## Kingdom of the Netherlands — The Netherlands: High‑Tech Sector (content unit 1nldea2026002)

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### Definition and Statistical Scope
- Uses Eurostat’s sectoral-level classification of high- and medium-high-tech manufacturing and high-tech knowledge-intensive services (NACE Rev. 2).
- Covers advanced export-oriented activities including semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, photonics, aerospace, and knowledge-intensive services in ICT, software, and professional and scientific activities.
- High-tech manufacturing concentrated in machinery and equipment (led by lithography machines production and its supplier network).
- High-tech knowledge‑intensive services dominated by computing, programming, and IT consulting.

### Size, Market Concentration, and Intangibles
- Key statistics:
  - 11 percent of total gross value added.
  - 6 percent of employment.
  - Netherlands' rank: 14th (share of value added in total global high‑tech exports, 2022).
  - Market data (as of 2025): 33 listed companies (Netherlands), 2,251 (China), 1,036 (US).
  - One leading semiconductor equipment company accounts for about 60 percent of listed Dutch high‑tech market capitalization at end‑2025.
- Intangible capital:
  - Medium‑high‑tech industries (notably electrical and machinery equipment) show relative advantage in intangible assets.
  - High‑tech KIS intangible assets broadly in line with peers.
  - Intangible assets include computer software and databases, innovative property, and economic competencies.

### Contribution to Growth, Exports, and GVC Integration
- Performance:
  - High‑tech sub sectors—especially pharmaceuticals, machinery and equipment, and advanced manufacturing—have recorded stronger growth in GVA and labor productivity than the overall economy (average of 2014–2024 growth rates referenced).
  - High‑tech GVA relative to that of the U.S. rose strongly before 2008, declined until around 2015, and has since recovered to broadly stable levels.
- Exports and GVCs:
  - Foreign value added has exceeded one‑third of high‑tech exports and remains above the EU median.
  - Deep integration into global value chains is a key source of competitiveness and a channel of exposure to supply chain shocks.
  - Netherlands is among the top 15 global exporters of high‑tech value added (rank: 14th).

### GVC Exposures: Foreign Inputs and Demand
- Overview:
  - Two-sided exposure channels: backward linkages (reliance on imported inputs, specialized components, foreign technology) and forward linkages (exposure to external demand and concentrated export markets). Most evident in semiconductors but present across high‑tech.
- Sectoral variation:
  - Foreign‑input exposure highest in manufacturing; chemicals and pharmaceuticals show the highest foreign value added in exports.
  - Machinery, equipment, and electronics exhibit meaningful backward linkages due to complex, specialized components.
  - High‑tech KIS: lower direct foreign‑input exposure but indirect exposure through links to manufacturing.
- Sourcing trends (2010–2022):
  - Non‑EU share has risen in key high‑tech manufacturing sectors.
  - Computer, electronic, and electrical equipment: domestic value‑added share declined markedly with rising share of China; U.S. share unchanged.
  - Chemicals and pharmaceuticals: Chinese content increased in chemicals; U.S. share unchanged in chemicals but declined significantly in pharmaceuticals.
  - Machinery: moderate decline in domestic content.
  - Other transport equipment: shift within Europe from Germany toward broader EU suppliers.
- Exposure to foreign final demand:
  - Exposure to foreign final demand: ~60 percent of sectoral value added.
  - Key downstream markets: Germany, the U.S., and China.
    - Germany: key for machinery, semiconductors, and lithography‑related inputs.
    - U.S. and China: major markets for electronics and other high‑tech goods.

### Channels of GVC‑Related Vulnerabilities and Characteristics Heightening Dutch Vulnerability
- Identified channels:
  - Geoeconomic fragmentation and trade restrictions (export controls, subsidies, security-driven policies).
  - Strategic input chokepoints and external dependencies (critical raw materials, energy inputs, specialty components).
  - Production relocation risk driven by foreign subsidies, permitting, energy costs, targeted industrial policies.
  - Dependence on non‑EU capital and exit channels risking relocation of control, IP, and production.
- Dutch characteristics increasing vulnerability:
  - Specialized suppliers, long qualification periods, and limited short‑term substitutes make backward linkages hard to mitigate.
  - Since COVID‑19, supply disruptions have become larger, more persistent, and more frequent.

### Illustrative Assessment Methodology and Caveats
- Modeling approach:
  - Examines two GVC‑related vulnerability channels: foreign‑input and foreign‑demand linkages with key trading partners.
  - Maps critical product categories to high‑tech manufacturing sectors; weights supplier concentration using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index.
  - Traces linkages through input–output relationships using an input–output model augmented with international trade data and inter‑country input–output tables.
- Interpretation and limitations:
  - Results are structural output at risk, not forecasts or point estimates.
  - Framework is illustrative only; it excludes behavioral relationships, substitution, inventories, price responses, policy adjustment, and broader macroeconomic effects.
  - Direct supply exposures assessed for goods trade; high‑tech services captured only through foreign‑demand channels and indirect links to goods sectors.

### Illustrative 50 percent Bilateral Trade Disruption Simulation — Key Findings
- Vulnerability metric: total loss as a percent of gross output under a 50 percent disruption of bilateral trade.
- Exposure composition (most exposed manufacturing sectors):
  - Supply‑driven exposure: almost half of total vulnerability.
  - Demand‑side exposure: contributes around 30 percentage points to risks in most manufacturing sectors.
  - Indirect input–output linkages: amplify initial shocks by slightly more than 20 percentage points in the most exposed sectors.
- Sector ranking (most vulnerable): chemicals, machinery, electronics and electrical equipment show the largest simulated output‑at‑risk.
- Caveat: results are best read as a ranking of relative exposure across sectors and partners, not as estimates of likely output losses.
- Model scope: partial‑equilibrium, open‑economy input–output framework measuring structural exposure of Dutch high‑tech sectors to bilateral (not global) supply and demand disruptions with key partners; no global macroeconomic effects included.
- Channel‑specific notes:
  - Supply drivers: reliance on foreign inputs and concentrated supplier bases for specialized components, semiconductor‑related inputs, lithography equipment components, and rare earth elements.
  - Exceptions: sectors C29 (motor vehicles) and C30 (other transport equipment) show no direct supply effects in this analysis.
  - High‑tech KIS: limited direct vulnerability by design, but indirectly exposed via domestic input–output linkages when manufacturing demand falls.

