## 1ngaea2026001 - 4.4 percent of GDP in 2025. While non-oil revenues were on target, oil revenues fell short of

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### Key findings
- Consolidated government (CGN) deficit (from financing side) was 4.4 percent of GDP in 2025, up from 2.4 percent in 2024.
- At the Federal Government (FGN) level:
  - Oil and gas revenue fell short of budget expectations.
  - Company income tax and value added tax (VAT) were on target.
  - Interest payments absorbed 53 percent of FGN revenues in 2025, up from 41 percent in 2024.
- Offsetting factors and financing in 2025:
  - Shortfall in oil revenues was offset by under execution of reported capital expenditures and inclusion, via January 2026 Repeal and Re-enactment Bills for the 2024 and 2025 budgets, of some expenditures executed outside budgets.
  - Financing sources: Eurobond issuance, syndicated loans for infrastructure projects, domestic securities, and a Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) deposit drawdown of 1.1 percent of GDP.
  - Estimated statistical discrepancy of 2.7 percent of GDP could reflect spending not captured by the Office of the Accountant General of the Federation (OAGF).
- Growth and inflation snapshots:
  - Real GDP growth: 4.0 percent in 2025.
  - Production of crude oil: 1.64 million barrels per day in 2025.
  - Consumer price index (annual average): 23.0 percent in 2025; end-of-period CPI: 15.2 percent in 2025.
  - Inflation: 15.4 percent year-on-year in March 2026 (from 15.1 percent in February 2026).
  - Core inflation: 16.2 percent year-on-year in March 2026; food inflation: 14.3 percent in March 2026.

### Fiscal developments and mechanics
- CGN consolidated operations (percent of GDP):
  - Total revenues and grants: 10.2 percent in 2025 (estimated); projected 10.8 percent in 2026 and 10.6 percent in 2027.
  - Oil and gas revenue: 3.1 percent in 2025; projected 3.8 percent in 2026 and 3.5 percent in 2027.
  - Non-oil revenue: 6.8 percent in 2025; projected 6.7 percent in 2026 and 6.9 percent in 2027.
  - Total expenditure and net lending: 12.0 percent of GDP in 2025; projected 15.5 percent in 2026 and 14.2 percent in 2027.
  - Financing (overall balance from financing side): 4.4 percent of GDP in 2025; projected 4.7 percent in 2026 and 3.6 percent in 2027.
  - Non-oil primary balance (from financing side): -5.1 percent in 2025; projected -5.9 percent in 2026 and -4.6 percent in 2027.
- Public gross debt and composition:
  - Public gross debt: 36.1 percent of GDP in 2025; projected 35.4 percent in 2026 and 36.7 percent in 2027.
  - FX denominated debt: 16.9 percent of GDP in 2025; projected 17.2 percent in 2026 and 19.1 percent in 2027.
- FGN interest burden:
  - FGN interest payments (percent of FGN revenue): 53.2 percent in 2025; projected 53.7 percent in 2026 and 52.4 percent in 2027.
- Federal Government 2025 table highlights (percent of GDP):
  - FGN total revenues and components as presented in source tables (values include multiple table entries for 2025).
  - FGN interest payments (percent of FGN revenue) series includes 40.8, 27.5, 53.2 across table rows for 2025 presentation.

### Outlook and key risks
- Growth and inflation projections:
  - Real GDP: 4.1 percent in 2026 and 4.3 percent in 2027 (projection series).
  - Inflation (CPI annual average): projected 16.0 percent in 2026 and 15.9 percent in 2027.
  - End‑2026 inflation projected to tick up to 17.0 percent year-on-year.
- External and reserves outlook:
  - Price of Nigerian oil: US$68.3 per barrel in 2025; projected US$80.2 per barrel in 2026 and US$71.5 per barrel in 2027.
  - Gross international reserves (CBN definition): US$45.8 billion in 2025; projected US$58.1 billion in 2026 and US$62.0 billion in 2027.
  - Equivalent months of prospective imports: 8.1 months in 2025; projected 9.7 months in 2026 and 10.2 months in 2027.
- Major downside risks:
  - Uncertain global environment (fuel and food prices), domestic security deterioration, tighter global financial conditions, and election-related spending pressures.
  - Climate-related shocks and cyberattacks.
- Upside potential:
  - Quick gains in revenue mobilization, durably high hydrocarbon prices, lower financing costs, improvements in investor sentiment, and improved domestic security.

### External position and reserves (selected)
- Current account and reserves 2025:
  - Current account surplus: 4.8 percent of GDP in 2025.
  - Gross international reserves: increased to US$46 billion in 2025 from US$40 billion at end-2024; rose to US$49 billion (30-day moving average) by end-March 2026.
  - Net international reserves: US$35 billion at end-2025 (from US$23 billion at end-2024).
  - Reserves pledged under a securities lending arrangement: close to US$8 billion at end-2025 (excluded from official reserves figure reported by the central bank).
  - Naira appreciated by 10 percent year-on-year against the U.S. dollar in March 2026.
- Capital flows 2025:
  - Financial account net inflow: around US$5.9 billion (around 2 percent of GDP), mainly portfolio-led.
  - Net FDI inflows: US$2.8 billion in 2025.
  - Portfolio net inflows supported by Eurobond issuance and non-resident participation in CBN OMOs (close to US$5.8 billion of net inflows).

### Financial sector developments and vulnerabilities
- Private sector credit and intermediation:
  - Private sector credit grew about 20 percent in 2025 (adjusting for exchange rate valuation effects), with a 16 percent expansion in naira-denominated lending.
  - Private sector credit remains low at 12 percent of GDP in 2025.
  - Credit exposure concentrated in oil and gas, services, manufacturing and industry.
- Banking sector metrics:
  - Recapitalization raised about US$3.4 billion in new equity.
  - 33 out of 37 banks met revised requirements by end‑March deadline; 4 banks remain under regulatory and judicial processes.
  - Capital adequacy ratio declined to 11.7 percent in Q3-2025.
  - NPLs increased to 8 percent in Q3-2025, above the prudential ceiling.
- Insurance, pension, and nonbank financing:
  - Insurance sector recapitalization underway under the 2025 Insurance Industry Reform Act; deadline July 2026; 20 of 58 insurers submitted for capital verification to date.
  - Pension sector: funds equal 6.4 percent of GDP; reforms impose new limits on investing in government securities.
  - Banks’ holdings of government securities: 22 percent of total assets.
- Basel III and macroprudential priorities:
  - Progress on Basel III implementation ongoing; remaining elements include countercyclical capital buffer and liquidity coverage ratio.
  - Recommendation: establish a clear roadmap to operationalize remaining Basel III elements.
- Stablecoins and digital assets:
  - Rapid growth of U.S. dollar‑denominated stablecoin flows raises risks: monetary sovereignty, capital flow volatility, financial stability, and financial integrity.
  - Policy priorities: bring stablecoin activities within regulatory perimeter, robust licensing, consumer protection and reporting, and close CBN–SEC coordination.
- AML/CFT:
  - Progress noted, including exit from FATF grey-list; continued efforts required to address illicit financial flows and vulnerabilities in crypto-asset sector.

### Policy recommendations and prescriptions
- Fiscal policy:
  - Adopt a neutral fiscal stance in 2026 to support macroeconomic stability and disinflation, while protecting priority and social spending.
  - Focus domestic revenue mobilization on administrative gains in 2026, recognizing tax rate increases likely needed over the medium term.
  - Secure funding for the cash transfers program and expand cost-effective public works programs for vulnerable populations.
  - Accelerate enhancements to the budget process, fiscal reporting, transparency, and accountability; eliminate off‑budget spending and complex financing instruments.
- Monetary and exchange rate policy:
  - Maintain tight monetary policy for longer given inflationary pressures from the war in the Middle East and global risk-off environment.
  - Reduce reliance on expensive portfolio inflows as market conditions allow; maintain a flexible exchange rate regime.
  - Focus CBN foreign exchange interventions on countering risks to financial and price stability, consistent with the Integrated Policy Framework (IPF).
- Financial sector and supervision:
  - Accelerate Basel III implementation with a roadmap for remaining elements.
  - Continue vigilance on rising NPLs and the sovereign–bank nexus; strengthen supervision; bring stablecoin and crypto-asset activities into the regulatory perimeter.
- Structural reforms:
  - Prioritize governance, security, electricity, agriculture, infrastructure, and human capital reforms to support inclusive growth and diversification.
  - Strengthen macroeconomic statistics; integrate climate considerations into macroeconomic and development policies.

### Debt, DSA findings, and fiscal risks
- Debt levels and drivers:
  - Public gross debt: 36.1 percent of GDP in 2025 (down from 39.3 percent in 2024).
  - Share of foreign debt rose to 48 percent in 2025.
  - Residual maturity (projection): 12.9 years.
  - Electricity arrears recognized: 1 percent of GDP; bonds issued to cover electricity arrears: 0.1 percent of GDP.
- DSA projections and indicators (selected):
  - Public debt path: 36.1 (2025), 35.4 (2026), 36.7 (2027), trending to 34.9 (2031) and 34.0 (2035).
  - Primary deficit (percent of GDP): -0.8 (2025), 1.9 (2026), 1.0 (2027).
  - Gross financing needs (GFN) and debt-service series presented in tables indicate rising financing needs in nominal naira terms.
- Risks and recommendations from DSA:
  - Risks from unrecognized arrears, pre-export financing deals, and contingent liabilities.
  - Staff recommendations: stay the course on revenue mobilization, build buffers, enhance fiscal risk management, extend maturities where possible.

### Capacity development (CD) strategy and priorities (Fiscal Year 2026)
- Context and objectives:
  - CD focused on preserving macro stability while supporting inclusive growth; immediate focus on tax administration, ringfencing hydrocarbon revenues, fiscal risk management, and progress toward inflation targeting.
  - Resident advisor on revenue administration maintained.
- Priority CD areas:
  - Tax policy and revenue administration: TaxProMax traction, petroleum sector tax regime implementation, VAT and CIT compliance improvements, digitalized audits, customs controls, e-invoicing assessment.
  - Monetary and exchange rate policies: advance transition to inflation targeting, revamp monetary policy toolkit, adopt robust FX intervention framework.
  - Public financial management: strengthen budget process, fiscal risk management, public investment management, and arrears reporting.
  - Financial stability: end regulatory forbearance, complete Basel III rollout, strengthen macroprudential toolkit, improve interbank market functioning.
  - Macroeconomic statistics: improve quarterly GDP, BOP, monetary statistics, and fiscal reporting harmonization.
- Risks to CD delivery:
  - Political commitment, absorptive capacity, and proximity to Q1 2027 presidential elections may slow implementation; mitigation includes top-level buy-in and hands-on support from Afritac West and resident advisor.

### Risk Assessment Matrix — selected entries
- External risks with likelihood and policy responses (examples):
  - Geopolitical Tensions and Intensification of Conflicts: Likelihood High (30-50 percent); Time Horizon Short Term; Impact Medium. Policy responses include tightening monetary policy, maintaining exchange rate flexibility, accelerating revenue mobilization, and using temporary FXIs per IPF where appropriate.
  - Commodity Price Volatility: Likelihood High; Impact High. Policy responses include tightening monetary policy, maintaining exchange rate flexibility, accelerating revenue mobilization, and temporary FXIs per IPF.
  - Cyberthreats: Likelihood High; Impact Medium. Policy responses include strengthening cyber-resilience and supervision and tightening regulation of fintech and crypto assets.
- Nigeria-specific risks:
  - Reduction in oil and agriculture production due to worsening domestic security and climate shocks: Likelihood Medium; Impact High. Policy responses: strengthen security, maintain exchange rate flexibility, tighten monetary policy, accelerate revenue mobilization.

### Alternative (adverse) scenario guidance
- Adverse global shock scenario (April 2026 WEO adverse):
  - Higher hydrocarbon prices with concurrently higher food and input costs, tighter global financial conditions, and potential capital outflows.
  - Policy guidance: follow IPF and IMF Institutional View on capital flows; tighten monetary policy to prioritize inflation control; maintain exchange rate flexibility; adopt a neutral fiscal stance and prioritize cash transfers and quick-impact growth projects; intensify financial-sector supervision; secure low-cost financing.

### Authorities’ views and staff appraisal (summary)
- Authorities:
  - Report substantial strengthening of supervision and recapitalization; progress toward Basel III; joint CBN–SEC framework for stablecoins under development.
  - Objective for medium-term growth of 7–12 percent; 2026–30 National Development Plan under preparation; agree broadly with staff priorities and sequencing.
  - Commit to keeping public expenditure within budget framework and not reintroducing fuel subsidies.
- Staff appraisal:
  - Reforms since 2023 improved stability; challenges remain (global uncertainty, high poverty, food insecurity, security).
  - Recommend neutral fiscal stance in 2026, prioritizing growth-enhancing investments and social protection; urge restraint on election-related spending; emphasize revenue mobilization, public financial management, and monetary policy centered on MPR as anchor while progressing toward inflation targeting.

*Source: NIGERIA — STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2026 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION (May 7, 2026); Nigerian authorities; IMF staff estimates and projections (excerpts from 1ngaea2026001).*

### 4.4 percent of GDP in 2025. While non-oil revenues were on target, oil revenues fell short of

### 1ngaea2026001 - 4.4 percent of GDP in 2025. While non-oil revenues were on target, oil revenues fell short of

### Key findings
- Consolidated government (CGN) deficit (from financing side) was 4.4 percent of GDP in 2025, up from 2.4 percent in 2024.
- At the Federal Government (FGN) level:
  - Oil and gas revenue fell short of budget expectations.
  - Company income tax and value added tax (VAT) were on target.
  - Interest payments absorbed 53 percent of FGN revenues in 2025, up from 41 percent in 2024.
- The shortfall in oil revenues was offset by:
  - Under execution of reported capital expenditures.
  - Inclusion, via the January 2026 Repeal and Re-enactment Bills for the 2024 and 2025 budgets, of some expenditures that had been executed outside the budgets.
- Financing sources in 2025 included a Eurobond issuance, syndicated loans for infrastructure projects, domestic securities, and a Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) deposit drawdown of 1.1 percent of GDP.
- An estimated statistical discrepancy of 2.7 percent of GDP could reflect spending not captured by the Office of the Accountant General of the Federation (OAGF).
- Growth and inflation:
  - Real GDP growth estimated at 4.0 percent in 2025.
  - Production of crude oil: 1.64 million barrels per day in 2025 (Table 1).
  - Consumer price index (annual average) 23.0 percent in 2025; end-of-period CPI 15.2 percent in 2025.
  - Inflation ticked up to 15.4 percent year-on-year in March 2026 (from 15.1 percent in February 2026).
  - Core inflation 16.2 percent year-on-year in March 2026; food inflation 14.3 percent in March 2026.

