## 1gbrea2026001

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### Real sector developments — recent outcomes and backdrop
- Growth and macro backdrop:
  - The economy grew at 1.4 percent in 2025.
  - Quarterly pattern: strong first half of 2025, deceleration in second half due to budget uncertainty and weakening labor market; growth picked up again in 2026Q1 prior to the Middle East conflict.
  - Major shocks since the pandemic: lingering post-pandemic distortions, a rise in global yields, trade tensions, episodes of market volatility, and the conflict in the Middle East.
  - UK is a net importer of energy and vulnerable to spikes in oil and gas prices and supply-chain disruptions.
- Inflation and wages:
  - Headline CPI peaked at 3.8 percent in mid-2025, eased to 3.0 percent before the start of the war.
  - Headline inflation decreased to 2.8 percent in April (after November 2025 Budget measures and the Ofgem cap set for Q2).
  - Underlying disinflation continued prior to the March 2026 energy price shock: core inflation eased, services inflation edged down slowly, wage growth moderated, and inflation expectations edged down.
  - November 2025 Budget measures cost around 0.1 percent of GDP per year over 3 years and aimed to reduce cost-of-living, including a reduction in households’ energy bills.
- Monetary and financial conditions:
  - Bank Rate maintained at 3.75 percent after pausing rate cuts in March.
  - Staff estimate of the neutral level: 3 percent.
  - QT slowed to £70bn over 10/2025–09/2026 (down from £100bn annually in the past 3 years), skewed towards shorter maturity gilts.
  - Since August 2024, the Bank Rate has been reduced by 150 basis points.
  - Expected path of short rates rose sharply amidst the energy price shock; 10-year gilt yield moved above 5 percent in April–May 2026.
- Fiscal and external sectors:
  - Fiscal stance tightened significantly in FY2025/26; CAPB improved by around 1 percentage point of GDP.
  - PSNFL increased slightly, remaining above 80 percent of GDP.
  - Current account deficit close to 2½ percent of GDP in 2025 (declined for the second year in a row).
  - Improvement driven by higher net primary income and rising services surplus; goods exports deteriorated.
  - REER appreciated only modestly; 2025 external position assessed as weaker than implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.

### Outlook and key assumptions
- Growth projections:
  - Growth projected to slow to 1 percent in 2026 before rebounding towards potential thereafter.
  - Medium-term potential growth rate around 1.4 percent (identical to the 2025 Article IV report).
  - Medium-term components: labor supply growth revised down (lower net migration), labor productivity growth revised up (including a 0.2pp boost from AI investment and diffusion), planning reform effect of 0.2pp.
- Inflation projections and monetary path:
  - Energy price shock expected to push headline inflation temporarily higher and delay return to target by about one year.
  - Under staff assumptions, inflation projected to peak above 3.5 percent toward end-2026, before easing in the second half of 2027 and returning to target toward end-2027.
  - Bank Rate projected to remain at current 3.75 percent for the rest of the year, before declining at a rate of one cut per quarter on average in 2027, converging to an estimated nominal neutral rate of 3 percent in 2027Q3.
- Key commodity and fiscal assumptions (Text Table 1):
  - Natural gas: a 21.7 percent increase in 2026, and a 13.2 percent decrease in 2027.
  - Oil prices: increase by 31.8 percent in 2026 and decrease by 11.8 percent in 2027.
  - Fiscal projections aligned with authorities’ medium-term plans (OBR March 2026), but envisage higher debt interest and additional welfare spending due to the energy price shock.
  - Defense spending expected to increase from 2.4 percent of GDP in FY2025/26 to 3.0 percent by FY2030/31.
  - Fiscal multipliers used: around 0.3 for tax and 0.5 for spending (based on OBR estimates).
  - Trade policy: projections incorporate tariffs and trade agreements effectively in place as of mid-May 2026 and assume continuation of the TCA and implementation of new agreements announced in May 2025 (text truncated in source for UK-US trade-weighted tariff assumption).

### Risks and scenario considerations
- Main risk channels from the Middle East conflict: higher energy prices, tighter financial conditions, and increased uncertainty.
- UK-specific sensitivities: strong reliance on natural gas, low domestic storage capacity, gas as marginal fuel in electricity pricing, and greater sensitivity of sovereign bond yields to global risk shocks.
- Risk matrix highlights (selected items):
  - Geopolitical tensions and commodity volatility: Relative Likelihood: High; Impact if Realized: High.
  - Protectionism and trade disruptions: Relative Likelihood: High; Impact if Realized: Medium.
  - Disorderly AI correction: Relative Likelihood: High; Impact if Realized: Medium.
  - Fiscal vulnerabilities and higher interest rates: Relative Likelihood: Medium; Impact if Realized: Medium.
  - Implementation gaps in structural reform agenda: Relative Likelihood: Medium; Impact if Realized: High.
  - Delays in fiscal adjustment plan: Relative Likelihood: High; Impact if Realized: High.
  - Labor shortages: Relative Likelihood: High; Impact if Realized: Medium.
  - AI acceleration: Relative Likelihood: Medium; Impact if Realized: High (Aggregate TFP could increase by 1 to 5 percentage points over 10 years).
  - Cyberthreats: Relative Likelihood: High; Impact if Realized: High.

### Annex III — Illustrative downside (energy price shock) scenario (selected impacts)
- Growth and inflation effects:
  - UK GDP growth would be 0.6 percentage points lower in 2026, and 0.8 percentage points lower in 2027 (compared to staff baseline).
  - Headline inflation would be higher by 0.7 percentage points in 2026 and 2.0 percentage points in 2027.
- Monetary policy implications:
  - Two rate hikes this year followed by a hold throughout 2027 would be necessary in staff modelling to support return of inflation to target over the medium term.
- Fiscal and financial stability implications:
  - In the absence of support measures, weaker growth and higher interest rates would increase the fiscal deficit ratio by around half a percent of GDP on average over the next two years compared to the baseline.
  - BoE 2025 desk-based stress tests indicate banks’ aggregate capital ratios would remain above minimum requirements under a pronounced downturn.
  - If broader liquidity strains emerge, the BoE could activate contingency liquidity facilities for banks and non-banks.

### Fiscal consolidation, risks, and recommended strategy
- Medium-term fiscal picture:
  - CAPB projected to improve by about 2 percent of GDP over 2026/27–2029/30 under staff forecasts based on legislated policies.
  - On average, around three quarters of the adjustment expected from higher taxes (including higher employer NICs and extension of the freeze to income tax threshold from 2028 to 2031); remaining quarter from lower primary spending.
  - Rising interest bill as percent of GDP driven by high interest rates and elevated debt levels.
  - Both fiscal rules met under the baseline: a current surplus expected in FY2029/30; PSNFL ratio declining thereafter.
- FY2026/27 stance:
  - Staff projects a fiscal adjustment of around ½ percent of GDP.
  - Targeted support for the energy crisis estimated to cost less than 0.1 percent of GDP in FY2026/27.
- Fiscal risks:
  - Expenditure risks: reliance on ambitious efficiency savings and rising local government spending pressures.
  - Revenue risks: dependence on a more tax-rich composition of nominal income growth and uncertain yields from tax administration and compliance.
- Staff two-step strategy:
  - Stay the course: deliver planned deficit reduction; be selective in accommodating new demands and reprioritize within existing envelopes.
  - Develop contingency plans: pre-identify corrective measures on revenue (examples: broadening the VAT tax base; replacing Council Tax with a recurrent property tax; increasing Capital Gains Tax) and spending (control welfare bill, strengthen procurement, productivity reforms in healthcare).

### Monetary policy guidance (staff emphasis)
- Staff recommends monetary policy remain restrictive this year to prevent second-round inflation effects.
- Holding the policy rate unchanged for the remainder of the year—alongside some tightening in broader financial conditions—would maintain sufficiently restrictive policy to limit second-round effects and keep long-term inflation expectations anchored.
- This stance would imply a real interest rate above staff’s neutral estimate of 1 percent until the second half of 2027.
- Policy decisions should be meeting-by-meeting and data-dependent (e.g., wage settlements and price-setting intentions).
- BoE transition to a repo-led, demand-driven liquidity framework:
  - Asset purchase portfolio expected to shrink so liquidity is provided primarily through regular repo operations by early-2027.
  - Transitional risks exist; recommendations include pricing liquidity facilities appropriately, predictable and stigma-free operations, regular repo operations of adequate size and maturity, close engagement with participating banks, and monitoring distributional liquidity metrics and unencumbered collateral availability.

### Financial sector resilience and regulatory reforms
- System-wide resilience:
  - UK close to middle of the financial cycle; household and corporate balance sheets strengthened; low aggregate indebtedness and contained arrears.
  - Banking sector appears well capitalized; non-performing loans remain low.
  - 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test suggests banks could continue to support the economy under severe stress.
- Vulnerabilities and policy responses:
  - System-wide vulnerabilities remain in market-based finance and core funding markets; gilt market could amplify shocks.
  - Staff supports maintaining the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) at its two percent neutral level.
  - Non-bank financial intermediation (NBFI): recommend continued lead by authorities in risk assessment, mapping exposures (second SWES to conclude in 2027), encourage registration and preparedness for the Contingent Non-Bank Financial Institution Repo Facility (CNRF) and consider expanding eligibility.
- Insurance and pension sector (ICPF):
  - ICPF sector represents about one third of the UK NBFI sector.
  - Recommendations: accelerate consolidation mindful of concentration risks; avoid mandating asset allocations; strengthen oversight of bulk purchase annuities (BPAs) and monitor concentration, liquidity, and cross-border reinsurance risks.
- FSAP and stress-testing advances:
  - Contingent Non-Bank Financial Institution Repo Facility (CNRF) launched in 2025.
  - Expansion of system-wide stress testing, desktop toolkits, improvements in model development (system interlinkages model), and sectoral tests (e.g., LIST 2025, DyGIST 2026).
  - The Bank launched its second SWES exercise focused on private markets in December 2025, with firm participation and findings to be published through 2026–2027.

### Structural reforms, productivity, and AI
- Medium-term productivity context:
  - Medium-term potential growth around 1.4 percent.
  - Slower TFP growth is the primary driver of the productivity slowdown; concentrated in intangible-intensive sectors.
- Policy priorities to boost TFP:
  - Improve labor mobility: Planning and Infrastructure Act passed December 2025; NPPF changes and mandatory housing targets; implementation and monitoring remain critical.
  - Address skills gaps: Skills England established June 2025; binding constraints include tertiary education funding, underinvestment, and migration restrictions; recommendation to enhance domestic upskilling focusing on younger people.
  - Deepen financing for innovation: address scale-up financing gap, pension fund fragmentation, constrained financing for intangible assets; reforms include pension fund consolidation, market and listing changes, and expanded public finance institution role.
- Realizing AI’s productivity potential:
  - AI offers potential to boost TFP via process efficiency, innovation, and new business models.
  - Preconditions: skills, policy stability, infrastructure, and energy capacity.
  - Priority interventions: targeted visa eligibility and fast-track pathways for specialized AI occupations; clear, predictable regulatory frameworks for data-intensive sectors.

### Energy security and trade diversification (resilience)
- Energy policy and vulnerabilities:
  - Clean Power 2030 Action Plan (Dec 2024); Great British Energy Act 2025; Zero Emissions Vehicle mandate; Boiler Upgrade Scheme.
  - Renewable share: "The share of renewables in electricity production has increased to over 50 percent."
  - Remaining vulnerability: gas still plays a disproportionate role largely due to residential heating.
  - Priorities: incentivize electricity storage (including long-duration schemes), accelerate permitting of new renewables, speed up grid connections and transmission build-out.
  - Transitional costs: short-term increases in energy and network costs; recommend targeted cash transfers to protect vulnerable households and consider feebates (authorities indicated no plans to introduce feebates across wider portfolio).
- Trade diversification:
  - Recent steps: 2024 critical imports and supply chains strategy; 2025 critical minerals strategy; UK–EU “reset” (May 2025); UK–US Economic Prosperity Deal.
  - Priorities: accelerate steps to reduce trade frictions with the EU (SPS/veterinary arrangement, linking ETSs, customs simplifications), deepen trade agreements beyond EU and US, and pursue targeted, temporary industrial policies justified by cost-benefit analysis.

