## 1. Downside Scenario ## Source details **Canonical URL:** [1. Downside Scenario](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1surea2026001-source-pdf.pdf) ## Other formats - [Markdown version](/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1surea2026001-source-pdf.pdf.md) - [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1surea2026001-source-pdf.pdf.json) --- ### Context and Recent Developments - Suriname completed a Fund-supported reform program in March, which rebuilt reserves, reduced inflation to single digits, placed debt on a sustainable path, and established new fiscal and monetary policy frameworks. - A surge in oil production is expected to begin in 2028, creating the need to build institutions to manage resource wealth, improve public services, invest in infrastructure, and preserve macroeconomic stability. - Political and social constraints: a six-party coalition government (took office in July 2025) faces pressure to relax fiscal policy and increase spending to address social and developmental needs. - Economic performance and inflation: - Gold production declined by 8 percent in 2024 and continued to underperform in the first half of 2025; gold smuggling by small miners reportedly increased. - Non-natural resource economy growth was estimated above 4 percent in 2024 and expected to remain robust. - Inflation rose to 10.9 percent in October (largely due to sizable depreciation triggered by fiscal and monetary slippages). - Fiscal developments and public debt: - Primary balance was -1.1 percent of GDP (excluding 5.4 percent of GDP spent to recapitalize the central bank (CB recap)) to August; supplier arrears grew by 1¾ percent of GDP. - Expenditure rose significantly prior to the May election, reversing much of the prior fiscal adjustment; revenues were buoyed by high gold prices and a tax amnesty. - A primary deficit of 1 percent of GDP (excluding the CB recap) is estimated for 2025. - Authorities issued US$1.575 billion in 5- and 10-year Eurobonds in November 2025 (yields of 8 and 8.5 percent, respectively) to repurchase 2033 Eurobonds; proceeds held in overseas escrow for future debt service until 2028. This operation raised gross public debt to 106 percent of GDP. - Second phase of Paris Club restructuring finalized in October; negotiations with China are almost complete; remaining private creditor restructuring finalized in April. - Banking and external sectors: - Most banks now above minimum capital adequacy; NPLs falling; liquidity concentrated in large banks. - Private sector credit grew by over 40 percent nominally (two thirds due to FX loans) and by 22 percent in real terms (y/y). - Current account balance fell to -6.3 percent of GDP in the year to September 2025; staff estimates correctly measured current account deficit will exceed 30 percent of GDP in 2025. - FX reserves were US$1.3 billion (102 percent of the ARA metric) in October 2025. ### Outlook and Balance of Risks - Activity and growth: - Non-natural resource growth estimated at 4.7 percent in 2026. - GDP growth around 4 percent in 2026–27, supported by oil-related sentiment and stable gold production. - Offshore hydrocarbon production expected in 2028, pushing growth to around 30 percent in 2028. - Inflation and monetary outlook: - Year-on-year inflation expected to remain in double digits for most of 2026 due to lagged effects of loose fiscal and monetary policy in 2025. - Monetary restraint, if adhered to, could steadily lower month-on-month inflation. - Fiscal and external trajectories: - Staff projects a primary balance of around 0 percent of GDP in 2026–27 under current policy, lower than a September 2025 draft budget targeting a 2.7 percent primary surplus. - Electricity subsidies expected to remain high due to suspended tariff adjustments and irregular transfers from the electricity company (EBS). - Gross financing needs (GFNs) peaked at an estimated 28 percent of GDP in 2025; GFNs expected to be considerably lower in 2026–27 and the debt-GDP ratio expected to decline. - Offshore oil field development adds to imports, producing a very large current account deficit: expected about 50 percent of GDP in 2026–27, largely financed by FDI and external borrowing. By 2028, exports expected to grow by over 50 percent (y/y); by 2029 the current account should swing back into surplus, and reserve coverage should increase as oil revenues strengthen the external position. - Near-term downside risks: - Policy slippages in next two years could adversely affect macro stability. - Drought risk would raise electricity generation costs, adding to fiscal deficit and inflation. - Higher global food prices could increase import inflation. - A 25 percent reduction in the gold price would reduce fiscal revenues by 2 percent of GDP and exports by 14 percent of GDP. - Measurement issues could lead to lower-than-forecast current account deficits. - Authorities’ view: - Block 58 on track to commence production in 2028; related investments to support oil investments expected to significantly boost non-oil GDP. - Excessive pre-election spending and insufficiently restrictive monetary policy contributed to higher inflation, which is expected to return to single digits by end-2026 as these factors partially unwind. ### Illustrative Downside Scenario — Assumptions and Outcomes - Scenario assumptions: - Deterioration of fiscal position: lower-than-expected revenues (insufficient tax compliance) and larger-than-expected expenditures (failure to control spending) reduce the primary balance to –1.1 percent of GDP in 2026 and –2.2 percent in 2027. - Government cash buffers exhausted; unfunded financing needs of 0.9 percent of GDP in 2027, weakening the currency and raising debt by 4 percent of GDP relative to the baseline. - Financing constraints could cut access to international markets. - Fiscal loosening yields a short-lived marginal positive effect on growth; instead it is inflationary and strains CBvS ability to mop up liquidity and meet monetary targets. - Inflation expected above 13 percent in both 2026 and 2027; currency depreciates by 14 percent relative to the baseline by 2027. - Higher interest rates and lower confidence reduce private investment and erode growth. The current account deteriorates significantly in 2027 as demand is met through imports; gross international reserves decline sharply. - Comparative outcomes (Baseline vs Downside Scenario — exact figures from source): - Real GDP (annual percentage change): - 2026 Baseline 3.9; 2026 Downside Scenario 4.0; 2027 Baseline 4.4; 2027 Downside Scenario 4.0 - Consumer prices (end of period): - 2026 Baseline 9.7; 2026 Downside Scenario 13.6; 2027 Baseline 6.1; 2027 Downside Scenario 13.8 - Consumer prices (average): - 2026 Baseline 12.3; 2026 Downside Scenario 13.3; 2027 Baseline 7.3; 2027 Downside Scenario 13.7 - Reserve Money: - 2026 Baseline 16.3; 2026 Downside Scenario 18.4; 2027 Baseline 9.2; 2027 Downside Scenario 19.9 - Revenue Share GDP: - 2026 Baseline 27.5; 2026 Downside Scenario 27.1; 2027 Baseline 27.5; 2027 Downside Scenario 26.8 - Total Expenditure: - 2026 Baseline 32.8; 2026 Downside Scenario 33.4; 2027 Baseline 32.4; 2027 Downside Scenario 33.8 - Primary Balance: - 2026 Baseline -0.1; 2026 Downside Scenario -1.1; 2027 Baseline 0.0; 2027 Downside Scenario -2.2 - Overall Balance: - 2026 Baseline -5.4; 2026 Downside Scenario -6.3; 2027 Baseline -4.9; 2027 Downside Scenario -7.0 - Government Debt: - 2026 Baseline 96.2; 2026 Downside Scenario 96.6; 2027 Baseline 89.2; 2027 Downside Scenario 93.2 - Central Government Cash 1/: - 2026 Baseline 3.5; 2026 Downside Scenario 2.1; 2027 Baseline 3.1; 2027 Downside Scenario -0.9 - Gross Financing Needs: - 2026 Baseline 5.4; 2026 Downside Scenario 6.3; 2027 Baseline 7.2; 2027 Downside Scenario 9.2 - Current Account balance (percent of GDP): - 2026 Baseline -48.1; 2026 Downside Scenario -52.7; 2027 Baseline -52.7; 2027 Downside Scenario -59.7 - Gross International Reserves (US$ millions): - 2026 Baseline 1,717; 2026 Downside Scenario 1,545; 2027 Baseline 1,988; 2027 Downside Scenario 1,420 - Exchange Rate percentual change relative to baseline (+ is depreciation): - 2026 Downside Scenario 6.5; 2027 Downside Scenario 13.6 - Note: 1/ Negative Cash means unfunded financing needs. ### Policy Discussions and Recommendations — Fiscal Direction and Priority Measures - Overall fiscal direction: - Additional measures are urgently needed to achieve fiscal consolidation. A primary surplus of around 1 percent of GDP in 2026 is appropriate, implying consolidation of around 1 percent of GDP relative to 2025 (excluding one-off spending). - Fiscal prudence would help restore cash buffers, improve confidence, retain regular market access, reduce local currency liquidity injections, bring inflation down to around 5 percent sooner, and build buffers against downside risks. - Priority measures to achieve consolidation: - Reduce electricity subsidies: - Re-establish automatic link between electricity tariffs and costs; implement a gradual increase in electricity price to reach cost recovery by end-2026. - This could generate 2 percent of GDP in fiscal savings and incentivize investment in generation capacity and grid modernization. - Regularize transfers from EBS and improve EBS financial management, transparency, and accountability. - Control wage bill: - Continue reducing public workforce; enforce action plan to remove unregistered government employees (4 percent of total public workforce) and stop wage payments to unregistered workers. - Differentiate salary increases across public employees to attract and retain skilled workers. - Better target social assistance: - Implement National Social Protection Strategy: digitalize social assistance, improve monitoring and evaluation, avoid duplication, and improve accuracy of social registry. - Implementing the plan should free resources to expand coverage and raise benefit levels while keeping social spending constant in real terms. - Avoid untargeted transfers to whole population in anticipation of future oil receipts. - Broaden tax base and improve revenue administration: - Excise and non-tax revenues: - Increase excise tax rates on alcohol and sugary beverages; introduce excises on gambling and single-use plastics; potential yield more than ½ percent of GDP per year. - Increase non-tax revenues by operationalizing collection of air navigation and land lease fees and regularizing land conversion. - Tax administration reforms: - Address insufficient technical personnel and digitalization challenges. - Improve VAT compliance (only 70 percent of taxpayers file returns); address rising unprocessed VAT refund claims (0.8 percent of GDP at end-October 2025). - Prioritize a unified IT system covering all core tax types and expand functionalities for monitoring and enforcement. - Consider transitioning to a Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authority (SARA) to increase salaries, improve organizational structure, and attract skilled workers. - Strengthen enforcement of gold royalties collection to prevent smuggling and re-establish control over this revenue source. ### Fiscal Framework, SSFS, and PFM Strengthening - Fiscal framework and SSFS operationalization: - Legislation passed to introduce fiscal rules and improve the SSFS; changes need to be operationalized through a decree and by submitting to parliament, starting with the 2026 budget, a multi-year fiscal plan that has annual ceilings on primary spending and a clear debt target consistent with the fiscal rules. - Board of Directors and Investment Advisory Committee of the SSFS should be constituted with clear merit-based criteria; Board should establish a clear investment strategy. - Transparent procedures required to determine size of SSFS transfers to the annual budget. - Annual independent audits and transparent reporting of the SSFS’s financial accounts recommended. - Public financial management and public investment: - Accelerate implementation of the Public Financial Management Priority Action Plan. - Require clearer budgeting process and enforcement of quarterly budget ceilings for line ministries. - Strengthen capacity in cash management and liquidity planning with an eventual goal of establishing a Treasury Single Account and systems for commitment control. - Ensure timely debt service to all creditors, including the CBvS; suppliers should be paid on time and legacy supplier arrears cleared. - Develop a project quality assurance system; adopt a template for capital budgeting as part of the regular multi-year budget planning cycle; integrate climate resilience into project selection. ### Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies - Reserve money and targets: - Reserve money was 18 percent above the CBvS November target in the first half of 2025. - Need to bring reserve money back to target by early next year and contain its growth to around 10 percent y-o-y in 2026. - Doing so would help guide inflation back to around 7 percent by the first half of 2027 (Annex V). - Achieving this reserve money level will require significant absorption of liquidity by OMOs, likely leading to sizable increases in nominal interest rates. - The CBvS should limit sales of its liabilities only to the banks. - FX reserves and interventions: - End-2025 reserves expected to have fallen to 104 percent of the ARA EM metric or 28 percent of GDP. - Resources in the escrow account are equivalent to a further 19 percent of GDP but are not freely usable. - Currency should be allowed to float; CBvS