### Fiscal developments and mechanics
- CGN consolidated operations (percent of GDP, Table 1):
  - Total revenues and grants: 10.2 percent in 2025 (estimated), projected 10.8 percent in 2026 and 10.6 percent in 2027.
  - Of which: oil and gas revenue: 3.1 percent in 2025; projected 3.8 percent in 2026 and 3.5 percent in 2027.
  - Of which: non-oil revenue: 6.8 percent in 2025; projected 6.7 percent in 2026 and 6.9 percent in 2027.
  - Total expenditure and net lending: 12.0 percent of GDP in 2025; projected 15.5 percent in 2026 and 14.2 percent in 2027.
  - Financing (overall balance from financing side): 4.4 percent of GDP in 2025; projected 4.7 percent in 2026 and 3.6 percent in 2027.
  - Non-oil primary balance (from financing side): -5.1 percent in 2025; projected -5.9 percent in 2026 and -4.6 percent in 2027.
- Public gross debt: 36.1 percent of GDP in 2025; projected 35.4 percent in 2026 and 36.7 percent in 2027.
  - Of which: FX denominated debt: 16.9 percent of GDP in 2025; projected 17.2 percent in 2026 and 19.1 percent in 2027.
- FGN interest payments (percent of FGN revenue): 53.2 percent in 2025; projected 53.7 percent in 2026 and 52.4 percent in 2027.

### Outlook and risks
- Risks to the outlook:
  - Uncertain global environment, notably the outlook for fuel and food prices.
  - Domestic security situation affecting people and economic activity.
- Upside potential:
  - Quick gains on revenue mobilization would create additional budget space for growth-enhancing priority spending.
- External and monetary context:
  - Price of Nigerian oil: US$68.3 per barrel in 2025; projected US$80.2 per barrel in 2026 and US$71.5 per barrel in 2027.
  - Gross international reserves (CBN definition): US$45.8 billion in 2025; projected US$58.1 billion in 2026 and US$62.0 billion in 2027.
  - Equivalent months of prospective imports of goods and services: 8.1 months in 2025; projected 9.7 months in 2026 and 10.2 months in 2027.

### Policy recommendations (as presented)
- Fiscal policy:
  - Adopt a neutral fiscal stance in 2026 to support macroeconomic stability and disinflation, while protecting priority and social spending.
  - Focus domestic revenue mobilization on administrative gains in 2026, while recognizing that tax rate increases will likely be needed over the medium term.
  - Secure funding for the cash transfers program to support the most vulnerable.
  - Accelerate efforts to enhance the budget process, fiscal reporting, transparency, and accountability, addressing concerns about off-budget spending and complex financing instruments.
- Monetary and exchange rate policy:
  - Maintain tight monetary policy for longer than previously expected given inflationary pressures from the war in the Middle East and a global risk-off environment.
  - As market conditions allow, reduce reliance on expensive portfolio inflows that pose a rollover risk.
  - Maintain the flexible exchange rate regime and focus CBN foreign exchange interventions on countering risks to financial and price stability, in line with the Integrated Policy Framework (IPF).
- Financial sector policies:
  - Accelerate Basel III implementation, including a clear roadmap for remaining elements such as the countercyclical capital buffer and the liquidity coverage ratio.
  - Continue vigilance on rising NPLs and the sovereign-bank nexus; strengthen supervision and bring stablecoin and other crypto-asset activities into the regulatory perimeter.
- Structural reforms:
  - Prioritize reforms in governance, security, electricity, agriculture, infrastructure, and human capital to support inclusive growth and diversification.
  - Strengthen macroeconomic statistics to support policy formulation and implementation.
  - Integrate climate considerations into macroeconomic and development policies, where relevant.

### Selected quantitative highlights (from Table 1 and text)
- Real GDP (at 2019 market prices): 4.0 percent in 2025; projected 4.1 percent in 2026 and 4.3 percent in 2027.
- Oil and Gas GDP: 8.5 percent in 2025; projected 4.5 percent in 2026 and 4.1 percent in 2027.
- Non-oil GDP: 3.9 percent in 2025; projected 4.0 percent in 2026 and 4.3 percent in 2027.
- Production of crude oil: 1.64 million barrels per day in 2025; projected 1.71 in 2026 and 1.75 in 2027.
- Nominal GDP at market prices (trillions of naira): 442 in 2025; projected 529 in 2026 and 618 in 2027.
- Nominal GDP per capita (US$): 1,223 in 2025; projected 1,556 in 2026 and 1,565 in 2027.
- Consumer price index (annual average): 23.0 percent in 2025; projected 16.0 percent in 2026 and 15.9 percent in 2027.
- Gross national savings: 22.0 percent of GDP in 2025; projected 24.2 percent in 2026 and 22.4 percent in 2027.
- Investment: 17.2 percent of GDP in 2025; projected 20.3 percent in 2026 and 20.4 percent in 2027.

*Source: NIGERIA — STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2026 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION (May 7, 2026).*

### 6.      The external position remained

### 6.      The external position remained

### External position and reserves
- Current account recorded a surplus of 4.8 percent of GDP in 2025, driven by oil and gas exports and reduced refined fuel imports, with the domestic refinery ramping up production.
- Gross international reserves:
  - Increased to US$46 billion in 2025 from US$40 billion at end-2024.
  - Supported by the current account surplus, US$6 billion net purchases of central bank open market operations (OMOs) by non-residents, and a US$2.3 billion Eurobond issuance.
  - Rose to US$49 billion (30-day moving average) by end-March 2026.
- Net international reserves increased to US$35 billion at end-2025 from US$23 billion at end-2024.
- Reserves pledged under a securities lending arrangement (close to US$8 billion at end-2025) would be excluded from the official reserves figure reported by the central bank.
- The naira appreciated by 10 percent year-on-year against the U.S. dollar in March 2026.

### Government operations and fiscal balances
- Consolidated Government (CGN) 2025 (in percent of GDP):
  - Total revenues: 10.8...10.2
  - Of which: oil: 3.0...3.1
  - Of which: grants: 0.9...0.3
  - Expenditures: 12.0...12.0
  - Overall balance: -1.3...-1.8
  - Financing: 2.4...4.4
  - Statistical discrepancy ("+" = additional spending): 1.2...2.7
  - Non-oil primary balance (from financing side): -3.1...-5.1
- Federal Government (FGN) 2025 (in percent of GDP):
  - Total revenues: 5.3 8.6 4.3 4.3 (as presented in the table)
  - Of which: oil: 0.8 4.9 0.9
  - Of which: VAT and CIT: 0.8 1.2 1.2
  - Of which: grants: 0.9 0.0 0.3
  - Expenditures: 6.8 11.0 6.0
  - Of which: capital spending: 2.2 5.1 1.3
  - Overall balance: -1.5 -2.4 -1.8
  - Financing: 2.4...3.5
  - Statistical discrepancy ("+" = additional spending): 1.0...1.7
  - Non-oil primary balance (from financing side): -1.1...-2.2
  - FGN interest payments (percent of FGN revenue): 40.8 27.5 53.2
- 2026 budget and projections:
  - Staff expects the FGN deficit of 4.4 percent of GDP in 2026, compared with 3.5 percent of GDP in 2025 (financing side).
  - Staff projects a CGN non-oil primary deficit of 5.9 percent of GDP in 2026 up from 5.1 percent of GDP in 2025 (financing side).
  - The draft budget includes a US$5 billion (1.3 percent of GDP) total return swap with an international bank, collateralization of 133 percent with domestic government securities.
  - The authorities may build up further deposits at the CBN which stood at 4.2 percent of GDP at end‑2025 or use resources to prepay expensive debt.
- Text Table 3 / consolidated figures (2026 projection vs 2025):
  - Consolidated Government: Total revenues, including grants: ...10.2...10.8
  - Total Expenditures: ...12.0...15.5
  - Overall balance: ...-1.8...-4.7
  - Financing: ...4.4...4.7
  - Non-oil primary balance (from financing side): ...-5.1...-5.9
- Federal Government detailed projections (2025–26, percent of GDP):
  - Total revenues: 8.6 4.3 5.5 4.9 (as presented)
  - Oil revenues (net): 4.9 0.9 2.5 1.6
  - Non-oil revenues: 3.5 3.0 2.8 3.1
  - Total Expenditures: 11.0 6.0 9.9 9.2
  - Of which: Capital Expenditure: 5.1 1.3 4.4 3.8
  - Overall balance: -2.4 -1.8 -4.4 -4.3
  - Financing: ...3.5...4.3
  - Non-oil primary balance (from financing side): ...-2.2...-3.3
  - FGN interest payments (percent of FGN revenue): 27.5 53.2 43.0 53.7

### Credit and financial sector developments
- Private sector credit:
  - Adjusting for exchange rate valuation effects, private sector credit grew by about 20 percent in 2025, driven by a 16 percent expansion in naira-denominated lending.
  - Private sector credit remains low at 12 percent of GDP in 2025.
  - Credit exposure concentrated in oil and gas, services, manufacturing and industry.
- Bank recapitalization and banking sector metrics:
  - The recapitalization exercise raised about US$3.4 billion in new equity.
  - 33 out of 37 banks met the revised requirements by the end‑March deadline; 4 banks remain under regulatory and judicial processes.
  - Capital adequacy ratio declined to 11.7 percent in Q3-2025, driven by naira depreciation on risk-weighted assets and higher provisioning.
  - NPLs increased to 8 percent in Q3-2025, above the prudential ceiling.
- Insurance sector:
  - Undergoing recapitalization under the 2025 Insurance Industry Reform Act, with a deadline in July 2026.
  - To date, 20 of 58 insurers have submitted for capital verification.
- Pension and nonbank financing:
  - Pension funds face new limits on investing in government securities that could constrain nonbank financing.
  - Banks indicate capacity to absorb more government securities, though this crowds out private credit.

### Outlook and risks
- Baseline growth and inflation projections:
  - Growth expected to be resilient at 4.1 percent in 2026.
  - Over the medium-term, growth projected at just over 4 percent, with services remaining a key driver.
  - Inflation projected to tick up to 17 percent year-on-year at end-2026—about 3½ percentage points higher than projected before the war—and return to the pre-war disinflation path as policies remain tight and supply conditions improve.
- War in the Middle East assumptions and impacts:
  - Staff’s projections assume the war will have limited duration, intensity, and scope, such that disruptions will fade by mid-2026.
  - Staff estimates that, in the baseline (consistent with the April 2026 World Economic Outlook reference scenario), the war shaves off 0.3 percentage points of growth in 2026.
  - Petrol and diesel prices increased by 22.5 and 16 percent, respectively, in March compared to pre-war.
  - Oil/gas production has limited scope to quickly respond to rising prices.
- Breakeven sensitivities for oil price moves:
  - Fiscal breakeven price (US$/bl): 195
  - Change in overall balance for US$10/bl price move (percent of GDP): 0.4
  - Current account breakeven price (US$/bl): 40
  - Change in current account balance for US$10/bl price move (percent of GDP): 1.0
- Downside risks:
  - A further increase in global commodity prices and tightening of financial conditions would weigh on non-oil activity and financing costs, and push up inflation.
  - Deterioration in domestic security could hit oil production, impact fiscal and export revenues, and aggravate poverty and food insecurity.
  - Climate-related shocks and security developments can affect agriculture and food insecurity.
  - Spending pressures from elevated poverty and food insecurity, including in the run-up to the elections, could widen fiscal deficit and increase financing needs.
  - A slowdown in the reform momentum around the elections, and structural constraints—such as infrastructure and human capital gaps—pose risks to growth.
  - Cyberattacks could undermine financial stability.
- Upside risks:
  - Durably high global hydrocarbon prices, lower financing costs, and improvements in investor sentiment could bolster investment, revenues, fx reserves, and growth.
  - Swift implementation of recent changes in tax laws combined with enhanced enforcement could generate fiscal space for social and development priorities.
  - Continued improvements in domestic security could boost agriculture and oil production, increasing fiscal revenues and fiscal space.
- Alternative (adverse) scenario guidance:
  - If global headwinds become protracted, non-oil activity would slow further, inflation pressures would mount, and capital outflow pressures could intensify.
  - Policy response should be guided by the IMF’s Integrated Policy Framework and the IMF’s Institutional View on The Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows.
  - Recommended actions: adjusting monetary and fiscal policies, allowing the exchange rate to fluctuate, undertaking structural reforms to improve the business environment and attract FDI, and phasing out reliance on short-term portfolio inflows.