### External sector assessment — key metrics and assessments (2025)
- NIIP and external balances:
  - NIIP: -6.6 (% GDP) in 2025.
  - Gross Assets: 486 (% GDP)
  - Debt Assets: 249 (% GDP)
  - Gross Liab.: 493 (% GDP)
  - Debt Liab.: 270 (% GDP)
- Current account (2025, % GDP):
  - CA: -2.4
  - Cycl. Adj. CA: -2.4
  - EBA Norm: -0.1
  - EBA Gap: -2.3
  - Staff Adj.: 0.1
  - Staff Gap: -2.2
- Real exchange rate:
  - REER appreciated by 2.2 percent in 2025 compared to the 2024 average; REER gap assessed at 8.2 percent (using an estimated elasticity of 0.26), within a range of 7.2 to 9.2 percent.
  - As of March 2026, the REER was 0.2 percent below its 2025 average.
- Assessment summary:
  - External position in 2025 weaker than implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
  - CA deficit expected to increase short term due to energy price shock and narrow moderately in the medium term.

### AML/CFT, cyber resilience, and operational risk
- AML/CFT strengthening:
  - FCA appointed sole supervisor of legal and accountancy professions and TCSPs; transition from fragmented supervision welcomed.
  - Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2026 undergoing parliamentary scrutiny.
  - Specific measures: bring sale of ‘off-the-shelf’ companies by TCSPs under MLRs; require VASPs to conduct counter-party due diligence; establish identity verification of company directors and beneficial owners; extend trust registration to non-UK trusts.
  - Key statistic: a 24 percent rise in illicit proceeds recovered over the past five years.
  - Recovering criminal assets: total value recovered increased by 24 percent from £217.6 million in 2019–20 to £284.5 million in 2024–25.
  - Beneficial ownership and registration: as of February 2026, 33,028 overseas entities had registered with the UK’s Register of Overseas Entities; penalties issued: 44 for non-registration and 111 for failure to update.
- Cyber and operational resilience progress:
  - Final operational incident and third party reporting rules published in March 2026 (PRA PS7/26 and equivalents).
  - From April 2025 to March 2026, over 3.7 million identities have been verified.
  - It is estimated that 6 to 7 million individuals will need to undertake identity verification by November 2026.
  - PRA/FCA/BoE plan consultation in H2 2026 on expectations around cyber resilience; consultation updated from an original 2025 timetable.
  - Joint statement on frontier AI models published May 2026; additional guidance via CMORG (June 2026) and FSB/G7 CEG work (June/July 2026).
  - Cyber stress-testing and toolkits: CORST and CBEST thematics; Cyber Recovery thematic (2025); ongoing SIMEX exercises and international cooperation.

### Governance, implementation, and staff recommendations
- Staff policy recommendations (selected):
  - Sustain and deepen the authorities’ reform strategy centered on stability, investment, and reforms.
  - Prioritize: growth-friendly public investment within a strengthened fiscal framework; planning reforms to accelerate housing and infrastructure; pragmatic steps to deepen trade and regulatory cooperation; sustained implementation, clear prioritization, and communication.
  - Monetary policy: remain vigilant; maintain policy tighter for longer as needed to prevent second-round inflation effects from becoming entrenched.
  - Fiscal policy: continue medium-term consolidation while supporting growth-friendly public investment within departmental expenditure limits set out in the 2025 Spending Review; pre-identify contingency measures on revenue and spending sides.
  - Financial sector: maintain CCyB at two percent neutral level; proceed cautiously with regulatory-for-growth initiatives to preserve resilience.
  - Structural reforms: improve labor mobility, close skills gaps, mobilize patient capital for innovation, and implement predictable regulation to harness AI.
- Implementation and monitoring:
  - Staff recommends publishing annual reports on reform progress separating inputs/process from outputs/outcomes and tracking early and outcome metrics (e.g., skills program allocations and take-up).
  - Consultation cycle recommendation: next Article IV consultation to be held on the standard 12-month cycle.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpts (1gbrea2026001).*

### 1. Real Sector Developments  ____________________________________________________________________ 30

### 1. Real Sector Developments

### Backdrop
- The economy grew at 1.4 percent in 2025.
- The central policy challenge: sustain the recovery and set conditions for durable, productivity-led growth.
- Major shocks since the pandemic: lingering post-pandemic distortions, a rise in global yields, trade tensions, episodes of market volatility, and the conflict in the Middle East.
- The conflict in the Middle East reintroduced significant downside risks:
  - UK is a net importer of energy and vulnerable to spikes in oil and gas prices and supply-chain disruptions.
  - Higher energy costs are likely to weigh on real incomes and demand while pushing headline inflation up.
  - Sovereign yields have increased substantially; monetary policy will need to remain tighter for longer to avoid entrenching inflation.
  - Perceived uncertainty following the May 7 local elections added to market pressures.
- Authorities’ reform strategy organized around stability, investment, and reforms aims to:
  - Combine a growth-friendly public investment push within a strengthened fiscal framework.
  - Ease key supply bottlenecks and improve the business environment (examples: planning reforms for housing and infrastructure; pragmatic steps to deepen trade and regulatory cooperation).
  - Emphasize sustained implementation, clear prioritization, and continued communication to build confidence and translate reforms into stronger potential growth and real income gains.

### Recent Economic Developments
- Growth dynamics:
  - The economy was gaining momentum prior to the war in the Middle East; growth picked up to potential in 2025 driven by recovery in private consumption and private investment, with some drag from net exports.
  - Quarterly pattern uneven: strong first half of year, deceleration in second half due to budget uncertainty and a weakening labor market; services and construction underperformed.
  - Growth picked up again in 2026Q1 just prior to the Middle East conflict.
- Inflation:
  - Headline CPI peaked at 3.8 percent in mid-2025, eased to 3.0 percent before the start of the war.
  - Headline inflation decreased to 2.8 percent in April (after November 2025 Budget measures and the Ofgem cap set for Q2).
  - Underlying disinflation continued prior to the March 2026 energy price shock: core inflation eased, services inflation edged down slowly, wage growth moderated, and inflation expectations edged down.
  - November 2025 Budget measures: aimed to reduce cost-of-living and included a reduction in households’ energy bills and other measures with a cost of around 0.1 percent of GDP per year over 3 years.
- Monetary policy and financial conditions:
  - The Bank of England (BoE) paused its rate cutting cycle in March; the policy rate was maintained at 3.75 percent.
  - Staff estimate of the neutral level: 3 percent.
  - BoE normalization of its balance sheet continued with Quantitative Tightening (QT) slowed to £70bn over 10/2025–09/2026 (down from £100bn annually in the past 3 years), skewed towards shorter maturity gilts.
  - Since August 2024, the Bank Rate has been reduced by 150 basis points, lowering debt service burdens for households and firms.
  - Expected path of short rates rose sharply amidst the energy price shock; 10-year gilt yield moved above 5 percent in April–May 2026.
  - Financial conditions had eased since the last Article IV, but remain vulnerable to rapid tightening if shocks lift inflation expectations and risk premia.
- Fiscal developments:
  - Fiscal stance tightened significantly in FY2025/26 as first year of the medium-term consolidation plan.
  - Cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) improved by around 1 percentage point of GDP.
  - Improvement driven by higher receipts (including increase in employer NICs) more than offsetting higher recurrent spending on health and education and increased public investment.
  - Public sector net financial liabilities (PSNFL) increased slightly, remaining above 80 percent of GDP.
  - Note: the fiscal year in the UK runs from April to March.
- External sector:
  - Current account deficit declined for the second year in a row, at close to 2½ percent of GDP in 2025.
  - Improvement mainly due to higher net primary income (earnings on direct investment abroad outperformed foreign earnings on direct investment in the UK).
  - Services surplus continued to increase, offsetting deterioration of goods exports.
  - From saving-investment perspective, higher private and public savings contributed to current account decline.
  - REER appreciated only modestly.
  - 2025 external position assessed as weaker than implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies (Annex I).
- Authorities’ views:
  - Treasury officials broadly shared staff’s growth and balance of payments assessment.
  - Noted sterling’s reserve currency status allows access to a deep, diversified investor base willing to hold sterling-denominated liabilities, contributing to resilience.

### Outlook and Risks
- Growth projections:
  - Growth projected to slow to 1 percent in 2026 before rebounding towards potential thereafter.
  - Medium-term potential growth rate around 1.4 percent.
  - Channels through which the war will affect growth: higher energy prices, tighter financial conditions, and increased uncertainty.
  - UK-specific sensitivities: strong reliance on natural gas, low domestic storage capacity, significant role of gas as marginal fuel in electricity pricing, and greater sensitivity of sovereign bond yields to global risk shocks.
  - Recovery expected in second half of 2027 and strengthening thereafter driven by private consumption, investment, and a more supportive external sector.
- Inflation projections:
  - Energy price shock expected to push headline inflation temporarily higher and delay return to target by about one year.
  - Under staff assumptions, inflation projected to peak above 3.5 percent toward end-2026, before easing in the second half of 2027.
  - Inflation projected to return to target toward end-2027.
- Key assumptions conditioning staff’s forecasts (Text Table 1):
  - Energy prices: based on commodity futures prices as of mid-June.
    - Natural gas: a 21.7 percent increase in 2026, and a 13.2 percent decrease in 2027.
    - Oil prices: increase by 31.8 percent in 2026 and decrease by 11.8 percent in 2027.
  - Monetary policy: Bank Rate projected to remain at current 3.75 percent for the rest of the year, before declining at a rate of one cut per quarter on average in 2027, converging to estimated nominal neutral rate of 3 percent in 2027Q3.
  - Fiscal policy: projections aligned with authorities’ medium-term plans as detailed in the OBR March 2026 Economic and Financial Outlook, but envisage higher debt interest and additional welfare spending as a result of the recent energy price shock.
    - Defense spending expected to increase from 2.4 percent of GDP in FY2025/26 to 3.0 percent by FY2030/31.
    - Revenue projections based on measures legislated in the last two Fall budgets, with staff assuming a smaller revenue yield from tax compliance efforts and that fuel duty is not uprated over the medium term.
    - Fiscal multipliers used: around 0.3 for tax and 0.5 for spending (based on OBR estimates).
  - Trade policy: projections incorporate tariffs and trade agreements effectively in place as of mid-May 2026, assume continuation of the TCA and implementation of new agreements announced in May 2025 summit on a shared agrifood trade area and linked energy and emissions trading systems; for UK-US trade policy, projections assume a trade-weighted average tariff rate on UK exports of (text truncated in source).
- Risks:
  - Downside risks from the Middle East conflict through energy-price shocks and supply disruptions.
  - Monetary policy may need to remain tighter for longer if second-round effects of energy shock entrench inflation.
  - Financial markets are sensitive to perceived policy uncertainty (e.g., post-May 7 local elections).
  - The environment remains vulnerable to a rapid tightening of financial conditions if shocks lift inflation expectations and risk premia.

### Policy implications and recommendations (staff emphasis)
- Sustain—and where possible deepen—the authorities’ reform strategy centered on stability, investment, and reforms to provide policy stability and improve living standards.
- Key elements to prioritize and maintain:
  - Growth-friendly public investment push within a strengthened fiscal framework.
  - Measures to ease key supply bottlenecks (examples cited: planning reforms to accelerate delivery of housing and infrastructure).
  - Pragmatic steps to deepen trade and regulatory cooperation with major partners.
  - Continued implementation, clear prioritization, and communication about reform progress to build confidence and translate reforms into stronger potential growth and real income gains.
- Monetary policy:
  - Remain vigilant; maintain policy tighter for longer as needed to prevent second-round inflation effects from becoming entrenched.
- Fiscal policy:
  - Continue medium-term consolidation plan while supporting growth-friendly public investment within the departmental expenditure limits set out in the 2025 Spending Review.

*Source: IMF staff report (1. Real Sector Developments).*

### 8.23 percent. This reflects sectoral exemptions on autos and auto parts, steel, aluminum,

### 1gbrea2026001 - 8.23 percent. This reflects sectoral exemptions on autos and auto parts, steel, aluminum,

### Medium-term growth
- Medium-term potential growth is identical to the 2025 Article IV report at 1.4 percent.
- Components updated:
  - Labor supply growth revised down to reflect lower net migration consistent with ONS projections.
  - Labor productivity growth revised up after re-estimating the trend and including a small boost from AI investment and diffusion (0.2pp in line with the OBR).
  - The growth estimate incorporates the effect of the planning reform (0.2pp).
- Note: 8.23 percent reflects sectoral exemptions on autos and auto parts, steel, aluminum, aerospace, and pharmaceuticals, as part of the US-UK Economic Prosperity Deal announced in May 2025.
- Source: IMF Staff.

