## 1htiea2026001 ## Source details **Canonical URL:** [1htiea2026001](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1htiea2026001.pdf) ## Other formats - [Markdown version](/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1htiea2026001.pdf.md) - [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1htiea2026001.pdf.json) --- ### Security, humanitarian, and political context - Security and humanitarian crises continue to deteriorate amid recurrent adverse shocks and an ongoing political transition. - Major recent shocks and developments: - Oil price shock stemming from the war in the Middle East, raising the fuel import bill and implicit fuel subsidy costs. - Hurricane Melissa in October 2025 disrupted economic activity and exacerbated humanitarian needs. - Ongoing fragile political transition aimed at restoring governance, improving security, and paving the way for the first general elections in a decade. - International engagement and security developments: - Arrival of the Gang Suppression Force in April could help improve security conditions and renew momentum for international support. - UN Integrated Office in Haiti’s mandate extended through January 2027. - U.S. action: retroactive but temporary extension of HOPE and HELP Acts in February 2026 through end-December 2026; subsequent February 20, 2026 decision to apply a 10 percent import surcharge effectively eliminated the preferential treatment under HOPE/HELP. - Humanitarian scale: - About 6.4 million people expected to require emergency assistance in 2026. - 5.7 million people face acute food insecurity. - 1.45 million people are internally displaced. ### Economic outlook and recent developments - Real GDP and inflation: - Real GDP is expected to contract for an eighth consecutive year in FY2026. - Real GDP fell by 2.7 percent in FY2025. - Annual inflation rose to 31.9 percent by end-FY2025 and decelerated to 20.6 percent by March 2026. - Core inflation reached 22.8 percent by end-FY2025. - Sectoral performance in FY2025: - Agriculture declined by 4.8 percent, including a 19 percent rice shortfall vis-à-vis its five-year average. - Manufacturing shrank by 4.3 percent, driven by an 8 percent decline in textiles. - Commerce contracted by 7.7 percent. - Transport contracted by 15.4 percent. - Outlook and projections: - Real GDP projected to decline by 1.7 percent in FY2026. - End-period inflation projected at 22.0 percent in FY2026 (compared to 24.1 percent envisaged in the second review). - Medium-term real GDP growth rates expected to gradually converge to potential (1.5 percent), conditional on improvements in security conditions. ### External sector, remittances, and reserves - Current account and reserves: - Current account balance expected to remain broadly balanced in FY2026; current account expected to remain almost balanced at 0.2 percent of GDP in FY2026. - Gross international reserves projected to remain adequate at over seven months of prospective imports through FY2028. - Net international reserves (2024 SMP definition): Sep 2024: 919.9; Sep 2024 (1st Review Revised): 916.3; Sep 2024 (2nd Review Revised): 918.0; Jul 2025: 1,484.4; Aug 2025: 1,564.8; Sep 2025: 1,602.7; Oct 2025: 1,576.1; Nov 2025: 1,671.2; Dec 2025: 1,769.3. - Bank of the Republic of Haiti (BRH) cumulative net purchases since end-September 2024 exceeded USD 725 million, as of end February 2026. - Gross international reserves exceeded USD 3.4 billion as of end-January—over seven months of prospective imports. - Despite BRH purchases, the nominal exchange rate remained stable at around 130 gourdes per US dollar. - The real exchange rate appreciated 31 percent during FY2025, and an additional 9 percent through February 2026. - Remittances and external pressures: - Net remittances: FY2025 current account surplus of 1.9 percent of GDP (reversing a 0.6 percent of GDP deficit in FY2024). - From October 2025 to February 2026 net remittances increased by 15.8 percent relative to a year earlier. - Net remittances projected to reach 11.2 percent of GDP in FY2026 despite a one percent tax on cash remittances from the US. - External pressures from higher oil prices: estimated additional import bill of about USD 180 million (about 0.45 percent of GDP). - Fuel import bill projected to reach about USD1.2 billion in FY2025-26. ### Fiscal conditions, budget execution, and public finances - Revenue, spending, and fiscal balances: - Domestic revenues have declined and are projected at 4.3 percent of GDP in FY2026 (domestic revenues projected in FY2026: 4.3 percent of GDP; domestic revenues projected at 222.8 billion gourdes in FY2025–26). - Nominal domestic revenues (IT) increased by 13.3 percent year-on-year, but the revenue-to-GDP ratio declined to 4.8 percent—its lowest level since FY2002. - FY2025 fiscal balances: overall balance: small deficit of 0.1 percent of GDP; primary balance (Indicative Target, IT): surplus of 0.1 percent of GDP. - Total expenditure reached only 75.5 percent of the supplementary budget; capital spending was 42.2 percent. - Total expenditure for FY2026 projected at about 5.8 percent of GDP; overall fiscal deficit expected to widen to about 0.9 percent of GDP. - Budget execution FY2026 (data as of February 2026): - Domestic revenues (IT) remained subdued—1.7 percent of projected GDP compared to a 10-year average of 2.6 percent. - Budget execution: total spending reached 25.2 percent of the budget; capital spending reached 12.2 percent (10-year averages: total 25.5 percent; capital 7.1 percent). - Grants received as of February 2026 were lower than in the same period of FY2025. - Social spending reached 21.2 billion gourdes (0.4 percent of GDP) during October 2025–February 2026, with constrained execution. - Fiscal risks and implicit costs: - Higher oil prices expected to add pressure through implicit fuel subsidy costs; foregone fuel tax revenues of about HTG 14.2 billion in FY2026. - Policy imperative: prioritize spending while safeguarding support for the most vulnerable; maintain a prudent stance via stronger revenue mobilization and efficient spending execution. ### SMP implementation, performance, and extension request - Program performance under the Staff‑Monitored Program (SMP): - Authorities remain committed to the SMP. - All end-September 2025 indicative targets met except the fiscal revenues target, missed by a narrow margin (missed by 0.04 percent of the target). - All end-December 2025 quantitative and indicative targets were met. - Reserve accumulation has been strong; net international reserves reached USD 1.76 billion in December 2025. - Monetary financing target was met; authorities confirmed no accumulation of domestic or external arrears and no plans to contract non-concessional loans. - Structural benchmarks: - Three of the eight structural benchmarks assessed in this review were met; delays concentrated in public financial management and resource mobilization. - Specific SB status highlights: - SB2 (procurement contracts published): continuous, not met (publication lagged since October 2025). - SB3 (FSW monthly execution reports): continuous, met. - SB4 (quarterly internal expenditure audit for FSW): continuous, met. - SB5 (CSCCA audit FY2022-23 and FY2023-24): end-March 2026 target, not met. - SB6 (quarterly FAES report): continuous, not met. - SB8 (digitalization of tax declarations/payments): end-March 2026 target, not met. - SB11 (BRH full balance sheet): continuous, met. - SB12 (interconnection of tax and customs systems): end-March 2026 target, not met. - SMP extension: - Authorities requested a nine-month SMP extension through June 19, 2027. - Rationale: Haiti’s multidimensional crisis, heightened fragility, and to anchor SMP objectives during the transition. - IMF staff supports the request and proposes adjustments to structural benchmarks to reinforce public financial management and safeguards. - Proposed new and rescheduled SBs include SB15, SB16, SB17, SB18, SB19 with target dates between end-September 2026 and May 10, 2027. ### Policy priorities and reform agenda - Main policy priorities discussed during mission (March 23rd to April 1st, 2026): - Boost revenue mobilization. - Strengthen budget execution and cash management, including TSA consolidation. - Advance core governance reforms and fiscal transparency. - Safeguard monetary and financial stability. - Improve data adequacy and statistical reporting. - Revenue mobilization measures and targets: - Advance implementation of the new tax code and complete preparatory steps ahead of rollout on October 1, 2026. - Restructure DGI information system; ad hoc Commission established in January 2026 to address weaknesses and support SB8. - Accelerate transition to the Revenue Management System (RMS) with operational and cybersecurity safeguards. - Restructure and modernize customs and migration services; government signed a 10-year concession to strengthen border security and optimize customs revenues. - Adopt customs duty exemptions on capital goods and raw materials to support recovery (with caution on fiscal and governance risks). - Public investment and PIP: - Streamline and publish FY2026–27 Public Investment Program (PIP) after review of Treasury-financed projects with zero execution (SB15). - Embed measures in a rolling multi-year investment framework and strengthen project appraisal and disaster-risk screening. ### Oil price shock, pump price adjustments, and fiscal implications - Fuel pricing action and mechanism: - Authorities increased pump prices: gasoline by 29 percent and gasoil and kerosene by about 37 percent, equivalent to about a 40 percent pass-through of higher international prices. - Fuel Pump Price Adjustment Mechanism (decree of March 27, 2026) key rules: - No adjustment when calculated price varies by 3 percent or less relative to last published pump price. - Automatic adjustments when variation exceeds 3 percent, provided adjustment does not exceed 10 percent of last published pump price. - For adjustments in excess of 10 percent, pump price set by Government following consultation with a Petroleum Market Consultative Council. - April 1, 2026 implemented adjustments (effective April 2, 2026): - Gasoline: HTG 560 → HTG 725 per gallon (29.5 percent increase). - Diesel (gasoil): HTG 620 → HTG 850 per gallon (37.1 percent increase). - Kerosene: HTG 615 → HTG 845 per gallon (37.4 percent increase). - Fiscal implications: - The oil price shock is projected to generate an excess fuel import bill of about USD 180 million in FY2026. - Foregone fuel tax revenues estimated at about HTG 14.2 billion in FY2026. - Adverse scenario analysis: Additional fiscal cost of about 0.7 percent of GDP in FY2026 and about 2.0 percent of GDP in FY2027 if domestic pump prices were not adjusted in line with the oil shock. ### Banking sector, financial intermediation, and supervision - Banking sector indicators: - Non-performing loan ratios declined from 14.2 percent to just under 9 percent between June and December 2025. - Capital adequacy ratios were at 26 percent in December 2025—well above the 12 percent regulatory minimum. - System-wide gross loans fell by 68 percent between March 2022 and December 2025, with a contraction of 22 percent in 2025. - Preliminary data for January-February 2026 suggests gross loans contracted an additional 4 percent in real terms. - Movements reflect retrenchment in lending and reallocation of bank balance sheets toward central bank and sovereign claims. - Supervision and AML/CFT: - Revised regulations on credit risk classification and provisioning submitted to the Board; expected full effect October 1, 2026. - BRH operationalizing a new risk-based supervision framework; adoption of a new IT security framework and governance structure expected by end June 2026 (SB 13). - National Risk Assessment (NRA) published in March 2026; dissemination and UCREF resourcing and Board appointment by end-May 2026 remain priorities. ### Governance, transparency, and anti‑corruption - Governance actions and risks: - Decree creating the Haute Cour de Justice adopted on December 1, 2025; concerns about divergence from Governance Diagnostic Report (GDR) recommendations. - Anti-Corruption Pole created by decree in April 2025; operationalization pending and contingent on judicial appointments by the High Judicial Council. - Priority actions for anti-corruption effectiveness: clear legal mandate, institutional safeguards, adequate resources, transparent merit-based selection, and donor TA support. - Public financial management and transparency: - Progress: expanded fiscal data publication and reporting on FSW and FAES spending (SBs 3 and 6). - Remaining weaknesses: delays in publishing procurement contracts (SB2), uneven internal-audit practices, incomplete integration of extra‑budgetary accounts into TSA. - Priority actions: timely procurement disclosure, systematic audits, accelerated TSA consolidation, stronger commitment and payment controls, reducing unspecified budget allocations. ### Natural disaster-risk financing and Hurricane Melissa impact (Annex I) - Hurricane Melissa (October 2025) impacts and estimates: - Affected mostly southern departments accounting for about 15 percent of GDP. - Staff estimates Hurricane Melissa caused economic losses and damages in the range of 2 to 5 percent of GDP. - Real GDP growth estimated to decline by around 0.2–0.4 percentage points in FY2025/26. - Annual headline inflation estimated to rise by 0.3–0.7 percentage points. - Damages and losses calculations: - Damages (capital stock): 1.5 − 3.0 percent of GDP. - Losses (flow output): 1.1 − 2.1 percent of GDP. - Agriculture losses and damages: ≈ 0.8 − 1.7 percent of GDP. - Disaster financing and liquidity: - CCRIF payout following Melissa: USD 1.2 million. - Emergency fund available about 2.8 billion gourdes (0.05 percent of GDP) in March 2026. - Between 2012 and 2023 the CERC with IDA financing was activated 7 times in Haiti. - Recommendation: integrate CCRIF and emergency fund into cash management, strengthen damage assessments, fund release protocols, and transparent reporting. ### Risks to the outlook, adverse scenario, and contingency policies - Risks overview: - Risks tilted to the downside: further deterioration in security conditions; persistently higher global oil prices; potential shifts in foreign immigration policies that could slow remittance inflows. - Upside scenario: deployment of the Gang Suppression Force—supported by the newly established United Nations Support Office for Haiti—could help restore confidence and support economic activity. - Staff estimate: a positive security shock restoring security broadly to pre-2017 average levels improves the probability of positive GDP growth in FY2026 from less than 1 percent in the baseline to more than 10 percent (IMF growth-at-risk methodology). - Adverse scenario assumptions (Annex V): - International oil prices increasing by 100 percent in Q2 2026 and remain at that level in FY2027. - Food commodity prices increasing by 5 percent in FY2026 and by 10 percent in FY2027. - A 10 percent decline in goods exports due to changes in major trading partners’ policies. - Net remittances declining by 10 percent in FY2026 and FY2027. - Adverse scenario quantified impacts (Annex V Results): - Real GDP growth: −2.6 percent in FY2026 and −0.6 percent in FY2027 (about 0.9 and 1.1 percentage points below baseline). - Current account: FY2026 deficit of 1.8 percent of GDP (from surplus of 0.2 percent baseline); FY2027 CA deficit widens to 3.8 percent of GDP. - Fiscal pressures from fuel subsidies: +0.7 percent of GDP in FY2026 and +2.0 percent of GDP in FY2027 if domestic pump prices were not adjusted. - Contingency policy recommendations: - Prioritize macroeconomic stability and expenditure reprioritization. - Consider further adjustments of domestic fuel prices while protecting the most vulnerable and using FSW resources where appropriate. - Secure additional official grant financing and donor coordination; maintain limits on monetary financing and transparent budgeting of subsidies. ### Key statistics and dates (preserved exactly as in source) - Real GDP change FY2025: fell by 2.7 percent. - FY2026 projection: contraction expected for an eighth consecutive year. - Annual inflation: 31.9 percent by end-FY2025; eased to 20.6 percent by March 2026. - Core inflation: 22.8 percent by end-FY2025. - Domestic revenues projected in FY2026: 4.3 percent of GDP; domestic revenues projected at 222.8 billion gourdes in FY2025–26. - Estimated oil-import-related cost increase: about USD 180 million (about 0.45 percent of GDP). - Net remittance growth from October 2025 to February 2026: increased by 15.8 percent relative to a year earlier. - Humanitarian figures for 2026: - 6.4 million people expected to require emergency assistance. - 5.7 million people face acute food insecurity. - 1.45 million people internally displaced. - SMP extension request period: nine-month extension through June 19, 2027. - Mission dates: March 23rd to April 1st, 2026. - U.S. import surcharge applied: 10 percent (February 20, 2026 decision). - HOPE/HELP Acts temporary extension: through end-December 2026 (retroactive approval in February 2026). - Net international reserves (selected): Sep 2024: 916.3; Sep 2025: 1,604.6; Dec 2025: 1,761.7; Jan 2026: 1,777.6 (2024 SMP definition entries). - Gross international reserves (selected): Sep 2024 (Revised): 2,522.2; Dec 2025: 3,393.1; Jan 2026: 3,410.1. - Non-performing loan ratios: declined from 14.2 percent to just under 9 percent between June and December 2025. - Capital adequacy ratios: 26 percent in December 2025. - System-wide gross loans contraction: fell by 68 percent between March 2022 and December 2025; contraction of 22 percent in 2025. - Food Shock Window unspent as of January 2026: about 1.5 billion gourdes. - Emergency fund: about 2.8 billion gourdes (0.05 percent of GDP) in March 2026. - Timeline for SMP reviews (selected): fourth review expected by mid-December-2026; fifth review expected by June 19, 2027. - Program exchange rate for September 2024 to June 2027: SDR 0.737261 per U.S. dollar (exchange rate as of September 30, 2024). - Program oil price assumptions: USD 84 per barrel for FY2025-26 Q3 and USD 75 per barrel for FY2025-26 Q4. - Fixed program import volume: 3.6 million barrels per quarter. - Adjustor cap for oil shock: USD 58 million (example when average WTI = USD 100 per barrel in FY2026Q3). - Nominal GDP (2025): US$32.1 billion. - GDP per capita (2025): US$2,556. - Population (2025, est.): 11.9 million. - Percent of population below poverty line (2021): 52.3. - Fiscal and program memoranda (selected): Food Shock Window of the Rapid Credit Facility financing: SDR 81.9 million (50 percent of Haiti’s quota); Net international reserves: USD 1.77 billion (as of end January 2026); Gross international reserves: exceeding seven months of prospective imports (as of end January 2026). *Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY and selected excerpts (1htiea2026001) — IMF report on Haiti, May 7, 2026.* ### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ### Security, humanitarian, and political context - Security and humanitarian crises continue to deteriorate amid recurrent adverse shocks and an ongoing political transition. - Major recent shocks and developments: - Oil price shock stemming from the war in the Middle East, raising the fuel import bill and implicit fuel subsidy costs. - Hurricane Melissa in October 2025, which disrupted economic activity and exacerbated humanitarian needs. - Ongoing fragile political transition aimed at restoring governance, improving security, and paving the way for the first general elections in a decade. - International engagement and security developments: - Arrival of the Gang Suppression Force in April could help improve security conditions and renew momentum for international support. - UN Integrated Office in Haiti’s mandate extended through January 2027. - U.S. action: retroactive but temporary extension of HOPE and HELP Acts in February 2026 through end-December 2026; subsequent February 20, 2026 decision to apply a 10 percent import surcharge effectively eliminated the preferential treatment under HOPE/HELP. ### Economic outlook and recent developments - Real GDP and inflation: - Real GDP is expected to contract for an eighth consecutive year in FY2026. - Real GDP fell by 2.7 percent in FY2025. - Annual inflation rose to 31.9 percent by end-FY2025 and decelerated to 20.6 percent by March 2026. - Core inflation reached 22.8 percent by end-FY2025. - Sectoral performance in FY2025: - Agriculture declined by 4.8 percent, including a 19 percent rice shortfall vis-à-vis its five-year average. - Manufacturing shrank by 4.3 percent, driven by an 8 percent decline in textiles. - Commerce contracted by 7.7 percent. - Transport contracted by 15.4 percent. - External sector: - Current account balance expected to remain broadly balanced in FY2026. - Gross international reserves projected to remain adequate at over seven months of prospective imports of goods and services. - External pressures from higher oil prices: estimated additional import bill of about USD 180 million (about 0.45 percent of GDP). - Net remittances: FY2025 current account surplus of 1.9 percent of GDP (reversing a 0.6 percent of GDP deficit in FY2024); from October 2025 to February 2026 net remittances increased by 15.8 percent relative to a year earlier. - Humanitarian scale: - About 6.4 million people expected to require emergency assistance in 2026. - 5.7 million people face acute food insecurity. - 1.45 million people are internally displaced. ### Fiscal conditions and public finances - Domestic revenues have declined and are projected at 4.3 percent of GDP in FY2026, reflecting continued security-related disruptions, administrative fragilities, and institutional paralysis following termination of the Transitional Presidential Council’s mandate. - Higher oil prices are expected to add pressure through implicit fuel subsidy costs. - Budget execution remains uneven amid capacity constraints and heightened uncertainty. - Policy implication highlighted: prioritize spending while safeguarding support for the most vulnerable. ### Program implementation under the Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) - Authorities remain committed to the SMP. - Performance against targets: - All end-September 2025 indicative targets met except the fiscal revenues target, which was missed by a narrow margin due to security-related disruptions to tax collection. - All end-December 2025 quantitative and indicative targets were met. - Reserve accumulation has been strong. - Revenue, primary balance, social spending, and monetary financing targets remained on track despite increasingly constrained fiscal space. - Structural benchmarks: - Three of the eight structural benchmarks assessed in this review were met. - Delays concentrated in public financial management and resource mobilization. - Authorities’ engagement: - Continued engagement through the high-level Program Monitoring Committee. ### Risks to the outlook - Risks tilted to the downside: - Further deterioration in security conditions. - Persistently higher global oil prices. - Potential shifts in foreign immigration policies that could slow remittance inflows. - Upside scenario: - Deployment of the Gang Suppression Force—supported by the newly established United Nations Support Office for Haiti—could help restore confidence and support economic activity. ### SMP extension request and staff position - Authorities have requested a nine-month SMP extension through June 19, 2027. - Rationale: Haiti’s multidimensional crisis, heightened fragility—including a fragile political environment and exposure to large exogenous shocks—and to anchor SMP objectives of macroeconomic stabilization and reform momentum during the transition. - Extension would provide a bridge to maintain close engagement until a new government is elected and to build a track record of policy implementation. - IMF staff supports the request and proposes adjustments to structural benchmarks to reinforce public financial management and safeguards. ### Policy priorities discussed - During mission (conducted remotely March 23rd to April 1st, 2026), priorities included: - Boosting revenue mobilization. - Strengthening budget execution. - Advancing core governance reforms. - Safeguarding monetary and financial stability. - Improving data adequacy. - Implementation challenges noted: - Persistent insecurity, political fragility, an uncertain electoral process, and geopolitical developments pose increasing challenges to the SMP’s objectives. ### Key statistics and dates (preserved exactly as in source) - Real GDP change FY2025: fell by 2.7 percent. - FY2026 projection: contraction expected for an eighth consecutive year. - Annual inflation: 31.9 percent by end-FY2025; eased to 20.6 percent by March 2026. - Core inflation: 22.8 percent by end-FY2025. - Domestic revenues projected in FY2026: 4.3 percent of GDP. - Estimated oil-import-related cost increase: about USD 180 million (about 0.45 percent of GDP). - Net remittance growth from October 2025 to February 2026: increased by 15.8 percent relative to a year earlier. - Humanitarian figures for 2026: - 6.4 million people expected to require emergency assistance. - 5.7 million people face acute food insecurity. - 1.45 million people internally displaced. - SMP extension request period: nine-month extension through June 19, 2027. - Mission dates: March 23rd to April 1st, 2026. - U.S. import surcharge applied: 10 percent (February 20, 2026 decision). - HOPE/HELP Acts temporary extension: through end-December 2026 (retroactive approval in February 2026). *Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1htiea2026001) — IMF report on Haiti, May 7, 2026.* ### 7. External financing has declined sharply over the past decade, although recent donor ### 7. External financing has declined sharply over the past decade, although recent donor ### External financing and donor support - Compared to the historical peak in FY2010 (USD 1,840 million), the amount of budget support and grants received by the Haitian government had declined over 80 percent by end FY2025 (USD 364 million). - External donors committed about USD 20 million to support Haiti’s recovery from Hurricane Melissa. - Countries pledged about USD 35 million in new funding to the GSF trust fund to help restore security. ### International reserves and exchange rate - The Bank of the Republic of Haiti (BRH) cumulative net purchases since end-September 2024 exceeded USD 725 million, as of end February 2026. - Gross international reserves exceeded USD 3.4 billion as of end-January—over seven months of prospective imports. - Net international reserves (2024 SMP definition) series (in Millions of US Dollars): Sep 2024: 919.9; Sep 2024 (1st Review Revised): 916.3; Sep 2024 (2nd Review Revised): 918.0; Jul 2025: 1,484.4; Aug 2025: 1,564.8; Sep 2025: 1,602.7; Oct 2025: 1,576.1; Nov 2025: 1,671.2; Dec 2025: 1,769.3. - Despite BRH purchases, the nominal exchange rate remained stable at around 130 gourdes per US dollar. - The real exchange rate appreciated 31 percent during FY2025, and an additional 9 percent through February 2026. ### Fiscal outturns and budget execution - FY2025 fiscal balances: - Overall balance: small deficit of 0.1 percent of GDP. - Primary balance (Indicative Target, IT): surplus of 0.1 percent of GDP. - Nominal domestic revenues (IT) increased by 13.3 percent year-on-year, but the revenue-to-GDP ratio declined to 4.8 percent—its lowest level since FY2002. - Grants accounted for 1.2 percent of GDP in FY2025. - Total expenditure reached only 75.5 percent of the supplementary budget; capital spending was 42.2 percent. - Social spending (IT) increased but delivery constrained; as of January 2026 about 90.2 percent of Food Shock Window (FSW) resources had been executed, leaving about 1.5 billion gourdes unspent. ### FY2026 fiscal conditions and execution - FY2026 developments (data as of February 2026): - Domestic revenues (IT) remained subdued—1.7 percent of projected GDP compared to a 10-year average of 2.6 percent. - Budget execution: total spending reached 25.2 percent of the budget; capital spending reached 12.2 percent (10-year averages: total 25.5 percent; capital 7.1 percent). - Grants received as of February 2026 were lower than in the same period of FY2025. - Social spending reached 21.2 billion gourdes (0.4 percent of GDP) during October 2025–February 2026, with constrained execution. ### Oil price shock, pump price adjustments, and fiscal implications - The authorities increased pump prices: gasoline by 29 percent and gasoil and kerosene by about 37 percent, equivalent to about a 40 percent pass-through of higher international prices. - The oil price shock is projected to generate: - Excess fuel import bill of about USD 180 million in FY2026. - Foregone fuel tax revenues of about HTG 14.2 billion in FY2026. - Fuel Pump Price Adjustment Mechanism (decree of March 27, 2026) key rules: - No adjustment when calculated price varies by 3 percent or less relative to last published pump price. - Automatic adjustments when variation exceeds 3 percent, provided adjustment does not exceed 10 percent of last published pump price. - For adjustments in excess of 10 percent, pump price set by Government following consultation with a Petroleum Market Consultative Council. - April 1, 2026 implemented adjustments (effective April 2, 2026): - Gasoline: HTG 560 → HTG 725 per gallon (29.5 percent increase). - Diesel (gasoil): HTG 620 → HTG 850 per gallon (37.1 percent increase). - Kerosene: HTG 615 → HTG 845 per gallon (37.4 percent increase). - These adjustments are expected to reduce fiscal pressures from fuel subsidies and limit incentives for cross-border fuel smuggling. ### Banking sector and financial intermediation - Non-performing loan ratios declined from 14.2 percent to just under 9 percent between June and December 2025. - Capital adequacy ratios were at 26 percent in December 2025—well above the 12 percent regulatory minimum. - System-wide gross loans fell by 68 percent between March 2022 and December 2025, with a contraction of 22 percent in 2025. - Preliminary data for January-February 2026 suggests gross loans contracted an additional 4 percent in real terms. - Movements reflect sharp retrenchment in lending and reallocation of bank balance sheets toward central bank and sovereign claims. ### Program implementation under the SMP - Quantitative and Indicative Targets: - End-September 2025 ITs were met except fiscal revenue target, missed by 0.04 percent of the target. - All quantitative and indicative end-December 2025 targets have been met. - Net international reserves reached USD 1.76 billion in December 2025. - Monetary financing target was met; authorities confirmed no accumulation of domestic or external arrears and no plans to contract non-concessional loans. - Structural Benchmarks (status at third review): - Of eight SBs due, three were met. - Procurement contracts published but publication lagged since October 2025 (SB2—continuous, not met). - FSW monthly execution reports continue to be published (SB3—continuous, met); quarterly internal expenditure audit for FSW due Dec 2025 provided on time (SB4—continuous, met). - CSCCA conducted and published financial and operational compliance audit of FSW spending for FY2022-23 and FY2023-2024 with delay; audit for FY2024-2025 ongoing (SB5—end-March 2026 target, not met). - Quarterly report on FAES delayed (SB6—continuous, not met). - Digitalization of tax declarations and payments for large taxpayers facing implementation constraints (SB8—end-March 2026 target, not met). - BRH provided full balance sheet on time (SB11—continuous, met). - Interconnection of tax administration and customs automation systems not implemented (SB12—end-March 2026 target, not met). ### Outlook and risks - Real GDP projections: - Real GDP projected to decline by 1.7 percent in FY2026. - Staff estimates Hurricane Melissa caused economic losses and damages in the range of 2 to 5 percent of GDP and will reduce GDP growth in FY2026 by about 0.2–0.4 percentage points. - Medium-term real GDP growth rates expected to gradually converge to potential (1.5 percent), conditional on improvements in security conditions. - Inflation: - End-period inflation projected at 22.0 percent in FY2026 (compared to 24.1 percent envisaged in the second review). - Private credit: - Expected to begin a gradual recovery in FY2027, with real credit growth expanding further in FY2028. - Current account and external sector: - Net remittances projected to reach 11.2 percent of GDP in FY2026 despite a one percent tax on cash remittances from the US. - Trade deficit expected to widen to 12.2 percent of GDP in FY2026. - Current account expected to remain almost balanced at 0.2 percent of GDP in FY2026. - Gross international reserves projected to remain adequate at over seven months of prospective imports through FY2028 before declining somewhat thereafter. - Over the medium term, current account projected to revert to a deficit reflecting normalization of remittances and higher imports related to reconstruction and recovery. *Source: IMF staff compilation from the provided chapter text.* ### 16. Risks to the outlook are tilted to the ### 16. Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside. ### Downside and upside risk overview - Downside risks: larger-than-expected declines in remittances; further deterioration in security conditions; higher global oil prices — these would weaken the external position and compress fiscal space (Annex V and ¶25-26). - Upside risk: deployment of the GSF and associated improvement in security conditions could significantly raise growth. - Staff estimate: a positive security shock restoring security broadly to pre-2017 average levels improves the probability of positive GDP growth in FY2026 from less than 1 percent in the baseline to more than 10 percent (captured by a rightward shift in the one-year ahead forecast distribution using IMF growth-at-risk methodology). ### Policy discussions - Focus areas: implementation of the SMP, boosting revenue mobilization, strengthening budget execution, advancing core governance reforms, safeguarding monetary and financial stability, improving data adequacy. - Recent focal point: impact of the global rise in oil prices on the macroeconomic framework. ### A. Fiscal Policy — current outlook and trade-offs - Domestic revenue projected at about 4.3 percent of GDP for FY2026 (down from 4.7 percent projected at the time of the second review). - Total expenditure for FY2026 projected at about 5.8 percent of GDP. - Overall fiscal deficit expected to widen to about 0.9 percent of GDP. - Oil shock effects: higher implicit fuel subsidy and narrowed fiscal space. - Policy imperative: maintain a prudent stance via stronger revenue mobilization and efficient spending execution through strengthened cash and public investment management; fiscal framework should be realistic, transparent, and linked to medium-term priorities and SMP targets. - Supplementary budgets: should be supported by a clear financing table, approved through appropriate legal channels, consistent with SMP objectives, executed through strengthened cash management, and subject to enhanced transparency. ### Revenue performance and mobilization priorities - Immediate priority: step up domestic revenue mobilization given low revenue base and large security, humanitarian, and development needs. - Noted benchmark: a sustainable tax level for Haiti is at least 10 percent of GDP; international benchmarks suggest 12.5 percent of GDP is needed for basic state capacity. Under the baseline, gradual improvements and reforms are projected to narrow the gap by about 1.7 percentage points over the medium term. - Key initiatives underway: - Advance implementation of the new tax code; remaining steps include adoption and publication of the revised code and implementing decrees, completion of training, and system preparation ahead