### Policy discussions and recommendations
- Overarching stance:
  - Macroeconomic policies should safeguard internal and external balance with a neutral fiscal stance in 2026 to support tight monetary policy.
  - Completing the roll-out and budgeting for the cash transfer system is needed to alleviate poverty and food insecurity.
  - Over the medium-term: transition to inflation targeting, enhance public financial management and budget practices, continue revenue mobilization efforts, improve security, accelerate structural reforms, and address infrastructure bottlenecks.
- Fiscal policy recommendations:
  - Staff recommends a neutral fiscal stance in 2026 while prioritizing growth-enhancing spending and providing support to the most vulnerable.
  - Keep the non-oil primary balance unchanged from 2025 (an adjustment of 0.8 percent of GDP compared to staff’s projections).
  - The adjustment can come from lower capital expenditure which would still be higher than in 2025.
  - Ensure sufficient allocations for the cash transfer system; expand cost-effective public works programs for youth, less-skilled individuals and vulnerable households.
  - If administrative revenue gains materialize, reduce the need to hold back capital spending.
- Transparency and public financial management:
  - Route remittances of hydrocarbon revenues directly to the Federation Account to improve fiscal transparency and revenue availability.
  - Include national priority projects in the budget and continue phasing out Federal Accounts Allocation Committee deductions.
  - Complete and automate reconciliation of budget execution data across the Budget Office, Debt Management Office, and OAGF, and resume regular publication of audited accounts for the FGN.
- Debt and financing cautions:
  - The US$5 billion total return swap arrangement exposes the government to margin calls if the fx value of naira securities drops (naira depreciation, higher interest rates) and could constrain monetary or exchange rate policy.
  - Staff’s projections include the full value of the collateral issued as a liability in the DSA until the swap matures.
  - Pension fund investment limits and increased government securities issuance could crowd out private credit.

*Source: Nigerian authorities; and Fund staff calculations and projections.*

### 19.      Going forward, further steps to strengthen the budget process, and fiscal

### 19.      Going forward, further steps to strengthen the budget process, and fiscal

### Budget process, fiscal transparency, governance, and fiscal risks
- Timely passage of the budget and phasing out overlapping budgets would strengthen budget implementation.
- Adopt annual reporting of general government fiscal data to allow fiscal monitoring at national level and use fiscal policy as an active macroeconomic management tool.
- Continue efforts to eliminate spending outside the budget sphere and improve fiscal governance.
- Establish and maintain an integrated fiscal risk management framework in line with the IMF CD recommendations to help monitor risks, in particular from oil-backed loans and SOEs.
- Energy sector reforms are needed to reduce ongoing losses from the average tariff being below cost recovery and collection challenges, an implicit subsidy that constitutes a contingent liability.
- Electricity sector arrears at end-2025 were about ¾ percent of GDP, and are expected to increase by ½ percent of GDP.
- The IMF stands ready to provide further CD to strengthen public financial management.

### Revenue mobilization and fiscal space
- Continued revenue mobilization is essential to create fiscal space for development and social spending over the medium term.
- Staff cautions limited space to sustain the 2026 ramp up of capital expenditure over the medium-term in the absence of further revenue gains.
- Robust implementation of the new tax laws should gradually increase revenue collection; leveraging digitalization (e.g., fiscalization, e-invoicing, tax ID registration) would reduce leakages and mitigate corruption vulnerabilities.
- Further tax policy changes likely needed to complement administrative gains:
  - increasing the VAT rate;
  - extending VAT to fuel products;
  - rationalizing tax expenditures, in particular VAT exemptions on extractive industries and some customs duties;
  - introducing telecom excises.
- Timing of reforms must consider the poverty and food insecurity situation and ensure the cash transfer system is in place and funded.
- IMF support noted: resident advisor on tax administration and CD on customs from the regional technical assistance center, with readiness to provide further assistance at the authorities’ request.

### Public debt, contingent liabilities, and outlook
- Public debt stood at 36.1 percent in 2025, down from 39.3 percent of GDP in 2024, due to a favorable interest-growth differential and naira appreciation.
- Gains in macroeconomic stability, a stronger external position, and improved security should support growth and put debt on a stable path.
- Risks to the outlook: global uncertainty, weak domestic revenue mobilization, potential expenditure slippage.
- Contingent liabilities, if recognized and realized, would increase the public and publicly guaranteed debt stock.
- Authorities’ views:
  - Repeal and Re‑enactment of the 2024 and 2025 budgets ensures spending is now included in the budgets; estimated 2025 statistical discrepancy would be lower once added spending is included in revised fiscal outturn reports.
  - Commitment that all public expenditure will remain strictly within the budget framework and no reintroduction of fuel subsidies.
  - Authorities consider staff’s estimates of revenue gains too conservative and underscore commitment to reach more beneficiaries via the cash transfer program.

### Monetary policy
- Monetary policy must remain focused on bringing down inflation and anchoring inflation expectations.
- CBN actions:
  - Maintained a tight policy stance with a positive real MPR.
  - Cut the MPR by 50 bps in February 2026 to 26.5 percent.
  - Lowered the Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) by 5 percentage points to 45 percent.
  - Adjusted the corridor around the MPR.
- Policy guidance:
  - Given changed inflation outlook, keeping the MPR unchanged for now and carefully monitoring inflation, exchange market, and fiscal developments is appropriate.
  - CBN may need to sterilize fx inflows from increased oil prices.
  - Monetary policy should be data driven and respond if inflation pressures are more persistent or less pronounced, including from a strengthening exchange rate.
- Progress toward inflation targeting welcomed, but transmission remains weak; further steps needed for MPR to fully anchor lending and deposit rates:
  - Introduced a 7-day OMO instrument to manage short-term liquidity rates.
  - Consider CRR averaging to manage daily liquidity fluctuations and forecast errors.
  - Standing facilities to provide a stable corridor for short-term rates.
  - Over time: normalize the CRR, implement reserve requirements on an average basis, broaden coverage to include foreign currency deposits.
  - Deepen analytical work on inflation target specification; establish an inflation target setting process independent of the budget cycle; extend policy horizon through MPC-owned forecasts; develop clear communication including the quantitative inflation target.
- Authorities’ views: reaffirm commitment to reducing inflation with a calibrated data-driven approach; MPR is primary policy anchor; will normalize CRR over time once monetary policy transmission strengthens.

### External stability and exchange rate policy
- Nigeria’s external position in 2025 is assessed as stronger than implied by fundamentals and desirable policies (Annex VI), with caution due to sizable net errors and omissions.
- Strong current account driven by improved trade balance: higher oil and gas exports and lower refined oil imports due to Dangote Refinery supplies.
- Diaspora remittances improved since mid-2023, supported by fx reforms and transition to a more market-determined exchange rate.
- EBA-Lite REER model indicates a REER gap of –25.6 percent, implying the REER is weaker than levels implied by fundamentals.
- Closing the REER gap would require:
  - slowing the pace of fx reserve accumulation when appropriate;
  - allowing greater two-way flexibility of the exchange rate;
  - strengthening fx market functioning;
  - continued fiscal and structural reforms that support non-oil imports and broader external rebalancing.
- Gross international reserves of US$46 billion at end-2025 are estimated at 157 percent of the IMF’s Assessment of Reserve Adequacy (ARA) metric (above the 100–150 percent range considered broadly adequate).
- Policy priorities:
  - Gradually reduce reliance on OMO-related investment while encouraging shift toward other domestic assets (government securities, equities);
  - Diversify foreign exchange earnings, including further strengthening remittance inflows through official channels;
  - Advance structural reforms to attract more stable FDI.
- FX interventions:
  - CBN uses a model-based framework developed with Fund advice to assess fx market developments and decide on interventions.
  - Temporary FXIs can address disorderly market conditions but should not substitute for warranted macroeconomic adjustments.
  - Publishing the broad principles of the CBN’s foreign exchange intervention framework can further strengthen fx market functioning.
- Capital flow measures:
  - March 2026: eliminated the CFM requiring International Oil Companies to hold 50 percent of repatriated export proceeds in Nigeria for 90 days before transferring offshore.
  - Authorities intend to phase out three remaining outflow CFMs: (1) ban on fx purchases in Nigeria for investing in fx securities abroad; (2) payment limits on naira-denominated credit and debit cards for overseas transactions; (3) net open positions limit should not exceed 20 percent short or 0 percent long of shareholders’ funds.
  - In line with the Fund’s Institutional View, these CFMs should be phased out as fx pressures abate and macroeconomic and financial stability is restored.
- Multiple Currency Practices (MCPs) identified by staff over the past 12 months:
  - MCP from use of the buying rate determined as previous day`s WAR minus one naira for CBN fx purchases from MDAs and oil/oil related companies; latest impermissible spread observed on March 23, 2026 (as of April 27, 2026).
  - MCP from use of the selling rate determined as previous day`s WAR plus 2 percent commission for CBN fx sales to MDAs; latest impermissible spread observed on April 22, 2026 (as of April 27, 2026).
  - Staff encourages authorities to eliminate these official actions.
- Authorities’ response: CBN expects upcoming FX Manual to address measures; does not consider official actions MCPs and characterizes the 2 percent commission as cost-recovery; will review and take necessary actions given Fund framework.

### Financial sector policies and stability
- Bank recapitalization successfully completed, enhancing resilience and supporting financial stability; most institutions meet revised capital requirements.
- Vulnerabilities remain:
  - Capital buffers under pressure from higher credit provisioning after withdrawal of temporary forbearance.
  - A more prolonged tightening cycle could further weigh on asset quality.
  - Capital buffers, enhanced supervision, and more granular stress testing provide a cushion.
- Structural impediments and sovereign–bank linkages constrain financial intermediation:
  - Banks’ holdings of government securities are 22 percent of total assets.
  - High CRR requirements and structural constraints crowd out private credit.
  - Pension sector is 6.4 percent of GDP and concentrated in government securities; recent reforms could support diversification.
  - Increased government borrowing risks deepening sovereign–bank linkages.
- Progress on Basel III alignment:
  - Several macroprudential tools in active use: stress testing frameworks, loan to deposit ratio, capital adequacy requirements, limits on NPLs.
  - Ongoing bottom-up stress testing exercise noted; shift toward risk-based capital requirements.
  - Key elements not yet operationalized or enforced: countercyclical capital buffer and liquidity coverage ratio.
  - Recommendation: establish a roadmap for adopting remaining standards.
- Stablecoins:
  - Growing use of U.S. dollar‑denominated stablecoins for cross-border transactions presents opportunities and risks (Annex VII).
  - Risks: monetary sovereignty, capital flow management, financial stability, financial integrity (digital dollarization; cross-border transactions outside the formal system).
  - Policy priorities: maintain confidence in the naira through sound macro policy; strengthen oversight and supervisory capacity; bring stablecoin arrangements within regulatory perimeter with robust licensing, consumer protection, and reporting requirements.
  - Close coordination between CBN and Securities and Exchange Commission essential to ensure coherent oversight and avoid regulatory gaps.
- AML/CFT:
  - Progress in improving AML/CFT framework is commendable, but continued efforts required to combat illicit financial flows.
  - Ongoing risks from corruption, fraud, and terrorism financing.
  - Continued strengthening of the AML/CFT framework needed, including measures to mitigate vulnerabilities in high-risk areas such as the crypto-asset sector.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpt.*

### 37.      Authorities’ Views. The authorities stressed that they have substantially strengthened

### 1ngaea2026001 - 37.      Authorities’ Views.

### Authorities’ views on financial supervision and reform
- The authorities stressed that they have substantially strengthened supervision, while the recapitalization exercise is expected to enhance the resilience of the financial sector.
- Further progress is being made toward Basel III implementation.
- A joint CBN–SEC regulatory framework is being developed to enhance oversight of stablecoin activities.
- Follow-up to the 2013 Financial Sector Assessment was summarized in the 2024 Article IV Consultations. Since then, the authorities have further strengthened macroprudential oversight and risk preparedness and have continued to enhance Development Finance Schemes.

### E. Structural Reforms — objectives and staff priorities
- Authorities’ objective: achieve medium-term growth of 7–12 percent.
- The 2026-30 National Development Plan is still under preparation; policy interventions focus on infrastructure, the electricity sector, and supporting small businesses.
- Staff emphasizes reform areas crucial to unlocking inclusive growth:
  - Near-term: further enhancing security to support hydrocarbon and agriculture production; cut red tape in trade (examples: cumbersome procedures for exports/imports and ending the pre -shipment inspection of nonoil exports) to make the most of the National Single Window.
  - Longer-term: a productivity-led push—improve agricultural productivity through mechanization, developing agriculture value chains and promoting R&D in agriculture; develop infrastructure and accelerate electricity sector reforms to stimulate private investment and boost productivity; increase spending on education and health; facilitate access to financing.
  - Governance: address multifaceted governance challenges as identified in Annex IX of the 2024 Article IV Report to unlock growth potential and strengthen the social contract.
- Authorities’ view: broadly agreed with staff’s priorities and see them reflected in a sequenced reform strategy—from stabilization to consolidation and, over time, productivity-enhancing measures—with scaling up infrastructure investment and electricity-sector reforms as top priorities.

### F. Macroeconomic Statistics — data quality and needs
- Improving the quality, availability, and timeliness of data would enhance policy formulation.
- Nigeria’s economic data have shortcomings that hamper surveillance, particularly affecting assessment of fiscal, external and monetary sectors (Annex VIII).
- Priority statistical improvements:
  - Address issues around fiscal reporting—including enhancing consistency across agencies, expanding coverage, and improving granularity—to facilitate timelier fiscal assessment.
  - Continue work to reduce balance-of-payments errors and omissions to strengthen external stability analysis.
- The IMF stands ready to support data improvements through CD.

