Sector Cost Rationalization and Subsidy Containment Initiative, aimed at reducing gas costs, improving supply-chain efficiency, and strengthening operations at *Centrale Électrique du Congo*.

## **Pursuing Financial Sector Reforms**

**In a challenging regional financial environment, the authorities are taking steps to better contain emerging financial sector risks.** While liquidity pressures and sovereign-bank linkages remain a source of vulnerability, recent efforts have focused on strengthening liquidity management frameworks, improving the predictability of domestic financing operations, and enhancing cash-flow planning. Going forward, financial sector reforms will focus on strengthening supervision under the regional supervisory body COBAC and improving access to finance to support growth and inclusion.

**To further sustain these efforts, priority is being given to strengthening financial sector statistics.** The authorities are working, in close coordination with regional partners, notably COBAC and BEAC, to improve the quality, coverage, and timeliness of financial sector data and to deepen forward-looking risk analysis within existing supervisory arrangements.

## **Structural Transformation, Social Safety Nets, Governance Reforms, and Climate Agenda**

**Accelerating reforms to reduce dependence on hydrocarbons and broaden the growth base will be centered on improving the business environment, strengthening capital budget execution, and easing critical infrastructure bottlenecks, particularly in the energy sector.**

**Despite tight fiscal conditions, the authorities have advanced measures to better protect vulnerable groups during the adjustment process.** Progress has been made in improving the targeting and execution of social spending, including through the gradual rollout of social safety net mechanisms. Going forward, the authorities intend to address remaining implementation bottlenecks and strengthen coordination with partners to ensure that limited resources are used more effectively to safeguard human capital and essential social services.

**Governance reforms are advancing, even as institutional and capacity limitations continue to pose challenges.** The authorities have taken steps to strengthen public financial management, transparency, and oversight frameworks, and recognize that sustained effort will be required to translate reforms into durable outcomes. They remain focused on consolidating recent gains by prioritizing implementation, leveraging technical assistance, and working closely with development partners to address remaining gaps and reinforce institutional credibility over time.

**Climate considerations are being increasingly embedded in the policy framework.** As a key steward of the Congo Basin rainforest, the Republic of Congo views climate action as both an environmental responsibility and a macro-critical priority. In this context, the authorities have requested IMF technical assistance to conduct a diagnostic assessment of mitigation and adaptation policies and to strengthen climate-related fiscal frameworks, with a view to better integrating climate risks into macro-fiscal planning.

## **Conclusion**

The authorities remain committed to sustained and disciplined reform implementation while adjusting their policy response as the situation evolves.

The authorities concur with IMF staff's assessment that the country's capacity to repay the Fund remains adequate, underpinned by their continued commitment to corrective measures that promote fiscal sustainability and by Congo's strong and consistent track record of meeting its financial obligations to the IMF.

They value the Fund's continued engagement and policy advice, which they consider instrumental in sustaining reform momentum and supporting the re-anchoring of the macroeconomic policy framework. They look forward to continued strong engagement.