of rollout on October 1, 2026. Consultations on personal income tax (PIT) reforms have been initiated; detailed options and timeline not finalized. - Restructure the Directorate of General Taxes (DGI) information system; ad hoc Commission established in January 2026 to address weaknesses including lack of registration and filing by the Large Taxpayers Office (supports completion of SB8). - Accelerate transition to the Revenue Management System (RMS) to automate registration, filing, payments, audits; implementation should include operational and cybersecurity safeguards. - Restructure, strengthen, and modernize customs and migration services; government signed a 10-year concession to strengthen border security, optimize customs revenues, and increase capacity against transnational crime, fiscal evasion, and smuggling. - Adopt customs duty exemptions on capital goods and raw materials to support recovery, reduce production costs, and promote investment. - Caution: proposed exemptions/incentives could weaken efforts to broaden the tax base and reduce leakages; border concession raises fiscal, governance, and interoperability risks if remuneration and performance criteria are unclear; reliance on proprietary platforms could complicate interoperability and data sovereignty, potentially weakening SB12 and coordination with development partners. ### Budget execution and Treasury Single Account (TSA) - Fiscal credibility hindered by weak budget execution due to weaknesses in commitment controls, limited predictability of cash availability at spending-unit level, and delays in consolidating government accounts into the TSA. - Recent actions: Treasury using weekly and monthly revenue forecasts; protocol underway to route tax and customs payments through commercial banks into the TSA; revision of TSA framework to support broader perimeter. - Commitment: authorities to adopt and publish principles for creation and functioning of the TSA (new SB16). - Remaining needs: advance reforms in procurement, internal controls, compliance, and administrative processes with capacity support. ### Public investment management - Unlocking public investment requires stronger project preparation, prioritization, and predictable multi-year budgeting. - PIMA follow-up TA identified persistent weaknesses in feasibility studies, project appraisal, and systemic use of disaster-risk screening. - Reform priorities (following PIMA recommendations and Annex III): - (i) streamlined and implementation-ready Public Investment Program (PIP); - (ii) better project screening and prioritization; - (iii) closer coordination between MEF and the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPEC). - Authorities committed to streamline the FY2026-27 Public Investment Program following review of treasury-financed projects with zero execution during the previous two fiscal years (new SB15), and to enhance transparency via additional reporting on priority national investment projects (new SB17). - Recommendation: embed measures in a rolling multi-year investment framework and complement with transparent, competitive procedures for public-private partnerships. ### Digitalization and systems interoperability - Digitalization central for revenue mobilization and public financial management (expenditure control and investment management). - Progress deploying RMS and ASYCUDA has highlighted interoperability, data integrity, and system fragmentation risks; broader interconnection depends on rollout, configuration, and testing. - Need for coordinated IT governance across institutions to ensure compatibility with TSA and investment monitoring, and to avoid delays in meeting SBs. - Recommendation: move towards modular, interoperable information systems with centralized technical governance. ### Social assistance and humanitarian spending - Social spending: 1.2 percent of GDP in FY2025 (1.1 percent of GDP in FY2024). - Execution through February 2026: executed outlays amounted to 0.41 percent of GDP (broadly unchanged from previous year). - Operational issues: Hurricane Melissa response showed delays in deploying budgeted assistance and completing damage and needs assessments despite some gains. - IMF 2023 Rapid Credit Facility (FSW) execution: about 1.5 billion gourdes unspent as of January 2026. - FY2026 priorities: execute remaining FSW resources in the supplementary budget; accelerate execution via structured disbursement planning and earlier procurement for recurring interventions; strengthen governance, monitoring, and audit framework for FSW execution; follow CSCCA audit recommendations; improve expenditure traceability and record-keeping. - Targeting and delivery challenges: - SIMAST covers about 30 percent of the population (around 0.8 million households) but data quality and coverage gaps persist. - Hurricane Melissa operations: about 3.5 million SMS alerts sent and anticipatory e-money transfers of USD 100 per household delivered to roughly 47,465 affected individuals. - Scaling up requires broader SIMAST coverage, more reliable data, and resolution of beneficiary identification, payments processing, and network coverage constraints; continue interoperability and audit-trail work. ### Fiscal risks and contingency planning (elections and fuel) - Elections: - Total resources for election-related spending amount to about USD 60 million, including accumulated funds and FY2026 budget allocation of about 5.4 billion gourdes (USD 41 million). - Final cost estimate not yet available; identified envelope may be insufficient. - Elections could increase pressures for higher current spending, ad-hoc policy measures, and supplementary budgets, undermining cash management and expenditure prioritization. - Conversely, successful orderly elections could strengthen donor confidence and improve fiscal conditions. - Fuel pricing: - Domestic fuel pricing volatility remains a key fiscal risk. - Recent fuel pump price adjustment under the new automatic pricing mechanism expected to help mitigate fiscal pressures from higher implicit fuel subsidy costs. - Risk of reversal: renewed international oil price shocks could reverse gains and increase pressures for discretionary fiscal support. - Recommendation: complement fuel price reforms with well-targeted measures to protect the most vulnerable, including leveraging remaining IMF 2023 FSW resources. - Importance of transparent implementation supported by clear communication, stronger regulatory frameworks, and stronger sector institutions to preserve fiscal gains and enhance policy credibility. *International Monetary Fund (excerpt).* ### 26. External policy changes could add social spending pressures through migration. ### 26. External policy changes could add social spending pressures through migration. ### Migration risk and social spending pressures - Although TPS for Haitians in the US has been extended through July 1, 2026, uncertainty remains over its continuity beyond that date. - Expiration of TPS could increase migration flows to Haiti, putting additional pressure on social spending. - The authorities have prepared a phased response plan for such a scenario, though capacity and financing constraints could limit its effectiveness. - The plan has an estimated cost of 0.2 percent of GDP (8.3 billion gourdes). ### Natural disaster-risk financing and liquidity for shocks - Haiti’s exposure to natural disasters underscores the need to institutionalize natural disaster-risk financing. - Participation in the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) provides rapid liquidity after qualifying events. - Following Hurricane Melissa, a USD 1.2 million CCRIF payout highlighted the value of coverage and the need to strengthen post-event processes, including: - timely damage and cost assessments; - clear fund release protocols; - transparent public reporting on the use of funds. - The authorities indicated that the emergency fund stood at about 2.8 billion gourdes (0.05 percent of GDP) in March 2026. - CCRIF and the emergency fund should be better integrated into cash management, while strengthening risk management, transparency and accountability in the use of disaster-related resources. - Financing will need to be supported with other multilateral instruments, including the World Bank’s Contingency Emergency Response Component (CERC). - Between 2012 and 2023 the CERC with International Development Assistance (IDA) financing was activated 7 times in Haiti. ### Debt distress, contingent liabilities, and fiscal risks - The risk of debt distress remains elevated, reflecting Haiti’s very limited buffers and heightened vulnerability to domestic and external shocks. - The overall assessment remains broadly unchanged from the most recent Debt Sustainability Analysis published alongside the second review of the SMP, but the revised baseline—including lower near-term growth and exports—underscores limited buffers. - Risks hinge on explicit public debt dynamics and the containment of contingent liabilities and quasi-fiscal operations. - Temporary monetary financing and subsidy absorption could give rise to implicit debt accumulation via the central bank balance sheet. - While public debt declines as a share of GDP in the near and medium term, it increases in gourdes over the medium term, reflecting financing of reconstruction efforts; the projected reduction in the debt‑to‑GDP ratio is therefore driven primarily by nominal GDP growth, rather than a decline in debt levels. - Policy priorities to mitigate risks: - continued adherence to strict limits on monetary financing; - ensuring that subsidies are transparently budgeted; - rigorous appraisal and transparency requirements for concessions that can give rise to contingent liabilities, including off-budget fiscal exposures; - clear risk-sharing arrangements and limits on government commitments. ### Enhancing governance and transparency - Delivering core governance reforms is critical to strengthening resilience and rebuilding trust in public institutions. - The decree creating the Haute Cour de Justice (High Court of Justice) was adopted on December 1, 2025; current information indicates the mechanism is anchored within the legislature and exercises functions related to prosecution or adjudication of high-level officials. - International experience suggests politically embedded arrangements often face structural weaknesses, including unclear jurisdictional boundaries vis-à-vis the ordinary judiciary and heightened risks of political influence. - The Haute Cour de Justice appears to diverge from the Governance Diagnostic Report (GDR) recommendations, which emphasized: - strengthening the independence, capacity, and integrity of judicial and anti-corruption institutions; - implementing the Anti-Corruption Pole as an ad-hoc mechanism rather than creating new politically anchored structures. - Ensuring operational independence and effective complementarity with the broader justice system will be essential. ### Anti-corruption and accountability framework - Accountability for corruption, organized crime, and money laundering remains limited; preventive anti-corruption measures are weak. - The operationalization of the Anti-Corruption Pole is pending; the Pole was created by decree in April 2025. - For effective functioning the Pole will require: - a clear legal mandate; - appropriate institutional safeguards; - adequate resources to pursue high-risk cases free from interference. - Once constituted and trained, the Pole is expected to bring together officials from the Anti-Corruption Unit, the Central Financial Intelligence Unit (UCREF), the Haitian National Police, prosecutors, and judges, selected through a transparent, participatory, and merit-based process. - The Ministry of Justice and Public Security has appointed magistrates under its authority; the Pole cannot become operational until the High Judicial Council appoints the remaining magistrates. - Donor support and technical assistance (TA) will be critical to operationalize the Pole. - Haiti has not held legislative elections since the 2015–16 cycle, and there has been no functioning Parliament since early 2020; the ongoing electoral process is expected to address these gaps. ### Public financial management and fiscal transparency - Stronger public financial management is essential to improving transparency. - Progress made: fiscal data publication has expanded and reporting on FSW and FAES spending continues (SBs 3 and 6; ¶22). - Remaining weaknesses: - delays in publishing procurement contracts (SB 2); - uneven internal‑audit practices; - incomplete integration of extra‑budgetary accounts into the TSA. - Priority actions: - timely procurement disclosure; - more systematic internal and external audits; - accelerated TSA consolidation; - stronger commitment and payment controls; - reducing unspecified budget allocations; - restoring ex-ante expenditure oversight to improve fiscal transparency and budget execution, including for public investment. ### Monetary and exchange rate frameworks - Consolidating the central bank’s policy framework and credibility is essential, particularly after recent shocks. - The Bank of the Republic of Haiti (BRH) remains committed to preserving price and exchange rate stability under the SMP. - Exchange rate stability has provided a nominal anchor supported by accumulation of international reserves. - In the face of heightened external pressures due to the oil price shock, preserving reserve adequacy while using available buffers prudently will be critical; any use of available buffers must remain temporary, carefully calibrated, and consistent with preserving BRH credibility and the exchange rate as the main anchor. - Foreign exchange conditions have improved: the spread between official and informal market rates narrowed from 7 percent in June 2025 to 2 percent in December 2025, suggesting improved availability of physical foreign exchange cash and better market functioning. - FX interventions should remain focused on preserving exchange rate stability while allowing available reserve buffers to be used prudently and should remain consistent with Haiti’s obligations under Article VIII. - Authorities reported no changes in the FX system since the second review that would give rise to new multiple currency practices, exchange restrictions on payments and transfers for international transactions, or capital flow management measures; they also indicated no immediate plans for revising banks’ net FX open position limits. ### Reserve management reform - The BRH has adopted a new reserve management framework and investment policy, developed with Fund support (TA), aligning reserve management with safety and liquidity objectives. - Implementation is ongoing; effectiveness of decision making could be reinforced further by: - quantifying institutional risk tolerance anchored in balance sheet loss-absorption capacity to guide strategic asset allocation and gradual rebalancing to safer, more liquid instruments; - introducing and enforcing standardized procedures for documenting all security selection decisions to reinforce accountability and create an audit trail; - establishing escalation and remediation procedures for limit breaches. - The transition to the new investment policy is expected to be finalized by May 2027 (new SB 18). ### Inflation, interest rates, and liquidity - Domestic monetary conditions reflect elevated inflation and weak liquidity demand. - The policy rate remained at 13.8 percent throughout FY2025, and together with an inflation rate of 31 percent, resulted in an ex-post real rate of -13.7 percent, compared to -11 percent in 2024 and -7 percent in 2023. - Real narrow money balances declined by 6.5 percent in FY2025 alongside an increase in money velocity, indicating reduced demand for liquidity. ### Financial sector supervision and AML/CFT - The BRH continues regulatory and supervisory reforms to safeguard financial integrity. - Revised regulations on credit risk classification and provisioning—initially expected in November 2025—have been submitted to the Board of Directors for approval. - Progress in risk-based banking supervision includes testing new risk assessment grids and rating matrices on three banks, with two additional assessments underway. - Building on IMF TA, the BRH is operationalizing a new risk-based supervision framework and advancing IT security reforms; adoption of a new IT security framework and governance structure is expected by end June 2026 (SB 13). - Work remains on integrating risk-assessment tools into supervisory architecture and introducing a new chart of accounts for financial institutions; on-site and off-site supervision continues. - AML/CFT priorities: - The National Risk Assessment (NRA) was published in March 2026 with approval from the National Committee for Combating Money Laundering. - Dissemination of NRA findings to financial institutions and designated nonfinancial bodies and professions (DNFBPs) is critical to inform risk-based compliance and supervisory actions. - A draft decree assigning UCREF responsibility for DNFBP supervision is under preparation, alongside training and awareness-raising initiatives for DNFBPs on AML/CFT obligations, including maintaining accurate beneficial ownership information. - Ensuring UCREF is provided with additional human resources will be important for effective DNFBP supervision. - Timely appointment of the UCREF Board by end-May 2026 would enable full implementation of the 2023 decree strengthening UCREF’s governance framework. ### Data adequacy and transparency of the BRH - Progress toward timely and regular publication of the BRH’s audited financial statements has strengthened policy credibility. - The BRH completed and published the FY2023 audit and committed to initiate FY2024 audit without further delay; the BRH committed to publish the FY2024 audit report by mid-2026 (SB 14). - Central bank accounts are being updated in line with FY2023 audit recommendations, leading to recent data corrections in historical monetary data. - Data