## 1prtea2026001 - introduction of a positive neutral countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) was timely, and

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### Recent developments and macroeconomic outlook
- Real GDP growth: 1.9 percent in 2025; projected 1.7 percent in 2026 under staff’s baseline scenario.
- Labor market:
  - Real wages grew by 6.0 percent in 2025 (after 7.4 percent in 2024).
  - Working-age population grew since 2023.
  - Unemployment rate remained at historically-low levels; high vacancies-to-unemployment ratio.
- Inflation:
  - Headline (core) inflation averaged 2.2 (2.1) percent in 2025, down from 2.7 (2.8) percent in 2024.
  - Headline inflation rose to 3.3 percent y/y in April 2026 due to oil price surge.
  - Core inflation broadly stable at 2.3 percent; service inflation 2.8 percent in April.
  - Staff projects inflation to increase to 3.4 percent in 2026 before receding in 2027.
- Fiscal outcomes and public debt:
  - Fiscal balance: surplus of 0.7 percent of GDP in 2025 (third consecutive year).
  - Cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB) excluding grants decreased by 0.2 percentage points of potential GDP.
  - Public debt declined by 3.8 ppt of GDP to 89.7 percent of GDP in 2025; down 44 ppt from 2020.
- External sector:
  - Current account surplus narrowed from 2.2 percent of GDP in 2024 to 1.2 percent in 2025.
  - NIIP-to-GDP: -50.2 in 2025; NIIP expected to improve to -27.3 percent of GDP in 2031.
  - Trade balance expected to decline by 1.6 percentage point of GDP in 2026 due to higher commodity prices and weaker external demand.
- Credit and housing:
  - Household debt: 80.8 percent of disposable income in 2025Q3 (from 79.2 percent in 2024Q4).
  - Mortgage lending growth: 10 percent yoy in 2026Q1.
  - Corporate lending growth: 4.3 percent yoy in 2026Q1; corporate debt 72.3 percent of GDP (46.2 percent net of deposits) in 2025Q3.
  - Residential real estate prices rose by 19 percent yoy in 2025Q4 and by 180 percent since 2015 (EA average 56 percent).
  - House price overvaluation estimates range between 20 and 40 percent.
  - New dwellings remain below historical averages.

### Financial sector stability and macroprudential stance
- Banking sector indicators:
  - Tier 1 capital ratio: 17.9 percent in 2025Q4.
  - Nonperforming-loans ratio: 2.1 percent for all loans and 0.9 percent for housing loans in 2025Q4.
  - Net interest margins narrowed as policy rates decreased; profits stayed high (ROA: 1.32 percent; ROE: 14.5 percent in 2025).
- Macroprudential measures and recommendations:
  - Introduction of a positive neutral countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) was timely; a positive neutral CCyB of 0.75 percent became effective in January 2026.
  - Sectoral systemic risk buffer at 4 percent for household loans secured by housing properties (for banks using IRB approach).
  - Total releasable capital brought to 1 percent.
  - Recommendation: Banco de Portugal (BdP) should consider the range of releasable capital needed at cycle peaks; given high bank profitability, setting a higher CCyB would likely entail limited costs.
  - Borrower-based measures (BBMs) reduced riskiness since 2018; rising share of high LTV new mortgages suggests BdP is considering tightening BBMs.
  - Recommendation: reverse demand-fueling housing measures and grant BdP binding enforcement powers over BBMs to prevent compliance erosion.
- Stress tests and exposures:
  - Real estate exposures account for about a third of banks’ total assets.
  - Banks’ sovereign exposure about 20 percent of total assets.
  - Stress tests: banks’ capital buffers and profitability can absorb cumulative house price shocks of 40 percent over three years (upper-bound of overvaluation estimates).
  - No bank capital position would fall below the combined regulatory buffers under an extreme adverse scenario including credit, market, and interest rate risks; liquidity positions remain strong.
- AML/CFT and cyber:
  - AML/CFT supervision strengthened; resources should remain adequate and international cooperation enhanced.
  - Cyber risk oversight generally effective; recommendations include finalizing a sector-wide cyber strategy, strengthening analytical capabilities, formalizing inter-agency cooperation, and planning multi-year budgets and staffing.

### Nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) and capital markets
- NBFIs contracted over the past decade; accounted for about a third of financial sector assets.
- Total NBFI assets around 80 percent of GDP as of end-2024, far below the EA average of 363 percent.
- Policy priorities:
  - Develop catastrophe and rental insurance.
  - Advance domestic capital market development and the EU savings and investment union.
  - Gradually move key aspects of capital market supervision to ESMA.
  - Strengthen financial independence of ASF and CMVM.

### Productivity, structural reforms, and housing policy
- Productivity challenge:
  - Labor productivity stood at about 79 percent of the euro‑area average in 2024, virtually unchanged since 1990.
  - Weak productivity driven by insufficient investment in human and physical capital and a constraining business environment.
- Recommended reforms:
  - Remove disincentives to firm growth, including eliminating size-contingent corporate income tax provisions.
  - Streamline bureaucracy, reduce permits and approval delays, expand tacit approval, centralize and harmonize procedures.
  - Boost investment in human capital, align curricula with labor-market needs, and strengthen research–business collaboration.
  - Improve SMEs’ access to finance and foster venture capital development.
  - Increase labor market flexibility to reduce duality.
  - Deepen the European single market, advance the savings and investment union, and integrate the EU energy market.
- Housing market and affordability:
  - Reduce imbalances by fostering higher supply; supply response remains sluggish due to structural factors.
  - Policy recommendations: ease licensing, permitting, zoning and land‑use rules; rebalance property taxation; improve rental market functioning; provide targeted social housing and housing allowances; reverse demand-fueling measures for first-time buyers.

### Risks, scenarios, and authorities’ views
- Key risks:
  - Global shocks (high likelihood) — Portugal’s small open-economy nature and tourism reliance increase vulnerability.
  - War in the Middle East (illustrative severe scenario based on April 2026 WEO):
    - Real GDP growth could decrease to 1.3 percent in 2026 and 1.0 percent in 2027.
    - Annual inflation could reach 4.2 percent and 5.0 percent in 2026 and 2027, respectively.
    - Fiscal balance would weaken but debt would continue declining as a share of GDP; severe downturn could trigger house price correction and lower household consumption.
  - Domestic risks: labor shortages, climate change, increased cyber threats, persistent wage pressures that could keep core inflation higher for longer.
- Authorities’ views:
  - Broad agreement with staff’s assessment of outlook and risks.
  - Note high reliance on renewable energy mitigates some energy shock impact and expect limited passthrough from energy prices to core inflation.
  - View recent wage growth as compensation for prior real wage losses.
  - See relatively low productivity growth as the key hindrance to medium-term growth.

### Fiscal policy stance, RRF implementation, and short-term risks
- Overall fiscal stance: "2.6 percent of potential GDP, implying a strong expansionary stance."
- Drivers:
  - Expansion mostly driven by expected acceleration of RRF implementation in the final year of the program; RRF acceleration will have significant import-content and will be largely reversed in 2027 when the end of the RRF implies a contractionary stance by 1.6 pp of potential GDP.
  - Expansion reflects needed full RRF implementation and necessary storm-related additional spending; will help soften the impact of the energy price shock and remains consistent with a further large decline in public debt by 4.1 pp of GDP.
- Risks and guidance:
  - With a still positive output gap, the expansion will likely add to upward inflation risks even if funds are spent gradually.
  - Authorities should monitor inflation and be ready to tighten fiscal policies if inflation pressures exceed expectations from the energy shock.

### Medium-term fiscal positions, debt dynamics, and required measures
- Authorities' plans: small surpluses or balanced budgets over the medium term.
- Debt trajectory under authorities’ plans: debt would decrease below 60 percent of GDP by 2036.
- Staff projection and pressures:
  - Factoring aging, planned defense increases to reach NATO target of 3.5 percent of GDP by 2035 (from 2.0 percent of GDP in 2025), and permanent impact of recent/planned tax reductions, staff projects growing fiscal deficits from 2028, reaching about 1¼ percent of GDP in 2031.
  - Primary surplus projected to be gradually eliminated; debt to start increasing by 2035.
  - Policy implication: offsetting measures required to close growing fiscal gaps to reach authorities’ fiscal targets.
  - Risk of sovereign stress assessed as moderate (Annex III).

### Composition of public spending and investment priorities
- Diagnostic: public investment has remained below the EA average since the sovereign debt crisis.
- Priority actions:
  - Boost investment in infrastructure and education to help reduce external imbalances.
  - Make fiscal space for productive projects after RRF ends while improving implementation capacity.
  - Contain wage bill growth and reduce other current expenditure in percent of GDP.

### Tax reform: revenue potential and efficiency gains
- Tax expenditures: 7.2 percent of GDP in 2024.
- U-Tax recommended reforms that would reduce tax expenditures by 0.5 percent of GDP; included reduction of some CIT incentives for R&D (“indirect SIFIDE”) in 2026 budget expected to yield savings starting 2027.
- VAT:
  - VAT concentrates 60 percent of tax expenditure; recommend broadening VAT base by scaling back not-well-targeted reduced rates and exemptions and supporting low‑income households via targeted social benefits.
- PIT:
  - PIT revenue accounts for 24 percent of tax expenditures; recommendation: further PIT rate reductions should only occur once concrete offsetting budgetary measures are in place.
  - Preferential taxation of capital income is costly and regressive and should be better aligned with labor income.
  - Youth‑specific PIT exemptions should be reversed.
- CIT:
  - CIT revenue in line with EA average but complex and fragmented; recommendation to improve CIT efficiency while keeping revenue stable and eliminate size-contingent rate variations.
  - Better-targeted R&D incentives, focusing on smaller and younger firms or substituting with direct grants.
- Property taxation:
  - Heavy reliance on transaction taxes and low recurrent property taxes due to outdated assessments.
  - Recent reduction of transaction taxes and update of taxable property value formula welcomed; recommend gradual increases in recurrent property taxation and more effective taxation of underutilized properties.

