## 1egyea2026001

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---

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY — Context and near-term program status
- Macroeconomic stabilization supported by adequately tight monetary and fiscal policies and exchange rate flexibility.
- Limited progress on deeper reforms, notably the stalled divestment agenda, is weighing on medium-term growth, keeping gross financing needs high, and constraining fiscal space for priority social spending.
- With less than a year remaining under the program, scope for corrective action is increasingly narrow.
- Authorities’ planned reforms highlighted as necessary steps:
  - reduce the state footprint and level the playing field;
  - adopt a more comprehensive active debt management strategy;
  - strengthen risk management in state-owned banks.

### Program performance (reviews, QPCs, ITs, structural benchmarks)
- Met:
  - end-June 2025 QPCs on NIR and tax revenues, and the continuous PC on the non-accumulation of external arrears.
  - end-June and end-December QPCs and the end-September IT on the CBE overdraft.
  - Twelve of the 14 structural benchmarks.
- Missed and corrective actions:
  - Missed end-September IT and end-December QPC on NIR due to lack of FX purchases by the CBE; CBE committed to a newly established FX reserve accumulation framework.
  - Repayment of legacy central bank lending to public agencies progressed more slowly than planned (missed end-June 2025 QPC and end-September IT); corrective actions helped meet the end-December QPC.
  - Shortfalls in divestment caused missing the end-June 2025 primary balance QPC and end-June IT on the debt ceiling; authorities used all proceeds of a US$3.5 billion real estate deal with Qatar to reduce budget-sector debt.
  - Preparation of the FY26/27 tax package (due in November) will be delivered as a prior action.

### Recent developments — activity, inflation, exchange rate, flows
- Growth and activity:
  - FY2024/25 GDP expanded by 4.4 percent y/y (from 2.4 percent in previous year).
  - Q1 FY2025/26 growth: 5.3 percent y/y (up from 3.5 percent y/y in Q1 FY2024/25).
  - Recovery broad-based: non-oil manufacturing, transportation, finance, and tourism robust; Suez Canal and mining/extraction declined but offset by other gains.
  - PMI: consecutive monthly expansions in November and December 2025 — first back-to-back in more than five years.
- Inflation and monetary stance:
  - Headline urban inflation: 12.3 percent y/y in December 2025.
  - Core inflation: fell from 26.6 percent at end-FY2023/24 to 11.8 percent by December 2025.
- Exchange rate and external flows:
  - Official EGP/USD range between April and December 2025: EGP/USD 46.99–51.75; peaked on April 6 and appreciated to its strongest level since May 2024 in November 2025.
  - No FX backlogs or CBE interventions; spread with parallel market measures remained closed.
  - Nonresident holdings of domestic LC T-bill/bond market reached record highs by end-2025; nonresident holdings surged to US$32.8 billion at end-2025.
  - Net international reserves (NIR): US$36.9 billion at end-November (up by US$4.2 billion since end-2024).

### Medium-term reform gaps and commitments
- Three major reform areas with slow progress:
  - Reducing the State Footprint and Leveling the Playing Field:
    - Divestment shortfalls; no material divestment over last 24 months; SOP target exit from non-strategic sectors by 2027.
    - Military encroachment in economic activities appears to persist.
    - Authorities removed tax exemptions for SOEs and seek Competition Law amendments to enhance ECA.
    - Identified four major transactions expected to yield US$1.5 billion (about half to budget); Qatari land sale US$3.5 billion (proceeds allocated to debt reduction). Aggregate proceeds fall short of US$6.5 billion target.
  - Reducing Debt Vulnerabilities:
    - Debt reduction pillars: sustained primary surpluses, use of state asset sale proceeds to reduce debt, and lengthening maturities.
    - Interest payments absorb about 73 percent of revenues (noted earlier as roughly 83 percent in other sections; source reports both—preserve each instance as presented).
    - Authorities committed to reducing gross financing needs (GFN) by 6 percent of GDP by FY2025/26 and by 10 percent of GDP cumulatively by FY2026/27 (new structural benchmark).
    - Need for an ambitious liability management strategy to extend maturities and lower interest service costs.
  - Reforming the Financial Sector:
    - Large presence of state-owned banks; independent assessments commissioned for the two biggest SOBs.
    - Commitment to strengthen SOB risk management in line with diagnostic studies (new structural benchmark).
    - CBE to prepare corrective action plan by end-March 2026 and final status report by end-September 2026.

### Policy recommendations and priorities
- Macroeconomic:
  - Greater exchange rate flexibility.
  - Complete disinflation; maintain adequately restrictive monetary policy until disinflation is entrenched.
  - Pursue revenue-led fiscal consolidation supported by a comprehensive debt management strategy and active debt management.
- Structural:
  - Accelerate reforms to transition to a more dynamic, resilient, and inclusive growth model.
  - Advance the State Ownership Policy to reduce the state footprint and level the playing field.
  - Strengthen state-owned bank governance and risk management.
  - Introduce and mainstream a climate agenda addressing adaptation and mitigation needs.
- Operational:
  - Strengthen CBE’s FX intervention framework: transparent, CBE-led, limited to disorderly market conditions, and anchored in CBE mandate; review intervention rule and budget using transaction-level data; consider complementary FX risk management instruments (forwards, swaps, repos).
  - Continue shift toward auction modalities and lengthen maturities; introduce QPC ceiling on share of total local currency financing conducted via non-market modalities.
  - Gradually reduce outstanding stock of CBE lending to public sector agencies excluding the MoF to zero by end-June 2029.

### Modification of conditionality and program requests
- Staff supports:
  - Authorities’ request to extend the EFF arrangement through December 15, 2026 (total duration 48 months) and corresponding extension of the RSF, with rephasing of access.
  - Waiver for non-observance of the end-December 2025 QPC on the floor of NIR.
  - Introduction of a QPC ceiling on the share of total local currency financing conducted via non-market modalities.
- Proposed adjustments:
  - Seven new structural benchmarks to support tax reform, GFN reduction plan, SOB studies’ results, and refocused structural agenda.
  - Rephasing of remaining purchases under EFF totaling SDR 3,691.47 million: SDR 1,465.44 million upon completion of combined 5th and 6th reviews; SDR 1,113.01 million at 7th review; SDR 1,113.02 million at 8th review.
  - Requests to complete combined fifth and sixth reviews and first RSF review (disbursement of SDR 200 million upon RM1 and RM2 completion).

### Risks, political context, and implementation caveats
- Major risks:
  - Domestic and geopolitical uncertainties, escalations in trade measures, commodity price volatility, tighter global financial conditions.
  - Slow structural reform implementation, insufficient action on energy sector sustainability, large GFN, and materialization of contingent liabilities from SOEs.
- Political context:
  - Parliamentary elections began November 2025; new parliament convened January 12.
  - Cabinet reshuffle possible; could affect continuity.
- Implementation caveat:
  - Transition benefits require more decisive and forceful reforms; enterprise and operational risks are significant.

---

### Financial sector and State-owned banks (Chapter 8 highlights)
- SOB behavior during stress:
  - SOBs acted as key FX suppliers during April 6–7 and June 15–19 stress periods, supplying over 83 percent of daily USD sales (USD 1.1 billion) on April 6–7.
  - Between April and December, SOBs recorded net FX sales of USD 1.1 billion while private and foreign banks were net buyers.
  - Market structure: SOBs typically net sellers; private/foreign banks net buyers; on normal days both trade at margins of 2–3 piasters; in stress SOBs sell larger amounts at deeper discounts.
  - Interpretation: asymmetric dynamics—SOBs play stabilizing role during shocks via FX liquidity provision, reinforcing role in FX intervention under stress rather than as part of regular exchange rate management.
- Banking sector performance and composition:
  - Banks’ net foreign assets (NFA) rebounded by August 2025 and stood at USD 10.9 billion in October 2025.
  - Bank assets grew by 24 percent y/y by June 2025; investments in government securities grew 36 percent.
  - Gross NPLs: 2 percent as of end-September 2025; ROA around 2.6 percent.
  - Lending to private sector: less than 43 percent of total lending and declining since 2020.
  - Elevated exposures and concentration raise concerns about monetary transmission, market fragmentation, banking liquidity concentration, and increased risk premiums.
- Supervisory actions and SBs:
  - CBE commissioned independent assessments for NBE and Bank Misr; one assessment completed, the second outstanding.
  - CBE to instruct the two SOBs to close identified gaps by end-September 2026; CBE to prepare corrective action plan by end-March 2026 (new SB) and deliver final status report by end-September 2026 (new SB).

### Public finances, debt management, and gross financing needs
- Fiscal outturn and composition:
  - Budget sector primary balance (excluding net acquisition of financial assets) increased to 3.6 percent of GDP in FY2024/25 from 2.4 percent the previous year.
  - Tax revenues increased by 0.43 ppt of GDP; taxes on T-bills/bonds’ payable interest contributed approximately 0.48 percent of GDP; taxes on goods and services contributed approximately 0.15 percent of GDP; taxes on corporate profits declined by 0.36 percent of GDP.
  - In absence of divestment proceeds, primary balance fell short by around 0.6 percent of GDP.
- Debt and financing:
  - Public debt declined from 97.2 percent of GDP in FY2023/24 to 91.8 percent in FY2024/25.
  - Projected to fall below 75 percent by 2031 (various projections in tables).
  - Gross financing needs (GFN) expected to remain around 40 percent of GDP over next three years; GFN projected to hover around 40 percent of GDP over next three years in outlook.
  - Interest payments absorb roughly 83 percent of tax revenues (noted in debt management section); automatic debt dynamics and effective interest rates cited in debt tables.
  - Debt consolidation baseline and projections: actual 2025 public debt 91.8 percent of GDP; projected path shows decline over 2027–2036 under baseline.
- Measures to reduce GFNs:
  - Strategy: debt swap operations with institutional holders to roll maturing short-term debt into longer-term instruments and equity claims (backed by land); a new weekly sukuk issuance program with 3–5 year maturities; allocation of full proceeds from Qatari deal and 50 percent of future divestment proceeds to debt reduction.
  - Expected GFN reduction: about 6 percent of GDP in FY2025/26, plus further 4 percent in FY2026/27 (total 10 percent cumulatively).
  - Institutional reforms: establish a dedicated Debt Management Office (DMO) and publish MTDS and FY2025/26 ABP.

### Key public finance and program arithmetic (selected figures preserved)
- Primary balance (including NAFA, percent of GDP): 2023/24 = 1.3; 2024/25 = 1.6; 2025/26 = 6.2; 2026/27 = 4.4.
- Gross budget sector debt (percent of GDP, memorandum): 2023/24 = 92.3; 2024/25 = 87.7; 2025/26 = 84.5; 2026/27 = 83.7; 2030/31 = 72.3.
- Gross financing needs (percent of GDP): 2025 actual = 35.3; 2026 = 43.0; 2027 = 39.8; 2028 = 40.8; 2029 = 36.3; 2030 = 32.1.
- Public investment: FY2024/25 total public investment EGP 924 billion; public investment ceiling FY2025/26 set at EGP 1,158 billion; public investment–to–GDP ratio at 5.4 percent.

### Macroeconomic outlook and projections (selected)
- Real GDP (annual change, in percent):
  - 2024/25 (Proj.): 3.6; 2025/26 (Proj.): 4.4; 2026/27 (Proj.): 4.1; 2027/28 (Proj.): 4.7; 2028/29 (Proj.): 5.4; 2029/30 (Proj.): 5.7; 2030/31 (Proj.): 5.2.
- CPI inflation (end-of-period, in percent):
  - 2024/25 (Proj.): 16.6; 2025/26 (Proj.): 14.9; 2026/27 (Proj.): 13.4; 2027/28 (Proj.): 11.7; 2028/29 (Proj.): 8.7; 2029/30 (Proj.): 7.0; 2030/31 (Proj.): 5.3.
- Current account (percent of GDP):
  - 2024/25: -5.8; 2025/26: -4.2; 2026/27: -3.4; medium-term narrowing projected to around -3 percent of GDP.
- Official reserves (US$, selected projections):
  - 2024/25: 32.8; 2025/26: 44.3; 2026/27: 44.9; 2027/28: 46.4; 2028/29: 49.2; 2029/30: 51.3; 2030/31: 52.6.

### Divestment and State Ownership Policy (SOP) — implementation and implications
- SOP aims to exit non-strategic sectors by 2027 and level the playing field.
- Recent progress and pipeline:
  - No material divestment over last 24 months; new military entities created.
  - Identified four major transactions for financial closure before program end with expected proceeds US$1.5 billion (about half to budget).
  - Qatari land sale US$3.5 billion proceeds used to reduce budget-sector debt.
  - Aggregate proceeds (US$1.5 billion + US$3.5 billion) fall short of US$6.5 billion original objective.
- Institutional changes:
  - Law No. 170 of 2025 establishes an SOE unit under the Prime Minister’s Office to triage SOEs; Government Offerings Unit and Sovereign Fund roles defined.
  - SOP monitoring framework with indicator weights: SOP implementation 60 percent; business climate improvements 20 percent; macroeconomic impact 20 percent; first release January 2026, semiannual thereafter.
- IMF staff view:
  - Accelerating privatization/divestment could deliver up to three times greater and longer-lasting dividends than first-generation governance and business regulation reforms alone.
  - Recommend clear mandates, strong governance, central data repository, and full integration of SOEs into fiscal risk analysis.

### Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) and climate-related reforms
- RSF performance: strong; authorities completed both RM1 and RM2 by June 2025.
- RSF reform areas:
  - Energy and electricity reforms: renewable energy implementation plan through 2030 (RM1 delivered); objective to reach 30 percent renewable-energy target by 2030 in Cabinet plan.
  - Disaster risk management: develop disaster risk financing plan and integrate climate fiscal risks (RM5 in progress).
  - Financial sector resilience to climate shocks: CBE directive on banks monitoring exposures to CBAM-related transition risks (RM2 delivered); further ESRMS frameworks under development (RM6 in progress).
  - Public investment management: embed climate criteria in project selection and appraisal (RM3 and RM4 in progress).
- Climate and energy measures:
  - Retail fuel price increases: EGP 2 on April 11 and EGP 2 on October 17 (cumulative increases of 11–15 percent depending on product); automatic retail fuel indexation mechanism to resume end-Q2 2026.
  - Estimated hydrocarbon subsidy reduction from implemented price adjustments: about EGP 97 billion (0.5 percent of GDP) in FY25/26.
  - Renewable and grid milestones in 2025: 1 GW solar financial close with Scatec; 900 MW wind PPA; commissioning of 300 MWh battery energy storage system.
- MRV, CBAM, and industrial decarbonization actions underway; first Biennial Transparency Report (BTR1) published late 2025.

### Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) — selected risks and recommended policy responses
- Global risks with Relative Likelihood = High:
  - Escalating trade measures and prolonged uncertainty — Impact: High. Responses: allow exchange rate to act as shock absorber; implement structural reforms; improve SOE governance/transparency.
  - Financial market volatility and correction — Impact: Medium. Responses: implement MTDS/MTRS; reprioritize spending; allow exchange rate flexibility.
  - Geopolitical tensions and commodity price volatility — Impact: High. Responses: strengthen social safety nets; exchange rate flexibility; diversify exports.
- Domestic risks:
  - Failure to allow exchange rate flexibility — Relative Likelihood: Medium; Impact: High. Response: allow two-way market-determined FX movements.
  - Slower-than-expected structural reform implementation, including divestment — Relative Likelihood: Medium; Impact: Medium/High. Response: re-invigorate structural reform agenda, prioritize SOE reform, competition, trade facilitation.
  - Materialization of fiscal contingent liabilities — Relative Likelihood: Medium; Impact: Medium/High. Response: improve transparency and governance of EAs and SOEs; prohibit CBE lending to public agencies excluding MoF.
- Sovereign risk and DSA summary:
  - Public debt assessed as sustainable but not with high probability; overall risks of sovereign stress assessed as high.
  - Medium-term risks: high (GFN module signals high average gross financing needs and large claims of domestic banks on government).
  - Contingent liabilities: publicly-guaranteed debt EGP 5,379 billion as of June 2025.

### Reporting, monitoring, and TMU key features
- TMU defines program exchange rates for test dates, definitions of NIR, primary balance, tax revenues, QPCs, ITs, and SBs.
- Key TMU figures and rules (selected):
  - As of end-November 2025, foreign reserve assets defined in TMU: US$56,518 million; foreign reserve-related liabilities: US$19,648 million.
  - Program disbursement projections (excluding IMF): US$ 1,993 million as of end-March 2026; US$ 4,387 million as of end-June 2026.
  - Program assumptions for cumulative flows of local currency T-bills and T-bonds held by nonresidents: US$ 5,458 million for end-March 2026; US$ 5,708 million for end-June 2026; US$ 250 million for end-September 2026.
  - Ceiling on outstanding stock of MoF Notes as at end-December 2025: EGP 650 billion.
  - CBE bank-by-bank FX NFA at end-November 2025: - US$11.9 billion; consultation trigger: cumulative $2 billion decline over any past three-month period.

*Source: International Monetary Fund — Executive Summary and chapter excerpts from 1egyea2026001 (February 12–25, 2026).*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### 1egyea2026001 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Context
- Adequately tight monetary and fiscal policies, together with exchange rate flexibility, have helped restore macroeconomic stability.
- Limited progress on deeper reforms, especially the stalled divestment agenda, continues to weigh on medium-term growth, keeps gross financing needs high, and constrains fiscal space for priority social spending, putting key program objectives at risk.
- With less than a year remaining under the program, the scope for corrective action is increasingly narrow.
- Authorities’ planned reforms highlighted as necessary steps:
  - reduce the state footprint and level the playing field;
  - adopt a more comprehensive active debt management strategy;
  - strengthen risk management in state-owned banks.

### Program Performance
- Performance vis-a-vis macro-stabilization targets:
  - Met the end-June 2025 QPCs on NIR and tax revenues, and the continuous PC on the non-accumulation of external arrears.
  - On the CBE overdraft, all the end-June and end-December QPCs and the end-September IT were met.
  - Missed the end-September IT and end-December QPC on NIR due to lack of FX purchases by the CBE; CBE commitment to a newly established FX reserve accumulation framework is expected to bring NIR back onto its programmed path.
  - Repayment of the legacy stock of central bank lending to public agencies progressed more slowly than planned, resulting in missing the end-June 2025 QPC and end-September IT; corrective actions helped meet the end-December QPC.
  - CBE adopted a tight monetary stance, driving inflation consistently below the MPCC upper outer band; however inflation breached the MPCC upper inner band at end-June, end-September, and end-December 2025, largely reflecting increases in administered prices and services.
- Performance on state footprint, debt reduction, and revenue mobilization:
  - Shortfalls in divestment led to a miss of the end-June 2025 primary balance QPC.
  - The end-June IT on the debt ceiling was not met.
  - Corrective action: authorities used all the proceeds of a US$3.5 billion real estate deal with Qatar to reduce budget-sector debt.
- Structural benchmarks:
  - Twelve of the 14 structural benchmarks were met.
  - Preparation of the FY26/27 tax package (due in November) will be delivered as a prior action.
  - Corrective action underway to improve the coverage and depth of SOE annual reporting (remaining unmet SB).
- Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF):
  - Performance under the RSF has been strong.
  - Authorities completed both reform measures due by June 2025 (RM1 and RM2).
  - Progress ongoing on remaining reform measures, supported by technical assistance.

### Recent Developments
- Growth and activity:
  - FY2024/25 GDP expanded by 4.4 percent y/y, compared to 2.4 percent in the previous year.
  - Momentum into Q1 FY2025/26: growth accelerated to 5.3 percent y/y, up from 3.5 percent y/y in Q1 FY2024/25.
  - Recovery broad-based: robust non-oil manufacturing, transportation, finance, and tourism; declines in Suez Canal activity and mining/extraction sectors offset by other gains.
  - High-frequency indicators: PMI recorded consecutive expansions in November and December 2025 — first back-to-back monthly expansions in more than five years.
  - Suez Canal trade activity gradually recovering; air travel and hotel occupancy rates increasing; exports, imports, and remittances showing solid gains.
- Inflation and monetary stance:
  - Headline urban inflation reached 12.3 percent y/y in December 2025.
  - Core inflation fell from 26.6 percent at end-FY2023/24 to 11.8 percent by December 2025.
- Exchange rate and external environment:
  - Since April, the nominal exchange rate fluctuated significantly with an initial depreciation followed by appreciation as market conditions and capital inflows improved.
  - Official rate fluctuated within EGP/USD 46.99–51.75 range between April and December 2025, peaking on April 6 and appreciating to its strongest level since May 2024 in November 2025.
  - Spread with parallel market measures remained closed, with no FX backlogs or CBE interventions.
  - Exchange rate volatility reached its highest since April 2024, with sharp spikes during events such as the April 2 U.S. tariff announcement and June 22 strikes on Iran.
  - Nonresident inflows into the domestic LC T-bill/bond market continued, reaching record highs by end-2025.

### Medium-term reform gaps and commitments
- Three major reform areas where progress has been slow:
  - Reducing the State Footprint and Leveling the Playing Field:
    - Divestment progress has fallen short of commitments at program approval; prospects for acceleration in the near term appear limited.
    - Military encroachment in economic activities appears to persist.
    - Authorities removed tax exemptions for SOEs and are seeking amendments to the Competition Law to enhance the Egyptian Competition Authority; implementation will require additional efforts.
  - Reducing Debt Vulnerabilities:
    - Debt reduction strategy pillars: sustained primary surpluses, use of proceeds from state asset sales to reduce debt, and lengthening maturities.
    - Authorities delivered planned primary adjustment, but divestment stalled and gains from maturity lengthening have been modest.
    - Debt remains sustainable, but not with high probability; gross financing needs are elevated.
    - Interest payments absorb about 73 percent of revenues.
    - Authorities committed to reducing gross financing needs by 6 percent of GDP by FY2025/26 and by 10 percent of GDP, cumulatively, by FY2026/27 (new structural benchmark).
    - Need for a more ambitious liability management strategy focused on extending maturities and lowering interest service costs.
  - Reforming the Financial Sector:
    - Significant presence of state-owned banks underscores need for strong governance frameworks.
    - Authorities commissioned an independent assessment of policies, procedures, and controls at state-owned banks.
    - Commitment to strengthening risk management practices at state-owned banks in line with diagnostic studies (new structural benchmark).

### Policy recommendations
- Macroeconomic priorities:
  - Greater exchange rate flexibility.
  - Completing disinflation.
  - Pursuing revenue-led fiscal consolidation supported by a comprehensive debt management strategy.
- Structural priorities with macroeconomic stability in place:
  - Accelerate structural reforms to transition to a more dynamic, resilient, and inclusive growth model.
  - Advance the State Ownership Policy to reduce the state footprint and level the playing field.
  - Strengthen state-owned bank governance.
  - Introduce a climate agenda that addresses growing adaptation and mitigation needs.
- Implementation caveat:
  - The transition and related benefits will not be achieved without more decisive and forceful reforms.

### Modification of conditionality and program requests
- Staff supports authorities’ request to extend the EFF arrangement through December 15, 2026, bringing total duration to 48 months, and a corresponding extension of the RSF arrangement, with rephasing of access under both arrangements.
- Staff supports requests for:
  - A waiver for the non-observance of the end-December 2025 QPC on the floor of NIR.
  - Introduction of a QPC ceiling on the share of total local currency financing conducted via non-market modalities.
- Additional program adjustments:
  - Seven new structural benchmarks proposed to support implementation of critical reforms: authorities’ tax reform, GFN reduction plan, reflecting results of the study of state-owned banks, and refocused structural agenda.
- Implementation and enterprise risks are significant.

### Risks and political context
- Domestic and geopolitical uncertainties pose risks to program implementation.
- Parliamentary elections began in November 2025; newly constituted parliament convened first session on January 12.
- Current government and approved program remain in force per constitutional provisions; a cabinet reshuffle remains possible and could affect pace and continuity of implementation.
- Regional geopolitical shocks remain a key risk; to date economic impact has been largely concentrated in persistent and significant shortfalls in Suez Canal revenues.