### Fiscal consolidation and medium-term fiscal strategy
- A steady fiscal consolidation is expected to stabilize the net debt ratio in the medium term.
- Under staff forecasts based on the authorities’ legislated policies:
  - The CAPB is projected to improve by about 2 percent of GDP over the next four years (2026/27–2029/30).
  - On average, around three quarters of the adjustment is expected to come from higher taxes (including higher employer NICs and extension of the freeze to income tax threshold from 2028 to 2031).
  - The remaining quarter is expected to come from lower primary spending towards the end of the projection horizon (including tighter departmental spending limits under the spending review).
- Rising interest bill in percent of GDP is driven by high interest rates and elevated debt levels.
- Both fiscal rules are met under the baseline forecast, with:
  - A current surplus expected in FY2029/30.
  - The PSNFL ratio declining thereafter.
- The FY2026/27 fiscal stance:
  - Staff projects a fiscal adjustment of around ½ percent of GDP—about half last year’s effort.
  - Targeted support measures for the energy crisis are estimated to cost less than 0.1 percent of GDP in FY2026/27.
- Recent fiscal framework changes:
  - The projected buffer (“headroom”) against the current balance in 2029/30 increased from £10 billion as of March 2025 to £23 billion according to OBR projections in March 2026.
  - Staff estimates this doubling of headroom would increase the likelihood that the rules be met from around 50 percent to just under 75 percent.

### Fiscal risks and recommended strategy
- Risks to the fiscal plan:
  - Expenditure risks: reliance on ambitious efficiency savings and containing rising local government spending pressures.
  - Revenue risks: dependence on a more tax-rich composition of nominal income growth and uncertain yields from tax administration, compliance, and debt collection measures.
- Staff two-step strategy to manage risks:
  - Staying the course: prioritize delivering planned deficit reduction; be selective in accommodating new demands and reprioritize within existing envelopes.
  - Developing contingency plans: formulate corrective measures in advance on both revenue and spending sides. Candidate revenue measures include:
    - Broadening the VAT tax base by removing selected reduced rates and exemptions.
    - Reforming property taxation by replacing Council Tax with a recurrent property tax based on updated valuations.
    - Increasing Capital Gains Tax to bring it more in line with Personal Income Tax.
  - On the spending side, focus on controlling the rising welfare bill and delivering efficiency measures that protect the vulnerable and preserve service delivery (including strengthened procurement and contracting and productivity reforms in key public services, especially healthcare).

### Long-term fiscal pressures
- Over coming decades, rising spending demands could raise public spending by around 7 percent of GDP by 2050.
- Constraints on tax-raising capacity:
  - Standard VAT rate is 20 percent.
  - Revenue from property taxes close to 4 percent of GDP.
- Implications:
  - A growing share of adjustment will likely need to come from expenditure restraint and deeper expenditure reforms.
  - Possible reforms include replacing the “triple lock” with indexing the state pension to the cost of living and improving targeting of social benefits.
  - Expanding charges in the health system beyond existing user fees while protecting the vulnerable and focusing on preventative care could help contain healthcare costs.

### Risks to growth and scenario considerations
- Risks to growth are tilted to the downside; main risk is a prolonged increase in energy and food prices.
- If the shock has large second-round effects on inflation:
  - Monetary policy could require a more restrictive approach, leading to tighter credit conditions and slower economic growth.
- Other downside risks:
  - Uncertainty about future economic policy.
  - Deteriorating external environment: further trade and geopolitical tensions, slowdown in trading partners, tightening global financial conditions.
- Upside possibilities:
  - Households using savings to maintain spending.
  - AI adoption boosting productivity more than expected in the medium term, provided key bottlenecks are lifted.
- Baseline should be interpreted as a reference path; scenario analysis (Annex III) illustrates range of possible outcomes, including a severe downside scenario.

### Monetary policy guidance
- Staff recommends monetary policy remain restrictive this year to prevent higher energy prices spilling over to core inflation and wage growth.
- Staff assessment:
  - Holding the policy rate unchanged for the remainder of the year—alongside some tightening in broader financial conditions—would maintain sufficiently restrictive monetary policy to limit second-round effects and keep long-term inflation expectations anchored.
  - This stance would imply a real interest rate above neutral estimated by staff at 1 percent until the second half of 2027.
- Policy decisions should continue to be taken on a meeting-by-meeting basis, guided by incoming data (e.g., wage settlements and price-setting intentions).
- The BoE transition to a repo-led, demand-driven liquidity framework:
  - Asset purchase portfolio expected to shrink so liquidity is provided primarily through regular repo operations by early-2027.
  - Transitional risks exist; robustness untested under severe stress.
  - Recommendations: price liquidity facilities appropriately, predictable and stigma-free operations, regular repo operations of adequate size and maturity, close engagement with participating banks, monitor distributional liquidity metrics and unencumbered collateral availability.

### Financial sector resilience and reforms
- Overall UK financial system appears resilient from a sectoral, bottom-up perspective:
  - UK is close to the middle of the financial cycle.
  - Household and corporate balance sheets strengthened; low aggregate indebtedness and contained arrears.
  - Banking sector appears well capitalized; non-performing loans remain low.
  - 2025 Bank Capital Stress Test suggests banks could continue to support economy under severe stress.
- Elevated global risks and financial stability concerns:
  - Deteriorated global risk environment, stretched asset valuations (notably US equities), rising AI-related debt financing, pressures in sovereign debt markets, and the conflict in the Middle East.
  - System-wide vulnerabilities remain in market-based finance and core funding markets; gilt market could amplify shocks.
  - Staff supports maintaining the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) at its two percent neutral level.
- Non-bank financial intermediation (NBFI):
  - Authorities lead in risk assessment, management, and prevention for NBFIs.
  - 2024 System Wide Exploratory Scenario (SWES) pioneering step; second SWES to be concluded in 2027 to map exposures and interconnections.
  - Contingent non-bank repo facility (CNRF), launched in 2025, to address episodes of severe gilt market dysfunction; recommendation to encourage registration and operational preparedness among eligible counterparties and consider expanding eligibility.
  - Regulatory work advancing on stablecoins, tokenized assets, and AI.
- Insurance corporation and pension fund (ICPF) sector:
  - Represents about one third of the UK NBFI sector.
  - Vulnerabilities from pension sector fragmentation, policy initiatives influencing pension fund investment, and growing use of risk transfer to insurers.
  - Recommendations: accelerate consolidation mindful of concentration risks; avoid mandating asset allocations; strengthen oversight of bulk purchase annuities (BPAs) and monitor concentration, liquidity, and cross-border reinsurance risks.
- Financial sector growth objectives:
  - Authorities aim to make the UK’s financial sector a stronger engine of investment and productivity (Financial Services Growth and Competitiveness Strategy, “Leeds Reforms”).
  - Non-regulatory initiatives include expanded role of British Business Bank, Growth Guarantee Scheme, and Business Growth Service.
  - Modernization of regulation can help, but review should assess cumulative effects and preserve resilience (including assessment of fall in average risk weights and Basel 3.1 implementation).

*Source: IMF Staff.*

### 35. The authoritiesshould continue to strengthen the AML/CFT regulatory and

### 35. The authorities should continue to strengthen the AML/CFT regulatory and supervisory regime to mitigate the UK’s exposure to high ML/TF risks

### AML/CFT regulatory and supervisory strengthening
- Staff welcomes the appointment of the FCA as the sole supervisor of the legal and accountancy professions and trust and company service providers (TCSPs), which act as ‘gatekeepers’ to the UK’s financial system.
- The transition to the FCA as sole supervisor represents a shift from fragmented towards more consistent and coordinated, risk-based supervision of these high-risk sectors.
- Recent proposed changes to the Money Laundering Regulations (MLRs) should be fully implemented to strengthen effective supervision of:
  - financial institutions,
  - designated non-financial businesses and professions,
  - virtual asset service providers (VASPs).
- Specific measures noted:
  - Bringing the sale of ‘off-the-shelf’ companies by TCSPs under the scope of the MLRs.
  - Requiring VASPs to conduct counter-party due diligence in correspondent relationships with other VASPs.
  - Establishing identity verification of company directors and beneficial owners.
  - Extending trust registration requirements to non-UK trusts.
- Legislative and regulatory context:
  - The changes to the MLRs were introduced as the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2026, which are currently undergoing parliamentary scrutiny.
  - Authorities should continue implementation of the Economic Crime Plan 2023–26, including increasing money laundering prosecutions and asset recovery efforts.
- Key statistic:
  - A 24 percent rise in illicit proceeds recovered over the past five years.

### Progress on FSAP recommendations and financial stability reforms
- The UK authorities have made substantial progress in implementing the 2022 FSAP recommendations across:
  - market resilience,
  - supervision,
  - operational resilience,
  - resolution frameworks.
- Key achievements include:
  - launch of the Contingent Non-Bank Financial Institution Repo Facility (CNRF),
  - expansion of system-wide stress testing,
  - enhanced oversight of critical third parties,
  - strengthened supervisory practices,
  - completion of the LIBOR transition,
  - advanced resolution planning for banks, insurers, and CCPs,
  - improved beneficial ownership transparency,
  - expanded data collection on non-bank financial intermediation,
  - reinforced international regulatory cooperation,
  - continued primacy of financial stability objectives.

### Authorities’ views on financial stability and regulatory-for-growth agenda
- Authorities’ assessment of broad financial stability risks:
  - Financial system remains resilient, although risks have increased.
  - Emphasis on robustness of the banking sector—including resilience in stress tests—and strength of corporate and household balance sheets.
  - Highlighted global vulnerabilities from stretched asset valuations, private credit and risky credit, and hedge fund activity in core funding markets.
- On regulatory-for-growth agenda:
  - Authorities see scope to streamline regulations that hinder growth, while maintaining that financial stability is a prerequisite for sustainable growth.
  - Regulatory initiatives are being assessed within the FPC’s overarching financial stability framework, including for potential cumulative system-wide effects.
  - Stress testing remains integral to incentivize prudent risk management.
  - Recalibration of the system-wide bank capital benchmark is described as consistent with the evolution of the financial system since the FPC’s first assessment in 2015.
  - Further analysis of trends in banks’ risk weights is under way.
  - The planned reduction in Pillar 2A capital reflects anticipated effects of Basel 3.1 implementation.
  - Broader capital framework review is continuing; authorities note UK capital stringency is comparable with peer jurisdictions.
  - While many growth constraints sit outside banking (including barriers to equity financing for high-growth firms), banks remain a key part of the financing ecosystem.

### Structural reforms to revive productivity-led growth
- Context and diagnosis:
  - UK growth has decelerated markedly over the past decade and a half, with trend productivity weakening relative to peers.
  - Production-function decompositions indicate the slowdown has been driven primarily by weaker total factor productivity (TFP) growth, with subdued capital deepening also contributing.
  - The TFP slowdown appears concentrated in intangible-intensive sectors, pointing to slower innovation, diffusion, and scaling of new technologies.
  - This has weighed on labor productivity, widening the gap with the United States and, more recently, with European peers.
  - Reviving TFP is central to sustaining improvements in living standards and preserving fiscal space over the medium term, particularly given population aging and the fall in migration.
- Authorities’ strategy and limits:
  - Government agenda structured around three pillars—stability, investment, and reforms—focusing on easing input constraints: raising public investment, expanding labor supply, and improving infrastructure.
  - These measures are necessary but may not be sufficient to deliver the step change in growth needed to offset demographic pressures and rising demands on public services.
  - Sustained improvements in living standards require a stronger emphasis on TFP, dependent on progress in key areas below.

### Policy priorities to boost TFP and growth
- Improving labor mobility:
  - UK productivity problem reflects pronounced spatial disparities; housing costs in productive urban areas, particularly London, are prohibitively high due to planning restrictions.
  - Legislative steps: Planning and Infrastructure Act passed in December 2025; focus on strategic spatial planning; changes to the NPPF with release of “grey-belt” land and mandatory housing targets.
  - Implementation challenge: construction activity remains weak even in forward-looking indicators such as housing starts and planning decisions—need to track implementation closely and assess design gaps or other frictions.
- Addressing skills gaps:
  - UK workforce suffers from larger and more chronic skills gaps than most peer countries, constraining TFP by limiting adoption and diffusion of new technologies, reducing within-firm productivity improvements, and preventing high-productivity firms from scaling.
  - Authorities’ institutional architecture: Skills England, the Growth and Skills Levy, and the Temporary Shortage List.
  - Binding constraints: deteriorating tertiary education funding model, decades of underinvestment, and migration restrictions tightening availability of skilled labor.
  - Recommendation: significant enhancement of the pace and ambition of domestic upskilling, with a focus on younger people.
- Deepening financing for innovation:
  - Central weakness: many high-growth, innovation-intensive firms struggle to secure sufficient long-term risk capital to scale domestically.
  - Three credit-supply frictions identified:
    - (i) a scale-up financing gap for firms that have outgrown early-stage venture but still need substantial equity to expand;
    - (ii) institutional investors’ portfolios are relatively less oriented toward domestic risky productive investments compared to similar advanced economies, including because of a fragmented investor landscape;
    - (iii) constrained financing for intangible assets, which are hard to collateralize and ill-served by the UK’s bank- and listed-equity-heavy financing model.
  - Authorities’ reform agenda to mobilize “patient” capital:
    - pension fund consolidation to overcome fragmentation;
    - market and listing changes to lower frictions in public markets and strengthen the domestic scale-up pipeline;
    - expanding role of public finance institutions (e.g., British Business Bank vehicles) to crowd in private capital where coordination problems and information frictions are binding.
  - Note on effectiveness and timing:
    - These reforms operate with lags and their effects are still uncertain.
    - Additional steps may be warranted, for instance scope for consolidating public finance institutions—without material disruption to their investment activity—to reduce fragmentation and eventually increase the scale of their financing operations.