### Aging-related spending pressures and pension reform
- 2024 Ageing Report estimate: over 2026-31, pension and health spending will increase annually by 0.16.
- Pension system projections and Green Book proposals (Annex IV):
  - Public pension contributions stable until 2050; expenditures projected to rise with aging.
  - Peak annual deficit of 0.6 percent of GDP in 2046; pension spending projected to decline after 2046 as CGA is phased out and system returns to surplus by mid-2050.
  - FEFSS projected assets equal to 15 percent of GDP in 2026; government transfers to pension system projected to rise from 2.7 percent of GDP to 4.5 percent by 2050.
- Green Book main directions include phasing out early retirement for long-term unemployed, indexing minimum early retirement age to statutory normal retirement age (statutory normal retirement age was last adjusted in December 2025 to 66 years and 11 months effective in 2027), introducing a net value-added contribution (CVAL) after impact assessment, conducting actuarial analysis of social contribution rates (global rate 34.75 percent unchanged since 1995), and allowing more flexible FEFSS investment strategy (current minima and caps: minimum 50 percent in Portuguese public debt; caps of 25 percent on securities and 15 percent on unhedged exposure to non-euro currencies).
- Recommendations and cautions:
  - Automatic indexation of retirement-age to life expectancy seen as important mitigant.
  - CVAL requires comprehensive evaluation before implementation due to administrative, macroeconomic, and volatility concerns.
  - Additional reform options: simplify/reduce accrual rate structure (current marginally decreasing accrual rate from 2.3 to 2 percent), simplify indexation toward CPI-based mechanism, reform survivor pensions (survivor pensions account for 1.9 percent of GDP), and institute regular actuarial reporting every three years.

### Public investment management (PIM) and contingency planning
- PIM: strong foundations exist but gaps remain; recommended actions:
  - Apply common appraisal and climate-risk checks to major projects.
  - Link investment plans to budget with clear multiyear funding and strengthen Ministry of Finance review role.
  - Introduce clear multi-year capital budgets, speed up procurement and funding releases, strengthen maintenance and asset management, and integrate climate and disaster risks into decisions.
- Contingency fiscal guidance under energy/import shocks:
  - Fiscal measures should be temporary and targeted to protect lower-income households and viable firms while allowing price signals to pass through.
  - Fiscal policy must be calibrated with ECB monetary policy; discretionary support may need offsets.
  - Potential offsets/sequencing: temporarily postpone domestically-financed investment, accelerate reduction of CIT and PIT tax expenditure, and sequence VAT base broadening after inflationary pressures subside.
  - If prolonged war triggers persistent recession, temporary fiscal relaxation size should depend on recession magnitude, inflation behavior, and monetary policy stance.
  - To increase resilience: accelerate renewable energy transition and pursue greater EU coordination.

### Financial sector policies — crisis preparedness and recommendations
- Strengths: BdP’s resolution function, advanced resolution planning, broad resolution toolkit.
- Needed improvements:
  - Introduce dedicated administrative bank liquidation regime for LSIs with negative public-interest assessment (PIA).
  - Clarify crisis coordination arrangements and strengthen backup-funding mechanisms for the Deposit Guarantee Fund and the Resolution Fund.
- Crisis preparedness and macroprudential toolkit:
  - Recommendation to consider a higher CCyB given large bank profitability and real estate exposures.
  - Recommendation to monitor non-resident deposits and upgrade AML/CFT framework; leverage AML tools to tackle tax evasion and support revenue mobilization.
  - Finalize sector-wide cyber strategy and plan multi-year staffing budgets.

### Annex I — External Sector Assessment: key positions and projections
- Overall assessment: external position in 2025 moderately stronger than implied by fundamentals and desirable policies.
- Key 2025 positions (% GDP):
  - NIIP: -50.2
  - Gross Assets: 173.2
  - Debt Assets: 167.2
  - Gross Liab.: 223.4
  - Debt Liab.: 38.9
- Current Account:
  - CA: 1.2 in 2025; cyclically adjusted CA: 1.5; EBA Norm: 0.2; EBA Gap: 1.3.
  - CA gap range: 0.6 to 2.0; point estimate 1.3; policy gaps contribution 1.7; unexplained residual -0.4.
- Real exchange rate:
  - CPI-based REER appreciated by 2.4 percent between end-2024 and 2025; ULC-based REER appreciated by 1.3 percent.
  - Staff-assessed CA gap range implies REER undervaluation 1.7 to 5.6 percent, midpoint 3.6 percent (elasticity of CA to REER = 0.36).
  - EBA CPI-based REER model suggests overvaluation of 0.6 percent; level REER model indicates 3.7 percent undervaluation.
- Foreign assets/liabilities trajectory:
  - Negative NIIP declined from peak of 124 percent of GDP in 2014 to 50 percent in 2025.
  - Gross external debt remained high at 145.3 percent of GDP at end-2025.
  - External financing needs estimated to average 48 percent of GDP over 2026-31.
- Sovereign risk and DSA:
  - Overall DSA: Portugal at moderate overall risk of sovereign stress (near-term: Moderate; Medium-term: Moderate; Long-term: Moderate).
  - Baseline public debt projections (percent of GDP):
    - 2025: 89.7; 2026: 85.6; 2027: 82.3; 2028: 79.2; 2029: 76.8; 2030: 74.9; 2031: 73.6; 2032: 72.8; 2033: 72.3; 2034: 72.2; 2035: 72.4.
  - Change in public debt (selected):
    - 2026: -4.1; 2027: -3.3; 2028: -3.1; 2029: -2.4; 2030: -1.8; 2031: -1.3; 2032: -0.9; 2033: -0.5; 2034: -0.1; 2035: 0.3.
  - Primary deficit (percent of GDP): 2025: -2.4; 2026: -1.9; 2027: -1.9; 2028: -1.7; 2029: -1.3; 2030: -1.0; 2031: -0.6; 2032: -0.2; 2033: 0.2; 2034: 0.6; 2035: 1.0.
  - Gross financing needs (percent of GDP): 2026: 4.2; 2027: 7.9; 2028: 7.8; 2029: 7.3; 2030: 6.8; 2031: 8.0; 2032: 8.1; 2033: 7.6; 2034: 7.8; 2035: 10.1; 2035 (extended): 11.6.
  - Debt service (percent of GDP): 2026: 6.9; 2027: 10.0; 2028: 9.9; 2029: 9.2; 2030: 8.3; 2031: 9.2; 2032: 8.9; 2033: 8.0; 2034: 7.8; 2035: 9.7; 2035 (extended): 10.8.
- Memo projections:
  - Real GDP growth: 2025: 1.9; 2026: 1.7; 2027: 1.6; 2028: 1.8; 2029: 1.7; 2030: 1.7; 2031: 1.6; 2032: 1.6; 2033: 1.6; 2034: 1.6; 2035: 1.6.
  - Inflation (GDP deflator): 2025: 3.9; 2026: 3.2; 2027: 2.3; 2028: 2.4; 2029: 2.2; 2030: 2.0; 2031–2035: 2.0 each year.
  - Effective interest rate: 2025: 0.0; 2026: 2.4; 2027: 2.5; 2028: 2.7; 2029: 2.8; 2030–2035: 2.8–2.9.

### Annex VI — Implementation of the 2024 Article IV: selected follow-up
- Fiscal policy:
  - Near-term recommendation: avoid further loosening versus 2024 budget and maintain neutral fiscal stance in 2025.
  - Authorities: 2025 fiscal balance recorded a surplus; stance was expansionary due to higher RRF grants.
  - Medium-term recommendation: sustain consolidation to mitigate public debt risks and build fiscal space for public investment.
- Financial policies:
  - Recommendation: consider implementing a positive neutral CCyB to lock-in banks’ temporarily high profits into releasable capital.
  - Authorities’ action: adopted a positive neutral CCyB of 0.75 percent effective January 2026.
  - RRE sector recommendation: monitor RRE risks and calibrate sectoral systemic buffer and BBMs; implement measures to increase housing supply.
  - Authorities’ actions: compliance with supervisor recommendations on credit standards; government proposed housing package with tax incentives.
- Structural reforms:
  - Labor markets: reduce labor market duality; authorities proposed labor reform to increase flexibility of open-ended contracts.
  - Product markets: promote competition and streamline red tape; authorities launched “Reforma do Estado” in June 2025.

### Annex VII — Data issues and IMF relations
- Data adequacy: staff assessment — "Data provision is adequate for surveillance."
- Key data-quality and timeliness notes and sample latest observations include:
  - Exchange Rates: 2026-05-19 / received 2026-05-20.
  - Consumer Price Index: 2026-04 / received 2026-05.
  - GDP/GNP: 2025-12 / received 2026-03.
  - International Investment Position: 2025-12 / received 2026-03.
- Fund relations and IMF financial position (as of May 26, 2026):
  - Quota: 2,060.10 (SDR Million); Fund holdings of currency: 1,527.29; Reserve position in Fund: 532.83.
  - SDR Department net cumulative allocation: 2,780.99; Holdings: 2,816.11.
  - No outstanding purchases and loans.
  - Exchange rate arrangements: Portugal currency is the euro; euro area exchange rate arrangement is free floating.
- Article IV consultation key findings:
  - 2025 growth: 1.9 percent; inflation (2025): 2.2 percent.
  - 2025 public debt: 89.7 percent of GDP (lowest since 2009).
  - 2026 government projects a balanced budget and public debt projection decline to 87.5 percent of GDP.
  - Housing: housing price change (2025) rose by 17.6 percent; policy measures focus on supply-side reforms and targeted measures for access.

