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### Overview and Short-term Outlook
- Real GDP growth: 3.8 percent in 2025; 3.4 percent in 2026.
- Staff expect real GDP growth to stabilize at around 3½ percent over the medium term, supported by public investment and an expanding labor force.
- Foreign reserves: expected to remain ample, albeit growing at a slower pace as current account (CA) surpluses narrow.
- Short-term risks:
  - Upside: more favorable terms of trade and higher public investment.
  - Downside: commodity price volatility, weaker global growth, tighter U.S. immigration and trade policies, natural disasters, and stricter and broader international sanctions.
- Recent developments:
  - Real GDP growth: 3.9 percent y/y in 2025H1.
  - Headline inflation: 2.9 percent y/y in November 2025.
  - Core inflation: stabilized around 2¾-3 percent since March 2025.
  - GIR: US$7.6 billion by end-October 2025 (8 months of next-year imports, excluding maquila, or 36 percent of GDP).

### Fiscal Policy and Public Finances
- Staff welcome authorities’ commitment to safeguarding fiscal sustainability and building buffers while supporting growth; recommend additional measures.
- Key fiscal positions and projections:
  - CPS surplus: about 3 percent of GDP in 2024.
  - Public debt-to-GDP: 45.1 percent at end-2024; projected 43.2 percent in 2025; 42.4 percent in 2026.
  - Central government deposits: increased to 14.9 percent of GDP by July 2025.
  - Authorities’ 2026 draft central government budget: expected fiscal surplus of 0.6 percent of GDP.
  - Staff baseline: projects fiscal surplus of 1.6 percent of GDP in 2026 and medium-term fiscal surplus of 2¼ percent of GDP.
- Staff recommend:
  - enhancing tax collection (including VAT collection);
  - better targeting SOE transfers;
  - proceeding cautiously with 2026 budget execution given downside risks and limited external financing;
  - deploying targeted and time-bound support to vulnerable groups in a downside scenario.
- Specific fiscal measures (Section 18):
  - Additional measures totaling 0.6 percent of GDP could create space for priority public investment and targeted social spending.
    - Strengthening VAT collection (Annex IV): 0.3 percent of GDP.
    - Better targeting and rationalization of SOE subsidies: 0.3 percent of GDP.
  - Proposed reallocation: capital spending 0.4 percent of GDP; social spending 0.2 percent of GDP.
- Fiscal risks and SOE/INSS pressures:
  - INSS deficits: transfers rising from ½ percent of GDP per year to 1 percent of GDP by 2030.
  - Need comprehensive pension system strategy (parametric changes, expenditure controls, robust investment framework).
  - Execution rates of expenditures during 2020–2024: averaged about 97–98 percent of the approved budget.

### Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate
- Monetary policy should preserve price and external stability; BCN should continue strengthening monetary policy transmission.
- BCN easing cycle: cumulative cuts of 100 basis points to a monetary reference rate (MRR) of 6 percent (in four steps between October 2024 and October 2025).
- Exchange rate crawling rate: maintained at 0 percent and announced at 0 percent for 2026 (announcement on October 20, 2025).
- Staff recommend:
  - continue fostering use of local currency and deepen capital markets;
  - stand ready to increase the monetary reference rate and recalibrate the rate of crawl in a downside scenario.

### Financial Sector and Crisis Preparedness
- Staff support implementation of comprehensive financial laws approved in early 2025 that increased capital buffers and strengthened recovery and crisis resolution framework.
- Banking sector indicators:
  - NPLs: declined to 1.1 percent of total loans in October 2025 from 1.7 percent in December 2023.
  - Capital adequacy ratio: 19.1 percent at end-October 2025.
  - LCR: increased in 2025 to almost double the 100 percent required minimum.
- Crisis preparedness recommendations:
  - prepare analysis required for activating the CCB and contingency plans in the crisis resolution framework;
  - stand ready to release CCBs in downside scenarios;
  - adjust further financial regulations in consultation with banks to avoid excessive regulatory burden.

### Growth, Human Capital, and Exports
- Medium-term growth drivers and constraints:
  - Staff expect stabilization at around 3½ percent medium-term growth.
  - Medium-term growth projection remains below pre-crisis average of 4.3 percent (2004-17).
- Policy recommendations to raise growth and resilience:
  - increase public investment and strengthen human capital accumulation;
  - implement targeted social spending and stronger social safety nets;
  - expand active labor-market policies and support integration of returning migrants;
  - diversify exports and work with export firms to scale into higher value-added products;
  - strengthen business climate and economic governance, especially significantly improving the rule of law and protections for private property rights.
- Export concentration and developments:
  - Remittances-to-GDP ratio: 26.6 percent in 2024; over 84 percent of remittance inflows originate in the U.S.
  - U.S. share in exports: declined from about 61 percent to 51 percent over two decades.
  - Free Trade Agreement with China implemented in 2024; cooperation agreement with Russia signed in 2024.

### Economic Governance, AML/CFT, and Anti-corruption
- Staff recommend:
  - continuing to increase fiscal transparency by publishing consolidated financial statements and audit reports;
  - coordinating with private and NPOs to better understand AML/CFT risks and increase reporting of suspicious transactions;
  - further strengthening anti-corruption by allowing automatic publication of asset declarations of top-level officials and ensuring effective management and oversight of all state property.
- Legal and institutional steps:
  - Law No.1232 adopted; staff recommend further strengthening BCN’s institutional autonomy in future amendments.
  - Authorities preparing for GAFILAT’s Fifth Mutual Evaluation Round (expected 2028); new regulations for virtual asset service providers issued in 2025.

### Data and Statistics
- Data adequacy assessment: broadly adequate for surveillance with some shortcomings; Data Adequacy Assessment Rating: B.
- Major data gaps:
  - Poverty statistics: latest official poverty data dates to 2014.
  - Household survey incorporation into national accounts pending (2017/18 results not yet incorporated).
  - High errors and omissions in BOP; since May 2025 some BOP components (e.g., monthly remittances) not published with same detail/frequency.
  - Census last available: 2005; national accounts benchmark year 2019 series pending dissemination.
- Staff recommend:
  - expanding data sources and improving timeliness of key statistics such as poverty rates and remittances;
  - improving coverage of FDI statistics and harmonizing public and external sector debt data;
  - completing and disseminating new national accounts series with 2019 benchmark.

### External Sector Assessment (Annex I) and Annex II — U.S. Policy Impacts
- External position: in 2024 assessed as substantially stronger than level implied by fundamentals and desirable policies.
- 2024 CA: 4.2 percent of GDP (narrowed from 8.2 percent in 2023).
- NIIP: -91 percent of GDP in 2024; NIIP improved by 6 percent of GDP in 2024.
- Reserves: US$5.8 billion at end-2024 (6.7 months of next-year non-maquila imports); GIR continued to accumulate in 2025 (US$7.3 billion at end-August 2025).
- Annex II quantitative estimates for U.S. policy changes:
  - A 10-percentage-point increase in U.S. effective tariffs would lower GDP level by about 0.3 percent in the first year.
  - Tighter migration policies would reduce remittances by about 3.5 percent of GDP starting in 2026.
- Remittances and migration assumptions:
  - About 650,000 Nicaraguan-born in the U.S.; about 340,000 at risk for deportations.
  - Staff assume 75 percent of CHNV parolees and TPS individuals will be removed in 2026, translating to around 70,000 and 2,200 deportations respectively after termination.
  - Projected remittances decline by 3.5 percent of GDP in 2026 and converge toward about 25 percent of GDP by 2030 in staff projections.

### Debt Sustainability and Public Debt Coverage
- DSA conclusions:
  - Nicaragua assessed at moderate risk of external and overall public debt distress.
  - Total public debt: 45.1 percent of GDP at end-2024; projected 43.2 percent in 2025; projected to decline to 40.1 percent of GDP by end-2030 under sustained fiscal surpluses and growth.
  - External PPG debt at end-2024: 36.0 percent of GDP.
  - Public domestic debt at end-2024: 9.1 percent of GDP.
- Debt carrying capacity classification: strong (Composite Indicator based on October 2025 WEO and 2024 World Bank CPIA of 3.06).
- Tailored stress tests and contingent liability calibrations:
  - Contingent liability shock applied: 9.7 percent of GDP.
  - PPP shock: 2.2 percent of GDP (35 percent of PPP capital stock).
  - Financial sector contingent liability: 5 percent of GDP.
- Under most extreme shock scenarios:
  - PV of public debt-to-GDP breaches benchmark in 2027 under an extreme combination shock (to 56 percent) and in 2032 under a lower growth scenario (to 73 percent).
- External debt composition (end-2024):
  - Total external debt: US$8,658 million.
  - Multilateral: US$6,795 (78.5 percent of total external debt); CABEI 28.2 percent; IADB 26.6 percent; World Bank 11.3 percent.
  - Bilateral external debt: US$1,819 (non-Paris Club US$1,610).
  - Adjustment for expected HIPC debt relief: about US$1.3 billion reduction as of December 2024.

### Annex V — Use of Local Currency Securities in BCN Liquidity Operations
- Transition outcomes by October 2025:
  - Stock of córdoba-denominated securities: 7.2 percent of GDP.
  - Stock of dollar-denominated securities: 0.4 percent of GDP.
  - Córdoba yields lowered from 9.5 percent to 6.4 percent by October-2025, narrowing spread with dollar yields to about 1.4 percentage points.
- Currency composition and dollarization:
  - Foreign currency deposits: declined from about 72.3 percent in early 2021 to 66.6 percent of total deposits by September 2025.
  - 87.4 percent of credit is conducted in US$ (modestly declining from 91 percent in early 2021).
- Quasi-fiscal balance:
  - Quasi-fiscal surplus narrowed to 0.1 percent of GDP in June 2025 from 0.5 percent of GDP in 2024.
- Policy directions recommended:
  - deepen domestic capital markets;
  - further de-dollarize and strengthen incentives for local currency intermediation to improve monetary transmission.