### Realizing AI’s productivity potential
- AI offers a transformative opportunity to boost TFP growth by improving process efficiency, accelerating innovation, and enabling new products and business models.
- UK positioning:
  - Strong research base and large exposure of its workforce and key sectors to AI-driven productivity gains.
- Preconditions and complementary policies:
  - Realizing AI gains at scale depends first on successful implementation of the broader growth agenda: skills, policy stability, infrastructure and energy capacity.
  - Complementary, targeted interventions justified where market failures slow AI development and diffusion or job transitions.
- Priority interventions for AI:
  - Address near-term shortages in AI-relevant talent, including through targeted visa eligibility and fast-track pathways for specialized occupations.
  - Provide clear, predictable regulatory frameworks that keep pace with technological change and offer legal clarity for firms—especially in data-intensive sectors such as health and finance—while safeguarding trust.

*Source: IMF country report excerpt (United Kingdom).*

### 41.  The authorities should sustain the implementation of their reform agenda. The

### 41.  The authorities should sustain the implementation of their reform agenda. The

### Sustained implementation and credibility
- The economic payoff from many structural reforms will materialize only gradually, and credibility will ultimately hinge on sustained delivery: moving from announcements to implementation, staying the course through inevitable lags and trade-offs, and relying on systematic monitoring and evaluation to course-correct where needed.
- More regular communication on reform progress would help anchor expectations and sustain support during the implementation phase.
- Staff recommendation: publish annual reports on the advancement of the agenda that separate inputs and process from outputs and outcomes.
  - Early metrics to demonstrate momentum and identify bottlenecks: skills program allocations and disbursements, take-up, and completion rates.
  - Outcome metrics to assess effectiveness: measurable reductions in skills shortages and improved job matching.

### Resilience to shocks (need to lift productivity durably)
- The global environment has become structurally more uncertain, with more frequent and persistent shocks from geopolitics, trade fragmentation, energy markets, and climate risks.
- The authorities have taken steps to strengthen macroeconomic and financial stability, underpinning resilience.
- Further progress could reduce key structural vulnerabilities through:
  - Trade diversification:
    - Recent steps: 2024 critical imports and supply chains strategy; 2025 critical minerals strategy; UK–EU “reset” (May 2025 summit); UK–US Economic Prosperity Deal.
    - Implementation gaps: translating the EU reset into operational reductions in border frictions has been more gradual than anticipated.
    - Priorities:
      - (i) Accelerate ongoing efforts to reduce trade frictions with the EU (near-term steps include concluding and implementing the SPS/veterinary arrangement, linking energy and emission trading systems, and achieving other customs simplifications to lower fixed costs for firms, especially SMEs).
      - (ii) Advance broader diversification by deepening existing and seeking new trade agreements in line with the rules-based trading system to deepen services and digital trade opportunities, reduce regulatory frictions, and enhance robustness of trade links beyond the EU and US (examples in text: promote cooperation on critical minerals supply chains, implement the WTO e-commerce agreement, expand the UK’s digital trade templates).
    - Guidance: pursuit of industrial policies should be targeted, temporary, justified by cost-benefit analyses, and avoid creating economic distortions.
  - Energy security:
    - Recent measures: Clean Power 2030 Action Plan (Dec 2024); Great British Energy on a statutory footing (Great British Energy Act 2025); Zero Emissions Vehicle mandate; Boiler Upgrade Scheme.
    - Renewable share: "The share of renewables in electricity production has increased to over 50 percent."
    - Effect on price-setting: increased renewables contributed to reduce in recent years the share of time natural gas sets the wholesale electricity price.
    - Remaining vulnerability: gas still plays a disproportionate role largely due to residential heating.
    - Priorities to reduce reliance on natural gas:
      - (i) Incentivize investments in electricity storage, including through long-duration schemes and improving connectivity.
      - (ii) Accelerate permitting of new renewables.
      - (iii) Speed up grid connections and transmission build-out.
    - Transitional considerations:
      - The transition is likely to raise energy and network costs in the short term, but should help reduce volatility over the medium and long term by lowering exposure to imported fossil fuels.
      - Targeted cash transfers can help protect vulnerable households during the transition.
      - The introduction of feebates could reinforce incentives to shift towards clean energy in residential and transport sectors (authorities indicated they have no plans to introduce feebates across the wider decarbonization and electrification portfolio due to distributional concerns, specifically on heating).
    - Other policy design notes: energy pricing should reflect supply costs and externalities; clear and stable investment frameworks for networks, storage, and low-carbon dispatchable capacity would help lower risk premia and support predictable energy costs.

### Authorities’ views (summary of official positions)
- Authorities highlighted substantial progress on the three principles of their growth mission: stability, investment, and reform; they broadly concurred with staff’s structural reform priorities while stressing that measures need time to take effect.
- On stability:
  - Strengthened tax revenues.
  - Increased fiscal certainty by committing to a single fiscal event per year.
  - Material progress on fiscal consolidation and supporting disinflation.
- On investment:
  - Significantly increased public investment allocations.
  - Developed a 10-year infrastructure pipeline to catalyze private investment.
  - Scaled up resources at public finance institutions.
  - Noted potential consolidation of public finance institutions would need to avoid disrupting financing operations.
- On reform:
  - Advanced reforms spanning planning and housing, energy security, the labor market, and regulatory simplification.
  - Noted recently legislated planning reforms will take time to implement; weak demand explains limited near-term construction impact.
  - Agreed on the need to address skills gaps.
- On AI and innovation:
  - Chancellor's Mais lecture highlighted harnessing innovation—including AI—unlocking private capital, boosting regional growth through infrastructure and fiscal devolution, and forging a deeper relationship with the EU.
  - Authorities share staff’s view that AI-driven productivity gains for the UK are large; strategy aims at building sovereign capability, managing the transition, and encouraging adoption.
- On energy security:
  - Authorities conveyed decreased role of gas in the energy mix and decreased share of time gas sets the wholesale electricity market price in recent years.
  - Reaffirmed intention to limit licenses for North Sea drilling.
- On corruption:
  - Authorities reiterated commitment to mitigating transnational aspects of corruption (Annex IX).

### Staff appraisal — outlook and policy guidance
- Near-term macro outlook:
  - The Middle East war has dampened near-term prospects.
  - Growth projection: slow to "1.0 percent" this year, then gradually recover as the shock dissipates.
  - Higher energy prices expected to push inflation up temporarily, delaying the return to target by a year to the "second half of 2027."
  - External position assessed as weaker than implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies; projected to deteriorate modestly because of the energy shock before strengthening in the medium term.
  - Risks are tilted to the downside, notably from a prolonged increase in energy prices and sustained global market volatility.
  - Recommendation: maintain policy stability to anchor confidence and support growth given elevated market pressures.
- Monetary policy:
  - Recommendation: remain sufficiently restrictive, supported by continued improvements in the communications framework.
  - Under the baseline energy price outlook, holding rates for the remainder of the year should be sufficient to bring inflation back to target by "end-2027."
  - Given heightened uncertainty, decisions should remain data dependent and taken meeting by meeting.
  - The shift toward a repo-led, demand-driven liquidity framework is progressing, but transition is ongoing and experience remains limited.
  - BoE communication improvements noted (individual MPC member statements, enhancements to the Monetary Policy Report, illustrative paths for Bank Rate); staff suggests presenting, alongside the central forecast, a streamlined set of policy paths under alternative scenarios.
- Fiscal policy:
  - Authorities’ fiscal strategy judged appropriate: balances deficit reduction and growth-friendly spending.
  - The prudent response to the energy shock so far is welcome.
  - Near term: continued consolidation will help reinforce credibility and commitment to fiscal rules; slower pace of adjustment compared to 2025 will limit procyclicality.
  - Recent improvements: move toward a single fiscal event and enhanced buffers under fiscal rules strengthen stability and credibility.
  - Medium term: emphasis on stabilizing debt while protecting investment and core services is well placed, but implementation risks remain elevated.
  - Policy recommendation: stay the course on deficit reduction and pre-identify contingency measures on both revenue and spending sides to safeguard fiscal credibility if the outlook deteriorates or delivery falls short.
  - Long-term pressures: ageing, defense, and the climate transition will require difficult choices to contain spending growth given limited space to raise additional tax revenue without harming growth.
- Financial sector:
  - UK financial system appears resilient.
    - Banking sector capitalization strong and non-performing loans low.
    - Supported by sound corporate and household balance sheets.
  - Global risks intensified: elevated macroeconomic uncertainty, pressures in sovereign debt markets, vulnerabilities in market-based finance.
  - Decision to maintain the countercyclical capital buffer at its neutral level judged appropriate.
  - Authorities’ leadership on non-bank financial sector risks is welcome.
  - Given breadth and pace of regulatory reforms, staff advises a cautious approach to ensure incremental changes preserve overall resilience.
- Structural reforms:
  - Authorities’ structural reform agenda covers the right areas; success hinges on clear prioritization and sustained delivery.
  - Need for systematic monitoring and reporting to enable timely course-correction given implementation lags.
  - Key priorities:
    - Improve labor mobility through planning reform.
    - Close persistent skills gaps through strengthened domestic upskilling efforts and facilitated immigration pathways.
    - Mobilize financing for innovation.
    - Provide predictable and enabling regulations and improve AI-relevant skills to capture AI potential.
  - Resilience recommendations reiterated: further trade diversification and continued progress in strengthening energy security, including accelerating investment in renewable capacity and grid infrastructure.
- Consultation cycle recommendation:
  - It is recommended that the next Article IV consultation be held on the standard 12-month cycle.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpt.*

### Annex I. External Sector Assessment

### Annex I. External Sector Assessment

### Overall assessment
- The external position in 2025 was weaker than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
- The CA deficit ratio has trended down from the elevated levels of the mid-2010s.
- In 2025, the deficit improved for the second year in a row after the temporary pandemic-related deterioration. The improvement was primarily driven by higher private and public savings, reflected in higher net primary income and services trade surpluses, which offset the drag from goods trade deficits.
- The CA deficit is expected to increase in the short term due to the energy price shock and to narrow moderately in the medium term, driven by fiscal consolidation and improvements in the terms of trade following the resolution of the energy crisis.
- The REER remains elevated due to successive shocks.
- The NIIP is projected to deteriorate in the medium term, although its evolution is uncertain given difficult-to-predict valuation effects and the UK’s status as a global financial center.

### Potential policy responses
- The authorities’ fiscal consolidation path will support external rebalancing by containing import growth and reducing interest rates on domestic liabilities.
- Progress in the net-zero transition should help mitigate risks of further energy-related terms of trade shocks.
- Policies should promote transparent, predictable and mutually beneficial trade policy frameworks.
- Industrial policies should continue to be deployed cautiously, remain targeted to specific objectives where externalities and other market failures prevent effective market solutions, and minimize trade and investment distortions.

### Foreign asset and liability position and trajectory
Background
- The NIIP has been stable, at -6.6 percent of GDP in 2025, and close to the past decade's average of -6.2 percent of GDP.
- Valuation effects have largely offset CA deficits in 2025, as in recent years. These valuation effects have been primarily related to strong global equity price growth and slight sterling depreciation, which positively affected foreign asset holdings.
- The NIIP is projected to deteriorate in line with projected current account deficits over the medium term, although volatile valuation effects make these estimates uncertain.

Assessment
- The NIIP remains vulnerable to changes in market sentiment, including due to the large fraction of short-term liabilities that create rollover risks.
- Two mitigating factors:
  - The UK has a large currency mismatch between sterling-denominated liabilities and foreign-currency-denominated assets, which, paired with exchange rate flexibility, mitigates external shocks.
  - Intragroup bank holdings constitute a large share of external liabilities and are less reactive to changes in market sentiment.