should intervene only in response to (narrowly-defined) disorderly market conditions. - CBvS should review its indicator of disorderly market conditions to align with the standard definition. - Transition of monetary framework: - Need to shift away from reserve money as the nominal anchor given growing uncertainty in money demand. - Start transition to an interest rate–based framework as a stepping stone to inflation targeting; strengthen operations and institutional capacity. - Establish a Forecasting and Policy Analysis System (FPAS) and a monetary policy committee. - Introduce a deposit facility and gradually develop an interbank market to establish an effective interest rate corridor. - Broader reforms needed: stronger collateral frameworks, repo legislation, modernization of market infrastructure, development of domestic debt market. - Communication and safeguards: - CBvS should publish a clear Monetary Policy Statement following policy decisions and a quarterly Monetary Policy Report. - Continue strengthening staff capacity in key assurance functions and regularly publish audited financial statements. ### Financial Stability and Banking Sector Recommendations - Address risks from rapid credit growth and FX exposure: - Strengthen internal risk management and lending practices; strengthen liquidity and solvency stress testing. - Monitor Net open position (NOP) of banks; eliminate prudential framework features that allow temporary NOP breaches. - Develop a comprehensive credit registry to track borrowers and close data gaps. - Develop a macroprudential toolkit, supported by capacity development. - CBvS should remain ready to deploy standing facilities if any solvent bank faces near-term liquidity shortfalls. - Enforce banks’ recapitalization plans and governance reforms; state-owned banks should operate on a fully commercial basis. - Operationalize bank resolution framework and develop contingency plans under the Financial Stability Committee. - Resolve any remaining undercapitalized banks without viable financial plans. - Improve supervision of nonbank financial institutions (pension funds and insurance companies). ### Governance, AML/CFT, Procurement, and Managing the Oil Boom - Strengthen AML/CFT regime and supervision; develop risk-based supervisory framework for DNFBPs; progress on beneficial ownership regime needed. - Implement new procurement law quickly: publish tenders, procurement contracts, names of awarded entities and their beneficial owners, names of public officials awarding contracts, and perform ex-post validation of delivery. - Amend anti-corruption law to mandate declaration of income and assets of politically exposed persons, require verification and publication of declarations, and establish sanctions for non-compliance. - Strengthen transparency in the mineral sector and implement governance reforms; institutional reforms to manage the oil boom are critical. - It is estimated that, over the coming 10 years, public spending would have to increase by close to 5 percentage points of GDP annually to achieve the SDGs (Annex VII). ### Key Numerical Projections and Indicators (selected exact figures) - Inflation (period average): 2023: 51.6; 2024: 16.2; 2025: 8.7; 2026: 9.5; 2027: 12.3; 2028: 7.3; 2029–2031: 5.4/5.0/5.0/5.0. - Inflation (end of period): 2023: 32.6; 2024: 10.1; 2025: 7.4; 2026: 13.0; 2027: 9.7; 2028: 6.1; 2029–2031: 5.0/5.0/5.0/5.0. - Real GDP (percent change): 2023: 2.4; 2024: 1.7; 2025: 3.2; 2026: 3.9; 2027: 4.4; 2028: 28.5; 2029: 43.4; 2030: 3.1; 2031: 2.9. - Central government revenue and expenditure (percent of GDP): - Revenue and grants: 2026: 28.2; 2027: 27.5; 2028: 27.5. - Total expenditure: 2026: 38.2; 2027: 32.8; 2028: 32.4. - Primary balance: 2026: -6.3; 2027: -0.1; 2028: 0.0. - Overall balance: 2026: -10.0; 2027: -5.4; 2028: -4.9. - Central government debt (percent of GDP): 2026: 106.3; 2027: 96.2; 2028: 89.2; 2029: 64.9; 2030: 41.7. - Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2025: -33.9; 2026: -34.3; 2027: -48.1; 2028: -52.7; 2029: -11.2; 2030: 30.3. - Gross international reserves (Millions USD): 2026 Baseline 1,717; 2026 Downside Scenario 1,545; 2027 Baseline 1,988; 2027 Downside Scenario 1,420. - Gold price (USD per troy ounce): 2026: 3,419; 2027: 4,195; 2028: 4,345. - Oil production (million barrels): 2028: 32.0; 2029: 86.3; 2030: 86.1. - Liability management operation (November 2025): issuance of US$1.575 billion in 5- and 10-year Eurobonds (yields 8 and 8.5 percent); proceeds used to buy back 2033 Eurobonds; remaining funds held in overseas escrow. ### Risk Matrix — Selected high-probability, high-impact risks and responses - External: Geopolitical Tensions (Likelihood: High; Impact: Medium). Response: maintain fiscal discipline; protect targeted fiscal support; maintain restrictive monetary policy. - Domestic: Loss of reform momentum (Likelihood: High; Impact: High). Response: gradual scaling of spending; tighter monetary policy to counter inflationary and exchange rate pressures. - Commodity price volatility: (Likelihood: Low; Impact: High). Response: calibrate multi-annual spending ceilings; continue electricity tariff adjustments. - Financial market volatility: (Likelihood: High; Impact: Medium). Response: monitor financial system; be ready to provide liquidity assistance; continue fiscal discipline. - Climate shocks (drought): (Likelihood: Medium; Impact: Low). Response: invest in climate-resilient infrastructure and seek climate financing. *Source: IMF staff text, figures, and tables as provided in the supplied PDF content.* ### 1. Downside Scenario _____________________________________________________________________________ 8 ### 1. Downside Scenario ### Context and Recent Developments - Suriname completed a Fund-supported reform program in March, which rebuilt reserves, reduced inflation to single digits, placed debt on a sustainable path, and established new fiscal and monetary policy frameworks. - A surge in oil production is expected to begin in 2028, creating the need to build institutions to manage resource wealth, improve public services, invest in infrastructure, and preserve macroeconomic stability. - Political and social constraints: a six-party coalition government (took office in July 2025) faces pressure to relax fiscal policy and increase spending to address social and developmental needs. - Economic performance and inflation: - Gold production declined by 8 percent in 2024 and continued to underperform in the first half of 2025; gold smuggling by small miners reportedly increased. - Non-natural resource economy growth was estimated above 4 percent in 2024 and expected to remain robust. - Inflation rose to 10.9 percent in October (largely due to sizable depreciation triggered by fiscal and monetary slippages). - Fiscal developments and public debt: - Primary balance was -1.1 percent of GDP (excluding 5.4 percent of GDP spent to recapitalize the central bank (CB recap)) to August; supplier arrears grew by 1¾ percent of GDP. - Expenditure rose significantly prior to the May election, reversing much of the prior fiscal adjustment; revenues were buoyed by high gold prices and a tax amnesty. - A primary deficit of 1 percent of GDP (excluding the CB recap) is estimated for 2025. - Authorities issued US$1.575 billion in 5- and 10-year Eurobonds in November 2025 (yields of 8 and 8.5 percent, respectively) to repurchase 2033 Eurobonds; proceeds held in overseas escrow for future debt service until 2028. This operation raised gross public debt to 106 percent of GDP. - Second phase of Paris Club restructuring finalized in October; negotiations with China are almost complete; remaining private creditor restructuring finalized in April. - Banking and external sectors: - Most banks now above minimum capital adequacy; NPLs falling; liquidity concentrated in large banks. - Private sector credit grew by over 40 percent nominally (two thirds due to FX loans) and by 22 percent in real terms (y/y). - Current account balance fell to -6.3 percent of GDP in the year to September 2025; staff estimates correctly measured current account deficit will exceed 30 percent of GDP in 2025. - FX reserves were US$1.3 billion (102 percent of the ARA metric) in October 2025. ### Outlook and Balance of Risks - Activity and growth: - Non-natural resource growth estimated at 4.7 percent in 2026. - GDP growth around 4 percent in 2026–27, supported by oil-related sentiment and stable gold production. - Offshore hydrocarbon production expected in 2028, pushing growth to around 30 percent in 2028. - Inflation and monetary outlook: - Year-on-year inflation expected to remain in double digits for most of 2026 due to lagged effects of loose fiscal and monetary policy in 2025. - Monetary restraint, if adhered to, could steadily lower month-on-month inflation. - Fiscal and external trajectories: - Staff projects a primary balance of around 0 percent of GDP in 2026–27 under current policy, lower than a September 2025 draft budget targeting a 2.7 percent primary surplus. - Electricity subsidies expected to remain high due to suspended tariff adjustments and irregular transfers from the electricity company (EBS). - Gross financing needs (GFNs) peaked at an estimated 28 percent of GDP in 2025; GFNs expected to be considerably lower in 2026–27 and the debt-GDP ratio expected to decline. - Offshore oil field development adds to imports, producing a very large current account deficit: expected about 50 percent of GDP in 2026–27, largely financed by FDI and external borrowing. By 2028, exports expected to grow by over 50 percent (y/y); by 2029 the current account should swing back into surplus, and reserve coverage should increase as oil revenues strengthen the external position. - Near-term downside risks: - Policy slippages in next two years could adversely affect macro stability. - Drought risk would raise electricity generation costs, adding to fiscal deficit and inflation. - Higher global food prices could increase import inflation. - A 25 percent reduction in the gold price would reduce fiscal revenues by 2 percent of GDP and exports by 14 percent of GDP. - Measurement issues could lead to lower-than-forecast current account deficits. - Authorities’ view: - Block 58 on track to commence production in 2028; related investments to support oil investments expected to significantly boost non-oil GDP. - Excessive pre-election spending and insufficiently restrictive monetary policy contributed to higher inflation, which is expected to return to single digits by end-2026 as these factors partially unwind. ### Downside Scenario (Illustrative) - Scenario assumptions (Box 1 summary): - Deterioration of fiscal position: lower-than-expected revenues (insufficient tax compliance) and larger-than-expected expenditures (failure to control spending) reduce the primary balance to –1.1 percent of GDP in 2026 and –2.2 percent in 2027. - Government cash buffers exhausted; unfunded financing needs of 0.9 percent of GDP in 2027, weakening the currency and raising debt by 4 percent of GDP relative to the baseline. - Financing constraints could cut access to international markets. - Fiscal loosening yields a short-lived marginal positive effect on growth; instead it is inflationary and strains CBvS ability to mop up liquidity and meet monetary targets. - Inflation expected above 13 percent in both 2026 and 2027; currency depreciates by 14 percent relative to the baseline by 2027. - Higher interest rates and lower confidence reduce private investment and erode growth. The current account deteriorates significantly in 2027 as demand is met through imports; gross international reserves decline sharply. - Comparative table (Baseline vs Downside Scenario, exact figures as in source) - Annual percentage change / in percent of GDP / US$ millions (as presented): - Real GDP: 2026 Baseline 3.9; 2026 Downside Scenario 4.0; 2027 Baseline 4.4; 2027 Downside Scenario 4.0 - Consumer prices (eop): 2026 Baseline 9.7; 2026 Downside Scenario 13.6; 2027 Baseline 6.1; 2027 Downside Scenario 13.8 - Consumer prices (average): 2026 Baseline 12.3; 2026 Downside Scenario 13.3; 2027 Baseline 7.3; 2027 Downside Scenario 13.7 - Reserve Money: 2026 Baseline 16.3; 2026 Downside Scenario 18.4; 2027 Baseline 9.2; 2027 Downside Scenario 19.9 - Revenue Share GDP: 2026 Baseline 27.5; 2026 Downside Scenario 27.1; 2027 Baseline 27.5; 2027 Downside Scenario 26.8 - Total Expenditure: 2026 Baseline 32.8; 2026 Downside Scenario 33.4; 2027 Baseline 32.4; 2027 Downside Scenario 33.8 - Primary Balance: 2026 Baseline -0.1; 2026 Downside Scenario -1.1; 2027 Baseline 0.0; 2027 Downside Scenario -2.2 - Overall Balance: 2026 Baseline -5.4; 2026 Downside Scenario -6.3; 2027 Baseline -4.9; 2027 Downside Scenario -7.0 - Government Debt: 2026 Baseline 96.2; 2026 Downside Scenario 96.6; 2027 Baseline 89.2; 2027 Downside Scenario 93.2 - Central Government Cash 1/: 2026 Baseline 3.5; 2026 Downside Scenario 2.1; 2027 Baseline 3.1; 2027 Downside Scenario -0.9 - Gross Financing Needs: 2026 Baseline 5.4; 2026 Downside Scenario 6.3; 2027 Baseline 7.2; 2027 Downside Scenario 9.2 - Current Account balance: 2026 Baseline -48.1; 2026 Downside Scenario -52.7; 2027 Baseline -52.7; 2027 Downside Scenario -59.7 - Gross International Reserves (US$ millions): 2026 Baseline 1,717; 2026 Downside Scenario 1,545; 2027 Baseline 1,988; 2027 Downside Scenario 1,420 - Exchange Rate percentual change relative to baseline (+ is depreciation): 2026 Baseline -; 2026 Downside Scenario 6.5; 2027 Baseline -; 2027 Downside Scenario 13.6 - Notes: Sources: IMF Staff calculations. 