### Geographic Concentration of Exposure (simulation)
- Key trading partners identified: U.S., China, Germany, South Korea, and France.
- Partner roles by sector:
  - U.S.: single largest source of exposure for electrical equipment and electronics, chemicals and machinery; both upstream supplier and major export market.
  - China: second‑largest contributor in most manufacturing sectors, particularly electronics and chemicals.
  - Germany: visible contributor in machinery, motor vehicles, and aerospace.
  - South Korea: concentrated contribution in electronics (semiconductor and display supply chains).
  - France: mainly in aerospace value‑chain links.
- Appendix III top suppliers (selected figures):
  - China — 100,388 — 22,403
  - USA — 36,112 — 6,547
  - South Korea — 30,785 — 5,188
  - Japan — 21,546 — 4,345
  - Germany — 24,065 — 8,321
- Top markets by concentration‑weighted exports (selected):
  - Germany — 25,658 — 33,313
  - France — 19,353 — 18,85
  - USA — 14,961 — 11,126

### Domestic Structural Bottlenecks Constraining High‑Tech Growth
- Overview: labor and skill shortages, grid congestion, regulatory constraints, and later‑stage scale‑up finance frictions constrain investment, scaling, and diffusion.
- Labor and skills:
  - Labor shortages: main obstacle in high‑tech sectors; rank second in medium‑high‑tech manufacturing after insufficient demand.
  - Firm responses: increased automation (robotization and AI support) to address shortages.
  - STEM enrollment: reported as low compared to peers for both males and females.
  - Skill analysis based on ESJS wave 2 (2021); sample covers AT, BE, DE, DK, FI, FR, NL, and SE.
- Energy, environmental, and permitting constraints:
  - Grid capacity: insufficient in high‑tech clusters (including Noord‑Brabant and Limburg).
  - Nitrogen deposition exceeded critical loads across about 70 percent of Natura 2000 area as of 2023.
  - Permitting timelines: obtaining an industrial building permit estimated 20–39 months; objection and appeal procedures account for 10–23 months. Example: Eemshaven LNG terminal permitting and construction took 200 days when prioritized.
- EU internal market fragmentation:
  - Fragmented approval, reimbursement, and adoption processes for medical and biotech; overlapping digital regulations (AI Act, GDPR, Data Act, DSA/DMA, NIS2) raise compliance costs; 27 divergent export‑control and dual‑use regimes and 27 national reimbursement regimes increase complexity and market access costs.

### Gaps in Access to Finance and Proposed National Investment Institution (NII)
- Early‑stage and later‑stage funding (preserved figures):
  - Seed and other early‑stage VC investment in the Netherlands: 0.07 percent of GDP in 2025.
  - Sweden: 0.1 percent of GDP (seed); U.S.: 0.29 percent of GDP (seed).
  - Later‑stage VC investment in the Netherlands: 0.03 percent of GDP in 2025.
  - Sweden: 0.1 percent of GDP (later‑stage); U.S.: 0.33 percent of GDP (later‑stage).
  - Insurance sector equity allocation: 13 percent in the Netherlands compared to 50 percent in Sweden.
  - Typical funding rounds: Pre‑seed and seed €10k–2 million; Series A €3–15 million; Series B/C+ €10–100+ million.
  - IPOs: IPOs make up only about 10 percent of high‑tech sector exits and 1.2 percent of all exits.
- Interim public funding sources:
  - EIB venture debt: typically €15 to 50 million.
  - European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI): fund‑of‑funds under InvestEU.
  - European Innovation Council (EIC): grants and equity investments of up to €30 million.
- Proposed National Investment Institution (NII):
  - Roles: standardize funding processes, improve coordination, provide “bridge” patient series B equity capital, design patient equity products, leverage EU financing, ease compliance with EU state‑aid rules.
  - Example existing initiative: €610 million Dutch Deep Tech Fund.
  - Implementation requirements:
    - Clear mandates, arms‑length governance, ability to crowd in private finance.
    - Current funding plans suggest total initial capital in the €3–5 billion range.
    - Many scale‑ups require €100–300 million in total funding across multiple rounds; NII likely too small alone without private co‑investment.

### Policy Priorities: Execution, Scale, and Resilience (selected recommendations)
- Execution (domestic delivery):
  - Address skill shortages through reskilling and scaling STEM and international talent pipelines.
  - Fast‑track grid expansion in key clusters and resolve nitrogen and spatial planning constraints.
  - Establish priority permitting lanes for strategic projects; expand housing near tech clusters.
- Scale (market depth and financing):
  - Address later‑stage financing gap; crowd in Dutch institutional and EU capital for larger, patient tickets.
  - Deepen Single Market and cross‑border value chains.
  - Implement EU Listing Act by mid‑2026 and pursue Capital Markets Union reforms to raise liquidity.
- Resilience (supply chains and diffusion):
  - Strengthen R&D diffusion and university–industry collaboration to broaden technology adoption.
  - Diversify supply chains, identify and manage critical dependencies, and complete energy transition.
  - Deploy industrial policy targeted at clear market failures while avoiding Single Market fragmentation and ensuring additionality.
- Policy instruments and existing initiatives (selected numeric entries):
  - Research and Development Promotion Act (WBSO): Payroll tax relief (32–40% first tranche; 16% thereafter); used by 20,000 firms last year.
  - Innovation Box: Reduced effective CIT rate (9%) on profits from qualifying self‑developed IP.
  - Innovation Credit (NEA): Maximum of €50 mn for 2026; maximum funding €10 mn per project.
  - Seed Capital Scheme (NEA): Maximum of €42 mn for 2026; maximum funding €12 mn per project.
  - Project Beethoven: €2.5 bn public‑private focus on supply side bottlenecks.
  - Invest‑NL Deep Tech Fund: €610 million.
  - 3% R&D Action Plan: target of investing 3% of GDP in R&D by 2030.
  - EU AI Act: gradual implementation from 2025‑2027.

### Measuring Direct Supply Exposure — Method and Key Equations (preserved)
- Direct supply‑loss for high‑tech sector s from shock intensity 휆∈[0,1]:
  - 푑푠푠푢푝푝푙푦(휆) = 푚푖푛(휆⋅∑_{ℎ∈퐻푠} 푣ℎ⋅푤ℎ , 푓푠푠ℎ표푐푘)
  - Where 퐻푠 is HS codes mapped to sector s; 푣ℎ are Dutch imports of product ℎ from critical suppliers (USD mn); 푤ℎ non‑substitutability weights (range 0.25–0.90); 푓푠푠ℎ표푐푘 total foreign intermediate inputs consumed by sector s from shock countries.
- Demand‑side direct exposure:
  - 퐸푠푠ℎ표푐푘 = ∑_{j∈sℎ표푐푘} 푍_{s,j} + ∑_{j∈sℎ표푐푘} 푌_{s,j}
  - Demand‑diversion difficulty coefficient 휙푠∈[0,1] calibrated from export structure; 푑푠푑푒푚푎푛푑(휆) = 휆⋅퐸푠푠ℎ표푐푘⋅휙푠
- Combined direct loss and cap:
  - 푑푠(휆) = 푚푖푛(푑푠푠푢푝푝푙푦(휆) + 푑푠푑푒푚푎푛푑(휆), 푥푠)
  - 푥푠 is gross output of sector s.
- Supply‑chain propagation: Leontief framework
  - 퐴 = 푍 푥̂^{-1}; 퐿 = (퐼 − 퐴)^{-1}
  - Δ푥(휆) = 퐿 × 푑(휆)
  - Vulnerability indicator for 50% disruption: 푉_{s}(0.5) = Δ푥_{s}(0.5) / 푥_{s}
- Model limitations explicitly noted (fixed technical coefficients, no substitution, no inventories, goods‑only HS‑to‑sector bridge, illustrative results).