*International Monetary Fund — Executive Summary for ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, February 12, 2026*

### 8. State-owned banks (SOBs) continued to play a central role in smoothing exchange rate

### 8. State-owned banks (SOBs) continued to play a central role in smoothing exchange rate

### SOB behavior during stress episodes
- SOBs acted as key FX suppliers during two distinct periods of heightened volatility: April 6–7 and the week of June 15–19, selling heavily without appearing to target a specific EGP/USD level.
- These two major negative shocks coincided with the highest FX turnover days, driven by large foreign outflows from the LC T-bill market.
- SOBs provided over 83 percent of daily USD sales (USD 1.1 billion) on April 6–7 after the tariff announcement.
- Between April and December, SOBs recorded net FX sales of USD 1.1 billion, while private and foreign banks were net buyers.
- Market structure and intraday behavior:
  - High concentration and segmentation: SOBs typically net sellers; private and foreign banks net buyers.
  - On normal days both trade at small margins of 2–3 piasters.
  - In stress periods SOBs sell larger amounts and at deeper discounts, while private banks adjust prices more aggressively with their positions.
- Interpretation:
  - Evidence points to asymmetric dynamics with some SOBs playing a stabilizing role during shocks through FX liquidity provision, reinforcing their role in FX intervention under stress rather than as part of regular exchange rate management.
  - Private banks respond flexibly to market conditions.

### FX turnover, reserves, and external flows
- Nonresident holdings surged to US$32.8 billion at the end of 2025, doubling in one year.
- Net international reserves (NIR) rose to US$36.9 billion at end-November, up by US$4.2 billion since the end of 2024.
- Egypt issued US$3 billion in Eurobonds and Sukuks during FY2024/25, and a $1.5 billion in Sukuks in October 2025.
- A US$3.5 billion investment agreement was signed in November for acquisition of land as part of a larger US$29.7 billion project; settlement in cash occurred at end-December 2025. Implementation timeline not disclosed.

### Fiscal outturn and domestic financing
- Budget sector primary balance (excluding net acquisition of financial assets) increased to 3.6 percent of GDP in FY2024/25 from 2.4 percent the previous year.
  - Driven by a decline in primary expenditure of 1.05 percent of GDP and a 0.16 percent of GDP increase in revenues and grants.
- Tax revenue composition changes:
  - Tax revenues increased by 0.43 ppt of GDP.
  - Taxes on T-bills/bonds’ payable interest and taxes on goods and services contributed approximately 0.48 and 0.15 percent of GDP, respectively.
  - Taxes on corporate profits declined by 0.36 percent of GDP owing to lower taxes from EGPC and Suez Canal Authority.
- In absence of divestment proceeds (included in program’s primary balance target), the primary balance fell short of the program target by around 0.6 percent of GDP.
- Current account:
  - CAD narrowed to 4.2 percent of GDP in FY2024/25 from 5.4 percent of GDP the previous year.
  - Remittances rose from 5.7 to 9.9 percent of GDP.
  - Tourism receipts rose from 3.8 to 4.6 percent of GDP.
  - Nonhydrocarbon trade deficit widened by 1.9 percent of GDP.
- Domestic LC financing shift:
  - Share of private placements (including MoF Notes) in LC financing fell from around 80 percent to below 30 percent.
  - Average auction maturity at issuance rose to 1 year from 0.52 years a year ago.
  - Outstanding medium-term T-bonds close to 13 percent of overall LC portfolio by end-July 2025, up from 2 percent a year ago.

### Banking system performance and composition
- Banks’ net foreign assets (NFA) rebounded by August 2025 and stood at USD 10.9 billion in October 2025 (record high since 2020).
- Bank assets grew by 24 percent year-on-year by June 2025, with 36 percent growth in investments in government securities.
- Asset quality and profitability:
  - Gross NPLs at 2 percent as of end-September 2025.
  - ROA rose to around 2.6 percent.
- Lending composition and risks:
  - Lending to the private sector remains subdued at less than 43 percent of total lending and on a declining trend since 2020.
  - Banks’ assets heavily concentrated in government securities, increasingly tilted in 2025 towards T-bills and fewer bonds.
- Elevated exposures and concentration raise concerns about monetary transmission, market fragmentation, banking liquidity concentration, and increased risk premiums.

### Outlook and risks
- Growth projections:
  - Growth projected to reach 4.7 percent in FY2025/26.
  - Medium-term growth expected to accelerate to 5.7 percent by FY2027/28.
  - Growth projected to taper to about 4.8 percent by FY2029/30 without deeper structural changes.
- Inflation: projected to maintain downward trajectory, converging toward CBE’s target over the medium term.
- Debt and financing:
  - Debt-to-GDP ratio projected to decline due to sustained primary surpluses and favorable interest-growth differentials driven by external deleveraging.
  - Gross financing needs (GFN) projected to hover around 40 percent of GDP over the next three years.
  - Interest burden and rollover risks remain elevated.
- Current account and reserves projections:
  - CAD projected to narrow to 3.8 percent of GDP in FY2025/26.
  - NIR projected to rise to US$ 43.5 billion, equivalent to 108 percent of the ARA metric.
  - CAD projected to narrow to 3 percent of GDP in the medium term; NIR projected to continue rising, conditional on a flexible exchange rate regime.
- Risk assessment:
  - Downside risks include insufficient action on energy sector sustainability, large gross financing needs, slow structural reform implementation, global commodity price volatility, greater pass-through from administered price adjustments, unanchored expectations, and tighter global financial conditions.
  - Upside risks include faster pickup in Suez Canal activity, rebound in hydrocarbon production, and Gulf-backed mega projects supporting FDI.

### Program performance and structural reforms
- Program targets and QPCs:
  - Controlling QPCs for 5th and 6th reviews are end-December 2025 QPCs.
  - Authorities met end-June 2025 QPCs on NIR and tax revenues, and the continuous PC on non-accumulation of external arrears.
  - Some end-September and end-December QPCs and ITs on NIR were missed due to lower-than-projected government external market debt issuance and absence of CBE FX purchases.
  - CBE committed to a newly established FX reserve accumulation framework expected to bring NIR back onto programmed path.
- Divestment and debt-reduction targets:
  - Shortfalls in divestment led to missing the end-June 2025 primary balance QPC and the end-June IT on the debt ceiling.
  - Corrective measure: finalized a US$3.5 billion real estate deal with Qatar; proceeds received in late December 2025 were allocated to reducing budget-sector debt.
- Structural benchmarks:
  - Authorities met twelve of fourteen structural benchmarks.
  - Of six recurring SBs, one remains unmet: aggregate annual reports on Egypt’s SOE portfolio do not cover all SOEs under the State Ownership Policy and lack sufficient financial and governance detail.
  - Law No. 170 of 2025 establishes an SOE unit under the Prime Minister’s Office to create a centralized SOE database.
  - Of eight non-recurring SBs, one was not met and converted into a prior action: adoption of a tax package of high-quality measures yielding 1 percent of GDP to be secured as a prior action.
- RSF performance:
  - Authorities completed both reform measures due by June 2025 (RM1 and RM2).
  - Progress ongoing on remaining reform measures with technical assistance support.

### Policy recommendations and priorities
- Exchange rate and FX intervention:
  - Maintain exchange rate flexibility as first line of defense against external shocks.
  - Strengthen CBE’s FX intervention framework to ensure interventions are transparent, undertaken by the CBE, limited to disorderly market conditions, and firmly anchored within CBE’s regulatory and policy mandate.
  - Review CBE’s FX intervention rule and budget using transaction-level data; consider complementary FX risk management instruments (forwards, swaps, repos).
- Monetary policy:
  - Monetary policy should remain adequately restrictive to ensure disinflationary pressures become firmly entrenched, preserve market confidence, and reduce risks.
- Fiscal and structural reforms:
  - Prioritize revenue-led fiscal consolidation supported by comprehensive debt management strategy.
  - Contain public investment while protecting priority spending.
  - Strengthen SOE bank governance, implement State Ownership Policy effectively, and level the playing field further.
- Public sector financing and debt management:
  - Continue shift toward auction modalities and lengthen maturities to reduce reliance on short-term non-market securities.
  - Gradually reduce the outstanding stock of CBE lending to public sector agencies outside the MoF to zero by end-June 2029.
- Banking and market functioning:
  - Address banking liquidity concentration, improve monetary transmission, and reduce market fragmentation to lower elevated real rates and risk premiums.

*Source: IMF staff summary of chapter "8. State-owned banks (SOBs) continued to play a central role in smoothing exchange rate" from the provided PDF content.*

### 22. Staff emphasized the importance of continuing ongoing efforts to strengthen the

### 1egyea2026001 - 22. Staff emphasized the importance of continuing ongoing efforts to strengthen the

### A. FX Reserves
- Headline reserves remain adequate, however external risks remain important.
- External risks cited: exposure to fluctuations in commodity prices, shocks to tourism and remittances, and potential reversal of portfolio inflows amid record nonresident holdings of mostly short-term local-currency debt.
- The CBE agreed in principle to the introduction of a market-based reserve accumulation program to support the achievement of the program’s NIR targets.
- Staff cautioned against reliance on CBE commercial borrowing for reserves accumulation.
- Staff emphasized that transparent, market-based FX purchases should remain the primary tool for building high-quality reserves.

### B. Fiscal Policy — FY2025/26 and FY2026/27
- FY2025/26 budget targets a primary balance (excluding net acquisition of financial assets) of 4 percent of GDP.
- Approved budget revenue projections are not fully aligned with program tax revenue targets; authorities reaffirmed commitment to meeting program tax targets.
- Authorities submitted to parliament a tax package yielding 1 percent of GDP as agreed at the time of the 4th review; withholding tax on free zones sales to the domestic market and the real estate tax have not yet been approved by Parliament (Text Table 1).
- Authorities committed to seek approval of amendments to these pending items in the context of the FY26/27 budget discussions starting in March 2026, with Parliamentary approval expected by end-June 2026.
- Interim measure: temporarily reallocate to the Ministry of Finance the portion of the Free Zone turnover tax accruing to the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI).
- Increases in revenue from higher tobacco prices starting in January are expected to further contribute to closing the revenue gap resulting from the delayed approval.
- Authorities committed to further consolidation of 1 percent of GDP to reach a primary surplus (excluding net acquisition of financial assets) of 5 percent of GDP in FY2026/27.
- FY2026/27 consolidation will be supported by legislation of another tax package including: further removal of VAT exemptions, transfer pricing taxation, and a dividend tax on SOE distributable profits.
- Program objective: increase the tax-to-GDP by 2 percent over FY2024/25-FY2026/27.
- Cabinet approval for the FY2026/27 tax package will be secured as prior action; package to be submitted to Parliament by end of March 2026.
- FY2026/27 tax package and remaining tax measures originally planned for FY2025/26 will be included in the FY2026/27 budget and Parliamentary approval will be secured by end-June 2026 (new structural benchmark).

### C. Energy Pricing, Subsidies, and Social Spending
- Authorities achieved cost recovery for all products covered under the retail fuel indexation mechanism (gasoline 95, 92 and 80, diesel and mazut).
- Retail gasoline and diesel prices were raised by EGP 2 in April and again in October, equivalent to cumulative increases of 11–15 percent depending on product.
- Automatic fuel price indexation mechanism will resume at the end of the second quarter of 2026.
- As a result of price adjustments already implemented (including fuel, diesel, Mazut, LPG and gas), hydrocarbon subsidies are projected to decline by about EGP 97 billion, or 0.5 percent of GDP, in FY25/26.
- Social spending increases:
  - Takaful and Karama (T&K) spending rose from EGP 43 billion in FY2024/25 to EGP 54 billion in FY2025/26.
  - In-kind support for beneficiaries increased from EGP 6 billion to EGP 31.2 billion.
  - The T&K programs currently cover 4.67 million households (roughly 17 million individuals).
- Overall, cash and in-kind social spending for T&K beneficiaries projected to rise from about 0.3 percent of GDP in FY2024/25 to 0.4 percent of GDP in FY2025/26.

### D. Public Investment and EGPC Reforms
- Total public investment in FY2024/25 amounted to EGP 924 billion.
- Public investment ceiling for FY2025/26 set at EGP 1,158 billion.
- Public investment–to–GDP ratio currently at 5.4 percent of GDP.
- Authorities committed to strengthening evaluation and prioritization of public investment projects, including public–private partnerships.
- EGPC reform package (Cabinet approved March 2025) includes:
  - Fuel, gas, and electricity price adjustments to achieve full cost recovery for retail fuels by end-2025.
  - Budget allocations of EGP 75 billion to EGPC and EGP 75 billion to the electricity company (EEHC) to clear arrears.
  - Initiatives to boost domestic oil and gas production and exports; continued expansion of renewable energy.
- Outcomes noted:
  - EGPC’s arrears to international suppliers declined from US$6.2 billion in October 2024 to about US$2 billion by December 2025.
  - Expected outcomes: strengthen EGPC’s liquidity and profitability, reduce government guarantees to EGPC, currently at 18 percent of GDP, by 25 percent in FY2026/27, and increase revenues through higher production, energy price adjustments, and improved collections.

### E. Debt Management — Stock, Risks, and Strategy
- Public debt dynamics:
  - Debt declined from 97.2 percent of GDP in FY2023/24 to 91.8 percent in FY2024/25.
  - Projected to fall below 75 percent by 2031.
- Risks and pressures:
  - Gross financing needs expected to remain around 40 percent of GDP over the next three years and above 30 percent in the medium term.
  - Interest payments absorb roughly 83 percent of tax revenues.
  - Heavy reliance on short-term domestic debt (about 60 percent of total domestic debt) increases rollover and interest rate risks.
- Program shortfalls: slow execution of divestment agenda; marginal results on lengthening maturities; baseline fiscal adjustment alone insufficient to restore key metrics.
- Measures to reduce GFNs and rollout:
  - Strategy includes (i) debt swap operations with key institutional holders to roll over maturing short-term debt with longer-term debt and equity claims on sovereign assets (backed by land), (ii) a new weekly sukuk issuance program with 3–5 year maturity instruments, and (iii) allocation of the full proceeds from the Qatari investment deal, and 50 percent of all future divestment proceeds, towards debt reduction.
  - These measures are expected to reduce gross financing needs by about 6 percent of GDP in FY2025/26, with additional measures planned to deliver a further 4 percent reduction of GDP reduction in FY2026/27 (new structural benchmark).
  - Authorities agreed on a more ambitious calibration of the indicative target on issuance maturities from December 2025 onwards, supported by expanded issuance of longer-term bonds and sukuks.
  - Introduction of a new QPC target improving the quality of financing through a ceiling on the share of non-market local currency debt.
- Institutional and reporting reforms:
  - Priority reforms include establishing a dedicated Debt Management Office with exclusive mandate over the entire public debt portfolio.
  - Authorities to publish a multi-year medium-term debt management strategy (MTDS) and the FY2025/26 Annual Borrowing Plan (ABP) in January.
  - Quarterly public debt reporting (a recurring structural benchmark) has been strengthened by expanding coverage of domestic financing instruments, including auction results, private placements, and overdraft borrowing.

### F. Financial Sector Policies
- Strengthening governance practices and competition in the banking sector is a key priority, given the large presence of state-owned banks.
- The CBE commissioned independent assessments of policies, procedures, and controls of the two biggest state-owned banks by two internationally recognized firms in February 2025 (terms of reference prepared in consultation with IMF staff).
  - One assessment completed; the second assessment outstanding.
  - Draft results of one study were made available to IMF staff in early December 2025 and transmitted to the SOB’s senior management for factual corrections.
  - Second study findings were expected to be delivered to IMF staff by early February 2026.
- Supervisory and remedial actions and deadlines:
  - CBE plans to instruct the two SOBs, as their supervisory authority, to close identified gaps in risk management practices by end-September 2026.
  - The CBE will prepare the details of the corrective action plan for the two SOBs by end-March 2026 (new structural benchmark).
  - The CBE will deliver a final status report by end-September 2026 detailing progress on the status of the corrective action plan, including addressing any potential regulatory breaches identified by the studies (new structural benchmark).

*Source: 1egyea2026001 - 22. Staff emphasized the importance of continuing ongoing efforts to strengthen the — https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1egyea2026001.pdf*

### 35.  Divestment, a key pillar of the State Ownership Policy (SOP), has stalled, precluding

### 35.  Divestment, a key pillar of the State Ownership Policy (SOP), has stalled, precluding

### SOP objectives, implementation status, and divestment outcomes
- SOP aims: encourage private sector activity by reducing the state’s economic footprint through divestment, leveling the playing field, and improving the business environment.
- SOP target: exit from non-strategic sectors by 2027.
- Implementation status:
  - No material divestment has occurred over the last 24 months, while new military entities were created.
  - Authorities’ divestment strategy appears to increasingly focus on selling non-controlling stakes and introducing airport management and operations concessions, which would limit resources for debt reduction.
- Identified major transactions:
  - Authorities have identified four major transactions for financial closure before the end of the program.
  - Expected proceeds from divestment amount to US$1.5 billion, roughly half of which is anticipated to be allocated to the budget.
  - Qatari land sale valued at US$3.5 billion (full proceeds to go to debt reduction).
  - Aggregate proceeds (US$1.5 billion + US$3.5 billion) fall short of the US$6.5 billion required to meet the program’s original divestment objective.
  - Observation: the full Qatari land-sale proceeds will go to debt reduction but do little to level the playing field between SOEs and the private sector.

### Institutional reforms and governance arrangements
- New institutional architecture:
  - New SOE unit established under the Prime Minister’s Office, already headed by a CEO, responsible for triaging state-owned companies.
  - Non-strategic and market-ready firms → Government Offerings Unit (established in 2023 under the Prime Minister’s Office) for listing on the stock exchange.
  - Entities deemed strategic or with potential for value maximization → Sovereign Fund of Egypt.
  - Companies requiring further restructuring → remain under the new SOE unit’s oversight.
- Strengthening oversight:
  - Efforts underway to strengthen the Fiscal Risk Unit within the Ministry of Finance.
  - Authorities are updating the SOP to reflect recent institutional developments and newly established priorities (new end-March 2026 structural benchmark).
  - Recommended safeguards for new architecture:
    - Ensure clear mandates, strong governance, and fiscal and financial oversight within the new SOE institutional architecture.
    - Establish robust reporting requirements based on a central data repository accessible to all stakeholders.
    - Ensure all SOEs across entities remain fully integrated into fiscal risk analysis, with regular publication of consolidated financial information.

### Expected economic impact of structural reforms and role of accelerated divestment
- IMF staff analysis (Annex III) conclusions:
  - Reforms focused on governance, business regulation, and external liberalization could generate positive but modest and potentially temporary output gains.
  - Business regulation reforms require complementary credit market reforms to deliver sustained benefits.
  - Accelerating privatization and divestment could deliver up to three times greater and longer-lasting dividends, helping Egypt align more closely to frontier emerging-market peers.
- Authorities’ National Narrative for Economic Development:
  - Aims to shift toward a more competitive, private-sector-driven economy by focusing on governance, business regulation, and external liberalization.

### Structural benchmarks, trade facilitation, and digitalization measures
- Trade facilitation:
  - Streamlined risk-based control systems among border authorities (end-April 2025 structural benchmark).
  - Customs clearance times at ports reduced from 16 days in 2021 to 5.8 days, with a target of 2 days by Q1 2026.
  - Cabinet to submit to Parliament amendments to Article 39 of the Customs Law (Law No. 207 of 2020) to make advance customs clearance mandatory (new end-February 2026 structural benchmark).
- Digitalization and business environment:
  - Establishment of a fully digital Integrated Economic Entities Platform to streamline business registration, licensing, and operations.
  - Authorities will publish, by end-June 2026, an action plan to review and reengineer procedures for establishing a business across 275 economic activities, based on an inception report prepared by a competitively selected consultant (new end-2026 structural benchmark).
  - Quarterly updates will track progress, including the number of reengineered activities.
- SOP monitoring framework:
  - Added an indicator related to divestment (end-March 2025 structural benchmark).
  - Indicator components and weights:
    - (i) SOP implementation, tracking divestment, state’s footprint reduction, and competitive neutrality (60 percent weight);
    - (ii) business climate improvements (20 percent);
    - (iii) overall macroeconomic impact (20 percent).
  - First release in January 2026; will be published semiannually.
  - Authorities published a report detailing SOEs’ tax collections following the removal of special exemptions, including CIT, VAT, and others; and have issued cabinet level instructions to budgetary units and designated SOEs to provide procurement data to the GAGS.

### Program financing, risks, and implications for divestment objectives
- Financing and proceeds:
  - Total financing needed to reach NIR targets is about US$13 billion for FY2025/26 and US$4 billion in FY2026/27, including IMF purchases.
  - Firm financing commitments secured for budget support: about US$4.4 billion in FY2025/26 and US$2.5 billion in FY2026/27.
  - December 2025: US$3.5 billion received from the sale of land rights to Qatar.
  - Divestment proceeds expected to reach US$1.5 billion by end-June 2026.
  - Firm assurances that US$18.3 billion in GCC official deposits at the CBE will not be withdrawn before the EFF concludes in December 2026, except for equity purchases, with FX proceeds retained in CBE’s foreign reserves.
- Program adjustments:
  - Staff supports authorities’ request to extend the EFF arrangement to December 15, 2026, bringing total duration to 48 months.
  - Proposed rephasing of access and purchases:
    - Completion of combined 5th and 6th reviews → total purchases of SDR 1,465.44 million.
    - Each of the 7th and 8th reviews → purchase of SDR 1,113 million.
  - Authorities request a waiver for non-observance of end-December 2025 QPCs on the floor of NIR.
  - Authorities request to introduce a QPC ceiling on the share of total local currency financing activities conducted via non-market modalities.
  - Seven new structural benchmarks proposed to support tax reform, GFN reduction plan, results of the study of state-owned banks, and the refocused structural agenda.
- Risks to capacity to repay the Fund:
  - Outstanding IMF credit expected to rise to SDR 9.17 billion by end of program in December 2026, about one third below level at program inception.
  - Fund credit outstanding, including projected purchases, will peak in 2026/27 at 2.6 percent of GDP, equivalent to around 14.4 percent of exports of goods and services and 18.3 percent of gross international reserves.
  - Total debt service to the Fund will peak at 4.8 percent of exports of goods and services and 5.8 percent of gross international reserves in 2025/26.
  - Risks include commodity price shocks, policy slippages leading to higher trade deficits, disruptive capital outflows, and materialization of significant contingent liabilities from SOEs.
  - Egypt’s stock of gross and net international reserves exceeds its obligations to the Fund, providing a buffer for repayments.
- Enterprise and operational risks:
  - Incomplete program implementation, high debt levels, reliance on short-term domestic financing, outstanding structural reform gaps, and data/ non-standard accounting practices remain risks.
  - Additional efforts needed to implement remaining recommendations from the 2023 safeguards assessment, including transition to full compliance with Egyptian Accounting Standards.

### Staff appraisal and recommended policy priorities
- Macroeconomic assessment:
  - Tight monetary policy has significantly reduced inflation.
  - Exchange rate flexibility, supported by foreign inflows, has improved the external position and financing conditions.
  - Fiscal consolidation and slowdown of public investment have reduced demand pressures and eased crowding-out of private investment.
  - Adjustments in energy prices and clearance of arrears are reinforcing the energy sector’s financial health.
  - Outcomes: economic growth is picking up, debt ratios are declining, reserves remain broadly sufficient, and market access has improved.
- Key priorities and recommendations:
  - On macroeconomic front: greater exchange rate flexibility, completing disinflation, pursuing revenue-driven fiscal consolidation under a comprehensive debt management strategy.
  - On structural front: accelerate reforms—strengthen state-owned bank governance, advance the State Ownership Policy to further level the playing field, and implement a climate agenda addressing adaptation and mitigation needs.
  - Maintain an open foreign exchange system within a flexible exchange rate regime; FX movements should be market-determined with CBE interventions confined to mitigating disorderly market conditions and underpinned by adequate, high-quality international reserves.
  - Achieving a more dynamic, resilient, and inclusive growth model will require bolder and more decisive reforms.