### Staff Appraisal — macroeconomic stance, fiscal and monetary recommendations, and risks
- Reforms since 2023 have improved macroeconomic stability and resilience.
- Challenges: uncertain global environment, high poverty and food insecurity, difficult domestic security situation.
- Policy stance and fiscal guidance:
  - A neutral fiscal stance in 2026 is warranted, while prioritizing growth-enhancing investments and social protection spending.
  - Under staff’s revenue projections, curtail the ambitious capital expenditure plans which would still leave capital expenditure above the 2025 levels.
  - Staff urges authorities to withstand election-related spending pressures and stick to their commitment to not bringing back fuel subsidies.
  - Within the budget envelope, allocate for the cash transfer system to provide temporary and targeted support given prospects for poverty and food insecurity to increase further.
  - Caution: complex financing instruments that involve high collateral and possible margin calls introduce additional fiscal risks and could constrain monetary or exchange rate policy.
- Revenue and public finance reforms:
  - Revenue mobilization, enhancing public investment efficiency, and improving public financial management and transparency are essential to generate fiscal space and contain risks.
  - Staff welcomes tax reforms that modernize the tax system, increase progressivity, tackle corruption vulnerabilities, improve compliance and enforcement, and reduce leakages and informality.
  - Recent initiatives to reduce hydrocarbon revenue deductions from the Federation Account and bring large infrastructure projects into the budget appropriation processes are important for transparency and accountability.
  - Over the medium-term, and with a funded and well-functioning cash transfer system, bringing tax rates in line with regional peers may be needed to achieve the government’s revenue objective and create space for social and development priorities.
  - Further progress is needed to strengthen the budget process and enhance fiscal reporting, transparency, and governance.
- Monetary policy:
  - The CBN’s tight monetary policy with positive real rates is appropriate.
  - With a less favorable inflation outlook than at the start of the year, a tighter-for-longer posture is warranted, while remaining data-driven.
  - Mopping up excess liquidity, including from fx inflows, would be important to steer inflation downwards.
  - As the CBN moves towards inflation targeting, the MPR should be at the center of monetary policy operations to anchor lending and deposit rates.
  - A clear communication strategy is key, including guidance on quantitative targets for inflation targeting.
- External sector and exchange rate policy:
  - Nigeria’s external position at end-2025 is assessed to be stronger than the level implied by fundamentals and desirable policies.
  - Large foreign holdings of OMOs represent a roll-over risk and carry elevated yields.
  - Staff recommends gradually reducing reliance on OMO-related foreign portfolio investment while encouraging a shift toward other domestic assets, further diversifying foreign exchange earnings, and advancing reforms to attract FDI.
  - Staff recommends eliminating the remaining legacy exchange restrictions, the remaining CFMs and the official actions leading to MCPs, for which approvals are not being sought.
  - In line with the IMF’s Integrated Policy Framework, the exchange rate should continue to play its role as shock absorber; foreign exchange interventions, under certain circumstances, may play a complementary role in addressing risks to price stability.
  - With a floating regime, allowing the exchange rate to fluctuate and adjusting monetary and fiscal policies remain the appropriate policy response to external shocks.
  - Temporary FXIs can help mitigate the impact of confidence swings and the pass-through to inflation. Ensuring market participants understand the CBN’s FXI framework will enhance traction and support the transition to inflation targeting.
- Financial sector resilience and supervision:
  - The financial system remains resilient, with pockets of vulnerabilities.
  - Staff welcomes the CBN's forthcoming risk-based stress testing exercise and encourages the authorities to maintain close supervisory monitoring, accelerate Basel III implementation, and address structural impediments to private sector credit intermediation to support growth.
  - The authorities should ensure that stablecoin arrangements are regulated in line with international best practices, supported by close and effective coordination between CBN and Securities and Exchange Commission.
- Growth strategy:
  - Focus on policies with near-term payoffs to ease the adjustment–growth trade-off and create conditions for stronger and more inclusive growth.
  - Reforms with longer gestation would lift potential growth over the medium term and help Nigeria exit fragility.
  - Addressing governance challenges remains an overarching reform need, including strengthening fiscal management and laying a strong foundation for private sector-led growth.

*Source: 1ngaea2026001 - 37. Authorities’ Views.*

### 50.      Staff recommends the standard 12-month cycle for the next Article IV Consultations.

### 1ngaea2026001 - 50.      Staff recommends the standard 12-month cycle for the next Article IV Consultations.

### Overview
- Staff recommends the standard 12-month cycle for the next Article IV Consultations.
- Key macroeconomic baseline and projections cover 2022–31 and are presented across national income, prices, fiscal operations, monetary aggregates, external sector, and financial soundness indicators.

### Major macroeconomic projections and indicators
- Real GDP (at 2019 market prices): 4.3 (2022 Act.), 3.3 (2023 Act.), 4.1 (2024 Act.), 4.0 (2025 Est.), 4.1 (2026 Proj.), 4.3 (2027 Proj.), 4.1 (2028 Proj.), 4.2 (2029 Proj.), 4.2 (2030 Proj.), 4.2 (2031 Proj.)
- Oil and Gas GDP: 24.8, 4.4, 5.5, 8.5, 4.5, 4.1, 4.1, 4.9, 4.1, 4.1 (2022–31 series)
- Non-oil GDP: 3.8, 3.3, 4.0, 3.9, 4.0, 4.3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.2, 4.2 (2022–31 series)
- Production of crude oil (million barrels per day): 1.38 (2022), 1.50 (2023), 1.55 (2024), 1.64 (2025), 1.71 (2026), 1.75 (2027), 1.80 (2028), 1.88 (2029), 1.93 (2030), 2.00 (2031)
- Nominal GDP at market prices (trillions of naira): 274, 314, 373, 442, 529, 618, 710, 813, 927, 1,057 (2022–31 series)
- Nominal GDP per capita (US$): 2,893 (2022), 2,139 (2023), 1,084 (2024), 1,223 (2025), 1,556 (2026), 1,565 (2027), 1,604 (2028), 1,684 (2029), 1,761 (2030), 1,842 (2031)
- GDP deflator: 8.0, 10.8, 14.1, 13.9, 15.2, 11.9, 10.4, 9.8, 9.5, 9.4 (2022–31 series)
- Consumer price index (annual average): 18.8, 24.7, 33.2, 23.0, 16.0, 15.9, 12.7, 10.0, 10.0, 10.0 (2022–31 series)
- Consumer price index (end of period): 21.3, 28.9, 34.8, 15.2, 17.0, 14.5, 11.0, 10.0, 10.0, 10.0 (2022–31 series)

### Fiscal position and public finances
- Consolidated government: Total revenues and grants (percent of GDP): 6.6 (2022 Act.), 7.3 (2023 Act.), 10.8 (2024 Act.), 10.2 (2025 Est.), 10.8 (2026 Proj.), 10.6 (2027 Proj.), 10.3 (2028 Proj.), 10.5 (2029 Proj.), 10.4 (2030 Proj.), 10.4 (2031 Proj.)
- Of which: oil and gas revenue (percent of GDP): 2.7, 2.4, 3.0, 3.1, 3.8, 3.5, 3.2, 3.2, 3.1, 3.0 (2022–31 series)
- Total expenditure and net lending (percent of GDP): 10.6, 10.4, 12.0, 12.0, 15.5, 14.2, 13.4, 13.1, 13.1, 13.1 (2022–31 series)
- Overall balance (percent of GDP): -4.0 (2022 Act.), -3.1 (2023 Act.), -1.3 (2024 Act.), -1.8 (2025 Budget/Est.), -4.7 (2026 Proj.), -3.6 (2027 Proj.), -3.1 (2028 Proj.), -2.7 (2029 Proj.), -2.7 (2030 Proj.), -2.8 (2031 Proj.)
- Non-oil primary balance (from financing side; percent of GDP): -6.4, -3.5, -3.1, -5.1, -5.9, -4.6, -3.9, -3.5, -3.3, -3.4 (2022–31 series)
- Public gross debt (percent of GDP): 29.8, 36.3, 39.3, 36.1, 35.4, 36.7, 36.5, 35.8, 35.3, 34.9 (2022–31 series)
- Of which: FX denominated debt (percent of GDP): 7.5, 13.5, 19.0, 16.9, 17.2, 19.1, 19.6, 19.7, 19.4, 18.9 (2022–31 series)
- FGN interest payments (percent of FGN revenue): 61.2, 83.8, 40.8, 27.5, 53.7, 52.4, 52.2, 52.2, 53.4, 53.4 (table series across pages)
- Federal Government (percent of GDP): Total revenue: 2.4 (2022 Act.), 3.1 (2023 Act.), 5.3 (2024 Act.), 8.6 (2025 Budget/Est.), 4.3 (2026 Proj.), 5.1 (2027 Proj.), 5.5 (2028 Proj.), 4.9 (2029 Proj.), 4.5 (2030 Proj.), 4.8 (2031 Proj.)
- Federal Government total expenditure (percent of GDP): 5.5, 5.9, 6.8, 11.0, 6.0, 8.8, 9.9, 9.2, 8.2, 7.5 (2022–31 series)

### Fiscal levels in naira (Federal Government, selected lines)
- Total Revenue and Grants (billions of naira): 6,454 (2022 Act.), 9,728 (2023 Act.), 19,733 (2024 Act.), 38,019 (2025 Budget/Est.), 18,888 (2026 MTEF/Budget), 28,218 (2027 MTEF/Proj.), 30,808 (2028 MTEF/Proj.), 26,085 (2029 Proj.), 31,535 (2030 Proj.), 29,705 (2031 Proj.)
- Total expenditure (billions of naira): 14,991 (2022 Act.), 18,609 (2023 Act.), 25,233 (2024 Act.), 48,402 (2025 Budget/Est.), 26,678 (2026 MTEF/Budget), 48,788 (2027 MTEF/Proj.), 55,261 (2028 MTEF/Proj.), 48,627 (2029 Proj.), 48,054 (2030 Proj.), 50,679 (2031 Proj.)
- Overall balance (billions of naira): -8,536 (2022 Act.), -8,880 (2023 Act.), -5,500 (2024 Act.), -10,383 (2025 Budget/Est.), -7,790 (2026 MTEF/Budget), -20,570 (2027 MTEF/Proj.), -24,453 (2028 MTEF/Proj.), -22,541 (2029 Proj.), -16,519 (2030 Proj.), -20,974 (2031 Proj.)
- FGN Total Debt (mem. item, billions of naira): 74,490 (2022), 104,093 (2023), 134,756 (2024), 146,740 (2025), 172,804 (2026), 213,737 (2027), 247,239 (2028), 280,157 (2029), 316,192 (2030), 357,954 (2031)

### External sector and balance of payments
- Current account balance (US$ billions): 3.5 (2022 Act.), 6.4 (2023 Act.), 19.0 (2024 Act.), 14.0 (2025 Act.), 14.7 (2026 Proj.), 7.9 (2027 Proj.), 6.8 (2028 Proj.), 9.0 (2029 Proj.), 10.7 (2030 Proj.), 11.4 (2031 Proj.)
- Trade balance (US$ billions): 6.0 (2022 Act.), 8.1 (2023 Act.), 13.2 (2024 Act.), 14.5 (2025 Act.), 24.1 (2026 Proj.), 16.6 (2027 Proj.), 15.5 (2028 Proj.), 18.5 (2029 Proj.), 21.0 (2030 Proj.), 22.6 (2031 Proj.)
- Exports (US$ billions): 64.2 (2022 Act.), 55.8 (2023 Act.), 53.0 (2024 Act.), 57.5 (2025 Act.), 68.8 (2026 Proj.), 64.3 (2027 Proj.), 62.9 (2028 Proj.), 67.4 (2029 Proj.), 71.2 (2030 Proj.), 73.8 (2031 Proj.)
  - Crude Oil exports: 49.8, 44.0, 36.9, 31.5, 37.2, 34.4, 34.7, 34.0, 32.5, 34.2 (2022–31 series)
  - Refined Oil exports: 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 6.1, 7.6, 6.1, 5.3, 10.0, 14.6, 13.9 (2022–31 series)
  - Gas exports: 7.4, 5.8, 8.7, 10.5, 12.9, 11.8, 9.9, 9.5, 9.2, 9.6 (2022–31 series)
  - Other exports: 7.1, 6.0, 7.5, 9.3, 11.1, 12.0, 12.9, 13.8, 14.9, 16.0 (2022–31 series)
- Imports (US$ billions): -58.2 (2022 Act.), -47.7 (2023 Act.), -39.8 (2024 Act.), -43.0 (2025 Act.), -44.7 (2026 Proj.), -47.7 (2027 Proj.), -47.4 (2028 Proj.), -48.8 (2029 Proj.), -50.3 (2030 Proj.), -51.1 (2031 Proj.)
- Gross official reserves (CBN definition, US$ billions): 36.6 (end-2022), 33.2 (end-2023), 40.2 (end-2024), 45.8 (end-2025), 58.1 (end-2026), 62.0 (end-2027), 62.8 (end-2028), 64.2 (end-2029), 64.7 (end-2030), 66.4 (end-2031)
- Equivalent months of prospective imports of G&S (reserves): 6.7, 6.9, 7.7, 8.1, 9.7, 10.2, 9.9, 9.7, 9.5, 9.5 (2022–31 series)
- Price of Nigerian oil (US$ per barrel): 99.08 (2022), 82.37 (2023), 79.96 (2024), 68.38 (2025), 80.27 (2026), 71.56 (2027), 69.76 (2028), 69.46 (2029), 69.46 (2030), 69.46 (2031)
- External debt outstanding (US$ billions): 108.3 (2022), 109.2 (2023), 105.9 (2024), 109.3 (2025), 119.3 (2026), 132.0 (2027), 141.9 (2028), 149.4 (2029), 154.1 (2030), 158.4 (2031)