*International Monetary Fund. KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS—THE NETHERLANDS. June 29, 2026.*

### 1. Definition of the High-Tech Sector ___________________________________________________ 4

### 1. Definition of the High-Tech Sector

### A. Definition and Statistical Scope
- Uses Eurostat’s sectoral-level classification of high- and medium-high-tech manufacturing and high-tech knowledge-intensive services (NACE Rev. 2). (Appendix I referenced for details.)
- Covers advanced export-oriented activities including semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, photonics, aerospace, and a large base of knowledge-intensive services in ICT, software, and professional and scientific activities.
- High-tech manufacturing concentrated in machinery and equipment (led by lithography machines production and its supplier network).
- High-tech knowledge-intensive services dominated by computing, programming, and IT consulting.

### B. Size and Economic Footprint
- High-tech sectors account for about 11 percent of total gross value added and 6 percent of employment.
- The Netherlands ranks among the top in the EU in value added in foreign exports in high-tech sectors and is among the top 15 global exporters of high-tech value added.
- Netherlands' rank: 14th (share of value added in total global high-tech exports, 2022).

### C. Market and Firm Concentration
- Market data covers 33 listed companies for the Netherlands, 2,251 for China, and 1,036 for US (as of 2025).
- One leading semiconductor equipment company accounts for about 60 percent of listed Dutch high-tech market capitalization at end-2025.

### D. Recent Performance
- High-tech sub sectors—especially pharmaceuticals, machinery and equipment, and advanced manufacturing—have recorded stronger growth in gross value added (GVA) and labor productivity than the overall economy (figure reference: average of 2014–2024 growth rates).
- High-tech GVA relative to that of the U.S. rose strongly before 2008, declined until around 2015, and has since recovered to broadly stable levels.

### E. Intangible Capital
- Medium-high-tech industries (notably electrical and machinery equipment) exhibit a relative advantage in intangible assets; high-tech KIS intangible assets remain broadly in line with peers.
- Intangible assets include computer software and databases, innovative property, and economic competencies.

### F. Role of Innovation Ecosystems
- Ecosystems connect frontier firms, specialized suppliers, universities, and local authorities; combine capability networks (semiconductors, photonics, precision mechatronics, advanced materials) with mission-oriented networks (medical and biotech, energy and climate, defense, digital/ICT).
- Innovation hubs support translation of research into commercial applications and diffusion across firms, underpinning strong innovation performance.

### Key statistics (preserved)
- 11 percent of total gross value added.
- 6 percent of employment.
- 60 percent (market capitalization share of one leading listed firm at end-2025).
- 33 listed companies (Netherlands), 2,251 (China), 1,036 (US) as of 2025.

*Source: KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS—THE NETHERLANDS. International Monetary Fund. June 29, 2026.*

---

### 2. High-Tech Sector: Importance and Strategic Role

### A. Contribution to Growth and Competitiveness
- High-tech exhibits stronger GVA and labor productivity growth than the overall economy in key sub sectors (pharmaceuticals, machinery and equipment, advanced manufacturing).
- Combination of hardware innovation and complementary services underpins competitiveness.

### B. Export Orientation and GVC Integration
- Deep integration into global value chains (GVCs) is a key source of competitiveness and a channel of exposure to supply chain shocks.
- Foreign value added has exceeded one-third of high-tech exports in recent years and remains above the EU median.
- High-tech footprint is large in global high-tech exports; the Netherlands is among the top 15 global exporters of high-tech value added (Netherlands' rank: 14th).

### C. Sectoral Patterns
- High-tech manufacturing led by machinery and equipment; lithography machines production is a notable domestic anchor.
- High-tech KIS dominated by computing, programming, and consulting; IT services remain broadly comparable to peers.

### Key statistics (preserved)
- Foreign value added has exceeded one-third of high-tech exports.
- Netherlands' rank: 14th in share of value added in total global high-tech exports (2022).

*Source: KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS—THE NETHERLANDS. International Monetary Fund. June 29, 2026.*

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### 3. Exposures from Reliance on Foreign Inputs and Demand

### A. Overview of GVC-Related Vulnerabilities
- Deep global integration heightens exposure to external disruptions through:
  - Backward linkages: reliance on imported inputs, specialized components, foreign technology.
  - Forward linkages: exposure to external demand and concentrated export markets.
- Two-sided exposures are most evident in semiconductors but present across high-tech industries.

### B. Sectoral Variation in Foreign-Input Exposure
- Foreign-input exposure highest in manufacturing; chemicals and pharmaceuticals show the highest foreign value added in exports.
- Machinery, equipment, and electronics exhibit meaningful backward linkages due to complex, specialized components.
- High-tech KIS have lower direct foreign-input exposure but remain indirectly exposed through links to manufacturing.

### C. Trends in Sourcing and Partner Concentration
- Domestic sectoral final demand remains diversified, but non-EU share has risen in key high-tech manufacturing sectors between 2010 and 2022.
- In computer, electronic, and electrical equipment, domestic value-added share has declined markedly with a rising share of China; U.S. share unchanged.
- Chemicals and pharmaceuticals: Chinese content has increased in chemicals; U.S. share unchanged in chemicals but declined significantly in pharmaceuticals.
- Machinery: moderate decline in domestic content.
- Other transport equipment: shift within Europe from Germany toward broader EU suppliers.

### D. Exposure to Foreign Final Demand
- Exposure to foreign final demand is high—~60 percent of sectoral value added—and concentrated.
- Key downstream markets: Germany, the U.S., and China.
  - Germany is a key downstream market for machinery, semiconductors, and lithography-related inputs.
  - The U.S. and China are major markets for electronics and other high-tech goods.

### Key statistics (preserved)
- Foreign value added in high-tech exports: over one-third.
- Exposure to foreign final demand: ~60 percent.