2025(% GDP)
- NIIP: -6.6
- Gross Assets: 486
- Debt Assets: 249
- Gross Liab.: 493
- Debt Liab.: 270

### Current account
Background
- The CA deficit improved for the second year in a row from -3.6 percent of GDP in 2023 to -2.4 percent of GDP in 2025, driven by an increase in both public and private savings while investment remained stable.
- This improvement was primarily reflected in higher net primary income and an increase in the services trade surplus.
- Goods trade deficits excluding volatile precious metals improved mildly by 0.3 percent of GDP despite rising trade frictions.
- Following a projected CA deterioration in 2026 due to the energy price shock, the fiscal consolidation path and a projected recovery in the terms of trade and external demand are expected to moderate the CA deficit to -2 percent of GDP over the medium term, below pre-COVID-19 averages.

Assessment
- The EBA CA model estimates a norm deficit of –0.1 percent of GDP, implying an unadjusted CA gap of –2.3 percent of GDP in 2025.
- Measurement adjustments of 0.1 percent of GDP account for differences between the statistical definition of income and the relevant economic concept.
- After this adjustment, staff assesses the CA gap at –2.2 percent of GDP, within a range of –1.9 to –2.5 percent of GDP.
- About a third of the gap reflects higher health expenditure, proxying for more spending on social safety nets than in the rest of the world, which reduces precautionary savings.
- Part of the remaining gap could be due to the pound’s status as a global reserve currency and deep financial markets that together attract strong capital inflows, as well as inflation differentials between the UK and the rest of the world.

2025(% GDP)
- CA: -2.4
- Cycl. Adj. CA: -2.4
- EBA Norm: -0.1
- EBA Gap: -2.3
- Staff Adj.: 0.1
- Staff Gap: -2.2

### Real exchange rate
Background
- The REER appreciated by 2.2 percent in 2025 compared to the average in 2024, leaving it 10 percent stronger than before the pandemic.
- The NEER appreciated 0.97 percent compared to the 2024 average as interest rates remain higher in the UK than in other advanced economies.
- The real appreciation in previous years was driven by higher inflation in the UK than in other advanced economies.
- As of March 2026, the REER was 0.2 percent below its 2025 average.

Assessment
- The EBA REER level and index models suggest an overvaluation of 13.3 and 4.4 percent, respectively.
- Consistent with the staff CA gap, staff assesses the 2025 REER gap at 8.2 percent (using an estimated elasticity of 0.26), within a range of 7.2 to 9.2 percent.

### Capital and financial accounts: flows and policy measures
Background
- The UK has maintained a very open financial account.
- As a global financial hub, portfolio investment flows and other investments constitute a large share of financial flows, often driven by intragroup bank transactions.
- Portfolio investment net inflows were the most important source of financing for the CA deficit in 2025.

Assessment
- Large fluctuations in capital flows are inherent in countries with large financial sectors. This volatility is a potential source of vulnerability, although it is mitigated by a robust financial stability framework overseen by the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) of the Bank of England, including a broad set of macroprudential tools.

### FX intervention and reserves level
Background
- The pound has the status of a global reserve currency.
- The share of global reserves held in sterling increased slightly over the past several years, from an average of 4.5 percent pre-pandemic (2016–19) to close to 5.0 percent in 2025.

Assessment
- Reserves held by the UK are typically low relative to standard metrics, and the currency is free-floating.
- Reserve levels remained stable, with a modest accumulation in 2025.

---

### Risk Assessment Matrix — Global risks
- Geopolitical tensions, intensification of conflicts, and commodity price volatility
  - Relative Likelihood: High
  - Impact if Realized: High
  - Key impacts: Protracted shocks to energy and food prices; UK vulnerability due to reliance on gas imports; higher inflation; adverse competitiveness effects; higher costs for farmers; slower investment and consumption.
  - Policy responses:
    1. Accelerate the energy transition to diversify the energy mix.
    2. Provide targeted and temporary support for vulnerable households and exposed firms, within the existing budget envelope (minimizing deviations from the deficit reduction plan).
    3. Monetary policy might need to pause easing for longer or even tighten to keep inflation expectations anchored and return inflation to target over the medium term.

- Protectionism and trade disruptions
  - Relative Likelihood: High
  - Impact if Realized: Medium
  - Key impacts: Higher trade barriers weigh on investment and net exports; supply chain disruptions could be inflationary; reduced trade could lower productivity.
  - Policy responses:
    1. Diversify supply chains, deepen economic ties with trading partners, and undertake structural reforms to boost competitiveness.
    2. Adjust monetary policy as needed to anchor inflation expectations and return inflation to target in the medium term.
    3. Limit state intervention to address clear market failures.

- Disorderly AI correction
  - Relative Likelihood: High
  - Impact if Realized: Medium
  - Key impacts: Sharp repricing of tech assets could generate valuation losses; negative wealth effects could weigh on consumption and confidence.
  - Policy responses:
    1. Monitor and contain amplification channels; step up surveillance of concentrated exposures among leveraged investors and open-ended funds.
    2. Ensure liquidity backstops and market tools are operational; communicate clearly to avoid disorderly conditions.
    3. If the shock propagates or impairs core market functioning, deploy liquidity facilities to support intermediation.

- Fiscal vulnerabilities and higher interest rates
  - Relative Likelihood: Medium
  - Impact if Realized: Medium
  - Key impacts: Sharp yield increases can interact with leverage, margin requirements, and liquidity mismatches, especially among NBFIs, forcing asset sales and straining market intermediation.
  - Policy responses:
    1. Activate the BoE’s contingent liquidity provision facilities to support market functioning during stress episodes.
    2. Communicate clearly about the operational framework for market interventions.
    3. If market dysfunction persists, consider a temporary adjustment to the pace of balance sheet reduction, including active gilt sales, to avoid exacerbating strains in gilt market intermediation.

---

### Risk Assessment Matrix — Domestic risks
- Implementation gaps in the structural reform agenda
  - Relative Likelihood: Medium
  - Impact if Realized: High
  - Key impacts: Disappointing gains in potential growth and productivity; weaker household incomes and living standards; postponed firm investment.
  - Policy responses:
    1. Monitor implementation through progress reports and course correct if needed.
    2. Prioritize the reform agenda to ensure timely delivery.
    3. Reduce key structural vulnerabilities, including through continued trade diversification and greater energy security.

- Delays in the fiscal adjustment plan
  - Relative Likelihood: High
  - Impact if Realized: High
  - Key impacts: Higher borrowing weakens market confidence; slow delivery undermines credibility; weaker growth; higher required fiscal adjustment; increased borrowing costs.
  - Policy responses:
    1. Stick to the medium-term deficit reduction plan.
    2. Develop and, if need be, activate a contingency plan with correction measures on both the revenue and spending sides.
    3. Mitigate financing risks through active debt management strategies.

- Financial sector volatility associated with NBFIs
  - Relative Likelihood: Medium
  - Impact if Realized: Medium
  - Key impacts: Unexpected liquidity pressures could amplify stress; asset sales (gilts) could push yields higher and impair market functioning.
  - Policy responses:
    1. Activate the BoE’s contingent liquidity provision facilities.
    2. Communicate clearly and transparently about the operational framework for market interventions.
    3. If market dysfunction persists, consider a temporary adjustment to the pace of balance sheet reduction, including active gilt sales.

- Labor shortages
  - Relative Likelihood: High
  - Impact if Realized: Medium
  - Key impacts: Reduced net migration decreases labor supply, harming potential output.
  - Policy responses:
    1. Accelerate the agenda meant to close critical skills gaps.
    2. Ensure schemes such as the TSL work as intended to alleviate acute skill shortages.
    3. Boost productivity of the existing labor force, including by use of AI.

- AI acceleration
  - Relative Likelihood: Medium
  - Impact if Realized: High
  - Key impacts: Aggregate TFP could increase by 1 to 5 percentage points over 10 years depending on AI technology potential and pace of adoption.
  - Policy responses:
    1. Ease innovation bottlenecks, such as specialized labor shortages and scarcity of domestic scale-up finance.
    2. Provide regulatory clarity.
    3. Lead by example and boost public sector TFP with efficient public sector AI adoption.

- Cyberthreats
  - Relative Likelihood: High
  - Impact if Realized: High
  - Key impacts: Cyberattacks on financial infrastructure could trigger financial and economic instability.
  - Policy response:
    1. Continue to invest in resilience, cyber preparedness, and effective public-private coordination.

---

### Annex III. Illustrative downside scenario (energy price shock)
1. Growth and inflation impact
- Under the severe scenario (based on the April 2026 WEO severe scenario), the severe scenario assumes higher oil and gas prices, a significant increase in inflation expectations, and tighter financing conditions.
- UK GDP growth would be 0.6 percentage points lower in 2026, and 0.8 percentage points lower in 2027 (compared to the staff’s baseline).
- Headline inflation would be higher by 0.7 percentage points in 2026 and 2.0 percentage points in 2027.

2. Monetary policy implications
- Given higher inflation, monetary policy would need to be more restrictive for longer.
- Staff modelling finds that two rate hikes this year followed by a hold throughout 2027 would be necessary to support the return of inflation to target over the medium term.
- In a more uncertain environment, the MPC’s recent use of scenarios to complement the baseline forecast would become even more useful.

3. Fiscal implications and corrective measures
- In the absence of support measures, weaker growth and higher interest rates would increase the fiscal deficit ratio by around half a percent of GDP on average over the next two years compared to the baseline, but debt would still stabilize over the medium term.
- Financing higher deficits would require additional borrowing, which could increase liquidity and financial market pressures.
- Deviations from the medium-term deficit path should be contained by implementing corrective measures on both the revenue and spending sides, while recognizing that some deviations reflecting automatic stabilizers may be warranted.
- Any additional support to households and firms would need to be temporary and targeted, without blunting price signals.

4. Banking and financial stability
- The BoE’s 2025 desk-based stress tests, which was based on a significantly larger shock, indicate that UK banks’ aggregate capital ratios would remain above minimum requirements even under a pronounced downturn in activity and asset prices.
- If banks were to tighten lending by more than justified by macroeconomic conditions due to capital erosion, the Financial Policy Committee could consider releasing the countercyclical capital buffer.
- Should broader liquidity strains emerge, the BoE could activate its contingency liquidity facilities, including those for banks and non-banks, as needed to preserve financial stability.

*Source: Annex I. External Sector Assessment (1gbrea2026001) — United Kingdom, International Monetary Fund.*

### Annex IV. Staff Policy Advice from the 2025 Article IV Consultation

### Annex IV. Staff Policy Advice from the 2025 Article IV Consultation

### Monetary Policy
- Recommendation: The gradual approach to policy easing continues to be appropriate.
- Recommendation: Continue work on strengthening the Bank of England’s forecasting and communication capacity, in line with the recommendations of the Bernanke Review.
- Recommendation: The MPC could consider basing the forecasts on an endogenous interest rate path, particularly for alternative scenarios.
- Key developments between 2025 Article IV and May 2026:
  - The Bank Rate has been cut by 150 bps since August 2024 at a pace of 25bp per quarter (from 5.25 percent at its peak over mid 2023-mid 2024 to 3.75 percent in February).
  - The BoE has increasingly relied on scenarios and recently made changes to its communication toolkit, including introducing individual MPC member statements and enhancements to the Monetary Policy Report.
  - The Monetary Policy Report now includes a more structured discussion of the central projection separately from the alternate scenarios, and illustrative interest paths for the Bank Rate under a wide range of policy rules.

### Fiscal Policy
- Assessment: The authorities’ medium-term fiscal strategy strikes the right balance between boosting growth and preserving sustainability.
- Recommendations:
  - Carefully manage risks by staying the course on planned deficit reduction.
  - Base the medium-term budget on conservative growth assumptions.
  - Prepare contingency plans in case the economic outlook deteriorates.
- Key developments and risks between 2025 Article IV and May 2026:
  - The medium-term fiscal adjustment continues to envision a consolidation of 2.5 ppts of GDP between 2025/26 and 2029/30, which will help stabilize debt.
  - Actual spending in 2025/26 has exceeded what was set out in the spending envelope, driven by higher welfare spending (including on the child benefits, the winter fuel payment and health-related benefits).
  - The OBR’s projections for future revenue and spending are based on more conservative assumptions about potential growth, although implementation risks remain elevated.
  - Difficult decisions will likely be needed beyond the medium term to address existing and new spending pressures and rebuild fiscal buffers.
- Policy framework changes:
  - The government has published several white papers, including a 10-Year Health Plan for England and a SEND White Paper, and launched reviews (Timms review; Milburn review).
  - To insulate fiscal policy from small changes to the economic outlook, the authorities more than doubled the fiscal buffer against the current balance rule.
  - To support the move to one fiscal event, the OBR now assesses compliance with the fiscal rules only once per year, at the time of the Fall Budget.