*International Monetary Fund — Portugal: Staff Report, May 28, 2026.*

### introduction of a positive neutral countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) was timely, and

### 1prtea2026001 - introduction of a positive neutral countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) was timely, and

### Recent developments and macroeconomic outlook
- Real GDP growth: 1.9 percent in 2025; projected 1.7 percent in 2026 under staff’s baseline scenario.
- Labor market:
  - Real wages grew by 6.0 percent in 2025 (after 7.4 percent in 2024).
  - Working-age population grew since 2023.
  - Unemployment rate remained at historically-low levels; high vacancies-to-unemployment ratio.
- Inflation:
  - Headline (core) inflation averaged 2.2 (2.1) percent in 2025, down from 2.7 (2.8) percent in 2024.
  - Headline inflation rose to 3.3 percent y/y in April 2026 due to oil price surge.
  - Core inflation broadly stable at 2.3 percent; service inflation 2.8 percent in April.
  - Staff projects inflation to increase to 3.4 percent in 2026 before receding in 2027.
- Fiscal outcomes:
  - Fiscal balance: surplus of 0.7 percent of GDP in 2025 (third consecutive year).
  - Social contributions increased by 0.3 percentage points of GDP.
  - Personal income tax (PIT) revenue increased by 0.2 percent of GDP despite rate reductions.
  - Indirect tax revenue strengthened by 0.2 percent of GDP; corporate income tax (CIT) revenue decreased by 0.3 percent of GDP.
  - Compensation of employees increased by 0.2 percent of GDP.
  - Cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB) excluding grants decreased by 0.2 percentage points of potential GDP.
- Public debt:
  - Declined by 3.8 ppt of GDP to 89.7 percent of GDP in 2025; down 44 ppt from 2020.
- External sector:
  - Current account surplus narrowed from 2.2 percent of GDP in 2024 to 1.2 percent in 2025.
  - NIIP expected to improve to -27.3 percent of GDP in 2031.
  - Trade balance expected to decline by 1.6 percentage point of GDP in 2026 due to higher commodity prices and weaker external demand.
- Credit and housing:
  - Household debt edged up to 80.8 percent of disposable income in 2025Q3 (from 79.2 percent in 2024Q4).
  - Mortgage lending growth reached 10 percent yoy in 2026Q1.
  - Corporate lending growth 4.3 percent yoy in 2026Q1; corporate debt 72.3 percent of GDP (46.2 percent net of deposits) in 2025Q3.
  - Residential real estate prices rose by 19 percent yoy in 2025Q4 and by 180 percent since 2015 (EA average 56 percent).
  - House price overvaluation estimates range between 20 and 40 percent.
  - New dwellings remain below historical averages.

### Financial sector stability and macroprudential stance
- Banking sector indicators:
  - Tier 1 capital ratio: 17.9 percent in 2025Q4.
  - Nonperforming-loans ratio: 2.1 percent for all loans and 0.9 percent for housing loans in 2025Q4.
  - Net interest margins narrowed as policy rates decreased; profits stayed high.
- Macroprudential measures:
  - Introduction of a positive neutral countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) was timely.
  - Further strengthening of the macroprudential toolkit may be needed.
  - Given banks’ large exposure to the overvalued real estate sector, associated risks should be closely monitored.
- Policy priorities in financial domain:
  - Continued strengthening of the financial policy framework per FSAP recommendations.
  - Reinforcing the macroprudential policy toolkit.
  - Fostering growth of the NBFI sector to increase access to finance.

### Productivity, structural reforms, and housing policy
- Productivity challenge:
  - Portugal’s persistent income gap with euro area peers requires reforms to increase productivity.
  - Recommended reforms include:
    - Removing disincentives to firm growth.
    - Streamlining bureaucracy.
    - Boosting investment in human capital.
    - Improving SMEs’ access to finance.
    - Addressing labor market duality.
  - Deepening the European single market, advancing the savings and investment union, and integrating the EU energy market will boost productivity and resilience to geo-fragmentation and trade policy uncertainty.
- Housing market and affordability:
  - Reducing imbalances in the housing market requires measures to foster higher supply, which will also improve housing affordability.
  - Structural factors continue to keep the supply response sluggish.

### Risks, scenarios, and authorities’ views
- Key risks:
  - Global shocks given Portugal’s small open-economy nature; tourism and EU/EA membership mitigate some risks.
  - War in the Middle East:
    - Under an illustrative sensitivity analysis (based on April 2026 WEO severe scenario assumptions), real GDP growth could decrease to 1.3 percent in 2026 and 1.0 percent in 2027.
    - Annual inflation could reach 4.2 percent and 5.0 percent in 2026 and 2027, respectively.
    - Fiscal balance would weaken but debt would continue declining as a share of GDP; severe downturn could trigger house price correction and lower household consumption.
  - Domestic risks: labor shortages, climate change, increased cyber threats, and persistent wage pressures that could keep core inflation higher for longer.
- Authorities’ views:
  - Broad agreement with staff’s assessment of outlook and risks.
  - Note Portugal’s high reliance on renewable energy mitigates some energy shock impact.
  - Authorities expect limited passthrough from energy prices to core inflation and view recent wage growth as compensation for prior real wage losses.
  - Authorities and staff see relatively low productivity growth as the key hindrance to medium-term growth prospects.

### Fiscal policy stance and recommendations
- 2026 fiscal posture:
  - Fiscal position expected to be broadly balanced in 2026.
  - Storm-related spending preliminarily estimated at about 0.3 percent of GDP.
  - Government measures in response to energy shocks: reduced fuel excise by expected higher VAT revenue from fuel, postponed carbon tax update, limited targeted subsidies for selected transport and agriculture subsectors at a marginal fiscal cost.
  - Other 2026 budget measures: further CIT rate cuts and a one-off solidarity-supplement for the elderly.
  - PIT rate reductions were anticipated but postponed given limited fiscal space despite positive carryover from 2025 overperformance.
- Policy guidance:
  - Fiscal policy should continue focusing on debt reduction while reorienting public spending toward higher investment.
  - Efforts should rely on tax reform, improved efficiency of spending, and reforms to contain spending pressures from aging.
  - Accelerate absorption of EU cohesion funds to cushion the decline in public investment after RRF-financed projects conclude.

*International Monetary Fund — Portugal: Staff Report, May 28, 2026.*

### 2.6 percent of potential GDP, implying a strong expansionary stance. However, this is mostly driven

### 1prtea2026001 - 2.6 percent of potential GDP, implying a strong expansionary stance. However, this is mostly driven

### Fiscal stance, RRF implementation, and short-term risks
- The overall fiscal stance is "2.6 percent of potential GDP, implying a strong expansionary stance."
- This expansion is mostly driven by "the expected acceleration of RRF implementation in the final year of the program," which:
  - "will have a significant import-content (thus helping reduce the strong external position)"
  - "will be largely reversed in 2027 when the end of the RRF will imply a contractionary stance by 1.6 pp of potential GDP."
- The expansionary stance "reflects the needed full RRF implementation and the necessary storm-related additional spending," and:
  - "will help soften the impact of the energy price shock on growth"
  - "remains consistent with a further large decline in public debt by 4.1 pp of GDP."
- Risks and policy guidance:
  - "With an output gap still positive, it will likely add to upward inflation risks even if the funds are spent gradually (including through the development bank), as planned."
  - "Thus, the authorities should monitor inflation developments closely and be ready to tighten fiscal policies if inflation pressures go beyond what would be expected from the energy shock."

### Medium-term fiscal positions, debt dynamics, and required measures
- Authorities' plans: "small surpluses or balanced budgets over the medium term."
- Debt trajectory under those plans: "debt, which would decrease below 60 percent of GDP by 2036, further rebuilding buffers and lowering the overall risk of sovereign stress."
- Pressure points and projected deterioration:
  - "Factoring spending pressures from aging (¶22), planned increases in defense spending to reach the NATO target of 3.5 percent of GDP by 2035 (from 2.0 percent of GDP in 2025), and the permanent impact of recent and planned tax reductions, staff projects growing fiscal deficits from 2028, reaching about 1¼ percent of GDP in 2031."
  - "The primary surplus is projected to be gradually eliminated, and debt to start increasing by 2035."
- Policy implication: "Offsetting measures are thus required to reach the authorities’ fiscal targets by closing growing fiscal gaps."
- Risk assessment: "Under this baseline projection, the risk of sovereign stress is assessed as moderate (Annex III)."

### Composition of public spending and investment priorities
- Key diagnostic: "Portugal’s public investment has remained below the EA average since the sovereign debt crisis."
- Priority actions:
  - "Boosting investment in infrastructure and education, which will also help reduce external imbalances."
  - With RRF ending, "fiscal space needs to be made to finance productive projects, while improving implementation capacity."
  - "In addition to containing the wage bill growth after recent salary increases, as planned, efforts should be made to reduce other current expenditure in percent of GDP."