*Source: KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS—THE NETHERLANDS. International Monetary Fund. June 29, 2026.*

---

### 4. Channels of GVC-Related Vulnerabilities and Risks

### A. Identified Channels
- Geoeconomic fragmentation and trade restrictions: export controls, subsidies, security-driven policies disrupt trade and technology flows and can weaken investment incentives.
- Strategic input chokepoints and external dependencies: reliance on critical raw materials, energy inputs, specialty components, and specific production stages creates chokepoints, especially in advanced materials, chemical technology, electronics, energy technologies, and defense.
- Production relocation risk: foreign subsidies, faster permitting, lower energy costs, or targeted industrial-policy packages can incentivize relocation of capital-intensive deep-tech activities abroad (semiconductors, photonics, advanced materials, energy technologies).
- Dependence on non-EU capital and exit channels: foreign investors and acquisition-led exits can risk relocation of control, intellectual property, and production even when early-stage research originates domestically.

### B. Characteristics Heightening Dutch Vulnerability
- Specialized suppliers, long qualification periods, and limited short-term substitutes make backward linkages hard to mitigate.
- Since COVID-19, supply disruptions have become larger, more persistent, and more frequent.

*Source: KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS—THE NETHERLANDS. International Monetary Fund. June 29, 2026.*

---

### 5. Illustrative Assessment Methodology and Caveats

### A. Modeling Approach
- Two GVC-related vulnerability channels are examined: foreign-input and foreign-demand linkages with key trading partners.
- Critical product categories are mapped to high-tech manufacturing sectors and weighted by supplier concentration using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index.
- Linkages traced through input–output relationships to illustrate output at risk under a stylized two-sided disruption involving key partners.
- Framework uses an input–output model augmented with international trade data and inter-country input–output tables (Appendix III).

### B. Interpretation and Limitations
- Results are structural output at risk, not forecasts or point estimates.
- Framework is illustrative only; it does not include behavioral relationships, substitution, inventories, price responses, policy adjustment, or broader macroeconomic effects.
- Direct supply exposures assessed for goods trade; high-tech services captured through foreign-demand channels and indirect links to goods-producing sectors.

*Source: KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS—THE NETHERLANDS. International Monetary Fund. June 29, 2026.*

### 13.      Illustrative simulations of a 50 percent bilateral trade disruption shock suggest

### 13.      Illustrative simulations of a 50 percent bilateral trade disruption shock suggest sizeable output at risk, especially in chemicals, machinery and electronics and electrical equipment

### Key simulation findings
- Vulnerability metric: total loss as a percent of gross output under a 50 percent disruption of bilateral trade.
- Exposure composition (most exposed manufacturing sectors):
  - Supply-driven exposure: almost half of total vulnerability.
  - Demand-side exposure: contributes around 30 percentage points to risks in most manufacturing sectors.
  - Indirect input–output linkages: amplify initial shocks by slightly more than 20 percentage points in the most exposed sectors.
- Sector ranking (most vulnerable): chemicals, machinery, electronics and electrical equipment show the largest simulated output-at-risk.
- Caveat: results are best read as a ranking of relative exposure across sectors and partners, rather than as estimates of likely output losses.
- Model scope: a partial-equilibrium, open-economy input–output framework measuring structural exposure of Dutch high-tech sectors to bilateral (not global) supply and demand disruptions with key partners without any consideration for global macro-economic effects.

### Channel- and sector-specific notes
- Supply-channel drivers: reliance on foreign inputs and concentrated supplier bases for specialized components, semiconductor-related inputs, lithography equipment components, and rare earth elements.
- Exceptions: for sectors C29 (motor vehicles) and C30 (other transport equipment) no direct supply effects are identified in this analysis because none of the critical inputs used are sourced from these sectors.
- Other transport equipment: exposure more closely associated with demand concentration and a narrower set of export markets.
- High-tech knowledge‑intensive services (KIS): limited direct vulnerability due to the goods-based supply-shock design, but exposed indirectly via domestic input–output linkages when manufacturing disruptions reduce demand for ICT, engineering, professional, and scientific services.

### Geographic concentration of exposure
- Key trading partners identified: U.S., China, Germany, South Korea, and France.
- Partner roles by sector:
  - U.S.: single largest source of exposure for electrical equipment and electronics, chemicals and machinery; acts as both dominant upstream supplier of advanced intermediates and a major export market.
  - China: second-largest contributor in most manufacturing sectors, particularly electronics and chemicals.
  - Germany: visible contributor in machinery, motor vehicles, and aerospace where bilateral intermediate trade is dense.
  - South Korea: contribution concentrated in electronics (semiconductor and display supply chains).
  - France: mainly in aerospace value-chain links.

### Domestic structural bottlenecks constraining high-tech growth
- Overview: labor and skill shortages, grid congestion, regulatory constraints, and later‑stage scale-up finance frictions constrain investment, scaling, and diffusion and weaken the sector’s ability to expand capacity, commercialize innovation, and adapt to external shocks.
- Bindingness: constraints are most binding for capital- and infrastructure-intensive activities; knowledge-based activities are less directly affected.

### Labor and skills
- Labor shortages: remain one of the main obstacles in high-tech sectors, especially high-tech KIS, and rank second in medium-high-tech manufacturing after insufficient demand.
- Firm responses: increased adoption of automation (e.g., robotization and AI support) to address labor shortages and increase productivity—especially in high-tech KIS.
- Skill needs: skill-enhancement needs are high among workers in high-tech sectors, specifically high-tech KIS.
- STEM enrollment: reported as low compared to peers for both males and females.
- Data notes: skill analysis based on ESJS wave 2 (2021); sample covers AT, BE, DE, DK, FI, FR, NL, and SE.

### Energy, environmental, and permitting constraints
- Electricity grid congestion:
  - Grid capacity: insufficient grid capacity is an acute bottleneck in high-tech clusters (including Noord-Brabant and Limburg).
  - Consequences: long connection queues, uncertainty over future access delay factory expansions, electricity-intensive production lines, on-site renewable generation and battery storage, and slow electrification.
  - Policy priority: accelerate permitting and delivery of network upgrades, greater demand flexibility, storage, and energy-efficiency measures to ease near-term pressures.
- Nitrogen deadlock:
  - Nitrogen deposition exceeded critical loads across about 70 percent of Natura 2000 area as of 2023.
  - A 2024 Council of State ruling further limited the use of nitrogen headroom within existing permits.
  - Fragmented responsibilities across municipal, provincial, and national authorities add delays and uncertainty for projects requiring multiple permits or located near protected areas.
- Permitting timelines:
  - Obtaining an industrial building permit: estimated 20–39 months from preparation through appeals.
  - Objection and appeal procedures alone: account for 10–23 months.
  - Example: Eemshaven LNG terminal permitting and construction took only 200 days when prioritized and coordinated effectively.
- Policy implication: need a more predictable, better-coordinated permitting framework and progress in resolving the nitrogen deadlock.