### Structural Policy
- Assessment: The authorities’ “Growth Mission” focuses on the right structural areas; prioritization, sequencing, and continued clear communication are key to ensure quick wins and buy-in.
- Key reforms and implementation since the 2025 AIV consultation:
  - The Planning Bill, aiming to speed up the construction planning process for both housing and infrastructure, received Royal Assent in December 2025.
  - A significant augmentation to the NHS Budget.
  - Establishment of “Skills England” (a new agency of the Department of Education) in June 2025 to address skills gaps.
- Climate and energy:
  - Assessment: The UK’s climate and energy strategy offers an opportunity to reduce emissions while delivering more secure and affordable energy.
  - Progress reported:
    - Publication of a revised Carbon Budget Delivery Plan to meet Carbon Budgets 4 to 6.
    - Announcements across key sectors, including mileage charges for EVs, budget allocations for heat and buildings policies, and a Finance Bill including primary legislation to implement CBAM from January 2027.
    - Progress on 2030 goals on renewables, including new contracts with hydrogen producers and expanded investment into nuclear power.
    - Continued work towards linking the UK and EU ETSs.

*Source: Annex IV. Staff Policy Advice from the 2025 Article IV Consultation (excerpts).*

### Annex VI. 2022 FSAP Recommendations

### Annex VI. 2022 FSAP Recommendations

### 1. Strengthen backstops to the functioning of core markets in times of stress (BOE)
- Timeframe: 1–3 years
- Summary of work in progress and outcomes:
  - The BoE designed and carried out gilt market purchases on financial stability grounds in Autumn 2022 to address market dysfunction in long-dated gilts. The purchases were successfully exited.
  - Work to reflect on lessons learnt from the LDI episode is ongoing, building on other Bank analysis of the subject, and is largely complete.
  - The Contingent Non-Bank Financial Institution Repo Facility (CNRF) opened for applications in January 2025. As a contingent facility, the CNRF will be activated at the Bank’s discretion in episodes of severe gilt market dysfunction that threaten UK financial stability.
  - The CNRF will lend cash to participating insurance companies, pension funds and LDI funds (ICPFs) against gilt collateral for a short lending term.
  - Since launch, there has been strong engagement from ICPFs, and the Bank has an active pipeline of applications.
  - Work to explore how to design a broader facility (that would expand access to include more ICPF counterparties and potentially reach a broader set of NBFIs that are relevant to the functioning of UK core markets) has continued in parallel, although the near-term focus has been on onboarding ICPF applicants.

### 2. Enhance and further strengthen the existing stress testing framework (BOE/PRA, with FCA)
- Timeframe: 3–5 years
- Key developments and analytical enhancements:
  - The BoE has published its approach to stress testing the UK banking system from 2025 onwards, combining predictability of regular stress testing with adaptability to explore different risks.
  - The BoE is investing in its desk-based / top-down modelling toolkit for stress testing, including new mortgage models, mid (UK) and large corporate (UK,US and euro area) loan-level models, and granular product-level models for projecting net interest income to enable simulation of higher interest rate scenarios.
  - The BoE has run a deep dive with banks on Chinese and Hong Kong SAR portfolios.
  - The 2024 desk-based stress test considered more than one scenario and used greater sensitivity analysis (including on house prices and net interest income assumptions). Supplementary analysis explored unrecognised losses on hold-to-collect assets and cash flow hedges, and lending exposures to private market funds.
  - The BoE supported international exercises like the FSB/BCBS global stress test.
  - The BoE published the final report for its system-wide exploratory scenario exercise (SWES) in November 2024. The SWES explored behaviour of banks and NBFIs in stress and interactions that might amplify shocks in ways adverse to UK financial markets core to UK financial stability.
  - The BoE alongside the FCA is investing in building capacity to conduct in-house stress simulations that model system-wide dynamics, to update SWES findings periodically, supplemented by engagement with firms.
  - In December 2025, the BoE launched its second SWES exercise focused on private markets:
    - The exercise will explore actions of non-banks and banks active in the UK private markets ecosystem in response to an economic downturn, and how these actions may interact to amplify stress and pose a threat to UK financial stability and the UK corporate sector.
    - The exercise will be run in close collaboration with market participants. The Bank has signed up 50 firms, including 17 alternative asset managers.
    - The Bank will launch the scenario phase of the exercise in June, including the publication of the PM SWES scenario.
    - The Bank will publish interim findings throughout 2026 upon completion of major milestones, with the first update expected alongside July FSR and a final report to be published in 2027.
  - Model development to examine propagation channels and aggregate liquidity impacts:
    - The Bank is developing its “system interlinkages model”, including improving modelling of fundamental asset price and open-ended fund flows; refining the treatment of repo borrowing; and introducing an LDI fund.
    - The Bank is developing model approaches that exploit new datasets on financial exposures and interlinkages, e.g., extending the capital at risk microstructural model of banking sector exposures to include amplification and feedback effects, and bringing in additional data collections on insurers and funds.
  - The Bank has embedded SWES-1 findings into a desktop-toolkit replicating key drivers of asset transactions using firm-level data (sales to meet LDI recapitalisation calls; restore liquidity buffers after initial margin and variation margin calls; meet redemption requests; reduce risk to within internal risk limits). This enables tracking of vulnerabilities in core UK markets and dialogue with firms for verification.
  - PRA-specific developments:
    - The PRA’s 2025 Life Insurance Stress Test (LIST) focused on annuity writers and, for the first time globally for a regulator, published firm level outcomes. Results showed the sector remained resilient under a severe market stress involving lower risk free rates, falls in equity and property prices, wider spreads, and associated defaults and downgrades.
    - LIST 2025 included exploratory stresses on asset concentration and Funded Reinsurance (FundedRe) recapture. Firm level results were published only for the core scenario. The FundedRe scenario demonstrated that recapture can materially affect solvency, though firms could absorb the impact at current levels. Findings highlight the need for continued monitoring as exposures grow or structures become more complex.
    - Combined with Market Risk Sensitivities and Matching Adjustment Portfolio data, results enhance the PRA’s ability to assess sector-wide sensitivities.
    - The PRA will run a Dynamic General Insurance Stress Test (DyGIST) in 2026. DyGIST 2026 is a global first for a regulator, simulating a sequential set of adverse events over a three-week period in May 2026.
      - Objectives of DyGIST 2026: assess the industry’s solvency and liquidity resilience to a specific adverse scenario; assess the effectiveness of insurers’ risk management and management actions following an adverse scenario; and inform the PRA supervisory response following a market-wide adverse scenario.
      - Results of the DyGIST exercise will be disclosed at an aggregate industry level in 4Q 2026.
  - CCP stress-testing and coordination:
    - Progress in strengthening CCP stress-testing frameworks has continued, with increased use of desk-based exercises alongside participatory approaches, and planned enhancements into 2027.
    - Engagement with other relevant authorities has been strengthened through more coordinated and collaborative approaches to CCP stress testing across jurisdictions.
  - Strategic integration:
    - The Bank has started a project to ‘join the dots’ between various stress-test initiatives and plans to develop a strategy for making the Bank’s stress testing more macroprudential and efficient, including a vision for using stress tests to support a coherent system-wide assessment of resilience, behaviours, and interactions under stress.

### 3. Seek additional statutory powers to review and examine resilience of all critical services provided by third parties (BOE/PRA, FCA, and HMT)
- Timeframe: 3–5 years
- Progress and framework design:
  - In 2023, the government gave regulators new powers, as recommended by the last FSAP, to oversee the resilience of critical third parties (CTPs) to the UK financial sector. These powers seek to mitigate the risks that CTPs may pose to financial stability.
  - In November 2024, the Bank, PRA and FCA published their final policy and rules establishing a CTP regime setting out how they intend to use their new powers, having consulted widely and working closely with industry to inform the design of the regime.
  - HM Treasury will decide which third parties should fall under the new regime based on advice from regulators. HM Treasury is currently gathering evidence to inform designation decisions this year (i.e. 2026). HM Treasury will decide which third parties should be designated, and may only exercise its designation power if, in its opinion, a failure in or disruption to the provision of the services that the third party provides to firms could threaten the stability of, or confidence in, the UK financial system. HM Treasury generally expects to make designations of CTPs on the basis of recommendations from the financial regulators.
  - The new rules align closely with international standards and similar regimes, like the EU’s Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA).
  - In January 2026, the Bank/PRA and FCA published a Memorandum of Understanding to strengthen collaboration on the oversight of CTPs under the UK CTP regime and EU’s DORA.
  - The new rules do not reduce the responsibility of financial firms and FMIs in making sure they are resilient to operational shocks and for their management of third-parties, in-line with FCA’s existing outsourcing and operational resilience rules.

### 4. Further develop “on the ground” reviews of systemically important firms for early identification and remediation (BOE/PRA and FCA)
- Timeframe: 1–3 years
- Supervisory practice and outcomes:
  - The PRA is satisfied with the actions taken below and is not planning to take any further actions through its current strategy.
  - As part of its 2021–26 strategy, the PRA strengthened its supervisory approach and internal capabilities. For its largest firms, the supervisory approach continues to include regular 'on the ground' reviews for some topics (e.g. capital, liquidity). For mid-sized firms, there is a new requirement to complete annual 'on site' visits. This adjusted supervisory approach has now been in place for over two years, and the PRA is satisfied that it has been adequately embedded.
  - The PRA’s supervisory approach continues to include aggregation of intelligence to inform the Bank of England’s assessments of risks and resilience of the UK banking (and insurance) system that are routinely considered by FPC. The PRA is investing in cross-firm work to enhance macroprudential insights and frequently issues communications to the market to share findings and set expectations to firms.
    - Examples: letters to Chief Risk Officers after the Thematic review of private equity related financing activities in 2024; letters to Chief Financial Officers to communicate feedback and prudential expectations for significant risk transfer financing in 2025.
  - The PRA routinely conducts thematic reviews with considerable time spent onsite, including reviews of banks’ Counterparty credit risk (CCR) management practices (including use of Potential future exposure metrics), and a review of banks’ risk management of principal trading firms (which underpinned a 2026 speech prompting many firms to undertake risk management enhancement programmes).
  - The PRA demonstrated the ability to respond quickly to macroprudential risks during market events in spring 2023 and the current Middle East conflict: introduced greater focus on composition of firms’ liquidity asset buffer portfolios and liquidity monitoring metrics; aggregated information through an internal taskforce; responded to commissions from the FPC on exposure from non-systemic firms; and carried out contingency planning on a small subset of those firms.
  - In 2023, the PRA introduced new requirements, training and guidance to ensure greater use of Section 166 Skilled Person Reviews. After three years of embedding, the PRA is satisfied with the benefits and sees sustained use of Skilled Person Reviews for its largest firms (or adequate justification when such a review is not needed). It has no plans to make immediate changes.
  - The PRA has established an international platform for supervisory cooperation with overseas regulators for Lloyd’s of London to facilitate sharing of supervisory information. Meetings were held in November 2023 and April 2025, with over 40 representatives attending. The next meeting is scheduled for September 2026.
  - The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) remains the lead UK regulator for managing money laundering (AML) and terrorist financing (CFT) for the financial sector; the PRA will continue to consider both topics in its prudential assessment of firms and cooperate closely and share information with the FCA and other AML/CFT authorities.

*Annex VI. 2022 FSAP Recommendations — updates on relevant work in progress contained in the source document.*

### 5. Enhance cyber risk technical risk

### 5. Enhance cyber risk technical risk

### Progress on regulatory framework and guidance
- The PRA, FCA and the Bank of England plan to start consulting in the second half of 2026 on expectations around the management of cyber resilience risks. The original plan for a 2025 consultation has been updated to ensure it reflects the evolving threat landscape and aligns with developments in the UK Government’s national cybersecurity strategy.
- The consultation will be progressed in 2026 and it includes risks arising from the sector’s ability to detect, withstand and recover from disruptions in the event of cyber incidents.
- While the regulations will focus on cyber risks, the PRA, FCA and Bank rulebook covers operational risk and resilience more broadly, including technology and third party risk management expectations.
- The authorities will also consider the implications of recent AI developments as part of this consultation.
- Between 2022 and 2026, the PRA, FCA and the Bank of England continued to publish technical guidance and thematics informed by supervisory activities and collaboration with the sector, including:
  - annual CBEST thematics (2024, 2025)
  - Cyber Recovery thematic (2025)
  - Cyber Stress Testing thematics (2022, 2024)
  - SIMEX exercise publications (2022, 2024)
- The Bank contributes to the CPMI-IOSCO Cyber Resilience Guidance Toolkit.