### Tax reform: revenue potential and efficiency gains
- Aggregate magnitudes:
  - "7.2 percent of GDP in 2024, tax expenditures are high by international standards."
  - "An assessment by the tax unit “U-Tax”, recommended reforms that would reduce tax expenditures by 0.5 percent of GDP, including the reduction of some CIT incentives for R&D investment (“indirect SIFIDE”), incorporated in the 2026 budget and expected to yield savings starting 2027."
- General recommendation: "Greater efforts are needed to eliminate provisions that no longer serve a policy priority, are ineffective, or are too costly for their benefits."
- Specific areas:
  - VAT
    - "VAT concentrates 60 percent of tax expenditure: revenues are weakened by extensive reduced rates and exemptions, often aimed at supporting specific sectors, such as hotels and restaurants (since 2016) and construction in the most-recent housing measures."
    - Recommendation: "The VAT base should be broadened by scaling back these not-well-targeted reduced rates and exemptions, while supporting low‑income households through targeted social benefits instead."
  - PIT
    - "PIT revenue (24 percent of tax expenditures) is relatively low."
    - Recommendation: "Further reduction in rates, as intended, should only happen once concrete offsetting budgetary measures are in place."
    - "Preferential taxation of capital income is costly and regressive and should be better aligned with labor income."
    - "Youth‑specific PIT exemptions add fiscal costs and complexity, without clear evidence of effectiveness in stemming emigration (2024 Article IV Report); they should be reversed."
    - "Other insufficiently-targeted exemptions should be gradually eliminated and replaced by targeted transfers."
  - CIT
    - "CIT revenue is in line with the EA average, but CIT is complex and fragmented, including a base rate, a state surtax, municipal surcharges, and size‑ and location‑based reduced rates."
    - Recommendation: "Reforms should focus on improving the efficiency of CIT taxation, while keeping revenue stable. Rather than lowering the base rate, as planned, the size-contingent rate variations should be eliminated to foster corporate growth (2024 Article IV Report)."
    - "Better targeting remaining R&D tax incentives, with a stronger focus on smaller and younger firms, and substituting them by direct R&D grants where appropriate will also increase efficiency."
  - Property taxation
    - Diagnosis: "Property taxation relies heavily on transaction taxes, while recurrent taxes on property are low, in part due to outdated property value assessment."
    - Impacts: "Combined with limited use of higher tax rates on vacant or underused dwellings, this leads to weaker revenue, discourages residential mobility, and mainly benefits wealthier homeowners."
    - Recent steps and further recommendations: "The recent reduction of transaction taxes, and update of the taxable property value formula are welcome; they should be supplemented with gradual increases in recurrent property taxation and more effective taxation of underutilized properties. This would raise revenues, improve housing market efficiency, and increase the tax system’s progressivity."

### Aging-related spending pressures
- Headline projection: "The 2024 Ageing Report estimates that, over 2026-31, pension and health spending will increase annually by 0.16"
- Policy implication: "Curbing pressures from aging-related spending remains critical."

*Source: 1prtea2026001 - 2.6 percent of potential GDP, implying a strong expansionary stance. However, this is mostly driven (IMF).*

### 0.05 ppt of GDP, respectively, much faster than EA average (Annex III).

### 1prtea2026001 - 0.05 ppt of GDP, respectively, much faster than EA average (Annex III).

### Fiscal pressures: pensions and health
- Pension spending:
  - Fiscal pressures from pension spending are expected to rise further through the mid-2040s before easing as past reforms—notably the phase out of the civil servants’ special scheme—reduce average benefits.
  - A recent study by experts (“Livro Verde”) proposes reform directions; fiscal impacts remain uncertain without further analysis.
  - Recommended reforms to strengthen the system (Annex IV):
    - Simplifying accrual rates and indexation mechanisms.
    - Reforming survivor pensions.
    - Instituting regular public actuarial reporting.
- Health spending:
  - Portugal’s health spending level is broadly in line with EU peers considering its income and demographic profile, but benchmarking suggests room to increase spending efficiency.
  - Ongoing reforms to improve allocation and management of resources:
    - Integration of hospitals and primary care.
    - Shift towards capitation-based funding and program budgeting.
  - Sustaining efficiency gains requires:
    - Strengthening workforce management.
    - Controlling pharmaceutical spending.
    - Improving patient flow across levels of care.
    - Reinforcing budgeting, governance, and accountability.
  - Over the medium term, consideration could be given to reintroducing carefully-designed user fees.

### Public investment management (PIM)
- Improvements needed to reduce costs and increase growth return:
  - PIM framework has strong foundations (clear fiscal rules, effective oversight of PPPs and SOEs, investment planning aligned with national and EU climate goals).
  - Gaps to address:
    - Apply common appraisal and climate-risk checks to all major projects.
    - Link investment plans to the budget and identify clear multiyear funding.
    - Strengthen central oversight: give the Ministry of Finance a stronger role in reviewing projects before approval.
    - Introduce clear multi-year capital budgets with transparent project costs.
    - Speed up procurement and funding releases to accelerate predictability of project implementation.
    - Strengthen maintenance and asset management.
    - Better integrate climate and disaster risks into infrastructure decisions.

### Contingency planning and fiscal policy under uncertainty
- Fiscal measures for higher energy import prices should focus on temporary, targeted support to protect lower-income households and struggling, yet viable, firms, while allowing higher prices to pass through to end users to avoid muting the price signal.
- Fiscal policy must be calibrated with ECB monetary policy to avoid second-round inflationary effects; discretionary support measures would, in most cases, need to be offset.
- Potential offsetting and sequencing:
  - Temporarily postpone domestically-financed investment if needed.
  - Accelerate efforts to reduce CIT and PIT tax expenditure.
  - Sequencing: reducing VAT tax expenditure should be sequenced after current inflationary pressures have subsided.
- If the war’s prolongation triggers a persistent recession, fiscal balances could be weakened temporarily; the appropriate size of relaxation would depend on the recession magnitude, inflation behavior, and the monetary policy stance.
- To increase resilience: accelerate transition to renewable energy and pursue greater EU coordination to improve efficiency and reduce financing costs.

### Authorities’ views on fiscal recommendations
- The government agrees with many staff fiscal policy recommendations but believes balanced budgets can be achieved over the medium term without additional saving measures.
- Expectations and positions:
  - Expects tax revenues to remain buoyant despite rate cuts.
  - Expects social contributions to grow faster than GDP.
  - Expects aging-related spending to increase more slowly than projected in the outdated 2024 Ageing Report.
  - Future PIT reduction contingent on available fiscal space; prioritized storm-related support this year over PIT cuts.
  - Any additional energy-shock measures will be narrowly targeted and avoid distorting price signals.
  - Agrees with advice to reduce tax expenditures as feasible but considers youth-specific lower PIT rates important to stem emigration.
  - Does not intend to harmonize size-dependent CIT given large SME share.
  - Further pension reforms need additional study.
  - Not planning to reintroduce moderating-fees in health at this stage.
  - Stressed efforts underway to simplify public tendering rules for PIM.

### Financial sector policies — banking resilience and risks
- Overall assessment:
  - The banking sector is resilient; systemic risks have remained moderate since the last Article IV report.
  - Buildup of financial buffers, robust economic growth and employment, and a stronger fiscal position reduced vulnerabilities.
  - FSAP analysis finds the banking sector robust to adverse macro-financial conditions.
  - Stress-test results: no bank capital position would fall below the combined regulatory buffers under an extreme adverse scenario including credit, market, and interest rate risks; banks would maintain strong liquidity positions.
  - Sensitivity analyses: banking sector expected to remain solvent under the April 2026 WEO severe scenario.
- Exposures and vulnerabilities:
  - Real estate exposures account for about a third of banks’ total assets.
  - Banks’ exposure to sovereign debt accounts for about 20 percent of total assets; portfolio fairly concentrated in EA countries.
  - Stress tests showed banks’ capital buffers and profitability can absorb cumulative house price shocks of 40 percent over three years (the upper-bound of overvaluation estimates).
- Policy recommendations on real estate and housing:
  - Reverse recent measures that have fueled mortgage credit growth (support for young first-time homebuyers increased demand and widened market imbalances).
  - Supply-side reforms to improve affordability:
    - Ease licensing, permitting, zoning and land-use rules (as planned).
    - Rebalance property taxation.
    - Improve rental market functioning.
  - Provide well-targeted support to vulnerable households via dedicated social housing and housing allowances.

### Macroprudential policy, AML/CFT, and crisis preparedness
- Macroprudential stance: adequate but scope to strengthen toolkit.
  - Capital buffers:
    - Positive neutral CCyB at 0.75 percent became effective in January 2026.
    - Sectoral systemic risk buffer at 4 percent for household loans secured by housing properties (for banks using IRB approach).
    - These bring total releasable capital to 1 percent.
    - Recommendation: Banco de Portugal (BdP) should consider the range of releasable capital needed at cycle peaks; given high bank profitability, setting a higher CCyB would likely entail limited costs.
  - Borrower-based measures (BBMs):
    - Since 2018, BBMs reduced riskiness of housing loan portfolio.
    - Increasing share of high LTV of new mortgages suggests BdP is considering tightening BBMs.
    - First-best is to reverse demand-fueling measures; BdP currently lacks binding enforcement powers over BBMs—granting enforcement powers would prevent compliance erosion.
- AML/CFT and cyber:
  - AML/CFT supervision has strengthened, but resources should remain adequate to manage increasingly-sophisticated and cross-border risks; deeper international cooperation and enhanced data sharing are needed.
  - Cyber risk oversight generally effective, but threats intensify while DORA, MiCAR and the AI Act expand supervisory mandates.
  - Recommendations: finalize sector-wide cyber strategy, strengthen analytical capabilities, formalize inter-agency cooperation, and plan multi-year budgets and staffing to attract and retain specialists.
- Crisis preparedness:
  - Strengths: BdP’s well-established resolution function, advanced resolution planning, and broad resolution toolkit.
  - Needed improvements:
    - Introduce a dedicated administrative bank liquidation regime for LSIs with negative public-interest assessment (PIA) because the current reliance on corporate insolvency is relatively slow and risks asset-value deterioration.
    - Clarify crisis coordination arrangements and strengthen backup-funding mechanisms to support the Deposit Guarantee Fund and the Resolution Fund.

### Nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) and capital markets
- NBFI sector status and risks:
  - NBFIs contracted over the past decade; accounted for about a third of financial sector assets.
  - Total NBFI assets around 80 percent of GDP as of end-2024, far below the EA average of 363 percent.
  - Limited NBFI development constrains household savings options (largely bank deposits and real estate) and corporate financing for young high-growth firms (“gazelles”).
- Policy priorities:
  - Develop catastrophe insurance and rental insurance to increase resilience to climate shocks and incentivize rental supply.
  - Advance domestic capital market development and the EU savings and investment union.
  - Gradually move key aspects of capital market supervision to ESMA to ensure EU prudential framework resilience and effectiveness.
  - Strengthen effective financial independence of ASF and CMVM, currently constrained by limited budgetary rules.