provision has been broadly consistent for monetary statistics, balance of payments (BOP), and national accounts, but further improvements are required: - BRH has yet to start reporting Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs) to the IMF; - Test data for the Reserves Template have been communicated to the IMF and minor reporting limitations are being resolved; - Economic accounts for FY2025 have been published by the Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d’informatique; - BRH has implemented BPM6 for export and import statistics and revised historical data to address discrepancies with trading partners; - TA is scheduled to support design and implementation of a framework for monitoring and measuring domestic arrears in line with IMF standards. - Further progress needed in aligning FSIs with international standards, strengthening monetary data compilation, minimizing retrospective revisions, and improving reporting timeliness. ### Program issues, SMP extension, and structural benchmarks - Progress under the SMP continues but deteriorating domestic and external conditions are posing increasing challenges: persistent insecurity, higher global oil prices, and heightened political tensions. - Staff support the authorities’ request for a nine-month extension of the SMP through June 19, 2027, to anchor SMP objectives during the political transition and provide a bridge for engagement and policy implementation. - The authorities engage regularly with IMF staff through the high-level SMP Monitoring Committee. - Quotas and targets (QTs) have been adjusted to provide temporary and capped flexibility to manage the global oil shock; pace of accumulation of net international reserves has been increased. - The Letter of Intent reschedules some structural benchmarks (SBs) and introduces five new SBs to consolidate progress on public financial management, governance, and safeguards: - Reschedule SB 8: Launch and implementation of digital tax declarations and payments rescheduled to end-December 2026. - Reschedule SB 12: Interconnection of the Tax Administration System and the Customs Automation System, and publication of a joint communiqué by DGI and AGD, rescheduled to December 2026. - Introduce SB 15 (end December 2026): Publish on the MPEC website a streamlined FY2026/2027 PIP following a review of all Treasury-financed projects with zero execution during the previous two fiscal years; for each project retained, disclose total project cost, cumulative execution to date, and remaining cost to completion. - Introduce SB 16 (end December 2026): Strengthen the Treasury Single Account’s institutional framework by adopting an MEF text describing principles for creation and functioning of the TSA and publishing it on the MEF website. - Introduce SB 17 (end September 2026): Publish on the MEF website a report listing priority national investment projects required over the next three years, ending in FY2028, together with potential financing sources and expected year of completion. - Introduce SB 18 (May 10, 2027): Align the BRH’s reserve management framework with sound governance, safety and liquidity principles by finalizing the transition to the new investment policy, including the new strategic asset allocation, and fully operationalizing related reforms. - Introduce SB 19 (end March 2027): Enhance the transparency of the central bank’s operations by publishing on the BRH’s website the audit report and audited financial statements for FY2025 (ending in September 2025) conducted by an independent international audit firm. *Source: 1htiea2026001 - 26. External policy changes could add social spending pressures through migration.* ### 42. Given the transitional nature of the government, the Article IV consultation is expected ### 1htiea2026001 - 42. Given the transitional nature of the government, the Article IV consultation is expected ### Article IV consultation timing and rationale - The Article IV consultation is expected to take place after a new government is elected and a cabinet is formed. - According to the current electoral timeline, a new government is expected to take office in the first quarter of 2027. - Rationale: sequencing the Article IV consultation to follow formation of a new government would allow for more effective surveillance, stronger traction, and clearer ownership of medium-term policies while recognizing pressing security and humanitarian priorities. - Haiti’s last Article IV Board meeting took place on November 20, 2024. ### Capacity development (CD) linkages to the SMP - CD actively complements and informs the SMP. - CD focus areas: governance, revenue mobilization, budget execution, cash and public investment management, support for the central bank’s governance, operations and financial supervision—including reserve management—and the compilation and dissemination of statistics. - CD informs new SBs for the extension of the SMP. - The IMF will continue supporting the country and authorities through CD, including following up and supporting the implementation of preexisting recommendations from delivered TA. ### Staff appraisal — security, humanitarian, and macro context - Haiti faces severe security and humanitarian challenges amid heightened domestic and geopolitical uncertainty. - The ongoing oil shock is tightening fiscal and external conditions by raising imports and implicit fuel subsidy costs, and fiscal space is narrowing. - The newly deployed GFS could improve security, but any macroeconomic gains are expected to materialize only gradually. ### Program implementation and conditionality - Program implementation has remained broadly encouraging despite increasingly challenging conditions. - End-September ITs were met, except for a negligible revenue shortfall. - End-December targets were met. - Reform momentum has been slower than anticipated—of the eight SBs due at the time of the third review, three have been met. ### External position and reserves - The external position is expected to be broadly balanced. - While remittances remain strong, higher international oil prices and increased imports related to efforts to restore security are projected to widen the import bill, bringing the current account close to balance. - Gross international reserves are expected to remain adequate, and net international reserves to continue increasing, supported by high remittance inflows. ### Fiscal stance and oil shock response - Fiscal policy remains constrained by weak revenues, the oil shock, and weak budget execution. - Authorities’ response to the oil shock—centered on partial fuel price pass-through and complementary expenditure restraint measures—helps contain part of the immediate pressure but does not fully eliminate implicit fuel subsidy costs. - Any resulting use of existing buffers should remain temporary, carefully calibrated, and consistent with SMP objectives. - Preserving a prudent fiscal stance is essential. - Any additional spending, including for security, elections, or humanitarian needs, should be transparently budgeted, carefully prioritized, and managed consistent with macroeconomic stability and the program’s medium-term fiscal framework. ### Domestic revenue mobilization - Stepping up domestic revenue mobilization remains essential to ease fiscal constraints. - Authorities continue preparatory work on tax policy and revenue administration reforms aimed at broadening the tax base, strengthening compliance, and reducing leakages. - Progress has been slow and uneven, and available resources for high priority spending have decreased alongside weak revenues. - Tax administration and customs reforms should reinforce the broader public financial management architecture and preserve transparency, interoperability, and value for money. ### Expenditure control and budget execution - Improving expenditure control and budget execution is essential for timely and effective service delivery. - Reforms and actions recommended: strengthen commitment controls, improve cash planning, accelerate TSA consolidation to ensure budget allocations translate into timely and predictable spending. - Reforms should also focus on improving public investment readiness and implementation discipline. - Public-private partnerships and other long-term contractual arrangements should be subject to transparent and competitive procedures to contain fiscal and governance risks. ### Fiscal risk management and contingency planning - Heightened political, social, and external uncertainty underscores the importance of strong fiscal risk management and contingency planning. - Election-related spending pressures, additional social and security needs, and renewed external shocks could further strain fiscal space. - Transparency and prudency in budgeting and execution will be essential. ### Exchange rate policy and reserve use - Exchange rate stability continues to provide an important nominal anchor for the economy. - Preserving reserve adequacy while using available buffers prudently and temporarily will be critical to managing external pressures, containing broader inflationary effects, and safeguarding central bank credibility. ### BRH reserve management and audits - Fully operationalizing the BRH’s new reserve management framework and investment policy remains an important milestone. - Sustained efforts needed to quantify institutional risk tolerance, strengthen documentation of investment decisions and transactions, and enforce clear procedures for escalation and remediation of limit breaches. - Finalizing the transition to the new investment policy is essential to align reserve management with safety, liquidity, and governance objectives. - The BRH is making progress towards finalizing the financial audit for FY2024, after which work should continue towards the audit for FY2025. - Staff continue to engage with the BRH on implementation of the other 2019-24 safeguards recommendations, primarily in internal controls, financial reporting, and the legal framework. ### Banking supervision - Work on oversight of the commercial banking sector to mitigate financial risks should continue. - Staff welcome progress by the BRH in advancing supervisory reforms and increased efforts to enhance risk assessments, including continued efforts towards on-site and off-site supervision. ### AML/CFT framework - Strengthening the AML/CFT framework remains essential to mitigate risks stemming from corruption, organized crime, and illicit financial flows. - Staff welcome the completion of the NRA in March 2026. - Progress in DNFBP outreach and training is encouraging. - Staff stress the importance of sharing NRA results with financial institutions and DNFBPs, implementing its action plan, finalizing the legal framework for DNFBP supervision, and ensuring that UCREF is adequately resourced. ### Governance, anti‑corruption, and accountability - Governance and anti‑corruption reforms should accelerate to reinforce confidence in public institutions. - Initial steps toward operationalizing the Anti-Corruption Pole have been taken, but accountability outcomes remain limited. - Staff underscore the need to complete outstanding judicial appointments and clarify mandates so that the accountability framework translates into effective enforcement, in line with the GDR’s recommendations. ### Data provision and statistical capacity - Authorities remain committed to improving the quality and timeliness of economic and financial data provision. - The BRH continues to provide IMF staff with its full balance sheet in a standardized format and has made progress in compiling its external sector statistics. - Authorities are working to strengthen assessment of fiscal data, and TA is scheduled in FY2027 to support design and implementation of a framework for monitoring and measuring domestic arrears in line with IMF standards. - Staff encourage further improvements in data compilation, reporting timeliness, and inter-institutional coordination. ### SMP extension request - Staff support the authorities’ request for an extension of the SMP through June 19, 2027. - The extension aims to preserve macroeconomic stability and reform momentum to build a track record of policy implementation, while maintaining engagement. - IMF TA and coordination with Haiti’s development partners, in line with the IMF Strategy for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, continue to be instrumental in supporting the SMP and advancing reforms. *International Monetary Fund — Staff appraisal and program assessment excerpts from the provided content unit.* ### 58. Staff support the completion of the third review of the SMP. Risks to implementation ### 58. Staff support the completion of the third review of the SMP. Risks to implementation ### Risks to implementation - Security environment: Hati’s fragile security environment is a risk to implementation. - Political risks: Political risks could undermine sustained reform momentum. - Institutional capacity constraints: Institutional capacity constraints may limit implementation. - External vulnerabilities: Vulnerabilities to external developments and shocks affecting remittances, global oil prices, trade, and official aid. - Mitigants: Sustained reform momentum will require continued political commitment, enhanced coordination across government agencies, and timely support from development partners to mitigate these risks and safeguard program objectives. ### Timeline for reviews - The fourth review of the SMP is expected to be completed by mid-December-2026. - The fifth review is expected by June 19, 2027 (program end-date). - Schedule of previous and planned reviews (selected): - December 20, 2024 Approval of SMP. - February 1, 2025 First review and assessment of end-December 2024 quantitative targets and continuous quantitative targets. - August 1, 2025 Second review and assessment of end-June 2025 quantitative targets and continuous quantitative targets. - April 1, 2026 Third review and assessment of end-December 2025 quantitative targets and continuous quantitative targets. - October 1, 2026 Fourth review and assessment of end-June 2026 quantitative targets and continuous quantitative targets. - April 1, 2027 Fifth review and assessment of end-December 2026 quantitative targets and continuous quantitative targets. ### Program performance and quantitative targets (high-level findings) - Net international reserves (NIR) of the central bank (floor) — multiple periodic targets listed in Table 1a were met: - Examples from Table 1a: adjusted target 60 / actual 60 / status Met; adjusted target 80 / actual 377 / status Met; adjusted target 100 / actual 565 / status Met; adjusted target 120 / actual 687 / status Met. - Primary balance of the nonfinancial public sector (NFPS, in millions of gourdes) — floor targets reported as Met across multiple reporting dates in Table 1a (e.g., adjusted target 9,020 / status Met). - Net central bank credit to the nonfinancial public sector (in millions of gourdes) — ceiling targets met across reporting dates (examples show totals reported as Met). - Budget allocations for social expenditure (in millions of gourdes) — floor targets met across reporting dates (examples: 11,000 target / 11,951 actual / Met; 39,619 target / 52,048 actual / Met). - Continuous quantitative targets: accumulation of domestic arrears by the central government (ceiling) — 0 / Met; accumulation of external arrears by the public sector (ceiling) — 0 / Met; contracting or guaranteeing by the public sector of new nonconcessional external debt (ceiling) — 0 / Met. - Indicative target: central government fiscal revenue, excluding grants (in millions of gourdes) — examples: target 40,000 / actual 48,151 / Met; target 200,000 / actual 199,918 / Not Met. ### Structural benchmarks and governance reforms (selected) - Governance, including Public Financial Management: - Publish report on the Governance Diagnostic Assessment and associated action plan on MEF website — Target date End February 2025 — Status Met. - Publish monthly public procurement contracts (including beneficial ownership information) on CNMP and MEF websites — Monthly starting from December 2024 — Status Not Met. - Publish monthly reports on execution of fiscal expenditure through Haiti Food Shock Window account — Monthly starting from December 2024 — Status Met. - Conduct and report quarterly internal expenditure audits of ministries involved in the Haiti Food Shock Window — Quarterly starting from end December 2024 — Status Met. - CSCCA financial and operational compliance audit of Rapid Credit Facility Food Shock Window expenditures for fiscal years 2022-23, 2023-24 and 2024-25 — Target date End March 2026 — Status Not met. - Publish quarterly reports on the Economic and Social Assistance Fund (FAES) operations and financial status — Quarterly starting from end December 2024 — Status Not met. - Interconnection protocol between DGI and AGD for IT systems — Target date End June 2025 — Status Met. - Interconnect Tax Administration System and customs automation system (SYDONIA) and publish commitments — Target date End December 2026 (Rescheduled from March 2026) — Status Not met. - Launch digitalization of tax declarations and payments through all commercial banks for large taxpayers registered at the DGI — End December 2026 (Rescheduled from March 2026) — Status Not met. - Governance and safeguards (central bank): - Publish BRH audit report and audited financial statements for FY2023 on BRH website — End August 2025 — Status Met. - BRH Board approval of reserve management items (medium-term plan, strategic asset allocation, updated investment policy and guidelines) — End September 2025 — Status Met. - Provide BRH full balance sheet to IMF staff in SRF-1SR format with two-month lag — Monthly periodicity starting to be provided by end February 2025 — Status Met. - Adopt framework to strengthen BRH bank-wide IT security and business continuity arrangements — End June 2026 (status listed). - Publish BRH audit report and audited financial statements for FY2024 — End