### Monetary sector and CBN balance sheet
- Broad money (percent change; end of period): 17.45 (2022), 1.95 (2023), 0.3 (2024), 14.6 (2025), 15.9 (2026), 15.9 (2027), 14.3 (2028), 13.3 (2029), 13.3 (2030), 13.4 (2031)
- Credit to the private sector (y/y, percent): 11.05 (2022), 3.63 (2023), 30.1 (2024), -1.2 (2025), 14.0 (2026), 14.2 (2027), 19.3 (2028), 18.1 (2029), 17.3 (2030), 16.5 (2031)
- CBN Analytical Balance Sheet (selected lines, billions of naira):
  - Net foreign assets: 4,995 (2022 Act.), 9,255 (2023 Act.), 25,820 (2024 Act.), 30,327 (2025 Est.), 43,542 (2026 Proj.), 48,914 (2027 Proj.), 51,407 (2028 Proj.), 56,041 (2029 Proj.), 58,727 (2030 Proj.), 62,621 (2031 Proj.)
  - Foreign assets: 16,452, 36,983, 65,782, 77,736, 92,714, 98,589, 99,857, 102,003, 102,778, 105,328 (2022–31)
  - Foreign liabilities: -11,458, -27,728, -39,962, -47,410, -49,172, -49,675, -48,449, -45,962, -44,050, -42,707 (2022–31)
  - Net domestic assets: 11,038, 15,480, 6,853, 7,308, -2,627, -4,577, -3,303, -3,536, -1,892, -955 (2022–31)
  - Reserve money: 16,033, 24,736, 32,673, 37,635, 40,914, 44,337, 48,104, 52,505, 56,835, 61,666 (2022–31)
- Monetary Survey (selected lines, billions of naira):
  - Net foreign assets (system): 3,843 (2022), 9,338 (2023), 37,684 (2024), 42,774 (2025), 55,424 (2026), 63,005 (2027), 66,770 (2028), 72,552 (2029), 76,356 (2030), 81,443 (2031)
  - Net domestic assets (system): 48,345, 69,914, 81,394, 93,736, 102,808, 120,367, 142,757, 164,891, 192,553, 223,373 (2022–31)
  - Broad money (M3, billions of naira): 52,187 (2022), 79,252 (2023), 119,078 (2024), 136,510 (2025), 158,232 (2026), 183,372 (2027), 209,527 (2028), 237,443 (2029), 268,909 (2030), 304,816 (2031)

### Financial soundness indicators (selected, percent, end of period)
- Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets: 13.8 (2022), 13.0 (2023), 11.0 (2024), 12.5 (2025), 14.0 (2026), 15.3 (2027), 15.6 (2028), 13.4 (2024Q4 onwards reported), 11.7 (2025Q3)
- Non-Performing Loans to Total Gross Loans: 4.0 (2022), 4.4 (2023), 5.4 (2024), 4.1 (2025), 4.9 (2026), 4.9 (2027), 6.0 (2028), 5.8 (2024Q4), 8.0 (2025Q3)
- Return on Assets: 1.4 (2022), 3.1 (2023), 3.4 (2024), 3.9 (2025), 3.5 (2026), 3.5 (2027), 3.2 (2028), 3.3 (2024Q4), 3.0 (2025Q3)
- Liquid Assets to Total Assets (Liquid Asset Ratio): 25.4 (2022), 18.0 (2023), 16.5 (2024), 19.3 (2025), 19.6 (2026), 18.3 (2027), 19.7 (2028), 20.9 (2024Q4), 24.0 (2025Q3)

### Selected risks and fiscal-financial pressures (implied by data)
- Elevated and rising FGN total debt in nominal naira terms: 74,490 (2022) to 357,954 (2031) (mem. item)
- Significant share of public debt denominated in foreign currency: FX denominated debt shares 7.5 to 19.6 (percent of GDP across 2022–31 series)
- High interest burden relative to revenues: FGN interest payments as percent of FGN revenue: 61.2 (2022) and episodic values up to 83.8 (2023), and recurring above 40 percent in projections
- Large swings in gross official reserves and reserve adequacy measures: gross official reserves (CBN definition) move from 36.6 (end-2022) to 66.4 (end-2031) (US$ billions); months of imports range from 6.7 to 10.2 in projections
- Current account and trade balances show notable volatility tied to oil exports and refined oil dynamics (e.g., Refined Oil exports jump from 0.0 to 6.1 and beyond in projections)

### Policy-relevant indicators and implications (from numbers)
- Inflation trajectory: CPI annual average and end-period rates project a decline from 33.2 (2024 Act.) to 10.0 (from 2029 onward), implying disinflation over the projection horizon.
- Growth composition: Non-oil GDP growth remains positive and steady (3.8 to mid-4s), while oil and gas GDP fluctuates, reflecting volatile oil sector performance and production (1.38 to 2.00 million bpd).
- Fiscal consolidation challenge: Consolidated overall balance improves over time but remains negative (e.g., -4.7 percent of GDP in 2026 projected), while non-oil primary balances reflect persistent deficits (e.g., -5.9 percent of GDP in 2026 Proj.).
- Financing mix: Projected financing shows both external and domestic components with sizable domestic bank financing and nonbank financing in naira terms; public external debt in percent of GDP rises in the medium term (mem. items).

*Source: Nigerian authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.*

### Annex I. Status of Key Recommendations from

### Annex I. Status of Key Recommendations from the 2025 Article IV Consultation

### Fiscal: status of recommendations
- Step up revenue mobilization
  - A set of new tax laws that became effective January 1, 2026, modernizes the tax system and should facilitate compliance and enforcement, including with further digitizing revenue collection.
  - A presidential order mandates direct remittances of hydrocarbon revenues to the government, bypassing the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Limited (NNPCL).
- Ensure fuel subsidy savings accrue to the government
  - Challenges remain in tracking if and how fuel subsidy savings accrue to the budget.
- Prioritize adjustments to recurrent spending to protect growth-enhancing investments while accelerating delivery of cash transfers under the cash transfer program
  - In 2025, recurrent and capital expenditure were both under executed.
  - For 2026, publication of the budget is still outstanding.
  - Enrollment in the cash transfer program has progressed, but at most three payments of naira 25,000 (~US$ 18) have been made to individual households since 2023.

### Monetary and financial: status of recommendations
- Maintain tight monetary policy and announce a disinflation path to contain inflation and external pressures
  - The monetary policy stance was appropriately tightened in 2025.
- Eliminate remaining legacy exchange rate restrictions as conditions permit
  - One legacy CFM has been removed.

### Structural reforms: status of recommendations
- Strengthen security to stop oil theft and protect farmers and herders
  - In 2025, the government and security agencies intensified operations to curb oil theft and protect critical infrastructure, but insecurity persists in rural areas.
- Enhance governance frameworks to safeguard credit quality, manage risks, and ensure AML/CFT compliance in fast-growing fintech and crypto sectors
  - Nigeria exited from the FATF grey-list exit, while enhancing risk management and governance amid growing fintech and crypto activity.
  - Covid-era forbearance has been phased out. Banks were required to increase capital.
- Enhance governance frameworks and anti-corruption frameworks
  - The Federal Audit Service Act has been passed by both chambers and is awaiting presidential assent, while broader progress on earlier anti-corruption and rule-of-law recommendations remains limited.
- Amend the EFCC law to assure independence
  - An EFCC (Establishment) Act amendment bill has been filed in the House of Representatives and is now in the legislative process for approval.

*Source: Annex I. Status of Key Recommendations from the 2025 Article IV Consultation (as provided).*

---

### Annex II. Capacity Development Strategy Fiscal Year 2026

### A. Context
- After 3 years of reforms, policies remain focused on preserving macroeconomic stability gains while supporting higher and more inclusive growth.
- A tighter policy mix and fx market reforms stabilized the naira, helped the ongoing disinflation and contributed to external sustainability.
- Key remaining challenges:
  - Food insecurity and poverty have increased.
  - Inflation remains in double-digit territory.
  - Fiscal space is constrained by a high interest-to-revenue ratio.
  - Large infrastructure gaps continue to weigh on inclusive growth.
- Authorities’ priorities: bringing inflation down further, continuing domestic revenue mobilization, and enabling the private sector to drive long-term growth, jobs, diversification, and inclusion.
- Fund capacity development (CD) has been instrumental across revenue mobilization, debt management, financial supervision, disaster risk financing, and ongoing work on inflation targeting.
- The electoral cycle could further slow CD demand and implementation; as the next presidential elections approach in Q1 2027, the window for additional major reforms has closed.
- Immediate CD focus: technical support to fine-tune existing tools and reforms, prioritizing support for tax authorities implementing the new tax laws in effect since January 1, ringfencing hydrocarbon revenues, strengthening fiscal risk management, and progressing toward inflation targeting.
- Stronger engagement on the revenue agenda is desirable.

### B. CD Strategy and Priorities
- Alignment and delivery
  - CD is closely aligned with staff’s policy recommendations and the authorities’ macroeconomic objectives.
  - CD intensity is broadly in line with sub-Saharan Africa and Fragile and Conflict Affected States.
  - Continued prioritization: revenue mobilization, inflation targeting, financial stability, and macroeconomic statistics, supported by HQ and Afritac West II.
  - Resident advisor on revenue administration maintained given criticality.
- Implementation challenges
  - Engagement and coordination challenges within government and proximity to the 2027 elections make major changes and implementation tricky.
  - Staff will assess government appetite for reforms and tailor CD to priorities high on the government’s own agenda.
  - The forthcoming Nigeria Development Plan (2026-30) will be an important reference for medium-term CD priorities.

### C. Key Overall CD Priorities Going Forward
- Tax policy and revenue administration
  - Traction achieved through TaxProMax solution, petroleum sector tax regime implementation, and TADAT-based administration improvements.
  - Follow-up HQ mission reviewed progress after enactment of four Tax Acts effective January 1, 2026.
  - CD contributions: compliance improvement plan focused on VAT (subsequently extended to CIT), digitalized audits in telecommunications, human resource performance management improvements, strategic management framework development.
  - Customs-related CD: strengthened controls and enforcement of rules of origin, redesign and optimization of cargo control and customs clearance processes, forthcoming assistance to assess implementation options for the National Single Window system for trade, support on risk-based compliance and fraud.
  - Climate-related fiscal policy work advanced integration of climate considerations into tax policy.
  - Going forward: continue resident advisor support; focus on technical enhancements (compliance risk management, tax arrears management, revenue gap analyses, capacity in audit and compliance in specialized sectors, tax expenditure monitoring, electronic invoicing assessment, oil and gas administration, AfCFTA assessment).
  - Additional needed progress: improving taxpayer services using behavioral insights, strengthening project portfolio management, and cascading strategic plans.
  - Note: momentum on oil and gas administration CD limited due to lower authorities’ engagement.

- Monetary and exchange rate policies
  - Traction: CBN moving towards inflation targeting with Fund CD; inflation targeting scoping undertaken; CBN staff exploring long-run inflation target dimensions with research support.
  - Follow-up mission recommended aligning monetary operations with best practices: put monetary policy rate at center, pivot to shorter-term liquidity absorption operations.
  - Mixed follow-through: CBN has not produced a public strategy document; staff viewed the decision to announce a double-digit inflation target for the next two years as inconsistent with TA advice.
  - CBN engages in FX interventions (FXIs) with limited transparency; Fund staff developed an fx intervention framework at CBN request.
  - Going forward: advance transition to inflation targeting, adopt robust fx intervention framework considering a shallow fx market and IPF frictions; revamp monetary policy toolkit, streamline asymmetric corridor, and use credible fx intervention framework aimed at smoothing excess volatility.

- Public financial management
  - Traction: Progress on establishing a Treasury Single Account and enhancing debt management.
  - Remaining issues: budget process characterized by poor credibility, lack of transparency, and insufficient reporting; limited uptake of TA on monitoring and classification of Government-Owned Enterprises.
  - Recent fiscal risks mission proposed remedial measures addressing SOEs, PPPs, and contingent liabilities.
  - Going forward: TA focus on strengthening budget process from planning to execution and controls, transparency, fiscal risk management, public sector spending reviews, public investment management, and asset-liability management.

- Enhance financial stability
  - Traction: Positive authority response to IMF advice on bank regulation and supervision, including Basel III implementation, cross-border supervision, and surveillance of crypto-asset/Fintech risks.
  - Going forward: TA to help CBN reduce financial sector vulnerabilities, end regulatory forbearance, address high sovereign-bank loop contributing to high interest environment, develop macroprudential tools, tighten loan classification and provisioning rules, issue pending Basel III regulations, and strengthen interbank market functioning.

- Strengthen macroeconomic statistics compilation
  - Traction: NBS updated CPI and GDP base years in line with best practices; advancing producer price index work with TA.
  - Remaining needs: urgent improvement of quarterly GDP time series, BOP statistics (large errors and omissions), monetary statistics to reduce publication lag of full monetary surveys, harmonizing fiscal reporting by OAGF and Budget Office with GFS covering general government, better data on arrears and SOEs monitoring.
  - Proceeding with CD is conditional on strong high-level ownership.
  - Going forward: maintain support with urgency, subject to ownership by the authorities.

- AML/CFT compliance
  - Traction: LEG provided TA to help implement FATF action plan; Nigeria recently exited the FATF grey list and the European Union list of high-risk third countries for money laundering and terrorist financing.

### D. Main Risks and Mitigation
- Progress on implementing TA recommendations has been slow; political commitment, absorptive capacity, and technical skills are key risk factors.
- With presidential elections in Q1 2027, focus will be on technical, less politically charged CD to fine-tune existing reforms.
- Mitigation measures:
  - Ensure top-level buy-in and regular liaison at the principal level.
  - Close follow-up until reform delivery is completed.
  - Be willing to step away from CD areas with insufficient traction.
  - Rely on hands-on and regular support from Afritac West and the resident advisor to address limited absorptive capacity.