### Authorities’ views on financial sector policies
- Authorities broadly agree with systemic risk assessment and most FSAP recommendations.
- Positions:
  - Agree the banking system is resilient but emphasize close monitoring of rapid house price growth and accelerating mortgage lending.
  - Consider sovereign exposure diversified across countries.
  - View positive neutral CCyB as appropriately set.
  - Support reviewing BdP powers over BBMs, noting high compliance.
  - Prioritize multi-year staffing and retention strategy for financial supervision.
  - Agree to explore legal changes on budgetary independence of nonbank regulators and board appointments.
  - Note international cooperation would refine risk monitoring.
  - Took note of recommendation to consider administrative insolvency regime for LSIs with negative PIA.
  - Concur on the need to further develop the NBFI sector.

### Reforms to increase productivity and potential growth
- Key findings:
  - Portugal has a persistent GDP‑per‑capita gap driven by chronically-weaker productivity growth.
  - Labor productivity stood at about 79 percent of the euro‑area average in 2024, virtually unchanged since 1990.
  - Weak productivity stems from insufficient investment in human and physical capital and a constraining business environment.
- Global value chain (GVC) integration:
  - Portugal remains less integrated into GVCs compared to EU peers; its role as a supplier in other countries’ exports has stagnated.
  - Lower GVC participation reduces opportunities for technological upgrading and productivity gains.
- Firm dynamism and innovation:
  - Insufficient firm dynamism: “gazelles” are much rarer than the European average; small and less productive firms predominate.
  - Low innovation: lower patent applications and lower technological absorption capacity, likely linked to insufficient R&D investment despite significant government support.
- Policy recommendations to bolster firm growth and productivity:
  - Remove tax disincentives and streamline bureaucracy:
    - Eliminate size-contingent corporate income tax provisions.
    - Expand ongoing efforts to streamline bureaucracy under the Ministry for State Reform; involve local governments.
    - Reduce number of permits, shorten approval deadlines, expand tacit approval, centralize and harmonize procedures (first applied to construction and urban licensing, industrial permits, commerce and tourism licensing, environmental approvals).
    - Foster digitalization (e.g., digital wallets for enterprises).
  - Improve labor market efficiency and upskilling:
    - Increase labor market flexibility to reduce duality and improve resource allocation.
    - Invest more in education; align curricula with labor-market needs and strengthen research collaboration with businesses.
  - Deepen the European single market and EU-level reforms:
    - Remove remaining barriers to trade within the EU and harmonize regulations and bankruptcy frameworks.
    - Deepen integration in the EU energy market to lower energy price volatility and leverage renewables.
    - Improve access to finance, including venture capital, as the savings and investment union progresses.

### Authorities’ views on productivity reforms
- Authorities stress boosting productivity as a key priority.
- Actions and commitments:
  - Streamlining red tape, simplifying and digitalizing government functions.
  - Active labor market policies to reduce skill mismatches and collaboration with businesses to update curricula.
  - Prioritizing further labor market flexibility via ongoing social dialogue.
  - Launched a large program (Portugal Transformação, Recuperação e Resiliência) to support recovery from natural disasters and upgrade infrastructure.
  - Supportive of EU-level reforms to deepen the single market, complete the banking union, progress on the savings and investment union, and better integrate the energy market.

*Source: 1prtea2026001*

### Box 1. Portugal’s Integration into Global Value Chains

### Box 1. Portugal’s Integration into Global Value Chains

### Integration patterns
- Portugal’s forward linkages—measuring Portugal’s value-added share in other countries’ exports—remain below those of other EU countries on average.
- Since the global financial crisis, Portugal’s forward linkages have largely stagnated, widening the gap with the EU average.
- Portugal’s backward linkages—the share of foreign value added embodied in Portugal’s gross exports—have been slightly higher than the EU average.
- These patterns suggest Portugal is more strongly positioned as a downstream customer in GVCs than as an upstream supplier of value added.

### Export composition and economic complexity
- Portugal’s economic complexity—measured by the uniqueness and diversity of its goods exports—remains below that of most EU countries.
- Indicators of technological intensity are below the EU average:
  - The share of high-technology goods in exports is below the EU average.
  - The share of knowledge-intensive services in exports is below the EU average.
- Portugal’s share in tourism-related services has been consistently higher than that of its peers.
- Since high-technology goods typically generate stronger forward linkages than tourism-related services, Portugal’s export composition has contributed to relatively weak forward linkages.

### Constraints to deeper GVC integration
- Institutional indicators—economic freedom and the Indigo index—exceed the EU average.
- Key obstacles to greater integration:
  - Significantly lower labor productivity relative to EU peers.
  - A higher proportion of workers with lower educational attainment.
- These gaps likely hamper Portugal’s transition toward more knowledge-intensive activities and higher value-added production.

### Policy implications and links to broader staff appraisal
- Structural challenges and a risky external environment justify policies to entrench resilience and boost potential growth; population aging, relatively low investment levels, and low productivity growth hamper convergence toward higher European living standards.
- Fiscal strategy considerations:
  - Government short and medium-term targets of balanced fiscal positions are broadly appropriate but require additional action to achieve targets while increasing public investment.
  - Priorities include reducing high tax expenditures (including reversing untargeted VAT reduced rates and costly youth-specific personal income tax benefits); harmonizing size-contingent corporate income tax rates; increasing spending efficiency (notably infrastructure investment and health); and further reforming the pension system.
  - The fuel excise tax reduction implemented in response to the energy shock should be replaced by targeted support to lower-income households and struggling but viable firms in energy intensive sectors.
- Financial sector and housing market policy considerations relevant to resilience:
  - Strengthen the financial policy framework per FSAP recommendations (skills resource strategy; greater international cooperation on AML/CFT; stronger crisis and cyber risk preparedness).
  - Develop the financial system beyond the banking sector to expand savings and investment channels.
  - Reduce real-estate market imbalances through supply-side measures: facilitate construction of new housing; incentivize owners of unoccupied buildings or short-term rentals to sell or long-term lease properties.
  - Support for low- to middle-income households should rely on housing allowances and expanded availability of dedicated social housing; reverse misdirected demand-support measures that widen imbalances; exercise caution on costly tax incentives for construction and real estate activities.
- Reforms to boost productivity and potential growth are encouraged:
  - Streamline central and local government bureaucracy to boost private investment and economic efficiency.
  - Continue gains in education, reduce skill mismatches, and prepare for rapid AI diffusion.
  - Increase labor market flexibility.
  - Pursue EU-level reforms: deepen the single market, advance the savings and investment union, and integrate energy markets.

*Based on: Shim, Vassileva, and Wang, IMFWorking Paper 2026/002.*

### Annex I. External Sector Assessment

### Annex I. External Sector Assessment

### Overall Assessment
- The external position in 2025 was moderately stronger than the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.
- NIIP-to-GDP ratio improved from -58.9 percent in 2024 to -50.2 percent in 2025.
- Under baseline assumptions, NIIP is projected to fall to -27.3 percent by 2031, reflecting current account surpluses and sustained GDP growth.
- Further NIIP reduction would reduce external sustainability risks, given tourism dependence and susceptibility to external demand shocks.

### Potential Policy Responses
- Maintain a balanced fiscal position while reorienting public spending toward higher investment to bring the current account (CA) closer to its medium-term equilibrium.
- Structural reforms to stimulate private investment, including:
  - Deepening the EU single market.
  - Removing tax disincentives to firm growth.
  - Improving education.
- Increase labor market flexibility and reduce labor market duality to lower precautionary saving and support higher consumption.
- Enhance diversification and deepen integration into global value chains to mitigate downside risks from trade fragmentation and geopolitical tensions.

### Foreign Asset and Liability Position and Trajectory
Background
- Negative NIIP declined from a peak of 124 percent of GDP in 2014 to 50 percent of GDP in 2025.
- Improvement in 2025 reflects a larger increase in gross assets than liabilities in percent of GDP, supported by a CA surplus of 1.2 percent of GDP.
- Gross external debt position remained high at 145.3 percent of GDP at end-2025.
- Both negative NIIP and gross external debt expected to continue decreasing during the projection horizon, but at a decelerating pace as the CA surplus becomes smaller.

Assessment
- Negative NIIP reduced to a moderate level, alleviating external sustainability concerns.
- External debt induces vulnerabilities, particularly from substantial gross financing needs (estimated to average 48 percent of GDP over 2026-31).
- Past debt management efforts (smoothing redemptions, lengthening average maturity) are important mitigants.
- NIIP expected to continue improving and reach -27.3 percent of GDP by 2031, with the CA converging toward its norm.

Key 2025 positions (% GDP)
- NIIP: -50.2
- Gross Assets: 173.2
- Debt Assets: 167.2
- Gross Liab.: 223.4
- Debt Liab.: 38.9

### Current Account
Background
- CA declined from 2.2 percent in 2024 to 1.2 percent in 2025.
- Decline driven by strong growth in goods imports (robust consumption and investments) and weaker goods exports (tariff hikes in the US and subdued EU demand).
- Service exports remained strong as tourism grew, albeit at a slower pace.
- Primary and secondary incomes remained similar to the previous year.

Assessment and EBA results (2025, % GDP)
- CA: 1.2
- Cyclically adjusted CA: 1.5
- EBA Norm: 0.2
- EBA Gap: 1.3

Additional decomposition (2025, % GDP)
- CA gap range: 0.6 to 2.0
- Point estimate of CA gap: 1.3
- Policy gaps contribution: 1.7
- Unexplained residual: -0.4

Note
- High reliance of the CA surplus on tourism implies vulnerability to external shocks; successful reduction in external debt provides buffers.