### Key Social and Macro Indicators (selected figures from Table 1)
- GDP per capita (current US$, 2024): 2,865
- GNI per capita (Atlas method, current US$, 2023): 2,360
- GINI Index (2014): 46.2
- Population (millions, 2024): 6.9
- Life expectancy at birth in years (2022): 74.5
- Unemployment (percent of labor force, 2024): 3.4
- Poverty rate ($3.65/day line in 2017 PPP, percent): 12.5
- Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births, 2022): 10.7

### Selected Macro and Financial Statistics (2024–26 from Table 1)
- GDP growth: 2024 = 3.6; 2025 = 3.8; 2026 = 3.4
- GDP (nominal, US$ million): 2024 = 19,694; 2025 = 21,407; 2026 = 22,737
- Consumer price inflation (period average): 2024 = 4.6; 2025 = 2.5; 2026 = 2.7
- Gross domestic investment (Percent of GDP): 2024 = 24.7; 2025 = 27.3; 2026 = 28.0
- Gross national savings (Percent of GDP): 2024 = 28.9; 2025 = 36.6; 2026 = 33.2
- Current account (Percent of GDP): 2024 = 4.2; 2025 = 9.3; 2026 = 5.2
- Remittances (Percent of GDP): 2024 = 26.6; 2025 = 29.5; 2026 = 26.1
- Gross international reserves (US$ million): 2024 = 5,820; 2025 = 8,018; 2026 = 9,050
- In months of imports excl. maquila: 2024 = 6.7; 2025 = 8.5; 2026 = 9.1
- Consolidated public sector (overall balance after grants, Percent of GDP): 2024 = 2.9; 2025 = 2.4; 2026 = 1.6
- Revenue (including grants, Percent of GDP): 2024 = 33.3; 2025 = 33.1; 2026 = 33.5
- Expenditure (Percent of GDP): 2024 = 30.4; 2025 = 30.8; 2026 = 31.9
- Non-financial public sector debt (Percent of GDP): 2024 = 45.1; 2025 = 43.2; 2026 = 42.4
- Private sector external debt (Percent of GDP): 2024 = 27.9; 2025 = 25.5; 2026 = 23.8

### Key Policy Recommendations (summarized)
- Fiscal:
  - Continue to safeguard fiscal sustainability, increase buffers, and ensure fiscal space while supporting growth by increasing priority spending, enhancing VAT collection, and improving fiscal integrity;
  - Proceed cautiously with implementation of the 2026 budget and provide targeted and time-bound support to vulnerable groups in a downside scenario.
- Monetary and exchange rate:
  - Continue to gradually ease monetary policy in the near term; coordinate monetary and exchange rate policy to maintain price and external stability; stand ready to adjust the monetary reference rate and the rate of crawl if foreign exchange inflows decline.
- Financial stability:
  - Maintain financial stability, prepare analysis to release the CCB, and stand ready to release the CCB as needed; adjust regulations in consultation with banks to avoid excessive regulatory burden.
- Growth and structural reforms:
  - Boost human and physical capital, diversify the export base, strengthen the business climate and rule of law, deepen capital markets, and expand financial inclusion.
- Governance and AML/CFT:
  - Increase fiscal transparency (publish consolidated financial statements and audit reports), coordinate with private and NPO sectors on AML/CFT risks, and strengthen anti-corruption frameworks (automatic publication of asset declarations of top-level officials, better management of state property).
- Data:
  - Expand statistical sources, improve timeliness of key statistics (e.g., poverty rates), and enhance publication of detailed balance of payments data, including remittances.

*IMF staff report for the 2025 Article IV Consultation (Nicaragua).*

### 3.8 percent in 2025, reflecting mostly staff’s assumptions of lower remittances, in a context of

### 1nicea2026001-source-pdf - 3.8 percent in 2025, reflecting mostly staff’s assumptions of lower remittances, in a context of

### Overview and Short-term Outlook
- Real GDP growth: 3.8 percent in 2025; 3.4 percent in 2026.  
- Staff expect real GDP growth to stabilize at around 3½ percent over the medium term, supported by public investment and an expanding labor force.  
- Foreign reserves: expected to remain ample, albeit growing at a slower pace as current account (CA) surpluses narrow.  
- Upside short-term risks: more favorable terms of trade and higher public investment.  
- Downside risks: commodity price volatility, weaker global growth, tighter U.S. immigration and trade policies, natural disasters, and stricter and broader international sanctions.

### Fiscal Policy and Public Finances
- Staff welcome authorities’ commitment to safeguarding fiscal sustainability and building buffers while supporting growth, and recommend additional measures.  
- Staff broadly support the 2026 capital and human development spending plans, and advise proceeding cautiously with budget execution in line with staff’s baseline scenario, considering downside risks, high uncertainty, limited external financing, and persistent imbalances in the pension system.  
- Staff recommend:
  - enhancing tax collection and better targeting SOE transfers to create space for higher priority public investment and targeted social spending;
  - in a downside scenario, deploying targeted and time-bound support to vulnerable groups.

### Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate
- Monetary policy should continue preserving price and external stability and the BCN should continue strengthening monetary policy transmission.  
- The ongoing easing of the monetary policy stance and the announced rate of crawl of 0 percent for 2026 are appropriate given external conditions and the macroeconomic and financial policy mix.  
- Staff recommend continuing to foster the use of local currency and deepen capital markets to enhance monetary policy effectiveness.  
- In a downside scenario, authorities should stand ready to increase the monetary reference rate and recalibrate the rate of crawl, if needed.

### Financial Sector and Crisis Preparedness
- Staff support implementation of the comprehensive set of financial laws approved in early 2025 and recommend further strengthening crisis preparedness.  
- The new laws increased capital buffers and strengthened the recovery and crisis resolution framework.  
- Further efforts needed to prepare the analysis required for activating the CCB and contingency plans in the crisis resolution framework.  
- Staff recommend standing ready to release CCBs in a downside scenario of financial distress and adjusting further financial regulations in consultation with banks to ensure they do not impose an excessive regulatory burden.

### Growth, Human Capital, and Exports
- Staff recommend boosting human and physical capital and diversifying exports.  
- Stronger social safety nets and expanded active labor-market policies would support a higher contribution of labor to medium-term growth, along with expected public investment in transport and health.  
- Staff welcome efforts to expand export markets and recommend working with export firms to support skills needed to scale up into higher value-added products.  
- To sustain higher medium-term growth, staff recommend strengthening the business climate and economic governance, especially significantly improving the rule of law.  
- Actions to improve competitiveness and increase private investment include strengthening business facilitation, maintaining fiscal integrity, and increasing transparency, accountability, and effectiveness of administrative and judicial processes related to private property rights (including of third parties), including guaranteeing all adequate, effective, and fair legal recourse.

### Economic Governance, AML/CFT, and Anti-corruption
- Staff recommend continuing to increase fiscal transparency by publishing consolidated financial statements and audit reports.  
- Coordinate with private and NPOs to better understand AML/CFT risks and increase reporting of suspicious transactions, as needed.  
- Further strengthen the anti-corruption framework by allowing the automatic publication of asset declarations of top-level officials and ensuring effective management and oversight of all property of the state.

### Data and Statistics
- Data provided to the Fund remains broadly adequate for surveillance with some shortcomings.  
- Staff recommend expanding data sources, improving the timeliness of key statistics such as poverty rates, and enhancing the publication of detailed balance of payments data, including remittances.

### Key Social and Economic Indicators (selected figures from Table 1)
- GDP per capita (current US$, 2024): 2,865  
- GNI per capita (Atlas method, current US$, 2023): 2,360  
- GINI Index (2014): 46.2  
- Population (millions, 2024): 6.9  
- Life expectancy at birth in years (2022): 74.5  
- Unemployment (percent of labor force, 2024): 3.4  
- Poverty rate ($3.65/day line in 2017 PPP, percent): 12.5  
- Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births, 2022): 10.7

### Selected Macro and Financial Statistics (2024–26 from Table 1)
- GDP growth: 2024 = 3.6; 2025 = 3.8; 2026 = 3.4  
- GDP (nominal, US$ million): 2024 = 19,694; 2025 = 21,407; 2026 = 22,737  
- Consumer price inflation (period average): 2024 = 4.6; 2025 = 2.5; 2026 = 2.7  
- Gross domestic investment (Percent of GDP): 2024 = 24.7; 2025 = 27.3; 2026 = 28.0  
- Gross national savings (Percent of GDP): 2024 = 28.9; 2025 = 36.6; 2026 = 33.2  
- Current account (Percent of GDP): 2024 = 4.2; 2025 = 9.3; 2026 = 5.2  
- Remittances (Percent of GDP): 2024 = 26.6; 2025 = 29.5; 2026 = 26.1  
- Gross international reserves (US$ million): 2024 = 5,820; 2025 = 8,018; 2026 = 9,050  
- In months of imports excl. maquila: 2024 = 6.7; 2025 = 8.5; 2026 = 9.1  
- Consolidated public sector (overall balance after grants, Percent of GDP): 2024 = 2.9; 2025 = 2.4; 2026 = 1.6  
- Revenue (including grants, Percent of GDP): 2024 = 33.3; 2025 = 33.1; 2026 = 33.5  
- Expenditure (Percent of GDP): 2024 = 30.4; 2025 = 30.8; 2026 = 31.9  
- Non-financial public sector debt (Percent of GDP): 2024 = 45.1; 2025 = 43.2; 2026 = 42.4  
- Private sector external debt (Percent of GDP): 2024 = 27.9; 2025 = 25.5; 2026 = 23.8

### Key Policy Recommendations (summarized)
- Continue to safeguard fiscal sustainability, increase buffers, and ensure fiscal space while supporting growth by increasing priority spending, enhancing VAT collection, and improving fiscal integrity; proceed cautiously with the implementation of the 2026 budget; provide targeted and time-bound support to vulnerable groups in a downside scenario.  
- Continue to gradually ease monetary policy in the near term; coordinate monetary and exchange rate policy to maintain price and external stability and stand ready to adjust the monetary reference rate and the rate of crawl if foreign exchange inflows decline.  
- Maintain financial stability, prepare analysis to release the counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCB), and stand ready to release the CCB as needed; adjust regulations in consultation with banks to avoid excessive regulatory burden or state overreach.  
- Boost growth by increasing investment in infrastructure, human capital, and targeted social spending; increase resilience and diversify the export base; support integration of returning migrants through active labor market policies; deepen capital markets and expand financial inclusion.  
- Significantly improve the rule of law and strengthen economic governance; enhance safeguards, increase fiscal transparency, and strengthen AML/CFT and anti-corruption frameworks.

*IMF staff report for the 2025 Article IV Consultation (Nicaragua).*

### 3.      Sustaining medium-term growth rates requires

### 3.      Sustaining medium-term growth rates requires 

### Recent economic developments
- Growth and employment
  - Real GDP growth: 3.9 percent y/y in 2025H1.
  - Private consumption was a strong driver in 2024-2025H1—underpinned by high remittances, consumer credit, and rapid disinflation.
  - Export volumes declined in 2024H2 but rebounded in 2025H1.
  - Formal employment (workers affiliated to social security) has risen only modestly and remains below pre-2018 crisis levels.
- Inflation
  - Headline inflation: 2.9 percent y/y in November 2025 as food prices normalized.
  - Core inflation: stabilized around 2¾-3 percent since March 2025.
- Public finances and buffers
  - CPS surplus: about 3 percent of GDP in 2024 (maintained despite increases in public investment and social benefits of about 1 percent of GDP and a reduction in compensation of employees).
  - Public debt-to-GDP ratio: declined from 49.8 percent at end-2023 to 45.1 percent at end-2024.
  - Central government deposits: increased to 14.9 percent of GDP by July 2025.
- External sector and reserves
  - Current account (CA) surplus: narrowed from 8.2 percent of GDP in 2023 to 4.2 percent of GDP in 2024.
  - Gross international reserves (GIR): reached US$7.6 billion by end-October 2025 (8 months of next-year imports, excluding maquila, or 36 percent of GDP).
  - REER: appreciated 2.2 percent in 2024; depreciated by 3 percent by July 2025.
  - Reserves coverage: 6.7 months of next-year non-maquila imports—assessed under the ARA metric—was adequate in 2024 and near the upper bound of the suggested range.
  - NIIP: sustainable; external position in 2024 assessed as substantially stronger than level implied by fundamentals (EBA lite CA model showed a positive CA gap in 2024 with an implied REER gap of 19 percent).
- Monetary policy and exchange rate policy
  - BCN easing cycle: started October 2024; cumulative cuts of 100 basis points to a monetary reference rate (MRR) of 6 percent (in four steps between October 2024 and October 2025).
  - Exchange rate crawling rate: maintained at 0 percent and will remain so in 2026 (announcement on October 20, 2025).
  - Policies to promote local currency: incentivizing córdoba-denominated instruments; mandating that all credit and debit card transactions and announced prices be done and posted exclusively in córdobas from January 2025.
- Banking sector
  - NPLs: declined to 1.1 percent of total loans in October 2025 from 1.7 percent in December 2023.
  - Capital adequacy ratio: 19.1 percent at end-October 2025.
  - LCR: increased in 2025 to almost double the 100 percent required minimum.
- Remittances and trade concentration
  - Remittances-to-GDP ratio: 26.6 percent in 2024.
  - Over 84 percent of remittance inflows originate in the U.S.
  - U.S. share in Nicaragua’s exports: declined from about 61 percent to 51 percent over the past two decades.
  - Nicaragua implemented a Free Trade Agreement with China in 2024 and signed a cooperation agreement with Russia in 2024.