1/ Negative Cash means unfunded financing needs. ### Policy Discussions and Recommendations - Overall fiscal direction: - Additional measures are urgently needed to achieve fiscal consolidation. A primary surplus of around 1 percent of GDP in 2026 is appropriate, implying consolidation of around 1 percent of GDP relative to 2025 (excluding one-off spending). - Fiscal prudence would help restore cash buffers, improve confidence, retain regular market access, reduce local currency liquidity injections, bring inflation down to around 5 percent sooner, and build buffers against downside risks. - Priority measures to achieve consolidation: - Reduce electricity subsidies: - Re-establish automatic link between electricity tariffs and costs; implement a gradual increase in electricity price to reach cost recovery by end-2026. - This could generate 2 percent of GDP in fiscal savings and incentivize investment in generation capacity and grid modernization. - Regularize transfers from EBS and improve EBS financial management, transparency, and accountability. - Control wage bill: - Continue reducing public workforce; enforce action plan to remove unregistered government employees (4 percent of total public workforce) and stop wage payments to unregistered workers. - Differentiate salary increases across public employees to attract and retain skilled workers. - Better target social assistance: - Implement National Social Protection Strategy: digitalize social assistance, improve monitoring and evaluation, avoid duplication, and improve accuracy of social registry. - Implementing the plan should free resources to expand coverage and raise benefit levels while keeping social spending constant in real terms. - Avoid untargeted transfers to whole population in anticipation of future oil receipts. - Broaden tax base and improve revenue administration: - Excise and non-tax revenues: - Increase excise tax rates on alcohol and sugary beverages; introduce excises on gambling and single-use plastics; potential yield more than ½ percent of GDP per year. - Increase non-tax revenues by operationalizing collection of air navigation and land lease fees and regularizing land conversion. - Tax administration reforms: - Address insufficient technical personnel and digitalization challenges. - Improve VAT compliance (only 70 percent of taxpayers file returns); address rising unprocessed VAT refund claims (0.8 percent of GDP at end-October 2025). - Prioritize a unified IT system covering all core tax types and expand functionalities for monitoring and enforcement. - Consider transitioning to a Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authority (SARA) to increase salaries, improve organizational structure, and attract skilled workers. - Strengthen enforcement of gold royalties collection to prevent smuggling and re-establish control over this revenue source. *Source: IMF staff compilation from the chapter "1. Downside Scenario" of the provided PDF.* ### 18. There is a need to strictly adhere to the fiscal rules and strengthen the institutional ### There is a need to strictly adhere to the fiscal rules and strengthen the institutional ### Fiscal framework and Savings and Stabilization Fund Suriname (SSFS) - Legislation has been passed to introduce fiscal rules and improve the SSFS. - Changes need to be operationalized through a decree and by submitting to parliament, starting with the 2026 budget, a multi-year fiscal plan that has annual ceilings on primary spending and a clear debt target that is consistent with the fiscal rules (see Annex VII). - Board of Directors and Investment Advisory Committee of the SSFS should be constituted with clear merit-based criteria for choosing Board and Advisory Committee members. - The Board should establish a clear investment strategy. - Transparent procedures are needed to determine the size of SSFS transfers to the annual budget. - There should be annual independent audits and transparent reporting of the SSFS’s financial accounts. Box 2 (laws enacted) - In December 2024, Suriname’s parliament passed: Accounts Act 2024 and Suriname Savings and Stabilization Fund Act 2024 (SSFS Act). - Accounts Act introduces two fiscal rules: every five years the government sets i) a target for public debt (net of assets in the SSFS) to be reached by the end of the five years, and ii) annual primary expenditure limits, consistent with achieving the debt target. - The Accounts Act provides for an escape clause that can be invoked with the approval of the National Assembly and must be followed by a plan to bring public finances back into line with the fiscal rules as soon as possible. - Purpose of the Fund (SSFS Act): avoid procyclical fiscal policy while investing according to the Fund's investment policy approved by the minister of finance. - Starting in 2026, all mineral revenues are to be deposited directly in the SSFS and managed independently by the fund. - Annual budgets will set a maximum withdrawal from the fund that can be used to finance spending, while incorporating non-mineral revenues and respecting the fiscal rules. - The law does not specify what constitutes natural resource revenues; mineral revenues in the published fiscal data include tax and non-tax revenues. - Fund governance: council of five members; the President of the council appointed by the government, and one member each appointed by the minister of finance, the governor of the CBvS, the trade union and the business community. - The council will appoint and oversee the investment advisory committee that will advise the board on investment strategy. - For the first three years, the CBvS will manage the resources of the SSFS. - Act sets conditions for appointment of an external asset manager if the CBvS does not continue to manage the assets after three years. - The SSFS will invest the proceeds exclusively in foreign currency instruments outside of Suriname to avoid political influence. - Legislation provides for a governance framework with wide-ranging transparency (reporting and auditing) requirements; the National Assembly will have oversight and should receive annual independent audits of the SSFS’ financial statements. ### Public financial management, budget processes, and public investment - Progress on implementing the Public Financial Management Priority Action Plan should be accelerated. - Require clearer budgeting process and enforcement of quarterly budget ceilings for line ministries. - Establishing a PFM Reform Steering Committee, supported by a technical unit, can help with implementation. - Strengthen capacity in cash management and liquidity planning with an eventual goal of establishing a Treasury Single Account and systems for commitment control. - Objectives: prevent accrual of new spending arrears; improve government asset-liability and cash management; provide greater predictability for the government’s financial position; facilitate the CBvS’s liability management operations. - Government should ensure timely debt service to all creditors, including the CBvS; there may be a need to inject more capital into the CBvS. - Suppliers should be paid on time and legacy supplier arrears cleared. - Supported by the IDB, Suriname is working to strengthen public investment management capacity. - Need to develop a project quality assurance system; adopt a template for capital budgeting as part of the regular multi-year budget planning cycle. - Improve project monitoring through a better information system and integrate climate resilience considerations into project selection. ### State-owned enterprises (SOEs) - SOE sector carries significant fiscal risks and their financial operations are not transparent. - Near-term priority: enhance timely and regular collection of data to better assess financial performance of major SOEs, particularly EBS. - Audits and financial statements of all major SOEs that quantify their quasi-fiscal activities should be regularly published. - Companies’ governance frameworks should be more responsive to the government as shareholder with appropriate systems of independent audit and financial oversight. - Government should move ahead quickly with plans to rationalize the sector by closing some non-performing enterprises and/or privatizing them. - For the remainder, develop a broader roadmap to improve service delivery and safeguard public resources. ### Monetary and exchange rate policies - Reserve money developments and targets: - In the first half of 2025, reserve money growth accelerated as the CBvS reduced its Open Market Operations (OMOs). - Reserve money was 18 percent above the CBvS November target. - Need to bring reserve money back to target by early next year and contain its growth to around 10 percent y-o-y in 2026. - Doing so would help guide inflation back to around 7 percent by the first half of 2027 (Annex V). - Achieving this reserve money level will require significant absorption of liquidity by OMOs, likely leading to sizable increases in nominal interest rates. - The CBvS should limit sales of its liabilities only to the banks. - FX reserves and interventions: - End-2025 reserves are expected to have fallen to 104 percent of the ARA EM metric or 28 percent of GDP. - Resources in the escrow account are equivalent to a further 19 percent of GDP but are not freely usable. - Currency should be allowed to float; CBvS should intervene only in response to (narrowly-defined) disorderly market conditions. - CBvS should review its indicator of disorderly market conditions to align with the standard definition. - Authorities should review foreign exchange regulations to better define the role, if any, of the Foreign Exchange Commission. - Exchange rate practices and FX auction guidelines: - Suriname maintains one multiple currency practice (MCP) related to CBvS use of buying and selling transfer exchange rates published at 3 p.m. of the previous day. - The latest impermissible spread was observed on November 5, 2025 in EUR/SRD transactions. - FX auction guidelines updated in April result in subsidized FX allocated to the lowest bidders (costs borne by the CBvS) with a cap on margins for resale; guidelines distort price discovery and erode credibility and should be revised. - Transition of monetary framework: - Given growing uncertainty in money demand, there is a need to shift away from reserve money as the nominal anchor. - An MCM TA mission in October 2025 reviewed the framework and provided a roadmap for the transition. - CBvS should start transition to an interest rate–based framework as a stepping stone to inflation targeting; requires strengthening operations and institutional capacity. - A Forecasting and Policy Analysis System (FPAS) should integrate data, forecasting, policy decisions; a monetary policy committee should be formed. - Introduce a deposit facility and gradually develop an interbank market to establish an effective interest rate corridor (initially wide and without a fixed policy rate while reserve money remains the operating target). - Broader reforms needed: stronger collateral frameworks, repo legislation, modernization of market infrastructure, development of domestic debt market. - After capacity building and lower short-term interest rate volatility, authorities should announce a point policy rate as the operational target. - Communication and safeguards: - CBvS should publish a clear Monetary Policy Statement following policy decisions and a quarterly Monetary Policy Report. - Steps taken to address safeguards recommendations made in 2021 include: (i) amending the CBvS Act; (ii) constituting new decision-making bodies; (iii) transitioning to International Financial Reporting Standards; (iv) establishing an internal audit function; (v) implementing the recapitalization plan; and (vi) engaging an international external auditor to audit long-outstanding financial statements. - CBvS should continue strengthening staff capacity in key assurance functions and regularly publish audited financial statements. ### Financial stability and banking sector - Risks increasing due to rapid credit growth and FX exposure of banks. - Strengthen internal risk management and lending practices to ensure prudent underwriting and accurate loan classification. - Strengthen liquidity and solvency stress testing by designing appropriate scenarios. - Net open position (NOP) of banks should be closely monitored; eliminate prudential framework features that allow temporary NOP breaches. - Develop a comprehensive credit registry to track borrowers and close data gaps. - Develop a macroprudential toolkit, supported by capacity development (Annex X). - CBvS should remain ready to deploy standing facilities if any solvent bank faces near-term liquidity shortfalls. - Banks’ recapitalization plans and governance reforms need monitoring and enforcement. - State-owned banks should be run on a fully commercial basis with a level supervisory and regulatory playing field with private banks. - Framework for bank resolution should be quickly operationalized; MOFP and CBvS should develop contingency plans under the Financial Stability Committee. - Resolve any remaining undercapitalized banks without viable financial plans and opportunities for recapitalization. - Regular audits of commercial banks should be enforced (Annex VIII). - Supervision of nonbank financial institutions (pension funds and insurance companies) needs improvement: assess lending practices, stricter reporting, asset classification regulations, and introduce