### Real Exchange Rate
Background
- CPI-based REER appreciated by 2.4 percent between end-2024 and 2025.
- ULC-based REER appreciated by 1.3 percent between end-2024 and 2025.

Assessment (2025)
- Staff-assessed CA gap range implies REER undervaluation in the range of 1.7 to 5.6 percent, midpoint 3.6 percent (elasticity of CA to REER = 0.36).
- EBA CPI-based REER index model suggests an overvaluation of 0.6 percent.
- Level REER model indicates 3.7 percent undervaluation.

### Capital and Financial Accounts: Flows and Policy Measures
Background
- Financial account surplus at 2.9 percent of GDP in 2025, mainly driven by “Other investments”, partly offset by portfolio investment outflows.
- Capital account surplus high, reflecting inflows associated with RRF funds.
- Public debt reduced to 90 percent of GDP at end-2025.
- Credit rating upgrades between 2025 and early 2026; as of February 2026 ratings: S&P: A+, Moody’s: A3, Fitch: A, DBRS: A.

Assessment
- Active debt management supported external financing rollover needs in the public sector and had positive spillovers to private sector funding costs.
- Consistent rating upgrades lowered funding costs for sovereign and private sector.
- Remaining external financing needs leave Portugal exposed to market volatility.

### FX Intervention and Reserves
Background and Assessment
- The euro has the status of a global reserve currency.
- Reserves held by the EA are typically low relative to standard metrics, but the currency is free floating.

### Risk Assessment Matrix — Selected Risks and Policy Responses
Global Risks
- Geopolitical Tensions and Intensification of Conflicts
  - Relative likelihood: High
  - Impact if realized: Medium (indirect exposure via higher import prices and weaker growth among trading partners)
  - Policy responses:
    - Deliver temporary and well-targeted support to vulnerable households and firms to cushion higher energy import prices.
    - Reorient public investment toward competitiveness and accelerate structural reforms to support labor reallocation.
- Protectionism and Trade Disruptions
  - Relative likelihood: High
  - Impact if realized: High (damp goods exports, slow growth, increase inflation)
  - Policy responses:
    - Work with EU partners to deepen the single market and engage in new trade agreements; pursue structural reforms to increase productivity, competitiveness, and trade partner diversification.
    - Use automatic stabilizers first; in a severe recession, consider temporary fiscal loosening while preserving a primary surplus consistent with further debt reduction.
- Commodity Price Volatility
  - Relative likelihood: High
  - Impact if realized: Medium (increase inflation, discourage investment, damp growth; risk of sharp house price declines in severe shocks)
  - Policy responses:
    - Reintroduce temporary targeted support in persistent recessions; tie business support to energy efficiency goals.
    - Accelerate renewable energy transition via increased investment.

Portugal-Specific Risks
- Fiscal Vulnerabilities and Higher Interest Rates
  - Relative likelihood: High
  - Impact if realized: Medium (higher rollover costs, constrained fiscal space, slower deleveraging, weaker investment recovery)
  - Policy response: Stay the course on fiscal discipline; reorient public spending toward investment.
- Cyberthreats
  - Relative likelihood: High
  - Impact if realized: Low (operational disruptions, loss of confidence)
  - Policy responses:
    - Implement FSAP recommendations to strengthen resilience of domestic financial institutions to cyber risks.
    - Ensure utilities, government agencies, and transport companies strengthen protections and resilience.
- Labor Shortages and Remittances
  - Relative likelihood: High
  - Impact if realized: High (reduced potential output, higher inflation)
  - Policy response: Foster greater labor force participation and labor market flexibility via structural reforms.
- Climate Change
  - Relative likelihood: Medium
  - Impact if realized: Medium (damage from storms, floods, wildfires; disrupted activity)
  - Policy responses:
    - Deliver targeted fiscal support to affected households and firms.
    - Strengthen public investment in adaptation infrastructure and accelerate structural reforms.
- Stickier Core Inflation
  - Relative likelihood: Medium
  - Impact if realized: Medium (higher inflation expectations, wage pressures, weakened external competitiveness)
  - Policy responses:
    - Fiscal policy should balance growth and inflation objectives and recalibrate fiscal stance as needed; continue efforts to increase labor force participation.

### Sovereign Risk and Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)
- Overall DSA summary assessment: Portugal is at a moderate overall risk of sovereign stress.
- Near-term: Moderate; Medium-term: Moderate; Long-term: Moderate.
- Commentary highlights:
  - Moderate vulnerability in medium-to-long-term as aging and defense-related spending pressures, combined with recent tax cuts and wage increases, gradually worsen the fiscal position.
  - Long-term risks from aging-related expenditures on health and pensions are moderate but require addressing.
  - Under the baseline, debt-to-GDP stops decreasing in the mid-2030s.
  - Despite past debt reduction achievements, the debt level stays relatively high.

Debt coverage and disclosures (selected)
- Debt coverage in the DSA includes: Budgetary central government (Yes), Social security funds (Yes), Central bank (Yes), Local governments (Yes). Extra budgetary funds (No), Public nonfinancial corporations (No), Other public financial corporations (No).
- A large fraction of central government's debt is held by the central bank and social security funds.

### Baseline Scenario — Key Public Debt and Macroeconomic Projections (Percent of GDP unless indicated)
Public debt (actual and projections)
- 2025: 89.7
- 2026: 85.6
- 2027: 82.3
- 2028: 79.2
- 2029: 76.8
- 2030: 74.9
- 2031: 73.6
- 2032: 72.8
- 2033: 72.3
- 2034: 72.2
- 2035: 72.4

Change in public debt
- 2026: -4.1
- 2027: -3.3
- 2028: -3.1
- 2029: -2.4
- 2030: -1.8
- 2031: -1.3
- 2032: -0.9
- 2033: -0.5
- 2034: -0.1
- 2035: 0.3

Contribution of identified flows (selected)
- Primary deficit (percent of GDP):
  - 2025: -2.4
  - 2026: -1.9
  - 2027: -1.9
  - 2028: -1.7
  - 2029: -1.3
  - 2030: -1.0
  - 2031: -0.6
  - 2032: -0.2
  - 2033: 0.2
  - 2034: 0.6
  - 2035: 1.0
- Noninterest revenues:
  - 2025: 43.1
  - 2026: 44.3
  - 2027: 42.6
  - 2028: 42.5
  - 2029: 42.4
  - 2030: 42.5
  - 2031: 42.5
  - 2032: 42.5
  - 2033: 42.5
  - 2034: 42.5
  - 2035: 42.5
- Noninterest expenditures:
  - 2025: 40.7
  - 2026: 42.4
  - 2027: 40.7
  - 2028: 40.8
  - 2029: 41.1
  - 2030: 41.5
  - 2031: 41.9
  - 2032: 42.3
  - 2033: 42.7
  - 2034: 43.1
  - 2035: 43.5

Automatic debt dynamics (percent of GDP)
- 2026: -5.2
- 2027: -2.2
- 2028: -1.2
- 2029: -1.3
- 2030: -0.9
- 2031: -0.6
- 2032: -0.5
- 2033: -0.5
- 2034: -0.5
- 2035: -0.6

Real interest rate and relative inflation (percent)
- 2026: -3.5
- 2027: -0.7
- 2028: 0.2
- 2029: 0.2
- 2030: 0.5
- 2031: 0.6
- 2032: 0.7
- 2033: 0.7
- 2034: 0.6
- 2035: 0.6

Real growth rate (percent)
- 2026: 1.9
- 2027: 1.7
- 2028: 1.6
- 2029: 1.8
- 2030: 1.7
- 2031: 1.7
- 2032: 1.6
- 2033: 1.6
- 2034: 1.6
- 2035: 1.6

Gross financing needs (percent of GDP)
- 2026: 4.2
- 2027: 7.9
- 2028: 7.8
- 2029: 7.3
- 2030: 6.8
- 2031: 8.0
- 2032: 8.1
- 2033: 7.6
- 2034: 7.8
- 2035: 10.1
- 2035 (continued): 11.6 (extended)

Debt service (percent of GDP)
- 2026: 6.9
- 2027: 10.0
- 2028: 9.9
- 2029: 9.2
- 2030: 8.3
- 2031: 9.2
- 2032: 8.9
- 2033: 8.0
- 2034: 7.8
- 2035: 9.7
- 2035 (extended): 10.8

Memo projections
- Real GDP growth (percent):
  - 2025: 1.9
  - 2026: 1.7
  - 2027: 1.6
  - 2028: 1.8
  - 2029: 1.7
  - 2030: 1.7
  - 2031: 1.6
  - 2032: 1.6
  - 2033: 1.6
  - 2034: 1.6
  - 2035: 1.6
- Inflation (GDP deflator; percent):
  - 2025: 3.9
  - 2026: 3.2
  - 2027: 2.3
  - 2028: 2.4
  - 2029: 2.2
  - 2030: 2.0
  - 2031: 2.0
  - 2032: 2.0
  - 2033: 2.0
  - 2034: 2.0
  - 2035: 2.0
- Nominal GDP growth (percent):
  - 2025: 5.9
  - 2026: 5.0
  - 2027: 3.9
  - 2028: 4.3
  - 2029: 3.9
  - 2030: 3.7
  - 2031: 3.6
  - 2032: 3.6
  - 2033: 3.6
  - 2034: 3.6
  - 2035: 3.6
- Effective interest rate (percent):
  - 2025: 0.0
  - 2026: 2.4
  - 2027: 2.5
  - 2028: 2.7
  - 2029: 2.8
  - 2030: 2.8
  - 2031: 2.9
  - 2032: 2.9
  - 2033: 2.9
  - 2034: 2.9
  - 2035: 2.9

Commentary
- Public debt is projected to decline until 2034 and start increasing in 2035 due to the reversal in the primary balance into deficit in 2033.