June 2026 (status listed). - Finalize BRH transition to new investment policy and fully operationalize related reforms — 10-May-27 (proposed for extension). - Publish BRH audited financial statements for FY2025 — End March 2027 (proposed for extension). ### Key macroeconomic developments and projections (selected) - National aggregates (Table 3): - Nominal GDP (2025): US$32.1 billion - GDP per capita (2025): US$2,556 - Population (2025, est.): 11.9 million - Percent of population below poverty line (2021): 52.3 - Real sector: - Real GDP has contracted continuously since 2019 (fiscal year basis runs from October 1 to September 30). - FY2025 GDP at constant prices: multiple entries across tables; Table 3 shows GDP growth rates: FY2022 -1.7; FY2023 -1.9; FY2024 -4.2; FY2025 0.5 (Prog./Est. entries vary). - Output gap continues to widen amid high unemployment; inflation shows signs of easing but remains high. - Fiscal sector (selected): - Tax revenues remain extremely low. - Spending showed a mild recovery in FY2025, partly reflecting higher social spending. - Fiscal position strengthened following the 2023 fuel subsidy reform. - Monetary financing of the fiscal deficit remained at zero. - Government debt remains low after the sharp decline from the debt restructuring with Venezuela in 2024. - Central government balance including grants (Table 4a): FY2025 revised budget and program entries show deficits (examples: Central government balance incl. grants -13,928 (FY2025 Est.) and projections for FY2026 onward). - Monetary and financial sector (selected): - BRH financing of the fiscal deficit has been under control since FY2025, with net domestic assets declining. - Private sector credit continues to decline due to deterioration of security conditions; loan dollarization has been persistently increasing. - FX deposits have remained broadly stable. - Market rates have, on average, remained below inflation. - Structural liquidity in the banking system remains high but has shown a modest decline. - External sector (selected): - Import dynamics have reduced trade deficits even as exports have declined. - Remittances in 2025 reached historical highs. - Foreign direct investment ceased in recent years. - Current transfers have been weak, although some pick up were observed in 2025. - The REER has greatly appreciated during 2023-26 while net international reserves kept increasing. ### External vulnerabilities and scenario analysis - Table 7: External Financing Requirements and Sources — baseline and adverse scenarios: - Adverse scenario assumes shocks: (a) international oil price increasing by 100 percent in the second quarter of 2026 and remain at that level in FY2027; (b) food commodity prices increasing by 5 percent in FY2026 and by 10 percent in FY2027; (c) a 10 percent decline in exports due to changes in major trading partners’ policies; and (d) a 10 percent decline in net remittances in FY2026 and in FY2027. - Table 7 reports historical and projected requirements and sources; gross reserve losses in USD reported as 589 and 1,059 for selected periods. ### Financial sector soundness (selected indicators, Table 8) - Asset and deposit volumes (in US$ millions): - Asset volume: Sep-23 4,718; Dec-25 5,551. - Deposit volume: Sep-23 3,849; Dec-25 4,531. - Capital adequacy: - Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets: Sep-23 20.4; Dec-25 26.2. - Regulatory capital to assets: Sep-23 7.0; Dec-25 8.4. - Asset quality: - NPLs to gross loans: Sep-23 8.5; Dec-25 8.8 (with higher intermediate values reported). - Provisions to gross NPLs: Sep-23 79.4; Dec-25 101.9. - Profitability: - Return on assets (ROA): Sep-23 1.4; Dec-25 1.7. - Return on equity (ROE): Sep-23 15.0; Dec-25 15.4. - Dollarization: - Foreign currency loans to total loans (net): Sep-23 54.1; Dec-25 61.2. - Foreign currency deposits to total deposits: Sep-23 68.7; Dec-25 64.0. *Source: IMF staff report and accompanying tables and figures contained in the content unit.* ### Annex I. Estimate of the Economic Impact of Hurricane Melissa ### Annex I. Estimate of the Economic Impact of Hurricane Melissa ### Overview - Hurricane Melissa struck Haiti in October 2025, affecting mostly the southern departments—Sud, Grand’Anse, Nippes, and Sud-Est—which together are estimated to account for about 15 percent of GDP. - Drawing on the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) for Hurricane Matthew in 2016, estimates indicate: - Real GDP growth is estimated to decline by around 0.2-0.4 percentage points in FY2025/26. - Annual headline inflation is estimated to rise by 0.3-0.7 percentage points. - Total economic losses and damages are projected to range between 2-5 percent of GDP, largely reflecting disruptions to agriculture and basic infrastructure. - These calculations do not replace a formal damage assessment. ### Methodology and Key Assumptions (Box 1 calculation) - Scaling Hurricane Melissa to Hurricane Matthew (2016) impacts using scaling factors for damages and losses: - Damages calculation: (0.10 to 0.20) × 15% = 1.5−3.0 % of GDP. - Losses calculation: (0.15 to 0.30) × 6.9% = 1.1−2.1% of GDP. - GDP growth impact: (0.15 to 0.30) × −1.3 p.p = −0.2 to −0.4 p.p. - Inflation impact: 1 × 0.43 × (0.8 to 1.7) ≅ 0.3−0.7 percent. - Definitions and parameters: - Damage: partial or complete destruction of physical assets. - Loss: change in economic flows over a specific period (lost revenues and increased operating costs); only the loss component affects annual real GDP growth. - 푠푓_D, 푠푓_L: scaling factor for damages and losses, respectively. - 푝푑 and 푝푙: physical damages and production losses, respectively. - 휙: the pass-through from food inflation to headline inflation (≈1). - 휀: price elasticity of food CPI to agricultural losses and damages (≈ 0.43, based on Hurricane Matthew). - 푝푑푙_Agriculture_Melissa: agricultural losses and damages. ### Impact on Output — Damages and Losses - Historical comparator (Hurricane Matthew, 2016): - Matthew caused total damage and losses equivalent to roughly 22 percent of GDP, including the destruction of 32 percent of national agricultural output and a 1.3 percentage point decline in real GDP in FY2016/17. - According to the 2016 PDNA, Matthew caused total damages equivalent to about 15 percent of GDP and production losses of 6.9 percent of GDP. - Estimated impact of Hurricane Melissa (2025, proportional to Matthew): - Total damages + losses: ≈ 2 – 5 percent of GDP. - Damages (capital stock): 1.5 – 3.0 percent of GDP (housing + infrastructure). - Losses (flow output): 1.1 – 2.1 percent of GDP (agriculture, trade, service disruptions). - Agriculture losses and damages: ≈ 0.8 - 1.7 percent of GDP (10 – 20 percent of Matthew’s damages, 15–30 percent of losses). ### Impact on Growth — Real GDP - Matthew: −1.3 pp (FY2017). - Melissa (FY2025/26, estimated): −0.2 to −0.4 pp. - Rationale: Melissa is parameterized as approximately 15 – 30 percent of Matthew’s economic impact on GDP. ### Impact on Inflation - Matthew food-driven inflation impact: +3 pp. - Melissa estimated annual headline inflation increase: +0.3 to +0.7 pp. - Approach: calibrating a semi-elasticity between agricultural output loss and CPI inflation; Haiti’s inflation is largely food-driven since food dominates the consumption basket. Elasticity used ≈ 0.43. ### Impact on External Sector - Overall effect on the FY2026 current account balance is expected to be limited. - Several foreign governments and international organizations pledged support for recovery; such assistance will likely increase imports but would be recorded as a secondary income credit for the Haitian government, offsetting import-related increases in the trade deficit. - The hurricane caused severe damage to autumn crops across the Grand Sud and parts of Ouest and Artibonite, and to transportation infrastructure in affected areas. - Food products account for less than 5 percent of Haiti’s exports (about 0.1 percent of GDP), limiting export-side effects. ### Impact on Fiscal Sector - Expected fiscal pressures: - Downward pressure on the fiscal balance from disruptions to domestic revenue (agriculture, trade, transport) in southern departments. - Potential increases in budgetary demands for humanitarian relief and infrastructure repair over time. - Available fiscal data so far show no clear evidence of hurricane-related revenue shortfalls or disaster-related spending pressures. - Initial response appears to have relied largely on external support. - An emergency fund of about 2.8 billion gourdes (0.05 percent of GDP) is available but was not employed. ### Comparative Indicators (selected figures from Annex I Table 1) - Hurricane intensity upon reaching Haiti: - Matthew (2016): Category 4 (wind ≈ 230 km/h). - Melissa (2025, est.): Tropical Storm–Cat 1 (wind ≈ 60–70 km/h). - Rainfall (mm/24hours): - Matthew: 400 – 900. - Melissa: 150 – 450. - Population share in affected region: - Matthew: 20. - Melissa: 20 (note: Approx.15 percent of GDP located in affected region). - Estimated recovery time: - Matthew: > 18 months. - Melissa: 3 – 9 months (TBD). *Source: Annex I. Estimate of the Economic Impact of Hurricane Melissa (IMF staff calculations drawing on Haiti Post-Disaster Needs Assessment and related analysis).* ### Annex IV. Risk Assessment Matrix ### Annex IV. Risk Assessment Matrix ### Global Risks — Major Findings and Impacts - Commodity price volatility - Relative Likelihood: High - Impact Horizon: ST/MT - Impact: Intensifying external and fiscal pressures, social unrest, and macroeconomic instability. - Policy Response: - Protect the vulnerable through targeted fiscal measures. - Continue the fuel subsidy reform to ensure long-term fiscal sustainability. - Persistent inflationary pressures - Relative Likelihood: High ST/MT - Impact: Eroding real incomes. Worsening fiscal and external balances. - Policy Response: - Protect the vulnerable through targeted fiscal measures. - Social discontent (high living costs, youth unemployment, inequality) - Relative Likelihood: Medium - Impact: Triggers social unrest, political repression, instability; limits capacity for reforms. - Policy Response: - Protect the vulnerable through targeted fiscal measures. - Monitor financial risks closely and strengthen banking supervision. - Geopolitical tensions and intensification of conflicts - Relative Likelihood: High - Impact Horizon: High ST/MT - Impacts: - Reversal of migration policies lowering remittances. - Worsening fiscal and external balances. - Reduced exports, FDI, and supply chain integration, especially in textiles/agriculture. - Higher input costs and inflation, worsening cost-of-living crisis. - Policy Response: - Protect the vulnerable through targeted fiscal measures. - Expand targeted cash transfers or food assistance using existing delivery systems. - Monitor financial risks closely and strengthen banking supervision. - Work with banks and money transfer operators to keep remittance flows affordable and accessible. - Fiscal vulnerabilities and higher interest rates - Relative Likelihood: High - Impact Horizon: Medium ST/MT - Impacts: - Higher public debt and deficit levels put upward pressure on long-term interest rates. - Tightening global financial conditions, currency volatility, reduced consumption and investment. - Capital outflows could strengthen the U.S. dollar, pressure Haiti’s exchange rate and external balance, increase imported inflation, and weaken remittance and aid flows. - Policy Response: - Preserve macroeconomic stability through prudent monetary policy. - Prioritize concessional financing and donor coordination. - Strengthen domestic revenue mobilization. - Safeguard financial sector stability to prevent spillovers. - Protectionism and trade disruptions - Relative Likelihood: High - Impact Horizon: High ST/MT - Impacts: - Reduced exports, FDI, and supply chain integration, especially in textiles/agriculture. - Higher input costs and inflation. - Policy Response: - Engage actively with US policymakers and industry stakeholders for longer extension of HOPE/HELP access for textiles. - Simplify customs procedures, reduce port delays, and provide basic support services for exporters. - Cyberthreats - Relative Likelihood: High - Impact Horizon: High ST/MT - Impacts: - Loss of reserves and deposits held by central bank, commercial banks, businesses, and households. - Loss of critical data. - Policy Response: - Establish clear protocols for cyber incident prevention, detection, and response, involving government, private sector, and international partners. - Climate change - Relative Likelihood: Medium - Impact Horizon: High MT/LT - Impact: Lower long-term growth and FDI inflows. - Policy Response: - Seek donor financing to build ex-ante structural and financial resilience and enhance post-disaster response. - New trade agreements (positive risk) - Relative Likelihood: Low - Impact Horizon: High MT/LT - Impacts: Sustain and diversify exports, enhance employment, improve external stability. - Policy Response: - Enhance international communication to increase the chance of new trade agreements. - Policy uncertainty - Relative Likelihood: High - Impact Horizon: High ST/LT - Impacts: - Weaker external demand, remittance volatility, less predictable donor financing; tighter FX conditions and slower domestic consumption. - Policy Response: - Safeguard central bank independence. - Protect priority social spending. - Strengthen donor coordination. - Labor shortages and remittances - Relative Likelihood: High - Impact Horizon: High ST/LT - Impacts: - Reduce remittance inflows, weakening household consumption, widening external deficit, increasing exchange rate pressures. - Policy Response: - Safeguard remittance channels by improving payment systems. - Accelerate domestic revenue mobilization and labor market reforms. ### Domestic Risks — Major Findings and Impacts - Political instability and worsening insecurity - Relative Likelihood: High - Impact Horizon: High ST/MT - Impacts: - Further displacements, restrictions on movement, supply chain disruption (including fuel shortages), lower FDI inflows, and long-term growth losses. - Policy Response: - Coordinate closely with development partners and intensify requests for international support to enhance security. - Prioritize government spending, ensure sound financial institutions, strengthen governance (including AML/CFT), and publish timely and accurate data. - Natural disasters (hurricanes, heavy rains, earthquakes, droughts) - Relative Likelihood: High - Impact Horizon: High ST/MT - Impacts: Disruption in economic activity, lower FDI inflows and long-term growth, added fiscal pressure. - Policy Response: - Put in place contingency plans (e.g., insurance through CCRIF). - Seek donor financing to build structural resilience and enhance post-disaster response. - Infectious diseases (cholera, tuberculosis) - Relative Likelihood: High - Impact Horizon: High ST/MT - Impacts: Disruption of economic activities, lower long-term growth, increased pressure on public health system and fiscal spending. - Policy Response: - Increase health spending targeted at infectious diseases. - Seek international donor support for building resilience and addressing emergencies. - Service/infrastructure collapse - Relative Likelihood: High - Impact Horizon: High ST/MT - Impacts: Intensified humanitarian needs, disease outbreaks, deepened food insecurity, displacement, and social instability. - Policy Response: - Prioritize protection and rapid repair of critical health, water, and education infrastructure, especially in high-risk and accessible areas. - Seek urgent donor funding and technical support for emergency repairs and basic service delivery. ### Annex V — Adverse Scenario: Assumptions - External shocks assumed in the adverse scenario: - International oil prices increasing by 100 percent in the second quarter of 2026 and remain at that level in FY2027. - Food commodity prices increasing by 5 percent in FY2026 and 10 percent in FY2027. - Changes in major trading partners’ policies leading to a 10 percent decline in goods exports in FY2026 and FY2027. - Net remittances declining by 10% due to intensified deportations of undocumented Haitian immigrants from the US in FY2026 and FY2027. - Note: The scenario assumes that upside risks of improved security gains due to the deployment of the Gang Suppression Force do not materialize in FY2026. ### Annex V — Results (Quantified Impacts) - Real GDP growth - Adverse scenario: –2.6 percent in FY2026 and –0.6 percent in FY2027. - These are about 0.9 and 1.1 percentage points below the baseline, respectively. - Current Account (CA) - FY2026: CA turns into deficit of 1.8 percent of GDP from surplus of 0.2 percent of GDP. - FY2027: CA deficit widens from 0.5 to 3.8 percent of GDP. - Fiscal pressures from fuel subsidies - Additional fiscal cost of about 0.7 percent of GDP in FY2026 and about 2.0 percent of GDP in FY2027 if domestic pump prices were not adjusted in line with the oil shock. - Current projections are characterized as an upper boundary of the potential subsidy burden. - Tabled combined impacts (selected figures, in percent of GDP as presented) - Exports baseline: 14.0 (FY2026), 12.8 (FY2027); + shock: +0.8 (FY2026), +2.3 (FY2027) [table context indicates adjustments across import/export breakdowns]. - Imports of fuels baseline: 3.0 (FY2026), 2.6 (FY2027); + shock: +0.7 (FY2026), +2.0 (FY2027). - Imports of foods baseline: 4.1 (FY2026), 3.8 (FY2027); + shock: +0.3 (FY2026), 0.4 (FY2027). - Imports of other goods baseline: 5.6 (FY2026), 5.3 (FY2027); + shock: -0.2 (FY2026), -0.1 (FY2027). - Remittances (net) baseline: 1.9 (FY2026), 1.6 (FY2027); + shock: -0.2 (FY2026), -0.1 (FY2027). - Aggregate baseline: 11.2 (FY2026), 10.2 (FY2027); + shock: -1.0 (FY2026), -0.9 (FY2027). - Change in current account (illustrative): Baseline 0.2 (FY2026), -0.5 (FY2027); + shock: -2.0 (FY2026), -3.3 (FY2027). - Breakdown of CA shock contributions (FY2026 / FY2027): - Imports (fuels): -0.7 / -2.0 - Imports (foods): -0.3 / -0.4 - Imports (other): +0.2 / +0.1 - Exports: -0.2 / -0.1 - Remittances (net): -1.0 / -0.9 - Fuel Subsidies contribution to fiscal expense: +0.7 (FY2026), +2.0 (FY2027). - Sources for these figures: Ministry of Finance and Economy, Bank of the Republic of Haiti and Fund staff estimates and projections. ### Annex V — Contingency Policy Discussion and Recommendations - Priorities in event of adverse shocks: - Prioritize macroeconomic stability and expenditure reprioritization. - Consider further adjustments of domestic fuel prices to contain fiscal risks and reduce implicit fuel subsidy costs, while noting such adjustments increase cost-of-living pressures for vulnerable households. - Use existing buffers—including the remaining resources under the FSW—to help safeguard priority social spending if deployed. - Secure additional official grant financing and domestic financing on market terms, with increasing reliance on longer maturity instruments. - Maintain a clearer and more predictable domestic fuel pricing framework to allow pass-through of higher international oil prices. ### Key Program and Macroeconomic Statistics (from Letter of Intent and context) - SMP approved: December 2024 (Staff-Monitored Program). - Food Shock Window of the Rapid Credit Facility financing: SDR 81.9 million (50 percent of Haiti’s quota). - Net international reserves: USD 1.77 billion (as of end January 2026). - Gross international reserves: exceeding seven months of prospective imports (as of end January 2026). - Fuel import bill projected to reach about USD1.2 billion in FY2025-26. - As of end-September 2025: all indicative targets met except fiscal revenue target missed by a very narrow margin. - As of end-December 2025: all quantitative targets met. - Monetary financing of the fiscal deficit: kept at zero through December (year implied is 2025). *Source: Annex IV. Risk Assessment Matrix and Annex V. Adverse Scenario and Sensitivity Analysis (selection) from the provided IMF content unit.