clear “fit-and-proper” ownership criteria. ### Governance, AML/CFT, procurement, and managing the oil boom - AML/CFT regime should be strengthened; several deficiencies remain in technical compliance and effective implementation of the FATF framework. - Enhance AML/CFT supervision for all financial institutions; develop and implement a risk-based supervisory framework for Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions; make significant progress on the beneficial ownership regime. - New procurement law needs quick implementation: publish all tenders, procurement contracts, names of awarded entities and their beneficial owners, names of public officials awarding contracts, and perform ex-post validation of delivery. - Amendment to the anti-corruption law (submitted to parliament before the elections and under consideration) mandates declaration of income and assets of politically exposed persons, requires verification and publication of declarations, and establishes clear, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for non-compliance. - Suspension from the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative has been lifted after overdue annual reports were published; efforts should focus on strengthening transparency in the mineral sector and implementing governance reforms. - Institutional reforms to manage the oil boom are critical precursors to addressing developmental challenges. - Suriname's Multi-Annual Development Plan 2022–26 identifies good governance and sustainability of resources as key strategic areas; progress has been limited. - It is estimated that, over the coming 10 years, public spending would have to increase by close to 5 percentage points of GDP annually to achieve the SDGs (Annex VII). - Improve the business environment by improving government and regulatory efficiency; bureaucratic delays and unpredictable policy are leading constraints. ### Authorities’ views (selected) - Focus on strengthening capacity and enforcement to boost compliance and on fully operationalizing the SARA. - On the expenditure side, internal spending controls and budgeting processes are being strengthened. - Government will remove unregistered workers soon after the last opportunity to register expires in January 2026. - Social protection being strengthened by vesting programs in legislation and further developing a Beneficiary Information System. - Authorities emphasize commitment to price stability and bringing reserve money back to target through OMOs, while evaluating measures to enhance cost efficiency, adhere to the budget, and mitigate financial implications of high OMO interest costs. - CBvS will review implications of modifying administrative and settlement arrangements and, subject to review and budgetary requirements, engage with its external system providers. - On financial stability: authorities consider most FX loans extended to companies who will receive oil-related FX inflows and pent-up demand is driving SRD credit growth off a low base; reinforcing monitoring and supervision of banks and reducing data gaps would safeguard stability. *International Monetary Fund* ### 39. The authorities agreed with the need to improve transparency and enact anti- ### 1surea2026001-source-pdf - 39. The authorities agreed with the need to improve transparency and enact anti- ### Transparency, anti-corruption, and extractive-sector disclosure - Authorities agreed with the need to improve transparency and enact anti-corruption legislation but believe legislative changes have limited impact in the absence of strong enforcement mechanisms. - Authorities agreed to meet EITI criteria but cited difficulties in publishing production sharing agreements (PSAs) since some oil-related PSAs are protected by non-disclosure clauses. - The administration emphasized improvements in: - the legal system, - health (such as prevention and primary care), - education (including vocational training), - infrastructure, - diversification. ### Statistics: data gaps and modernization priorities - Clear need to improve the quality and availability of key statistics. - Identified shortcomings: - National accounts statistics are not timely. - Little comprehensive data on economic activity in the oil and gold sectors. - Lack of GDP measures on the expenditure approach. - Government finance statistics fall short in frequency, timeliness, and coverage, in part due to limitations in the current Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS), which should be modernized and upgraded. - Priorities for fiscal statistics: - publishing monthly data on the central government’s accounts payable including suppliers’ arrears, - expanding fiscal data to SOEs consistent with international standards. - Financial sector statistics should include NBFIs (Annex IX). - CD is supporting the authorities to improve the quality of economic statistics (Annex X). ### Staff appraisal — overarching assessment - It is important to preserve the gains that were made over the past three years. - The Fund-supported program (that concluded in March 2025) allowed the Surinamese authorities to stabilize the economy and restore fiscal sustainability. - These gains began to be eroded during the election cycle and there have been insufficient corrective actions since. - It is imperative that these cornerstones of a healthy economy are restored; the authorities should continue to build on their efforts under the program to strengthen institutions. ### Fiscal policy recommendations and priorities - Improving the fiscal balance would contain FX and inflationary pressures and help rebuild cash buffers. - The government can raise the primary surplus while increasing resources for investments in human capital. - Required measures include: - resuming the reductions in electricity subsidies, - restraining the wage bill, - broadening the tax base (through new excise taxes and greater enforcement efforts). - The recent liability management operation creates liquidity for the government to meet its FX debt service obligations but does not obviate the need for an important fiscal adjustment in 2026 to improve macroeconomic stability. - Implementation priorities: - fully implement the recently passed PFM and SSFS laws without further delay, - implement 2026-30 spending ceilings with the 2026 budget to avoid procyclical spending, ensure adequate savings, and permit a gradual scale up in spending to meet Suriname’s SDGs, - broader implementation of PFM improvements to help contain the buildup of supplier arrears and improve the quality of spending. ### Monetary and exchange-rate policy - Monetary policy should be more committed to achieving the reserve money target. - The CBvS should establish a clear target for the coming year and should endeavor to meet it by undertaking open market operations, regardless of their interest cost or impact on CBvS profits and capital. - External position in 2025 was moderately weaker than the level implied by fundamentals and desirable policies. - The CBvS should allow for a fully flexible exchange rate and only intervene in response to a narrow definition of disorderly market conditions. - Staff does not recommend approval of the MCP referred to in paragraph 25 and the informational annex, as there are currently insufficient details on the authorities’ strategy to remove the measure. The authorities’ intention to do so is welcome, and they should also change FX auction guidelines. - Staff supports the central bank’s plans for transitioning to a new monetary policy framework: - develop a Forecasting and Policy Analysis System, - create a decision-making monetary policy committee, - improve the communication toolkit, - develop a secondary market and establish a functioning repo market. ### Financial sector resilience - Financial sector resilience should be enhanced. - The CBvS should: - assess and encourage banks to strengthen risk management, - enhance monitoring of the banks. - Legislation to create a credit bureau should be enacted promptly. - Financial sector coverage should expand to include NBFIs (Annex IX). ### Managing oil wealth and SOE fiscal risks - Strong institutions are crucial for effectively managing the newly found oil wealth. - Implementation actions: - fully implement the recently passed PFM and SSFS laws without further delay to ensure the mineral revenues are transparently managed, - implement the 2026-30 spending ceilings with the 2026 budget to avoid procyclical spending, ensure adequate savings, and permit a gradual scale up in spending to meet Suriname’s SDGs. - Government financial control over SOEs should be enhanced to reduce fiscal risks and ensure sufficient payments are made to the government. - Non-performing enterprises should be closed or sold. ### Governance and business environment reforms - Governance reforms recommended to reduce misappropriation risk: - pass amendments to the anti-corruption law to strengthen income and asset declaration, - operationalize the procurement law, - strengthen the AML/CFT framework, - increase transparency in the mineral sector. - Business environment improvements: - reduce bureaucratic delays and regulatory costs to improve the business environment. *SURINAME INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND* ### 49. Staff recommends initiating a Post-Financing Assessment for Suriname. The authorities ### Staff recommendation and consultation cycle ### Key recommendation - Staff recommends initiating a Post-Financing Assessment for Suriname. - The authorities have not requested a Fund arrangement and credit outstanding to the Fund is expected to remain above 200 percent of quota through 2029. - Staff recommends that the next Article IV consultation take place on the standard 12-month cycle. *Source: IMF staff text and tables provided.* ### Inflation developments (summary points and indicators) - Consumer prices (period average): 2023: 51.6, 2024: 16.2, 2025: 8.7, 2026: 9.5, 2027: 12.3, 2028: 7.3, 2029–2031: 5.4/5.0/5.0/5.0 (period averages and end-of-period series reported separately). - Consumer prices (end of period): 2023: 32.6, 2024: 10.1, 2025: 7.4, 2026: 13.0, 2027: 9.7, 2028: 6.1, 2029–2031: 5.0/5.0/5.0/5.0. - Staff core inflation measures presented in figure series (excluding food and utilities; alternative core excludes food, utilities and transport). - CPI Inflation contributions by subcomponent include "Food and non-alcoholic beverages", "Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas and Other Fuels", "Transport", and "Other" (month-on-month percent contributions shown in charts). *Sources for series: Central Bank of Suriname, General Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Finance; SDMO and IMF staff estimates.* ### Fiscal developments — headline metrics and projections - Real GDP (percent change): 2023: 2.4, 2024: 1.7, 2025: 3.2 (2025 9th Review column shows 1.5 for another baseline), 2026: 3.9, 2027: 4.4, 2028: 28.5, 2029: 43.4, 2030: 3.1, 2031: 2.9. - Nominal GDP (percent change): 2023: 36.3, 2024: 14.8, 2025: 11.1, 2026: 19.2, 2027: 19.1, 2028: 13.5, 2029: 35.6, 2030: 48.6, 2031: 4.6, 4.7. - GDP deflator: 2023: 33.1, 2024: 12.8, 2025: 7.7, 2026: 17.4, 2027: 14.6, 2028: 8.7, 2029: 5.5, 2030: 3.6, 2031: 1.5, 1.8. - Central government revenue and expenditure (percent of GDP, Table 1): - Revenue and grants: 2023: 27.2, 2024: 26.9, 2025: 28.1, 2026: 28.2, 2027: 27.5, 2028: 27.5, 2029: 25.7, 2030: 24.3, 2031: 25.2, 24.9. - Total expenditure: 2023: 28.9, 2024: 29.3, 2025: 29.2, 2026: 38.2, 2027: 32.8, 2028: 32.4, 2029: 26.7, 2030: 20.2, 2031: 20.8, 21.1. - Overall balance (net lending/borrowing, percent of GDP): 2023: -1.7, 2024: -2.4, 2025: -1.2, 2026: -10.0, 2027: -5.4, 2028: -4.9, 2029: -1.0, 2030: 4.1, 2031: 4.5, 3.8. - Primary balance (percent of GDP): 2023: 1.4, 2024: 0.3, 2025: 2.7, 2026: -6.3, 2027: -0.1, 2028: 0.0, 2029: 2.9, 2030: 6.7, 2031: 6.8, 5.9. - Central government debt (percent of GDP, Table 1): - Total central government debt: 2023: 97.7, 2024: 88.0, 2025: 86.6, 2026: 106.3, 2027: 96.2, 2028: 89.2, 2029: 64.9, 2030: 41.7, 2031: 37.2, 35.0. - Domestic share (percent of GDP): 2023: 20.2, 2024: 14.4, 2025: 15.2, 2026: 18.0, 2027: 17.6, 2028: 18.6, 2029: 14.0, 2030: 9.3, 2031: 12.1, 12.3. - External share (percent of GDP): 2023: 77.5, 2024: 73.6, 2025: 71.4, 2026: 88.3, 2027: 78.6, 2028: 70.6, 2029: 50.9, 2030: 32.4, 2031: 25.1, 22.6. - Selected central government fiscal flows (Table 2a, amounts in Millions of SRD, 2023–2031 sample): - Revenues (Millions of SRD): 2023: 34,750; 2024: 39,410; 2025: 45,939 (9th Review column 49,236); 2026: 57,126; 2027: 64,966; 2028: 82,214; 2029: 115,738; 2030: 125,615; 2031: 129,869. - Taxes (Millions of SRD): 2023: 21,968; 2024: 27,874; 2025: 33,136 (9th Review 36,009); 2026: 41,468; 2027: 47,429; 2028: 57,721; 2029: 73,238; 2030: 76,553; 2031: 80,092. - Mineral resource revenues (Millions of SRD): 2023: 8,500; 2024: 8,108; 2025: 8,994; 2026: 7,829; 2027: 9,573; 2028: 10,596; 2029: 17,413; 2030: 34,823; 2031: 40,761; 40,786 (Table shows repeated values across columns for later years). - Expenditures (Millions of SRD): 2023: 36,884; 2024: 42,977; 2025: 47,863; 2026 (9th Review): 66,721; 2027: 68,304; 2028: 76,584; 2029: 85,539; 2030: 96,052; 2031: 103,462; 109,857. - Interest (Millions of SRD): 2023: 3,928; 2024: 4,062; 2025: 6,343; 2026: 6,445; 2027: 10,881; 2028: 11,697; 2029: 12,532; 2030: 11,952; 2031: 11,768; 10,935. - Overall balance (Millions of SRD): 2023: -2,134; 2024: -3,567; 2025: -1,924; 2026: -17,485; 2027: -11,177; 2028: -11,618; 