### Outlook and risks
- Growth projections
  - Short-term: Real GDP growth projected at 3.8 percent in 2025 and 3.4 percent in 2026.
  - Medium-term: Real GDP expected to grow by 3½ percent.
  - The small positive output gap is expected to close.
- External accounts and reserves
  - CA: expected to narrow to a broadly balanced position by 2030 as remittances decline and non-agricultural exports grow more slowly.
  - GIR growth: projected to moderate gradually, but reserves coverage expected to remain ample.
- Risk assessment
  - Risks tilted to the downside in the medium term.
  - Downside risks: commodity price volatility, weaker global growth, tighter U.S. immigration and trade policies, stricter/wider international sanctions, prolonged global policy uncertainty, natural disasters, possible additional trade actions.
  - Upside risks: more favorable terms of trade, higher public capital spending (which could also raise inflation above the baseline).
- Debt distress assessment
  - Nicaragua assessed at moderate risk of external and overall public debt distress.
  - Public debt projected to decline to 40.1 percent of GDP by end-2030 under sustained fiscal surpluses and growth.
  - Vulnerabilities to combined shocks and growth shocks require reinforcing policy buffers.

### Policy discussions and recommendations
- Near-term policy stance
  - Continue to gradually ease monetary policy while maintaining a broadly neutral fiscal stance.
  - Maintain prudent fiscal, monetary, and financial policies to preserve stability, fiscal sustainability, and buffers.
- Medium-term priorities to raise growth and resilience
  - Increase public investment.
  - Strengthen human capital accumulation.
  - Implement targeted social spending.
  - Strengthen economic governance and anti-corruption frameworks.
  - Improve the business climate and significantly improve the rule of law.
  - Advance structural reforms to increase resilience, diversify exports and trade, and raise labor force participation.
- Contingent measures in risk scenarios
  - Provide targeted and time-bound support to vulnerable groups.
  - Change the monetary reference rate and the rate of crawl as needed to maintain external and price stability.
  - Partially use buffers to mitigate shock impacts.
  - Use macroprudential measures as warranted, including releasing the CCB in periods of financial distress to avoid a credit crunch.
- Fiscal strategy and financing
  - Authorities’ 2026 draft central government budget: expected fiscal surplus of 0.6 percent of GDP (versus a surplus of 2-2¼ percent of GDP executed during 2024-25).
  - Staff baseline: projects a fiscal surplus of 1.6 percent of GDP in 2026 (broadly neutral fiscal stance) and a medium-term fiscal surplus of 2¼ percent of GDP.
  - Staff advice: proceed cautiously with budget execution in line with staff’s baseline given uncertainty over trade policies and external financing.
  - External financing: diminishing multilateral disbursements since 2024; gross financing needs projected to be met mostly through fiscal surpluses and increased disbursements from CABEI and China; concessional borrowing from IFIs expected to stay constrained.
  - Debt management: staff recommend any new borrowing be on transparent and as much as possible concessional terms.
  - Domestic capital markets: promote for longer-term borrowing to diversify financing sources.
- Specific fiscal details and sensitivities
  - 2026 budgetary dynamics: 22.8 percent increase in revenues and a 20.7 percent increase in total expenditures relative to the 2025 budget (driven by higher wage spending, public investment, and transfers).
  - Execution rates of expenditures during 2020–2024: averaged about 97–98 percent of the approved budget.
  - Staff projections incorporate central government, municipalities, SOEs, and transfers to cover INSS deficits (government transfers rising from ½ percent of GDP per year to 1 percent of GDP by 2030).
  - Cyclically adjusted primary balance in 2026: projected at 3.2 percent of GDP.
  - Medium-term growth projection remains below pre-crisis average of 4.3 percent (2004-17).

### Authorities’ views
- The authorities broadly agreed with staff on the economic outlook and risk assessment for 2025-26.
- Authorities anticipate higher medium-term growth (around 4 percent), driven by higher expected private consumption and investment.
- Authorities emphasized that ample buffers built in recent years could be deployed should risks materialize.

*Source: 3. Sustaining medium-term growth rates requires—IMF staff chapter content.*

### 18.      To sustain higher medium-term growth, staff recommend adopting additional fiscal

### 18. To sustain higher medium-term growth, staff recommend adopting additional fiscal measures to enable higher infrastructure investment and targeted social spending

### Fiscal measures recommended
- Additional measures totaling 0.6 percent of GDP could create space for priority public investment and targeted social spending.
  - Strengthening VAT collection by eliminating tax exemptions and addressing collection gaps (Annex IV, 0.3 percent of GDP).
  - Better targeting and rationalization of long-standing SOE subsidies (0.3 percent of GDP).
- The additional measures could be used to increase priority spending by the same amount, for instance allocated to capital spending (0.4 percent of GDP) and social spending (0.2 percent of GDP).
- VAT exemptions are not automatically progressive; a more efficient alternative is recycling part of the VAT revenues through targeted transfers.

### Fiscal risks and SOE, social security pressures
- Efforts are needed to contain medium-term fiscal pressures from SOEs, the social security system, and possible natural disasters.
- SOEs posted (collectively) a modest surplus recently, mainly due to a decline in investment; investment is expected to pick up, leading to re-emerging projected deficits.
- Close monitoring, enhancing oversight of SOEs, and fiscal transparency are needed to reduce fiscal pressures.
- Expenditure pressures in the social security system remain high due to pension obligations and administrative costs; pressures may increase if formal employment growth and contributions growth remain lower than expenditure growth, even with a higher total labor force due to returned migration.
- A comprehensive pension system strategy is needed, encompassing parametric changes to benefits and contributions, tighter expenditure controls, and a more robust investment framework to ensure long-term sustainability.

### Debt management and financing considerations
- Recently contracted debt in 2025 focused on infrastructure financing, including a loan from CABEI and commercial debt from China.
- The approved medium-term debt management strategy (MTDS) for 2024-27 prioritizes concessional external borrowing while diversifying financing sources (including from non-traditional creditors) and developing the domestic debt market.
- Nicaragua could expand borrowing through issuing domestic and external bonds; however, this would raise debt-servicing costs.
  - New domestic borrowing has declined significantly given overall fiscal surpluses; it has relatively shorter maturity, and domestic interest rates remain higher than international rates.
  - Nicaragua has not issued Eurobonds. Should Nicaragua issue Eurobonds it would likely incur a higher risk premium than peers.
- Fitch affirmed Nicaragua’s long-term credit rating at ‘B’ with a stable outlook in May 2025, citing strong fiscal and external buffers while underscoring ongoing risks from U.S policy shifts and weak governance.
- Although more costly, Eurobonds could broaden the investor base, diversify financing sources, and serve as a more resilient complement to bilateral borrowing as the external financing mix evolves.
- Greater fiscal transparency would help (see section D).

### Public financial management and fiscal risk disclosure
- Staff welcome the Ministry of Finance efforts to further strengthen public financial management through continued disclosure of fiscal risks and tax expenditures.
- Recommendation to broaden fiscal risk analysis coverage and increase audit capacity.
- Enhancing debt coverage, improving fiscal risk report, and ensuring timely publication of audited financial statements would strengthen oversight and help contain fiscal risks.

### Competitiveness, tax administration, and governance
- Maintaining fiscal integrity is paramount given the need for increased competitiveness for companies and enhanced tax collection for the government.
- Nicaragua has higher corporate income tax rates and minimum payment tax than competitors in the region, while also facing the highest effective U.S. tariff rate.
- To preserve competitiveness while enhancing tax collection, it is important to:
  - Increase the accessibility of regulations.
  - Limit administrative discretionary practices.
  - Ensure that penalties are proportionate, and appeals are independent, timely, and consistent with published procedures.

### Authorities’ views on fiscal measures
- Authorities reaffirmed commitment to safeguarding fiscal sustainability and building buffers while supporting growth.
- Noted the 2026 budget will be executed as planned; consideration could be given to implementing it more gradually in a downside scenario.
- Acknowledged staff recommendations on additional fiscal measures but did not see the need at this time, given that revenues and buffers have been growing at a satisfactory pace.
- Highlighted that most remaining VAT exemptions apply to basic goods and essential services and that transfers to SOEs primarily support public investment and cover deficits, as needed, thereby directly subsidizing consumers of public utilities.

*Source: IMF staff analysis in the provided content unit.*

### 33.      Improving the business climate is needed to sustain higher growth. To ensure private

### Improving the business climate is needed to sustain higher growth

### Macro outlook and key indicators
- Real GDP grew by 3.9 percent in the first half of 2025.
- Growth is projected to moderate to 3.4 percent in 2026, from 3.8 percent in 2025, reflecting mostly staff’s assumptions of lower remittances in a context of tighter U.S. immigration policies.
- Over the medium term, staff expect real GDP growth to stabilize at around 3½ percent, supported by public investment and an expanding labor force.
- The fiscal position is strong; external and overall public debt are at moderate risk of debt distress.
- The NIIP is sustainable, reserve coverage is adequate, and the external position is assessed as substantially stronger than the level implied by fundamentals and desirable policies.
- The announced rate of crawl is 0 percent for 2026.
- Latest actual data for poverty rates dates to 2014.

### Business climate, private sector, and competitiveness
- Improving the business climate is needed to sustain higher, private sector-led growth.
- Enhancing financial inclusion would help channel remittances and small savings towards investment and support entrepreneurship.
- Authorities have started diversifying export markets and sources of investment; reducing non-tariff barriers would support these efforts.
- Working closer with the business community would help support competitiveness and diversify exports by reducing the cost of doing business.
- Strengthening protection of property rights and practices in the rule of law, tax administration, and the regulatory framework would help enhance open competition and increase competitiveness.
- Most business associations and Chambers of Commerce have been closed, leading the private sector to interact individually with the government, the U.S. government, or importers, raising the cost of doing business, inefficiency, and governance vulnerabilities, thereby lowering competitiveness.

### Economic governance, rule of law, and property rights
- Progress on safeguards: Law No.1232 was adopted, incorporating some previous safeguards recommendations; staff recommend further strengthening BCN’s institutional autonomy in future amendments.
- Staff recommend developing a strategy for transitioning to IFRS after requested Fund technical assistance, while strengthening BCN’s balance sheet through profit retention.
- The rule of law requires significant improvement to support private property rights and growth:
  - Transfers of private property to the state are published in the Official Gazette for most assets, but judicial and administrative decisions on which transfers are based are not published.
  - Staff recommend increasing transparency, accountability, and effectiveness of administrative and judicial processes (including of third parties) by publishing those decisions in line with best practices; introducing reforms that suspend administrative decisions potentially affecting property rights until administrative acts are final; and guaranteeing adequate, effective, and fair legal recourse to all proceedings.