*IMF staff report excerpt.*

### 53. Sustaining the required primary surplus will require a strong commitment to

### 1egyea2026001 - 53. Sustaining the required primary surplus will require a strong commitment to

### Domestic revenue mobilization
- Egypt’s low tax revenue, both in absolute terms and relative to peers, leaves limited fiscal space to respond to shocks and meet priority development and social spending needs.
- Continued efforts needed to broaden the tax base by:
  - further removing exemptions, particularly within the VAT;
  - streamlining tax incentives in the corporate income tax regime;
  - building on recent improvements in tax administration to enhance compliance.
- Building public support for these reforms and strengthening trust with taxpayers will be critical to their success.
- Incidence analysis, especially for VAT reforms, should inform the design of compensatory and redistributive social policies.

### Safeguarding debt sustainability and addressing financing risks
- Fiscal consolidation alone is unlikely to be sufficient to address high gross financing needs and significant domestic rollover risks.
- Recommended measures to durably reduce debt and gross financing pressures include:
  - accelerating divestment with proceeds directed toward debt reduction;
  - tightening oversight and transparency of off-budget investments and fiscal activities;
  - designing and publishing an enhanced medium-term debt management strategy;
  - extending debt maturities;
  - further deepening and developing the domestic debt market;
  - broadening the base of market participants;
  - improving debt reporting; and
  - strengthening investor relations.
- Sovereign asset–liability management initiatives should be carefully designed to ensure transparency, alignment with strategic objectives, and careful management of macro-fiscal and macro-financial risks.
- Staff welcomes the authorities’ commitment to reducing GFN by 6 percent of GDP for the current fiscal year through a multi-pronged plan that includes liability management operations and using divestment and investment proceeds to repay debt.

### Financial sector governance and banking competition
- Strengthening governance practices and competition in the banking sector remains a key financial sector policy priority.
- The large presence of state-owned banks requires robust governance practices to:
  - safeguard financial health;
  - ensure a market-based transmission mechanism for monetary policy; and
  - promote fair competition with private banks.
- It is critical that the authorities strengthen, and without further delays, risk management practices at state-owned banks, in line with the findings of recent diagnostic studies and the agreed framework on ways forward to ensure tangible results within the EFF timeline.
- The studies’ findings and CBE’s planned actions present an opportunity to develop a broader supervisory engagement plan that covers all remaining banks as needed.

### Structural reform, state ownership, and growth prospects
- The National Narrative for Economic Development is a positive step toward structural reform and sustainable growth, but its impact will remain limited without progress with deeper reforms to reduce the state’s role.
- Rapid progress in trade facilitation, digitalization, and business climate reforms is expected to yield positive growth effects.
- Gains would be larger and more durable if reforms to reduce state ownership and strengthen competition were accelerated, as the state’s dominant role continues to constrain private activity.
- Policy priorities include:
  - consistent implementation of the State Ownership Policy, including a renewed push on divestment from non-strategic sectors;
  - restarting divestment to anchor private investment, given its low social costs and high potential growth returns;
  - continued efforts to crowd in private investment, including for the green transition; and
  - integrating mitigation and adaptation goals into macroeconomic policies, notably energy pricing and public investment planning.

### RSF performance, program modifications, and risks
- Performance under the RSF is strong: the authorities successfully completed both RMs that were due by June 2025, demonstrating effective execution and sustained policy commitment.
- Authorities are on track with implementation of the remaining RMs and are seeking technical assistance as needed.
- Authorities demonstrate strong ownership of the RSF framework and a firm commitment to delivering Egypt’s climate adaptation and mitigation objectives in line with the NDC.
- Staff supports the authorities’ requests to:
  - extend the arrangement till December 15, 2026, bringing the total duration to 48 months, and a corresponding extension of the RSF arrangement, with rephasing of access under both arrangements;
  - grant a waiver for the non-observance of the end-December 2025 QPC on the floor of NIR; and
  - introduce a QPC on the share of total local currency financing conducted via non-market modalities.
- In addition, seven new structural benchmarks are being proposed to support implementation of critical reforms, including the authorities’ tax reform, GFN reduction plan, reflecting the results of the study of state-owned banks, and supporting the refocused structural agenda.
- Implementation and enterprise risks are significant.

*Source: IMF country document.*

### 59. Staff recommends completion of the combined fifth and sixth reviews under the EFF

### 59. Staff recommends completion of the combined fifth and sixth reviews under the EFF arrangement and the first review under the RSF arrangement.

### Recommendation
- Staff recommends completion of the combined fifth and sixth reviews under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement and the first review under the Resilience and Sustainability Fund (RSF) arrangement.

### Macroeconomic outlook and projections
- Real GDP (annual change, in percent):
  - 2021/22: 6.7
  - 2022/23: 3.8
  - 2023/24 (Est.): 2.4
  - 2024/25 (Proj.): 3.6
  - 2025/26 (Proj.): 4.4
  - 2026/27 (Proj.): 4.1
  - 2027/28 (Proj.): 4.7
  - 2028/29 (Proj.): 5.4
  - 2029/30 (Proj.): 5.7
  - 2030/31 (Proj.): 5.2
- CPI inflation (end-of-period, in percent):
  - 2021/22: 13.2
  - 2022/23: 35.7
  - 2023/24 (Est.): 27.5
  - 2024/25 (Proj.): 16.6
  - 2025/26 (Proj.): 14.9
  - 2026/27 (Proj.): 13.4
  - 2027/28 (Proj.): 11.7
  - 2028/29 (Proj.): 8.7
  - 2029/30 (Proj.): 7.0
  - 2030/31 (Proj.): 5.3

### Balance of payments and external sector
- Current account (percent of GDP):
  - 2023/24: -5.4
  - 2024/25: -5.8
  - 2025/26: -4.2
  - 2026/27: -3.4
  - 2027/28: -3.9
  - 2028/29: -3.9
  - 2029/30: -3.5
  - 2030/31: -3.4
- Balance on goods and services (percent of GDP):
  - 2023/24: -6.6
  - 2024/25: -9.3
  - 2025/26: -9.8
  - 2026/27: -7.4
  - 2027/28: -8.6
  - 2028/29: -8.2
  - 2029/30: -7.8
  - 2030/31: -7.6
- Exports of goods and services (percent of GDP): 2023/24 = 16.4; 2024/25 = 17.7; 2025/26 = 19.8; 2026/27 = 19.1; 2027/28 = 17.7; 2028/29 = 17.9; 2029/30 = 17.2; 2030/31 = 17.0
- Imports of goods and services (percent of GDP): 2023/24 = -23.0; 2024/25 = -27.1; 2025/26 = -29.7; 2026/27 = -26.4; 2027/28 = -26.2; 2028/29 = -26.1; 2029/30 = -25.0; 2030/31 = -24.6
- Services (net, percent of GDP): 2023/24 = 3.7; 2024/25 = 3.6; 2025/26 = 4.1; 2026/27 = 4.2; 2027/28 = 4.0; 2028/29 = 4.3; 2029/30 = 4.3; 2030/31 = 4.4
  - Tourism receipts (percent of GDP): 2023/24 = 3.8; 2024/25 = 4.3; 2025/26 = 4.6; 2026/27 = 4.4; 2027/28 = 4.6; 2028/29 = 4.6; 2029/30 = 4.6; 2030/31 = 4.6
  - Suez canal dues (percent of GDP): 2023/24 = 1.7; 2024/25 = 1.0; 2025/26 = 1.0; 2026/27 = 1.6; 2027/28 = 1.0; 2028/29 = 1.3; 2029/30 = 1.4; 2030/31 = 1.4
- Transfers (percent of GDP): 2023/24 = 5.7; 2024/25 = 9.0; 2025/26 = 10.0; 2026/27 = 8.6; 2027/28 = 9.2; 2028/29 = 8.7; 2029/30 = 8.1; 2030/31 = 7.8
  - Private remittances mirror transfers: 2023/24 = 5.7; 2024/25 = 9.0; 2025/26 = 9.9; 2026/27 = 8.6; 2027/28 = 9.2; 2028/29 = 8.6; 2029/30 = 8.1; 2030/31 = 7.8
- Capital and financial account (percent of GDP): 2023/24 = 6.9; 2024/25 = 2.8; 2025/26 = 2.4; 2026/27 = 3.2; 2027/28 = 3.0; 2028/29 = 3.6; 2029/30 = 4.0; 2030/31 = 3.5
- Overall balance (percent of GDP): 2023/24 = 1.6; 2024/25 = -2.6; 2025/26 = -1.0; 2026/27 = -0.2; 2027/28 = -1.2; 2028/29 = -0.2; 2029/30 = 0.5; 2030/31 = 0.1
- Reserves (without RSF; "-" indicates increase, percent of GDP financing line): 2023/24 = -3.9; 2024/25 = 0.1; 2025/26 = -0.5; 2026/27 = -1.1; 2027/28 = -1.1; 2028/29 = -0.3; 2029/30 = -0.2; 2030/31 = 0.0
- Official memorandum: Official reserves (in billions of US$) projections in Table 9 / Table 8 memorandum:
  - 2023/24: 31.5
  - 2024/25: 32.8
  - 2025/26: 44.3
  - 2026/27: 44.9
  - 2027/28: 46.4
  - 2028/29: 49.2
  - 2029/30: 51.3
  - 2030/31: 52.6

### Public finances (budget and general government)
- Budget sector revenue and grants (percent of GDP):
  - 2023/24: 17.2
  - 2024/25: 15.4
  - 2025/26: 14.3
  - 2026/27: 15.0
  - 2027/28: 16.0
  - 2028/29: 15.2
  - 2029/30: 16.4
  - 2030/31: 16.3
- Tax revenue (percent of GDP) examples:
  - 2023/24: 12.6
  - 2024/25: 12.4
  - 2025/26: 11.7
  - 2026/27: 12.4
  - 2027/28: 12.2
  - 2028/29: 13.3
  - 2029/30: 13.2
  - 2030/31: 14.2
- Expenditure and net acquisition of financial assets (percent of GDP), budget sector:
  - 2023/24: 23.4
  - 2024/25: 21.4
  - 2025/26: 17.9
  - 2026/27: 25.5
  - 2027/28: 21.4
  - 2028/29: 24.9
  - 2029/30: 24.5
  - 2030/31: 23.4
- Cash balance (percent of GDP), budget sector:
  - 2023/24: -7.4
  - 2024/25: -11.5
  - 2025/26: -6.9
  - 2026/27: -9.1
  - 2027/28: -10.2
  - 2028/29: -6.8
  - 2029/30: -5.1
  - 2030/31: -2.7
- Overall balance (percent of GDP), budget sector:
  - 2023/24: -3.6
  - 2024/25: -10.6
  - 2025/26: -6.8
  - 2026/27: -8.8
  - 2027/28: -9.4
  - 2028/29: -7.0
  - 2029/30: -5.1
  - 2030/31: -2.7
- Primary balance (including net acquisition of financial assets, percent of GDP): 2023/24 = 1.3; 2024/25 = 1.6; 2025/26 = 6.2; 2026/27 = 4.4; 2027/28 = 3.8; 2028/29 = 4.4; 2029/30 = 4.8; 2030/31 = 4.8
- Gross budget sector debt (percent of GDP, memorandum): 2023/24 = 92.3; 2024/25 = 87.7; 2025/26 = 84.5; 2026/27 = 83.7; 2027/28 = 83.8; 2028/29 = 80.3; 2029/30 = 76.9; 2030/31 = 72.3

### Monetary and financial sector indicators
- Broad money (M2, end-period, in billions of EGP): 2023/24 = 6,614; 2024/25 = 8,248; 2025/26 = 10,619; 2026/27 = 12,307; 2027/28 = 13,073; 2028/29 = 14,449; 2029/30 = 15,273; 2030/31 = 17,344
- Net foreign assets (end-period, in billions of EGP): 2023/24 = -372; 2024/25 = -835; 2025/26 = 627; 2026/27 = 869; 2027/28 = 771; 2028/29 = 1,281; 2029/30 = 1,526; 2030/31 = 1,660
- Credit to private sector (annual percent change): 2023/24 = 24.3; 2024/25 = 25.4; 2025/26 = 27.8; 2026/27 = 28.0; 2027/28 = 23.1; 2028/29 = 18.0; 2029/30 = 18.0; 2030/31 = 18.0
- Financial soundness indicators (selected):
  - Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (percent): Mar 2025 = 18.6; Jun 2025 = 18.5; Sep 2025 = 18.6; historical range noted (2015–2024) included.
  - NPLs to total loans (percent): 2015 = 7.1; 2022 = 3.3; 2023 = 2.9; 2024 = 2.2; Mar 2025 = 2.2; Jun 2025 = 2.1; Sep 2025 = 2.0
  - Return on assets (percent): Mar 2025 = 2.6; Jun 2025 = 2.6; Sep 2025 = 2.6
  - Loans to deposits (percent): Sep 2025 = 64.3

### External financing, IMF program and schedules
- EFF proposed schedule of reviews and purchases (selected lines from Table 12b):
  - December 16, 2022: 261.13 million SDR (12.8 percent of quota) — Board approval of the EFF
  - March 15, 2023: 261.13 million SDR (12.8 percent of quota) — First review
  - March 15, 2024: 356.98 million SDR (17.5 percent of quota) — Second review
  - June 15, 2024: 618.11 million SDR (30.3 percent of quota) — Third review
  - September 15, 2024: 922.87 million SDR (45.3 percent of quota) — Fourth review
  - March 15, 2025: 732.72 million SDR (36.0 percent of quota) — Fifth review and end-December 2025 quantitative targets (note: fifth and sixth reviews were combined)
  - September 15, 2025: 732.72 million SDR (36.0 percent of quota) — Sixth review (combined)
  - June 15, 2026 and November 15, 2026: further scheduled reviews and purchases
  - Total proposed under EFF: 6,111.69 million SDR (300.0 percent of quota)
- RSF proposed schedule (selected lines from Table 12c):
  - February 2025: 0.0 million SDR — Board approval of the RSF
  - September 15, 2025: 100.0 million SDR (4.9 percent of quota) — RSF first review (EFF sixth review) and reform measure 1
  - September 15, 2025: 100.0 million SDR (4.9 percent of quota) — RSF first review (EFF sixth review) and reform measure 2
  - June 15, 2026: 100.0 million SDR (4.9 percent of quota) — RSF second review (EFF seventh review) and reform measure 3
  - November 15, 2026: multiple disbursements of 100.0 million SDR (4.9 percent of quota) tied to RSF third review (EFF eighth review) and several reform measures
  - Total proposed under RSF: 1,000.0 million SDR (49.0 percent of quota)
- Capacity to repay the Fund (Table 10 highlights):
  - Fund repurchases and charges (Millions of SDRs) projections and Fund credit outstanding details provided across 2023/24–2048/49 (detailed annual series in source tables).
  - Fund credit outstanding (Millions of SDRs) example snapshot: 10,290; 7,497; 8,075; 8,597; 7,643; 6,968; 6,445; 5,519; 4,501; 3,504; 2,529; 1,708; 1,093; 935; 835; 735; 635; 535; 435; 335; 235; 135; 35; 0; 0; 0 (series in source).
  - Memorandum items: exports of goods and nonfactor services and total debt service series provided (detailed annual series in source tables).

### Public debt composition and debt service
- Total budget sector debt (US$ billion) and percent total debt examples (Table 13):
  - Total budget sector debt (US$ billion): 319.1 (FY24/25); 193.4 (FY25/26); 172.8 (FY26/27)
  - External budget sector debt (US$ billion): 81.2 (FY24/25); 25.4 (percent total debt) noted
  - Domestic budget sector debt (US$ billion): 237.9 (FY24/25); 74.6 (percent total debt)
  - Memo: Nominal GDP (US$ billion): 499.8 (FY24/25)

### Key program arithmetic and financing items (selected)
- Financing gap and RSF:
  - Financing gap (percent of GDP) series in balance of payments table: e.g., 2023/24 = 2.1; 2024/25 = 4.1; 2025/26 = 2.8; 2026/27 = 2.1; 2027/28 = 3.0; 2028/29 = 0.9; 2029/30 = 0.0; 2030/31 = 0.0
  - RSF disbursement entries appear in the financing table (small RSF amounts shown in source tables; e.g., 0.1, 0.1, 0.2 in specific years)
- Net use of IMF resources (excl. 2022 EFF) (percent of GDP): 2023/24 = -1.2; 2024/25 = -1.6; 2025/26 = -1.6; 2026/27 = -0.8; 2027/28 = -0.7; 2028/29 = -0.4; 2029/30 = -0.3; 2030/31 = -0.2

*Source: IMF staff estimates, projections, and tables presented in the chapter.*

### Annex I. Risk Assessment Matrix

### Annex I. Risk Assessment Matrix

### Overview of RAM methodology and likelihood definitions
- The RAM shows events that could materially alter the baseline path (the scenario most likely to materialize in the view of IMF staff).
- The relative likelihood of risks is the staff’s subjective assessment of the risks surrounding the baseline:
  - “low” is meant to indicate a probability below 10 percent,
  - “medium” a probability between 10 and 30 percent,
  - “high” a probability between 30 and 50 percent.
- The RAM reflects staff views on the source of risks and overall level of concern as of the time of discussions with the authorities. Non-mutually exclusive risks may interact and materialize jointly.

### Global risks — findings and recommended policy responses
- Escalating Trade Measures and Prolonged Uncertainty
  - Relative Likelihood: High
  - Impact if Realized: High
  - Key findings: Rising trade barriers and prolonged policy uncertainty could reduce trade, investment, and growth. Inflationary pressures may re-emerge—especially in countries imposing tariffs. Effects can be amplified by strategic complementarities or bottlenecks in global value chains or inventory overhang.
  - Recommended policy response:
    - Allow the exchange rate to act as a shock absorber.
    - Implement structural reforms to diversify economy and increase exports to add sources of FX revenue.
    - Improve transparency, governance, and financial reporting of EAs and SOEs, and level the playing field.
- Financial Market Volatility and Correction
  - Relative Likelihood: High
  - Impact if Realized: Medium
  - Key findings: Stretched asset valuations, easy financial conditions, and subdued volatility could be affected by a sudden shift in investor sentiment or policy stance, triggering market corrections, exchange rate turbulence, spikes in sovereign bond yields, and capital flow volatility. Elevated leverage among Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries amplifies risks. Rapid growth of unregulated crypto markets could increase the risk of redemption runs and market dislocations.
  - Recommended policy response:
    - Implement the MTDS and MTRS to reduce debt vulnerabilities and build fiscal buffers.
    - Reprioritize spending to reduce financing pressure.
    - Allow exchange rate flexibility to be the first line of defense against capital outflows.
- Geopolitical tensions
  - Relative Likelihood: High
  - Impact if Realized: High
  - Key findings: Intensification of conflicts, coupled with weakening of multilateralism, may trigger commodity price volatility, increase migration pressures, reignite inflation, and weigh on growth by undermining confidence, investment, tourism, trade, and supply chains.
  - Recommended policy response:
    - Improve inclusiveness of government policies via well-targeted measures and strengthened social safety net.
    - Allow the exchange rate to act as a shock absorber.
    - Implement structural reforms to diversify the economy and increase exports to add sources of FX revenue.
- Commodity price volatility
  - Relative Likelihood: High
  - Impact if Realized: High
  - Key findings: Shifts in supply and demand—driven by geopolitical tensions and conflicts, OPEC+ actions, or the green transition—may fuel commodity price swings, intensifying external and fiscal pressures, social unrest, and macroeconomic instability.
  - Recommended policy response:
    - Improve inclusiveness of government policies via well-targeted measures and strengthened social safety net.
    - Allow the exchange rate to act as a shock absorber.
    - Implement structural reforms to diversify economy and increase exports to add sources of FX revenue.

### Domestic risks — findings and recommended policy responses
- Failure to allow for exchange rate flexibility
  - Relative Likelihood: Medium
  - Impact if Realized: High
  - Key findings: A build-up of external imbalances eventually leads to a sudden and large exchange rate adjustment, with implications on sovereign borrowing and debt service costs and inflation.
  - Recommended policy response:
    - Implement package of consistent reforms including allowing the exchange rate to find its market-clearing equilibrium so it can act as a shock absorber, with two-way movements that reflect foreign exchange demand and supply conditions.
- Inflation risks
  - Relative Likelihood: Medium
  - Impact if Realized: Medium/High
  - Key findings: Volatile global commodity prices, greater pass-through from administrative price adjustments, and/or unanchored expectations could add upward pressure to inflation and complicate the disinflation path.
  - Recommended policy response:
    - Continue to anchor inflation expectations through timely interest rate adjustments, clear communication, and a credible commitment to its inflation-targeting framework and exchange rate flexibility.
    - Improve fiscal-monetary coordination and strengthen social safety nets.
    - Continue with structural reforms to diversify the economy.
- Slower-than-expected structural reform implementation, including divestment
  - Relative Likelihood: Medium
  - Impact if Realized: Medium/High
  - Key findings: Lack of reform leads to re-accumulation of imbalances, lowering growth potential and leaving country more vulnerable to shocks.
  - Recommended policy response:
    - Re-invigorate the structural reform agenda focusing on priority areas such as SOE reform, competition and the investment climate, trade facilitation, and health and education reform to address constraints to growth.
- Materialization of fiscal contingent liabilities
  - Relative Likelihood: Medium
  - Impact if Realized: Medium/High
  - Key findings: Economic Authorities (EAs), SOEs, and central bank may require government recapitalization or repayment of government-guaranteed debt, putting pressure on public expenditure while increasing public debt.
  - Recommended policy response:
    - Improve transparency, governance, and financial reporting of EAs and SOEs.
    - Implement SOP fully.
    - Clearly define and separate commercial and non-commercial activities of EAs and SOEs.
    - Prohibit CBE lending to public sector agencies excluding the MoF.

### Sovereign risk and Debt Sustainability summary (Annex II excerpts)
- Overall assessment:
  - Public debt is assessed as sustainable but not with high probability.
  - The overall risks of sovereign stress are assessed as high.
- Medium-term assessment:
  - Medium-term risks are assessed as high, given the risk signals from the debt fanchart module and the GFN module.
  - The high risk signal from the GFN module reflects high average gross financing needs over the forecast horizon related to large issuances of short-term bills and the large claims of domestic banks on the government.
  - Contingent liability related to publicly-guaranteed debt is noted as EGP5,379 billion as of June 2025 and poses significant medium-term risks.
- Long-term assessment:
  - Long-term risks are assessed as moderate, as the debt ratio and gross financing needs are projected to trend downwards with sustained primary surpluses and favorable interest-growth differentials.
  - Long-term risks include pension and health cost as well as adaptation and mitigation costs.
- Mitigating factors:
  - The sustainability assessment considers the risk mitigating impact from the country’s track record of sustaining high gross financing needs, supported by stable financing by domestic banks, as well as the mitigating impact from ad-hoc asset sales (e.g. Ras-El-Hekma, Qatari land sale).

*Source: Fund staff.*

### 5. Debt consolidation across sectors:

### 5. Debt consolidation across sectors:

### Coverage and recording
- Coverage in this analysis is for the general government, which is comprised of the budget sector, National Investment Bank, and Social Insurance Funds.
- Official creditor deposits at the central bank are included in the public debt stock for the purposes of this analysis.
- Valuation and recording notes (as in source):
  - Stock of arrears could be used as a proxy in the absence of accrual data on other accounts payable.
  - IPSGSs: Insurance, Pension, and Standardized Guarantee Schemes, typically including government employee pension liabilities.
  - Includes accrual recording, commitment basis, due for payment, etc.
  - Nominal value: the amount the debtor owes to the creditor, reflecting the value of the instrument at creation and subsequent economic flows (such as transactions, exchange rate, and other valuation changes other than market price changes, and other volume changes).
  - Face value: the undiscounted amount of principal to be paid at (or before) maturity.
  - Market value: value as if acquired in market transactions on the balance sheet reporting date. Only traded debt securities have observed market values.
- Comment: Reporting on intra-government debt holdings spans central bank, other public financial corporations, budget central government, extra-budgetary funds (EBFs), social security funds (SSFs), state government, local government, and nonfinancial public corporates; the perimeter shown in figures is public debt or general government as indicated.