2029: -3,325; 2030: 19,686; 2031: 22,153; 20,012. Notes and fiscal-specific features from tables: - Expenditure includes central bank recap of 9,381 Million SRD (noted in table footnotes). - Netincurrence of liabilities and net acquisition of financial assets are detailed, including large central bank disbursements recorded in earlier years. - Notional VRI amount (projected opportunity cost of sharing oil revenues from block 58 oil) shown for 2023–2031 (USD millions): 2023: 314.7; 2024: 343.0; 2025: 373.9; 2026: 373.9; 2027: 407.5; 2028: 444.2; 2029: 484.0; 2030: 432.8; 2031: 375.8; 312.8. ### External sector — developments and projections - Current account balance (percent of GDP, Table 1 and Table 3b): - 2023: 4.3 percent of GDP - 2024: 0.2 percent of GDP - 2025: -33.9 percent of GDP - 2026: -34.3 percent of GDP - 2027: -48.1 percent of GDP - 2028: -52.7 percent of GDP - 2029: -11.2 percent of GDP - 2030: 30.3 percent of GDP - 2031: 27.9 percent of GDP - Exports and imports of goods and services (in Millions USD, Table 3a): - Exports of goods and services (Millions USD): 2023: 2,533; 2024: 2,793; 2025: 2,738; 2026: 3,190; 2027: 3,608; 2028: 3,783; 2029: 5,605; 2030: 9,417; 2031: 8,573; 8,690. - Imports of goods and services (Millions USD): 2023: 2,204; 2024: 2,571; 2025: 4,190; 2026: 4,464; 2027: 5,641; 2028: 6,263; 2029: 5,877; 2030: 5,205; 2031: 4,473; 4,741. - Trade balance, goods (Millions USD): 2023: 787; 2024: 931; 2025: -992; 2026: -551; 2027: -1,277; 2028: -1,688; 2029: 570; 2030: 5,122; 2031: 5,061; 4,960. - Primary income, net (Millions USD): 2023: -321; 2024: -366; 2025: -225; 2026: -498; 2027: -673; 2028: -738; 2029: -794; 2030: -995; 2031: -986; -920. - Financial account and FDI (Millions USD): - Capital and financial account (Millions USD): 2023: -183; 2024: -109; 2025: -1,443; 2026: -1,478; 2027: -2,677; 2028: -3,304; 2029: -1,946; 2030: 1,583; 2031: 3,418; 2,958. - Foreign direct investment (Millions USD): 2023: 63; 2024: 27; 2025: -1,335; 2026: -1,344; 2027: -2,344; 2028: -2,703; 2029: -1,239; 2030: 1,799; 2031: 2,729; 2,753. - International reserves (Gross and Adjusted, Millions USD, Table 3a & 3b): - Gross international reserves (Millions USD): 2023: 1,346; 2024: 1,632; 2025: 1,634; 2026: 1,570; 2027: 1,717; 2028: 1,988; 2029: 3,020; 2030: 4,874; 2031: 4,802; 5,123. - Adjusted gross international reserves (Millions USD): 2023: 1,112; 2024: 1,373; 2025: 1,374; 2026: 1,311; 2027: 1,458; 2028: 1,728; 2029: 2,761; 2030: 4,614; 2031: 4,542; 4,863. - Adjusted reserves in months of imports of goods and services: 2023: 6.1; 2024: 6.4; 2025: 3.9; 2026: 3.5; 2027: 3.1; 2028: 3.3; 2029: 5.6; 2030: 10.6; 2031: 12.2; 12.3. - Notable narrative points in external sector figures: - "After significant depreciation, REER has started to appreciate since mid-2021." - "International reserves have increased recently, partly due to SDR allocation and EFF disbursement but usable reserves remain at lower than three months of imports." - "A significant part of the current account adjustment was born by compression in imports. Exports also contributed to the current account adjustment." ### Monetary developments and banking sector indicators - Broad money (percent change): 2023: 19.5, 2024: 9.3, 2025: 7.1, 2026: 15.2, 2027: 14.2, 2028: 7.7, 2029: 19.0, 2030: 35.3, 2031: 19.6, 21.1. - Reserve money (percent change): 2023: 4.9, 2024: 10.1, 2025: 7.5, 2026: 23.6, 2027: 16.3, 2028: 9.2, 2029: 21.8, 2030: 25.8, 2031: 16.1, 17.3. - Broad money (percent of GDP): 2023: 62.7, 2024: 59.7, 2025: 57.3, 2026: 57.8, 2027: 55.4, 2028: 52.5, 2029: 46.1, 2030: 42.0, 2031: 48.0, 55.5. - Private sector credit (percent change): 2023: 18.4, 2024: 16.0, 2025: 11.0, 2026: 34.0, 2027: 14.7, 2028: 11.3, 2029: 9.3, 2030: 12.1, 2031: 12.3, 12.6. - Central Bank operations and OMOs: figures show SRD required/excess reserves and currency in circulation (billions of SRD), OMO Auction allocations and allotment rates for 7-, 30-, and 90-day tenors, CBC auctions and retail issuances series, and weighted average interest and tenor trends. - Depositary Corporations Survey (Table 4, Millions of SRD): - Broad money (Millions SRD): 2023: 80,103; 2024: 87,538; 2025: 93,717; 2026: 100,867; 2027: 115,192; 2028: 124,013. - Currency in circulation (Millions SRD): 2023: 6,654; 2024: 8,679; 2025: 9,484; 2026: 11,818; 2027: 17,495; 2028: 19,151. - Net international reserves (Held by the CBvS, Millions SRD): 2023: 45,624; 2024: 49,998; 2025: 52,027; 2026: 51,303; 2027: 60,633; 2028: 74,328. - Financial soundness indicators (Table 5, selected): - Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets: 2021: 14.5, 2022: 16.8, 2023: 20.3, 2024: 23.4, 2025 Dec.: 22.3, 2025 Sep.: 22.7. - NPL to gross loans: 2021: 12.8, 2022: 12.4, 2023: 13.0, 2024: 5.3, 2025 Jun.: 3.3, 2025 Sep.: 3.0. - Return on assets (ROA, annualized): 2021: 1.8, 2022: 2.7, 2023: 2.7, 2024: 2.7, 2025 Jun.: 1.7, 2025 Sep.: 2.3. - Liquid assets to total assets: 2021: 58.8, 2022: 54.3, 2023: 53.6, 2024: 52.7, 2025 Jun.: 52.8, 2025 Sep.: 51.3. ### Key macroeconomic drivers and commodity price assumptions (selected) - Gold production (thousand of troy ounce): 2023: 968; 2024: 890; 2025: 712; 2026–2031: 712/719/726/733/741/748 (annual series shown). - Gold price (USD per troy ounce): 2023: 1,943; 2024: 2,387; 2025: 2,821; 2026: 3,419; 2027: 4,195; 2028: 4,345; 2029–2031: 4,372/4,372/4,372/4,372. - Oil production (million barrels): 2023: 6.4; 2024: 6.3; 2025: 6.3; 2026: 6.3; 2027: 6.4; 2028: 32.0; 2029: 86.3; 2030: 86.1; 2031: 86.0. - Oil price (USD per barrel): 2023: 80.6; 2024: 79.2; 2025: 76.6; 2026: 67.9; 2027: 62.1; 2028: 62.2; 2029: 63.2; 2030: 64.4; 2031: 65.3; 65.8. ### Notable risks, adjustments, and operational notes from tables/figures - Usable reserves remain below three months of imports despite recent increases due to SDR allocation and EFF disbursement. - A large part of the current account adjustment was due to compression in imports, with exports also contributing. - Tables note that certain definitions differ from Suriname's Debt Act (central government debt ratios cover only central government debt). - Table footnotes indicate transactions such as central bank recapitalization of 9,381 Million SRD included in expenditure and other specific transactions (e.g., acquisition of stake in gold mine, loans to SOEs, sovereign wealth fund asset acquisitions and escrow account flows). - Official financing and IMF-related flows are explicitly presented (e.g., IMF purchases and repurchases, official financing values in percent of GDP and Millions USD). *Italicized source attribution: IMF staff text, figures, and tables as provided in the supplied PDF content.* ### Annex I. Status of the 2024 Article IV Main Recommendations ### Annex I. Status of the 2024 Article IV Main Recommendations ### A. Restoring Fiscal Sustainability - Summary: Some progress made, especially during overlap with the EFF-supported reform program; momentum slowed during the election period. Notable progress on strengthening monetary policy framework and financial stability; insufficient progress on broadening the tax base, reducing subsidies, and strengthening governance and transparency. - Fiscal consolidation - Recommendation: Further consolidation to firmly entrench fiscal position on a sustainable path. - Status: Excessive pre-election spending significantly eroded consolidation. Declared plans for course-correction by the new government need articulation. The target of primary surplus of 2.7 percent of GDP will be missed by a wide margin. - Tax policy - Recommendations included: (i) convert the tax department into a semi-autonomous revenue authority; (ii) fast-track VAT refunds for compliant taxpayers and impose penalties/interest for late filing/payment; (iii) increase non-tax revenues. - Status: Authorities have hired staff and are in the process of transforming tax departments into SARA. Revenue administration capacity is being strengthened to fast-track VAT refunds, but the stock of VAT refunds yet to be processed keeps growing. The new government is re-evaluating some past policies and pausing increases in non-tax revenues. - Wage bill - Recommendation: Remove unregistered workers and chronically absent civil servants. - Status: Government continues to work on removals and expects tangible results early in 2026, but has repeatedly given unregistered workers more time to comply. Pre-election salary bonuses increased the wage bill. No clear position on desired salary evolution in 2026. - Subsidies - Recommendations included: (i) update electricity tariff schedule to reach cost recovery for households by end-2025; (ii) eliminate intra-SOE settlements and include a line for utility payments for each ministry in the draft 2025 budget; (iii) have EBS publish full financial statements and audit reports for 2019–2021; (iv) eliminate LPG subsidies. - Status: Electricity tariff adjustments are paused and significant adjustments are now needed to reach cost recovery for households. Staatsolie continues to settle payments owed by EBS against dividend payments to the government. EBS published its 2019 and 2020 financial statements and sent its 2021 financial statements to an external auditor. Adjustments are being made in LPG tariffs to fully eliminate subsidies by September 2026. - Staying current on government payment obligations - Recommendation: Subject ministries to quarterly expenditure ceilings; require prior authorization before signing contracts. - Status: Quarterly ceilings facing delays. Prior authorization implemented. New government reiterated commitment to spending commitment controls and requested CD. Systems being put in place to fully automate debt payments within MOFP. Debt issuances were not supported by an updated/communicated debt management strategy or annual borrowing/issuance plan pursuant to the 2025 Eurobond issuance. Debt service payments on CBvS recapitalization bonds were missed. - Structural fiscal reforms - Recommendations: Introduce new fiscal rules into the PFM law and operationalize the Savings and Stabilization Fund; establish a TSA for a subset of line ministries and grant Minister of Finance authority to access government bank accounts; implement new procurement law and publish procurement/tender details; publish report quantifying principal fiscal risks of largest SOEs. - Status: Legislation for fiscal rules passed in 2024; authorities sought Fund Staff help to calibrate a multi-year annual plan including fiscal rules for 2026 budget. TSA and Minister’s broad account-access authority not implemented yet. Implementation decree for procurement law still awaited; publication of tenders, contract awards, beneficial owners, awarding officials, and ex-post validation of delivery pending. Publication of report quantifying fiscal risks of largest SOEs pending. EITI requirements fulfilled: authorities published EITI 2021-22 annual report and had temporary suspension lifted. ### B. Bringing Down Inflation - Recommendation: Fully implement reserve money targeting (RMT) framework and prepare transition to Inflation Targeting. - Reserve money targeting and monetary policy - Status: Central bank mostly adhered to RMT but slippages resurfaced since November 2024 and reserve money is 18 percent above target. - Transition to Inflation Targeting: Authorities requested capacity development; Fund Staff providing support. - Discontinue selling Central Bank liabilities to retail investors: Practice has not stopped for retail investors, although discontinued for wholesale investors. - Ensure all instruments issued by CBvS and government eligible as collateral for CBvS liquidity facilities: Still lacking digital infrastructure for bookkeeping; not all securities eligible for collateralized lending by Central Bank. - Recapitalize Central Bank: Achieved via cash injection/issuing bonds to meet central bank capitalization requirements according to the central bank act of 2022. - Publish Central Bank 2022 annual financial statements: Published. ### C. Supporting Financial Stability - Bank supervision, recapitalization, and governance - Recommendation: Complete banks’ recapitalization plans and reform governance for state-owned banks to run on a fully commercial basis. - Status: State-owned bank reached acceptable capital levels from interest earnings on central bank instruments, but governance reforms and senior management/internal audit improvements are not implemented. Governance framework for all state-owned banks not implemented. CBvS recommended to develop plan/timeframe for recapitalization of a private bank that did not meet minimum regulatory requirements. - Macroprudential toolkit and data - Recommendation: Develop a macro-prudential toolkit to address systemic risks from dollarization; implement sustainable fiscal and credible monetary policy; create a credit registry bureau to close data gaps. - Status: Fund providing capacity development to implement the macro-prudential toolkit. - Framework for bank resolution - Status: Authorities are working towards adopting a framework for bank resolution. - AML/CFT - Recommendations: (i) enhance AML/CFT supervision for all financial institutions; (ii) develop and implement risk-based supervisory framework for DNFBPs; (iii) provide adequate resources to Financial Intelligence Unit and Gaming Control Board; (iv) increase ML/TF investigations, prosecutions and confiscations; (v) amend International Sanctions Framework for UN Security Council Resolutions on Terrorism and Proliferation Financing. - Status: Work is currently underway