### Fiscal transparency, SOEs, and public finances
- Steady improvements in fiscal transparency should be maintained.
- Most commitments and recommendations from the 2020 RCF/RFI have been implemented; progress to address the rest of commitments continues.
- Coverage of SOEs in the quarterly public finance statistics report increased from seven to eight.
- The 2024 fiscal risk report enhanced coverage of macroeconomic risks and frequency of natural disasters.
- Remaining RFI/RCF commitments include publishing the financial statements of all SOEs, including their audit reports from the Comptroller General.
- Staff recommend enhancing tax collection and better targeting SOE transfers to create space for higher priority public investment and targeted social spending.

### AML/CFT, financial supervision, and anti-corruption
- Nicaragua is enhancing its AML/CFT framework in preparation for GAFILAT’s Fifth Mutual Evaluation Round, expected in 2028.
- The National AML/CFT Commission improved its coordination capabilities; the authorities revised key AML/CFT laws regarding asset seizures and forfeitures.
- New regulations for virtual asset service providers were issued in 2025; sectoral risk assessments were prepared for cooperatives and the banking sector.
- Supervision is shifting to thematic inspections and risk-based tools improved, but reporting of suspicious transactions remains low for some designated entities, including gold traders; designated entities have not filed suspicious transactions reports of politically exposed persons.
- The positive momentum in cooperation for financial supervision with public sector institutions should be extended to private and NPO sectors.
- Government steps to enhance governance and anti-corruption frameworks include digitizing asset declarations and assessing corruption risks; the Comptroller General continued publishing audits and strengthened its methodology in 2024 to allow for simultaneous and wider audits.
- Staff recommend further efforts: periodic risk-based assessments of asset declarations; strengthening the legal framework for automatic publication of declarations of top-level officials; ensuring transparent management and oversight of private property transferred to the state.

### Monetary and financial sector policy
- The ongoing easing of the monetary policy stance and the announced rate of crawl of 0 percent for 2026 are considered appropriate given external conditions.
- Staff recommend continuing to foster the use of local currency and deepen capital markets to enhance monetary policy effectiveness.
- Staff support implementation of comprehensive financial laws approved in early 2025 that increased capital buffers and strengthened recovery and crisis resolution frameworks, but recommend further strengthening crisis preparedness (analysis for activating the CCB, contingency plans).
- Authorities should stand ready to release CCBs in a downside scenario and adjust financial regulations in consultation with banks to avoid excessive regulatory burden.

### Data, statistics, and capacity development
- Data provided to the Fund has some shortcomings but remains broadly adequate for surveillance; the overall assessment is unchanged since the 2024 Article IV report.
- Efforts required include: (i) expanding sources of data for the real and external sectors; (ii) harmonizing public and external sector debt data; and (iii) improving timeliness of key statistics (e.g., poverty rate, remittances).
- Incorporation of the household survey results into national accounts and dissemination of the new series with benchmark year 2019 remains pending.
- BCN continues to work with IMF CD on external sector data to minimize errors and omissions.
- Staff recommend expanding data sources, improving timeliness of key statistics such as poverty rates, and enhancing publication of detailed balance of payments data, including remittances.

### Authorities’ views (summary)
- Authorities concurred with staff on the need to boost human and physical capital, diversify exports, and foster trade facilitation to attract investment; they view diversification as gradual.
- They consider current engagement with economic agents broadly adequate and do not foresee additional measures for returning migrants beyond current labor market policies.
- On safeguards, authorities confirmed they will continue to apply half of BCN profits towards recapitalization in accordance with Law 1232.
- On fiscal transparency, authorities will sustain efforts to publish annual financial statements and audit reports for the central government and broaden fiscal reporting coverage.
- On AML/CFT and anti-corruption, authorities highlighted continued preparation for the Mutual Evaluation Round and legal changes in 2024 that allow immediate removal of public officials for mismanagement of public funds; methodologies for checking asset declarations and audits are being strengthened.

### Staff recommendations (selected, policy-focused)
- Proceed cautiously with 2026 budget execution in line with staff’s baseline scenario, considering downside risks, high uncertainty, limited external financing, and pension system imbalances.
- Enhance tax collection and better target SOE transfers to fund higher-priority public investment and targeted social spending; deploy targeted and time-bound support to vulnerable groups in downside scenarios.
- Continue preserving price and external stability; strengthen monetary policy transmission and be ready to increase the monetary reference rate and recalibrate the rate of crawl in a downside scenario.
- Prepare the analysis and contingency planning needed for activating the CCB and crisis resolution tools; be ready to release CCBs if financial distress materializes.
- Boost human and physical capital and diversify exports; expand social safety nets and active labor-market policies; work with export firms to scale into higher value-added products.
- Strengthen the business climate and economic governance, especially by significantly improving the rule of law and protections for private property rights; increase transparency, accountability, and effectiveness of administrative and judicial processes related to property transfers and guarantee fair legal recourse.
- Continue increasing fiscal transparency by publishing consolidated financial statements and audit reports; coordinate with private and NPO sectors to better understand AML/CFT risks and increase reporting of suspicious transactions as needed.
- Further strengthen the anti-corruption framework by allowing automatic publication of asset declarations of top-level officials and ensuring effective management and oversight of all state property.
- Expand statistical sources, improve timeliness of key statistics (e.g., poverty rates), and enhance publication of detailed balance of payments data, including remittances.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1nicea2026001-source-pdf.pdf*

### 52.      Staff recommended that the next Article IV consultation takes place on the standard

### Staff recommended that the next Article IV consultation takes place on the standard 12-months cycle.

### Real Sector
- The retail sector continued driving growth, while manufacturing stagnated.
- Real private consumption and investment contributed to growth, along with a rebound in exports, while public consumption contracted.
- Real GDP growth (annual percentage change):
  - 2020: -2.2
  - 2021: 0.5
  - 2022: 3.6
  - 2023: 4.4
  - 2024: 3.6
  - 2025 (Prel.): 3.8
  - 2026–2030 (Projections): 3.4, 3.4, 3.4, 3.4, 3.4
- Inflation:
  - Core inflation stabilized around 3 percent in 2025.
  - Consumer price inflation (period average): 2025: 2.5 percent; projections 2026–2030: 2.7, 2.7, 2.7, 2.7, 2.7.
- Labor and credit:
  - Real credit growth accelerated in 2024 and slowed in 2025.
  - Formal employment growth remains low and well below pre-crisis levels.

### External Sector
- Current account:
  - Current account (percent of GDP): 2020: 3.8; 2021: -2.8; 2022: -2.9; 2023: 8.2; 2024: 4.2; 2025 (Prel.): 9.3; 2026–2030 (Projections): 5.2, 3.2, 1.8, 0.5, -0.1.
  - The current account surplus is expected to widen in 2025 on the back of sustained remittances and smaller trade deficits, primarily in the non-oil current account balance.
- Remittances:
  - Remittances (percent of GDP): 2020: 14.5; 2021: 15.1; 2022: 20.6; 2023: 26.2; 2024: 26.6; 2025 (Prel.): 29.5; 2026–2030: 26.1, 25.5, 25.0, 24.4, 23.9.
- Exports and trade:
  - Total exports increased strongly in 2025 especially for gold.
  - Exports f.o.b. (US$ million): 2024: 5,175; 2025 (Prel.): 5,248; 2026: 6,129; projections through 2030 given (e.g., 2027: 6,738; 2028: 6,915).
  - Trade account (US$ million): 2025: -3,295; projections show deficits widening through 2030 (e.g., 2030: -4,536).
- Financial account and external debt:
  - Financial account surplus increased in 2024, mainly due to reinvested FDI earnings.
  - Private and public external debt are projected to continue declining in 2025.
  - Total public external debt (percent of GDP): 2020: 46.1; 2021: 44.6; 2022: 42.6; 2023: 39.4; 2024: 36.0; 2025: 34.9; projections 2026–2030: 34.5, 34.9, 35.1, 34.8, 34.1.

- Reserves:
  - Gross international reserves (US$ million): 2020: 3,003; 2021: 3,828; 2022: 4,173; 2023: 5,190; 2024: 5,820; 2025 (Prel.): 8,018; projections 2026–2030: 9,050; 9,805; 10,302; 10,317; 10,266.
  - International reserves increased substantially in 2025, reaching historic highs, including coverage of months of imports (In months of imports excl. maquila: 2025: 8.5; projections 2026–2030: 9.1, 9.3, 8.8, 8.3).

### Fiscal Sector
- Fiscal balance and public debt:
  - Consolidated public sector overall balance, after grants (percent of GDP): 2020: -3.0; 2021: -1.8; 2022: 0.3; 2023: 2.9; 2024: 2.9; 2025 (Prel.): 2.4; projections 2026–2030: 1.6, 2.1, 2.3, 2.3, 2.4.
  - 2025 will mark the fourth consecutive year with a central government surplus.
  - Public sector debt (percent of GDP): 2020: 58.6; 2021: 57.2; 2022: 53.1; 2023: 49.8; 2024: 45.1; 2025 (Prel.): 43.2; projections 2026–2030: 42.4, 42.3, 42.1, 41.3, 40.1.
- Revenue and expenditure (Consolidated public sector, percent of GDP):
  - Revenue (including grants): 2024: 33.3; 2025 (Prel.): 33.1; projection 2026: 33.5; 2027–2030: 33.5, 33.5, 33.3, 33.0.
  - Expenditure: 2024: 30.0; 2025 (Prel.): 30.8; projection 2026: 31.9; 2027–2030: 31.4, 31.2, 31.0, 30.6.
  - The fiscal surplus has narrowed somewhat and remains well above historical averages, with the increase in expenditure broadly steady and offset by the increase in revenues.
- Social Security Institute (INSS):
  - INSS deficit stabilized at around ½ percent of GDP as expenditures outstrip contribution revenues.
  - INSS overall balance (percent of GDP): 2024: 0.0; 2025 (Prel.): 0.0; projections remain 0.0 through 2030 in the table.

### Monetary Sector
- Monetary aggregates and central bank:
  - Net international reserves and central government deposits rose substantially in 2025.
  - Growth of the monetary base and broad money contracted in early 2025 as the increase in NFA was more than offset by the sharper decrease in credit to the government in 2025.
  - BCN has remained a net purchaser of foreign exchange, while the official exchange rate has stayed closely aligned with the market rate (2025 data up to August).
- Banking rates and liquidity:
  - Banks’ excess reserves remain slightly above legal requirements.
  - The differential between lending and deposit rates in foreign currency remains high and broadly stable, at around 6 percentage points.
- Monetary indicators (selected):
  - Broad money (annual change): 2024: 7.6; 2025 (Prel.): 7.1; projections vary (e.g., 2026: 4.9; 2027: 2.6; 2028: 3.2).
  - Credit to the private sector (annual change): 2024: 20.7; 2025 (Prel.): 12.5; projections 2026–2030: 12.4, 12.3, 12.2, 12.0, 12.0.