### EU internal market fragmentation
- Fragmentation is a structural constraint for medical and biotech, digital and ICT, and defense and security ecosystems:
  - Medical and biotech: fragmented approval, reimbursement, and adoption processes across member states limit scaling within Europe.
  - Digital and ICT: overlapping regulations (e.g., AI Act, GDPR, Data Act, DSA/DMA, NIS2) increase compliance costs and slow cross-border expansion.
  - Defense: fragmented procurement and uneven state-aid practices weaken the level playing field.
- Table highlights (examples of fragmentation and impacts):
  - Overlapping EU frameworks (AI Act, GDPR, Data Act, DSA/DMA, NIS2) increase compliance costs for digital/AI-related firms.
  - 27 (divergent) export-control and dual-use regimes in EU raise costs and complicate semiconductor and dual-use exports within EU.
  - 27 national reimbursement regimes in EU restrict Dutch pharma market access by keeping reimbursement and market-access rules national.

### Gaps in access to finance for high-tech firms
- Early-stage funding:
  - Seed and other early-stage VC investment in the Netherlands: 0.07 percent of GDP in 2025.
  - Comparison: France, Germany, and Belgium seed funding lower; Sweden at 0.1 percent of GDP; U.S. seed and other early-stage funding at 0.29 percent of GDP.
  - Typical funding rounds: Pre-seed and seed €10k–2 million per round; Series A €3–15 million per round.
- Later-stage funding scarcity:
  - Later-stage VC investment in the Netherlands: 0.03 percent of GDP in 2025.
  - Comparison: Sweden 0.1 percent of GDP; U.S. 0.33 percent of GDP.
  - Series B/C+ (growth/later-stage) firms seek €10–100+ million per round.
  - Institutional investor behavior: share of insurance sector assets invested into equity is 13 percent in the Netherlands compared to 50 percent in Sweden.
- Exits and IPOs:
  - IPOs: the Netherlands has the second lowest number of SME IPOs per 1,000 firms in the EU.
  - Exit composition: IPOs make up only about 10 percent of high-tech sector exits and 1.2 percent of all exits.
- Policy and market actions to raise domestic equity supply:
  - Implement savings and investment union reforms to raise market liquidity and valuations.
  - EU measures: promote automatic enrollment in private pensions; review framework for pan-European private pension products and occupational pension funds to allow more VC investment domestically and EU-wide.
  - Implement the EU Listing Act by mid-2026 to improve listing processes on regulated markets and public offerings of shares.
  - Domestic reforms: Bankruptcy Act and securities law changes to shorten settlement cycles and help investors reallocate capital from failed startups more quickly.
  - Corporate debt issuance: standardize and simplify procedures for smaller-denomination corporate debt securities issuance; lower the minimum denomination currently set at €100,000; make pricing more transparent and leverage online platforms to increase retail investor participation.
- Interim public funding sources:
  - EIB venture debt: typically €15 to 50 million with very limited equity dilution.
  - European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI): fund-of-funds managed by EIF under InvestEU supports scale-ups.
  - European Innovation Council (EIC): grants and equity investments of up to €30 million.
  - Planned EC action: a market-based, privately-managed and privately co-financed Scaleup Europe Fund (as part of the EIC Fund and complement to ETCI 2.0).

*International Monetary Fund — Kingdom of the Netherlands: The Netherlands (chapter content).*

### 27.      The proposed National Investment Institution could standardize funding processes,

### 27.      The proposed National Investment Institution could standardize funding processes,

### Role and proposed functions of the National Investment Institution (NII)
- Standardize funding processes and improve coordination across sectors and regions.
- Provide “bridge” patient series B equity capital to support firms progressing from lab proof-of-concept to commercial deployment.
- Design patient equity products following principles used by existing initiatives (e.g., Invest-NL and the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ support for capital‑intensive ventures).
- Leverage and better coordinate EU financing, including series C+ EIB co-financing and EU instruments.
- Ease compliance with EU state‑aid rules.
- Example of existing initiative: €610 million Dutch Deep Tech Fund.

### Implementation requirements and institutional design
- NII will need:
  - Clear mandates and guidelines to ensure focus on addressing market failures, not substituting for private investors.
  - Arms‑length governance to guarantee independence from political pressure and signal intent to deliver value for money to markets.
  - Ability to crowd in private finance; current funding plans imply reliance on private co‑investment.
- Current funding plans suggest total initial capital would be in the €3–5 billion range.
- Many scale‑ups require €100–300 million in total funding across multiple rounds, implying the NII would likely be too small on its own without crowding in private capital.

### Policy considerations — Overview
- Sustaining high‑tech leadership requires a coordinated agenda emphasizing: execution, scale, and resilience.
- Domestic bottlenecks (skills, grid expansion, nitrogen constraints, permitting, patient capital) and external risks (geoeconomic fragmentation, concentrated GVC exposures, high energy costs) underpin the need for both domestic and EU‑level policies.
- Execution, scale, and resilience priorities reinforce one another: greater resilience and scale facilitate innovation translation; stronger execution supports both.

### Execution — priorities, existing policies, and gaps
- Priorities:
  - Address skill shortage through reskilling and scaling STEM and international talent pipelines.
  - Fast‑track grid expansion in key clusters.
  - Resolve nitrogen and spatial planning constraints.
  - Priority permitting lanes for strategic projects.
  - Expand housing availability in high‑tech growth clusters.
- Existing policies:
  - STEM & Reskilling: Technology Pact (Techniekpact), Lifelong Learning framework.
  - Talent attraction: 30% Expat Tax Exemption; Kennismigranten (fast-track residence permits for high-skilled migration).
  - Infrastructure: Climate Agreement (Klimaatakkoord) & SDE++ subsidies for low‑carbon energy to expand electricity grid capacity.
  - Ecosystem Projects: e.g., Project Beethoven to improve local infrastructure, talent, and housing.
- Gaps:
  - Skill shortage remains: A centralized high‑tech reskilling scheme is missing. STEM pipeline expansion remains limited.
  - Infrastructure bottlenecks: Progress addressing grid congestion is slow, no dedicated fast‑track permitting for strategic projects or housing near tech hubs.
  - Regulatory hurdles: Fragmented permitting across government levels; Nitrogen rules delaying permits for housing/facilities are acute and only partially resolved by current measures.