* ### 6. We have continued to make progress on the structural reform agenda since the second ### 1htiea2026001 - 6. We have continued to make progress on the structural reform agenda since the second ### Structural reform progress and outstanding benchmarks - Fiscal transparency strengthened through continued publication of monthly Food Shock Window (FSW) execution reports and quarterly FAES updates (Structural Benchmark, SB 3 and 6). - Internal FSW expenditure audits (SB4) were conducted and completed. - CSCCA’s financial and operational compliance audit for FY2023–24 were delivered, albeit with delays (SB5). - Slower implementation: - Digitalization of large taxpayer declarations could not be completed by the end-March 2026 deadline (SB8). - Regular publication of procurement information (SB2) remains hampered by inter-institutional coordination. - FSW execution status: - 1.5 billion gourdes (9.8 percent of the allocation) remaining to be executed during the fiscal year, as of February. - Structural benchmark assessment (three of eight SBs met at third review); specifics: - SB2 (procurement publication): publication lagging since October 2025 (continuous, not met). - SB3 (FSW monthly execution reports): met (continuous). - SB4 (quarterly internal expenditure audit for FSW): met (continuous). - SB5 (CSCCA audit FY2022–23 and FY2023–24): FY2022–23 and FY2023–2024 audits published with delay (SB5—end March 2025, not met, implemented with delay); FY2024–2025 audit delayed (SB5 modified—end-March 2026, not met). - SB6 (quarterly FAES reports): continue to be published on MEF website (SB6—continuous, not met). - SB8 (digitalization of tax declarations/payments for large taxpayers): not implemented due to operational constraints (SB8 modified—end-March 2026, not met). - SB11 (BRH full balance sheet to IMF staff): met (continuous). - SB12 (interconnection of tax and customs systems): not completed on time (SB12—end-March 2026, not met); preparatory work ongoing. - Ongoing targets: SB13 (bank-wide IT security and business continuity framework—end-June 2026 target), SB14 (BRH audit and financial statements for FY2024—end-June 2026 target); progress ongoing but affected by external audit timelines. ### Bank of the Republic of Haiti (BRH) governance and safeguards - Board approved a revised reserve management framework (SB10) including new strategic asset allocation, updated investment policy, and strengthened investment guidelines. - Implementation actions under way: - Quantifying risk tolerance and defining escalation procedures for non-compliance. - Strengthening documentation of investment decisions and transactions. - Updating investment guidelines to reflect applicability to internal managers. - BRH delivered the audit report and financial statements for FY2023 (SB9). - Ongoing efforts to follow up on audit recommendations and complete/publish FY2024 audit report and financial statements (SB14). - Advancing framework and governance to strengthen bank-wide IT security and business continuity (SB13). - BRH has consistently provided full balance sheet data to IMF staff on a monthly basis (SB11). ### Request to extend the Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) - Government requests extension of the SMP through June 19, 2027 to: - Maintain a credible macroeconomic and institutional anchor during fragile security and political transition. - Consolidate recent progress and complete outstanding reforms. - Continue strengthening institutions and governance while safeguarding priority social spending. - Anchor policies to reinforce Haiti’s implementation record ahead of a potential Upper Credit Tranche arrangement with the IMF. - MEFP attached describes developments and policy/reform commitments for the extension; any policy revisions will be consulted with IMF staff and data/information will be provided timely per the TMU. ### Macroeconomic developments and outlook - Political and security backdrop: - Transitional Presidential Council (CPT) mandate expired on February 7, 2026. - Gang Suppression Force arrival beginning April 2026 with international community support. - Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) adopted electoral law on December 1, 2025; party registration completed in March; proposed calendar envisages elections by end of 2026. - Economic outlook FY2025–26: - Real GDP expected to contract in FY2025–26 for an eighth consecutive year. - Inflation expected to remain elevated at about 22 percent in FY2025–26. - Domestic revenues projected at 222.8 billion gourdes (4.3 percent of GDP) in FY2025–26, down from 4.8 percent of GDP in FY2024–25. - Nonperforming loans declined from 14.2 percent to 8.8 percent between June and December 2025. - Capital adequacy ratio increased from 22.3 percent to 26.2 percent between June and December 2025. - Net international reserves reached USD 1.76 billion in December 2025. - External position and global shocks: - HOPE/HELP preferential trade agreement retroactively and temporarily extended through December 2026 from lapse on September 30, 2025, but February 20, 2026 U.S. decision to impose a universal 10 percent tariff effectively eliminated preferential treatment for apparel in U.S. market. - Exports of goods now expected to reach 1.7 percent of GDP in FY2025–26 (compared to 1.5 percent projected at second review). - Current account for FY2025–26 projected at 0.2 percent of GDP, supported by strong remittance inflows; remittances subject to uncertainty. - Apparel and textile industry accounted for about 90 percent of Haiti’s goods exports during 2023–25. - Higher international oil prices significantly increase import fuel bill, raising fiscal and inflationary pressures. ### Risks and scenarios - Downside risks: - Continued insecurity and delayed electoral progress could slow recovery. - Persistently high oil prices could further increase fuel and food import costs and intensify pressures on inflation, fiscal position, and external balance. - Tighter migration policies and uncertainty over HOPE/HELP renewal (expires December 31, 2026) could undermine investment and apparel production. - Fiscal space constrained by weak revenue mobilization, rising social and infrastructure spending needs, and higher fuel-related fiscal pressures. - Upside potential: - Faster-than-expected easing of global oil prices could alleviate fuel-related external and fiscal pressures. ### Results under the Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) - Overall performance since the Second Review broadly steady despite challenging environment. - Targets and performance: - End-September indicative targets: all met except the domestic revenue target, missed by a very narrow margin. - Net international reserve accumulation met by a large margin, supported by remittance inflows. - Ceiling on net central bank credit to the non-financial public sector (NFPS): met. - Primary balance target for NFPS: met. - Floor for budget allocations for social expenditures: met. - Continuous targets met: non-accumulation of domestic and external arrears; non-contracting or guaranteeing by the public sector of non-concessional external debt. - Domestic revenue target missed narrowly due to structural weaknesses, security disruptions, administrative capacity constraints, and implementation delays after DGI–AGD interconnection protocol signing in June. - End-December quantitative targets: all met as of end-December 2025. - Primary balance target: met. - Ceiling on monetary financing: met. - Reserve accumulation remained strong; gross reserve coverage strong. - Government accumulated no domestic or external arrears and did not contract non-concessional debt through end-December. - Structural benchmarks at third review: three of eight met. ### Fiscal policy and revenue mobilization priorities - FY2025-26 budget (adopted October 2025) aims to align with SMP stabilization goals: strengthen domestic revenue mobilization (QT), improve investment execution, and safeguard critical social spending (QT). - Implementation challenges in first five months (October 2025—February 2026): - Weaker-than-anticipated revenues and continued expenditure pressures. - Sharp international oil price increase created additional fiscal pressure via higher fuel subsidy costs and weaker fuel-tax collection absent full price pass-through. - Need to recalibrate revenue and expenditure paths and review potential supplementary budget to realign appropriations with updated macro conditions while protecting priority social spending and preserving fiscal stability; any supplementary budget to remain consistent with SMP objectives. - Revenue mobilization measures and commitments: - Signing and publication of DGI–AGD administrative and technical cooperation protocol to support interconnection of information systems (SB7, June 2025). - Commitments and scheduled actions: - Complete digitalization of tax declaration and payment for large taxpayers through all commercial banks (SB8, rescheduled to end-December 2026, not met). - Restructure DGI information systems; migrate core tax applications and data to MEF cloud and accelerate transition from TAX SOLUTION to Revenue Management System (RMS), overseen by ad hoc commission (January 2026). - Operationalize interconnection between Tax Administration System and SYDONIA customs automation; publish MEF joint communiqué confirming operationalization and commitments to a report and aggregated analysis by end-December 2026 (SB12, rescheduled to end-December 2026, not met). - Make new tax code effective by October 2026, following further consultations on personal income tax reforms and implementation measures. - Operationalize AGD reform during first half of FY2025–26 to strengthen governance, integrity, human capacity, technology, border security and coordination. - Strengthen customs administration and border management consistent with SMP structural reform agenda and timely information sharing with IMF staff. *Source: Attachment I. Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies and accompanying SMP letter and summary (IMF).* ### 10. Against this backdrop, the Government will continue to strengthen budget ### 10. Against this backdrop, the Government will continue to strengthen budget execution, focusing on a limited set of high-impact actions ### Budget execution, Public Investment Program (PIP), and Treasury Single Account (TSA) - Publish a streamlined FY2026–27 Public Investment Program (PIP) on the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPEC) website after reviewing all Treasury-financed projects with zero execution during the previous two fiscal years; for each retained project disclose: total project cost, cumulative execution to date, and remaining cost to completion (SB 15, new SB, end December 2026). - Strengthen the TSA institutional framework by adopting a Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) text describing the principles for the creation and functioning of the TSA and publishing it on the MEF website (SB 16, new SB, end December 2026). - Publish on the MEF website a report listing priority national investment projects required over the next three years, ending in FY2028, together with potential financing sources and the expected year of completion (SB 17, new SB, end September 2026). ### Social safety nets and social spending - Expand and strengthen social safety nets to alleviate widespread poverty; SIMAST (Social Registry) currently reaches about one-third of the population. - Continue vulnerability assessments to improve beneficiary targeting and scale up key social programs: cash transfers, food rations, and school feeding; hot meals provided through community restaurants; measures to eliminate selected school fees are advancing. - Execute the remaining balance of about 1.5 billion gourdes under the IMF Food Shock Window (FSW) in FY2024-25 fully in FY2025–26 through accelerated food assistance implementation. - Hurricane Melissa response: issued approximately 3.5 million SMS alerts and provided anticipatory e-money transfers of USD 100 per household to about 47,000 beneficiaries. - Continue expansion and improvement of SIMAST to support more effective shock-responsive social protection; execution and targeting of social expenditure by MAST, MENFP, MSPP, and MARNDR will be closely monitored (QT). ### Fuel subsidy reform and petroleum sector - Government committed to gradual fuel subsidy reform to support fiscal sustainability; higher international oil prices projected to raise the fuel import bill to about USD 1.2 billion in FY2025-26. - Decree adopted on March 27, 2026, establishing a rules-based fuel price adjustment mechanism: - Monthly process for calculating and publishing nationwide pump prices based on a defined price structure. - Smoothing mechanism to limit month-to-month volatility. - Pump prices adjust automatically when deviations exceed a threshold of 3 percent; larger monthly adjustments capped at 10 percent and subject to government decision after advisory council consultation. - First adjustment implemented on April 1, 2026; effective April 2, 2026 pump prices: - HTG 725 per gallon for gasoline (increase of 29.5 percent), - HTG 850 for gasoil (increase of 37.1 percent), - HTG 845 for kerosene (increase of 37.4 percent). - Continue protecting most vulnerable households through targeted social support and monitoring social impact; work ongoing to establish regulatory framework for petroleum products sector and strengthen regulatory institutions with targeted communications. ### Disaster risk management and insurance (CCRIF) - Strengthen capacity for rapid response, financial preparedness, and targeted insurance coverage; Hurricane Melissa highlighted need to reform emergency fund (Fonds d’Urgence) allocation, monitoring, and execution. - Institutionalize payment of premia for coverage under the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) by leveraging Public Treasury resources and partner support (e.g., Caribbean Development Bank). - Commit to sustained payment of CCRIF premia and mobilize additional partner support to secure predictable financing and strengthen long-term disaster-risk-management capacity. ### Monetary policy, exchange rate, and reserves management - Monetary policy to focus on preserving price and exchange rate stability; BRH will manage oil price shock impacts while maintaining a prudent monetary stance and preserving reserve adequacy. - BRH committed to maintaining net credit to the NFPS within program targets to support macro stability and key nominal anchors. - BRH accumulated USD 725.8 million in net foreign exchange purchases between end-September 2024 and January 2026. - Gross international reserves (GIR) reached USD 3.4 billion in January 2026. - Net international reserves (NIR) as defined in the program’s TMU reached USD 1.77 billion in January 2026 and amply exceeded the program’s end-September target (QT). - Over the medium term, as security stabilizes, exchange rate interventions will aim to reduce excessive volatility; BRH to explore improvements to the FX allocation mechanism and publish international reserves template monthly (TA-supported). ### Reserve-management framework, governance, and safeguards - BRH aligning reserve-management and investment policy with safety and liquidity objectives; framework includes: - Quantifying institutional risk tolerance to guide strategic asset allocation and gradual rebalancing toward safer, more liquid instruments. - Implementing standardized procedures for documenting security-selection decisions to reinforce accountability and governance. - Updating investment guidelines for internal portfolio managers, clarifying delegation and escalation procedures. - Implementation of transition strategy expected by May 10, 2027 (SB18, new SB, May 10, 2027). - Safeguards and governance actions: - Finalize audit report and financial statements for fiscal year 2024 (SB14, end-June 2026). - Adopt framework and governance to strengthen bank-wide IT security and business continuity arrangements (SB13, end-June 2026), including data center work. - Prepare and publish