### Financial Sector
- Banking sector soundness and performance:
  - Bank deposits and credit to the private sector continued to grow strongly, but the credit-to-GDP ratio remained well below pre-crisis levels.
  - Banks' capital remained well above the required minimum of 15 percent, reaching 19.1 by October 2025, explained also by the increase in capital requirements in February 2025.
  - Non-performing loans (NPLs) and other distressed assets continued to decline.
  - Provisioning continued to improve, including for NPLs.
  - Profitability (ROA) continued to improve since 2021 and broadly returned to pre-crisis levels.
  - Liquid assets to total deposits stabilized since 2024 at the pre-crisis level.
- Financial indicators (selected, percent):
  - Capital adequacy ratio: 2024: 19.6; Q3 2025: 19.1.
  - NPLs to total loans: 2020 Q4: 3.7; 2021 Q4: 2.5; 2022 Q4: 1.5; 2023 Q4: 1.5; 2024 Q4: 1.2; 2025 Q3: 1.2.
  - Return on assets (ROA), 12-month average: 2024: 2.1; 2025 (Q3): 2.4.
  - Liquid assets to total deposits (banking system): 2024: 33.1; 2025 Q3: 33.6.

### Key Social and Macro Indicators (selected)
- GDP per capita (current US$, 2024): 2,865
- GNI per capita (Atlas method, current US$, 2023): 2,360
- Unemployment (percent of labor force, 2024): 3.4
- GINI Index (2014): 46.2
- Poverty rate ($3.65/day line in 2017 PPP, percent): 12.5
- Population (millions, 2024): 6.9
- Life expectancy at birth (years, 2022): 74.5
- Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births, 2022): 10.7

*Source: National authorities and IMF staff calculations (figures and tables as provided).*

### Annex I. External Sector Assessment

### Annex I. External Sector Assessment

### Overall assessment
- Nicaragua’s external position in 2024 is assessed as substantially stronger than the level implied by fundamentals and desirable policies.
- CA surplus narrowed to 4.2 percent of GDP in 2024, compared to 8.2 percent in 2023, as rebounding imports more than offset robust remittances and higher gold and coffee exports.
- NIIP continued to improve as private and public sector debt continued to decline.
- REER appreciated slightly in 2024.
- Gross reserves continued to grow: US$5.8 billion at end-2024, close to 30 percent of GDP and equivalent to 6.7 months of next-year non-maquila imports.
- Crawling exchange rate remained at 0 percent since January 1, 2024, as announced in 2023.
- Nicaragua’s external position remains highly reliant on remittance inflows and external demand, particularly from the United States.

### Potential policy responses
- Maintain sound macroeconomic and financial policies while supporting growth.
- Policy recommendations include:
  - increasing public investment;
  - targeted social benefits;
  - strengthening governance and the business climate to support private investment;
  - addressing imbalances in the social security system;
  - developing domestic capital markets;
  - enhancing resilience to natural disaster.

### Foreign assets and liabilities: position and trajectory
- Background:
  - NIIP improved by 6 percent of GDP in 2024, reaching -91 percent of GDP, due mainly to a decline in gross liabilities of the private sector, and to a lesser extent of the public sector.
  - Gross liabilities were 139 percent of GDP in 2024, primarily composed of FDI liabilities (75 percent of GDP) and public debt (42 percent of GDP).
- Assessment:
  - The External Sustainability Assessment finds the NIIP sustainable.
  - NIIP is projected to strengthen further on continued accumulation of external assets—underpinned by sizable central bank reserves—though the pace of improvement will moderate as current account surpluses are projected to narrow in the medium-term.
- 2024 (percent of GDP) snapshot:
  - NIIP: -91
  - Gross Assets: 48
  - Debt Assets: 48
  - Gross Liab.: 139
  - Debt Liab.: 64

### Current account
- Background:
  - CA surplus narrowed to 4.2 percent of GDP in 2024 as the goods-and-services deficit widened.
  - Imports increased by 8 percent y/y and exports declined by 2.2 percent y/y, despite an improvement in the terms of trade.
  - Balance of services swung from a 2.6 percent surplus in 2023 to a marginal deficit of 0.04 percent of GDP in 2024, reflecting a 16.7 percent drop in services exports (notably in travel, telecommunications, and maquila-related services).
  - Remittances remained exceptionally high at about 26.6 percent of GDP (US$5.2 bn).
  - In 2025Q1, the CA surplus widened to 8 percent of GDP, from 4.1 percent of GDP in 2024Q1, reflecting higher gold and coffee exports, and accelerating remittances.
  - Remittance inflows increased in the four months of 2025 ahead of expected deportations; they are expected to decelerate from 2026 and stabilize at lower levels in the medium term due to more restrictive U.S. migration policies.
- Assessment (EBA-lite):
  - CA norm: -2.7 percent of GDP (reflects structural characteristics including lower income level and larger emigrant share).
  - Relative policy gap: 1.4 percent of GDP, driven primarily by tighter fiscal policy than in the rest of the world.
  - Implied current account gap in 2024: 6.6 percent of GDP, underscoring an external position substantially stronger than the level consistent with fundamentals and desirable medium-term policies.
  - Implied undervaluation: 19 percent; caveat that the CA gap is driven by items inelastic to REER changes: (i) actual CA surplus reflecting very large remittances inflows driven by recent emigration since 2021, and (ii) need for precautionary savings due to limited access to multilateral and concessional lending.
- Policy recommendations to support investment, growth, and reduce need for higher saving rates:
  - increasing public investment;
  - targeted social benefits and human capital accumulation;
  - improving non-price competitiveness, including through strengthening governance;
  - addressing imbalances in the social security system;
  - developing domestic capital markets;
  - enhancing resilience to natural disaster.
- Nicaragua: Model estimates for 2024 (in percent of GDP):
  - CA-Actual: 4.2
  - Cyclical contributions (from model) (-): 0.3
  - Adjusted CA: 3.9
  - CA Norm (from model): -2.7
  - Adjustments to the norm (+): 0.0
  - Adjusted CA Norm: -2.7
  - CA Gap: 6.6-4.2
  - o/w Relative policy gap: 1.4
  - Elasticity: -0.3
  - REER Gap (in percent): -19.4 12.2
  - Notes: Based on the EBA-lite 3.0 methodology; cyclically adjusted, including multilateral consistency adjustments.

### Real exchange rate (REER)
- Background:
  - Average REER appreciated by 2.2 percent in 2024.
  - By July 2025, REER was about 3 percent below its December 2024 level, reflecting an unchanged nominal exchange rate and domestic inflation running below that of major trading partners, particularly the United States.
- Assessment:
  - The REER index model finds a CA gap of -4.2 percent of GDP for 2024, suggesting a REER overvaluation of 12.2 percent.
  - This finding is mainly driven by a large residual which limits the assessment and the policy implications.

### Capital and financial accounts: flows and policy measures
- Background:
  - Net FDI inflows in 2024 rose to 6.5 percent of GDP—slightly above 2023 but still below the 2021–22 average (7.7 percent of GDP) and pre-crisis levels—with reinvested earnings making up 65 percent of the total inflows.
  - Other investment recorded net outflows for a second straight year (0.8 percent of GDP in 2024), largely reflecting private-sector loan amortizations.
  - Errors and omissions were large and negative (–7.2 percent of GDP), which may point to underestimation of other investment flows.
- Assessment:
  - Financing structure of the current account supports external stability, with the important caveat that this depends on the continued high level of remittance inflows.
  - Staff project a sizeable decline in remittances as a share of GDP under the baseline scenario, reaching around 21 percent of GDP in the medium term.

### FX intervention and reserves level
- Background:
  - Gross international reserves (GIR) at end-2024 were US$5.8 billion or 6.7 months of next-year imports excluding maquila, supported by prudent fiscal policy and sustained remittance inflows.
  - GIR continued to accumulate in 2025, US$7.3 billion at end-August, and are projected to rise further through 2026 (both as a share of GDP and in import coverage) before gradually declining as the current account shifts from surplus to deficit in the medium term, primarily due to a decline in remittances.
  - In the outer years staff project a decline in reserves in 2029-30 to finance the emerging negative BoP balance.
- Assessment:
  - Level of gross international reserves in 2024 was adequate, at 6.7 months of non-maquila imports, close to the upper bound of the suggested range of 4.4 to 7.6 months of non-maquila imports, estimated using the Fund’s adequacy metric for credit constrained LICs, with a range of reserves holding opportunity costs.

---

### Annex II. Expected Impact from Changes in U.S. Policies

### Summary impact estimates
- A 10-percentage-point increase in U.S. effective tariffs would lower GDP level by about 0.3 percent in the first year.
- Tighter migration policies would reduce remittances by about 3.5 percent of GDP starting in 2026.
- Estimates are subject to high uncertainty due to phased and conditional nature of announced trade measures by the U.S., and broader ongoing global policy shifts.

### Exports: structure and recent developments
- Exports in 2024:
  - Total exports about US$7.7 billion (39 percent of GDP).
  - About 55 percent from non-FTZ and 45 percent from FTZ.
  - Non-FTZ exports: mostly primary and resource-based products; gold, coffee, and beef accounted for almost two-thirds of non-FTZ exports or about 30 percent of total exports in 2024.
  - Since 2022, gold exports have averaged 15 percent of total exports.
  - FTZ exports concentrated in textiles and apparel, car wire harnesses, and cigars; textiles and apparel represented about 57 percent of FTZ exports, and 26 percent of total exports in 2024.
- Trade partners:
  - United States absorbs over half of total exports.
  - Other important destinations: Central America and Canada (together between 15-20 percent), Mexico (around 15 percent), selected European markets such as Belgium and Switzerland.
  - In 2023, China accounted for 0.3 of total exports; Russia accounted for less than 0.1 percent.

### Recent U.S. tariff actions and impact through 2025
- Timeline and effective tariffs:
  - In April 2025, U.S. government announced an 18 percent tariff on Nicaraguan exports; implemented as of August 9, 2025.
  - Between April 2 and August 8, 2025, Nicaraguan exporters faced a 10 percent tariff in line with most other countries.
  - Between August 9 and November 12, 2025, 18 percent tariff rate was above regional peers.
  - Gold exports remained exempt, bringing the effective tariff rate down to about 17 percent.
- Observed outcomes:
  - High international prices for gold, beef, and coffee have offset the impact of tariffs.
  - Total exports increased by 15.8 percent (y/y) as of 2025Q3.
  - Textile and apparel exports grew by 2.3 percent (y/y) despite higher tariffs.
  - Exporters are adapting through profit-margin compression, supported by Nicaragua’s relatively low labor and electricity costs.

### Buffers and mitigating factors
- CAFTA-DR utilization:
  - In 2025, around 70 percent of total exports to the United States originated under CAFTA-DR.
  - Utilization rates higher for main exports: close to 100 percent for beef and around 80 percent for textile and apparel.
  - High utilization rates limit exposure to higher effective tariffs and create incentives to reorient supply chains toward CAFTA-DR–compliant production and strengthen rules-of-origin compliance.
- Other mitigating factors:
  - Since mid-November 2025, U.S. announced universal tariff reductions on a large set of agricultural products, including coffee and beef, lowering effective tariff burden for Nicaragua to about 14 percent.
  - Prices of gold and some agricultural products are expected to remain high due to global supply constraints and strong demand.
  - Nicaragua benefits from relatively low labor and electricity costs, strong transport infrastructure, and access to both Pacific and Caribbean coasts.
- Uncertainties:
  - Timing and magnitude of phased-in tariffs could be revised or eliminated depending on Nicaragua’s response to USTR 301 investigation.
  - Additional trade actions will occur against heightened competitive pressure from regional peers (El Salvador and Guatemala have announced trade agreements with the U.S. starting in 2026).