*Source: Annex II. Capacity Development Strategy Fiscal Year 2026 (as provided).*

### Annex III . Risk Assessment Matrix

### Annex III . Risk Assessment Matrix

### External Risks — Key Risks, Likelihood, Horizon, Impact, and Policy Responses
- Geopolitical Tensions and Intensification of Conflicts
  - Likelihood: High (30-50 percent)
  - Time Horizon: Short Term
  - Impact on Nigeria: Medium
  - Policy Responses:
    - Tighten monetary policy to contain inflation if needed, supported by fiscal policy.
    - Maintain exchange rate flexibility to facilitate adjustment and preserve external buffers.
    - Accelerate revenue mobilization to reduce dependence on hydrocarbon revenue. Prioritize fiscal intervention to relieve food insecurity.
    - In line with the IPF, temporary FXIs can play a role in mitigating risks associated with large confidence swings and sharp depreciation.
- Protectionism and Trade Disruptions
  - Likelihood: High
  - Time Horizon: Short Term
  - Impact on Nigeria: Low
  - Policy Responses:
    - Maintain exchange rate flexibility to facilitate adjustment and preserve external buffers.
    - Tighten monetary policy to contain inflation.
    - Diversify external financing sources, including from IFIs.
    - In line with the IPF, temporary FXIs can play a role in mitigating risks associated with large confidence swings and sharp depreciation.
- Commodity Price Volatility
  - Likelihood: High
  - Time Horizon: Short Term
  - Impact on Nigeria: High
  - Policy Responses:
    - Tighten monetary policy to contain inflation if needed, supported by fiscal policy.
    - Maintain exchange rate flexibility to facilitate adjustment and preserve external buffers.
    - Accelerate revenue mobilization to reduce dependence on hydrocarbon revenue. Prioritize fiscal intervention to relieve food insecurity.
    - In line with the IPF, temporary FXIs can play a role in mitigating risks associated with large confidence swings and sharp depreciation.
- Fiscal Vulnerabilities and Higher Interest Rates
  - Likelihood: High
  - Time Horizon: Short to Medium Term
  - Impact on Nigeria: High
  - Policy Responses:
    - Maintain exchange rate flexibility to facilitate adjustment and preserve external buffers.
    - Tighten monetary policy to contain inflation, supported by fiscal policy.
    - Accelerate revenue mobilization to reduce dependence on external financing. Prioritize fiscal intervention to relieve food insecurity.
    - Review regulatory framework to contain excessive risk taking.
    - In line with the IPF, temporary FXIs can play a role in mitigating risks associated with large confidence swings and sharp depreciation.
- Labor Shortages and Remittances
  - Likelihood: High
  - Time Horizon: Medium to Long Term
  - Impact on Nigeria: Medium
  - Policy Responses:
    - Maintain exchange rate flexibility to facilitate adjustment and preserve external buffers.
    - Diversify sources of foreign exchange by increasing non-oil exports.
    - Accelerate revenue mobilization to provide space to support vulnerable groups most affected by the decline in remittances.
- Cyberthreats
  - Likelihood: High
  - Time Horizon: Short to Medium Term
  - Impact on Nigeria: Medium
  - Policy Responses:
    - Strengthen cyber‑resilience and operational risk supervision in the financial sector.
    - Tighten regulation and oversight of fintech, crypto assets, and AI-enabled financial services.
    - Build national cyber-incident preparedness capacity.

(Note: The RAM shows events that could materially alter the baseline. Likelihood reflects staff’s subjective assessment: “low” (below 10 percent), “medium” (10-30 percent), and “high” (30-50 percent).)

### Nigeria-specific Risks — Key Risks, Likelihood, Horizon, Impact, and Policy Responses
- Reduction in oil and agriculture production due to worsening domestic security and climate-related shocks
  - Likelihood: Medium
  - Time Horizon: Short to Medium Term
  - Impact on Nigeria: High
  - Policy Responses:
    - Strengthen security for the oil and gas sector.
    - Maintain exchange rate flexibility to facilitate adjustment and preserve external buffers.
    - Tighten monetary policy to contain inflation, supported by fiscal policy.
    - Accelerate revenue mobilization to reduce dependence on external financing. Prioritize fiscal intervention to relieve food insecurity.
    - In line with the IPF, temporary FXIs can play a role in mitigating risks associated with large confidence swings and sharp depreciation.
- Spending pressures and reform momentum (including election-year risks)
  - Likelihood: High
  - Time Horizon: Short Term
  - Impact on Nigeria: Medium
  - Policy Responses:
    - Tighten monetary policy to offset any liquidity injection.
    - Accelerate revenue mobilization to create fiscal space for social and development spending.
    - Enhance spending prioritization and quality.
    - Boost targeted support to vulnerable groups.

### Climate Change and Disaster Response (selected entries)
- Climate change
  - Likelihood: Medium
  - Time Horizon: Medium to Long Term
  - Impact on Nigeria: High
  - Policy Responses:
    - Expand delivery mechanisms for relief aid; accelerate pace of rolling out cash transfers to all targeted households.
    - Strengthen fiscal buffers and expand ex-ante risk financing instruments to improve speed and efficiency of disaster response.
    - Integrate climate resilience into public investment management.
    - Strengthen the agricultural sector; improve climate resilience of the agricultural sector by investing in needed infrastructure and improving supply of inputs.

### Annex IV — Alternative Scenario (summary of adverse global shock implications)
- Scenario description:
  - Based on the April 2026 World Economic Outlook adverse scenario.
  - Oil and gas prices increase further in 2026H2 and remain high during 2027, before returning to the baseline in 2028.
  - Other commodity prices, including fertilizer and other agricultural inputs, increase and stay high in 2026–27.
  - Intensified shock leads to further tightening of global financial conditions and increasing sovereign spreads; interacts with election year dynamics in Nigeria.
- A. Impact on the Economy — key findings:
  - External balance: net positive effect from higher hydrocarbon prices, but higher food and transport import costs and potential capital outflows create ambiguous net effects.
  - Exchange rate management: CBN likely to allow some exchange rate adjustment and use FXIs from reserves to smooth volatility.
  - Growth and inflation: risk of stagflation—higher input costs push up inflation and reduce non-oil growth; limited short-term capacity to raise oil production means hydrocarbon price windfalls do not raise real growth.
  - Financial sector: risk of higher non-performing loans, tighter lending standards, increased borrowing costs, and constrained private-sector credit if domestic financing needs rise.
- B. Policy Response — prescribed approach:
  - Follow the Integrated Policy Framework and the IMF’s Institutional View on The Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows.
  - Monetary policy: CBN should tighten and prioritize inflation control; keep the real policy rate positive at levels comparable to late 2025; if inflation pressures became severe, an even higher real policy rate may be required.
  - Exchange rate: maintain flexibility to absorb shocks and preserve credibility; clear and consistent communication is critical.
  - Fiscal policy:
    - Adopt a neutral fiscal stance to support disinflation.
    - Prioritize quick-impact growth-enhancing projects and sufficient allocations for cash transfers to vulnerable households.
    - Do not increase spending permanently in response to a temporary windfall; save windfalls or use to retire expensive debt.
    - Recalibrate financing strategy if external market financing becomes expensive; contain reliance on domestic financing to limit crowding out.
    - Secure low-cost financing, including from development partners.
  - Financial sector: intensify supervision, ensure timely provisioning for asset quality, apply resolution frameworks as needed, and monitor sovereign–bank nexus.
  - Structural reforms: improve business environment, strengthen governance, deepen domestic capital markets, and reduce reliance on oil revenues to crowd in private investment and diversify exports.

### Box 1 — Effects of Oil Supply Shocks on Inflation in Nigeria (empirical estimates)
- Method: 7-variable Bayesian Vector Autoregression.
- Baseline projection:
  - Baseline parameters: Brent $82/bl; food +8 percent.
  - Oil and food price channels would add 0.8 percentage points to headline inflation over a 12-month horizon.
  - A strengthening naira would partially offset the impact.
- Adverse scenario:
  - Adverse parameters: Brent $120/bl; food +20 percent.
  - Oil and food price channels would add 1.9 percentage points to headline inflation over a 12-month period.
  - If global risk-off pressures the exchange rate, inflation pressures could increase further.

### Short-term Stabilization Measures (severe adverse scenario)
- Temporary FXIs can play a role — in line with the IMF’s Integrated Policy Framework — to mitigate risks from sharp confidence swings and naira depreciation, given market shallowness, significant exchange rate passthrough, and exposure to short-term foreign inflows. FXIs should not substitute for warranted macroeconomic adjustments, and strong communication is key.
- Temporary capital flow management measures (CFMs) could be needed, consistent with the IMF’s Institutional View, as part of a broader policy package; CFMs should not substitute for needed macroeconomic adjustment.

### Annex V — Debt Sustainability Assessment (selected findings and key numbers)
- Overall risk of sovereign stress: Moderate.
- Highlights:
  - Nigeria's public debt declined in 2025 to 36.1 percent of GDP from 39.3 percent of GDP in 2024.
  - Drivers of improvement: favorable growth‑interest rate dynamics, a stronger naira, reforms and macroeconomic policy tightening since 2023, increased hydrocarbon production, improved external position, enhanced resilience, declining inflation, domestic refinery ramp-up, and private investment momentum.
  - Long-term risk: mitigated by debt structure—large share of external debt is concessional and the authorities’ debt strategy prioritizes long dated instruments.
  - Risks flagged: worsening global sentiment or oil prices, still weak domestic revenue mobilization, potential expenditure slippages given high poverty and large development needs.
  - Contingent risks: total return swap announced in 2026 (including overcollateralization) is included in external debt; margin-call risk could force additional collateral. Consolidated government arrears (to NNPCL, electricity companies, pensioners) will add to debt when recognized; pre-export financing deals could reduce future revenues.
- Staff recommendations to contain risks:
  - Stay the course on revenue mobilization and expenditure control.
  - Scale up private investment and address security challenges.
  - Build buffers, enhance fiscal risk management, and diversify exports and fiscal revenues away from hydrocarbons.

*Source: 1ngaea2026001 - Annex III . Risk Assessment Matrix*

### 1. Debt coverage in the DSA: 1/CGGGNFPSCPSOther

### 1. Debt coverage in the DSA: 1/CGGGNFPSCPSOther

### Coverage and perimeter
- Chosen perimeter: general government debt—namely central government debt and state and local government debt—as well as the government’s CBN overdraft facility (ways and means).
- Subsector inclusion (baseline):
  - Budgetary central government: Yes
  - Extra budgetary funds (EBFs): No
  - Social security funds (SSFs): No
  - State governments: Yes
  - Local governments: Yes
  - Public nonfinancial corporations: No
  - Central bank: No
  - Other public financial corporations: No
- Reporting on intra-government debt holdings: Not applicable
- Residual maturity (projection): 12.9 years

### Arrears and contingent items
- The government is currently undertaking a consolidation of potential arrears to the national oil company, electricity companies, and pensioners. Once recognized, these arrears will be included in the public debt.
- Electricity arrears recognized: 1 percent of GDP.
- Bonds issued to cover electricity arrears: 0.1 percent of GDP.
- Contingent liabilities shown in projections are 0.00 across projected years in the baseline tables shown.

### Debt composition, recent drivers, and market structure
- The share of foreign debt in total debt rose to 48 percent in 2025, driven by Eurobond issuance, World Bank disbursements, and depreciation.
- 2025 dynamics led to a higher share of marketable and long-term debt than in 2024.
- The government’s medium-term debt strategy expects increased reliance on non-bank and medium-and long-term domestic debt—particularly pension funds’ borrowing—raising pension funds' exposure to the sovereign but mitigated by the long-term nature of those investments.
- Rollover risks remain high due to some recent accumulation of short-term debt, despite projected declines in interest rates as disinflation becomes entrenched and external yields decline.
- Gross Financing Needs (GFN) are expected to continue increasing in the medium-and-long-term, reflecting the increasing share of 1-5 years maturity debt.

### Baseline debt projections and drivers (percent of GDP unless indicated)
- Public debt (selected years): 
  - 2025: 36.1
  - 2026: 35.4
  - 2027: 36.7
  - 2028: 36.5
  - 2029: 35.8
  - 2030: 35.3
  - 2031: 34.9
  - 2032: 34.5
  - 2033: 34.3
  - 2034: 34.2
  - 2035: 34.0
- Change in public debt (percent of GDP, selected years):
  - 2025: -3.3
  - 2026: -0.7
  - 2027: 1.3
  - 2028: -0.2
  - 2029: -0.7
  - 2030: -0.5
  - 2031: -0.4
  - 2032: -0.4
  - 2033: -0.2
  - 2034: -0.2
  - 2035: -0.1
- Contribution of identified flows (percent of GDP):
  - 2025: -3.8
  - 2026: 0.6
  - 2027: 0.0
  - 2028: -0.3
  - 2029: -0.6
  - 2030: -0.4
  - 2031: -0.3
  - 2032: -0.3
  - 2033: -0.1
  - 2034: -0.1
  - 2035: -0.1
- Primary deficit (percent of GDP, selected years):
  - 2025: -0.8
  - 2026: 1.9
  - 2027: 1.0
  - 2028: 0.6
  - 2029: 0.2
  - 2030: 0.2
  - 2031: 0.3
  - 2032: 0.3
  - 2033: 0.3
  - 2034: 0.3
  - 2035: 0.3
- Noninterest revenues (percent of GDP, selected years):
  - 2025: 10.2
  - 2026: 10.8
  - 2027: 10.6
  - 2028: 10.3
  - 2029: 10.5
  - 2030: 10.4
  - 2031: 10.4
  - 2032: 10.2
  - 2033: 10.2
  - 2034: 10.2
  - 2035: 10.2
- Noninterest expenditures (percent of GDP, selected years):
  - 2025: 9.4
  - 2026: 12.7
  - 2027: 11.6
  - 2028: 10.9
  - 2029: 10.7
  - 2030: 10.6
  - 2031: 10.6
  - 2032: 10.5
  - 2033: 10.5
  - 2034: 10.6
  - 2035: 10.5
- Automatic debt dynamics (percent of GDP, selected years):
  - 2025: -3.1
  - 2026: -1.3
  - 2027: -1.0
  - 2028: -0.9
  - 2029: -0.8
  - 2030: -0.6
  - 2031: -0.6
  - 2032: -0.6
  - 2033: -0.5
  - 2034: -0.5
  - 2035: -0.4
- Real interest rate and relative inflation (percent, selected years):
  - 2025: -0.1
  - 2026: 0.1
  - 2027: 0.5
  - 2028: 0.6
  - 2029: 0.7
  - 2030: 0.8
  - 2031: 0.8
  - 2032: 0.8
  - 2033: 0.9
  - 2034: 0.9
  - 2035: 0.9
- Real interest rate (percent, selected years):
  - 2025: -2.0
  - 2026: -1.7
  - 2027: -1.0
  - 2028: -0.8
  - 2029: -0.6
  - 2030: -0.5
  - 2031: -0.4
  - 2032: -0.4
  - 2033: -0.2
  - 2034: -0.2
  - 2035: -0.1
- Real GDP growth (percent, selected years):
  - 2025: 4.0
  - 2026: 4.1
  - 2027: 4.3
  - 2028: 4.1
  - 2029: 4.2
  - 2030: 4.2
  - 2031: 4.2
  - 2032: 4.2
  - 2033: 4.2
  - 2034: 4.0
  - 2035: 4.0
- Inflation (GDP deflator; percent, selected years):
  - 2025: 13.9
  - 2026: 15.2
  - 2027: 11.9
  - 2028: 10.4
  - 2029: 9.8
  - 2030: 9.5
  - 2031: 9.4
  - 2032: 9.3
  - 2033: 9.2
  - 2034: 9.1
  - 2035: 9.0
- Nominal GDP growth (percent, selected years):
  - 2025: 18.4
  - 2026: 19.9
  - 2027: 16.7
  - 2028: 15.0
  - 2029: 14.5
  - 2030: 14.0
  - 2031: 14.0
  - 2032: 13.9
  - 2033: 13.7
  - 2034: 13.4
  - 2035: 13.3
- Effective interest rate (percent, selected years):
  - 2025: 7.7
  - 2026: 9.4
  - 2027: 8.7
  - 2028: 8.7
  - 2029: 8.7
  - 2030: 7.9
  - 2031: 8.0
  - 2032: 8.0
  - 2033: 8.5
  - 2034: 8.4
  - 2035: 8.5
- Gross financing needs (GFN; percent of GDP, selected years):
  - Projection headline: Gross financing needs2.95.36.05.85.76.26.46.45.86.46.4 (values by year appear in series)
  - Of which: debt service3.73.45.05.25.56.06.16.15.56.16.1 (values by year appear in series)
  - Local currency component series and foreign currency component series are shown in the table (e.g., Local currency1.92.43.43.73.94.24.34.33.74.54.4; Foreign currency1.81.01.61.51.61.91.91.81.71.61.7)