in all these areas. ### D. Supply Side Reforms - Anti-corruption framework - Recommendation: Amend anti-corruption framework to strengthen income and asset declarations of politically exposed persons. - Status: Not amended yet; law is being re-evaluated by the new government. - Female labor force participation - Recommendations: (i) improve legal system in areas such as entrepreneurship, safety, and childcare services; (ii) improve access to clean water and sanitation; (iii) strengthen legal framework and educational policies to discourage child marriage. - Status: No progress in improving laws. ### E. Improving Economic Statistics - Recommendation: Improve quality and timeliness of monetary, fiscal, financial, and national accounts statistics. - Status: Ongoing capacity development in all these areas is helping improve data quality and timeliness. *Source: Annex I. Status of the 2024 Article IV Main Recommendations (from the provided IMF content)* ### Annex II. External Sector Assessment (Highlights) ### Overall Assessment and Key Findings - Overall assessment: The external position of Suriname in 2025 was moderately weaker than the level implied by fundamentals and desirable policies. Assessment subject to wide uncertainties around 2025 external sector statistics and based on staff’s estimates. - Offshore oil development: Started in 2025, temporarily increasing imports and lowering the current account balance. - Current account gap and REER: Despite a large forecast current account deficit, the current account gap is estimated at around -1.2 percent of GDP, suggesting Suriname’s REER against key trading partners was overvalued. - Projection: Current account deficit as a percentage of GDP is projected to improve significantly after 2028 with higher oil exports. ### Foreign Assets and Liabilities: Position and Trajectory (2025 levels) - Net international investment position (IIP) weakened to an estimated $ -5.2 billion (-110 percent of GDP) in 2025 from $ -2.7 billion (-60 percent of GDP) in 2024, due to very large direct investment inflows and other investment (external borrowing). - Over 2021 to 2025, the current account balance averaged -4.4 percent of GDP; NIIP averaged around -86 percent of GDP. - IIP assets decreased to $3.2 billion (69 percent of GDP) in 2025 from $3.3 billion (75 percent of GDP) in 2024 due to decreases in reserves assets. - IIP liabilities increased to $8.4 billion (179 percent of GDP) in 2025 from $6.0 billion (135 percent of GDP), primarily due to direct investment inflows and other investment including the Eurobond issuance. - Assessment: Large NIIP deficit mitigated by composition (large share of FDI liabilities). Direct investment inflows and borrowing to invest in Block 58 oil projects expected to increase liabilities sharply over 2025-2028. Oil flows later expected to improve NIIP. Sizeable debt liabilities remain a vulnerability. Policy restraint and exchange rate flexibility recommended to reduce external vulnerabilities. ### Current Account - Levels and dynamics - Estimated current account balance declined to -34.3 percent of GDP in 2025 from a surplus of 0.2 percent of GDP in 2024. - In 2025Q1-Q3, the deficit was -6.3 percent of GDP despite expected Block 58 imports (not fully reflected through September 2025), gold export shortfalls, higher election-related imports, and larger primary income deficit due to interest obligations. - Forecast: Deficit expected to widen through 2028 due to offshore oil development funded by FDI and Staatsolie debt, then turn into a surplus after 2028 with oil export inflows. - EBA-Lite CA model results (2025) - Model indicates overvaluation of 2.7 percent and a CA gap of -1.2 percent of GDP. - Cyclically adjusted CA balance: -5.1 percent of GDP against an adjusted CA norm of -3.9 percent of GDP. - Staff added a large adjustor to account for temporary imports related to Block 58 oil project of 31 percent of GDP. - Total policy gap estimated at -0.1 percent of GDP driven by: cyclically adjusted fiscal balance (+1.4 percent); public health expenditure (+1.0 percent); change in reserves (-1.5 percent); private credit level and growth (-0.1 percent); and the FARI index (-1.0 percent). ### Real Exchange Rate (REER) - Background: NEER depreciated on average by 19.2 percent over 2021-24, peaking at 37 percent in 2023. REER remained stable due to strong pass-through. As of September 2025, SRD/US$ depreciated by around 9.3 percent since end-2024. - Model assessments - EBA-Lite REER model indicates an overvaluation of 14.5 percent, implying a CA gap of -6.7 percent of GDP. - Staff relies on EBA-Lite CA model for bottom line, concluding 2025 REER overvalued by 2.7 percent. - Recommendation: Flexibility in the nominal exchange rate is key for alignment of REER to its norm. ### Capital and Financial Accounts: Flows and Policy Measures (2025 flows) - Direct investment inflow estimated at $1.35 billion (26 percent of GDP) to finance the oil project. - Net investment other estimated at $1.1 billion (20.4 percent of GDP) due to recent Eurobond issuance and Staatsolie borrowings. - In November 2025, authorities issued US$ 1.575 billion in 5- and 10-year Eurobonds; proceeds used for liability management. - In March 2025, Staatsolie raised $0.516 billion (a combined $0.469 billion and euro 0.435 billion) via bonds to refinance $0.195 billion maturities, generating $0.321 billion (7 percent of GDP) in new inflows. - In May 2025, Staatsolie contracted a $1.6 billion (35 percent of GDP) bank loan for its 20 percent stake in Block 58; expected drawdowns of around US$ 0.4 billion per year over next four years. - Policy measures: Partial forex surrender requirements remain (repatriate 100 percent of export proceeds and convert 35 percent in SRD at commercial banks on day received). FX auction guidelines updated April 2025 allocate subsidized FX to lowest bidders with costs borne by CBvS and cap on resale margins; these aim to stabilize the currency but distort price discovery and erode credibility. Authorities have no plans to change repatriation/surrender requirement. Recommendation: Revise auction guidelines. - Assessment: Block 58 development largely financed by FDI and Staatsolie borrowing. FDI inflows should strengthen external position during investment phase but external position could weaken when oil companies repatriate cost and profit oil. Authorities committed to maintaining macro stability and revamping the Savings and Stabilization Fund Suriname (SSFS) once oil proceeds flow. ### FX Intervention and Reserves Level - Reserves (international reserves excluding commercial banks’ ring-fenced FX reserves) estimated at $1.311 billion (28 percent of GDP) in 2025 from $1.373 billion (31 percent of GDP) in 2024. - Reserves equivalent to 103 percent of the ARA EM metric (recommended range: 100-150 percent). - In 2025, authorities undertook FX sales estimated at $72 million in announced auctions. - Projection: Usable reserves expected to remain above 100 percent ARA EM metric and increase to around 176 percent of the ARA EM metric by end-2028 as oil revenues begin to flow. - Assessment and recommendations: - Adequacy across ARA metric indicates current GIR provides some buffers to adverse external shocks. Escrow account from liability management operation increases liquidity for debt service. - Authorities should maintain reserves above 100 percent of the ARA EM metric as a buffer. - CBvS should refrain from FX sales and review its disorderly market conditions indicator in line with the standard definition. - Authorities should maintain a more flexible exchange rate as an exogenous shock absorber and undertake reforms to support FX market development; paired with a tighter macroeconomic policy stance, this would aid in maintaining adequate reserves. *Source: Annex II. External Sector Assessment (from the provided IMF content)* ### Annex III. Sovereign Risk and Debt Sustainability Framework ### Annex III. Sovereign Risk and Debt Sustainability Framework ### Summary assessment and commentary - Final assessment: The overall risk of sovereign stress is moderate. - Long-term risks: Assessed as moderate. Public debt to GDP is projected to decrease, aided by commencement of oil production from block 58. There is an expected increase in GFN to GDP in 2027, primarily due to repayments of restructured external debts after grace periods end. This highlights the necessity of maintaining fiscal discipline over the long term. - Medium-term assessment: Moderate. The Gross Financing Needs (GFN) tool suggests moderate risk due to a declining GFN and limited bank exposure to the sovereign, while the fanchart tool signals high risk because of notable historical macro-fiscal volatility. - Recent market access developments: In November, authorities issued $1.575 billion in 5- and 10-year Eurobonds (8–8.5% yields) to repurchase 2033 Eurobonds, with remaining funds in an overseas escrow for debt service, which reduces GFNs until significant oil revenues materialize. - Policy priorities emphasized: Maintaining fiscal discipline, FX reserve buffers, and institutional strengthening ahead of expected oil revenues in the medium term. *Source: Fund staff.* ### Debt coverage and disclosures - DSA coverage: Public debt in the DSA covers only central government debt. - Non-covered liabilities and estimates: - Liabilities of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) estimated at 25 percent of GDP in June 2024 (Annex VI). - Domestic arrears, including supplier arrears, estimated at 4 percent of GDP as of end-2024. - Legal and institutional changes: The government passed a law expanding the SDMO's mandate to include the entire Non-Financial Public Sector (NFPC) and to monitor the financial status of the ten largest SOEs. - Contingency test included: A contingency liability stress test of about 14.3 percent of GDP, reflecting limited debt coverage and Staatsolie’s phased drawdown of a $1.6 billion loan for its 20 percent stake in the Block 58 oil project. - Subsector inclusion (selected): Budgetary central government: Yes; Extra budgetary funds (EBFs): No; Social security funds (SSFs): No; State governments: No; Local governments: No; Public nonfinancial corporations: No; Central bank: No; Other public financial corporations: No. *Source: Fund staff.* ### Debt structure, holders, and creditor composition (end-2024 highlights) - Public debt (end-2024): 88 percent of GDP. - Currency composition: - FX debt: 77 percent of GDP. - External public debt: 73 percent of GDP. - Creditor composition (percent of GDP unless indicated): - Multilateral debt: 42 percent of GDP (approximately two-thirds owed to IDB). - Other official debt: 13 percent of GDP (primarily owed to China, which accounts for 11 percent of GDP). - Private debt (bonds and loans): restructured Eurobonds at 16 percent of GDP; other private creditors at 2 percent of GDP. - Domestic debt: 14 percent of GDP (CBvS 6% of GDP; commercial banks 2% of GDP; non-banking institutions 7% of GDP). - Arrears: Domestic arrears estimated at 4 percent of GDP as of end-2024. *Source: Fund staff.* ### Decomposition of debt stock and debt service (selected figures) - Total debt stock excl. arrears (end-2024): 3,659 (USD); Percent Total debt: 100; Percent GDP: 88. - External debt (end-2024): 3,060 (USD); Percent Total debt: 84; Percent GDP: 73. - Multilateral creditors (end-2024): 1,739 (USD); Percent Total debt: 48; Percent GDP: 42. - IMF: 510 (USD); 14% of total debt; 12% of GDP. - IADB: 1,007 (USD); 28% of total debt; 24% of GDP. - Official creditors (end-2024): 559 (USD); Percent Total debt: 15; Percent GDP: 13. - Bilateral creditors: 407 (USD); 11% of total debt; 10% of GDP. - China: 373 (USD); 10% of total debt; 9% of GDP. - Commercial creditors (end-2024): 762 (USD); Percent Total debt: 21; Percent GDP: 18. - Eurobonds: 673 (USD); 18% of total debt; 16% of GDP. - Oppenheimer: 673 (USD); 18% of total debt; 16% of GDP. - Domestic (end-2024): 600 (USD); Percent Total debt: 16; Percent GDP: 14. - Held by Central Bank: 249 (USD); 7% of total debt; 6% of GDP. - Other accounts payable, incl. supplier arrears: 181 (USD); 5% of total debt; 4% of GDP. - Notes on assumptions: - For external debts with incomplete bilateral restructuring by end-2024, stocks and services are based on original contracts. - For external debts with completed bilateral restructuring by end-2024, stocks and services are based on those agreements, with arrear repayments included in projected debt service. - Domestic restructuring with CBvS is reflected to calculate domestic debt service. - Figures are based on existing debts as of end-2024; debt service from newly contracted debt from 2025 onward not reflected. *Source: IMF staff estimates from Suriname Debt Management Office (SDMO).