### Scale — priorities, existing policies, and gaps
- Priorities:
  - Address potential later‑stage financing gap for scale‑ups.
  - Strengthen defense‑adjacent supply chains.
  - Crowd in private capital, including from Dutch institutional investors and EU capital for larger tickets and more patient investing.
  - Deepen Single Market, cross‑border value chains and market depth to scale beyond domestic demand.
- Existing policies and instruments:
  - Public Funding: National Growth Fund, Deep Tech Fund via Invest‑NL.
  - Innovation Box: Innovation Credit (NEA), ROMs (9 Regional Agencies).
  - Proposed NII.
  - Sectoral policies, e.g., EU Chips Act 2.0.
- Gaps:
  - Financing gaps remain: Domestic private equity capital and institutional investor participation are limited (especially at TRL5-6). No one‑stop shop to advise on financing.
  - The Capital Markets Union remains incomplete, hindering cross‑border financing at scale.
  - Incomplete Single Market, and need to integrate labor and energy markets.
  - Need to shift emphasis to back‑end and packaging, focus on critical inputs (not only front‑end fabs), coordinate investments to avoid subsidy races, and secure European design capability.

### Resilience — priorities, existing policies, and gaps
- Priorities:
  - Strengthen R&D diffusion and university–industry collaboration to broaden adoption of new technologies among smaller and younger companies.
  - Diversify supply chains and reduce choke points and critical dependencies.
  - Complete the energy transition and enhance competitiveness.
  - Develop EU energy blueprint and strengthen institutional frameworks and long‑term planning.
- Existing policies:
  - National Technology Strategy (NTS), New Industrial Policy 2025, 3% R&D Action Plan, Climate Agreement, SDE++ subsidies for decarbonization, TNO Mega clusters, IP targets 6 strategic markets.
  - EU‑level instruments: EU Critical Raw Materials Act; Important projects of common European interest (PCEIs); European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS); European Economic Security Strategy and EU Dual Use Export Control Framework.
- Gaps and risks:
  - Need to identify market failures for targeted industrial policy; avoid fragmentation risks.
  - Strategic supply chains: Need to identify critical dependencies.
  - Innovation diffusion/collab: R&D and adoption of new tech still concentrated in large companies.
  - Energy transition lags: Slow grid expansion; High energy costs due to heavy gas reliance.
  - GVC resilience: Regulatory fragmentation due to diverging rules and “Gold‑plating”; Fragmented energy market with highly volatile electricity prices and cross‑country differences due to weak interconnectivity.

### Concluding synthesis and policy recommendations
- The high‑tech sector is central to Netherlands’ growth but is vulnerable due to deep global integration and concentrated GVC exposures.
- Domestic constraints (skill shortages, grid congestion, nitrogen and permitting constraints, scale‑up finance frictions) and external vulnerabilities (reliance on non‑EU partners, concentrated export demand) together slow investment, scaling, and diffusion.
- Policy agenda to sustain high‑tech leadership:
  - Execution: Close implementation gaps by easing binding non‑financial constraints—skills, grid capacity, nitrogen limits, and permitting delays—through stronger coordination, faster delivery, and clearer accountability.
  - Scale: Improve demand‑side conditions by deepening the EU Single Market, strengthening EU policy coordination, reducing cross‑border barriers, and expanding scale‑up funding.
  - Resilience: Deploy industrial policy carefully by targeting clear market failures, avoiding Single Market fragmentation, ensuring additionality; strengthen supply‑chain resilience by identifying and managing critical dependencies and leveraging strategic interdependencies; lift productivity by broadening R&D diffusion.

*Source: IMF staff assessment based on the provided chapter content.*

### 8. Measuring Direct Supply Exposure. For each high-tech sector 푠, we compute the direct

### 8. Measuring Direct Supply Exposure

### Direct supply-loss definition and variables
- Direct loss for high-tech sector s from shock intensity 휆∈[0,1]:
  - 푑푠푠푢푝푝푙푦(휆) = 푚푖푛(휆⋅∑_{ℎ∈퐻푠} 푣ℎ⋅푤ℎ , 푓푠푠ℎ표푐푘)
- Definitions:
  - 퐻푠: set of HS codes mapped to sector s via the bridge table.
  - 푣ℎ: Dutch imports of product ℎ from critical suppliers (in millions of USD, from UN Comtrade).
  - 푤ℎ: non-substitutability weight (expert weights range from 0.25 to 0.90).
  - 푓푠푠ℎ표푐푘: total foreign intermediate inputs consumed by Dutch sector s sourced from the identified shock countries (from ICIO intermediate-use matrix 푍).
- Rationale for the bilateral cap (minimum operator):
  - Caps Comtrade-based exposure at bilateral ICIO intermediate input level to net out re-exports and final goods and ensure estimated losses reflect actual production dependencies.

### Demand-side direct exposure
- Total exports at risk for Dutch sector s to shock-country sectors:
  - 퐸푠푠ℎ표푐푘 = ∑_{j∈sℎ표푐푘} 푍_{s,j} + ∑_{j∈sℎ표푐푘} 푌_{s,j}
- Demand-diversion difficulty coefficient:
  - 휙푠∈[0,1], calibrated from ICIO export structure:
    - 휙푠 = export_to_shock_s / total_export_s
    - total_export_s is the sum of all foreign intermediate and final-demand deliveries by Dutch sector s.
- Demand-side direct loss:
  - 푑푠푑푒푚푎푛푑(휆) = 휆⋅퐸푠푠ℎ표푐푘⋅휙푠

### Combined direct shock and sector cap
- Combined direct loss for sector s:
  - 푑푠(휆) = 푚푖푛(푑푠푠푢푝푝푙푦(휆) + 푑푠푑푒푚푎푛푑(휆), 푥푠)
  - 푥푠 is gross output of sector s.
- Purpose of cap: ensure estimated losses cannot exceed sector's total production.

### Functional form and thresholds
- Supply-channel saturation threshold for sector s:
  - 휆_{s}^* = 푓푠푠ℎ표푐푘 / ∑_{ℎ} 푣ℎ 푤ℎ
- Properties:
  - Output loss is piecewise linear and concave in 휆.
  - Below 휆_{s}^*, supply losses grow proportionally with 휆; above it supply-side losses saturate.
  - Demand channel remains linear in 휆.
  - Leontief multipliers vary across scenarios and depend on shock composition.