### Risk assessment and diagnostics
- Medium-term risk signals:
  - Debt Fanchart Index (DFI): 2.0
  - Risk Signal (mechanical assessment): Moderate
  - Average baseline GFN5.92.0 (percent of GDP)
  - Initial Banks' claims on the gen. govt (pct bank assets): 11.23.6 (values shown in table)
  - Chg. In banks' claims in stress (pct banks' assets): 15.35.1 (values shown in table)
  - GFN Financeability Index (GFI): 10.8
  - Risk Signal from GFI: Moderate
- Probabilities (mechanical assessment outputs):
  - Prob. of missed crisis, 2026-2031, if stress not predicted: 18.2 pct.
  - Prob. of false alarms, 2026-2031, if stress predicted: 25.0 pct.
- Final fanchart outputs and indicators:
  - Fanchart width: 66.71.0 (percent of GDP)
  - Probability of debt non-stabilizaiton (percent): 40.90.3 (values shown)
  - Terminal debt-to-GDP x29.70.6 (values shown)
- Triggered modules and stress tests indicate downside risks from:
  - Accumulated government arrears to NNPCL, electricity companies and pensioners (would add to debt once consolidated and recognized).
  - Potential pre-export financing deals that would reduce future revenues.
  - Other triggers examined include banking crisis, commodity prices, exchange rate, contingent liabilities, natural disaster.

### Realism and scenario diagnostics
- Realism analysis highlights:
  - Baseline growth forecasts are optimistic relative to potential and historical averages but are considered achievable with sound macroeconomic policies and a pro-growth agenda.
  - Average per-capita growth in the projections is around 2 percent over the next 5 years.
  - The 3-year fiscal adjustment is ambitious relative to history but consistent with the fundamental change in macroeconomic management.
  - The expected debt path does not show realism issues; the 3-year debt reduction is within normal range cross-country and versus Nigeria’s experience.
- Long-term risk assessment:
  - High risks from large amortization across considered alternatives.
  - GFN and debt stabilize in the “medium-term extrapolation with debt stabilizing primary balance" scenario and the “customized" scenario (the latter corresponds broadly to an active scenario with domestic revenue mobilization measures that involve rate increases).
  - Climate adaptation customized scenario could slightly improve the debt trajectory relative to the baseline; the standardized climate adaptation scenario follows closely the baseline.
  - In a natural-resources exhaustion scenario (absence of new discoveries), lower oil revenues, exports and GDP could yield higher GFN, higher debt path and lower buffers; however, simulations suggest increasing economic diversification as the non-oil sector grows in importance.

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Fiscal reforms to improve revenue mobilization and spending efficiency would, along with steady growth, support debt stabilization.
- Higher revenues would reduce the fiscal deficit, lower borrowing requirements, and reduce the interest bill to revenue ratio.
- Key policy priorities underscored by the DSA:
  - Stay the course on domestic revenue mobilization.
  - Build buffers (e.g., reduce rollover risks and increase fiscal space).
  - Enhance fiscal risk management, including early consolidation and recognition of arrears.
  - Extend maturities where possible as macro stability and lower yields permit, to lower rollover risks.

*Source: IMF staff estimates and projections (Nigeria DSA content as provided).*

### Annex VI. External Sector Assessment

### Annex VI. External Sector Assessment

### Overall assessment and context
- Overall assessment: The external position of Nigeria in 2025 is assessed as stronger than the level implied by fundamentals and desirable policies, based on provisional data.
- Caveats:
  - Staff’s assessment relies on EBA-lite quantitative models and should be interpreted with caution, given sizable net errors and omissions in the balance of payments.
  - There continues to be lack of clarity regarding the CBN’s composition of gross reserves and how it aligns with the IMF’s definition of reserves.
- Key 2025 outcomes:
  - Current account remained in surplus in 2025 (around 4.8 percent of GDP).
  - Gross reserves increased by US$5.6 billion to US$45.8 billion by end-2025.
  - Reserve accumulation was supported by: the current account surplus; the central bank’s short-term borrowing in naira-denominated OMOs from non-resident investors; and Eurobond issuance.

### Policy implications and recommended responses
- Policy focus:
  - Improve competitiveness while containing inflation pressures.
  - Reduce reliance on oil-related fx receipts and on portfolio inflows into OMOs.
- Priorities:
  - Diversify fx earnings beyond hydrocarbons.
  - Maintain a tight and credible macroeconomic policy stance.
  - Rebuild external buffers through prudent fiscal policy and debt management.
  - Continue improvements in fx market functioning and deepen domestic capital markets.
  - Advance structural reforms to improve the business climate to attract stable FDI and reduce dependence on volatile portfolio flows.

### Foreign assets and liabilities: position and trajectory
- Background facts:
  - Nigeria is a net debtor country with heavy reliance on oil exports.
  - NIIP was at –31 percent of GDP at end-2025.
  - Gross assets increased in 2025, driven by rising reserve assets of the central bank.
  - Gross liabilities increased in 2025, driven primarily by an increase in the central bank’s short-term liabilities.
  - Valuation effects from exchange rate movements, changes in the composition of reserve assets, and repatriation of profits from oil companies are expected to remain key determinants of NIIP over the medium term.
- Assessment:
  - The external balance sheet is expected to remain relatively robust as oil and gas exports pick up, fuel imports decline, and investor confidence improves in the short to medium term.
  - Risks from gross external liabilities are mitigated by the long-term maturity of primarily official debt and by the accumulation of non-borrowed reserve assets by the central bank when the trade balance in goods remains in surplus.
- Key 2025 balance-sheet figures (percent of GDP):
  - NIIP: -31.0
  - Gross Assets: 43.2
  - Debt Assets: 38.1
  - Gross Liabilities: 74.3
  - Debt Liabilities: 51.6
- Data quality note:
  - Net errors and omissions: -US$15.7 billion (around 3.9 percent of GDP) in 2025 compared with -US$9.4 billion (around 3.7 percent of GDP) in 2024, based on provisional 2025 and revised 2024 BOP data. The large net errors and omissions constrain the external sector assessment.

### Current account: drivers and assessment
- 2025 outcomes:
  - Current account surplus of US$14.0 billion (around 4.8 percent of GDP) in 2025, based on provisional balance of payments data.
  - Goods trade balance close to US$14.5 billion in 2025, up from US$13.2 billion in 2024.
  - Net services balance remained in deficit at about 5 percent of GDP in 2025, widening slightly to US$14.6 billion from US$13.4 billion in 2024.
  - Remittances have improved since June 2023, reflecting improved fx conversion rate (the official exchange rate).
  - With increasing supply from the Dangote Refinery, the net oil/gas trade balance is expected to keep improving.
  - Planned large-scale oil and gas infrastructure investments are projected to increase non-oil/gas imports, leading to a reduced current account for a few years during peak investment activity; part of these expenditures may be executed and financed offshore and thus may not be fully captured in the current account.
- Model-based assessment:
  - Mechanical results of two regression models under the revised EBA-lite methodology suggest the external position is stronger than implied by fundamentals and desired policies, but interpretation requires caution given large net errors and omissions and absent clarity on CBN reserve composition.
  - Staff welcomes publication of net international reserves data for end-2024 and end-2025 and notes authorities’ progress in strengthening reserve buffers and transparency.
- Qualitative CA assessment:
  - The qualitative assessment, informed by the CA model, indicates a CA gap of 3.0 percent of GDP.
  - The EBA-lite cyclically adjusted CA surplus of 1.9 percent of GDP incorporates cross-country consistent adjustors and an additional temporary factor reflecting non-oil/gas import compression in 2025 (around 2.3 percent of GDP) following the 2023–24 foreign exchange reforms and the sharp naira depreciation.
  - The adjusted CA is compared with a CA norm of -1.0 percent.
  - Relative policy gaps explain most of this CA gap, mainly stemming from the fiscal balance and underspending on public health expenditures relative to the rest of the world.

### Real exchange rate (REER): background and assessment
- Background:
  - Nigeria’s REER is estimated to have appreciated by 32 percent in 2025, despite a 5.2 percent depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER).
  - On an annual average basis, the official naira/US dollar exchange rate depreciated from around 1,479 naira/US dollar in 2024 to 1,520 naira/US dollar in 2025 (around 2.8%).
  - On an end-of-period basis, the official naira/US dollar exchange rate appreciated from 1,535 naira/US dollar at end-2024 to 1,435 naira/US dollar at end-2025 (around 6.5%).
- Assessment:
  - The EBA-lite REER model indicates a REER gap of -25.6 percent, implying assessed REER undervaluation despite the appreciation already observed in 2025.
  - Policy recommendations to help close the REER gap:
    - Slow the pace of reserve accumulation.
    - Continue to allow 2-way movement of the naira exchange rate.
    - Strengthen fx market functioning.
    - Advance and support fiscal and structural reforms, particularly those that can improve non-oil/gas imports.

### Capital and financial accounts: flows and policy measures
- 2025 flows (provisional):
  - Financial account recorded a net inflow in 2025 of around US$5.9 billion (around 2 percent of GDP), mainly driven by net portfolio inflows.
  - Net FDI inflows improved to US$2.8 billion (still less than 1 percent of GDP).
  - Portfolio net inflows were supported by Eurobond issuance and foreign investor participation in central bank’s OMOs (close to US$5.8 billion of net inflows).
  - Net outflows from the other investments account significantly reduced from US$19 billion to US$4 billion.
- Assessment:
  - The financial account continues to be portfolio-led.
  - FDI inflows remain low but are expected to increase with planned large-scale oil and gas infrastructure projects.
  - Recommended reforms:
    - Credible macro and fx framework and more predictable regulations.
    - Improve business environment, including infrastructure and security, to support more stable capital flows.

### Capital flow measures (CFMs)
- Status:
  - Nigeria has phased out one CFM on “the requirement for International Oil Companies to hold 50 percent of repatriated export proceeds in Nigeria for 90 days before transferring offshore with the prior CBN approval.”
  - Nigeria maintains three outflow capital flow management measures.
- Staff recommendation:
  - Phase out the remaining CFMs in a properly timed and sequenced manner, considering external vulnerability risks and progress made with reforms to foster necessary institutional and financial development and in line with the IMF’s Institutional View.
  - Authorities intend to do so in the context of their upcoming FX Manual.

### FX intervention (FXI) and reserve adequacy
- Exchange rate regime and market functioning:
  - Nigeria has adopted a market-based exchange rate.
  - Fx market functioning is improving, supported by occasional FXI by the central bank.
  - Staff’s de facto exchange rate regime classification in 2025 remains “floating.”
- Reserves levels and dynamics:
  - Net international reserves increased from US$23 billion at end-2024 to about US$35 billion at end-2025.
  - Gross reserves (end of period) rose to US$45.8 billion (15.8 percent of GDP), equal to about 8.8 months of imports.
  - Gross reserves at end-2024 were US$40.2 billion (15.9 percent of GDP), close to 8.4 months of imports.
  - The increase in gross reserves in 2025 was supported by: the current account surplus; central bank’s short-term borrowing in naira denominated OMOs from non-resident investors; and Eurobond issuance.
- Reserve adequacy assessment:
  - Gross international reserves are estimated at 157 percent of the Assessment of Reserve Adequacy (ARA) metric, above the range of 100–150 percent of the composite ARA metric considered broadly adequate for precautionary purposes.
  - Gross reserves are projected to continue increasing in the medium term and remain above the ARA metric.
  - Projections: Current account surpluses, slight improvements in FDI, portfolio flows as well as borrowing from official and multilateral creditors, despite repayments on various public and private sector loans, will help gradually raise reserves to around US$66 billion in 2031.
- FXI trends and policy in 2025:
  - The CBN intervened sporadically with the objective of containing excess market volatility and supporting market confidence.
  - As authorities transition toward an inflation-targeting regime, clear and consistent communication on fx interventions will be critical.
  - Publishing a well-defined FXI framework would strengthen transparency and enhance the effectiveness of policy communication.