*International Monetary Fund — Annex I. External Sector Assessment*

### Annex IV. Reforming the Pension System: Green Book Proposals

### Annex IV. Reforming the Pension System: Green Book Proposals and Other Options

### Long-term fiscal outlook and key statistics
- Public pension contributions (including state transfers) are expected to remain stable until 2050, while expenditures are projected to continue rising as the population ages.
- Peak annual deficit of 0.6 percent of GDP in 2046.
- Pension spending is projected to decline after 2046, reflecting a significant decrease in the average pension benefit due to the phase-out of Caixa Geral de Aposentações (CGA)—a special pension scheme for civil servants—in 2005, with the system returning to surplus by mid-2050.
- Projections are sensitive to assumptions underpinning the Ageing Report baseline and would worsen under less favorable productivity or immigration paths.
- Automatic indexation of retirement-age to life expectancy is identified as an important mitigant to long-term sustainability risks.
- Social Security Financial Stabilization Fund (FEFSS) is projected to hold assets equal to 15 percent of GDP in 2026.
- Government transfers to the pension system (covering the CGA deficit and non-contributory benefits) are projected to rise from 2.7 percent of GDP to 4.5 percent by 2050.

### Green Book (2024) — main reform directions recommended
- The Green Book offers 18 broad recommendations to ensure financial sustainability, improve pension adequacy, guard against new risks, and enhance trust in the pension system.
- Main proposals included:
  - Phasing out early retirement for long-term unemployed (eligibility: became unemployed after age 52 and contributed at least 22 years; early retirement at age 57).
  - Indexing the minimum early retirement age under other early retirement schemes (currently fixed at 60) to the statutory normal retirement age, which itself is linked to life expectancy (it was last adjusted in December 2025 to 66 years and 11 months effective in 2027).
  - Introducing a net value-added contribution (CVAL) after an impact assessment to gradually replace part of the employer’s salary-based contribution, aiming to share the financial burden of pension contributions between capital and labor.
  - Conducting an actuarial analysis of social contribution rates (global contribution rate for all areas of the social security system is 34.75 percent and has been unchanged since 1995; no actuarial assessment has been conducted since 2009 despite a five-year legal mandate).
  - Assessing and rationalizing reduced contribution rates that apply to some employers or employees under specific situations (e.g., self-employed).
  - Allowing a more flexible investment strategy for the FEFSS (current minima and caps: minimum of 50 percent of the FEFSS’ investment in Portuguese public debt; caps of 25 percent on securities and 15 percent on unhedged exposure to non-euro currencies).
  - Reforming the Solidarity Supplement for the Elderly (CSI): recommend linking CSI to the poverty threshold instead of the average wage (CSI can represent up to 29 percent of the average wage).

### Assessment of Green Book recommendations
- Many recommendations are expected to improve the pension system; precise fiscal impacts require further analysis.
- Potential savings could come from:
  - Reforms of early retirement schemes (which account for around 4 percent of pension expenditure).
  - Rationalization of reduced contribution rates for specific groups.
  - Higher return on the FEFSS’ investments through a more flexible investment strategy.
- CSI reform can improve adequacy but would be unlikely to generate savings.

### Concerns and required analysis on CVAL
- The CVAL proposal raises concerns due to uncertainty around its specific design and its macroeconomic, financial, and administrative implications.
- Issues requiring thorough assessment:
  - Additional administrative capacity and increased compliance costs.
  - Need for clear accounting rules to prevent tax avoidance.
  - Potential for CVAL revenue to be more volatile than current revenue from labor income contributions.
- Recommendation: comprehensive evaluation of CVAL and its alternatives is essential before implementation.

### Additional reform options to evaluate (costing required)
- Simplify and, if needed, reduce the accrual rate structure:
  - Current marginally decreasing accrual rate with individual income: from 2.3 to 2 percent.
  - Proposal: make accrual rate uniform; consider lowering the accrual rate to improve sustainability (most European public pension systems have accrual rate below 1.7 percent; replacement ratio for pensions is among the two highest in the EU).
- Simplify the pension indexation mechanism:
  - Current indexation varies based on real GDP growth, CPI excluding housing, and current pension level relative to the social support index (SSI).
  - Proposal: replace the existing formula with a simpler CPI-based mechanism and offset potentially higher outlays by reducing new pension benefits (e.g., lower accrual rates) calibrated to ensure fiscal sustainability.
- Reform survivor pensions:
  - Current issues: individuals as young as 35 can qualify for lifelong survivor benefits; survivor benefit sums relative to total joint pension income before death are around 80 percent (one of the highest across EU countries).
  - Survivor pensions currently account for 1.9 percent of GDP (ranking third highest in the EU).
  - Possible measures: lower benefits, increase earliest eligibility age, or implement income tests; raising eligibility age may incentivize work.
- Issue regular actuarial reporting:
  - Recommendation: actuarial projections of the pension system should be conducted and published every three years, including assessments of pension adequacy and information on old-age poverty.

### Government priorities and planned actions
- Government prioritizes strengthening sustainability of the social security system while preserving adequacy.
- An analytical report by an expert working group established by the government is expected by mid-2026 to inform policy discussions.
- Government focus areas:
  - Promoting medium- and long-term savings incentives for citizens through complementary schemes.
  - Reviewing governance and investment framework of the FEFSS to improve financial performance of pension assets.
  - Enhancing financial literacy and retirement planning through the National Plan for Financial Education for younger workers and life-cycle-based training materials developed with the National Council of Financial Supervisors.

### Pension benefit indexation formula (as presented)
- Real GDP growth < 2%:
  - Pension < 2 SSI: CPI + 20% of real GDP growth
  - 2 SSI < Pension ≤ 6 SSI: CPI
  - 6 SSI < Pension ≤ 12 SSI: CPI-0.75pp
- 2% < real GDP growth < 3%:
  - Pension < 2 SSI: CPI + 20% of real GDP growth
  - 2 SSI < Pension ≤ 6 SSI: CPI + 12.5% of GDP growth
  - 6 SSI < Pension ≤ 12 SSI: CPI-0.25pp
- 3% ≤ real GDP growth:
  - Pension < 2 SSI: CPI + 20% of real GDP growth
  - 2 SSI < Pension ≤ 6 SSI: CPI + 12.5% of GDP growth
  - 6 SSI < Pension ≤ 12 SSI: CPI

*Source: Annex IV. Reforming the Pension System: Green Book Proposals and Other Options*

### Annex VI. Implementation of the 2024 Article IV

### Annex VI. Implementation of the 2024 Article IV

### Fiscal Policy
- Recommendation (Near term): Avoid further loosening the fiscal stance compared to the 2024 budget to balance ensuring deceleration of inflation and not further dampening growth. Maintain a neutral fiscal stance in 2025 consistent with a small positive overall balance to achieve a soft landing of the economy and continue reducing debt.
- Authorities' actions (Near term):
  - The fiscal balance recorded a surplus in 2025, as budgeted, however the stance was expansionary due to much higher RRF grants compared to 2024.
  - Inflation continued to decline and public debt continued its impressive downward trend.
- Recommendation (Medium term): Sustain the consolidation effort to mitigate public debt risks further and build fiscal space for higher public investment. Implement measures to offset the permanent negative impacts of the revenue and expenditure policies introduced in 2024.
- Authorities' actions (Medium term):
  - The 2026 budget will deliver a further reduction of public debt.
  - Carbon tax revenues are expected to further increase in 2026 and an inefficient CIT benefit for R&D spending was removed.
  - Going forward, the government’s medium-term fiscal targets, while appropriate, are not yet backed by sufficient offsets of the balance-reducing measures introduced since 2024.

### Financial Policies
- Recommendation (Macroprudential measures): Consider implementing a positive neutral CCyB to help lock-in banks’ temporarily high profits into releasable capital.
- Authorities' actions (Macroprudential measures):
  - A positive neutral CCyB of 0.75 percent was adopted and became effective in January 2026.
- Recommendation (RRE sector): Monitor the evolution of RRE risks to ensure that the calibration of the sectoral systemic risk buffer and borrower-based measures remains adequate. Implement measures to increase housing supply to alleviate real estate market imbalances.
- Authorities' actions (RRE sector):
  - Banks have continued to comply with the supervisor’s recommendations on credit standards in the RRE sector, which has helped reduce the riskiness of their loan portfolio.
  - The government’s newly proposed housing package includes tax incentives that seek to revitalize the construction sector and rental markets.
- Recommendation (Anti-money laundering): Monitor non-resident deposits in the banking sector, including their flows and beneficial ownership, to reduce money-laundering risks from remaining FDI avenues for Golden Visa programs. Further upgrade the AML/CFT framework in line with the revised international standard. Leverage AML tools to tackle tax evasion and support domestic revenue mobilization.
- Authorities' actions (Anti-money laundering):
  - Reforms have continued to strengthen the AML/CFT framework.

### Structural Reforms
- Recommendation (Labor markets): Reduce labor market duality by making open-ended contracts more flexible to incentive their use instead of fixed-term contracts.
- Authorities' actions (Labor markets):
  - The recent labor reform proposed by the government includes measures to increase the flexibility of open-ended contracts extending the maximum duration and broadening the use of fixed-term contracts.
- Recommendation (Product markets): Promote a competitive environment to help boost productivity, investment, and corporate growth. Streamline red tape at all levels of government.
- Authorities' actions (Product markets):
  - In June 2025, the government launched “Reforma do Estado” to make the public sector leaner and more efficient. Measures include administrative simplification, digitalization of public services, and institutional reorganization.