### Supply-chain propagation: Leontief framework
- Technical coefficients matrix:
  - 퐴 = 푍 푥̂^{-1} (where 푥̂ is diagonal matrix of gross output)
- Leontief inverse:
  - 퐿 = (퐼 − 퐴)^{-1}
  - Element 퐿_{i,j} gives total output required from sector i to deliver one unit of final output from sector j, accounting for all inter-industry feedback.
- Total output loss vector for disruption intensity 휆:
  - Δ푥(휆) = 퐿 × 푑(휆)
  - 푑(휆) has positive entries only for Dutch high-tech sectors.
- Leontief multiplier for group G:
  - 휇_{G}(휆) = ∑_{s∈G} Δ푥_{s}(휆) / ∑_{s∈G} 푑_{s}(휆)

### Vulnerability indicator
- Vulnerability of sector s to a 50% disruption:
  - 푉_{s}(0.5) = Δ푥_{s}(0.5) / 푥_{s}

### Model limitations (explicit)
- Fixed technical coefficients: no input substitution, supplier switching, inventory drawdown, or price responses are modeled.
- Static comparison of pre- and post-disruption states: transition dynamics, duration, and inventory depletion speed are not modeled.
- No services in product-to-sector bridge table: HS-to-ICIO bridge covers goods only; knowledge-intensive services show zero direct supply exposure by construction and receive losses only through demand or indirect channels.
- No re-routing of imports: imports from shock countries are lost proportionally to 휆; non-substitutability weight 푤ℎ partially captures rerouting difficulty.
- Interpretation caution: simulation results are illustrative and represent vulnerability rather than forecasts; omission of general-equilibrium feedback and price adjustments likely understates full economic impact, while fixed-coefficient and no-rerouting assumptions work in the opposite direction.

### Appendix III — Identified critical inputs and weights (selected entries)
- C26 — Electronics (example HS codes and w1):
  - 8542 Electronic integrated circuits (chips, processors): 0.14
  - 8541 Diodes, transistors, semiconductors: 0.27
  - 8534 Printed circuits (PCBs): 0.33
  - 8517 Telecom equipment (incl. smartphones, transmission apparatus): 0.33
  - 8471 Computers & data-processing machines: 0.31
  - 8473 Parts for computers & office machines: 0.28
  - 8523 Storage media (optical, magnetic, semiconductor): 0.10
  - 9001 Optical fibres, lenses, prisms (unmounted): 0.10
  - 9002 Mounted lenses, prisms, mirrors (for instruments): 0.18
  - 9013 Liquid crystal devices, lasers, optical appliances: 0.16
- C27 — Electrical Equipment (selected):
  - 8507 Electric accumulators (batteries, Li-ion): 0.25
  - 8504 Transformers & static converters: 0.22
  - 8506 Primary cells & batteries: 0.19
  - 8516 Electric heating apparatus: 0.19
  - 8532 Electrical capacitors: 0.18
  - 8533 Electrical resistors: 0.17
- C28 — Machinery & Equipment (selected):
  - 8457 Machining centres & unit construction machines: 0.20
  - 8486 Semiconductor manufacturing machinery: 0.16
  - 8456 Laser/ultrasonic/plasma machine tools: 0.15
  - 8460 Grinding, sharpening & polishing machines: 0.12
- C21 — Pharmaceuticals (selected):
  - 2941 Antibiotics (bulk): 0.22
  - 3002 Blood products, antisera, vaccines: 0.11
  - 3004 Medicaments in measured doses: 0.08
- C20 — Chemicals (selected):
  - 3707 Photographic chemical preparations (photoresists): 0.37
  - 2805 Alkali/alkaline-earth/rare-earth metals: 0.32
  - 2836 Carbonates (sodium, lithium, etc.): 0.25
  - 2846 Rare-earth compounds: 0.18
  - 2818 Aluminium oxide (corundum, alumina): 0.18
  - 2903 Halogenated hydrocarbons: 0.15
  - 2804 Hydrogen, noble gases, other non-metals (noble gases critical for chips): 0.10
  - 3901 Polymers of ethylene (polyethylene): 0.07
- C301 — Aerospace (selected):
  - 8803 Parts of aircraft & spacecraft: 0.34
  - 8802 Powered aircraft & helicopters: 0.26
  - 8407 Spark-ignition engines (piston): 0.11

- Note on weights:
  - Weights reflect empirical HHI of Dutch import sourcing for each HS code. Example interpretations preserved: w = 0.37 (photographic chemicals) and w = 0.07 (polyethylene).

### Appendix III — Top suppliers and markets (selected figures)
- Top suppliers by vulnerability-weighted imports (Partner — Imports (USD mn) — Weighted imports* (USD mn)):
  - China — 100,388 — 22,403
  - USA — 36,112 — 6,547
  - South Korea — 30,785 — 5,188
  - Japan — 21,546 — 4,345
  - Germany — 24,065 — 8,321
  - Malaysia — 15,597 — 2,780
  - Vietnam — 9,868 — 624
  - Singapore — 12,481 — 1,199
  - Thailand — 7,901 — 1,158
  - France — 8,593 — 6,129
- Top markets by concentration-weighted exports (Partner — Export (USD mn) — Weighted export** (USD mn)):
  - Germany — 25,658 — 33,313
  - France — 19,353 — 18,85 (note: preserved as in source)
  - USA — 14,961 — 11,126
  - Belgium — 14,042 — 4,299
  - Italy — 10,430 — 5,47 (note: preserved as in source)
  - UK — 9,238 — 4,29 (note: preserved as in source)
  - Ireland — 8,709 — 3,82 (note: preserved as in source)
  - Rest-of-world — 6,478 — 2,11 (note: preserved as in source)
  - Taiwan Province of China — 6,294 — 1,99 (note: preserved as in source)
  - Spain — 6,181 — 1,92 (note: preserved as in source)
- Construction notes:
  - Vulnerability-weighted imports and concentration-weighted exports use product- and partner-level concentration indices based on the Herfindahl–Hirschman index.