### Quantitative guidance on tariff impacts
- WEO-based elasticity:
  - An immediate, permanent increase of 10 percentage points in the U.S. effective tariff rate would reduce the level of GDP in the country subject to the new tariff by 0.29 percent in the first year the tariff is in place.
  - Assuming linear elasticity, this implies a decline in GDP compared to the baseline of maximum 0.29 percent in 2027 and 0.435 percent in 2028.
  - Impact could be higher if higher rates are imposed, as beyond a certain tariff exports volumes to the U.S. could fall sharply, causing larger effects through loss of market access and competitiveness.
- Historical analogues:
  - Experiences from Myanmar (2003) and the Dominican Republic (2005): U.S. trade actions led to declines in garment exports, reorientation to other markets over time, closure of uncompetitive firms, loss of employment, and fiscal revenues.

### Diversification opportunities
- Potential export diversification areas (World Bank 2021 study):
  - Feasible opportunities: agro-processing, light manufacturing, wood products.
  - More complex, higher-value options: machinery, metals, chemicals (far from current capabilities but could raise economic complexity).
  - Services remain underexploited: ICT and professional services were about 16 percent of Nicaragua’s total service exports in 2018 (same share as in 2010).
- Bottlenecks to address:
  - infrastructure, skills, and governance limitations that constrain scale and value-added of service exports.

### Migration and remittances
- Baseline migration assumptions:
  - About 650,000 Nicaraguan-born Nicaraguans live in the U.S., with more than half at risk for deportations (about 340,000).
  - Staff assume 75 percent of CHNV parolees and TPS individuals will be removed in 2026, translating to around 70,000 and 2,200 Nicaraguans being deported respectively after termination of each program in 2025.
  - Total removals of undocumented migrants of all nationalities from the U.S. would reach about 2.0 million migrants starting in 2026 (1.0 million per year removals plus termination of CHNV parole and TPS for many countries) and continuing at 1.0 million per year thereafter.
  - Each country’s share of deportations is assumed constant at its 2025 share of total removals (0.6 percent for Nicaragua), implying about 100,000 removals cumulatively during 2025-30 for Nicaragua.
- Remittances projection methodology:
  - Remittances = number of U.S. remitters × average remittances per person.
  - Number of U.S. remitters derived from initial stock of migrants and estimated deportations path.
  - Average remittance in 2024 estimated to be US$556 per month.
  - From 2026 onwards, average remittance assumed to grow in line with U.S. nominal GDP.
- Projected remittance path:
  - Given termination of CHNV parole and TPS and assumed increase in deportations, remittances projected to decline by 3.5 percent of GDP in 2026.
  - Thereafter, remittances expected to decline as percentage of GDP but at a lower rate, converging toward about 25 percent of GDP by 2030.
  - Compared with last year’s projection, the medium-term path was revised to reflect stronger-than-expected 2025 inflows—driven by precautionary reasons amid policy tightening—which offset the near-term drop.

*Source: Annex I. External Sector Assessment and Annex II. Expected Impact from Changes in U.S. Policies, from the provided IMF document.*

### 12. To understand the impact of

### 1nicea2026001-source-pdf - 12. To understand the impact of

### Consumption function estimation (2004–2024)
- Estimation approach and data:
  - Real consumption function estimated using the cointegration method.
  - Variables: labor force (log level), unemployment rate, remittances (real, log level and changes), real income taxes, real transfers from the budget to households, CPI-deflated (except unemployment rate).
  - Alternative specification used real wages as an income proxy.
- Key regression diagnostics and notes:
  - R2: 0.67 and 0.81 (two specifications).
  - Observations: 2119.
  - Note: ***p-value < 0.01; **p-value < 0.05; *p-value < 0.10. Since the log level of the labor force, real remittances, real transfers and real taxes are non stationary, no significance level is attached to these coefficients but the combination associated with the lagged private consumption variable is stationary.
- Long-run and short-run elasticities and dynamics:
  - Long-run elasticity of real private consumption with respect to real remittances: 0.34.
  - Long-run elasticity of real private consumption with respect to real income taxes: –0.8.
  - Short-run elasticity of private consumption growth with respect to the unemployment rate: –1.7.
  - Adjustment speed: about half of the long-run gap closes within a year.
- Additional contextual points:
  - Staff finds a strong long-term relationship among the variables.
  - Results show that real private consumption grows with employment, remittances, public support, and declines with income taxes.
- Remittances projections and assumptions:
  - About 85 percent of remittances originate from the U.S in 2024-25. This share is expected to decline gradually, reaching 82 percent by 2030, reflecting lower net-migration of Nicaraguan to the U.S.
  - Inflows of migrants to the U.S. is assumed to remain limited, as observed since January 2025.
  - Staff’s projections based on these estimates indicate a decline in remittances of about 6 percent (y/y) in 2026, from the larger base of 2025.

### Potential GDP impact of additional trade actions on textile and apparel sectors
- Scenario framing:
  - Uses the estimated consumption function and the link between exports and employment to study implications of additional trade actions (e.g., higher U.S.T.R. tariffs) on overall economic activity.
- Expected transmission and effects:
  - Assumed decline in exports (due to higher tariffs on manufacturing sectors over the medium term) leads to lower employment in the garment export sector, weakening private consumption.
  - Overall GDP impact is partly offset by a modest decline in imports associated with the export shortfall.
  - The impact is assumed to be gradual, reflecting phased effects on exports and labor markets.
  - The level of real GDP is expected to fall before stabilizing and returning to trend growth (no numerical magnitude of GDP fall provided in the source text).

### Risk Assessment Matrix — selected risks and policy responses
- Conjunctural risks (relative likelihood and expected impact shown in source):
  - Geopolitical Tensions — Relative Likelihood: High; Expected Impact: High.
    - Policy response: Accelerate structural reforms, deepen intraregional trade, strengthen business climate, improve supply-chain resilience.
  - Escalating Trade Measures and Prolonged Uncertainty — Relative Likelihood: High; Expected Impact: High.
    - Policy response: Coordinate monetary and fiscal policies; use buffers (government deposits and international reserves) if needed; adjust monetary policy stance and crawling exchange rate in line with fundamentals and projected inflation differential.
  - Commodity Price Volatility — Relative Likelihood: High; Expected Impact: High.
    - Policy response: Maintain competitive business environment, targeted/time-bound fiscal support to vulnerable populations, accelerate structural reforms, adjust monetary policy stance, improve supply-chain resilience.
  - Fiscal Vulnerabilities and Higher Long-Term Interest Rates — Relative Likelihood: High; Expected Impact: Medium.
    - Policy response: Remain committed to fiscal discipline and public financial management; improve rule of law and business climate; maintain flexibility of the de jure crawling exchange rate regime; refrain from imposing capital controls.
  - Decline in International Aid — Relative Likelihood: High; Expected Impact: Low.
    - Policy response: Prioritize expenditure to support affected households; adjust monetary policy stance; improve rule of law and governance reforms.
  - Financial Market Volatility and Correction — Relative Likelihood: High; Expected Impact: Low.
    - Policy response: Maintain sound macro and regulatory policies; stress testing; deploy macroprudential instruments.
  - Rising Social Discontent — Relative Likelihood: Medium; Expected Impact: Medium.
    - Policy response: Accelerate structural reforms, foster diversification and job creation, adjust fiscal expenditure while protecting social spending and public investment.
- Structural risks:
  - Labor supply and remittances — Relative Likelihood: High; Expected Impact: High.
    - Policy response: Expedite absorption of additional labor supply into formal employment; mitigate consumption and revenue shock through temporary, targeted countercyclical fiscal measures financed by existing buffers.
  - Climate — Relative Likelihood: Medium; Expected Impact: High.
    - Policy response: Prioritize infrastructure resilience investments; strengthen disaster risk management and preparedness.
  - Cyberthreats — Relative Likelihood: Low; Expected Impact: Low.
    - Policy response: Strengthen government IT systems, diversify trade patterns, allow real exchange rate to cushion external shocks, continue key infrastructure spending, support domestic market development and labor markets.

### Revenue mobilization analysis — key findings (two-decade perspective)
- Overall revenue trends:
  - Central government revenues increased from 12.2 percent of GDP in 2004 to 20.1 percent of GDP in 2024.
  - Predicted revenues used a log-log regression with an estimated tax elasticity of 1.2.
  - Prior to the 2018 socio-political crisis, revenues were closely aligned with predicted values; since 2019 actual revenues outpaced predicted levels.
- Tax buoyancy and responsiveness:
  - Tax buoyancy averaged around 1.2 during 2004-17.
  - Buoyancy increased significantly over 2018-2019, reflecting the sharp decline of revenues during the protracted recession.
  - Buoyancy rose again in 2021-22 reflecting the effects of the 2019 tax reform and post-pandemic recovery, then stabilized between 1.0 and 1.1 during 2023-2024.
- Income taxes:
  - Income tax revenues increased from 3.4 percent of GDP to 8.9 percent of GDP over the past two decades.
  - Share of income taxes in tax revenues rose from slightly more than a quarter to almost half.
  - 2019 reforms: maintained PMD principle (pay either 30 percent on net taxable profits or a rate applied to gross income), raised gross-income PMD rate from a 1 percent flat rate to differentiated rates of 1 to 3 percent; withholding tax on non-resident services increased from 15 to 20 percent; introduced progressive real estate gains tax of 1 to 7 percent; increases in excise taxes on some goods.
  - Administrative measures after 2019: specialized audits of large corporates, online cadastral valuation, stricter rules on accelerated depreciation, and one-off gains from taxpayer dispute resolutions in 2021-2022.
- VAT performance:
  - VAT C-efficiency increased from 15 percent to 54 percent of the potential VAT revenue over 2006-24.
  - This corresponds to an actual VAT revenue increase of about 2½ percent of GDP in 2006-24.
  - VAT gap (difference between benchmark VAT base and actual VAT revenues as percent of benchmark VAT base): 46 percent as of 2024.
  - Published VAT tax expenditures are available only in aggregate, limiting decomposition of policy vs compliance components under RA-GAP.
- Cross-country benchmarking and tax effort:
  - Actual central government tax revenues: 19.9 percent of GDP in 2022.
  - Estimated tax potential (SFA, benchmarked to 2022): 20.5 percent of GDP.
  - Implied tax effort: approximately 97 percent.
  - Remaining gap: 0.6 percentage points of GDP (suggesting further revenue improvements are more likely from strengthening compliance and administrative efficiency rather than major new tax policy measures, including further elimination of some VAT exemptions).
- Methodological and data notes:
  - Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) model uses IMF’s World Revenue Longitudinal Database (WoRLD), Worldwide Governance Indicators, and World Development Indicators, latest WoRLD coverage up to 2022.
  - Estimation sample excludes pandemic years (2020-2021) to avoid biasing the efficiency frontier downward; including pandemic years would raise estimated tax potential in 2022 from 20.5 to 21.3 percent of GDP, lowering implied tax effort from 97 percent to 93 percent and increasing estimated tax gap from 0.6 to 1.4 percentage points of GDP.
  - Administrative improvements since 2019 include online filing and declarations with automatic mass auditing, e-invoicing authorization, electronic collection and treasury management systems, enhanced audit and enforcement platforms (including daily VAT credit validation), and taxpayer services.