### Public debt structure indicators (selected qualitative observations)
- Commentary: Public debt is mainly domestic, held by domestic banks, and in local currency, and it is subject to local law.
- Debt is primarily in marketable instruments, including a large share of T-bills. This results in a relatively short maturity of public debt.
- Residual maturity: 3.7 years.

### Baseline scenario projections (percent of GDP unless indicated otherwise)
- Actual 2025 public debt: 91.8
- Projected public debt (selected years):
  - 2026: 92.8
  - 2027: 86.5
  - 2028: 83.6
  - 2029: 79.6
  - 2030: 76.1
  - 2031: 72.6
  - 2032: 68.7
  - 2033: 65.0
  - 2034: 61.4
  - 2035: 57.5
  - 2036: 53.6
- Change in public debt (percent of GDP, selected years):
  - 2025: -5.4
  - 2026: 1.0
  - 2027: -6.3
  - 2028: -2.8
  - 2029: -4.0
  - 2030: -3.5
- Contribution of identified flows (percent of GDP, selected years):
  - 2025: 0.4
  - 2026: 0.5
  - 2027: -1.5
  - 2028: -2.0
  - 2029: -3.3
  - 2030: -3.3
- Primary deficit (general government) (percent of GDP):
  - 2025 (actual): -3.9
  - 2026: -2.6
  - 2027 onward (projected): -3.5 (repeated for projection years)
- Noninterest revenues (percent of GDP): 16.4 (2025 actual); projected 16.4, 17.6, 17.5, 17.1, 17.0, 17.0, 17.0, 17.0, 17.0, 17.0
- Noninterest expenditures (percent of GDP): 12.6 (2025 actual); projected 13.8, 14.0, 14.0, 13.7, 13.6, 13.6, 13.6, 13.6, 13.6, 13.6
- Automatic debt dynamics (percent of GDP, selected years):
  - 2025: -0.4
  - 2026: 3.8
  - 2027: 1.7
  - 2028: 1.4
  - 2029: 0.1
- Real interest rate and relative inflation (percent): provided in decomposition; e.g., Real interest rate and relative inflation 2025: -1.3 and 7.2 (components shown separately below).
- Real interest rate (percent, selected years): -8.5 (2025); 5.2 (2026); 4.2 (2027); 4.7 (2028); 3.4 (2029); 3.2 (2030); 3.0, 2.8, 2.7, 2.5, 2.4 in later years as shown.
- Relative inflation (percent, selected years): 7.2 (2025); 2.8 (2026); 2.2 (2027); 1.3 (2028); 0.9 (2029); 0.6 (2030); 0.6, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.4 later.
- Real GDP growth (percent): historical and projected values listed with negative entries in one row (presentation in source is fragmented); memo items:
  - Real GDP growth (percent): 4.4 (actual), then 4.7, 5.4, 5.7, 5.2, 4.8, 4.8, 4.8, 4.8, 4.8, 4.8 (projection row).
  - Inflation (GDP deflator; percent): 25.0 (actual 2025), then 11.6, 9.8, 7.5, 6.2, 5.5, 5.5, 5.5, 5.5, 5.5, 5.5.
  - Nominal GDP growth (percent): 30.5 (2025), then 16.9, 15.8, 13.7, 11.8, 10.6, 10.3, 10.8, 10.5, 10.5, 10.5.
  - Effective interest rate (percent): 13.5 (2025), then 18.2, 15.1, 13.8, 10.7, 10.0, 9.8, 9.7, 9.8, 9.8, 9.3.
- Gross financing needs (percent of GDP, selected years):
  - 2025 actual: 35.3
  - 2026: 43.0
  - 2027: 39.8
  - 2028: 40.8
  - 2029: 36.3
  - 2030: 32.1
  - 2031: 30.3
  - 2032: 29.8
  - 2033: 27.5
  - 2034: 25.7
  - 2035: 23.9
  - 2036: 22.5
- Of which: debt service (percent of GDP, selected years):
  - 2025: 38.9
  - 2026: 45.9
  - 2027: 43.6
  - 2028: 44.5
  - 2029: 40.0
  - 2030: 35.8
  - 2031: 34.0
  - 2032: 33.5
  - 2033: 31.2
  - 2034: 29.4
  - 2035: 27.6
  - 2036: 26.1
- Local currency vs foreign currency composition of debt service (percent of GDP, selected years):
  - Local currency: 28.7 (2025); 38.9 (2026); 37.4 (2027); 38.4 (2028); 34.7 (2029); 31.6 (2030); 29.9, 29.5, 27.7, 25.9, 24.5, 23.0 in later years as shown.
  - Foreign currency: 10.2 (2025); 6.9 (2026); 6.2 (2027); 6.1 (2028); 5.3 (2029); 4.2 (2030); 4.2, 4.0, 3.5, 3.4, 3.1, 3.1 in later years as shown.
- Commentary: After declining in FY2024/25 (2025 in the chart), public debt is projected to rise slightly in FY2025/26 as the authorities rely more on costly domestic financing amid delays in program implementation and the divestment agenda. Debt is expected to resume its downward path from FY2026/27, supported by sustained primary surpluses and favorable interest-rate growth differential.
- FY2025/26 projection assumption: all proceeds from the Qatari investment deal and 50 percent of program divestment receipts are used for debt reduction.
- Risks: Further delays in divestment pose a downside risk to the baseline and could result in higher debt, while planned measures to reduce gross financing needs that are not currently incorporated represent an upside risk.

### Realism of baseline assumptions and debt dynamics
- Commentary: Analysis from realism tools does not signal major concerns. The forecast error track record does not signal a pattern of optimistic forecast errors. Debt drivers are projected to largely follow past experience.
- The 3-year debt reduction is above the 75th percentile, while the 3-year cyclically adjusted primary balance adjustment is close to the median of the distribution.
- Baseline growth projection is higher than suggested by the multiplier tool, as productivity gains from implementation of the National Narrative are expected to offset demand-effects from fiscal tightening and drive growth over the medium term above its historical average.

### Medium-term risk assessment (selected indicators and signals)
- Debt fanchart module:
  - Fanchart width: 53.8 (percent of GDP)
  - Debt fanchart index (DFI): 1.9
  - Risk signal: Moderate (per source thresholds)
- Probability of debt non-stabilization: 4.3 (percent)
- Terminal debt-to-GDP x: 51.9 (with contribution 1.1)
- Gross financing needs (GFN) module:
  - Average baseline GFN: 37.1 (percent of GDP) with contribution 12.6
  - Banks' claims on the general government (percent bank assets): 50.8 (value) with contribution 16.5
  - Change in banks' claims in stress (percent bank assets): 4.9 with contribution 1.6
  - GFN financeability index (GFI): 30.8
  - Risk signal: High
- Medium-term index (normalized combination): risk signal and final assessment:
  - Risk signal: Final assessment: Prob. of missed crisis, 2026-2031, if stress not predicted: 72.7 pct.
  - Prob. of false alarms, 2026-2031, if stress predicted: 3.4 pct.
- Commentary: Medium-term risks are assessed as high, given the risk signals from the debt fanchart and GFN modules. The high risk signal from the GFN module reflects high average gross financing needs and the large claims of the domestic banking sector on the government.
- Contingent liabilities: publicly-guaranteed debt of EGP 5,379 billion as of June 2025 adds to medium-term risks.

### Long-term risk analysis (overview and key scenario parameters)
- Overall long-term risks assessed as moderate.
- Rationale: debt ratio and gross financing needs are projected to trend downwards with sustained primary surpluses and favorable interest-growth differentials, while risks exist related to pension and health costs as well as climate adaptation and mitigation costs.
- Demographics / pensions:
  - Permanent adjustment needed in the pension system (pp of GDP per year) to keep pension assets positive for various horizons:
    - 50 years: 2.0%
    - Until 2100: 2.9%
    - 30 years: 4.4%
- Climate scenarios (notes from source):
  - Customized climate adaptation scenario assumes adaptation cost of around 0.9% of GDP in each year until 2050 (authorities' estimate from Egypt Climate Change Strategy 2050 for five sectors).
  - Customized climate mitigation scenario assumes mitigation cost of around 3.5% of GDP in each year until 2035 (authorities' estimate from Egypt Climate Change Strategy 2050 for seven sectors).
  - Progress: Egypt has made good progress on fuel-subsidy reform and on scaling up renewable-energy investments.
  - Policy action: In June 2025, as part of the RSF, the Cabinet adopted a plan to implement renewable-energy projects to reach the 30 percent renewable-energy target by 2030. Most projects are either fully privately financed or structured as public–private partnerships, with the government providing guarantees or other forms of support.

### Policy-relevant commentary and structural reform priorities (Annex III excerpts)
- Priority reforms to transform Egypt’s economic model and sustain private-sector-led growth:
  - Streamline business registration, licensing, and permitting processes.
  - Enhance regulatory transparency.
  - Ensure equal treatment of public and private operators.
  - Implement an active and transparent state-owned enterprises program (SOP) anchored in a credible divestment strategy to reduce the state footprint.
- Expected outcomes from these reforms:
  - Reduce the state’s footprint and level the playing field.
  - Attract productive private investment.
  - Support rebalancing of growth toward private-sector-led activity.
  - Strengthen Egypt’s medium-term growth potential and job creation capacity.
- Context: Egypt’s business climate remains complex and costly, with overlapping regulations, discretionary licensing, and opaque administrative procedures; many regulatory elements often do not apply to public entities, increasing compliance costs and uncertainty for private firms, especially new entrants and SMEs.

*Source: IMF staff estimates and projections from "5. Debt consolidation across sectors" (Egypt).*

### 2.      The authorities recently published the National Narrative for Economic Development,

### 2.      The authorities recently published the National Narrative for Economic Development,

### Overview of the National Narrative and scope
- Presents a reform agenda aimed at transforming Egypt’s growth model toward a more competitive, private-sector-driven economy.
- Sets out nearly 50 structural initiatives across three core pillars—governance, business regulation, and external-sector liberalization—with the objective of improving the investment climate, facilitating trade, reducing the state’s footprint, and fostering private-sector dynamism.
- Assessment basis: World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) for governance and the Fraser Institute’s indicators for business regulation, external openness, credit, and labor markets.
- Classification of reforms:
  - First-generation reforms: governance, business regulation, external sector (strengthen macroeconomic stability, improve investment climate).
  - Second-generation reforms: credit and labor markets (deeper structural bottlenecks).
  - Third-tier reforms: energy pricing (resilience and sustainability).

### Evolution of structural gaps and recent progress
- Structural gaps relative to frontier EM peers have narrowed over time but remain significant across most dimensions (Fraser Institute and World Bank Governance platform).
- Between 2016 and 2022:
  - Progress most notable in business regulation (measurable improvements).
  - Governance indicators: temporary improvement followed by a reversal, bringing Egypt roughly back to its earlier position.
  - External sector: only modest catch-up.
  - Gaps in credit markets, labor markets, and energy pricing remained wide in 2022.
- Assessment coverage: 23 unique reforms (some overlap across pillars).

### Empirical estimates of output dividends from first-generation reforms
- Method: maps reforms in the Narrative to comparable reform episodes in emerging market economies and applies gap-closure benchmarks (Budina et al. (2023) database).
- Key estimated impacts on GDP (first-generation reforms, IMF staff estimates):
  - Governance reforms: raise GDP by about 1.4 percent in the short term and 1.7 percent in the medium term.
  - Non-tariff trade barriers reforms: yield gains of about 1.1 percent initially, tapering to 0.8 percent over the medium term.
  - Business regulation reforms (conditional on credit-market deepening):
    - With complementary credit reforms: 0.8 percent initially and up to 1.4 percent over the medium term.
    - Without credit reforms: 0.4 percent gains in GDP in the short term and almost no gains in the medium term.
- Empirical scope limitation: analysis focuses on first-generation reforms only and does not quantify gains from labor market, industrial policy, and startup finance reforms.

### High-impact reforms identified to maximize output gains
- Priority measures emphasized by staff:
  - Establish an integrated, fully digitized “Economic Entities Platform” to streamline business registration, licensing, and operations.
    - Example target: reduce the number of steps to establish and license a textile factory from 24 to 9.
    - Supporting measures: introduction of a Unique Business Identifier (UBI) and issuance of an Ultimate Beneficiary Owner (UBO) law.
  - Streamline non-tax financial burdens imposed on businesses.
    - Current context: fees and service charges imposed by over 60 entities at various stages of establishment and licensing.
  - Trade facilitation upgrade for Nafeza (Egypt’s digital trade platform).
    - Objective: reduce average border clearance time from the current level of approximately six days to two days by December 2025, with further reductions thereafter.
    - Measures: digitization and automation of goods classification and pricing; development of an integrated risk management system; enhancement of pre-clearance systems.
  - Grant the Egyptian Competition Authority the legal mandate to review and potentially object to decisions that grant special exemptions or privileges to SOEs; conduct regular assessments of SOEs’ impact on market competition.
- Implementation caveat: political will and strong follow-through essential for timely and effective implementation.

### Potential gains from deeper reforms and closing gaps with frontier EM peers
- IMF estimates of closing gaps with frontier EM peers (Brazil, Colombia, Turkey, Georgia):
  - Narrowing governance gap toward leading EMs (e.g., Colombia or Georgia): boost GDP by 2.6–8.2 percent in the short term and 3.2–10.1 percent in the medium term.
  - Reducing the external trade gap with any of the four EMs: add 1.5–4.3 percent to output in the short term, tapering to 1.1–3.2 percent in the medium term.
  - Closing the business regulation gap with any of the four EMs:
    - Yields gains of 0.8–8.6 percent in the short term and 1.1–12 percent in the medium term when complemented with credit market reforms.
- Conclusion: substantially larger and more durable gains require deeper reforms that bring Egypt closer to frontier EM peers across governance, business regulation, and trade dimensions.

### Role of state ownership and lessons from frontier peers (Georgia)
- Persistent constraint: extensive state ownership and control over productive assets remain a key constraint on private-sector activity.
- Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World indicator: Egypt ranks among the weakest performers in the EM sample for state ownership of assets.
- Georgia’s experience (post-2003 Rose Revolution) as an illustrative case:
  - Privatized more than 1,800 SOEs between 2004 and 2007, equivalent to roughly 40 percent of total state assets.
  - Privatization proceeds averaged about 8 percent of GDP over the period.
  - FDI inflows rose from around 6 percent of GDP in 2003 to over 17 percent by 2007.
  - Real GDP growth averaged about 9.5 percent annually during 2004–07.
  - Implication: credible, transparent divestment can sharply reduce the state’s footprint, strengthen competition, and catalyze private-sector development.
- IMF analysis: Egypt could achieve up to three times larger, and more lasting, dividends if progress accelerates on privatization and divestment, bringing Egypt closer to frontier EM peers.

### Implementation, risks, and final assessment
- Realization of estimated dividends depends on:
  - Consistent implementation, effective enforcement and monitoring, and credible evaluation.
  - Complementary reforms (credit-market deepening, labor reforms, access to finance) to sustain and deepen gains.
- Staff assessment: the National Narrative is an important step; proposed measures could yield positive output gains, but these are likely modest and temporary unless complemented by accelerated privatization and competition-enhancing measures.

*Source: Content unit 1egyea2026001 (IMF).*

### 3. The relative length of the green arrow compared to the “full set” of reforms provides a

### 1egyea2026001 - 3. The relative length of the green arrow compared to the “full set” of reforms provides a 

### RSF RM Ambition — overview
- The relative length of the green arrow compared to the “full set” of reforms provides a proxy of the progress expected to be possible directly through RSF-supported reforms.
- This reflects the authorities’ ambition (cognizant of their capacity) under the RSF arrangement as well as limits to the Fund’s expertise in certain areas.
- The Fund’s expertise in areas such as agriculture or other sectoral policies is limited and development partners are better placed to provide this support.

### Reform areas covered by the RSF and intended long-term policy outcomes
- Reform areas covered by the RSF include:
  - (i) Energy and electricity reforms;
  - (ii) Disaster risk management;
  - (iii) Increasing the resilience of the financial sector to climate shocks;
  - (iv) Public Investment Management.
- Purpose:
  - Strengthening Egypt’s prospective balance of payments stability requires fiscal, financial, and structural policies—including macro-structural reforms in selected specific economic sectors.
  - All reforms proposed are key to managing the impacts of climate change on longer-term balance of payments stability.
- For each reform area, RSF-supported reforms (green arrow) are targeted at helping the country achieve desired long-term outcomes; additional reforms (blue arrow) may be supported by the concurrent UCT facility, development partners, or carried forward independently by the authorities.

### Energy and electricity reforms — desired outcomes and BoP implications
- Current issues cited:
  - NDC targets are not reflected in actionable plans.
  - High reliance on expensive fossil fuel for electricity generation.
  - Large emission from oil and gas sector.
- Desired long-term policy outcomes:
  - Achieving Egypt's NDC targets and accelerating its decarbonization plan.
  - Shift to market-based pricing mechanisms and filling institutional gaps that can result in market failures that may give rise to fiscal liabilities and external financing needs.
- Prospective balance of payments (BoP) risk reduction and macro benefits:
  - Improves external and fiscal sustainability.
  - Reduces reliance on fossil fuels and improves predictability of the energy bill.
  - Promotes net exports, investment and growth.
  - Develops and strengthens energy infrastructure, boosting investment, including FDI.
  - Contains losses of unrealized gas exports and FX earnings.

### Disaster risk management — desired outcomes and BoP implications
- Current issues cited:
  - No disaster risk management and financing plan.
  - Fiscal risk statement does not include climate impacts on infrastructure.
- Desired long-term policy outcomes:
  - Implementing a disaster risk financing plan.
  - Strengthening the management of climate-related risks and building resilience.
- Prospective BoP risk reduction and macro benefits:
  - Improves fiscal and external sustainability.
  - Limits adverse economic impact of climate related shocks, including by reducing fiscal costs and the subsequent need for external financing.
  - Reduces rehabilitation costs and associated import demand.
  - Facilitates rapid recovery of growth and exports.

### Increasing resilience of the financial sector to climate shocks — desired outcomes and BoP implications
- Current issues cited:
  - Lack of climate-related risk monitoring, and reporting.
  - No agreed taxonomies.
  - Climate considerations not included into supervisory framework.
  - Need to scale up private climate finance.
- Desired long-term policy outcomes:
  - Increasing the capacity of the financial sector to manage climate-related risks.
  - Support private climate finance decisions through improved climate finance architecture.
- Prospective BoP risk reduction and macro benefits:
  - Financial sector resilience.
  - Reduced financial sector losses when climate risks materialize, lowering recapitalization needs for banks.
  - Clarifying climate-related exposures will support the BOP by: (1) attracting investments by reducing uncertainty; (2) mitigating export losses in sectors most exposed to trade measures such as CBAM.
- Feasibility:
  - Feasible during RSF duration (as noted in table).

### Public Investment Management — desired outcomes and BoP implications
- Current issues cited:
  - Public investment planning does not take climate consideration into account.
  - Climate not factored into project appraisal, selection and evaluation processes.
- Desired long-term policy outcomes:
  - Improve climate-sensitive public investment management via identifying, measuring, and disclosing the effects of investment plans, programs, and projects on national climate change targets.
- Prospective BoP risk reduction and macro benefits:
  - Improves fiscal and external sustainability.
  - Limits adverse economic impact of climate related shocks, including by reducing fiscal costs and the subsequent need for external financing.
  - Reduces maintenance and rehabilitation costs and associated import demand.
  - Facilitates rapid recovery of growth and net exports.
- Feasibility:
  - Feasible during RSF duration (as noted in table).

### Key program commitments, financing, and targets (Letter of Intent highlights)
- Program status and macro developments:
  - Real private investment estimated to be growing by 24.4 percent y/y in FY 2024/2025.
  - In October 2025, S&P Global Ratings upgraded Egypt’s long-term sovereign credit rating from ‘B-’ to ‘B’ with a stable outlook.
- Prior actions and corrective measures:
  - As a prior action, Cabinet approval of a high-quality tax package, in agreement with IMF staff, that will generate 1 percent of GDP in revenues in FY26/27.
  - Removed subsidies on key fuel products; by end-June 2026 will revert back to using an automatic pricing mechanism to ensure fuel prices fully reflect cost-recovery levels.
  - Increased budget allocations for in-kind and cash transfers to Takaful and Karama beneficiaries.
  - Used all the proceeds of a US$3.5 billion real estate deal with Qatar to reduce budget-sector debt.
  - Reduced arrears of the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC) to international oil companies by two-thirds in 2025.
- Fiscal and debt targets:
  - Aim to cut gross financing needs by 10 percent of GDP by June 2027, with an interim reduction target of 6 percent of GDP in FY26.
  - Intend to reduce outstanding government guarantees for EGPC and lower the overall stock of government guarantees relative to GDP.
- Monetary and financial sector commitments:
  - Continue a flexible exchange rate regime and a liberalized foreign exchange (FX) system.
  - Maintain an appropriately tight monetary policy stance to reduce inflation.
  - Commit to strengthening risk management, governance, and internal controls within state-owned banks.
- EFF and RSF requests and rephasing (exact figures and dates preserved):
  - Request the extension of the EFF arrangement to December 15, 2026, bringing the total duration to 48 months.
  - Request a rephasing of the remaining purchases under the EFF (totaling SDR3,691.47 million), with:
    - a purchase of SDR 1,465.44 million upon the completion of the combined 5th and 6th reviews,
    - SDR 1,113.01 million at the completion of the 7th review,
    - SDR 1,113.02 million at the completion of the 8th review.
  - Request completion of the combined fifth and sixth reviews under the EFF arrangement, with the purchase of SDR 1,465.44 million.
  - Request the extension and rephasing of the RSF to align availability dates with the EFF reviews schedule.
  - With completion of RM1 and RM2, request completion of the RSF’s first review with the disbursement of SDR 200 million.
- Program monitoring and review timing:
  - The seventh review is expected to be completed on or after June 15, 2026, and the eighth and final review will be completed on or after September 15, 2026.
  - Request a waiver for the non-observance of the end-December 2025 QPC on the floor of NIR, based on the CBE’s commitment to the newly established FX reserve accumulation framework as corrective action.
  - Request the introduction of a QPC ceiling on the share of total local currency financing conducted via non-market modalities.
  - Request to elevate the March 2026 indicative targets to quantitative performance criteria for the seventh review, while the eighth review would assess performance against end-June QPCs and end-September ITs.
  - Propose seven new structural benchmarks spanning budget preparation, GFN reduction, financial sector reform, and a refocused structural agenda.
- Program assurances:
  - The program will continue to be monitored through quantitative performance criteria, indicative targets, and structural benchmarks, as described in the MEFP and Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU).
  - The program remains fully financed.

### Implementation and capacity considerations
- RSF-supported reforms are aimed at achievable progress during RSF duration, while additional reforms in the “full set” may require support from the UCT facility, development partners, or independent actions by authorities.
- The Fund’s limited expertise in certain sectoral areas (e.g., agriculture) implies reliance on development partners for some reforms.

*Source: 1egyea2026001 - 3. The relative length of the green arrow compared to the “full set” of reforms provides a — Chapter and Letter of Intent excerpts (IMF).*

### 4.      We remain fully committed to revenue-based pro-growth fiscal consolidation and

### 4.      We remain fully committed to revenue-based pro-growth fiscal consolidation and debt reduction, supported by enhancing voluntary compliance, strengthened tax efforts and administration, active debt management, and the strategic use of divestment proceeds to further reduce public debt.