audit and financial statements for fiscal year 2025 by end-March 2027 (SB19, new SB, end-March 2027). - Develop medium-term plan to phase out BRH development finance activities. ### Financial supervision and AML/CFT - Strengthen regulatory and supervisory framework and systemic-risk-prevention capabilities: - Revised regulation on credit-risk classification and provisioning published February 12, 2026; fully effective October 1, 2026. - Implementing a risk-based supervision framework with new risk-assessment grids and rating matrices (testing across several banks); plan to integrate grid into banking-supervision software after testing. - On-site and off-site supervision continues; revise net open position limits pending more stable macroeconomic environment. - AML/CFT: - National Risk Assessment (NRA) submitted to CNLBA in December 2025 and published on March 11, 2026; covers period 2019–24. - NRA guides reinforcement of national AML/CFT framework, mapping sector-specific vulnerabilities and prioritizing mitigation and supervision. - Preparations to strengthen UCREF governance and supervisory role; appointment of UCREF Board members expected by May 2026 to enable full implementation of the 2023 decree. - Authorities progressing toward assigning UCREF responsibility for supervising DNFBPs, with targeted outreach and training; FY2026-2027 budget to allocate adequate resources to UCREF. ### Governance, transparency, accountability, and social spending safeguards - Institutional reforms to strengthen accountability proceeding, but implementation challenges remain: - Operationalization of the Anti-Corruption Pole (decree April 2025) still pending; MJSP appointed magistrates under its authority; CSPJ completing remaining judicial appointments. - Commitment to complete designation of remaining magistrates through transparent, merit-based processes in accordance with applicable laws, including Article 4 of the April 16, 2025 decree. - Decree organizing the High Court of Justice adopted December 1, 2025, establishes procedures for accountability of senior public officials. - ULCC developing a new ten-year anti-corruption strategy supported by draft legislation on whistleblower and witness protection. - Safeguarding public resources and IMF-supported social spending through the FSW: - Implement follow-up actions aligned with CSCCA’s key recommendations focusing on: - Strengthening governance and oversight arrangements and clarifying roles across implementing entities. - Improving documentation, record-keeping, and expenditure traceability. - Strengthening beneficiary identification and targeting (SIMAST improvements). - Enhancing transparency and social accountability through regular reporting and publication. - Continue publication of FSW execution reports (SB3) and audit-related information (SB4 and SB5). ### Data provision, statistics, and SDR use - BRH has met obligation to submit full balance sheet in SRF-1SR within two-month window and is working to shorten timeframe for SRF-1SR and 2SR monetary data. - BRH advancing reporting in line with the International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity template by end-April 2026. - MEF requested IMF Statistics Department expert deployment to support implementation of recommendations from 2020 and 2022 TA missions on government finance statistics. - Additional TA requested to improve Government finance statistics quality and align with international standards, and to establish monitoring and evaluation to prevent potential domestic arrears. - Prudent use and transparent reporting of Haiti’s SDR assets to continue; any future conversions of the SDR allocation into freely usable currencies will be published on BRH or MEF websites. Institutional frameworks governing fiscal use of SDR allocation and transparency measures will be maintained. ### Program monitoring, targets, and institutional arrangements - Program monitoring based on QTs and SBs as defined in the TMU; fourth review to be completed by October 1, 2026. - High-level committee comprising MEF and BRH representatives in place to monitor program implementation; will meet at least quarterly and may include other sectors as needed. - Commitment to publish this Memorandum and the accompanying IMF Staff Report on MEF and BRH websites once the SMP extension is approved by IMF Management. *Source: IMF staff report excerpt (content unit: 1htiea2026001).* ### Appendix I. Table 1b. Haiti: Quantitative and Indicative Targets, December 2025–March 2027 ### Appendix I. Table 1b. Haiti: Quantitative and Indicative Targets, December 2025–March 2027 ### I. Periodic Quantitative Targets — Key outcomes and targets - Net international reserves (NIR) of the central bank (in millions of U.S. dollars) — floor - end-March 2026: Quantitative target 140; Adjusted target 120; Actual 844; Status: Met - end-December 2026: Indicative target 160; Quantitative Target 210; Adjusted target 260; Indicative Target 310 - end-March 2027: Adjusted target 360 - Primary balance of the nonfinancial public sector (NFPS, in millions of gourdes) — floor - end-March 2026: Quantitative target -470; Adjusted target -3,111; Actual 1,465; Status: Met - end-December 2026: Indicative target -939; Quantitative Target -10,188; Adjusted target -19,436; Indicative Target -4,742 - end-March 2027: Adjusted target -9,483 - Net central bank credit to the nonfinancial public sector (in millions of gourdes) — ceiling - end-March 2026: Quantitative target 0; Adjusted target 9,538; Actual 3,926; Status: Met - end-December 2026: Indicative target 0; Quantitative Target 23,580; Adjusted target 23,580; Indicative Target 21,222 - end-March 2027: Adjusted target 16,506 - Central government portion mirrors NFPS numbers: - end-March 2026: Quantitative target 0; Adjusted target 9,538; Actual 7,218; Status: Met - end-December 2026: Indicative target 0; Quantitative Target 23,580; Adjusted target 23,580; Indicative Target 21,222 - end-March 2027: Adjusted target 16,506 - Other nonfinancial public sector entities: - end-March 2026: Quantitative target 0; Adjusted target 0; Actual -3,292; Status: Met - end-December 2026 and end-March 2027: Indicative targets and adjusted targets all 0 - Budget allocations for social expenditure (in millions of gourdes) — floor - end-March 2026: Quantitative target 12,625; Adjusted target 13,969; Status: Met - end-December 2026: Indicative target 25,250; Quantitative Target 37,875; Adjusted target 50,500 - end-March 2027: Indicative Target 17,686; Adjusted target 35,372 ### II. Continuous Quantitative Targets — Ceilings and compliance - Accumulation of domestic arrears by the central government (in millions of gourdes) — ceiling - Targets and adjusted targets: 0; Status: Met - end-March 2027: 0 - Accumulation of external arrears by the public sector (in millions of U.S. dollars) — ceiling - Targets and adjusted targets: 0; Status: Met - end-March 2027: 0 - Contracting or guaranteeing by the public sector of new nonconcessional external debt (in millions of U.S. dollars) — ceiling - Targets and adjusted targets: 0; Status: Met - end-March 2027: 0 ### III. Indicative Target — Revenue - Central government fiscal revenue, excluding grants (in millions of gourdes) — floor - end-March 2026: Quantitative target 50,000; Adjusted target 55,561; Status: Met - end-December 2026: Indicative target 100,000; Quantitative Target 157,500; Adjusted target 210,000 - end-March 2027: Indicative Target 67,846; Adjusted target 135,692 ### Memorandum Items — notable balances and amounts - Provision for undisbursed FY24 expenditures (in millions of gourdes): 0 - Food Shock Window resources held in the central bank, but not yet transferred to the TSA (in millions of gourdes): 1,549 - Undisbursed resources received from the IMF Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT, in millions of gourdes): 1,409 - IMF exchange rate difference advance (central bank account number 172160 in millions of gourdes): 14,817 - Budget support (in millions of U.S. dollars): 39; 19; 39; 39 (listed as memorandum items) - Gross international reserves (in millions of U.S. dollars): 3,393 - Gross international reserves (in months of imports of goods and services of the following fiscal year): 7.1 ### Notes on accumulation and timing - Cumulative flows from September 2024: fiscal variables (primary balance of NFPS, budget allocations for social expenditure, central government fiscal revenue) accumulate from September 2025 for FY2026, and from September 2026 for FY2027. - Methodological updates to the recording of Food Shock Window resources have led to a significant increase in loans and advances to the central government. - The IMF exchange rate difference advance account captures exchange rate valuation effects on IMF‑related government obligations borne by the central bank and recorded as an advance to the central government. - The program includes an asymmetric adjustor on the floor for the NFPS primary balance and net international reserves (NIR) for external budget support below the planned amounts. - For program monitoring purposes, the program exchange rate for the period September 2024 to June 2027 is SDR 0.737261 per U.S. dollar (exchange rate as of September 30, 2024). - The Quantitative Target is met if the total is met. - The program includes adjustors to increase the net credit to the NFPS target by the amount of drawdowns in central government assets related to specified items and to increase the net credit to the NFPS target by other adjustments described in the notes. - Budget envelope allocated to social affairs and labor (MAST), education, agriculture, and public health. The floor corresponds to the sum of the budget allocations to the MAST, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Agriculture, and Ministry of Public Health. - Central government fiscal revenue includes domestic taxes on enterprises, personal income, and sales; and customs duties. - EU budget support (€19.5 million) to be included in the end April 2025 data. --- ### Structural Benchmarks under the 2024 SMP — Status and target dates (selected) - Governance, including Public Financial Management (completed and outstanding actions) - 1. Publish MEF report on Governance Diagnostic Assessment and associated action plan — Target: End February 2025 — Status: Met - 2. Publish all new public procurement contracts, including beneficial ownership information, on CNMP and MEF websites within 45 days — Target: Monthly starting from December 2024 — Status: Not Met - 3. Publish monthly reports on execution of fiscal expenditure through Haiti Food Shock Window account — Target: Monthly starting from December 2024 — Status: Met - 4. Conduct quarterly internal expenditure audits of ministries using Haiti Food Shock Window account and report to CSCCA — Target: Quarterly starting from end December 2024 — Status: Met - 5. CSCCA to conduct financial and operational compliance audit for Rapid Credit Facility Food Shock Window for fiscal years 2022-23, 2023-24 and 2024-25 and publish report — Target: End March 2026 — Status: Not met - 6. Publish quarterly reports on operations and financial status of FAES on MEF website — Target: Quarterly starting from end December 2024 — Status: Not met - 7. Sign and publish MEF/DGI/AGD protocol for interconnection of IT systems — Target: End June 2025 — Status: Met - 8. Launch digitalization of tax declarations and payments through commercial banks for large taxpayers — Target: End December 2026 (Rescheduled from March 2026) — Status: Not met - Governance and safeguards — central bank transparency and governance actions - 9. Publish BRH audit report and audited financial statements for FY2023 on BRH website — Target: End August 2025 — Status: Met - 10. BRH Board approval of medium-term plan to improve composition of investment portfolio and related documents — Target: End September 2025 — Status: Met - 11. Provide to IMF staff full BRH balance sheet in SRF-1SR format (with two-month lag) starting from end-December 2024 — Target: Monthly periodicity and two-month lag, starting to be provided to IMF staff by end February 2025 — Status: Met - 12. Interconnect Tax Administration System and SYDONIA and publish commitments and analysis — Target: End December 2026 (Rescheduled from March 2026) — Status: Not met - 13. Adopt BRH framework for bank-wide IT security and business continuity arrangements — Target: End June 2026 - 14. Publish BRH audit report and audited financial statements for FY2024 on BRH website — Target: End June 2026 - Proposed additional SBs for extension (selection) - 15. Publish on MPCE website a streamlined FY2026/27 Public Investment Program with project cost and execution information — Target: End December 2026 - 16. Adopt and publish MEF text describing principles for the Compte Unique du Trésor (CUT) — Target: End December 2026 - 17. Publish MEF report listing priority national investment projects for the next three years (ending in FY2028) with financing sources and expected completion year — Target: End September 2026 - 18. Finalize BRH’s transition to new investment policy and fully operationalize related reforms — Target: 10-May-27 - 19. Publish BRH audit report and audited financial statements for FY2025 on BRH website — Target: End March 2027 ### Schedule of reviews (expected dates) - December 20, 2024: Approval of SMP. - February 1, 2025: First review and assessment of end-December 2024 quantitative targets and continuous quantitative targets. - August 1, 2025: Second review and assessment of end-June 2025 quantitative targets and continuous quantitative targets. - April 1, 2026: Third review and assessment of end-December 2025 quantitative targets and continuous quantitative targets. - October 1, 2026: Fourth review and assessment of end-June 2026 quantitative targets and continuous quantitative targets. - April 1, 2027: Fifth review and assessment of end-December 2026 quantitative targets and continuous quantitative targets. ### Technical Memorandum highlights — definitions and valuation rules - All QTs are assessed in terms of cumulated flows from the reference date set at end-September 2024, as specified in Table 1 of the Memorandum on Economic and Financial Policies. - Program exchange rates (as at September 30, 2024): - HTG 132.0563 = USD 1 (BRH reference rate as of September 30, 2024) - USD 1.119600 = EUR 1 - SDR 0.737261 = USD 1 - Net central bank credit to the NFPS definition: - Difference between BRH assets and liabilities vis-à-vis the NFPS as reported by BRH to the IMF, including net BRH credit to central government and to other NFPS entities. - Claims of the BRH on the central government exclude the accumulated accrued interest not yet due from September 2025 to the reporting date on government securities acquired under the Protocole d’Accord signed on June 28, 2022 and February 10, 2023. - The accrued interest will be calculated at the contractual annual interest rate of 7.57 percent and will continue to accumulate through the end of the program, as the grace period on these securities extends beyond the SMP horizon. *Source: IMF staff table and accompanying Technical Memorandum of Understanding text.* ### 9.2 billion for government expenses contracted in FY2024 but not yet disbursed by the end- ### 1htiea2026001 - 9.2 billion for government expenses contracted in FY2024 but not yet disbursed by the end- ### Adjustors to net central bank credit to the NFPS - Purpose: prevent unwarranted constraints on NFPS spending by adjusting the indicator of net central bank credit to the NFPS. - Adjustors: - i. Adjust upward by the amount of disbursements made after September 30, 2024 related to central government expenses contracted in FY2024, up to the provisioned amount of HTG 9.2 billion (shown in “other gourde liabilities to central government” in Table 1). - ii. Adjust upward by the amount of disbursements made after September 30, 2024 of remaining resources related to the support from the 2023 Food Shock Window (FSW) and the debt relief from the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT). These FSW resources held in the central bank, but not yet transferred to the Treasury Single Account, and the remaining CCRT resources are shown under “FX other deposits of central government” in Table 1. - iii. Adjust upward by the amount of the increase in central government liabilities caused by exchange rate differences in central bank account 172160 (“Avance difference de change FMI”), which is part of the calculation line “loans and advances to the central government” in Table 1. - iv. Adjust downward by the amount of any reduction in central bank claims on the government under the FSW, as reflected in central bank account 174400 (“Avances spéciales FMI”), whose value as of September 30, 2024, is HTG 16,368.7 million. This account is included in the calculation line “loans and advances to the central government” in Table 1. - v. This adjustor (account 174400) applies only under the new methodology adopted by the BRH for recording FSW resources (applied since July 2025 monetary data and reported to the IMF starting in September 2025). The adjustment will cease after the BRH reverts to the previous methodology. - vi. Adjust upward to accommodate financing covering the excess fuel import bill arising from an oil price shock due to the war in the Middle East. Conditions and parameters: - Trigger: the average WTI crude oil spot price over the reference period exceeds the program oil price assumption for the reference period. - Amount: the gourde equivalent of the aggregate excess import bill cost for the period since the prior test date. - Cap: USD 58 million. - Applicability: only to assessment of performance at end-June 2026 and end-September 2026; no further adjustments after end-September 2026. - Unwinding: (i) 10 percent after two quarters from the period in which the adjustor was triggered; and (ii) an additional 20 percent in every subsequent quarter. - Program oil price assumptions: USD 84 per barrel for FY2025-26 Q3 and USD 75 per barrel for FY2025-26 