*Source: IMF staff analysis in the supplied content unit.*

### Annex V. The Use of Local Currency Securities in BCN Liquidity

### Annex V. The Use of Local Currency Securities in BCN Liquidity Operations

### Transition to local-currency securities and yields
- Since early 2024, banks’ holdings of BCN securities have been almost exclusively in local currency.
- By October 2025:
  - Stock of córdoba-denominated securities rose to 7.2 percent of GDP.
  - Stock of dollar-denominated securities diminished to 0.4 percent of GDP.
- To ensure this transition, BCN maintained córdoba yields considerably above the dollar yields for about a year (January 2023 until February 2024), creating a significant premium to hold local-currency instruments, as the crawling rate was 0.
- As the transition from US$ to local currency securities was completed and inflation declined faster, córdoba yields were gradually lowered from 9.5 percent to 6.4 percent by October-2025, narrowing the spread with dollar yields to about 1.4 percentage points.

### Policy transmission: interbank, retail, and bank margins
- Actions improved transmission from the reference rate to the local currency interbank market rate.
- Observations:
  - The interbank rate in córdoba increased above the reference rate from June 2023 until May 2025, but the differential remained close to 0.
  - The interest rate differential between lending and deposit rates in córdoba remained relatively large, at about 5 percent by October-2025, though it has narrowed over the past three years and is lower than the US$ interest differential of 6 percent.
  - Cross-currency differentials varied: córdoba loans often had lower costs than dollar loans, while córdoba deposits only occasionally provided higher returns.
    - Interpretation provided in-source: a negative lending differential indicates córdoba loans are less expensive than U.S. dollar loans; a negative deposit differential indicates that córdoba deposits yield less than U.S. dollar deposits.
- Conclusion: pass-through to retail markets remains weak because bank margins remain wide.

### Dollarization, currency composition of deposits and credit
- Declining share of foreign currency deposits:
  - From about 72.3 percent in early 2021 to 66.6 percent of total deposits by September 2025, driven by faster growth of córdoba deposits compared to dollar deposits.
- Currency composition of credit and transactions:
  - All credit and deposit card transactions are in local currency.
  - Two thirds of deposits remained in US$.
  - 87.4 percent of credit is conducted in US$, modestly declining from 91 percent in early 2021.
- Implication: dollarization has eased somewhat but remains high, hampering the transmission mechanism; incentives for saving in local currency have remained weaker and favored deposit dollarization.

### Quasi-fiscal balance and BCN balance-sheet effects
- With the increase in the stock of BCN securities in córdoba, the quasi-fiscal balance surplus achieved in recent years narrowed rapidly in 2025H1.
- Historical context:
  - Between 2006-2022, the quasi-fiscal balance was negative.
  - Net foreign assets rose substantially from 12.5 percent of GDP in early 2022 to 25.1 percent of GDP by July 2025.
- By 2024, financial income reached record levels, outweighing the increase in sterilization costs.
- Outcome:
  - Quasi-fiscal surplus narrowed to 0.1 percent of GDP in June 2025, from 0.5 percent of GDP in 2024.

### Analytical assessment and recommended policy directions (as stated)
- Remaining interest differentials (between lending and deposit rates in córdoba, and cross-currency for both deposit and loans) underscore that more progress is needed in improving monetary transmission mechanism.
- Recommended sustained efforts (as articulated in the source):
  - Deepen domestic capital markets.
  - De-dollarize further.
  - Strengthen incentives for local currency intermediation.
- Expected effects: consolidate recent de-dollarization gains and enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy.

*Prepared by Jessie Kilembe. Source: BCN (as presented in the Annex V text).*

### Annex VIII. Data Issues

### Annex VIII. Data Issues

### Data adequacy assessment and ratings
- Data Adequacy Assessment Rating: B
- Median Rating (sectoral heatmap): B
- Summary judgement: "Data provision is broadly adequate for surveillance, but data quality can be improved in national accounts, fiscal, monetary, and external sector statistics."
- Data Quality Characteristics: Granularity 3/

### Major data gaps and limitations
- Poverty statistics: Lack of national poverty data since 2014; staff uses World Bank's Macro Poverty Outlook statistics to estimate poverty.
- Census data: Last available Census data is from 2005; recent delays in the latest census highlight further data limitations and capacity constraints.
- Real sector source data: Coverage issues for tourism, manufacturing, and retail.
- Household survey incorporation: The results of the 2017/18 household survey have not yet been incorporated into national accounts.
- Benchmarking: New national accounts series using 2019 as a benchmark remain to be completed and disseminated.
- Balance of payments (BOP): High errors and omissions and limited coverage of some components (including FDI statistics and the breakdown of remittances since May 2025).
- Fiscal data: Timeliness needs improvement; harmonization of public sector debt with external sector debt data needed.
- Financial statistics: Breakdown of financial assets and liabilities needs enhancement; monitoring of public enterprise assets and liabilities is limited.

### Changes since last Article IV consultation
- Overall assessment: "Broadly unchanged" from the 2024 Article IV consultation.
- Publication changes: International reserves publication remains timely.
- BOP publication: Since May 2025, some components of balance of payments data, such as monthly remittances, are no longer published with the same level of detail or frequency, though authorities are expected to continue providing data to the Fund in a timely manner.
- National accounts: Revisions to official national accounts data are common and may impact the team's baseline projections; authorities should improve timely communication of methodological changes or significant revisions.
- Improvements noted: Some improvement in the frequency of fiscal and labor market statistics publication.

### Corrective actions and capacity development priorities (staff recommendations)
- Expand data sources:
  - Incorporate information from household surveys into the national accounts.
  - Complete and disseminate new series using 2019 as a benchmark.
- Improve statistical methodologies and compilation:
  - Address high errors and omissions in the BOP.
  - Improve coverage of FDI statistics.
  - Enhance breakdown of financial assets and liabilities.
- Strengthen fiscal statistics:
  - Improve timeliness of fiscal data.
  - Harmonize public sector debt with external sector debt data.
  - Monitor assets and liabilities of public enterprises.
- Address poverty and social statistics gaps:
  - Scarcity of poverty data should be remedied so current assessments do not rely primarily on supplementary sources.
- Continue capacity development work to address gender and climate data gaps and overall statistical capacity constraints.

### Data Standards Initiatives and dissemination
- Participation: Nicaragua participates in the Enhanced General Data Dissemination System (e-GDDS) and first posted its metadata in February 2005.
- e-GDDS dissemination: Nicaragua is yet to disseminate the data recommended under the e-GDDS through a National Summary Data Page.
- Table of Common Indicators Required for Surveillance: entries reported as of December 5, 2025 (detailed frequency/timeliness entries present in source tables).

### Use of data in Fund surveillance and staff rationale
- Use of alternative sources: Staff uses World Bank Macro Poverty Outlook where national poverty data are lacking.
- Staff assessment rationale (selected points):
  - Need to improve source data in the real sector (tourism, manufacturing, retail).
  - Pending incorporation of 2017/18 household survey into national accounts.
  - Necessity to conclude and disseminate new series using 2019 as a benchmark.
  - Need to reduce high errors and omissions and improve coverage of FDI statistics.
  - Revisions to national accounts may affect projections; authorities should communicate methodological changes.

### Technical assistance and capacity development delivered (selected items relevant to data)
- Statistics-related TA since December 2020 includes:
  - CAPTAC External Sector Statistics April 2020
  - CAPTAC National Accounts Statistics June & October 2020
  - CAPTAC Producer Price Index August 2020 & March 2022
  - CAPTAC Government Accounts and Harmonization with GFSM 2014 October 2020
  - CAPTAC Government Finance Statistics (GFS) July-Aug. & December 2021
  - CAPTAC Quarterly NAS and seasonal adjustment August 2021
  - CAPTAC Public Debt Statistics September-October 2021
  - CAPTAC Quarterly Supply and Use Table February 2022
  - CAPTAC Quarterly National Accounts Statistics (2008 SNA) April 2022
  - CAPTAC GFS and Public Sector Debt Statistics February & August 2022
  - CAPTAC Quarterly NAS and Economic Surveys November 2022
  - CAPTAC External Sector Statistics BOP-IIP October 2024

### Supplementary fiscal and macro data points referenced in the annex (selected figures)
- Census last available: 2005
- Household survey referenced: 2017/18
- National accounts benchmark to be completed: 2019
- e-GDDS metadata first posted: February 2005
- Since May 2025: some BOP components (e.g., monthly remittances) not published with same detail/frequency
- Official exchange rate as of November 30, 2025: C$36.6243 per U.S. dollar
- Projected payments to Fund (SDR Million; based on existing use of resources and present holdings of SDRs):
  - Forthcoming 2025 principal: 10.83
  - 2026 principal: 8.67
  - 2027 principal: 8.67
  - 2028 principal: 8.67
  - 2029 principal: 8.67
  - Charges/Interest: 2026: 2.80; 2027: 2.77; 2028: 2.77; 2029: 2.77
  - Total 2025: 10.83; 2026: 11.47; 2027: 11.44; 2028: 11.44; 2029: 11.44

*Source: Annex VIII. Data Issues (staff report excerpts).*

### 1.      Nicaragua’s public debt is reported at the consolidated public sector (CPS) level, with

### Nicaragua: Public Debt Coverage Under the Baseline Scenario

### Public debt coverage and methodology
- Public debt is reported at the consolidated public sector (CPS) level and includes the consolidated debt of the budgetary central government, local government, the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) guaranteed debt, and the Central Bank of Nicaragua (BCN).
- There is no non-guaranteed state-owned-enterprises’ debt recorded in Nicaragua.
- Data from extra-budgetary funds and non-guaranteed SOEs is excluded: extra-budgetary funds omitted due to insufficient data availability; non-guaranteed SOE debt not included as none is recorded.
- Debt data from the social security system (INSS) is excluded because INSS does not borrow directly and central government debt to the INSS was paid in full by end-2022.
- The DSA is conducted on a residency basis. There are no foreign holdings of local currency debt issued domestically.
- The DSA assumes the provision of expected Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief by Non-Paris Club creditors that have yet to provide it.
- A stress test on contingency liabilities is detailed in ¶17 to account for gaps in debt data coverage.

### Public debt coverage table specifics (Text Table 1 summary)
- Included: Central government; State and local government; Guarantees (to other entities in the public and private sector, including to SOEs); Central bank (borrowed on behalf of the government).
- Excluded (or not captured): Other elements of the general government (0.5 percent of GDP); SoE's debt (guaranteed and not guaranteed by the government) 1/2 percent of GDP; PPP 35 percent of PPP stock 2.24; Financial market (default value) 5 percent of GDP.
- Total contingent liability tailored stress test: 9.7 (in percent of GDP).

### External debt composition and HIPC adjustment
- Total external debt (in millions of U.S. dollars) at end-2024: 8,658.
- Multilateral external debt at end-2024: 6,795 (multilateral share 78.5 percent of total external debt).
- Largest multilateral creditors at end-2024 (share of total external debt): CABEI 28.2 percent; IADB 26.6 percent; World Bank 11.3 percent.
- Bilateral external debt at end-2024: 1,819 (non-Paris Club 1,610 of this).
- Private external debt at end-2024: 44 (0.5 percent of total external debt).
- A substantial stock of external debt owed to Non-Paris Club creditors is pending HIPC debt relief. The debt stock in this DSA is adjusted downward to reflect expected debt relief amounting to about US$1.3 billion as of December 2024; this largely refers to the central bank’s debt.
- All five Non-Paris Club creditors have engaged in negotiations with the authorities; negotiation and reconciliation processes are still ongoing.