*Annex VI. Implementation of the 2024 Article IV*

### Annex VII. Data Issues

### Annex VII. Data Issues (1prtea2026001)

### Data Adequacy Assessment
- Median Rating: AAAAAAA
- Sector ratings (heatmap highlights):
  - National Accounts: AAAAA
  - Prices: AAAAA
  - Government Finance Statistics: AAAA
  - External Sector Statistics: AA
  - Monetary and Financial Statistics: AAA
  - Intersectoral Consistency: AAA
- Coverage: AAAAA
- Consistency: AAA
- Frequency and Timeliness: AAAAA for most sectors; specific lower ratings noted (A, B, C, D) in the detailed heatmap.
- Granularity: 3
- Rationale for staff assessment:
  - "Data provision is adequate for surveillance."
  - Portugal’s statistics are described as comprehensive, generally of high quality, and provided comprehensively to the Fund.
  - Portugal publishes a full range of economic and financial data and a calendar of release dates.
  - Portugal is subject to Eurostat and ECB statistical requirements and has adopted the European System of Accounts 2010.
  - The relatively weak correlation between CPI and GDP deflator inflation is attributed to susceptibility to terms-of-trade fluctuations as an open, export-oriented economy.
- Data gaps and other issues:
  - "More detailed/recent data on commercial real estate would aid the team's assessment of the sector."
  - "No weaknesses were identified in the last consultation and no new weaknesses have emerged since then."
- Use of data in Article IV consultations:
  - "Staff do not use data and/or estimates different from official statistics."

### Data Standards Initiatives and Dissemination
- Portugal adheres to the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) Plus since February 2015 and publishes data on its National Summary Data Page.
- Table of common indicators (as of May 20, 2026) — selected indicator delivery details (Date of Latest Observation / Date Received / Frequency of Data / Frequency of Reporting / Expected Frequency / Announced Frequency / Expected Timeliness / Announced Timeliness):
  - Exchange Rates: 2026-05-19 / 2026-05-20 / DDD
  - International Reserve Assets and Reserve Liabilities of the Monetary Authorities: 2026-04 / 2026-05 / MMMM / 1W / NLT 1M
  - Reserve/Base Money: 2026-04 / 2026-05 / MMMM / 2W / 2W
  - Broad Money: 2026-04 / 2026-05 / MMMM / 1M / 1M
  - Central Bank Balance Sheet: 2026-04 / 2026-05 / MMMM / 2W / 2W
  - Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Banking System: 2026-04 / 2026-05 / MMMM / 1M / 1M
  - Total assets of other depository corporations: 2026-03 / 2026-04 / QQQQ / MM / 1M / 1M
  - Total credit from other depository corporations: 2026-03 / 2026-04 / QQQQ / MM / 1M / 1M
  - Interest Rates: 2026-05-19 / 2026-05-20 / DDD
  - Consumer Price Index: 2026-04 / 2026-05 / MMMM / 1M / 14D
  - General Government Revenue, Expenditure, Balance and Composition of Financing: latest obs 2025-12 / received 2026-03 / QQA...2Q...
  - Central Government Revenue, Expenditure, Balance and Composition of Financing: 2026-03 / 2026-04 / QQQQ / MM / 1M / 1M
  - Stocks of Central Government and Central Government-Guaranteed Debt: 2025-12 / 2026-03 / QQQQ / Q / Q / NLT 1Q
  - Total stock of General Government Debt: 2025-12 / 2026-03 / QQQQ / 4M / 1Q
  - External Current Account Balance: 2026-03 / 2026-05 / MM / Q / M / 1Q / 8W
  - Exports and Imports of Goods and Services: 2026-03 / 2026-05 / MMMM / 8W / 41D
  - GDP/GNP: 2025-12 / 2026-03 / QQQQ / 1Q / 85D
  - Gross External Debt: 2025-12 / 2026-03 / QQQQ / 1Q / NLT 3M
  - International Investment Position: 2025-12 / 2026-03 / QQQQ / 1Q / NLT 3M
- Notes on metadata and frequency/timeliness codes are preserved as in the source (e.g., “D”, “W”, “M”, “Q”, “A”, “NLT”).

### Fund Relations and IMF Financial Position (as of May 26, 2026)
- Membership Status: Joined: March 29, 1961; Article VIII
- General Resources Account (SDR Million; Percent Quota):
  - Quota: 2,060.10 100.00
  - Fund holdings of currency: 1,527.29 74.14
  - Reserve position in Fund: 532.83 25.86
- SDR Department (SDR Million; Percent Allocation):
  - Net cumulative allocation: 2,780.99 100.00
  - Holdings: 2,816.11 101.26
- Outstanding Purchase and Loans: None
- Financial Arrangements (historical):
  - EFF: Approval Date May 20, 2011; Expiration Date June 30, 2014; Amount Approved 23,742.00 (SDR Million); Amount Drawn 22,942.00 (SDR Million)
  - Stand-By: Approval Date Oct 07, 1983; Expiration Date Feb 28, 1985; Amount Approved 445.00; Amount Drawn 259.30
  - Stand-By: Approval Date Jun 05, 1978; Expiration Date Jun 04, 1979; Amount Approved 57.35; Amount Drawn 0.00
- Projected Payments to Fund (SDR Million; based on existing use of resources and present holdings of SDRs):
  - Forthcoming 2025–2029: Principal — (blank); Charges/Interest: 0.01 (each year 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029); Total: 0.01 (each year 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029)
- Exchange rate arrangements:
  - Portugal’s currency is the euro; exchange rate arrangement of the euro area is free floating.
  - Portugal participates in EMU with 20 other members of the EU and has no separate legal tender.

### Article IV Consultation — Key Findings and Policy Messages
- Overview:
  - The 2026 Article IV consultation, enriched with the FSAP, marks a full return to normality since the sovereign debt crisis and provides a stocktaking of structural adjustments, strengthened macroeconomic fundamentals, and resilience.
- Economic activity and outlook:
  - 2025 growth: 1.9 percent (slowing from 2024 but outperforming the euro area).
  - Inflation (2025): 2.2 percent (eased).
  - 2025 drivers: robust domestic demand; net exports weighed negatively; temporary refinery shutdown affected output late in the year.
  - Early 2026: economic activity softened due to severe storms and external spillovers from the conflict in the Middle East.
  - RRP execution: May — Portugal reached an execution rate of 75 percent of the RRP with the penultimate payment request to the European Commission.
  - Outlook: private consumption expected to moderate in 2026; growth supported by stronger investment and gradual recovery in exports; recent inflation rise driven by higher energy prices and mitigated by temporary fuel tax reductions.
  - Inflation outlook: pressures from geopolitical tensions expected to remain contained owing to high share of renewables, well-anchored expectations, and limited second-round wage effects.
- Fiscal policy:
  - 2025 overall balance: surplus of 0.7 percent of GDP.
  - 2025 primary surplus: 2.6 percent of GDP.
  - 2025 public debt: 89.7 percent of GDP (lowest level since 2009).
  - 2026 government projects a balanced budget.
  - Public debt projection: decline to 87.5 percent of GDP.
  - Fiscal policy stance: measures to mitigate energy prices and natural disasters are intended to be temporary, targeted, and limited in fiscal cost.
  - Policy intentions: maintain broadly balanced fiscal positions over the medium term; continue efforts to strengthen spending efficiency, improve public investment management, and create room for growth-enhancing investment; pursue gradual reduction in tax burden subject to fiscal space; maintain targeted youth-specific PIT relief; no intention to harmonize size-dependent CIT provisions.
  - Long-term fiscal risks: population aging, pensions, and health spending; authorities assessing options to safeguard long-term sustainability.
- Financial policies and financial sector resilience:
  - Banking system performance (2025):
    - ROA: 1.32 percent
    - ROE: 14.5 percent
  - Banking system status: high profitability, capital, and liquidity; capital ratios stabilized at historically high levels and above euro area average; liquidity elevated, well above regulatory requirements.
  - Risks: heightened geopolitical tensions, potential correction in housing prices amid rising mortgage lending, growing systemic cyber risks.
  - Macroprudential policy: build-up of a 0.75 percent Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) in 2026.
  - FSAP findings: banking system resilient to severe macrofinancial shocks from solvency and liquidity perspectives; rapid house price growth is a key vulnerability.
  - Authorities’ view: risks mitigated by borrower-based measures in place since 2018, limited bank financing in part of housing transactions, diversification of sovereign exposures, and sustained household deleveraging.
  - Policy actions and priorities: continue monitoring housing developments; maintain macroprudential measures; consider building releasable capital buffers; review powers over non-harmonized tools; explore governance and independence reforms for nonbank regulators; strengthen deposit guarantee payout processes; enhance international cooperation on financial integrity and cyber risks; consider multi-year staffing and retention strategy for supervision.
- Housing market:
  - Housing price change (2025): rose by 17.6 percent.
  - Policy response (2024 Construir Portugal strategy and subsequent measures): expand housing supply, promote public and affordable housing, mobilize land and public assets, accelerate RRP housing projects, improve access for younger households, tax incentives and regulatory reforms to support construction and rehabilitation, expand rental housing supply, and improve affordability.
  - Assessment: supply-side reforms will take time; targeted measures support near-term access.
- Structural policies and long-term growth:
  - Structural improvements: gains in competitiveness, market share in higher value-added and knowledge-intensive sectors, employment shift toward these sectors, rising educational attainment.
  - Policy focus: improve business environment (administrative simplification, licensing, digitalization), support innovation and investment, public administration reforms, education and training reforms, strengthen links between research institutions and firms.
  - Demographic and social policies: measures to promote active aging, strengthen labor market participation, National Strategy for Longevity, assessment of more gradual retirement transitions, proposed Single Social Benefit (Prestação Social Única) to simplify social support and strengthen work incentives.
  - Public investment priorities: infrastructure, housing, digitalization, and climate-related projects; PTRR complements these efforts.
  - European-level priorities: deepen the Single Market, advance the Savings and Investment Union, strengthen energy integration.

*Source: Annex VII. Data Issues; Tables and informational annexes from the staff report for the 2026 Article IV Consultation (Prepared by European Department), as provided in the content unit 1prtea2026001.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1prtea2026001.pdf_