* ### Baseline scenario projections (selected series, percent of GDP) - Public debt (actual and projections): - Actual 2024: 88.0 - 2025: 106.3 - 2026: 96.2 - 2027: 89.2 - 2028: 64.9 - 2029: 41.8 - 2030: 37.2 - 2031: 34.5 - 2032: 32.8 - 2033: 29.8 - 2034: 26.3 - Change in public debt (percent of GDP): - 2025: 18.3 - 2026: -10.0 - 2027: -7.0 - 2028: -24.3 - 2029: -23.1 - 2030: -4.6 - 2031: -2.7 - 2032: -1.7 - 2033: -3.1 - 2034: -3.5 - Contribution of identified flows (percent of GDP): - Primary deficit: - 2024: -0.3 - 2025: 6.3 - 2026: -0.1 - 2027: -0.2 - 2028: -3.0 - 2029: -6.7 - 2030: -6.7 - 2031: -6.0 - 2032: -8.2 - 2033: -14.8 - 2034: -11.8 - Noninterest revenues (percent of GDP): 2024: 26.9; 2025: 28.2; 2026: 27.5; 2027: 27.5; 2028: 25.7; 2029: 24.3; 2030: 25.2; 2031: 24.9; 2032: 29.0; 2033: 37.0; 2034: 35.5 - Noninterest expenditures (percent of GDP): 2024: 26.6; 2025: 34.5; 2026: 27.4; 2027: 27.3; 2028: 22.7; 2029: 17.6; 2030: 18.5; 2031: 18.9; 2032: 20.8; 2033: 22.2; 2034: 23.7 - Automatic debt dynamics (percent of GDP): 2024: -20.4; 2025: -1.6; 2026: -4.4; 2027: -3.3; 2028: -19.2; 2029: -19.1; 2030: -0.5; 2031: -0.2; 2032: 0.4; 2033: 1.6; 2034: 1.3 - Gross financing needs (incl. arrears clearance) (percent of GDP): - 2024: 7.5 - 2025: 28.6 - 2026: 7.9 - 2027: 9.5 - 2028: 5.2 - 2029: 3.9 - 2030: 6.8 - 2031: 5.3 - 2032: 2.6 - 2033: 1.3 - 2034: 3.0 - Debt service (excl. arrears) (percent of GDP): - 2024: 5.1 - 2025: 21.8 - 2026: 5.4 - 2027: 7.5 - 2028: 6.2 - 2029: 5.5 - 2030: 9.8 - 2031: 7.1 - 2032: 6.8 - 2033: 6.6 - 2034: 5.7 - Memo indicators: - Real GDP growth (percent): 2024: 1.7; 2025: 1.5; 2026: 3.9; 2027: 4.4; 2028: 28.5; 2029: 43.4; 2030: 3.1; 2031: 2.9; 2032: 1.0; 2033: -2.7; 2034: -2.6 - Inflation (GDP deflator; percent): 2024: 12.8; 2025: 17.4; 2026: 14.6; 2027: 8.7; 2028: 5.5; 2029: 3.6; 2030: 1.5; 2031: 1.8; 2032: 2.1; 2033: 2.5; 2034: 3.1 - Nominal GDP growth (percent): 2024: 14.8; 2025: 19.2; 2026: 19.1; 2027: 13.5; 2028: 35.6; 2029: 48.6; 2030: 4.6; 2031: 4.7; 2032: 3.1; 2033: -0.3; 2034: 0.4 - Commentary on baseline: Public debt is projected to fall below 90 percent of GDP by 2027 and decline to under 40 percent by 2030 with Block 58 oil revenues in the baseline. GFNs peak in 2025 due to a higher deficit, a debt exchange operation (buy back of the 2033 Eurobonds), principal payments on multilateral debt, and recapitalization of the CBvS. GFNs are expected to drop to 3.9 percent of GDP by 2029, supported by rising oil revenues, sustained primary surpluses, and recent liquidity management operations that shift some debt service obligations until after 2028 oil revenues. Residuals are large due to below-the-line items. *Source: Fund staff.* ### Realism of baseline assumptions - Tools flag optimism in the rapid reduction in public debt, but projections rely on: - Authorities' strong commitments to fiscal adjustment, with the primary balance falling within the 50-75th percentile. - Higher oil production boosting GDP in the medium term. - An interest-growth rate differential that reflects about half of total financing expected from IFIs with limited capital market access. - Suriname's 3-year adjustment and maximum 3-year adjustment in cyclically-adjusted primary balance: around 7.2 percent of GDP. - Commentary: While tools indicate optimism, staff note the assumptions are underpinned by planned fiscal consolidation and oil revenues. *Source: IMF staff.* ### Medium-term risk analysis (selected indicators and diagnostics) - Debt fanchart module: - Fanchart width: 88.6 (percent of GDP) - Probability of debt non-stabilization: 5.8 percent - Terminal debt-to-GDP x institutions index: 42.8 0.9 - Debt fanchart index (DFI): 2.3 → Risk signal: High - Gross financing needs (GFN) module: - Average baseline GFN: 8.9 (percent of GDP) and 3.0 (percent of GDP) contribution? (values presented as 8.9 3.0) - Initial banks' claims on the general government: 2.7 (pct bank assets) - Change in banks' claims in stress: 11.0 (pct banks' assets) - GFN financeability index (GFI): 7.6 → Risk signal: Moderate - Medium-term index (MTI): - MTI final assessment: Moderate - Final combined assessment: Medium-term and total risks assessed as moderate. - Probabilities (model diagnostics): - Prob. of missed crisis, 2025-2030, if stress not predicted: 18.2 pct. - Prob. of false alarms, 2025-2030, if stress predicted: 23.9 pct. - Commentary: The fanchart tool shows high risk from significant historical macro-fiscal volatility and rising risks linked to high terminal debt and institutional quality. The GFN tool indicates moderate risk due to declining baseline GFNs and limited bank sovereign exposure, supported by the Eurobond issuance that created cash buffers in an overseas escrow account for debt service obligations. Flexible exchange rates, fiscal consolidation, and stronger institutions can mitigate these risks. *Source: IMF staff estimates and projections.* ### Long-term risk analysis and scenarios - Long-term indications: - The long-term analysis indicates GFN-to-GDP and public debt-to-GDP diverge very quickly if the government followed the past 10-year path. - The historical 10-year average scenario is less informative because it includes past macro-fiscal shocks, but it underscores the importance of sufficient primary balance surpluses to achieve declining GFNs and public debt levels in the medium to long term. - Scenario labels shown: - Medium-term extrapolation with debt stabilizing primary balance. - Large amortizations. - Baseline with t+5; Baseline with t+5 and DSPB; Historical 10-year average. - Staff note: Staff projection may deviate from the long-term module's mechanical baseline because the former reflects below-the-line transactions (e.g., arrear clearances, debt restructuring). - Overall risk indication (long term): Large amortization risk signal appears emphasized; staff projection aligns with "Baseline with t+5" and suggests GFN-to-GDP is manageable, contingent on continued fiscal consolidation efforts. *Source: Fund staff.* ### Policy implications and recommendations (as derived from text) - Maintain fiscal discipline over the long term to contain rising GFN pressures (notably around 2027) and ensure sustainable debt dynamics. - Preserve FX reserve buffers to mitigate near-term risks and support confidence ahead of material oil revenues. - Strengthen institutions ahead of expected oil revenues to reduce vulnerabilities signaled by fanchart metrics. - Implement fiscal consolidation and maintain flexible exchange rate policies to mitigate medium-term risk flagged by fanchart and long-term divergence risks. - Use liquidity management tools (e.g., escrow accounts) to smooth GFNs until oil revenues materialize. *Source: Fund staff.* ### Annex III. Figure 7. Suriname: Long-Term Risk and Analysis (continued) ### Annex III. Figure 7. Suriname: Long-Term Risk and Analysis (continued) ### Long-Term Risk Assessment — Large Amortization (Incl. Custom Scenario) - Projection variables and selected values in scenarios: - Real GDP growth: 3.1% (2030); -0.6% (2034 to 2038 average); 0.3% (Custom Scenario) - Primary Balance-to-GDP ratio: 6.8% (2030); 10.0% (2034 to 2038 average); 9.5% (Custom Scenario) - Real depreciation: -2.5% (2030); -1.8% (2034 to 2038 average); -2.1% (Custom Scenario) - Inflation (GDP deflator): 1.5% (2030); 2.6% (2034 to 2038 average); 2.2% (Custom Scenario) - Commentary highlights: - GFN-to-GDP and public debt-to-GDP diverge very quickly if the government followed the past 10 year path. - The historical 10-year average scenario includes past macro-fiscal shocks and is less informative but underscores the need for sufficient primary balance (PB) surplus to achieve declining GFNs and public debt levels. - Staff projection aligns with the case of "Baseline with t+5" and suggests GFN-to-GDP is manageable, contingent on continued fiscal consolidation efforts. - Note: Staff projection may deviate from the long-term module's (mechanical) baseline because staff projections reflect below-the-line transactions (e.g., arrear clearances, debt restructuring). ### Climate Change — Adaptation - Scenario assumption: - Adaptation requires additional investment worth 3 percent of GDP per year in both standardized and customized scenarios. - Main implications: - Additional fiscal costs from adaptation reinforce the importance of continued fiscal efforts and maintaining sufficient liquidity buffers. ### Demographics — Health - Scenario outcomes: - Health costs driven by demographic changes could provide additional long-term risks. - Main implication: - Given continued fiscal consolidation efforts, health-related costs would not have a material impact because GFN-to-GDP and public debt-to-GDP keep declining. ### Climate Change — Mitigation - Scenario assumption: - Climate mitigation requires additional investment worth 5.7 percent of GDP in both standardized and customized scenarios. - Main implication: - Mitigation could cause additional fiscal costs; continued fiscal efforts and sufficient fiscal and liquidity buffers are important. ### Natural Resources (Block 58 oil project) - Scenario outcome: - Scaled-up oil extraction from block 58 (initial estimates of recoverable reserves of 750 million barrels) significantly reduces GFNs and the long-term public debt path. - Policy caveat: - Mitigating measures to address climate change are important since they could further impact revenues, growth, and the debt profile. - Continued fiscal consolidation and rebuilding buffers for future shocks remain necessary. --- ### Annex IV. Debt Restructuring and Financing Assumptions ### A. Public Debt Restructuring — Baseline assumptions - Paris Club and China: - Second phase of debt restructuring with Paris Club creditors concluded; agreement signed in October 2024, providing stock relief with repayments commencing in 2030. - Bilateral negotiations with individual PC creditors finalized; final agreement signed in October 2025 with Italy. - Second phase with China is close to completion. - External private creditors: - Debt exchange with private external bondholders in November 2023 reached a pre-CAC participation rate of over 96 percent and a post-CAC participation rate of 100 percent. - New bonds issued in an aggregate principal amount of USD 650 million, with an additional USD 10 million to cover fees and expenses of the bondholder committee. - Bondholders accepted a VRI conditional on new revenue streams from block 58 oil project (final investment decision in October 2024); DSA recognizes VRI payments only as they are expected to materialize (assumed realization of revenues from 2028 onwards). - Restructuring with the final commercial creditor finalized in April. - Liability management operation (November): - Issuance of US$ 1.575 billion in 5- and 10-year Eurobonds, with yields of 8 and 8.5 percent, respectively. - Proceeds used to buy back existing 2033 Eurobonds; remaining funds held in an overseas escrow account designated solely for debt service. - Escrow account intended to enable possible purchase of oil-linked VRIs and possible early settlement of selected debts, and must cover interest payments on the new Eurobonds until 2028. - Staff baseline does not incorporate possible VRI purchases or possible early debt payment and assumes the escrow account finances interest payments also beyond 2028. - Comparability/clawbacks: - Paris Club and China restructuring agreements include contingencies (clawback provisions) that may be revisited if macroeconomic outlook improves (notably oil developments). DSA assumes Paris Club and China will revisit clawbacks to be repaid as per terms comparable to VRI holders, by scaling up principal payments proportionate to VRI payments post 2028. - CBvS restructuring: - Legacy debts to the CBvS were restructured into a new loan with a grace period of 2 years and a maturity of 27 years. - All short-term advances to the CG were repaid to the CBvS in 2023; no outstanding arrears. - Losses from CBvS restructuring were reflected in CBvS recapitalization in early 2025. - Supplier and other arrears: - Total stock of supplier arrears: SRD 7.1 billion by September 2025, up from SRD 4.1 billion at end-December 2024. - End-2024 stock comprised of SRD 0.403 billion in legacy supplier arrears, and SRD 0.971 billion in VAT refund claims. - Authorities accumulated (net) SRD 3 billion by end-September 2025. - Authorities committed to no new accumulation of arrears through PFM reforms and TA, but have no clear plan to clear existing arrears. - Financing and liquidity management: - Liquidity management operation strengthens financing to service debt until significant oil revenues materialize. - After buyback of outstanding 2033 bonds, sufficient funds for debt service of new Eurobonds until at least 2028. - Projections assume no firm budget support from multilateral creditors in 2026. - Project financing from multilateral creditors assumed to decline gradually as Suriname switches to market financing of capital expenditures. - Domestic financing expected to be limited due to gradual recovery in market confidence. - Baseline assumes resumption of market access in 2026 and full domestic market access; residual GFNs assumed to be met entirely by domestic T bills and T bonds. - Any potential financing gap in 2025/26 expected to be filled by withdrawal of CG deposit at the Central Bank, projected at SRD 10.6 billion (6 percent of 2025-GDP) over 2025. - Stock of CG deposits projected to decline from 9¼ percent of GDP at end-2024 to 1¾ percent of GDP at end-2025. ### B. External DSA — Key points - External debt levels: - External debt estimated at 138 percent of GDP at end-2025, compared to 109 percent at end-2024. - Total external debt projected to decline below 60 percent of GDP at end-2029, in part due to large foreign direct investment into Block 58 oil project. - Risks: - While external debt is projected to decline substantially over the medium term, macroeconomic shocks pose significant risks; various shocks reveal external debt could be above 100 percent of GDP (2026-27). - Continued internal and external adjustment is critical to ensure external sustainability and reduce external vulnerability. - Staatsolie and Block 58: - Staatsolie secured capital to exercise its 20 percent stake in Block 58. - Following final investment decision in October 