### Recent public debt levels and composition
- Total stock of public debt decreased by about 4¾ percent of GDP in 2024, to 45.1 percent of GDP (from 49.8 percent of GDP in 2023).
- External public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) debt reached 36 percent of GDP at end-2024.
- At end-2024, 79 percent of total public external debt is owed by the non-financial public sector and 21 percent by the BCN (note: official statistics include the general IMF SDR allocation of 2 percent of GDP received in 2021).

### Public domestic debt
- Public domestic debt at end-2024: 9.1 percent of GDP (about 20 percent of total public debt).
- Composition by end-2024: central government accounted for 29 percent of total public domestic debt (declined from 41 percent in 2023); the BCN accounted for 71 percent of total public domestic debt (rose from 59 percent in 2023).
- Public domestic debt maturity: mainly medium- and long-term instruments (mostly 3 and 5 years).

### Macro-financial background and recent developments
- Real GDP growth: 3.6 percent in 2024 (4.4 percent in 2023). Real GDP grew by 3.9 percent in the first half of 2025.
- Headline inflation: 2.8 percent at end-2024 (5.6 percent in 2023). Inflation reached 2.7 percent by October 2025.
- Current account surplus: narrowed from 8.2 percent of GDP in 2023 to 4.2 percent of GDP in 2024.
- Gross international reserves (GIR): US$5.8 billion by end-2024 (about 6.7 months of next-year imports, excluding maquila); GIR reached US$7.6 billion by October 2025 (about 36 percent of GDP).
- BCN monetary policy: monetary reference rate (MRR) cut by 100 basis points to 6 percent in four steps between 2024Q4, early 2025 and October 2025. Exchange rate crawling rate maintained at 0 percent and to remain so in 2026 (announced October 20, 2025).
- BCN policy to promote local currency: mandated all credit and debit card transactions and announced prices be posted exclusively in córdobas from January 2025.

### Banking system and financial conditions
- Non-performing loans (NPL): declined to 1.1 percent of total loans in October 2025 (from 1.7 percent in December 2023).
- Capital adequacy ratio (CAR): 19.1 percent at end-October 2025.
- Bank deposits growth: 13.7 percent y/y.
- Credit to the private sector growth: 12.5 percent y/y in October 2025.
- Financial conditions assessed as neutral; profitability increased and remained high.

### Fiscal outlook, projections, and assumptions
- CPS recorded a surplus of about 3 percent of GDP in 2024.
- Increase in public investment and social benefits of about 1 percent of GDP was offset by a similar increase in tax revenues in 2024.
- Central government deposits increased (from 12 percent of GDP in December 2023 to 14.9 percent of GDP in July 2025).
- Short-term outlook under baseline policies: real GDP expected to reach 3.8 percent in 2025, moderate to 3.4 percent in 2026. Over the medium term, real GDP expected to grow by 3½ percent.
- Baseline incorporates: projected slowdown in remittances; impact of 18 percent U.S. tariffs on non-agricultural products except gold; phased-in tariffs announced by U.S.T.R. on December 10, 2025. Effective mid-November 2025, U.S. announced tariff reductions on a large set of agricultural products lowering the effective tariff burden for Nicaragua to about 14.8 percent.
- Current account projected to narrow to a broadly balanced position by 2030.
- Reserves coverage expected to remain ample despite projected gradual moderation in GIR growth.

### Fiscal policy measures and public investment
- Staff projections include authorities’ plans:
  - Strengthening revenues via enhanced revenue mobilization, eliminating tax exemptions, and addressing collection gaps.
  - Higher capital spending, primarily greater investment of SOEs (water and electricity).
- INSS: financial position shifted from sustained deficits to near balanced; recent government transfers about 1/2 percent of GDP per year, expected to grow to 1 percent of GDP in the medium-term. INSS liquidity and technical reserves remain fragile.
- Execution rates of expenditures averaged about 97–98 percent of the approved budget during 2020–2024. Revenue collections exceeded budget targets each year by an average of around 4 percent.

### External financing, debt management, and recommendations
- External financing has diminished since 2024; Nicaragua became a net payer as diminishing multilateral disbursements are not yet offset by bilateral loans.
- Gross financing needs projected to be met mostly through fiscal surpluses, increased disbursements from CABEI and China, and use of government deposits.
- Concessional borrowing from IFIs expected to stay constrained.
- Staff recommendation: support authorities’ prudent debt management and financing strategies; recommend any new borrowing be on transparency and concessional terms where possible to maintain debt sustainability.
- Promoting domestic capital markets for longer-term borrowing seen as a way to diversify financing sources gradually.
- New borrowing considerations: issuing Eurobonds could broaden investor base but likely incur higher risk premium; new domestic borrowing has declined given overall fiscal surpluses and shorter maturities; Fitch affirmed long-term credit rating at ‘B’ with a stable outlook in May 2025.

### Realism checks and debt dynamics
- With sustained fiscal consolidation, external PPG debt rose in recent years, decreased in the past few years, and is projected to continue to decline.
- The unexplained residual in debt dynamics remains sizable and may be attributed to accounting inconsistencies.
- Baseline fiscal adjustment is below the top 25 percent of historical primary fiscal deficit adjustments for low-income countries (LICs); vulnerability to natural disasters could slow growth and affect fiscal adjustment.
- GDP growth projected to stabilize around 3½ percent over the medium term, below pre-crisis and historical averages due to lower capital accumulation and productivity.
- Public investment role: projected increase in capital expenditure funded by projected bilateral loans is more moderate than in the previous DSA; private investment contribution expected to keep growing.

*Source: National Authorities and IMF Staff Calculations (as presented in the supplied DSA content).*

### 16.      Nicaragua’s current debt carrying capacity is classified as strong. The debt carrying capacity

### 16.      Nicaragua’s current debt carrying capacity is classified as strong. The debt carrying capacity

### Debt carrying capacity classification and thresholds
- Classification: strong under the Composite Indicator (CI) calculated based on the October 2025 WEO with the 2024 World Bank CPIA of 3.06.
- Classification unchanged from the 2024 DSA.
- Relevant indicative thresholds for the strong category (applicable to public and publicly guaranteed external debt):
  - PV of debt-to-GDP ratio: 55 percent
  - PV of debt-to-exports ratio: 240 percent
  - Debt service-to-exports ratio: 21 percent
  - Debt service-to-revenue ratio: 23 percent
- Benchmark for the PV of total public debt under strong debt carrying capacity: 70 percent of GDP.
- To account for specific risks, tailored stress tests applied: natural disaster and commodity price shock.

### Tailored stress tests and contingent liabilities
- Contingent liability tailored stress test calibration:
  - Contingent liability shock applied: 9.7 percent of GDP.
  - Other entities of the general government (to account for contingent liabilities of INSS): 0.5 percent of GDP.
  - SOE debt shock: maintained at the LIC-DSF default value due to lack of data.
- PPP distress proxy:
  - PPP shock set at 2.2 percent of GDP, representing 35 percent of Nicaragua’s PPP capital stock.
- Financial sector contingent liability shock:
  - Maintained at 5 percent rate given current moderation of financial sector risks with sufficient capital, provisioning, and liquid assets.
- Note on PPP stock calculation: consistent with LIC DSF guidance, PPP stock is calculated as 35 percent of the country’s PPP capital stock from the World Bank database.

### External debt sustainability outlook (A. External Debt Sustainability Analysis)
- Overall projection: external risk of debt distress projected to remain moderate.
- PPG external debt path under baseline:
  - Gradual decline to 29.5 percent of GDP in 2035.
- PV of PPG external debt:
  - Projected to remain below the threshold of 55 percent, increasing from 19.9 percent to 23 percent of GDP over the 10-year projection period.
- Other external debt burden indicators under baseline remain below thresholds throughout projection horizon.
- Specific indicator projections (baseline to 2035):
  - PV of external debt-to-exports ratio: increase from 47.4 percent to 63.2 percent.
  - Debt service-to-exports ratio: increase from 6.1 percent to 6.6 percent by 2035 (exports impacted by introduction of higher U.S. tariffs).
  - Debt service-to-revenue ratio: projected to decline from 7.8 percent to 7.5 percent.
- Private external debt: projected to decline as the debt owed to Venezuela is paid down.
- Sensitivity: standardized tests show combination of shocks has largest negative impact; under the most extreme shock, PV of debt-to-GDP ratio breaches its threshold in 2027 at 56 percent before declining to 51 percent in the long term.

### Public sector debt sustainability outlook (B. Public Sector Debt Sustainability Analysis)
- Overall projection: overall risk of debt distress projected to remain moderate.
- Total public sector debt under baseline:
  - Projected to reach 43.2 percent of GDP in 2025 and decline to 40.1 percent of GDP by 2030.
  - Remains well below the 70 percent of GDP benchmark through the projection horizon.
- Domestic public debt:
  - Projected to reach 4.4 percent of GDP by 2035.
  - Domestic-public-debt-to-GDP ratio remains below median level observed across LICs.
- PV of debt-to-revenues and debt service-to-revenue:
  - PV of debt-to-revenues will reach 85.1 percent by 2035.
  - Debt service-to-revenue ratio projected to decrease, reaching 8.3 percent by 2035.
- Stress scenario: under most extreme shock of lower growth, PV of public debt breaches the benchmark in 2032 at 73 percent and remains above the benchmark through the projection horizon.

### Risk rating, vulnerabilities, and baseline assumptions
- Short-term outlook: broadly favorable, but subject to high uncertainty and medium-term downside tilt.
- Baseline scenario assumptions include:
  - Impact of changes in U.S. immigration and trade policies, including the 18 percent reciprocal U.S. tariff, and phased-in additional U.S. tariffs.
  - Limited impact of U.S. immigration policies on net migration and remittances, expected to be larger in 2026 due to termination of CHNV parole program and TPS, and limited thereafter.
- Downside risks include:
  - Commodity price volatility, weaker global growth, tighter U.S. immigration and trade policies.
  - Stricter and wider international sanctions, prolonged global uncertainty, natural disasters.
  - Uncertainty related to the U.S.T.R. 301 investigation and possible changes to announced phased-in tariffs or timeline.
- Short-term upside risks:
  - More favorable terms of trade and higher public capital spending (could raise inflation above projected baseline).
- External sustainability dependence:
  - Heavily dependent on sustained remittance inflows; a material slowdown would weaken the current account and weigh on the NIIP.
- Policy recommendation summary:
  - Maintaining prudent policies would help sustain growth and strengthen Nicaragua’s capacity to respond to shocks.

### Risk ratings and granularity assessment
- Current risk ratings: moderate risk of external and overall debt distress, unchanged from previous DSA.
- Granularity assessment within moderate external debt rating: Nicaragua has substantial space to absorb shocks.
- Under baseline: all external debt burden indicators remain under thresholds over the 10-year projection horizon, with one debt burden indicator breaching the threshold under the shock scenario.
- Under stress (growth shocks): PV of public debt-to-GDP ratio breaches its threshold in 2032 and remains above threshold over projection horizon.

### Authorities’ views
- The authorities agreed with staff’s assessment that Nicaragua’s debt remains sustainable, with moderate external and overall risk of debt distress and substantial space to absorb shocks.
- Authorities’ commitment: maintain prudent fiscal policy and sound debt management practices to safeguard debt sustainability.

*Source: IMF staff calculations and country authorities as presented in the Nicaragua DSA text.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1nicea2026001-source-pdf.pdf_