### Fiscal consolidation and debt reduction commitments
- Deliver another package of high-quality tax measures in the context of the FY2026/27 budget so that efforts to reduce debt do not come at the expense of priority expenditure.
- Implement a package of debt management measures expected to result in substantial reductions in gross financing needs, including interest expenditure.
- Deploy 100 percent of the Qatari investment deal and a minimum of 50 percent of future divestment proceeds towards short-term domestic debt reduction.
- Commit to a revenue-based pro-growth fiscal consolidation, a comprehensive public investment management framework, and stepped up active debt management, including specific measures to reduce debt service costs and gross financing needs.

### State ownership, divestment, and public sector footprint
- Anchored by the State Ownership Policy (SOP), four state-owned enterprises have been identified for divestment, including responsible agencies and ownership stakes to be sold, to generate US$1.5 billion in proceeds by the end of the program and support the state's exit from non-strategic sectors.
- Continued comprehensive application of the public investment ceiling to contain macroeconomic pressures from broader public sector activities.
- Strengthening governance practices in the largely state-owned banking sector is a key financial sector priority.
- Hiring of investment and legal advisors for at least two proposed divestment deals (structural benchmark met).
- Commit to update the State Ownership Policy by March 2026.

### Recent developments and outlook — growth, inflation, and activity
- Growth picked up to 4.4 percent in FY2024/25, up from 2.4 percent in the previous year.
- Sector-supported recovery: robust performance in non-oil manufacturing, transportation, finance, and tourism; declines in Suez Canal revenues and mining and extraction sectors were offset.
- Egypt's headline PMI rose to 51.1 in November 2025 from 49.2 in October 2025.
- Headline urban inflation: 12.3 percent (y/y) in December 2025; hit a 40-month low in September 2025.
- Growth momentum: Q1 FY25/26 growth reached 5.3 percent (y/y), the highest y/y quarterly growth recorded since Q2-FY21/22.
- Medium-term expectation: growth in FY2025/26 expected to accelerate to 5 percent; medium-term strengthening anticipated with determined implementation of the reform agenda.
- Risks: downside from global trade and investment shocks, inward-looking policies, tighter financial conditions; positive risks include significant de-escalation of regional geopolitical conflicts and accelerated structural reforms attracting higher FDI.

### External sector and financial flows
- Current account deficit narrowed to 4.2 percent of GDP in FY2024/25 from 5.4 percent in FY2023/24; broadly stable during FY2025/26Q1.
- Remittances surged to record highs following unification of the exchange rate; tourism receipts remained buoyant.
- Nonhydrocarbon exports strong but outpaced by rebound in imports due to post-crisis catch-up.
- Progress on repayment of arrears to international oil companies easing constraints on hydrocarbon production.
- Sovereign international issuances: USD 4.5 billion in Eurobonds and sukuk between January and October 2025.
- Portfolio inflows into local-currency government debt rose to around USD 30 billion outstanding stock.
- Foreign-currency reserves reached USD 56.5 billion by end-November 2025 and were broadly stable during most of 2025.

### Program performance and targets
- Met all but two end-June 2025 QPCs; corrective actions implemented:
  - Central bank received sufficient repayments of EGP 102.2 billion to bring stock of outstanding loans to public agencies within end-June 2025 and end-December target.
  - Signed a real estate deal with Qatar for sale of land for US$3.5 billion; sale proceeds received end December 2025 and used for budget sector debt reduction in full.
- NIR target for December was missed; reserve accumulation program started to strengthen reserve position.
- Of 19 indicative targets for end-June and end-September 2025, 15 were met.
  - Missed ITs: debt ceiling (end-June) and NIR for end-September 2025 missed by US 2.4 billion.
  - CBE aligned with commitment not to increase lending to public sector agencies excluding Ministry of Finance, but targeted end-September decrease in stock not achieved.
  - Continuous performance criteria on non-accumulation of external arrears by the general government continue to be met.
  - MPCC: inflation exceeded the upper inner band for end-June 2025, end-September 2025, and end-December 2025 mainly due to increases in administered prices and services.
- Structural benchmarks: met 12 of 14 for combined fifth and sixth reviews.
  - Met: Cabinet-approved strategy to restore EGPC’s financial health; indicator to track SOP implementation; increased cash and in-kind support to Takaful and Karama beneficiaries in FY2025/26 budget; produced quarterly debt bulletins expanding coverage to general government; reduced customs clearance times; published a fiscal risk statement with FY25/26 budget; hiring of advisors for divestment deals; published report on institutional changes and procedures to secure collection of taxes from SOEs.
  - Not met: take required actions to deliver a tax package of high-quality measures in the context of the FY26/27 budget (still refining proposals). Commitment to undertake necessary actions, including legal assessments, to deliver committed tax package yielding 1 percent of GDP and secure Cabinet approval as a prior action.
  - Recurring SBs since November 2025: strengthened transparency and oversight of public procurement; brought coverage of budget entity and top 50 SOE procurement reporting into compliance; published second installment of aggregate SOE report and committed to broaden SOE financial reporting coverage and depth.

### Exchange rate and monetary policy stance
- Continued commitment to exchange rate flexibility as essential for responding to external shocks and managing volatile capital flows.
- CBE allowed market forces to play out during exchange rate volatility related to global tariff shocks (early April) and regional tensions (mid-June); spread between official rate and market clearing measures stayed closed; no reported FX demand backlogs at banks; CBE has not intervened in the market.
- Started collecting daily bank-by-bank, FX interbank transaction-level data to enhance monitoring of FX interbank market developments.
- CBE’s FX intervention framework is designed to maintain orderly market conditions consistent with a flexible exchange rate regime; interventions limited to smoothing excessive market volatility.
- Reaffirmation of commitment: will not introduce or intensify exchange restrictions or multiple currency practices, impose or intensify import restrictions for balance of payments purposes, or conclude bilateral payment agreements inconsistent with Article VIII of the IMF’s articles of agreement (continuous performance criterion).
- CBE will not provide direct or indirect oral or written instructions to commercial banks related to exchange rate levels or prioritization/allocation of foreign exchange.

### Reserve policy and banking sector safeguards
- CBE will resume accumulation of official reserves based on agreed definition including Tier 1 and Tier 2 assets and other foreign currency assets held by the CBE that could be used for reserve management purposes (performance criterion).
- New reserve accumulation framework: market-based, implemented through regular auctions with preannounced targets and published calendar, or direct market purchases or other market instruments with timing and volumes adjusted to market conditions.
- Consideration of a proactive communication strategy to clarify program objectives to market participants; ensure transparency on purchase operations.
- Contingency: if unfavorable market conditions impede near-term program execution, partial rollover of loans previously secured by the CBE and maturing in the second half of FY2025/26 could help maintain comfortable reserve levels.
- To limit foreign currency mismatches on banks’ balance sheets during external pressures: CBE will not grant exemptions for commercial banks that breach net foreign exchange open position limits and will apply sanctions to violators per regulations.
- Continue consultations on commercial banks’ NFA balances (consultation clause).
- Will not accumulate any general government external debt payment arrears (continuous performance criterion).
- CBE reinstated publication of its quarterly monetary policy report in calendar year 2025.

### Monetary policy objective and trajectory
- Monetary stance: gradual cuts in key policy rate of 725 basis points cumulatively between April 2025 and December 2025.
- Aim: pursue a gradual and data-dependent approach to ensure an orderly and durable decline in inflation to the CBE target of 7 percent (±2 percentage points) on average by Q4 2026.
- Adhere to the MPCC, which triggers consultation with the IMF if headline urban CPI inflation rate (y/y) falls outside the agreed range.
- Enhancing capacity to monitor inflation expectations and communication of monetary policy intentions to support transition to a fully-fledged inflation targeting regime.

### Fiscal policy specifics and targets
- Objective: balance fiscal and debt sustainability while providing adequate support to health, education, and targeted social protection.
- Plan to deliver in full on planned tax measures for FY2025/26 and FY2026/27 to achieve a cumulative 2 percent of GDP increase in tax revenue over the program period.
- Target primary surplus (excluding net acquisition of financial assets (NAFA)): 5 percent of GDP in FY26/27 as previously committed.
- Continued control over public sector investment spending under the established ceiling.
- FY2024/25:
  - Over-performed end-June 2025 tax revenue QPC due to strong fiscal effort, structural revenue measures, broadened tax base, improved compliance, removal of certain tax privileges for SOEs, and enhanced collection mechanisms.
  - Missed the PB target including NAFA at end-June 2025 as divestment proceeds and contingency measures did not materialize before fiscal year-end.
  - Corrective Qatar deal: first instalment worth USD 3.5 billion materialized end December 2025 and used to reduce gross financing needs and budget sector debt.
- FY2025/26:
  - Parliament approved a budget targeting a primary surplus of 4 percent of GDP excluding NAFA.
  - Structural revenue measures expected to generate an expected improvement in tax revenue of close to 1.0 percent of GDP in FY2025/26 versus actual outturns for FY2024/25.
  - Parliamentary approval secured for most legislative changes submitted as prior action for the 4th review.
  - Will link amendments to real estate tax and withholding tax on free zones sales to domestic market to FY26/27 budget discussions starting in March 2026; ensure approval by end-June 2026.
  - Interim measure: until withholding tax on Free Zone activity is approved, allocate portion of Free Zone turnover tax that accrues to GAFI to the Ministry of Finance.
  - Higher tobacco prices from January expected to contribute to closing the revenue gap.
  - Plan to secure 0.8 percent of GDP of proceeds from asset sales to be used to reduce gross financing needs (performance criterion); if sales proceeds do not materialize, take offsetting measures to reach primary balance target of 4.8 percent as defined under the program.
- FY2026/27:
  - Plan further consolidation of 1 percent of GDP to reach a primary surplus (excluding NAFA) of 5 percent of GDP.
  - Remain committed to legislating another tax package of high-quality measures to be delivered in the context of the FY2026/27 budget to meet the program’s tax revenue objective of increasing tax to GDP by 2 percent over the two-year period (FY24/25-FY26/27).
  - Preparations undertaken including Cabinet approval to deliver a tax package of 1 percent of GDP (prior action); package to be presented to Parliament as part of FY2026/2027 budget package by end of March 2026.
  - Commitment to include in the FY26/27 budget package and secure Parliamentary approval of the full tax package for FY26/27 and the remaining measures intended to underpin the FY25/26 tax revenue increase (new Structural Benchmark, end June 2026).

*Source: 1egyea2026001 - 4.      We remain fully committed to revenue-based pro-growth fiscal consolidation and debt reduction, supported by enhancing voluntary compliance, strengthened tax efforts and administration, active debt management, and the strategic use of divestment proceeds to further reduce public debt.*

### 19.      We achieved our commitment to reach cost recovery on the products covered under

### 19.      We achieved our commitment to reach cost recovery on the products covered under the retail fuel indexation mechanism (gasoline 95, 92 and 80, diesel and mazut)

### Hydrocarbon pricing, retail fuel indexation, and subsidy reduction
- Retail fuel prices (gasoline and diesel) were raised by 2 EGP on April 11 and by 2 EGP on October 17 (an increase of 11-15 percent depending on fuel product).
- The automatic retail fuel indexation mechanism will start being applied at the end of the second quarter of 2026 to further institutionalize sound pricing practices.
- The projected reduction in hydrocarbon subsidies from already implemented hydrocarbon pricing (fuel, diesel, Mazut, LPG and gas) is approximately EGP 97 billion, or 0.5 percent of GDP in FY25/26.
- Full cost recovery for retail fuel products to be achieved by end-December 2025 (part of the March 2025 package of measures).

### Social spending and programs
- Expanded allocations to social protection programs in FY25/26, including for the Takaful and Karama and other cash transfer or in-kind social protection programs, to 0.4 percent of GDP.
- Takaful and Karama (T&K) spending increased from EGP 43 in FY24/25 to EGP 54 billion in FY25/26.
- Allocations to T&K beneficiaries through various in-kind programs (e.g., medical treatments) increased from EGP 6 billion to EGP 31.2 billion.
- Overall cash transfer and in-kind social spending for T&K beneficiaries will increase from around 0.3 percent of GDP in FY24/25 to 0.4 percent of GDP in FY25/26.
- The “Hayah Karima” initiative (launched in 2019) aims to improve living standards in poorest rural villages by addressing developmental gaps and improving access to basic services.

### Public financial management, fiscal planning, and public investment
- Submitted a medium-term budget to parliament as part of the FY2025/26 budget package in line with the PFM law passed in 2022.
- Next steps to consolidate Economic Authorities (EAs) into general government fiscal reporting in line with GFSM 2014: review and finalize compilation guide, continue testing integration of mapped classifications into the GFMIS, and expand training to additional EAs as needed.
- Plan to publish a fiscal risk statement in accordance with the existing structural benchmark to improve transparency over potential fiscal risks from EAs.
- Enhance content of reports on budget sector arrears, including to critical SOEs and EAs (recurrent structural benchmark), and report the same data on a semi-annual basis in accordance with the TMU.
- Met the end-June 2025 indicative ceiling on public investment: public investment spending was EGP 924.1 billion at end-June.
  - Budget sector entities’ share of spending: 41.9 percent.
  - Economic Authorities’ share: 32.8 percent.
  - Public companies’ share: 25.3 percent.
- Reported investment spending includes investments/projects by ACUD, NUCA, NSPO, Future of Egypt Agency, National Agency for Military Production, AOI and their subsidiaries.
- Indicative ceiling for public investment FY2025/26 set at EGP 1,158 billion, maintaining spending level roughly constant in real terms.
- Under the ceiling, intention to prioritize projects financed by concessional lending and enhance evaluation and prioritization of public investment projects including PPPs.

### Guarantees, SOEs, and arrears reporting
- Proposed cumulative nominal target for FY2025/26 on guarantees of EGP 740 billion consistent with a 0.7 percentage points of GDP reduction in the nominal stock of guarantees (IT on guarantees).
- Commitment to expand coverage and analytical depth of state-owned enterprise (SOE) portfolio reporting (recurring structural benchmark at end-September each year).
- Published second installment of aggregate SOE report reflecting efforts to revise database and classification of companies across entities and sectors.
- New SOE unit will work on developing the existing database to transform it into the one-go to source for information on SOEs.
- Continued monthly publication of GAGS on-site post-procurement audits for budget units and top 50 SOEs procurement awards; strengthened procurement reporting coverage to comply with SBs from November 2025.
- Pilot to upgrade the public e-procurement system with KOICA to cover procurement activity of at least 5 budget sector entities and include posting of procurement awards on GAGS website by June 2026.

### Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) claims, lending limits, and monetary policy effectiveness
- Initiated transfer of relevant EA deposits to the central government Treasury account at the CBE to grant the Treasury full legal and permanent control over EA deposits within the TSA Framework; implemented and reflected in end-December analytical accounts of the CBE balance sheet.
- The CBE has not increased, and remains committed to not increase, its lending to public sector agencies excluding the Ministry of Finance (performance criterion).
- Outstanding stock of borrowing by public sector agencies excluding the Ministry of Finance was reduced to meet the end-December 2025 QPC target.
- Remaining stock to be reduced by EGP 100 billion per year, reaching zero by end-June 2029.

### EGPC reform package and financial recovery
- March 2025 Cabinet-approved package to put EGPC on a sustainable financial footing (structural benchmark) includes:
  - Increasing retail and commercial fuel and electricity prices, and price of natural gas sold to electricity generators, with full cost recovery for retail fuel products by end-December 2025.
  - Allocating in the FY25/26 budget EGP 75 billion directly to EGPC and an additional EGP 75 billion to EEHC to clear its payables to EGPC.
  - Enhancing domestic oil and gas production by expanding exploration activities.
  - Increasing export opportunities by capitalizing on Egypt’s potential as a regional gas hub.
  - Promoting growth in the renewable energy sector.
- Increases in fuel, gas and electricity prices reduced EGPC’s subsidy burden by 0.5 percent of GDP (EGP 97 billion) in FY25/26.
- EGPC arrears reduced from US$6.2 billion in October 2024 to US$2.1 billion in December 2025, partly financed from direct budget support to EGPC and EEHC in FY25/26.
- Anticipated improvements expected to:
  - Improve EGPC’s liquidity, solvency, and profitability.
  - Support objective of reducing guarantees to EGPC by 25 percent in FY2026/27.
  - Boost average annual growth in revenues of 15 percent, excluding subsidies, driven by production and energy price increases and improved collections.
- Agreed to provide IMF staff on a quarterly basis with financial information to monitor EGPC recovery plan, including data on:
  - (i) cash flows,
  - (ii) breakdown of operating revenues and costs (volumes and prices by product type, domestic purchase versus imports),
  - (iii) debt, new borrowing, borrowing costs and guarantees,
  - (iv) overall arrears, payables to international suppliers, and cross-arrears among EGPC, EEHC, and the budget sector,
  - (v) standard liquidity, solvency and profitability indicators.

### Active debt management strategy, issuance, and gross financing needs (GFN)
- Objective: place debt on sustained downward trajectory, reduce gross financing needs and contain interest payments using a credible mix of domestic and external instruments.
- Gradually extending issuance maturity of domestic debt through auctions (indicative target) by tilting issuance mix towards bonds and introducing new instruments like sukuks to broaden investor base.
- Program commitments:
  - Re-calibration of the IT on issuance maturities from December 2025 onwards, underpinned by incorporating a program for longer-term bonds and sukuks at market prices in forward-looking quarterly issuance calendars.
  - A new QPC targeting reduction of the outstanding stock of privately-placed MoF Notes starting with the end-March 2026 target date.
- Declared national priority to lower debt and debt-service obligations with the aim to reduce debt-to-GDP levels to low and sustainable levels, notably reduce debt service, and reduce gross financing needs by 10 percent of GDP by FY 2026/27 on a cumulative basis.
- Proposal to implement starting early in 2026 a series of multi-year measures to target a meaningful GFN reduction equivalent to about 6 percent of GDP for the remainder of FY25/26 and about 10 percent of GDP cumulatively for FY25/26 and FY26/27, including targeted, voluntary, liability management operations (including debt-for equity swaps) to partially replace short-term domestic debt with longer-term debt and equity.
- Deployed 100 percent of the Qatari investment deal and will deploy a minimum of 50 percent of future divestment proceeds towards short-term domestic debt reduction.
- Efforts to optimize financing mix in the new medium-term debt management strategy (MTDS) and accompanying Annual Borrowing Plan (ABP) via maximizing concessional financing, including Development Policy Financing/Operations (DPOs) from the World Bank and Macro-Financial Assistance from the EU currently under negotiation.

### MTDS, ABP, and public debt transparency
- Prepared a draft multi-year MTDS that includes FY25/26 annual borrowing.
- ABP will quantify FY2025/26 borrowing needs and indicate ranges of financing volumes and instruments between external and domestic sources.
- Finalized versions of MTDS and ABP will be published by end January 2026.
- MTDS will include a multi-year borrowing plan anchored by a cost and risk management framework updated annually, debt portfolio risk tolerance thresholds, and operational targets covering available and potential foreign and domestic debt.
- Quarterly public debt reporting (recurring structural benchmark) improved reporting on government financing from the domestic market by including auction results, private placements, and overdraft borrowing in the current debt reporting framework to strengthen market communications and investor relations.

### Strengthening debt management institutional capacity
- Plan to add a middle office unit and product development unit responsible for reporting, risk management, and new product development, and enhance debt management information systems.
- Plan to formalize before the end of FY25/26 an organizational structure for a centralized, well-resourced Debt Management Office (DMO) within the MoF mandated over public debt management functions.
- Intend to start working during FY25/26 towards establishing a coordination mechanism and a national committee on public debt management including major stakeholders in monetary policy, national planning, and others.

### Financial sector policy and state-owned banks
- Banking system remains adequately capitalized per prevailing minimum prudential regulation, profitable, and liquid.
- The CBE will continue to refrain from extending, renewing, or introducing any subsidized lending schemes.
- CBE committed to instruct NBE and Bank Misr (as their supervisory authority) to close identified gaps in risk management practices by end-September 2026 based on terms of reference prepared in consultation with IMF staff.
- Draft results of the NBE were made available to IMF staff in early December 2025 and transmitted to NBE senior management for factual corrections.
- Second study findings for Bank Misr outstanding; CBE committed to deliver draft findings to IMF staff by February 15, 2026.
- CBE to evaluate NBE study findings and decide/ initiate appropriate supervisory response within a corrective action plan covering common and specific findings from both studies; will share details with IMF staff as soon as ready and no later than end-March 2026 (new structural benchmark).
- Final status report to be delivered by the CBE to IMF staff by end-September 2026 detailing progress on corrective action plan and addressing potential regulatory breaches identified by the studies (new structural benchmark).

### Structural reforms, divestment, state-ownership policy (SOP)
- Divestment remains a key pillar of state ownership policy and the EFF-supported economic program, intended to provide resources for program financing and debt reduction and rebalance economic model towards private sector activity.
- Under the SOP, committed to divest from non-strategic sectors by 2027.
- Sold equity stakes in 9 companies generating about US$2.2 billion in proceeds in 2023 and early 2024; divestment over last 24 months limited to sale of shares in a small bank on the Egyptian Stock Exchange in December 2024.
- Developed a multidimensional indicator to monitor SOP implementation (structural benchmark) capturing measures across divestment, leveling the playing field, and improving business environment including enhanced competition.
- The SOP indicator to be published for the first time by end-December 2025 and thereafter on a semi-annual basis; semi-annual publication started in December 2025.
- Identified four major transactions for financial closure before the end of the program with expected proceeds of US$1.5 billion, about half anticipated to be allocated to the budget to reduce debt and gross financing needs.
- As of December 2025, pipeline involves 11 additional divestment transactions in priority sectors, plus 5 military-owned companies, and 7 companies under the IPO program.
- Preparing management concessions for 11 Egyptian airports, starting with one airport as a pilot (private management without upfront proceeds for debt reduction).
- Law No. 170 of 2025 on regulation of state ownership established an SOE unit under the PM’s Office to triage state-owned companies:
  - Non-strategic and market-ready firms transferred to Divestment Unit.
  - Entities deemed strategic or with potential for value maximization moved to the Sovereign Fund of Egypt.
  - Companies requiring further restructuring remain under the unit’s oversight.
- Will update the SOP to reflect institutional developments and new priorities by March 2026 (new structural benchmark).

### Economic model and communication
- Endorsed a new economic model in Egypt’s Narrative for Economic Development: Reforms for Growth, Jobs and Resilience pivoting the economy towards tradable, export-oriented and high-productivity sectors, underpinned by the National Structural Reform Program.
- Committed to maintaining strong reform momentum and improving public communication, reflected in MoPEDIC’s practice of publishing a list of implemented and announced reforms in its quarterly GDP note.

*Source: 1egyea2026001 - 19.      We achieved our commitment to reach cost recovery on the products covered under*

### 36.      We have made progress in trade facilitation, digitalization and improving the business

### We have made progress in trade facilitation, digitalization and improving the business environment

### Trade facilitation and customs clearance
- Clearance times at the ports lowered to 5.8 days from 16 days in 2021.
- Plan to lower clearance time to 2 days by Q1-2026.
- Met end‑April structural benchmark that streamlines risk‑based control systems among border authorities.
- New structural benchmark: submit the amendment to Article 39 of the Customs Law to Parliament to make advanced customs clearance mandatory by February 2026.

### Digitalization and business registration
- Commit to establish a fully digitalized Integrated Economic Entities Platform to streamline business registration, licensing and operations.
- Complete contracting of a top‑tier consultant to lead comprehensive re‑engineering of all establishment and licensing procedures across 275 economic activities.
- Consultant to support reengineering of procedures and their integration into the new platform.
- Example target: reduce steps to establish and license a textile factory from 24 to 9 through the platform; same approach to be applied to 274 other activities.
- New structural benchmark: publish, by end‑June 2026, an action plan for reviewing and reengineering procedures for establishing a business across 275 economic activities, based on an inception report prepared by a competitively selected consultant.
  - The action plan will set out time‑bound and measurable targets for reengineering processes across all economic activities, enabling quarterly monitoring of implementation progress.
  - From that point forward, provide quarterly updates on implementation with detailed reporting on the number of re‑engineered activities.