### Appendix IV — Key policies, initiatives, and regulations (selected entries and numeric details)
- Research and Development Promotion Act (WBSO): Payroll tax relief for R&D labor costs (32–40% first tranche; 16% thereafter); used by 20,000 firms last year.
- Innovation Box: Reduced effective CIT rate (9%) on profits from qualifying self-developed IP.
- Innovation Credit (Netherlands Enterprise Agency): Maximum of €50 mn for 2026, and maximum funding of €10 mn per project.
- Seed Capital Scheme (NEA): Maximum of €42 mn for 2026, and maximum funding of €12 mn per project.
- TO2 Applied Research Institutes (incl. TNO): Structural budget funding; applied and translational research.
- Project Beethoven: Multi-year public investment with a focus on supply side bottlenecks (€2.5 bn, public-private).
- Invest-NL (incl Deep Tech Fund): Deep Tech: €610 million fund dedicated entirely to high-risk investments in deep tech startups/scale-ups.
- New Industrial Policy – Six Strategic Markets (Industriebrief 2025): six strategic growth markets include (1) semiconductors, (2) biotech, (3) defense, (4) digital, (5) high-tech equipment, (6) chemical industry.
- 3% R&D Action Plan: Target of investing 3% of GDP in R&D by 2030.
- Action Plan for Green and Digital Jobs: National action plan coordinating multiple ministries; succeeded the Techniekpact (2013) on 1 January 2025.
- 30% Expat Tax Exemption: Preferential PIT treatment allowing qualifying foreign workers to receive up to 30% of gross salary tax-free.
- Highly Skilled Migrant scheme (Kennismigrantenregeling): Fast-track residence/work-permit route with an annually indexed salary threshold.
- European Chips Act (EU): Framework to support semiconductor R&D, pilot lines, manufacturing, and skills.
- Horizon Europe / EIC and InvestEU / EIB financing: EU grants, blended finance, loans & guarantees for innovation and scale-up.
- EU AI Act: Gradual implementation from 2025-2027.

*International Monetary Fund (content unit: 1nldea2026002).*

### References

### References

### Geoeconomic fragmentation, trade, and multilateralism
- Aiyar, S., J. Chen, C. Ebeke, R. Garcia-Saltos, T. Gudmundsson, A. Ilyina, A. Kangur, T. Kunaratskul, S. Rodriguez, M. Ruta, T. Schulze, G. Soderberg, and J. P. Trevino (2023), Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism, IMF Staff Discussion Note No. 2023/001, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, Geo-Economic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism; Staff Discussion Note No: 2023/001; January 15, 2023.
- Bems R., R.C. Johnson and K.-M. Yi (2011) “Vertical Linkages and the Collapse of Global Trade”, American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 2011, 101:3, 308–312, http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.101.3.308.
- Pietrobelli C., M. Delera and N. Geri (2026) “Navigating a fragmenting global economy: What GVC reconfiguration means for future industrial development”, UNIDO policy brief No. 28/2026.
- Rozenov R. and Z. Zhang (2025) “Geoeconomic Fragmentation: Implications for Ireland”. IMF Selected Issues Paper (SIP/2025/089). Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/en/publications/selected-issues-papers/issues/2025/07/07/geoeconomic-fragmentation-implications-for-ireland-568367.

### High-tech industry, innovation, and national technology strategies (Netherlands focus)
- Brainport Eindhoven (2024), Project Beethoven 2024: Strengthening the Microchip Industry and Quality of Life, https://brainporteindhoven.com/en/strategy-organisation/agenda-with-the-government/project-beethoven-2024.
- Brainport Eindhoven (2026), Innovation Campuses in Brainport Eindhoven, brochure, https://brainporteindhoven.com/fileadmin/user_upload/Campussen/Innovation-campuses_in_Brainport_Eindhoven_brochure-2026.pdf.
- Brouwer and de Winter (2026) Healthy Markets, Healthy Growth: Dynamics, Market Power and Misallocation in the Dutch Business Sector, De Nederlandsche Bank, DNB Analysis " Healthy firms, healthy growth".
- Holland High Tech (2026), Innovation Domains, https://www.hollandhightech.nl/en/innovation/innovation-domains.
- Kappen P., T. van Bree, C. Stolwijk, A. Yagafarova and T. van der Horst (2023), High-Tech Industry 2040: New Challenges for Long-Term Earning Capacity and the Impact for the Netherlands, TNO. White paper High-tech industry in 2040. White paper High-tech industry in 2040.
- Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy, TNO, and NWO (2024), National Technology Strategy: Building Blocks for Strategic Technology Policy, https://repository.tno.nl/SingleDoc?docId=66780.
- NWO (2026), Key Enabling Technologies, https://www.nwo.nl/en/key-enabling-technologies.
- Ru J. and L. Gan (2025), "Analysis on the Economic Growth Effects of Industrial Clustering in High-Tech Manufacturing and Knowledge-Intensive Service Industries," Sustainable Economies, 3(1).
- TNO (2025a). "Dutch competitiveness in the light of the Draghi report: Draghi analysis for the Netherlands." TNO 2025 R10842, Dutch competitiveness in the light of the Draghi report.
- TNO (2025b), Building Dutch Control Points through High-Tech Megaclusters, Building Dutch control points through High-Tech Megaclusters.
- TNO (2025c), R&D Top 50: The Netherlands' Top Research and Development Spenders, rapport-2025-r&d-top50-eng.pdf.
- Wennink, P. (2025), The Route to Future Prosperity: A Strong Netherlands in a Relevant Europe, independent advisory report, https://www.rapportwennink.nl/en/.

### European Union policy, defence, health, and capital markets
- European Commission (2026), Country Report — Netherlands, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-surveillance-eu-member-states/country-pages-including-country-reports/country-report-netherlands_en.
- European Commission (2025), European Innovation Scoreboard: Country Profile — Netherlands, European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, https://ec.europa.eu/assets/rtd/eis/2025/ec_rtd_eis-country-profile-nl.pdf.
- European Commission (2025), EU Defence Industry Transformation Roadmap: Unleashing Disruptive Innovation for Defense Readiness, COM (2025) 845.
- European Commission (2025), Staff Working Document: Monitoring progress towards a capital markets union: A toolkit of indicators.
- European Commission (2020), Public Health — Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe.
- European Parliament (2025), “Interplay between the AI Act and the EU digital legislative framework".
- European Parliament Research Service Brief (2025), "Dual-use export controls as tools of EU economic security".

### Analytical notes, central bank and other institutional analyses
- Attinasi M.-G., L. Boeckelmann, R. Gerinovics and B. Meunier (2025). “Unveiling the hidden costs of critical dependencies”, ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 5/2025, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/economic-bulletin/articles/2025/html/ecb.ebart202505_01~c93c71e372.en.html.
- Bonam D., J. Demmers, G. Goy, J. de Grip, B. Heerma van Voss, D. de Leeuw, C. Mehlbaum, A. Smadu, R. Swierstra (2026) “Global supply chains and European economic vulnerabilities”, DeNederlandscheBank, https://www.dnb.nl/media/d5xopy4u/dnb-analysis-global-supply-chains-and-european-economic-vulnerabilities-1.pdf.

### Policy frameworks and innovation policy resources
- OECD STIP Compass (2026), Mission Driven Top-Sector and Innovation Policy, https://stip.oecd.org/moip/case-studies/3.
- Pietrobelli C., M. Delera and N. Geri (2026) “Navigating a fragmenting global economy: What GVC reconfiguration means for future industrial development”, UNIDO policy brief No. 28/2026.

*References list as provided in the source PDF.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1nldea2026002.pdf_