### Frontier AI and emerging technologies
- In May 2026, the PRA, FCA, Bank of England and HM Treasury published a joint statement on frontier AI models and its implications for cyber resilience.
- The statement highlighted the importance of effective protective, detective, threat containment and cyber response capabilities including to address faster and more disruptive frontier AI-driven attacks.
- Additional guidance was provided to the sector through CMORG (June 2026), and as part of FSB’s and the G7 Cyber Expert Group (CEG) work on frontier AI (June and July 2026).
- These activities build on earlier work including:
  - a 2022/23 discussion and feedback paper on artificial intelligence
  - publications on the impact of AI on financial stability (2024)
  - the Bank’s approach to innovation (2025)
- The Bank of England led AI surveys and, in collaboration with the FCA, established the AI consortium, a public-private engagement platform focused on AI in UK financial services.
- The PRA, FCA, Bank of England have supported UK financial sector guidance on post-quantum cryptography through national and international collaboration, including the G7 CEG and CMORG.
- The PRA has progressed engagement with systemically important firms to gather intelligence on their readiness, patching capacity, and the operational impact of AI-enabled vulnerability discovery; engagements also assessed implications of emerging AI models for firms’ cyber defenses.

### New operational incident and third party reporting rules
- Final rules published in March 2026 (PRA PS7/26 and equivalent FCA/Bank publications) that:
  - set clear, consistent criteria for incident reporting;
  - establish requirements for reporting material third-party arrangements (MTPs);
  - aim to improve incident management and reduce harm from major disruptions, including cyber events.
- The framework is closely aligned with emerging international standards, particularly the FSB’s work on the Format for Incident Reporting Exchange (FIRE).

### UK Government strategic directives affecting cyber resilience
- Cyber Security & Resilience Bill (CSRB): proposed CSRB (second reading in Jan 2026) updates NIS regulations and increases cyber resilience expectations across critical sectors. Key features expected to affect financial institutions include:
  - expanded sectoral coverage (e.g. managed service providers);
  - stronger regulatory powers;
  - potentially stricter requirements on reporting and governance.
- UK Government Ransomware consultation proposals include:
  - a potential prohibition on ransom payments for critical infrastructure;
  - mandatory reporting of ransomware incidents.
- The Bank and the PRA contributed to the official policy consultation; a detailed government response was published in July 2025.
- Authorities will continue monitoring the development of future legislation, through the CSRB or other Home Office initiatives.

### Supervisory practice and industry implementation
- Firms have continued progressing towards meeting the Bank/PRA/FCA operational resilience requirements.
- Since 2025, many firms have invested in cyber recovery solutions that significantly reduce recovery times.
- Authorities shared Effective Practices for Cyber Response and Recovery in 2025 to support industry improvement.
- Cyber and Operational Stress Test (CORST): Bank/PRA completed their third cyber stress test; findings published in summer 2025 included an annex on how financial impacts of operational disruption can combine with operational and confidence factors to create financial instability.

### Cyber toolkit improvements and supervisory tools
- Authorities have implemented several enhancements aligned to FSAP recommendations:
  - A redesigned CQUEST maturity assessment (2023)
  - STARFS testing framework for smaller firms (2024) and expanded promotion of its use (2025)
  - Annual CBEST thematic publications (2023–2025)
  - Pilot of an advanced penetration testing model targeting mature firms
  - New analytics for cyber resilience metrics and MI reporting
  - Increased use of Skilled Person Reviews (s166) focused on cyber controls
  - A developing cyber assurance framework covering the full NIST aligned lifecycle

### Collaborations with the sector and international engagements
- Cross Market Operational Resilience Group (CMORG) outputs since 2021 include:
  - a reconnection framework for firms returning from cyber quarantine;
  - cyber recovery guidance for severe incidents;
  - a data vaulting reference architecture;
  - a dynamic scenario library;
  - guidance on shared third-party risks;
  - SIMEX22 and SIMEX24 thematic publications on cross-sector coordination.
- CMORG remains central to enhancing collective resilience and crisis readiness across the financial system.
- International engagement (G7 CEG, FSB, UK Finance public-private partnerships) produced (2021–2026):
  - best practices for recovery and reconnection;
  - guidance on quantum risk and AI in cybersecurity;
  - a roadmap for transitioning to post quantum cryptography;
  - cross border incident response protocols;
  - multi jurisdiction cyber exercises (2024, 2026).

### Key statistics and milestones
- From April 2025 to March 2026, over 3.7 million identities have been verified.
- It is estimated that 6 to 7 million individuals will need to undertake identity verification by November 2026.
- Final operational incident and third party reporting rules published in March 2026 (PRA PS7/26 and equivalent FCA/Bank publications).
- Planned consultation on cyber resilience expectations to start in the second half of 2026.

*Source: 1gbrea2026001 - 5. Enhance cyber risk technical risk*

### 9. Preserve the primacy of the FPC’s

### 9. Preserve the primacy of the FPC’s financial stability objective and strengthen its focus on global financial standards and cross-border surveillance. (HMT, BOE, PRA, and FCA)

### Timeframe: 1 year
- The 2025 Remit letter from the Chancellor reaffirmed the primacy of the FPC’s financial stability objective and recommended that the FPC supports international work to address vulnerabilities in the financial system.
- The letter notes the FPC should continue to prioritise building resilience in NBFIs and associated markets, including by working through the Financial Stability Board to improve regulatory frameworks and monitoring across jurisdictions, and using insights gained from the System Wide Exploratory Scenario, with a view to protecting and enhancing the resilience of the UK financial system.
- The FPC was asked to play an active role in supporting the growth and competitiveness of the UK’s financial services sector and the wider economy, through its primary objective to maintain financial stability, and, subject to that, by supporting the government’s economic policy under its secondary objective. The remit and recommendations also ask the FPC to assess and identify areas where there is potential to increase the ability of the financial system to contribute to sustainable economic growth, consistent with maintaining financial stability.
- The FPC has publicly stressed the importance for UK financial stability of alignment with international standards within the PRA and FCA’s secondary objectives.
- The PRA’s September 2022 discussion paper on its approach to policy noted it will remain at the forefront of efforts to strengthen international standards where necessary, and that the long-term competitiveness of the UK is underpinned by a robust and effective prudential regime, built around global standards, in a way that instils trust and confidence in the UK as a place to do business.

### 10. Preserve the primacy of PRA and FCA’s objectives of safety and soundness and market integrity, in principle and in practice, over any secondary objectives and ad hoc policy priorities. (HMT and FPC)

### Timeframe: 1 year
- The PRA’s primary objectives rank above all other considerations when making policy, including its secondary competition objective and the secondary competitiveness and growth objective.
  - The Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2023 preserves the primacy of the primary objectives to act in a way that promotes the safety and soundness of PRA-authorised persons so far as reasonably possible and to contribute to the securing of an appropriate degree of protection for those who are or may become policyholders while providing the PRA with wider rule-making responsibilities and enhanced accountability requirements.
  - FSMA 2023 gave the PRA a new secondary competitiveness and growth objective to facilitate, subject to aligning with relevant international standards, (a) the international competitiveness of the economy of the United Kingdom (including in particular the financial services sector through the contribution of PRA-authorised persons), and (b) its growth in the medium to long term. FSMA 2023 left unchanged the existing PRA secondary objective to facilitate effective competition in the markets for services provided by PRA-authorised firms in carrying on regulated activities. The secondary objectives are engaged only when the PRA is proposing to perform its general functions in pursuit of the primary objectives, and do not rank above the latter.
- The FCA’s primary (strategic and operational) objectives also rank above all considerations, including the secondary international competitiveness and growth objective (SIGCO). The secondary objective is only engaged when advancing its primary objectives by exercising general functions (as listed in s.1B of FSMA). These functions include:
  - Rule-making (s.1B(6)(a)).
  - Functions in relation to giving general guidance (s.1B(6)(c)).
  - Determining general policies (s.1B(6)(d)) that govern how PRA exercise’s particular functions.
- In speeches and public communications, senior leaders of the PRA (and Bank) have stressed that financial stability is a prerequisite for sustainable growth and that reforms supporting competitiveness and growth must not jeopardize financial stability.
- The FCA has published two reports on its work to embed SIGCO—the first in 2023/24 and a second in 2024/25—providing updates on relevant rules and guidance on how both the primary and secondary objectives were considered.
- The FCA’s 5 year strategy outlines the importance of international standards and approach to global cooperation.
- The PRA’s finalized Approach to Policy document and accompanying Policy Statement (PS) 3/25 set out how the PRA makes policy under FSMA 2023. PS 15/25—Closing liquidity reporting gaps and streamlining Standard Formula reporting—was published last year with the aim of improving safety and soundness.
- The PRA has published two reports on embedding SIGCO—in 2023/24 and 2024/25.

### 11. Review and estimate the expected workload in core and new financial stability and supervisory risk areas and determine how to align BOE/PRA and FCA capacity and resources accordingly. (HMT, BOE/PRA, and FCA)

### Timeframe: 1–3 years
- Over 2022/23, the PRA increased its funding, redeployed resources and set up a flexible resource hub to help manage its expanded regulatory responsibilities. The PRA is satisfied with these improvements.
- Since 2022/23, the PRA has re-allocated resources to reflect further changes in responsibilities and the changing nature of external risks. For example, PRA allocated resource to new responsibility in overseeing critical third parties designated by HM Treasury under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 and is planning new policy relating to the management of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and cyber risk.
- The second part of the PRA 2026 strategy includes transformation of capabilities around solvent exit planning for small to mid-tier firms and the use of advanced technology to support supervision.
  - On solvent exit planning, the PRA finalised new rules and expectations on banks, building societies and insurers. This came into effect for banks and building societies in October 2025.
  - On deploying new technology, the PRA continues to release tools to assist supervisors in analysing data and is conducting a controlled roll-out of machine learning and AI tools to staff.
  - PRA continues to engage with firms to identify targeted opportunities to streamline data collections (e.g. deletions of reporting templates that provide limited regulatory value).
- The FCA prioritised its work for 2023/24 to direct resources effectively and made 13 commitments in its multi-year strategy published in April 2022. Going into 2023/24, it invested further in its most critical commitments:
  - Preparing financial services for the future—working with the Treasury to implement the new regulatory framework so the FCA can address emerging harms more efficiently.
  - Putting consumers’ needs first—to improve consumer protection and standards for all consumers and ensure FCA’s support for struggling consumers remains a priority.
  - Reducing and preventing financial crime—prioritised to help protect consumers, including those in vulnerable circumstances.
  - Strengthening the UK's position in global wholesale markets—to help ensure the UK continues to be seen as one of the leading global markets of choice and strengthen FCA’s ability to respond to market volatility.
- The FCA continued to deliver across the remaining 9 commitments at a similar pace to 2022/23 (year 1).
- Going into 2024/25, the FCA deprioritised preparing financial services for the future after significant investment in implementing the Treasury’s Smarter Regulatory Framework (SRF).
- In developing the Strategy for 2025 to 2030, the FCA reduced priorities from 13 to 4. One priority is to become “A smarter regulator: more efficient and effective,” including initiatives to:
  - Enhance FCA’s supervisory model to focus on areas where harm is greatest and publish an annual suite of 8-10 publications setting out regulatory priorities for each market (first tranche to be published by March 2026).
  - Review firm categorisation to build relationships with a wider range of influential participants and dial up/down supervisory oversight of significant firms demonstrably doing the right thing.
  - Optimise operational performance using data and digital capabilities to drive productivity and efficiency.

### 12. Ensure that the final accountability and transparency mechanisms adopted under the ongoing FRF review seek to safeguard regulatory independence and pose no constraints for operational and oversight effectiveness. (HMT, PRA, FCA with other agencies)

### Timeframe: 1–3 years
- HMT completed the FRF review in 2022 and enacted the outcomes through the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2023. The Act includes measures enhancing regulators’ transparency and accountability and facilitating scrutiny by Parliament, including:
  - A requirement to keep rules under review (and to publish a framework for rule review).
  - Establishment of an independent Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) Panel.
  - A requirement to notify relevant parliamentary committees following publication of a consultation.
  - A requirement to respond in writing to parliamentary committees’ formal responses to consultations.
- The PRA, Bank and FCA engaged closely with HMT and stakeholders during the FRF review, ensuring operational independence of the regulators was appropriately considered and safeguarded. The mechanisms adopted through FSMA 2023 elevate accountability and transparency while preserving operational independence and effectiveness.
- The FSMA 2023 framework has been operational for approximately 3 years. The FCA and PRA have embedded these requirements to facilitate efficient and responsive policymaking while allowing effective oversight; HM Treasury’s recent consultation recognized scope for further improvements.
- The FCA and PRA CBA Panels are now set up and independently scrutinizing CBAs. The FCA CBA Panel is considering relevant CBAs from the FCA as well as the Payments Systems Regulatory (PSR), while the PRA CBA Panel is considering the PRA’s CBAs and Bank CBAs relating to CCP and CSD rules. The FCA and PRA have published statements of approach to CBAs and statements on rule reviews.
- The Bank embedded its new FSMA 2023 requirements in relation to regulation of CCPs and CSDs, effective 1 January 2024, including a new statutory committee (the FMI Committee), consulting the new independent CBA Panel on CBAs, and embedding the new secondary objective to facilitate innovation in policymaking.