Q4. - Fixed program import volume: 3.6 million barrels per quarter. - Exchange rate for gourde equivalent: arithmetic average of the BRH reference exchange rate (gourdes per U.S. dollar) over the reference period. - Formula (as presented): Adjustor(HTG) = (P̄_WTI − P_program) × Q_program × ER. - Example given: if average WTI = USD 100 per barrel in FY2026Q3, adjustor ≈ (100 − 84) × 3.6 million ≈ USD 58 million (cap becomes binding when WTI exceeds USD 100 per barrel). ### Key figures from Attachment II. Table 1 (Haiti: Net Credit to the Nonfinancial Public Sector, In Millions of Gourdes) - Net central bank credit to the nonfinancial public sector: - Sep 2024 (Preliminary): 240,020.9 - Sep 2024 (Revised 2nd Review): 239,850.3 - Sep 2024 (Revised 3rd Review): 254,110.1 - Sep 2025: 253,552.5 - Oct 2025: 258,833.5 - Nov 2025: 267,375.2 - Dec 2025: 258,035.9 - Jan 2026 4/: 274,878.6 - Net credit on central government: - Sep 2024 (Preliminary): 245,097.0 - Sep 2024 (Revised 2nd Review): 244,922.3 - Sep 2024 (Revised 3rd Review): 259,179.4 - Sep 2025: 260,532.3 - Oct 2025: 265,992.8 - Nov 2025: 275,251.2 - Dec 2025: 266,397.5 - Jan 2026 4/: 283,178.1 - Claims on central government ((i)+(ii)+(iii)-(iv)): - Sep 2024 (Preliminary): 349,591.2 - Sep 2024 (Revised 2nd Review): 349,543.6 - Sep 2024 (Revised 3rd Review): 364,026.3 - Sep 2025: 362,163.1 - Oct 2025: 365,397.2 - Nov 2025: 367,226.8 - Dec 2025: 369,615.7 - Jan 2026 4/: 372,208.0 - Components of claims on central government: - Holdings of government debt securities (i): 221,360.5 (constant across reported dates) - Loans and advances to the central government (ii): - Sep 2024 (Preliminary): 128,230.7 - Sep 2024 (Revised 2nd Review): 128,183.1 - Sep 2024 (Revised 3rd Review): 142,665.8 - Sep 2025: 140,802.6 - Oct 2025: 144,036.7 - Nov 2025: 145,866.4 - Dec 2025: 148,255.3 - Jan 2026 4/: 150,847.6 - Of which: accrued interest not yet due: - Sep 2024 (Revised 3rd Review): 45,253.7 - Sep 2025: 61,442.0 - Oct 2025: 62,791.0 - Nov 2025: 64,140.1 - Dec 2025: 65,489.1 - Jan 2026 4/: 66,838.1 - Memo: Cumulative changes in accrued interest not yet due from end-September 2025 onward (iv): - Sep 2024 (Revised 3rd Review): 0.0 - Sep 2025: 0.0 - Oct 2025: 1,349.0 - Nov 2025: 2,698.1 - Dec 2025: 4,047.1 - Jan 2026 4/: 5,396.1 - Liabilities to central government: - Sep 2024 (Preliminary): 104,494.1 - Sep 2024 (Revised 2nd Review): 104,621.4 - Sep 2024 (Revised 3rd Review): 104,846.8 - Sep 2025: 101,630.8 - Oct 2025: 99,404.4 - Nov 2025: 91,975.6 - Dec 2025: 103,218.2 - Jan 2026 4/: 89,029.9 - Selected liability line items: - Gourde Demand Deposits of central government (various dates): e.g., Sep 2024 (Preliminary) 63,710.2; Jan 2026 4/: 55,604.5 - Gourde Other Deposits of central government: 1,230.6 (earlier); Jan 2026 4/: 2,459.0 - Gourde loans from central government 2/: ~126.4–125.8 across dates - Gourde settlement accounts from central government (Bail): ~14.0–14.4 across dates - Other gourde liabilities to central government: 9,200.0 (Sep 2024 entries); 0.0 in Sep 2025 onward (per table) - FX demand deposits of central government: e.g., Sep 2024 (Preliminary) 27,021.9; Jan 2026 4/: 27,819.3 - FX other deposits of central government: 3,076.2 (Sep 2024 entries); Jan 2026 4/: 2,892.0 ### Net claims on other nonfinancial public sector entities (from Table 1 concluded) - Net claims on other nonfinancial public sector entities: - Sep 2024 (Preliminary): -5,076.1 - Sep 2024 (Revised 2nd Review): -5,072.0 - Sep 2024 (Revised 3rd Review): -5,069.4 - Sep 2025: -6,979.8 - Oct 2025: -7,159.3 - Nov 2025: -7,876.1 - Dec 2025: -8,361.6 - Jan 2026 4/: -8,299.5 - Liabilities to other nonfinancial public sector entities (various components) include: - Demand deposits of state and local governments (Gourde): 234.1 → Jan 2026 4/: 1,993.5 - Demand deposits of public nonfinancial corporations (Gourde): 527.6 → Jan 2026 4/: 1,746.4 - Other deposits of public nonfinancial corporations (Gourde): 4,314.4 → ranged to 4,559.7 by Jan 2026 4/ ### Notes on definition and methodology - Revised definition: From end-March 2026 onwards, a new definition applies for all calculations of net central bank credit to the NFPS. For end-March 2026 and any period before, net central bank credit to the NFPS will include the accrued interest not yet due on government securities whose face value amounted to HTG 213,848,282,380.8 as of end-September 2025. The revised definition aims to avoid unwarranted constraints arising from mechanical accumulation of accrued interest not yet due on these securities. - Footnotes and methodological points: - 1/ Accrued interest not yet due on government securities, acquired under the Protocole d’Accord signed between the BRH and the MEF on June 28, 2022, and on February 10, 2023. - 2/ Public treasury fiduciary in FIDEICOMMI. - 3/ Methodological updates to the recording of Food Shock Window resources have led to a significant increase in loans and advances to the central government. - 4/ Monetary data for January, as submitted by the authorities, are undergoing validation, as they include retrospective revisions to historical data. - 5/ This formula should be applied from June 2026 onward. ### Net International Reserves: definitions, adjustor, and key figures (Attachment II. Table 2, In Millions of US Dollars, Unless Otherwise Noted) - Definition highlights: - Gross international reserves: external assets readily available to and controlled by monetary authorities (monetary gold, liquid external assets, holdings of SDRs, IMF reserve position), reported by the BRH from Standardized Report Form 1SR. - Net international reserves (NIR) for program purposes: Gross international reserves minus reserve-related liabilities (liabilities denominated in foreign currency to non-residents), minus FX-denominated liabilities to residents, minus other FX liabilities. - Reserve-related liabilities include all Haiti liabilities to the IMF (based on IMF Finance Department data); for program purposes, all outstanding IMF credit and loans, regardless of maturity, should be deducted from reserve assets to measure NIR. - Adjustor to NIR: - If budgetary grants are lower than expected, the floor on net international reserves will be adjusted downwards by the amount of the difference. The floor will not be adjusted upwards if budgetary grants exceed expected levels. - Projected Budgetary Grants (Attachment II. Table 3 — Cumulative Flows since end-September 2024, In millions of US dollars): - September 2024: 0 - March 2025: 0 - June 2025: 21 - September 2025: 39 - December 2025: 39 - March 2026: 39 - June 2026: 39 - Key figures from Table 2: - A. Gross International Reserves: - Sep 2024 (Revised): 2,522.2 - Sep 2024 (2nd Review): 2,522.3 - Sep 2025 (Revised 3rd Review): 3,236.9 - Oct 2025: 3,186.9 - Nov 2025: 3,280.0 - Dec 2025: 3,393.1 - Jan 2026 5/: 3,410.1 - Monetary gold (component of A): - Sep 2024: 153.1 - Sep 2025: 222.7 - Jan 2026 5/: 290.0 - Demand deposits abroad: - Sep 2024: 443.7 - Sep 2025: 845.6 - Jan 2026 5/: 908.2 - Investments abroad (1/): Sep 2024: 1,765.9 → Jan 2026 5/: 2,060.2 - B. Reserve Related Liabilities: - Sep 2024: 306.9 - Sep 2025: 236.8 - Jan 2026 5/: 220.6 - Liabilities to the IMF (B component): - Sep 2024: 245.1 - Sep 2025: 234.7 - Jan 2026 5/: 219.4 - C. FX Denominated Liabilities to Residents: - Sep 2024: 1,263.7 - Sep 2025: 1,359.2 - Jan 2026 5/: 1,380.8 - D. Other FX Liabilities: - Sep 2024: 35.2 - Sep 2025: 36.3 - Jan 2026 5/: 31.0 - E. Net International Reserves, 2024 SMP definition (A - B - C - D): - Sep 2024: 916.3 - Sep 2024 (2nd Review): 918.0 - Sep 2025: 1,604.6 - Oct 2025: 1,578.3 - Nov 2025: 1,678.6 - Dec 2025: 1,761.7 - Jan 2026 5/: 1,777.6 - Memorandum items (not included in program NIR calculation): - Miscellaneous central bank FX liabilities (including values for adjustment): e.g., Sep 2024 23.4 → Sep 2025 4.8 → Jan 2026 5/: 2.8 - Central government FX deposits in the central bank: Sep 2024 228.9 → Sep 2025 245.0 → Jan 2026 5/: 233.6 - Short-term central government FX liabilities (next 12 months): Sep 2024 31.1 → varied, with entries in table ### Primary balance, financing, and arrears definitions - Domestic arrears of the central government: - Defined as expenditure accepted by the Treasury and unpaid after 90 days, despite delivery of goods and services. Domestic arrears do not include unpaid off-budget government commitments. - Unpaid off-budget central government commitments: - Liabilities incurred outside the budgetary process (from ministries or other public bodies), potentially giving rise to contingent claims against central government resources. - Net domestic financing of the NFPS: - Sum of: (i) net central bank credit to the NFPS; (ii) net credit from domestic commercial banks to the NFPS (includes changes in NFPS deposits and net issuance of Treasury bills and other NFPS securities to commercial banks); and (iii) net nonbank credit to the NFPS (includes net issuance of Treasury bills and other NFPS securities to nonbank institutions, change in NFPS net position vis-à-vis the electricity sector including independent power producers, and net change in suppliers’ credit and domestic arrears of central government). - Net external financing of the NFPS: - Sum of: (i) new external loan disbursements (excluding IMF loans); and (ii) net change in external arrears minus external loan amortizations. - For program purposes, the primary balance of the NFPS corresponds to the sum of net domestic financing of the NFPS and net external financing of the NFPS, after deducting interest payments on public debt. *Source: BRH, IFS and IMF staff calculations (Attachment II tables and accompanying text).* ### 23. Adjustor to primary balance of the NFPS. If budgetary grants do not reach the ### 1htiea2026001 - 23. Adjustor to primary balance of the NFPS. If budgetary grants do not reach the ### Adjustor to the primary balance of the NFPS - If budgetary grants do not reach expected levels, the floor on the primary balance of the NFPS includes an asymmetric adjustor. - If the amounts of budgetary support are in deficit, the floors on the primary balance will be reduced by the amount of those deficits. - If external budget support exceeds projections, the floor on the primary balance will not change. ### Budget allocations to social expenditure and monitoring dates - Definition of social spending for the program: execution of budgetary allocations to Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor (MAST), Ministry of Education, Ministry of Agriculture, and Ministry of Public Health, as specified in the budget decree. - The floor on the QT applies to the cumulative amount of budget execution (actual spending) during the fiscal year for MAST, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Agriculture, and Ministry of Public Health measured at the end of each test date. Provisional appropriations, if any, are included. - QTs are assessed at: - end-December 2024 - end-June 2025 - end-December 2025 - end-June 2026 - ITs are assessed at: - end-March 2025 - end-September 2025 - end-March 2026 ### Definition of debt for public-debt conditionality - Debt definition follows paragraph 8 of the Guidelines on Public Debt Conditionality in Fund Arrangements (Executive Board Decision No. 16919-(20/103), October 28, 2020): a current (not contingent) liability created under a contractual arrangement through provision of value in the form of assets (including currency) or services, requiring future payments in assets (including currency) or services to discharge principal and/or interest. - Primary forms of debt described: - loans: advances of money (including deposits, bonds, debentures, commercial loans, buyers’ credits), and temporary exchanges of assets equivalent to fully collateralized loans (repurchase agreements, official swap arrangements); - suppliers’ credits: contracts permitting deferred payment after delivery of goods or services; - leases: property provided for use over one or more specified periods; for these guidelines debt is the PV (at the inception of the lease) of all lease payments expected to be made during the agreement excluding payments covering operation, repair, or maintenance. ### Public sector coverage and guarantees - For the debt limit ceiling, public sector debt covers public and publicly guaranteed debt. Public sector is defined in paragraph 8 of this TMU. - Debt guarantee by the public sector: an explicit legal obligation to service a debt in the event of non-payment by the borrower (in return for payment in cash or in kind). ### Concessional debt and grant element calculation - For program purposes, a debt is concessional if it includes a grant element of at least 35 percent. - Grant element calculation: difference between the present value (PV) of debt and its nominal value, expressed as a percentage of the nominal value of the debt. - PV at contracting is calculated by discounting the future stream of payments of debt service due on the debt. - For debts with a grant element equal or below zero, the PV will be set equal to the nominal value of the debt. - The discount rate used for this purpose is the unified discount rate of 5 percent set forth in Executive Board Decision No. 15462-(13/97). ### External debt for the ceiling on new non-concessional external debt - External debt for the ceiling: any debt contracted or guaranteed by the public sector on non-concessional terms with non-residents or denominated in foreign currency (currency other than Haiti’s currency). It includes, where applicable, debt issued domestically by the government and held by non-residents. - The public sector undertakes not to contract or guarantee any new non-concessional external debt. This undertaking also applies to any private debt guaranteed by the public sector that constitutes a contingent liability. - Exclusions from the ceiling: - short-term import-related credits with maturity of less than one year, - rescheduling arrangements, - borrowing from the IMF, - non-resident purchases of treasury bills, - gourde-denominated BRH bills that are indexed to the exchange rate. - This QT will be monitored continuously by the authorities and any non-observance will be immediately reported to the Fund. ### Public sector external arrears accumulation - Definition: arrears on external debt of the public sector include all debt-service obligations (principal and interest) on loans contracted or guaranteed by the public sector that are due to non-residents but not paid on the due date as set out in the loan contract. - Exclusions: obligations being renegotiated with external creditors and/or those that are litigious. - For assessing the QT on the non-accumulation of new external debt arrears, arrears resulting from non-payment of debt service due to international sanctions preventing payments to the creditor are excluded. - Monitoring: This QT will be monitored continuously by the authorities, and any non-observance will be immediately reported to the Fund. ### Domestic arrears accumulation of the central government - Definition: arrears on domestic debt of the central government include all debt-service obligations (principal and interest) on loans contracted or guaranteed by the central government that are due to residents but not paid 90 days after the due date set out in the loan contract. - Monitoring: The QT on domestic arrears accumulation will be monitored continuously by the authorities, and any non-observance will be immediately reported to the Fund. ### Reporting requirements for program monitoring (selected items, periodicity, timeliness) - Authorities will provide IMF staff with data in Attachment II. Any data revisions will be promptly communicated. - Authorities will inform IMF staff in writing at least 10 working days (excluding public holidays in Haiti) before any change in economic and financial policies that may affect the program outcome. For continuous QTs, any non-observance will be reported promptly. - Selected data series, periodicity, and timeliness: - National accounts: Annual; Three months - Quarterly economic indicators (economic cycle): Quarterly; Two months - Consumer price index (including breakdowns): Monthly; Three weeks - Fiscal revenues (internal, external, other): Monthly; Four weeks - Expenditures on cash basis (wages and salaries, goods and services, external debt, current accounts): Monthly; Four weeks - Table of government financial transactions (TOFE): Monthly; Two weeks - Table on budget implementation with breakdown by ministry and other bodies and by type of expenditure: Monthly; One month - Total monthly amount of expenditure executed by transfer letters: Monthly; One month - Report on revenue collection of DGI (progress report): Monthly; One month - EDH commercial data allowing the calculation of EDH's billing and collection rates: Monthly; One week - EDH cash data including all revenues and all expenditures (operating, investment, and other): Monthly; One month - Stock of unpaid off-budget central government liabilities: Monthly; One month - Details of the stock of all government borrowing and debt securities (interest rate, maturity, creditor if known): Annual; Three months - Full amortization table of domestic and external government debt: Annual; Three months - Statement of stocks and flows of repayment of suppliers’ credits and payment arrears: Monthly; One week - Exchange rate: Daily; One day - BRH FX cash flow table; quarterly projections through end of fiscal year: Quarterly; One month - Balance of payments (first version): Quarterly; Six weeks - Revised balance of payments: Quarterly; Three months after the first reporting - External debt report prepared by the BRH showing monthly disbursements; debt service, debt forgiveness and rescheduling, arrears, and debt stocks: Monthly; One month - Data on stocks, accumulation, and repayment of external arrears: Monthly; Six weeks *Source: 1htiea2026001 - 23. Adjustor to primary balance of the NFPS. If budgetary grants do not reach the* --- _Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1htiea2026001.pdf_