*Source: Annex VI. External Sector Assessment (provisional IMF staff analysis and data).*

### 8. As the scale of stablecoin cross-border flows in Nigeria has grown rapidly, the

### 1ngaea2026001 - 8. As the scale of stablecoin cross-border flows in Nigeria has grown rapidly, the

### Safeguard monetary sovereignty
- Continue to affirm the naira as the sole legal tender and reinforce confidence in the currency through sound macroeconomic policies, underpinned by a credible and well-communicated monetary policy framework.
- Objective: contain risks of currency substitution (cryptoization or dollarization).
- Role of digital instruments:
  - eNaira could support monetary sovereignty by anchoring digital payments to central bank money denominated in naira.
  - Appropriately designed, regulated, and supervised local-currency–denominated stablecoins could serve as a complementary layer within the domestic payment ecosystem, including by supporting interoperability with regional payment arrangements.

### Regulate and supervise stablecoin activities
- Bring stablecoin arrangements fully within the regulatory perimeter, in line with Financial Stability Board (FSB) recommendations (FSB, 2023).
- International practice: major jurisdictions (EU, Singapore, Hong Kong SAR, Japan, United States) have adopted or are implementing frameworks subjecting stablecoin issuers and service providers to licensing, prudential and governance standards (including requirements on reserve management and redemption), as well as AML/CFT and consumer protection obligations.
- Policy recommendations for Nigeria:
  - Clarify policy stance toward U.S. dollar denominated stablecoins, including conditions under which foreign-based providers may offer services to residents and mechanisms for enforcing compliance.
  - Align domestic regulation with international standards while calibrating to local market conditions to mitigate risks from rapid adoption.
  - Design a balanced and enforceable regulatory framework to mitigate risks while avoiding driving activity into informal channels.
- Relevant regulators: Securities and Exchange Commission (stablecoins primarily under securities framework) and Central Bank of Nigeria (payment systems oversight, financial stability, monetary policy, currency issuance).

### Maintain control over capital flows
- Strengthen measures to monitor and manage stablecoin flows in line with IMF guidance to “guard against excessive capital flow volatility.”
- Improve data visibility for regulators, including through blockchain analytics tools—an area where the SEC and CBN have begun to build capacity—to track large cross-border stablecoin transactions.
- Enhance regulatory cooperation with foreign jurisdictions to help trace and interdict illicit outflows.
- Consider requiring reporting of naira–stablecoin conversions, drawing on international practices:
  - threshold-based reporting in Canada;
  - broader reporting frameworks in the United States and the European Union.

### Improve cross-border payment infrastructure
- Address frictions driving stablecoin use: high costs, slow settlement, limited interoperability, and weak access to formal foreign exchange channels.
- Encourage public and private investment in faster, cheaper, and more reliable cross-border payment systems.
- Aim for a modernized, multilayered ecosystem in which regulated stablecoins complement other payment infrastructures under appropriate safeguards, to reduce reliance on stablecoins operating outside the regulatory perimeter while supporting financial inclusion.

### Need for stronger inter-agency coordination
- Current framework: stablecoins fall primarily under the securities framework administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, while the Central Bank of Nigeria retains responsibility for payment systems oversight, financial stability, monetary policy, and currency issuance.
- Given overlapping and complementary mandates, strengthen coordination between agencies to avoid regulatory gaps or inconsistencies—particularly where stablecoins function simultaneously as investment instruments and as means of payment for cross-border transactions.

### Contextual macroeconomic notes (from accompanying authorities’ statement)
- Policy reforms since mid-2023 included merging naira exchange rates and cutting fuel subsidies.
- Inflation rose past 30.0 percent before starting to decline.
- The naira’s value dropped sharply against the dollar, prompting the Central Bank to raise interest rates.
- Positive developments: improvement in oil revenues, increase in foreign reserves, and increased investor interest conditional on maintaining reform momentum, greater security in food-producing regions, and favourable global oil prices.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpt (Nigeria).*

### 4. Growth is projected to strengthen modestly from 4.0 percent in 2025 to 4.1 percent in

### 4. Growth is projected to strengthen modestly from 4.0 percent in 2025 to 4.1 percent in

### Growth and inflation outlook
- Growth is projected to strengthen modestly from 4.0 percent in 2025 to 4.1 percent in 2026, and 4.3 percent in 2027 led by agriculture, real estate, information and communication, and oil and gas.
- Inflation is projected to tick up to 17.0 percent year-on-year at end-2026, from 15.2 percent in 2025, before returning to the disinflation path in the outer years as:
  - tight monetary policy is maintained,
  - fiscal discipline is preserved through a neutral fiscal stance, and
  - supply conditions, including a stronger harvest and improved domestic food production, improve.

### External sector and reserves
- The current account balance is projected to decline from 4.8 percent of GDP in 2025 to 3.9 percent of GDP in 2026 but remain positive and supported by earnings from oil and gas exports, benefiting from high global prices.
- A sharp drop in the amount of refined fuel imports is expected as Dangote Refinery boosts domestic production, turning Nigeria into a net exporter of refined petroleum products.
- Remittances inflow increases steadily since mid-2023, assisted by reforms in the foreign exchange market and a shift toward a market-determined rate.
- Gross official reserves are projected to remain stable at about 9 months of import cover in 2026.

### Fiscal policy: revenue and expenditure
- Authorities are committed to sustaining macroeconomic stability while creating fiscal space for growth-enhancing investment and social protection.
- Revenue mobilization:
  - A comprehensive domestic revenue mobilization drive has been embarked upon.
  - Recently enacted tax reform laws modernize the tax system, broaden the base, increase progressivity, and strengthen compliance and enforcement.
  - Some elements of reforms are revenue-reducing in the short run, notably the expansion of VAT input credits and zero-rated items.
  - Authorities expect net effect, combined with digital tracking of government revenues and enhanced customs administration supported by the Fund regional technical assistance center, to deliver a meaningful and sustained increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio.
  - Authorities remain open to further tax-policy adjustments over the medium term, including:
    - a possible increase in the VAT rate,
    - extension of VAT to fuel products,
    - rationalization of extractive-industry tax expenditures, and
    - the introduction of telecom excises,
    - timing contingent on cash-transfer system being fully funded and operational to avoid disproportionate burden on the most vulnerable.
- Expenditure priorities and governance:
  - 2026 budget incorporates national priority infrastructure projects to strengthen legislative oversight, expenditure prioritization, and execution monitoring.
  - Repeal and re-enactment of the 2024 and 2025 budgets to ensure all public spending is captured within the budget framework.
  - Ambitious capital-expenditure programme to exceed 2025 levels, focused on projects with highest growth multipliers in transport, energy, and digital infrastructure.
  - Social spending scaled up:
    - expanding the cash-transfer system toward its target of 15 million households,
    - deploying cost-effective public-works programmes for youth, less-skilled workers, and vulnerable households.
  - Fiscal governance reforms include reconciliation and eventual automation of budget-execution data across the Budget Office, the Debt Management Office, and the Office of the Accountant General of the Federation, and resumption of regular publication of audited federal accounts.

### Debt management
- Debt-management strategy aims to optimize costs and risks through diversification of financing sources (Eurobonds, concessional borrowing, and domestic securities) and keeping the Central Bank’s ways-and-means financing at zero.
- US$5 billion total-return swap arrangement:
  - Instrument designed to secure external financing on competitive terms.
  - Authorities mindful of associated risks, including margin-call exposure linked to exchange-rate and interest-rate movements.
  - Committed to managing risks prudently, including potential use of excess government deposits at the CBN to prepay expensive legacy obligations.
- Domestic strategy:
  - Deepen the domestic debt market,
  - encourage participation by pension funds and non-bank financial institutions,
  - reduce crowding-out of private credit.
- External borrowing:
  - Plan to restrict non-concessional borrowing,
  - favour longer maturities to lower rollover risk,
  - leverage improved credit outlook (including S&P positive outlook revision in November 2025 and the FATF grey list removal) for better market access.
- Belief that robust revenue mobilization and careful expenditure control will help keep both home and foreign debt relative to GDP on a sustainable downward course.

### Monetary policy stance and instruments
- The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) committed to maintaining a tight monetary policy stance to consolidate disinflation gains and anchor inflation expectations.
- Monetary Policy Committee decisions (May 2026):
  - Monetary Policy Rate retained at 26.5 percent,
  - Cash Reserve Requirement (CRR) at 45.0 percent for commercial banks and 16.0 percent for merchant banks,
  - asymmetric corridor left unchanged.
- CBN stands ready to sterilize foreign-exchange inflows from elevated oil prices and respond flexibly should inflation pressures prove more persistent, or less pronounced, than currently projected.
- Progress toward a full inflation-targeting framework includes:
  - introduction of the 7-day open-market-operations instrument to manage short-term liquidity rates,
  - planned normalization of the Cash Reserve Requirement over time,
  - deepening analytical work on the specification of an inflation target.
- Policy objectives: strengthen monetary transmission, establish the MPR at the center of policy operations, and enhance credibility and predictability of monetary policy.

### Exchange-rate policy and capital flow measures
- Administration reaffirms commitment to the flexible exchange-rate regime.
- CBN's model-based foreign-exchange intervention framework is limited to countering disorderly market conditions and mitigating risks to price and financial stability from large exchange-rate movements, consistent with the IMF's Integrated Policy Framework.
- Commitment to phase out remaining capital-flow management measures as macroeconomic conditions permit and foreign-exchange market deepens, including:
  - ban on foreign-exchange purchases for overseas securities investment,
  - payment limits on naira-denominated cards for overseas transactions,
  - asymmetric net-open-position limits.
- CBN reviewing multiple-currency practices identified by staff, specifically:
  - the one-naira bid-side spread on purchases from MDAs and oil companies, and
  - the 2.0 percent commission on sales to MDAs,
  - and will take necessary actions to bring these into conformity with IMF guidelines.
- Transition to a fully operational inflation-targeting regime will require:
  - strengthening monetary-policy communication strategy,
  - clear guidance on quantitative inflation targets independent of the budget cycle,
  - development of Monetary Policy Committee-owned forecasts with an extended policy horizon.
- Strategy to reduce reliance on costly short-term portfolio inflows through OMO instruments and encourage gradual shift of foreign portfolio investment toward longer-dated government securities and equities.

### Safeguarding external stability (medium-term strategy)
- Multi-pronged approach:
  - Promote trade facilitation, agriculture, and the business environment and structural changes in the energy industry to attract stable FDI and lower reliance on hydrocarbon exports.
  - Maintain a respectable and open foreign-exchange market and engage with International Money Transfer Operators and fintech companies to keep remittances in official channels strong.
  - Phased elimination of remaining measures controlling capital flows and resolution of multiple-currency practices, in line with the IMF's Institutional View on the Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows.
  - Limit CBN foreign-exchange intervention to addressing volatile market conditions rather than substituting for justified macroeconomic correction.
- Belief that these initiatives, coupled with responsible fiscal and monetary policies, will entrench Nigeria’s improved external posture and provide greater defense against external shocks.

### Financial sector policy and supervision
- Financial system described as strong, reliable, and profitable despite inflation, currency swings, and tighter monetary policies.
- CBN actions and priorities:
  - recapitalize banks,
  - expand fintech innovation,
  - improve regulatory frameworks to broaden access to finance and deepen inclusion,
  - strengthen prudential regulations and foreign exchange management,
  - enhance cybersecurity safeguards,
  - enforce stricter capital adequacy and loan quality controls.
- Supervision enhancements:
  - bottom-up stress test,
  - full Basel III rollout, including countercyclical capital buffers and liquidity coverage ratios.
- Insurance sector recapitalization under the 2025 Insurance Industry Reform Act with a July 2026 deadline; progress encouraging.
- Joint framework being developed between the CBN and the Securities and Exchange Commission to oversee stablecoins and digital assets.
- Deepening financial intermediation by addressing:
  - high CRR-constrained private-sector credit,
  - banks’ large holdings of government securities,
  - structural barriers.
- Agreement to normalize the CRR as monetary policy transmission improves and encourage diversification of pension-fund holdings away from government securities.
- Modernizing capital-market ecosystem through the Investment and Securities Act 2025 and tightening the AML/CFT framework after Nigeria’s removal from the FATF grey-list in October 2025.
- Commitment to address the sovereign–bank nexus by being fiscally responsible and diversifying sources of government funding to reduce crowding out of private credit.

### Structural reforms and development priorities
- Comprehensive and sequenced structural-reform agenda to move from stabilization to productivity-enhancing measures aimed at sustained, high, inclusive, and job-rich growth.
- Government target of medium-term growth of 7–12 percent presented as ambitious and grounded in a multi-pronged strategy addressing binding constraints.
- Near-term highest priorities:
  - enhancing domestic security (critical for hydrocarbon production, agricultural output, and investor confidence),
  - cutting red tape in trade, including streamlining import/export procedures and ending pre-shipment inspection of non-oil exports to maximize benefits of the National Single Window.
- Infrastructure and agriculture:
  - scale up infrastructure investment, particularly in transport and digital connectivity, to ease bottlenecks and reduce production costs,
  - accelerate electricity sector reforms to close the gap between tariffs and cost recovery, improve collection efficiency, reduce implicit subsidies, restructure the sector’s value chain, and encourage private investments into generation and distribution,
  - promote mechanization, develop agricultural value chains, invest in research and development, and strengthen extension services to raise productivity, enhance food security, and create jobs.
- Social and governance objectives:
  - increase expenditure on education and health,
  - ease access to funds for small and medium businesses,
  - tackle governance flaws outlined in the 2024 Article IV Report.
- The upcoming 2026–2030 National Development Plan will lay out priorities, funding sources, and integration into medium-term spending plans and yearly budgets.

### Conclusion
- Authorities reaffirm commitment to continue comprehensive policy reforms to address remaining economic and social challenges and sustain macroeconomic stability.
- Authorities appreciate the Fund’s advice and technical support and look forward to Directors' support in concluding the 2026 Article IV consultation.

*Source: 1ngaea2026001*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1ngaea2026001.pdf_