### Level playing field, competition, and SOE measures
- SOEs contributed some EGP 67 billion to the revenue effort in FY2023/24 and FY2024/25, as documented in the report on the removal of SOE tax exemptions by end‑September 2025 (structural benchmark).
- Parliament will consider amendments to the Competition Law to:
  - align the independence of the Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) with the independence of other regulators with comparable mandates, including the CBE and the Financial Regulatory Authority (FRA);
  - empower the ECA to issue direct administrative sanctions similar to the CBE.

### Financing and program monitoring
- Total financing needed to reach the net international reserve targets are US$12.9 billion and US$5 billion for FY2025/26 and FY2026/27, respectively, including IMF purchases.
- Firm financing commitments secured for budget support financing of about US$4.4 billion in FY2025/26 and US$2.5 billion in FY2026/27.
- Received US$3.5 billion from the sale of land rights under the deal with Qatar at end‑December.
- Divestment proceeds expected to amount to US$1.5 billion by end‑June 2026.
- Firm assurances that US$18.3 billion in GCC official deposits at the CBE will not be withdrawn before the EFF ends in December 2026, except for equity purchases, with FX proceeds staying in CBE’s foreign reserves.
- Market issuances, including guaranteed and new innovative instruments, will help secure remaining financing.
- Commit to adjust policies if needed to ensure the program remains fully financed.
- Program monitored through prior actions, quantitative performance criteria, indicative targets, and structural benchmarks; all quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets are listed in Table 1, prior action and structural benchmarks in Table 2.
- TMU indicates definitions of quantitative performance criteria, indicative targets, structural benchmarks, consultation clauses, and data provision requirements.
- Current reporting commitment: report the CBE’s net international reserves and their components with a submission lag of no more than 15 calendar days after the end of each month; will work to shorten the submission lag.

### Program Monitoring under the RSF and recent reform measures
- Completed the first two reform measures due in June 2025:
  - RM1: Published and adopted a plan of renewable energy implementation until 2030 detailing technology type, capacity, location, timeline, and funding source; submitted a budget plan for Cabinet approval outlining annual investments needed in grid and network enhancement for 2026‑2029 to support the renewable projects in the plan.
  - RM2: Issued a directive on June 15, 2025 mandating all banks to monitor and report exposures to firms that may face material transition risks due to the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), and included data related to exported firms that may be impacted by United Kingdom’s CBAM set to be implemented in 2027.
    - By the end of first quarter of 2026, necessary information about the directive and the amended reporting template will be uploaded on CBE website—Sustainability Tab to provide banks with required data under the directive.
    - Planned monitoring of banks’ inquiries about the directive to consider possible amendments by end of 2026.
- Agreement on revised formulation of RM10 to strengthen Egypt’s water allocation framework:
  - Commit to establish the National Water Council (NWC) through a Prime Ministerial decree, chaired by the Prime Minister and including key ministers and stakeholders from MALR, MWRI, MHUUC, MoE, MPEDoIC and the NWC to:
    1. endorse and issue a circular letter clarifying the roles and responsibilities of its members in generating and sharing of data on water demand and supply by sector/subsector/region and publishing analyses to support informed decisions on water allocation by June 2026;
    2. develop and publish the National Water Allocation Framework, clarifying prioritization criteria, general processes and rules for relevant licensing, allocative decisions and monitoring among sectors/regions to manage conflicting demands on water resources under normal and drought conditions, guided by best international practices and tailored to national circumstances, by August 2026.
  - Following the adoption of the presidential decree on the NWC, issue a circular letter to ensure necessary data for projection of water supply and demand will be generated and shared effectively across key stakeholders.
  - Clarification of roles and responsibilities related to the publication of analyses will ensure key information is tailored to end‑user needs and communicated transparently.

*Source: 1egyea2026001 — https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1egyea2026001.pdf*

### 43.      We are also progressing in preparing and implementing the rest of the reform

### 1egyea2026001 - 43.      We are also progressing in preparing and implementing the rest of the reform measures.

### Progress on climate-related PFM and investment reforms
- Two reform measures on public investment management (PFM) processes are due December 2025 and June 2026 to ensure climate considerations are embedded in the design and implementation of projects.
- RM3 (MoPEDIC):
  - Updated climate-related criteria in the national project selection manual, circulated to all ministries.
  - Begun applying the new framework to all major FY2025/26 projects above EGP 500 million — including two recently added projects focused on mitigation and adaptation.
- RM4 (MoPEDIC):
  - Established a unified climate-risk data framework and set up ministerial technical teams.
  - Upgraded its investment planning system to integrate climate risk assessments.
  - Is cataloguing new fixed assets, collecting risk data, coordinating with the Ministry of Environment, and preparing a December 2025 progress report outlining identified risks and mitigation measures.
- For RMs on fiscal risk statement, disaster risk financing, and methane reduction, authorities are receiving or being followed up with the technical assistance needed to implement these reform measures by the expected date of completion.

### National Water Allocation Framework (NWAF)
- Purpose and scope:
  - NWAF will consist of a collection of general processes and rules under which licensing and water allocation decisions will be made and monitored.
  - Development and publication will mark a major milestone as Egypt has lacked a comprehensive water allocation system with transparent processes and rules formally endorsed by all major stakeholders.
  - As a framework document, NWAF will set general processes and rules while greater details can be deliberated and improved upon by the NWC on a continual basis to operationalize the water allocation system.
- Content and governance:
  - NWAF will describe present arrangements of processes and rules in a clear and concise manner.
  - NWC will decide, at its discretion, appropriate content and language for references to future updates to avoid adverse consequences such as public misunderstanding and speculative behaviors.
  - NWAF will clarify processes and rules under normal as well as drought conditions (i.e., extreme circumstances).

### Key quantitative targets and indicators (selected figures from Table 1 and memorandum items)
- Balance of the government's overdraft account at the CBE (weekly ceiling on the balance): multiple weekly figures shown, e.g., 165, 127, 165, 145, 165, 135, 238, 174, 238, 203, 228, 228, 289.
- Threshold/project values and program projections:
  - Projects above EGP 500 million (application of RM3 framework).
  - Staff continues to project proceeds of $5 billion in FY2025/26 (as noted in Table 1 footnote 10).
- External program financing (cumulative change, $ million) examples in memorandum items:
  - 3,399; 3,824; 6,442; 3,876; 11,382; 5,462; 4,051; 1,993; 4,387; 0.
- IMF financing assumed under the program (cumulative, $ million) examples:
  - 2,051; 820; 2,044; 2,054; 3,268; 2,054; 1,222; 2,000; 3,503; 0.
- Net external loans from private creditors in FX assumed in BOP baseline (cumulative change, $ million) examples:
  - 2,500; -2,417; 414; -477; 1,062; -1,470; 1,000; 0; 2,000; -235; 292; 1,000.
- Public investment (semi-annual ceiling) and other program bands and indicators are reported with multiple nominal values and met/not met status entries across end-March, end-June, end-September, and end-December program dates.

### Structural benchmarks, prior actions, and status (selected)
- Prior action:
  - Secure Cabinet approval of a high-quality tax package that will generate 1 percent of GDP in revenues in FY26/27 — Prior action.
- Recurring and time-bound structural benchmarks (selected statuses and timings):
  - Publication monthly of all public procurement contracts that exceed EGP 20 million on the E-tenders portal; 30 days after month end — Met (as of November).
  - Ministry of Finance to monitor and report payment arrears 90 days after fiscal year end — Recurring SB; In progress.
  - Re-instate regular publication of annual aggregate reports on Egypt’s SOE portfolio; End-September 2024 and then end-September each subsequent year — Not Met (Report published on August 31, 2025, does not cover all companies under SOP).
  - Publish monthly on the general government’s e-tenders site of all material procurement contracts and awards made by the largest 50 SOEs; 30 days after month end — Met (as of November).
  - Prepare and publish general government debt statistical bulletins/reports quarterly starting April 2025 (expanded scope in November 2025) — In progress.
  - Sustain the flexible exchange rate regime — To be assessed once per program review — Met.
  - Integrate risk-based control among customs and inspection authorities to reduce container inspections — April-2025 — Met.
  - Submit cabinet-approved detailed plan to restore EGPC’s financial health — End-March 2025 — Met.
  - Expand Takaful and Karama coverage to 0.4 percent of GDP in FY25/26 budget — End-March 2025 — Met.
  - Establish indicators to track SOP implementation including share of private investment to total investment and divestment tracking — End-March 2025 — Met.
  - Hire advisors for at least two proposed divestment transactions worth an estimated combined US$1 – 1.3 billion — End-April 2025 — Met.
  - Publish a fiscal risk statement with quantified estimates and guarantee breakdown — End-June 2025 — Met.
  - Publish report on institutional changes to secure collection of taxes from SOEs and amounts collected after removal of tax privileges — End-September 2025 — Met.
  - Undertake legal/regulatory actions to deliver a tax package raising tax-to-GDP ratio by at least 2 percentage points over the program horizon — End-November 2025 — Not met.
  - Include full tax package for FY26/27 (withholding tax on Free Zones, real estate tax) and secure Parliamentary approval — End-June 2026 — New.
  - CBE supervisory responses and corrective action plans for NBE and Bank Misr risk management practices — End-March 2026 (formulate) and End-September 2026 (final status report) — New.
  - CBE to prepare supervisory background for CBAM directive and amended reporting template and upload on CBE website – Sustainability tab — End-March 2026 — New.
  - Implement MoF plan to reduce general government GFNs by EGP equivalent effort of 6 percent of GDP for FY 2025/26 and a further 4 percent of GDP for FY 2026/27 — End-June 2026 — New.
  - Publication of updated State Ownership Policy document reflecting IFC’s strategy recommendations — End-March 2026 — New.
  - Cabinet to submit amendment of Article 39 of the Customs Law to make advanced customs clearance mandatory — End-February 2026 — New.
  - Publish an action plan for reviewing and reengineering procedures for establishing a business across 275 economic activities, based on an inception report by a competitively selected consultant — End-June 2026 — New.

### Status update of RSF Matrix of Reform Measures (selected RMs and timings)
- Reform Area 1: Need to scale up mitigation efforts
  - RM1: Cabinet to adopt and publish a schedule for implementation of renewable energy until 2030 (consistent with 30 percent target for wind, solar, and hydropower generation capacity by 2030) — target end-June 2025 — Delivered by authorities, assessed as met by staff.
  - RM8: Ministry of Petroleum to implement an MRV system to track flaring, fugitive methane, and vented methane emissions at operator/project level quarterly or annually, and issue a decree mandating companies to submit and approve emission reduction targets with fines after a 2-year grace period — target end-August 2026 — Team discussed TA needs with authorities and World Bank Environment team.
- Reform Area 2: Disaster risk financing and fiscal risk statement
  - RM5: MoF to publish quantitative analysis of long-term climate-related fiscal risks and climate-sensitive contingent liabilities in the Fiscal Risk Statement starting with the 2026/27 Budget — target end-June 2026 — In progress; authorities receiving ongoing TA from FAD.
  - RM7: MoF to adopt a national disaster risk financing strategy integrating social assistance with Ministry of Social Solidarity — target end-August 2026 — Team discussed implementation and TA plan during first review.
- Streamlined RM (Water governance):
  - Authorities to establish the National Water Council (NWC) via Prime Ministerial decree and to (1) issue a circular clarifying roles and responsibilities for generating/sharing water data and publishing analyses to support water allocation decisions by June 2026; and (2) develop and publish the National Water Allocation Framework clarifying prioritization criteria, general processes and rules for licensing and allocative decisions under normal and drought conditions by August 2026 — Team discussed with authorities and converged to a streamlined RM; World Bank Water team ready to provide TA if requested.
- Reform Area 3: Financial sector resilience to climate shocks
  - RM2: CBE to issue a directive mandating banks to monitor and report data on exposures to firms with potential material transition risks related to CBAM adoption — end-June 2025 — Delivered by authorities, assessed as met by staff.
  - RM6: CBE to issue a binding regulatory framework mandating banks adopt an environmental and social risk management system (ESRMS) including a climate pillar and implementation timeline — end-June 2026 — In progress.
  - RM9: Under the NWFE platform and National Climate Change Strategy 2050, authorities to add two new sub-projects (one adaptation, one mitigation) with pre-feasibility studies and identify/adopt measures to facilitate private investments by end-2025 and June-2026 respectively — end-June 2026 — Streamlining options under revision by Fund staff.
- Reform Area 4: Climate-sensitive public investment framework gaps
  - RM3: MoPEDIC to publish climate-change related criteria and processes for project selection and update/publish project appraisal procedures with standardized climate mitigation and adaptation assumptions, and demonstrate application to all new projects exceeding 500 million EGP — end-December 2025 — Progress shared by authorities is under revision by Fund staff.
  - RM4: MoPEDIC to expand asset registry pilot to include Ministries of Transportation, Housing, Utilities and Urban Communities focusing on large fixed government assets; conduct location-specific climate risk analyses within registry; and prepare/publish consolidated overview of climate risks and mitigation measures — end-June 2026 — Progress shared by authorities is under revision by Fund staff.

*Source: Attachment II. Technical Memorandum of Understanding; Tables and text as presented in the provided content.*

### 1. This technical memorandum of understanding (TMU) sets out the understandings

### 1egyea2026001 - 1. This technical memorandum of understanding (TMU) sets out the understandings

### Overview
- Purpose: Defines quantitative performance criteria (PC), indicative targets (IT), consultation clauses, data reporting requirements under the IMF’s extended arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), and definitions for structural benchmarks (SB).
- Measurement convention: Assets and liabilities in currencies other than the U.S. dollar are converted into U.S. dollar equivalents using the program exchange rates indicated in this TMU.

### Program exchange rates and monetary gold valuations (by assessment dates)
- FY2022/23 (rates prevailing on September 30, 2022)
  - Currency Unit per U.S. dollar
    - SDR 0.781323
    - Euro 1.0293
    - U.K. Pound 0.9213
    - Japanese Yen 144.7094
    - Saudi Arabian Riyal 3.7576
    - Chinese Yuan 7.1305
  - Egyptian pound program exchange rate: 19.4970 (the CBE’s official buy rate on September 30, 2022)
  - Monetary gold: US$1,654.80 per troy ounce (rate on September 30, 2022)
  - Note: For other foreign currencies, current exchange rates to the U.S. dollar will be used.

- End-March 2024 test date (rates prevailing on January 31, 2024)
  - Currency Unit per U.S. dollar
    - SDR 0.751945
    - Euro 0.9228
    - U.K. Pound 0.7883
    - Japanese Yen 147.5000
    - Saudi Arabian Riyal 3.7500
    - Chinese Yuan 7.1807
    - U.A.E. Dirham 3.6725
  - Egyptian pound program exchange rate: 30.8272 (the CBE’s official buy rate on January 31, 2024)
  - Monetary gold: US$2,053.25 per troy ounce (rate on January 31, 2024)

- End-June 2024, end-Sept 2024, end-Dec 2024 test dates (rates prevailing at end-April 2024)
  - Currency Unit per U.S. dollar
    - SDR 0.7588
    - Euro 0.9330
    - U.K. Pound 0.7974
    - Japanese Yen 156.8200
    - Saudi Arabian Riyal 3.7500
    - Chinese Yuan 7.2420
    - U.A.E. Dirham 3.6725
  - Egyptian pound program exchange rate for end-June 2024 test date and test dates in FY2024/25: 47.7860 (the CBE’s official buy rate on April 30, 2024)
  - Monetary gold: US$2,307 per troy ounce (rate at end-April 2024)

- Calendar year 2025 test dates (rates prevailing at end-October 2024)
  - Currency Unit per U.S. dollar
    - SDR 0.7510
    - Euro 1.0882
    - U.K. Pound 1.2978
    - Japanese Yen 153.50
    - Saudi Arabian Riyal 3.7500
    - Chinese Yuan 7.1196
    - U.A.E. Dirham 3.6725
  - Egyptian pound program exchange rate for test dates in calendar 2025: 48.8908 (the CBE’s official buy rate on October 31, 2024)
  - Monetary gold: US$2,756.77 per troy ounce (rate at end-October 2024)

- Calendar year 2026 test dates (rates prevailing on September 30, 2025)
  - Currency Unit per U.S. dollar
    - SDR 0.7294
    - Euro 0.8517
    - U.K. Pound 0.7442
    - Japanese Yen 148.83
    - Saudi Arabian Riyal 3.7500
    - Chinese Yuan 7.1214
    - U.A.E. Dirham 3.6725
  - Egyptian pound program exchange rate for test dates in calendar 2026: 47.8077 (the CBE’s official buy rate on September 30, 2025)
  - Monetary gold: US$3,825.3 per troy ounce (rate at end-September 2025)

### A. Floor on Net International Reserves (NIR) of the CBE (PC)
- NIR definition: Difference between foreign reserve assets and foreign reserve-related liabilities.
- Conversion rule: Currencies other than the U.S. dollar are converted using the program exchange rates in this TMU.
- Foreign reserve assets definition:
  - Readily available claims on nonresidents in convertible foreign currencies (including Chinese Yuan and U.A.E. Dirham).
  - Include: CBE holdings of monetary gold, SDRs, foreign currency cash, foreign currency securities, CBE deposits abroad (irrespective of maturity), the country’s reserve position at the Fund, CBE foreign currency deposits at local banks, and CBE other foreign currency assets usable for reserve management.
  - Excluded: assets frozen, pledged, used as collateral, encumbered; assets acquired through short-term currency swaps with original maturity < 360 days; claims on residents other than CBE’s foreign currency deposits at local banks; precious metals other than gold; assets in nonconvertible currencies; illiquid assets.
  - As of end-November 2025, foreign reserve assets thus defined amounted to US$56,518 million.
- Foreign reserve-related liabilities definition:
  - All short-term foreign exchange liabilities of the CBE with original maturity < 360 days, except deposits at the CBE with original maturity < 360 days owed to official GCC member creditors.
  - Include government foreign currency deposits with original maturity < 360 days; banks’ required reserves in foreign currency; all credit outstanding from the Fund on the CBE balance sheet.
  - As of end-November 2025, foreign reserve-related liabilities thus defined amounted to US$19,648 million.
- Adjustors to the NIR floor (applied as specified below):
  - (i) Deviation in program disbursements relative to projections.
  - (ii) Deviation in external commercial borrowings (including Eurobonds and syndicated loans) relative to baseline assumptions.
  - (iii) Deviation in the stock/flow of government T-bills and T-bonds denominated in local currency and held by nonresidents relative to program assumptions.
  - (iv) Repo margin calls.
  - (v) Use of reserves according to an FX intervention framework.
- Program disbursements definition:
  - Disbursements of loans denominated in foreign currency (excluding external borrowings from private creditors such as Eurobonds, Sukuk, Panda bond, and Samurai bond that are part of baseline BOP projections, but including T-bonds and other government securities denominated in foreign currency), grants, and deposits for budget support purposes denominated in foreign currency.
  - Loans that qualify are new financing (do not include conversions of deposit liabilities existing at end-September 2022 at the CBE or conversions of official bilateral loans to the government).
  - Also include: net issuance of T-bills in foreign currency; purchases under the IMF’s Extended Fund Facility; official creditor foreign reserve-related loans to the CBE with original maturity > 360 days and official creditor deposits at the CBE regardless of maturity; rollovers by > 360 days of existing foreign loans and foreign reserve-related liabilities from official multilateral, official bilateral, and private creditors (including external bond placements denominated in foreign currency).
  - Exclude: project loans and project grants.
- Application of NIR adjustors:
  - Adjustor for deviations in program disbursements:
    - NIR floor adjusted up by full amount of any excess in cumulative program disbursements relative to projections, net of any shortfall in external commercial borrowings relative to baseline assumptions.
    - NIR floor adjusted down by full amount of any shortfall in cumulative program disbursements relative to projections.
    - Projections for cumulative program disbursements (excluding the IMF): US$ 1,993 million as of end-March 2026, US$ 4,387 million as of end-June 2026, and nil as of end-September 2026.
  - Adjustor for deviations in external commercial borrowings:
    - NIR floor adjusted up by full amount of any excess in net external commercial borrowings from private creditors in foreign currency relative to baseline projections in the BOP.
    - Projections for cumulative net external commercial borrowing from private creditors (from the beginning of the fiscal year): US$ -235 million as of end-March 2026, US$ 292 million as of end-June 2026, and US$ 1000 million as of end-September 2026.
  - Adjustor for deviations in the flow of local-currency government T-bills and T-bonds held by nonresidents:
    - NIR floor adjusted up by 50 percent of any excess in this flow relative to program assumptions.
    - This adjustor uses information on T-bill and T-bond holdings one month before the test date (example: for end-December 2022 test date, end-November 2022 holdings are used).
    - Program assumptions for cumulative flows (from beginning of fiscal year) of local currency T-bills and T-bonds held by nonresidents: US$ 5,458 million for end-March 2026, US$ 5,708 million for end-June 2026, and US$ 250 million for end-September 2026.
  - Adjustor for repo margin calls:
    - NIR floor adjusted down (up) by any margin call payments (receipts) associated with the CBE’s repo facilities.
  - Adjustor for FX intervention:
    - NIR floor adjusted down by amount of FX intervention (sales) undertaken by the CBE, provided intervention is consistent with the intervention framework.

### B. Floor on Primary Fiscal Balance of the Budget Sector (PC)
- Budget sector composition: 184 central government (administration) units (including executive powers, legislative powers), 323 local government units, and 156 entities in public service authorities (including universities and hospitals).
- Primary fiscal balance definition: Overall balance measured on a cash basis plus total cash interest payments of the budget sector.
  - Overall balance = total revenue and grants minus total expenditure plus net acquisition of financial assets; measured cumulatively from the beginning of the fiscal year.
- FY2024/25 primary balance thus defined: EGP 689 billion.
- Off-budget funds: Authorities must immediately inform IMF staff of creation of any new off-budgetary funds or programs (per IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014).
- Divestment proceeds flowing to the budget:
  - Defined as proceeds from sale of state-owned assets in FX and Egyptian pounds, including sale of equity stakes in SOEs and stakes in other assets such as land.
  - Recorded in the net acquisition of financial assets for program purposes.
  - Program assumptions for divestment proceeds flowing to the budget are listed in the QPC table.
- Adjustor for primary balance floor:
  - Floor adjusted up by full amount of excess divestment proceeds (including sale of equity stakes in SOEs and stakes in other assets) relative to program assumptions indicated in the QPC table.

### C. Floor on Tax Revenues (PC)
- Tax revenues include: personal income tax, corporate income tax, capital gain tax, property tax, tax on T-bills/T-bonds, value-added tax, excises, tax on specific services, stamp tax, international trade taxes, tax on use of goods and on permission to use goods and perform activities, other taxes, and development fees.
- Tax revenues totaled EGP 961.6 billion as of November 2025 since the start of FY2025/26.

### D. Floor on Health and Social Spending of the Budget Sector (IT)
- Definition: Spending related to the budgets of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Solidarity, excluding interest payments.

### E. Ceiling on Public Investment (IT)
- Target definition: Cumulative capital investment spending undertaken by all public agencies and entities controlled or owned directly or indirectly by public entities (state stake of 50 percent or more).
- Measurement: Cumulative investment spending since the beginning of the relevant fiscal year.

### F. Ceiling on Balance of Government’s Overdraft Account at the CBE (PC)
- Target definition: Balance on the government’s overdraft account at the CBE.
- Assessment: Periodic QPC assessed semi-annually on relevant test date using weekly performance data. If any weekly ceiling is missed during the semi-annual period, the QPC is assessed as not met.

### G. Ceiling on CBE Lending to Public Agencies Excluding the Ministry of Finance (PC)
- Target definition: Balance on lending by the CBE to public agencies excluding the Ministry of Finance.
- Ceiling as of January 2024: EGP 661.172 billion (reflecting stock of outstanding lending as of January 2024 to six entities).
- Repayment commitment: Government committed to a repayment plan to reduce existing claims on public sector agencies excluding the Ministry of Finance to EGP 308 billion by end-June 2026, with intermediate targets at end-December 2025 and end-March 2026, aiming to eliminate these claims from the CBE’s balance sheet by FY2028/29.
- Reporting: Balance reported in the weekly analytical balance sheet of the CBE, with “Other Items, net” split into a component for CBE lending to public agencies excluding the Ministry of Finance and a component for all other items. Loan-by-loan information reported separately (Table 1B).