### 13. Accelerate the efforts to close data gaps on NBFI activities, including data on all Sterling asset holdings and data needed to improve the management of liquidity demands by fund managers; continue improving flow-of-funds data including all cross-border NBFI exposures. (FPC, BOE/PRA, and FCA)

### Timeframe: 3–5 years
- The BoE submitted a new data request to banks in 2024 to address gaps in NBFI exposures after a comprehensive survey of available data; as this was a one-off exercise, the Bank is considering how to take forward future data collections.
- The ONS published a report in December 2024 covering plans to develop the UK financial sector account statistics to meet international standards and progress made so far.
- The ONS published for the first time in January 2025 international template data on debt securities and sectoral accounts, in line with the Special Data Dissemination Standards Plus, on their UK National Data Summary Page.
- The ONS published for the first time in the October 2025 Blue Book data for all UK based money market funds, and improved data for Non-Money Market Funds covering Private Equity Funds.
- The ONS primarily relies on the Financial Services Survey (FSS) to collect balance sheet data from NBFIs and updated the questionnaire to encompass a wider range of institutions and collect more granular data, including new sector counterparty data which separately identifies the rest of the world. The transformed questionnaire was launched in January 2025 with two separate targeted samples to separate collection of income and expenditure data from balance sheet data. The ONS intends to build the quality of the balance sheet data over time and integrate it into the National Accounts.
- Over 2024/25, Bank staff completed aggregation of all internally available data on gilt holdings to form a clear view of the size of the remaining data gap and engaged externally to learn about stakeholder data. BoE staff are weighing costs, benefits, and feasibility of options to address remaining gaps.
- The Bank co-led the FSB’s Open-Ended Fund Data Pilot project which concluded last year. The FCA, Bank and HMT are participating in international workstreams including the FSB’s Nonbank Data Task Force (NDTF) and the associated workstream on leveraged trading strategies (WLS).
- Domestically, the FCA’s enhanced derivative reporting requirements under UK EMIR have been applicable since 30 September 2024.
- Fund Liquidity:
  - In December 2025, the FCA consulted on proposals to enhance the liquidity risk management framework for retail-oriented authorised funds (CP 25/38), taking account of FSB and IOSCO recommendations on fund liquidity risk management and the FSB’s recommendations on liquidity preparedness for margin and collateral calls.
  - Later in 2026, the FCA will consult on a revised regime for alternative investment fund managers (AIFMs), including revised liquidity risk management rules and proposals to require some illiquid AIFs to have redemption terms matching portfolio illiquidity. The AIFM reforms CP will also take account of the FSB’s recommendations on liquidity preparedness for margin and collateral calls.
- Fund Data:
  - The FCA plans to transform its regulatory data model for asset managers and funds (including private market funds) by designing new, proportional, streamlined regulatory returns that address data gaps, incorporate international standards and regulatory practices and provide a consistent firm experience for submission.
  - The FCA is commencing work to reform its AIFMD reporting framework as part of the SRF transfer of the AIFM Level 2 regulation this year.

### 14. Strengthen information sharing with relevant third-country authorities, including reviewing the approach to monitor and supervise hybrid crossborder transactions, private market activities, and internationally active mixed financial groups. (FPC, BOE/PRA, and FCA)

### Timeframe: 3–5 years
- Good cooperation, information sharing and collaboration with relevant third country authorities remains a key priority, as set out in SS5/21 (refreshed May 2025) and SoP7/24 (refreshed May 2024).
- Market and supervisory events have tested relationships and found them strong in both 'peace time' and crises. Communication and information sharing between supervisory teams across jurisdictions remains strong. The Bank / PRA has supervisory cooperation Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with over 60 countries covering over 70 competent authorities. MoUs follow a risk-based approach considering volume of cross-border activity and presence of UK-regulated firms in the host market.
- The PRA has enhanced trilateral relationships with the FRB and ECB on supervisory issues, identifying potential areas for common work, horizon scanning and information sharing. Through the Trilateral group, they developed a quantitative data collection template on NBFI exposures to consider counterparty-credit risk on a group-wide basis.
- The PRA has undertaken reviews in coordination with regulators from key jurisdictions on crystallised and emerging risks including Archegos, nickel, fixed income financing, crypto products, private equity, CRR management practices and banks’ risk management of principal trading firms. Joint reviews have been established with Japanese and European supervisory colleagues in addition to long-standing work with US and Swiss counterparts.
- The PRA worked closely with FINMA, FRB and ECB in handling resolution and acquisition of Silicon Valley Bank and Credit Suisse, bolstering bilateral and multilateral supervisory relationships and ensuring flow of information during critical periods.
- During volatility following the invasion of Ukraine, the UK mini budget and the failures of SVB and Credit Suisse, the PRA held joint firm monitoring calls with the FRB and SSM to assess changes in firms’ risk profiles and exposures; PRA continues to share key concerns with FRB and SSM, including on a desk-based commodity stress test related to Russia/Ukraine volatility.
- The PRA published updates to its approach to branch and subsidiary supervision (PS6/25) to clarify expectations on booking arrangements, extend formal application to a subset of UK banks, introduce additional indicative criteria for branch vs subsidiary decisions, and amend the PRA branch return to improve collection of whole firm liquidity data.
- Letters of Good Standing (LOGS): Annually, the FCA receives c2k LOGS requests from overseas regulatory authorities and is obligated under FSMA (S354A) to respond. The FCA re-engineered their end-to-end process for managing these requests, including updating an external webform to make it clearer and easier for external regulators to submit requests, which FCA expect will significantly reduce response times to overseas regulators.

*UNITED KINGDOM — INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND*

### 15. Maintain the United Kingdom’s

### 15. Maintain the United Kingdom’s commitment to mutual cooperation with the EU, post-Brexit, including intensifying regulatory dialogue to support financial stability and mitigate market fragmentation risks, including the regulatory status of the U.K. CCPs over the long term. (HMT, BOE, and FCA)

### Regulatory dialogue and institutional cooperation
- The Joint EU-UK Financial Regulatory Forum met in March 2026 and will continue semi-annual meetings; UK authorities will engage bilaterally and through multilateral fora.
- The PRA has signed and implemented 32 Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with EU institutions and Member States, and a further three MoUs with EEA Member States.
- The PRA, EU and EEA insurance regulators are signatories to a Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding providing a formal basis for cooperation and information exchange among insurance supervisors, in addition to the IAIS Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding.
- The FCA has signed five MoUs with EU institutions and counterparties, and 31 bilateral MoUs with EU and EEA National Competent Authorities (NCAs) since 2020.
- The FCA has signed and implemented MoUs with global bodies such as IAIS and IOSCO; these continue to be reviewed and updated as required.
- The Bank, PRA and FCA have strengthened senior-level and working-level engagement with EU institutions, including the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the European Supervisory Authorities and the National Competent Authorities.

### Targeted MoUs and digital/CTP regulatory workstreams
- The FCA adopted specific MoUs, including:
  - Two MoUs with ESMA on critical benchmarks and the recognition of UK benchmark administrators in the EU in 2023 (the FCA is currently updating these).
  - An MoU with the AMF on MiFID data adopted in 2024.
- The FCA, together with the Bank and PRA, began negotiations on a DORA CTP oversight regime between the ESAs and UK authorities; an MoU to enhance regulatory cooperation and oversight of critical third parties under the UK’s CTP regime and the EU’s DORA was signed in January 2026.

### Financial market infrastructures, CCP recognition, and equivalence
- HMT granted the EU a package of equivalence decisions in November 2020, including a decision on CCP equivalence.
- The Bank has recognised three EU CCPs – Cboe Clear Europe, Eurex Clearing and LCH SA - since the Bank’s tiering policy came into force in December 2022.
- Further EU CCPs that have applied for recognition are able to continue providing services to UK clearing members and trading venues under the Temporary Recognition Regime while permanent recognition is pending.
- The Bank has signed and implemented 20 cooperation arrangements with EU institutions and Member States since the beginning of 2021 in relation to financial market infrastructures, including:
  - An updated MoU with ESMA in relation to UK CCPs revised to reflect new EU requirements under EMIR 3.
  - Agreements regarding the newly established resolution colleges for four EU CCPs.
  - An MoU template agreed with ESMA to be used for the recognition of EU CSDs that are non-systemic to UK financial stability.
- Equivalence and recognition are unilateral decisions; the EU has put in place time-limited decisions for UK CCPs.
  - In 2025, the European Commission renewed its equivalence decision regarding the UK CCP regime (until 30 June 2028).
  - Following the Commission’s equivalence determination, and the agreement of the revised UK CCP MoU between ESMA and the Bank in March 2025, ESMA extended its recognition of UK CCPs (now due to expire in June 2028).

### Strengthening UK CCP regime and international engagement
- An enhanced UK CCP resolution regime came into effect in December 2023, making the UK regime fully consistent with international FSB standards.
- The Bank is developing policy options on second skin in the game (SSITG) similar to the EU regime.
- The Bank continues engagement with international counterparts through CPMI-IOSCO and FSB workstreams.
- The FCA is an active member of international workstreams within the FSB, IOSCO and IAIS.
- Following multi-year engagement between the PRA and the EBA, in December 2025 the EBA published updated Guidelines on the equivalence of confidentiality and professional secrecy regimes of third-country authorities, which recognise the PRA's professional secrecy regime as equivalent to the EU's, providing a clear legal basis for information sharing and strengthening the supervisory relationship.

### Key actionable items and time horizon
- Timeframe indicated: 3–5 years.
- Continue semi-annual Joint EU-UK Financial Regulatory Forum meetings and bilateral/multilateral engagement.
- Maintain, review, and update MoUs and cooperation arrangements (insurance, benchmarks, MiFID data, CTP/DORA oversight, CCPs, CSD recognition).
- Develop and consult on policy options for SSITG and other CCP-related measures to align with international standards and preserve market stability.

*Source: IMF staff summary of authorities’ update as presented in the Financial Sector Assessment (content unit 15).*

### Annex IX. Transnational Aspects of Corruption

### Annex IX. Transnational Aspects of Corruption

### Overview
- The authorities continue to address transnational aspects of corruption, focusing on the supply side (criminalization and prosecution of foreign bribery) and facilitation (preventing laundering and concealment of foreign corruption proceeds).
- Authorities are encouraged to continue implementing past recommendations to address risks of transnational aspects of corruption.

### Supply Side — Criminalization and Prosecution of Foreign Bribery
- Strengthen whistleblower protection framework
  - A public consultation on the whistleblowing framework is envisaged to be launched in 2026.
- Engage with Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories on OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
  - The Overseas Territories are strongly encouraged to extend application of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to their jurisdictions.

### Facilitation — Preventing the Concealment of Foreign Corruption Proceeds
- Strengthen effective supervision of high-risk sectors attractive for laundering illicit foreign proceeds
  - The Financial Conduct Authority has been designated as the AML/CFT supervisor for legal and accountancy professionals, and trust and company service providers, intended to address fragmentation and inconsistency from the previous system of multiple self-regulatory bodies.
- Enhance entity transparency and access to beneficial ownership information
  - As of November 2025, identity verification for new and existing directors and beneficial owners is mandatory.
  - Anyone filing information with Companies House is now required to be verified directly or through an authorized corporate service provider.
  - Companies House’s investigation and enforcement powers have been strengthened by enabling proactive sharing of information with law enforcement agencies on high-risk entities or suspicious filings.
  - As of February 2026, 33,028 overseas entities had registered with the UK’s Register of Overseas Entities.
    - Penalties issued for non-registration: 44.
    - Penalties issued for failure to update: 111.
  - The proposed Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations would extend Trust Registration Service registration and data sharing rules to non-UK trusts holding UK land acquired prior to October 6, 2020.
  - The authorities continue to engage with UK Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies on delivery of publicly accessible beneficial ownership registers.
    - Cayman Islands and Turks and Caicos have launched legitimate interest access to their registers.
    - Anguilla, Bermuda, and British Virgin Islands have deferred implementation for later in 2026.

### Recovering Criminal Assets
- Recover criminal assets to deprive criminals of their illicit foreign proceeds laundered in the UK
  - The total value of proceeds of crime recovered from confiscation orders, forfeiture orders, and civil recovery orders increased by 24 percent from £217.6 million in 2019–20 to £284.5 million in 2024–25.

*Source: 1gbrea2026001 - Annex IX. Transnational Aspects of Corruption*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1gbrea2026001.pdf_