### H. Floor on Average Original Maturity of Newly Issued Local Currency Tradable Debt of the Budget Sector (IT)
- Definition: Weighted average original maturity of local currency tradable debt of the budget sector issued through public placements; weights are issuance volumes by maturity.
- Calculation frequency: Calculated quarterly for each quarter.
- Scope: Local currency tradable securities (tradable T-bills and T-bonds) denominated in Egyptian Pounds, including those issued by the budget sector to the Pension Fund and other public entities.

### I. Ceiling for Gross Debt of the Budget Sector (IT)
- Gross debt definition: Outstanding stock of debt issued by the budget sector as defined in IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014; includes debt issued to the pension fund and other public entities.
- Treatment: Sukuk issued by the budget sector treated as debt of the budget sector.
- Conversion: U.S. dollar amounts of foreign currency debt converted to Egyptian pound equivalents using program exchange rates in this TMU.
- Adjustor: Ceiling adjusted down by full amount of the excess of divestment proceeds (including sale of equity stakes in SOEs and stakes in other assets such as land) relative to program assumptions. Program assumptions for divestment proceeds flowing to the budget are listed in the QPC table.

### J. Ceiling on Government Guarantees (IT)
- Target definition: Cumulative change in stock of guarantees issued by the Ministry of Finance; guarantees on foreign currency denominated borrowing converted to Egyptian pound equivalents using program exchange rates in this TMU.
- Guarantee definition: Arrangement where the Ministry of Finance has an obligation to pay a third-party beneficiary when another institutional unit fails to perform certain contractual obligations.
- Reporting requirements:
  - Ministry of Finance will report the stock of guarantees in billions of Egyptian pounds at both program and actual exchange rates 90 days after the relevant test date.
  - Data will show guarantees on domestic currency and foreign currency borrowing by Economic Authorities (EGPC, GASC, Transport, NUCA, other) and state-owned enterprises (NIB, Electricity, other).
  - Stock of guarantees broken down into domestic and external guarantees by currency denomination, with U.S. dollar value of guarantees of foreign currency denominated borrowing reported at actual and program exchange rates.
- Measurement: Ceiling calculated as cumulative change in nominal value of the stock of guarantees since beginning of the relevant fiscal year.

### K. Structural Benchmark: Maintain a Flexible Exchange Rate Regime and a Liberalized Foreign Exchange System (SB)
- Assessment: SB will assess whether shift to a flexible exchange rate regime and a liberalized FX system is sustained.
- Monitoring indicators include:
  - FX demand backlogs at banks: CBE will provide data covering eight banks identified by the CBE (sample fixed throughout the program).
  - Spread between the official rate and measures of market-clearing rate: Measures include local parallel market rate and exchange rates implied by transactions in gold, GDR, and ADR markets; monitored daily.
  - Interbank FX turnover: CBE will provide daily data.
- Frequency: SB assessed once for each program review, based on information over period between program reviews.

### L. Structural Benchmark: CBE to instruct NBE and Bank Misr to close gaps in risk management practices (SB)
- Requirement: CBE to instruct NBE and Bank Misr to close the gaps identified in risk management practices based on terms of reference prepared in consultation with IMF staff.

*International Monetary Fund — Technical Memorandum of Understanding (TMU) for the Extended Fund Facility arrangement with the Arab Republic of Egypt (extract).*

### 28. The structural benchmark will assess CBE’s action plan to address findings in

### 1egyea2026001 - 28. The structural benchmark will assess CBE’s action plan to address findings in

### Structural benchmark: CBE action plan on state-owned banks’ governance studies
- The structural benchmark will assess CBE’s action plan to address findings in governance studies undertaken for state-owned banks.
- Commitments and timelines:
  - CBE commits through an end-September 2026 SB to instruct NBE and Bank Misr as their supervisory authority to close the identified gaps in risk management practices based on terms of reference prepared in consultation with IMF staff.
  - The CBE is committed to delivering the draft findings to IMF staff by February 15th 2026.
  - The CBE will evaluate the main findings of the NBE and Misr studies with a view to deciding on and initiating the appropriate supervisory response within a corrective action plan covering eventually common and specific findings from both studies once available.
  - The CBE will share the details of the corrective action plan with Fund staff as soon as it is ready, and no later than end-March 2026.
  - A final status report will be delivered by the CBE to Fund staff by end-September 2026 detailing progress on the status of the corrective action plan, including addressing any potential regulatory breaches.

### Data sources and FX monitoring
- Local parallel market rate data sources:
  - https://www.parallelrate.org/ (the data from this source is also available in Haver)
  - https://sarf-today.com/en/currency/us_dollar/market
- Exchange rate implied by gold transactions in Egypt and internationally:
  - https://egypt.gold-price-today.com/ and Bloomberg
- Exchange rate implied by stock transactions in Egypt and internationally (GDR and ADR markets):
  - Bloomberg
  - For GDR and ADR, monitoring will focus on the stock for Commercial International Bank (CIB), given that CIB stock has the largest trading volume in GDR and ADR among Egyptian companies.

### Commercial Banks’ Net Foreign Assets (NFA) — Consultation Clause
- Definition:
  - NFA of commercial banks = claims on nonresidents (including foreign currency holdings) − liabilities to nonresidents of other depository corporations.
  - NFA measured in US dollars using the monetary data reported in the standardized report form.
- Key figure:
  - The NFA at end-November 2025 was - US$11.9 billion.
- Consultation trigger:
  - Consultation with IMF staff will be triggered if banks’ NFA at the aggregate level decline by cumulative $2 billion over any past three-month period.
  - The cumulative change in banks’ NFA will be assessed at the end of every month.
  - Consultation will address reasons for the decline and whether: (i) there were imbalances in the FX market; and (ii) any corrective actions by the CBE are necessary.

### Monetary Policy Consultation Clause
- Inflation definition:
  - Inflation = year-on-year change in the end-of-period headline urban consumer price index (average FY2018/19 = 100), as measured and published by CAPMAS.
- Consultation with IMF Board:
  - Triggered if inflation falls outside of the upper outer band or the lower outer band (bands indicated in Table 1 of the MEFP).
  - Consultation topics: reasons for deviations from the outer band, the stance of monetary policy and the inflation outlook, whether the Fund-supported program remains on track, and the CBE’s remedial actions deemed necessary before further purchases under the EFF could be requested.
- Consultation with IMF staff:
  - Triggered if inflation falls outside of the upper inner band or the lower inner band (bands indicated in Table 1 of the MEFP).
  - Consultation topics: reasons for deviations from the inner band, the stance of monetary policy and the inflation outlook, and the CBE’s remedial actions.

### Other continuous performance criteria
- Non-accumulation of external debt payments arrears by the general government:
  - General government = budget sector, the Social Insurance Funds (SIFs), and the National Investment Bank (NIB).
  - External debt payments include principal and interest payments, including payments on long-term leases.
  - New external debt payments arrears cannot be accumulated during the program period.
  - Definition: an external debt payments arrear = amount of payment obligation (principal and interest) due to nonresidents by the general government and the CBE, not made when due under the contract, including any applicable grace period.
  - This performance criterion applies continuously throughout the arrangement.
- Standard continuous performance criteria include prohibitions on:
  - (i) imposition or intensification of restrictions on making of payments and transfers for current international transactions;
  - (ii) introduction or modification of multiple currency practices;
  - (iii) conclusion of bilateral payments agreements inconsistent with Article VIII;
  - (iv) imposition or intensification of import restrictions for balance of payments reasons.

### Ceiling on outstanding stock of MoF Notes (PC)
- Definition:
  - MoF Notes for the purpose of the QPC are non-tradeable, privately placed local currency Treasury securities issued by the MoF and ranging in original maturities from one week to one month.
- Assessment:
  - The ceiling will be assessed in relation to the total amount outstanding of MoF Notes (stock) at the end of each quarter.
- Key figure:
  - The ceiling as at end-December 2025 is EGP 650 billion.
- Reporting:
  - The outstanding stock will be provided to Fund staff transparently on a monthly basis, with a maximum of a two-week lag.

### Other Structural Benchmarks (definitions and recurring publication/implementation requirements)
- Definition of State-owned companies (SOEs):
  - All public corporations, regardless of legal framework and oversight agency; cover public sector companies, public business sector companies, military-owned companies, economic authorities (EAs), and joint ventures and partnerships.
- Reoccurring (annual) publication of domestic payment arrears:
  - Publish within 90 days after fiscal year end the stocks of commitments, overdue payments, and overdue transactions as well as the stock of gross liabilities and due payments to and from MOF with EGPC, GASC, NUCA, National Postal Authority, National Authority for Egyptian Railways, National Investment Bank, Central Bank of Egypt, Egyptian Electricity Holding Company, Holding Company for Drinking Water and Sanitation, and EgyptAir.
- Reoccurring (quarterly) implementation of the retail fuel indexation mechanism:
  - Enact increases in retail fuel prices in each quarter in line with the indexation mechanism formula.
  - The fuel price indexation mechanism will be considered fully implemented in quarter t if the retail price of all fuels, including gasoline, diesel, fuel oils (excluding fuel oil for bakeries and electricity) is changed by the specified computation within a month of the end of the quarter.
  - Components and parameters (preserved as in source):
    - The retail fuel price in quarter t is the price in end-quarter in domestic currency.
    - BPTPm_{t−1} is the average Brent crude oil price in the U.S. dollar in the previous quarter.
    - FX_{t−1} is the average exchange rate of the Egyptian pound against the U.S. dollar in the previous quarter.
    - 0.8 is the share of oil in the production cost of fuel products.
    - For gasoline and diesel, the change is rounded to multiples of 25 piasters.
    - Ministry of Petroleum will provide the relevant data.
    - Annual adjustment due to other costs: adjustments to other direct and indirect costs, as identified from the fuel subsidy table (percent change in per unit costs), are included on an annual basis in the second quarter of the fiscal year; adjustments due to other direct and indirect costs are zero in the remaining quarters of the fiscal year.
    - Catchup adjustment: because changes in retail fuel price are capped at 10 percent in absolute value, any adjustments not fully implemented in one quarter will result in additional adjustment in the following quarter, giving rise to the term CmtP hfp AaaafatmPmt_{t−1}. The catchup adjustment is taken to be zero for the adjustment in the third quarter of FY2022/23.
    - Transition specification: Given that the full impact of higher global oil prices and exchange rate depreciation was not fully passed through in FY2021/22, retail fuel prices will not be reduced during a transition period and the catchup adjustment and the pass-through from changes in crude oil prices in domestic currency will not be negative. This transition period will conclude once the level of fuel subsidies for products covered by the mechanism in the previous fiscal year has been eliminated.
    - Monitoring of the implementation of the fuel price mechanism has been temporary suspended given the authorities commitment to reach fuel price cost parity by end December 2025.
- CBE subsidized lending initiatives:
  - Defined as schemes where the CBE provides subsidies to financial institutions based on loans those institutions extend to predefined sectors or households at predefined interest rates.
  - Existing schemes include, but are not limited to: mortgage finance initiative for middle-income class, industrial, agricultural, and construction private sectors initiative, tourism sector initiative, and that aimed at substituting cars to work with dual fuel.
  - Key figure:
    - As of December 31, 2025, the total amount of loans utilized under the subsidized lending schemes was EGP 92.1 billion.
- CBE lending to public agencies excluding the Ministry of Finance:
  - CBE to issue a strategy, approved by the CBE Board, detailing how its claims on public agencies excluding the Ministry of Finance will be reduced to zero.
  - For each outstanding claim the strategy must detail either:
    - i) the timing and entities involved in repaying the claim to the CBE; or
    - ii) transferring the claim off the balance sheet of the CBE.
- Reoccurring (monthly) publication of public procurement awards (budget sector units):
  - Post within 30-day of the previous month’s end reports that comprise procurement awards greater than EGP 20 million made by budget sector units during the previous month and the previous month’s findings from General Authority for Government Services (GAGS) on-site post-procurement audits of budget unit procurement awards, which will be selected at random.
  - Monthly reports will be posted on the GAGS website, accessible in Egypt, and the Ministry of Finance website, accessible internationally.
- Reoccurring (monthly) publication of procurement awards by the largest economic authorities and state-owned enterprises:
  - Post within 30-day of the previous month’s end reports that comprise procurement awards made by the largest economic authorities and state-owned enterprises during the previous month and the previous month’s findings from GAGS on-site post-procurement audits, selected at random.
  - Monthly reports will be posted on the GAGS website, accessible in Egypt, and the Ministry of Finance website, accessible internationally.
- Quarterly publication of general government debt bulletins:
  - Post within 30-days of the previous quarter’s end summary general government debt statistical bulletins (and an annual report) covering all aspects of domestic and external debt and borrowing, including borrowing and market issuances (loans, private placements, public auctions, overdraft use), and including information on outstanding stock, instruments used, and terms (tenors, currency, interest rate level and type), and amortization and interest payments.
  - Starting with a first publication in April 2025 (new recurring structural benchmark).

*Source: 1egyea2026001 - 28. The structural benchmark will assess CBE’s action plan to address findings in*

### 45.  Performance under the program will be monitored using the data reported by the Ministry

### 1egyea2026001 - 45.  Performance under the program will be monitored using the data reported by the Ministry

### Reporting and monitoring framework
- Performance under the program will be monitored using the data reported by the Ministry of Finance and the CBE to the IMF, with frequency and submission lag indicated in Table 1A and Table 1B.
- Data are defined consistently with the program definitions above.
- CAPMAS will report data on inflation to the IMF, with submission lag of no more than 10 business/working days after each test date.
- In case of any data revisions, the authorities will transmit to the IMF immediately.

### Ministry of Finance: reporting requirements (Table 1a) — key items, frequencies, and submission lags
- Overall deficit of the budget sector — M — 30 calendar days
- Overall deficit of the general government, the NIB, and the SIF before July 2025, afterwards the consolidated general government and 59 EAs — Q — 60 calendar days
- Summary of budget sector accounts, including revenues, expenditures, and net acquisition of financial assets on a cash basis, consistent with the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics Manual 2001 — M — 30 calendar days
- Budget sector expenditures by the ministries of health and social solidarity — M — 30 calendar days
- Summary accounts of the NIB and the SIF before July 2025 and 59 EAs afterwards, consistent with presentation of general government accounts — Q — 60 calendar days
- Total divestment proceeds and divestment proceeds flowing into the budget, including sales of equities and land — M — 30 calendar days
- Domestic debt stock and debt service costs of the general government and the budget sector, including interest payments and amortization. Information on the below the line transactions (non-deficit debt creating flows) of the budget sector and the composition, including accrued interest expense and issuance of T-bonds for recapitalization of the CBE — Q — 30 calendar days for the budget sector debt and the below the line transactions (60 days for the general government debt)
- Debt of the budget sector by maturity of issuance and by debt holder, including debt to the NIB, the SIFs, and other public entities, at actual and program exchange rates — M — 30 calendar days
- End-week balance of government overdraft at the CBE, as defined in this TMU. Separately, interest payments including penalty — W — 5 working days
- Gross and net stock of bonds issued by the budget sector to the NIB and the SIFs — Q — 30 calendar days
- Gross and net domestic borrowing of the budget sector, including gross and net T-bill and T-bond issuance in local and foreign currency, separately for domestic and foreign investors, and issuance of other government debt instruments — M — 30 calendar days
- Auctions of T-bills and T-bonds via primary dealers, including: the number and value of submitted and accepted bids; minimum, maximum, and weighted average interest rates; and maturity dates — W — 5 working days
- Private placements of domestic and external debt (issuance amount, maturity date, currency of issuance, and interest rate). The information on each issuance should be reported — W — 5 working days
- Recapitalization of the CBE by the government (date of recapitalization, amount, information on instruments used to recapitalize the CBE including maturity and interest rate) — When recapitalization takes place — 5 working days
- Average original maturity of newly issued local currency tradable debt of the budget sector ... Underlying data to calculate the average maturity, including the issuance amount and the maturity date of individual issuances — Q — 30 calendar days
- Gross issuance of guarantees in billions of Egyptian pounds at program and actual exchange rates broken down into guarantees on domestic currency and foreign currency borrowing by Economic Authorities (EGPC, GASC, Transport, NUCA, other) and state-owned enterprises (NIB, Electricity, other) — Q — 60 calendar days
- Stock of outstanding domestic arrears by creditor. Stocks of commitments, orders to pay, and overdue payments of the budget sector in aggregate and by following entities (EGPC, GASC, NUCA, National Postal Authority, National Authority for Egyptian Railways, Egyptian Electricity Holding Company, Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Co., Holding Company for Drinking Water and Sanitation, and EgyptAir) — Q — 30 calendar days
- Financial information of the NIB: (i) detailed balance sheet, including interest on assets and liabilities across maturities; (ii) income statement; (iii) cash flow projections for the next 12 months; (iv) list of non-performing loans (overdue for more than 90 days), including loan amounts — Q — 60 calendar days
- Breakdown of fuel subsidies by product, including volumes, prices, and costs and revenue of EGPC — Q — 45 calendar days
- Breakdown of food subsidies by ration card spending and wheat purchase price and quantity — Q — 45 calendar days
- Submit each October and April all investment spending executed over the periods January – June and July – December, respectively, undertaken by all public agencies and entities controlled or owned directly or indirectly by a public entity. The submission will break out investment spending by the budget sector, Economic Authorities, state-owned enterprises, and other — S — End April and end October of each year
- EGPC financial information, including data on (i) cash flows, (ii) breakdown of operating revenues and costs (volumes and prices by product type, domestic purchase versus imports), (iii) debt, new borrowing, borrowing costs and guarantees, (iv) overall arrears, payables to international suppliers, and cross-arrears among EGPC, EEHC, and the budget sector, and (v) standard liquidity, solvency and profitability indicators — Q — (frequency indicated as Q in table)

(Note: S= Semi-annual Q= quarterly; M = Monthly; W = Weekly)

### Central Bank of Egypt: reporting requirements (Table 1b) — key items, frequencies, and submission lags
- Gross international reserves at the CBE, at market and program exchange rates — M — 7 working days
- Program net international reserves at the CBE and its components (foreign reserve assets and foreign reserve-related liabilities), at market and program exchange rates — M — 15 calendar days
- Breakdown of gross foreign assets and liabilities (including foreign currency liabilities to residents) of the CBE by currency, at actual and program exchange rates — M — 15 calendar days
- Breakdown of foreign reserve-related liabilities (including foreign currency liabilities to residents) of the CBE by original maturity, at market and program exchange rates — M — 15 calendar days
- Program disbursements as defined in this TMU, including purchases of state-owned assets (including sales of equities and land) in foreign currencies by official bilateral partners including sovereign wealth funds and the private sector. Breakdown of program disbursements described in this TMU — M — 7 working days
- Stock of government T-bills and T-bonds denominated in local currency and held by nonresidents — W — 7 working days
- Stock of outstanding external debt payment arrears of the general government and the CBE (if any), by creditor — M — 30 calendar days
- Debt service schedule for external debt payments, with breakdown of interest and amortization. Breakdown by type of creditor and type of debt: bilateral creditors, multilateral institutions (distinguish between public and private), deposits, bonds and notes, and short-term deposits (include GCC deposits in this category) — Q — 90 calendar days
- Monthly cash flow table based on the agreed template (both past outcomes and projections for 12 months) — M — 15 calendar days
- Balance of payments, international investment position, and external debt data in electronic format and same presentation format as the CBE’s SDDS tables. Values of export and imports of goods, with a breakdown by main categories, including exports of natural resources oil, natural gas, and gold. All items in BOP financing (below-the-line) that reconcile changes in reserves implied by the BOP and changes in the program gross international reserves — Q — 90 calendar days
- CBE foreign exchange deposits held at commercial banks headquartered in Egypt — W — 5 working days
- Commercial bank deposits (Egyptian pound and foreign currency) by sector (household, corporate, and public) — M — 30 calendar days
- End-week stock of bank-by-bank FX demand backlogs in U.S. dollar, for the eight banks identified by the CBE (the sample of banks is fixed throughout the program). For each bank, report the total stock and breakdown by type of backlogs, including: (i) backlogs related to pending LCs, (ii) backlogs related to unavailed IDCs (sight), (iii) backlogs related to unavailed IDCs (deferred), (iv) backlogs related to non-trade items (repatriation, dividend, and service invoice), and (v) backlogs related to foreign investors — W — 5 working days
- End-month bank-by-bank foreign exchange net open position (NOP) as a ratio of bank capital. The underlying components of NOP ratio, including NOP (the numerator of the ratio) and capital (the denominator of the ratio). In addition, information on any breaches by commercial banks of NOP limits and the sanctions applied by the CBE in such cases — M — 30 calendar days
- Bank-by-bank net foreign assets, as defined in this TMU — M — 30 calendar days
- Daily interbank turnover in the FX spot market — W — 5 working days
- Daily central bank purchases and sales of foreign exchange by counterparts (commercial banks, EGPC, GASC, government). Data on purchases related to the reserve accumulation program will include, for individual transactions, the date, amount, settlement exchange rate, and modalities (e.g., preannounced FX auctions, direct market purchases or any other instruments used) — W — 2 working days
- Information on the FX intervention, including volumes, execution prices, chosen modality of intervention as well as any other relevant information — When intervention takes place — End of the day of intervention
- Daily official exchange rates (EGP per USD) — W — 5 working days
- Daily average buy and sell exchange rates (EGP per USD) as quoted by foreign exchange bureaus and banks — W — 5 working days
- Bank-by-bank data: (i) balance sheets by currency (Egyptian pound and foreign currency); (ii) income statements; (iii) breakdown of loan classification, deposits, due from/to, securities holdings, repos, fixed and repossessed assets, net open positions; and (iv) FSI indicators (capital, asset quality, earnings, and liquidity) — Q — 75 calendar days
- Other depository corporations (commercial banks) balance sheet information in SRF (preliminary) — M — 30 calendar days
- Central bank balance sheet in SRF (preliminary) — M — 15 calendar days
- Central bank’s weekly analytical balance sheet. Reporting on “Other Items, net” will be split into a component relating to the stock of outstanding CBE lending to public agencies excluding the Ministry of Finance and a component reflecting all other items — W — 7 working days
- Monthly CBE financial statements (unaudited) — M — 20 calendar days
- Quarterly and annual CBE financial statements (audited) — Q — 60 calendar days
- Recapitalization of the CBE by the government (date of recapitalization, amount, information on instruments used to recapitalize the CBE including maturity and interest rate) — When recapitalization takes place — 5 working days
- End-week balance of government overdraft at the CBE, as defined in this TMU. Separately, interest payments including penalty — W — 5 working days
- New CBE lending to public agencies excluding the Ministry of Finance (amount, terms of lending) — When lending takes place — 5 working days
- Stock of outstanding CBE lending to public agencies excluding the Ministry of Finance, by individual loan (amount, date contracted, terms of lending) — M — 5 working days
- Daily overnight interbank rate (CONIA) and the daily mid-corridor rate — W — 2 working days
- Stock of loans under CBE subsidized lending initiative, both utilized and allocated / committed amounts, with the decomposition by initiative — M — 30 working days
- Bank-by-bank holdings of government securities, with for each security information on: (i) the total issuance amount; (ii) name of issuer; (iii) type of instrument (bills, bonds, other); (iv) accounting treatment (AFS, HTM, HFT); (v) maturity date; (vi) coupon rate and interest payment frequency; (vii) current market price; (viii) yield to maturity. Data for bank-by-bank holdings of government securities at end-March 2024 will be provided by end-June 2024 — Q — 60 calendar days

(Note: Q= quarterly; M = Monthly; W = Weekly)

### Program update: recent policy actions and performance outcomes (supplementary information)
- The authorities met the outstanding prior action on approving a tax package yielding at least 1 percent of GDP.
  - On February 17, 2026, the newly formed cabinet—with both the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance reappointed—approved a package of tax measures, with a projected yield of EGP 300 billion—estimated at around 1.2 percent of GDP for FY26/2.
  - The bulk of the yield comes from: (i) streamlining VAT exemptions; (ii ) reforms strengthening the transfer pricing and international taxation regime; and (iii ) a surcharge on all SOE net profits.
  - Remaining measures include customs tariffs adjustments and tax administration improvements.
- Staff considers the package sufficiently strong to achieve the expected yield and encourages the authorities to limit any potential social impact.
  - The tax measures will be included in the FY2026/27 budget submitted to Parliament by end-March 2026.
  - Staff encourages the authorities to consider the surcharge on SOE net profits as a temporary measure that should shift to full enforcement of the existing dividend policy.

### Key quantitative outcomes, market developments, and central bank actions
- End-December indicative target on the average maturity at auction issuance of gross local-currency debt:
  - Outturn: 0.84 years
  - Target: 0.94 years
  - Shortfall reflected the Ministry of Finance’s decision to limit issuance of 3-year and 5-year Treasury bonds in response to elevated yield demands.
  - Corrective action: additional 3-yr and 5yr T-bond issuance of EGP 109 billion through February 3, 2026, relative to the Q3 issuance calendar.
  - Resulting expectation: end-March IT of 1.1 years is expected to be met per the current quarterly issuance calendar.
- Inflation and monetary policy:
  - Headline urban inflation reached 11.9 percent in January 2026, down from 12.3 percent in December 2025.
  - CBE cut the policy rate by 100-basis points at its February 12 Monetary Policy Committee Meeting.
  - Required reserve ratio reduced from 18 to 16 percent.
  - The 100-basis points rate cut keeps the policy rate above staff’s estimate of the neutral rate.
  - Policy objective: balance supporting disinflation with safeguarding financial stability; stance should remain adequately restrictive to firmly entrench disinflation, preserve market confidence, and mitigate risks to the inflation outlook.
- Portfolio inflows and reserve accumulation:
  - In January, the stock of foreign holdings of local-currency government debt (T-bills and T-bonds) increased by USD 5.3 billion (or 16 percent on a month-over-month basis).
  - Outstanding stock reached USD 38.1 billion.
  - The outstanding stock is predominantly short-term, with T-bills accounting for 74 percent.
  - Amid substantial inflows and in line with program commitments, the CBE conducted FX purchases to help increase reserve buffers.

*Supplementary information, February 20, 2026.*

### 3.      In parallel, Egypt has continued to strengthen its engagement with UNFCCC-aligned

### 1egyea2026001 - 3.      In parallel, Egypt has continued to strengthen its engagement with UNFCCC-aligned

### Adaptation planning and transparency
- During 2025, work on the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) advanced under the leadership of the Adaptation Taskforce of the National Council for Climate Change, focusing on moving from climate risk assessment toward actionable sectoral adaptation pathways.
- Egypt’s First Biennial Transparency Report (BTR1) was published in late 2025, strengthening institutional basis for tracking climate actions and adaptation-relevant information under the enhanced transparency framework.

### Water management legal reforms
- Egypt enacted the Water and Sanitation Services Law (Law No. 172 of 2025).
- The law:
  - strengthens the regulatory framework for water and wastewater services, including the role of the Egyptian Water Regulatory Agency;
  - introduces principles to improve efficiency, cost recovery, and service sustainability.
- The Government is preparing the Executive Regulations of the law, which are expected to be issued within six months of enactment; these regulations will be critical for operationalizing tariff structures, service standards, and regulatory oversight, and are expected to help attract private capital.

### Local-level resilience and cross-sector initiatives
- 2025 developments included localized climate resilience frameworks, including GIZ support in Qena and Kafr El-Sheikh governorates to integrate climate risk into local planning and service delivery.
- In July 2025, the Government launched the Convergence Initiative, a cross-sectoral platform to better integrate food security, climate adaptation, and public health policies, with technical support from UN partners; the initiative aims to co-develop a coordinated action blueprint addressing overlapping climate and human development risks at the local level.

### Institutional coordination and integration with public financial management
- Climate governance strengthened in 2025 through:
  - the National Council for Climate Change;
  - the Adaptation Taskforce;
  - establishment of climate focal points across line ministries.
- In August 2025, the Acting Minister of Environment convened a high-level inter-ministerial coordination meeting to accelerate adaptation efforts and reinforce cross-government ownership.
- The Ministry of Finance advanced analytical work in 2025 to identify and assess long-term climate-related fiscal risks, including climate-sensitive contingent liabilities.
- Gaps remain: climate priorities are not yet systematically integrated into medium-term expenditure frameworks, budget circulars, or performance-based budgeting systems; there is no consolidated climate budget tagging or reporting mechanism, constraining the translation of strategy into prioritized, costed, and monitored expenditures and alignment of sector investment plans with national climate targets.

### Renewable energy deployment and electricity market reforms
- 2025 rollout of private-to-private (P2P) renewable electricity trading (using the national grid) marked a first step toward implementing an open electricity market; this reform pathway was supported under the World Bank GROWTH DPF1 in FY25 and aligns with RSF focus on a detailed renewable expansion schedule toward the 42 percent clean electricity target by 2030.
- To achieve the 42 percent clean electricity target by 2030, Egypt aims to replace 5 GW of thermal energy with 10 GW of renewable energy.
- Four solar/wind projects totaling 400 MW were approved in 2025 to sell electricity directly to industrial off-takers under the new P2P framework.

### Renewable and grid flexibility investments
- 2025 project milestones:
  - financial close of a 1 GW solar project with Scatec;
  - signing of a 25-year power purchase agreement (PPA) for a 900 MW onshore wind project;
  - progress in construction of the first unit of the El Dabaa nuclear power plant;
  - commissioning in July 2025 of Egypt’s first utility-scale battery energy storage system (300 MWh), strengthening grid flexibility and enabling higher penetration of variable renewable energy.

### Regulatory work and market instruments
- Progress in developing regulations for Guarantees of Origin (renewable energy certificates) and related energy source certification frameworks, including steps taken under Decree No. 1539 of 2025; regulations have yet to be adopted.
- Expected benefits of an operational certification framework:
  - facilitate corporate procurement of clean electricity;
  - enhance competitiveness of Egyptian products in global markets, including compliance with CBAM requirements;
  - enable renewable energy producers to monetize emissions reductions;
  - improve transparency and credibility of renewable energy claims.
- 2025 planning documents emphasized reducing electricity losses to improve power-system efficiency, even if actual reduction in losses remains limited to date.

### Methane abatement and petroleum sector emissions
- Ratification of Presidential Decree No. 31 of 2025 approved a USTDA grant (about USD 0.96 million) to develop a national Methane Emissions Reduction Roadmap for Egypt’s petroleum sector; the roadmap will support identification of priority emissions sources and cost-effective mitigation options, strengthening foundation for improved methane monitoring and abatement.

### Industrial decarbonization and CBAM response
- In 2025, sectoral analysis (with World Bank support) examined emissions exposure in iron and steel, cement, fertilizers, and aluminum, engaging line ministries and industry on mitigation pathways including cleaner production, energy efficiency, and expanded renewable electricity use.
- Egypt was selected to participate in the Climate Investment Funds (CIF) Industry Decarbonization Program and hosted consultations to advance planning for low-carbon manufacturing, policy reforms, and concessional financing instruments for energy-intensive industries.
- Egypt’s mitigation framework relies on sector-specific 2030 targets under the updated Nationally Determined Contribution (June 2023):
  - 37 percent emissions reduction in electricity (2030, relative to 2015 baseline and a 2030 business-as-usual scenario);
  - 65 percent emissions reduction in oil and gas (2030, relative to 2015 baseline and a 2030 business-as-usual scenario);
  - 7 percent emissions reduction in transport (2030, relative to 2015 baseline and a 2030 business-as-usual scenario).
- Egypt has not adopted a Long-Term Low-Emissions Development Strategy (LTS) or an explicit economy-wide net-zero emissions target; articulating a national long-term net-zero pathway with sectoral transition plans would help provide stronger policy signals, improve investment predictability, and facilitate scaling-up of public and private financing.

### Transport decarbonization
- The launch of the Cairo Ring Road Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system in 2025 aims to shift urban travel toward high-capacity, lower-emissions public transport, reduce congestion and air pollution along a heavily trafficked corridor, and support modal shift away from private vehicles.

### Macroeconomic constraints and policy trade-offs
- To mitigate social pressures, the Government deferred planned energy price adjustments through January 2026 (last tariff increase took place in August 2024); this increased electricity subsidies to EGP 10 billion (0.1 percent of GDP) in FY2024/25 and kept tariffs below cost-recovery levels.
- Fiscal trade-offs:
  - elevated subsidies have weighed on fiscal space and weakened price signals needed to crowd in private investment in the energy sector;
  - constrained fiscal space may limit scope for public investment in climate priorities, increasing reliance on external climate finance and private capital.
- The subsidy bill is budgeted to increase to EGP 75 billion (approximately 0.4 percent of World Bank estimated GDP) in FY2025/26, up from an average close to zero percent of GDP between FY2019/20 and FY2023/24.
- Recent easing of inflationary pressures could create room to resume gradual energy pricing reforms in 2026, consistent with the Government’s medium-term energy pricing roadmap.

### CBAM exposure and competitiveness implications
- Egypt is among the top six countries exporting CBAM-covered goods to the EU, with an estimated 6 percent of its 2022 exports (especially fertilizers, cement, steel, aluminum) falling within CBAM’s scope.
- Modeling suggests that, without adaptation, Egypt’s real income could shrink by ~0.6 percent due to CBAM, and certain export sectors could see significant declines (e.g., up to an 8.3 percent drop in exports of certain carbon-intensive products).
- Policy responses to CBAM highlighted:
  - operationalizing economy-wide emissions measurement and reporting (MRV);
  - advancing industrial decarbonization pathways;
  - strengthening carbon pricing readiness, including consideration of a carbon pricing mechanism (tax or ETS) for exporting sectors so carbon pricing is captured in Egypt rather than by payments to EU;
  - leveraging reforms enabling private-to-private renewable procurement and preparation of renewable energy certificates;
  - pursuing Article 6 carbon market readiness to mobilize climate finance for industrial upgrading.

### MRV, carbon markets, and international support
- In 2025, government and development partner support advanced the design of a digitalized national MRV system covering priority sectors: electricity, oil and gas, transport, waste, and agriculture, with focus on improving data standards and inter-ministerial coordination.
- Publication of BTR1 in late 2025 reinforced institutional basis for emissions tracking and readiness for CBAM-related reporting and future carbon market engagement.

### World Bank Group and IFC engagement
- GROWTH Development Policy Operation (DPF1, USD 500 million approved June 2024) and follow-ups:
  - DPF1 advanced: a national MRV working group; core building blocks for voluntary carbon credit markets (verifiers, registries, and credit listing rules); regulatory circular enabling direct private-to-private renewable power supply; a utility plan to cut distribution losses with annual targets; submission to Parliament of a draft Water and Sanitation law.
  - DPF2 is developing: MRV guidelines aligned with the Paris Agreement’s Enhanced Transparency Framework for priority sectors; institutional framework to identify sectors eligible for private investment under Article 6 and voluntary carbon market; regulations on certification of energy origin; first audit of distribution loss-reduction performance and approval of a financial viability plan; revision of water allocation standards and codes.
  - DPF3 will focus on: adopting a fully digitalized MRV system for transport, electricity, and oil and gas; submitting a revised environmental law with MRV provisions to Parliament; issuing decrees to align Egypt’s carbon market framework with IOSCO and UNFCCC principles; advancing electricity sector financial viability measures toward cost recovery and establishing a state-utility performance agreement; issuing executive regulation for the drinking water and sanitation utilities law.
- Green Transition Programmatic ASA and PASA provide targeted support on carbon markets, MRV, CBAM exposure assessment, and carbon pricing options, and support development of a green finance taxonomy and integration of climate risks into financial supervision.
- IFC activities in 2025:
  - supported IPP transactions including Abydos II (1,000 MW solar PV paired with a 600 MWh BESS in Aswan Governorate);
  - scaled climate finance via Egypt’s banking sector, building on Egypt 30 by 30 and thematic bonds, expanding lending for energy efficiency and renewable energy among corporates and SMEs;
  - IFC invested USD 700 million in partner banks, directly enabling more than USD 630 million in loans disbursed to corporates and SMEs.
- IFC advisory programs focused on industrial decarbonization, resource and energy efficiency, corporate climate governance, MRV practices, and access to climate finance.

*Source: 1egyea2026001 — International Monetary Fund*

### 22.      MIGA is active in mobilizing private capital into renewable energy and other climate

### 22.      MIGA is active in mobilizing private capital into renewable energy and other climate finance projects in Egypt

### MIGA exposure to climate projects
- MIGA’s present exposure to climate projects totals $694 million.
- Of this total, $364 million is linked to investments in solar and wind energy.
- The remaining $331 million represents the climate finance shares of MIGA’s capital optimization projects with GCC banks investing in their Egyptian subsidiaries.
- An additional $878 million in exposure to solar, wind, and battery storage projects is expected to come into effect this fiscal year.

### Macroeconomic stabilization and program status
- Real GDP growth accelerated to 4.4 percent in FY 2024/25 compared to 2.2 in FY 2022/23, underpinned by real private investment estimated to be growing by 24.4 percent year‑on‑year.
- The CBE sustained a flexible exchange rate regime and a liberalized foreign exchange system; foreign reserves have reached a comfortable level at more than six months of merchandise imports.
- Annual headline and core inflation rates dropped to 11.9% and 11.2%, respectively, in January 2026, down from about 24% in January 2025.
- The Ministry of Finance generated a primary surplus—for the seventh consecutive year—of 3.6% of GDP in FY 2024/25.
- General government debt declined from about 96% of GDP in June 2023 to about 84% in June 2025 and is targeting to be below 80% by June 2027.
- Successive energy price hikes and arrears repayments strengthened the financial position of the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC) and advanced the shift toward a greener economy.
- S&P Global Ratings upgraded Egypt’s long-term sovereign credit rating from ‘B-’ to ‘B’ with a stable outlook in October 2025.

### Program performance and corrective actions
- The authorities met the end-June 2025 QPCs on NIR and tax revenues, the weekly QPCs on the CBE overdraft, and the continuous PC on the non-accumulation of external arrears.
- Repayment of the legacy stock of central bank lending to public agencies progressed more slowly than planned, resulting in missing the end-June 2025 QPC and end-September IT; corrective actions were taken to meet the end-December QPC.
- Shortfalls in divestment led to a miss of the end-June 2025 primary balance QPC and the end-June IT on the debt ceiling; as a corrective action, authorities used all the proceeds of a US$3.5 billion real estate deal with Qatar’s Alam El Roum region to reduce budget-sector debt.
- Progress under the structural agenda was strong with twelve of the fourteen structural benchmarks (SBs) met.
- Performance under the RSF was strong; both reform measures due by June 2025 were completed.

### Fiscal policy objectives and recent outcomes
- The MOF overperformed the end-June 2025 tax revenue QPC; tax revenues grew by 35 percent year-on-year in FY24/25.
- Tax revenues rose by a further 32 percent year-on-year in the first half of FY25/26.
- The authorities used the USD 3.5 billion first installment from a Qatar real estate deal, received on December 30, 2025, to reduce gross financing needs and budget-sector debt.
- The MOF is targeting a primary surplus of 4 percent of GDP for FY 2025/26 and plans additional consolidation of 1 percent of GDP to reach a primary surplus of 5 percent of GDP in FY 2026/27.
- Cash-transfer and in-kind social spending for T&K and other beneficiaries is projected to increase from around 0.3 percent of GDP in FY 2024/25 to 0.4 percent of GDP in FY 2025/26.
- Spending on T&K rose from EGP 43 billion in FY 2024/25 to EGP 54 billion in FY 2025/26; allocations for in-kind support expanded from EGP 6 billion to EGP 31.2 billion.

### Energy sector reforms and EGPC
- The government removed subsidies on key fuel products and will revert back to using an automatic pricing mechanism by end-June 2026 to ensure fuel prices fully reflect cost-recovery.
- Retail fuel prices were raised by 2 EGP on April 11 and by 2 EGP on October 17 (an increase of 11-15 percent depending on fuel product).
- The reform package approved in March 2025 for EGPC aims to restore financial sustainability through cost-recovery energy pricing, targeted budget support, operational restructuring, clearing arrears, and enhanced quarterly financial reporting.

### Debt management and financing strategy
- Beginning in early 2026, the authorities plan multi-year measures designed to achieve a meaningful reduction in gross financing needs—equivalent to about 6 percent of GDP for the remainder of FY25/26 and about 10 percent of GDP cumulatively over FY25/26–FY26/27.
- Egypt will fully deploy the proceeds from the Qatari investment deal and will allocate at least 50 percent of future divestment proceeds toward reducing short-term domestic debt.
- The MOF is gradually extending the maturity profile of domestic debt, tilting issuance toward longer-term bonds, and introducing new instruments, including sukuks.
- Efforts include maximizing concessional financing, notably through Development Policy Financing/Operations from the World Bank and Macro-Financial Assistance from the EU currently under negotiation.
- The MOF plans to establish dedicated middle-office and product development units and to enhance debt management information systems.

### Fiscal governance and public financial management reforms
- Ongoing reforms build on the Medium-Term Revenue Strategy and the PFM law to strengthen PFM and fiscal transparency by fully integrating economic authorities into general government reporting, improving data quality, and systematically disclosing fiscal risks.
- A ministerial decree passed in November 2025 established a Fiscal Risks Unit under the auspices of MOF.
- Reforms target containment and improved efficiency of public investment through firm spending ceilings, strengthened project prioritization—including PPPs—and greater reliance on high-value, concessional financing.
- The program targets a reduction in contingent liabilities by capping guarantees and deepening SOE reporting to enhance monitoring of performance and fiscal risks.

### Monetary policy and exchange rate framework
- The CBE held interest rates steady at elevated levels from March 2024 through February 2025 and initiated easing in April 2025 with cumulative cuts of 825 bps through February 2026.
- Annual headline and core inflation registered 11.9 and 11.2 percent in January 2026, respectively, down from 33.3 and 33.7 percent in March 2024, respectively.
- The CBE extended inflation target horizons to Q4 2026 and Q4 2028 at 7% (±2 percentage points) and 5% (±2 percentage points), on average, respectively.
- The CBE resumed publication of the quarterly monetary policy report since H1-2025 and received technical assistance to enhance its forecasting and policy analysis system (FPAS).
- Exchange rate flexibility remains the first line of defense; successful exchange rate unification occurred in March 2024.
- Since April 2025, the nominal exchange rate fluctuated with initial depreciation followed by appreciation as market conditions improved; the CBE refrained from direct FX intervention in 2025.
- Staff recommends reviewing the CBE's FX intervention rule and budget using transaction-level data and considering complementary use of FX risk management instruments.

_Statement by Mr. Mohamed Maait, Ms. Maya Choueiri, and Ms. Habiba ElKharbotly on Arab Republic of Egypt: Fifth and Sixth Reviews Under the Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility and First Review Under the Resilience and Sustainability Arrangement, Requests for Rephasing of Access, Extension of the Arrangements, Waiver of Nonobservance of Performance Criterion, and Modification of Performance Criteria, February 25, 2026._

### 15.      Strengthening  financial  sector  resilience  continues  to  be  a  key  priority.  Egypt’s

### 1egyea2026001 - 15.      Strengthening  financial  sector  resilience  continues  to  be  a  key  priority.  Egypt’s

### Financial sector resilience and supervision
- The banking system remains well capitalized, profitable and liquid.
- The CBE is vigilant to the possible adverse impact of heightened geopolitical and trade uncertainty.
- The CBE commissioned in early 2025 independent assessments of the policies, procedures, and controls of the two largest state-owned banks by internationally recognized firms; both assessments have been finalized and delivered to IMF Staff.
- Follow-up actions and timelines:
  - The CBE plans to instruct the banks, in its supervisory capacity, to close identified gaps in risk-management practices.
  - The CBE will prepare a comprehensive corrective action plan by end-March 2026.
  - A final status report detailing implementation progress and the resolution of any potential regulatory breaches will be prepared by end-September 2026.

### State Ownership Policy (SOP) and divestment program
- Divestment remains a central pillar of the SOP and the EFF-supported program, supporting program financing and debt reduction and signaling commitment to greater private-sector participation.
- SOP objectives and milestones:
  - SOP published in late-2022 aims at levelling the playing field and boosting private sector-led growth.
  - Under the SOP, the authorities committed to divesting from non-strategic sectors by 2027.
- Transactions and proceeds:
  - Equity stakes in nine companies have been sold, generating about US$2.2 billion in proceeds in 2023 and early 2024.
  - Four major transactions have been identified for financial closure before the end of the program, with expected proceeds of about US$1.5 billion, 50 percent of which is anticipated to be allocated to the budget.
- Institutional reforms:
  - A new SOE unit under the Prime Minister’s Office has been established to triage state-owned enterprises—channeling market-ready firms toward listing, strategic assets toward the Sovereign Fund of Egypt, and restructuring cases toward targeted oversight.
  - The SOP is being updated to reflect recent institutional developments and priorities by end-March 2026.
  - Implementation of Law No. 159 of 2023 aimed to abolish tax and fee exemptions previously granted to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and public entities is ongoing; the law is highlighted as a key structural reform to ensure competitive neutrality.

### National Narrative for Economic Development and complementary reforms
- The National Narrative aims to advance structural reforms, reduce the state’s footprint, and improve the business environment through governance, regulatory, and external liberalization reforms.
- Structural benchmarks and initiatives:
  - Reforms include trade facilitation, digitalization, and business regulation measures such as mandatory advance customs clearance and the rollout of a fully digital platform for business registration.
  - Expected outcomes: strengthen competition, improve the investment climate, and support more durable private-sector-led growth.

### Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF)
- Context and objectives:
  - Egypt faces climate-related structural vulnerabilities stemming from droughts, rising sea levels, and water scarcity, and it relies on traditional energy sources.
  - The RSF supports addressing these vulnerabilities while complementing risk management at the level of the EFF and supporting macro-stabilization objectives.
- Performance and completed measures:
  - Authorities completed all reform measures due by June 2025, reflecting strong implementation capacity, sustained commitment, and effective coordination.
  - As part of reforms completed in June 2025, the authorities adopted and published a comprehensive renewable energy implementation plan through 2030, detailing technologies, capacities, locations, timelines, and funding sources.
  - A Cabinet-submitted budget plan for grid and network investments for 2026–29 was published.
  - The CBE issued a directive requiring banks to monitor and report exposures to firms facing transition risks from the EU and UK Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms, with further guidance and reporting templates to be published by end-Q1 2026.
  - Agreement on a revised formulation of RM10 to strengthen Egypt’s water allocation framework through the establishment of a National Water Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, was reached.
    - The Council will issue a circular clarifying data-sharing responsibilities by June 2026 and publish a National Water Allocation Framework by August 2026, setting transparent allocation and licensing rules under normal and drought conditions.
- Ongoing RSF measures:
  - Integration of climate-related criteria into public investment selection.
  - Development of a unified climate-risk data framework.
  - Incorporation of climate risk assessments into investment planning.
  - Reforms related to fiscal risk disclosure, disaster risk financing, and methane reduction are advancing with technical assistance from the IMF and the World Bank.

### Conclusion and authorities’ commitments
- The Egyptian authorities reiterate full commitment to economic stabilization and reform despite an exceptionally challenging regional and international environment.
- Progress under the program has delivered tangible results; while external conditions have delayed aspects of SOP implementation, the policy remains a central pillar of the structural reform agenda.
- All government institutions, together with the Central Bank of Egypt, remain fully committed to accelerating transformational reforms to support sustainable, job-rich, private-sector-led growth.
- The authorities seek Executive Directors’ support for the completion of the Fifth and Sixth Reviews under the EFF and the First Review under the RSF, and the related decisions.

*IMF staff report content as provided in the source document.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1egyea2026001.pdf_