2024, Staatsolie confirmed option to hold 20 percent equity share. - In May 2025, Staatsolie contracted a $1.6 billion (35 percent of GDP) bank loan to finance its equity stake. - These funds enable Staatsolie to invest in the oil project but increase its liquidity exposure. - Equity participation allows the government to benefit from royalty revenues and a share of profit oil. --- ### Annex V. Estimating a Model of Inflation in Suriname ### Main findings from the inflation model (2021–25, Reserve Money Targeting period) - Summary results: - Inflation responds strongly to the exchange rate, with most of the direct effect occurring with a one-month lag. - Exchange rate movements are driven mainly by government deficits and Reserve Money (RM) expansion. - Quantified impacts (VAR analysis): - A higher deficit of 1 percent of annual GDP in each month leads to depreciation of 1.2 percent after four months, and consequently an increase in month-on-month (m-o-m) inflation of 0.15 percent on average in the next six months (equivalent to a 2.3 percent increase in year-on-year (y-o-y) inflation). - A RM expansion of 1 percent of annual GDP in a given month depreciates the currency by 1.7 percent in six months, and thus increases m-o-m inflation of 0.21 percent on average in the next six months (equivalent to 3 percent increase in y-o-y inflation). - The exchange rate stabilizes within two months of monetary and fiscal shocks, but m-o-m inflation continues to rise for up to six months following the shock. - Controlling for the exchange rate channel, the direct effect of monetary and fiscal policy on inflation is modest. - Drivers and structural features: - Three structural characteristics amplify these dynamics: - High dollarization: households mainly save in foreign currency. - Large import share of domestic demand due to capacity constraints. - Limited official statistics released with delays. - When fiscal or monetary policy expands liquidity, households convert excess local currency into foreign exchange, depreciating the exchange rate; the weaker exchange rate raises inflation through higher import costs and signals that influence price-setting. - Recent episodes: - Mid-2025 surge: Between March and June 2025, fiscal deficits and Reserve Money both increased; monthly inflation in June and July 2025 reached 2 percent in both months. - Model estimates attribute 32 percent of the observed inflation in June–July 2025 to loose fiscal policy and 19 percent to loose monetary policy. - 2024 disinflation: Contractionary monetary and fiscal policies in 2024 led to significant decline in inflation; fiscal policy explains 35 percent of the reduction and monetary policy explains 26 percent. The reduction occurred without FX intervention. - Policy implication and recommendation: - To control inflation, fiscal and monetary policy must remain restrictive. - The model confirms exchange-rate movements transmit policy effects to inflation; FX intervention to fight depreciation would only offset expansionary policies at the expense of reserves and macroeconomic stability. - Sustained fiscal and monetary discipline is effective and essential to preserve price stability in Suriname. *Source: Annex III–V of the IMF staff analysis contained in the provided PDF content.* ### Annex V. Figure 2. Suriname: Impulse Response Function of a Shock to Fiscal Policy ### Annex V. Figure 2. Suriname: Impulse Response Function of a Shock to Fiscal Policy ### Impulse responses on exchange rate (ER) and inflation (CPI) - Title and focus: - Annex V. Figure 2. Suriname: Impulse Response Function of a Shock to Fiscal Policy on ER and Inflation. - Graphical setup (as presented): - Horizontal axis: Months since shock (0 to 10). - Vertical axes labeled as "Exchange Rate (In percent)" and "CPI (In percent)" with tick values shown from negative to positive (example axis values include -0.6, -0.4, -0.2, 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4 for ER and -0.3, -0.2, -0.1, 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 for CPI in the figure). - Interpretation pointers included implicitly by figure placement: - The figure pairs the dynamic responses of exchange rate and CPI to a fiscal policy shock over a 10-month horizon. - A separate, analogous figure (Annex V. Figure 3) reports the impulse responses for a shock to monetary policy on ER and Inflation. ### Risk Assessment Matrix — Key risks, impacts, and policy responses - External conjunctural risks - Geopolitical Tensions - Likelihood: High - Impact: Medium - Economic effects summarized: Disruptions to energy and food prices; worsening fiscal and current account balances; inflation pressures due to higher import prices. - Policy response highlights: - Remain committed to fiscal discipline, protecting targeted fiscal support to ensure delivery of essential services; increase social assistance transfers. - Submit budgets with a margin with respect to fiscal rule spending ceilings. - Maintain appropriately restrictive monetary policy to keep inflation expectations anchored. - Escalating Trade Measures and Prolonged Uncertainty - Likelihood: High - Impact: Medium - Economic effects summarized: Reduction of investment, increased import prices and currency depreciation. - Policy response highlights: - Keep flexibility in exchange rate to act as a shock absorber. - Keep appropriately tight monetary policy stance, communicating and signaling strong commitment to keeping inflation in check. - Reprioritize spending to provide targeted fiscal support to the vulnerable. - Commodity Price Volatility - Likelihood: Low - Impact: High - Economic effects summarized: Increase in fuel and/or food prices would increase fuel import bill, worsen current account and external financing needs; increase inflation and exchange rate pressures; fuel subsidies could rise. Upside: increase in gold prices would increase fiscal revenues. Downside: decrease in gold prices would worsen fiscal and external balances. - Policy response highlights: - Calibrate multi-annual spending ceilings to avoid procyclicality and build buffers if upside risk materializes. - Reprioritize spending to provide targeted fiscal support to the most vulnerable. - Maintain appropriately tight monetary policy to keep inflation expectations anchored. - Continue and if needed accelerated electricity tariff adjustments. - Financial and fiscal external risks - Financial Market Volatility and Correction - Likelihood: High - Impact: Medium - Economic effects summarized: Higher global risk premium can delay reestablishment of regular market access and make refinancing of external debt obligations more challenging; negative feedback between sovereign and banks; asset quality deterioration for banks; exchange rate appreciation in trading partner countries could spike inflation in Suriname. - Policy response highlights: - Monitor the financial system and be ready to provide liquidity assistance if needed to maintain financial stability. - Adjust macroprudential measures to avoid an undue tightening of financial conditions. - Continue with fiscal discipline backed by structural reforms to increase fiscal sustainability and improve business/regulatory environment. - Maintain appropriately restrictive monetary policy. - Fiscal Vulnerabilities and Higher Long-Term Interest Rates - Likelihood: Medium - Impact: High - Economic effects summarized: Higher global risk premium can delay market access; higher funding costs for sovereign and corporates; capital outflows. - Policy response highlights: - Maintain fiscal discipline and tight monetary policy. - Seek additional concessional financing from IFIs and bilateral donors. - Avoid oil collateralized borrowing. - Decline in International Aid - Likelihood: High - Impact: Medium - Economic effects summarized: Lower resources for growth friendly capital expenditure and social spending for the vulnerable. - Policy response highlights: - Maintain fiscal discipline and tight monetary policy. - Seek additional financing from IFIs and bilateral donors. - Continue reform momentum to increase efficiency of capital expenditure and social spending. - Other external structural risks - Climate Change - Likelihood: Medium - Impact: Low - Economic effects summarized: Extreme climate shocks, like drought, would weaken fiscal position through higher spending on food and electricity subsidies and reduce government ability to mobilize revenues while increasing the need for more priority spending. - Policy response highlights: - Continue building capacity to monitor and assess climate change risks, including building a data collection mechanism. - Accelerate investment into climate resilient infrastructure and continue seeking climate financing. - Domestic risks - Loss of reform momentum - Likelihood: High - Impact: High - Economic effects summarized: Policy uncertainty could undermine confidence and hurt investment and growth; high spending could reduce purchasing power through exchange rate depreciation and inflation. - Policy response highlights: - Raise spending to meet social and development needs only gradually to allow capacity to execute and the economy’s ability to absorb it. - Counter inflationary and exchange rate pressures through tighter monetary policy and not FXI. - Accumulation of debt arrears - Likelihood: Low - Impact: High - Economic effects summarized: Could increase NPLs, erode bank capital, constrain financial intermediation and require fiscal resources to bail out troubled banks; missed payments to the central bank could weaken its balance sheet. - Policy response highlights: - Prioritize debt service payments by adhering to fiscal consolidation and improving debt management. - Decline in gold output - Likelihood: Medium - Impact: High - Economic effects summarized: Worsen current account and external financing needs; increased inflation and exchange rate pressures; lower fiscal revenues and aggravated financing constraints. - Policy response highlights: - Invest in enforcement efforts to counter smuggling. - Adhere and if needed accelerate fiscal consolidation. - Reprioritize spending and keep exchange rate flexible. - Higher-than-expected hydrocarbon output - Likelihood: High - Impact: High - Economic effects summarized: More hydrocarbon flows; more resources for growth friendly capital expenditure and social spending for the vulnerable. - Policy response highlights: - Continue building fiscal buffers and accumulating sovereign wealth fund assets. - Avoid windfall increase in spending to avoid loss of competitiveness in non-natural resource sector. - Incorporate latest available information in regular update of medium-term financial plan. ### Annex VII — Calibrating Fiscal Rules for Suriname and SDG spending - Institutional and legal context: - In December 2024, Suriname’s parliament passed legislation to strengthen the fiscal framework by introducing fiscal rules and revamping the Savings and Stabilization Fund Suriname (SSFS). - The legislation introduced two fiscal rules: every five years the government sets i) a target for public debt (net of assets in the SSFS) to be reached by the end of the five years, and ii) annual primary expenditure limits consistent with achieving the debt target. - The first Multi-Year Financial Plan is supposed to be submitted together with the 2026 budget and determine the framework for fiscal policy over 2026-30. - Mineral revenue and production projections (as stated) - Offshore oil production is expected to increase annual oil production from the current 6 million barrels to roughly 86 million barrels at its peak in 2029. - Total fiscal mineral revenues are expected to grow from USD 480 million in 2024 to peak at USD 3.2 billion in 2033 (90 percent of 2024 GDP). - Constraints and approach - Suriname faces financing and implementation capacity constraints: weak implementation capacity, slow structural reform progress, low domestic absorption capacity, and risks that fiscal stimulus can raise inflation and exchange rate pressures. Financing constraints persist despite the liability management operation. - Once sufficient market access is established and capacity constraints ease, expenditure can be scaled up gradually toward developmental goals; ultimately primary expenditure is assumed to converge to the path consistent with the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) so mineral wealth finances a constant real annuity in perpetuity. - Estimating SDG spending needs - Methodology: IMF Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) costing tool (third edition) used to estimate additional spending needs for education, health, roads, electricity, water and sanitation; methodology follows Gaspar et al. (2019) and Carapella et al. (2023). - Time horizon: analysis shifted to 2025-35 (starting from 2020 baseline earlier) given limited progress during early 2020s; projections updated for demographics, GDP per capita evolution, and electricity consumption. - Sectoral treatment: health and education distinguish public and private spending; infrastructure sectors assumed fully public. - Additional SDG spending (Annex VII. Table 1: Additional SDG Spending (Annualized) to Achieve Goals — In Percent of GDP, compared to 2025) - 2035: - Health: 1.4 - Education: 1.1 - Water & Sanitation: 0.4 - Electricty: 0.7 - Roads: 1.4 - Total: 4.9 - Note: Growth in non-resource GDP is applied to 2025 nominal GDP. - Figure note: The profile of ramping up SDG spending for 2025-35 reaches almost 10 percent of non-resource GDP (or 6 percent of GDP). - Recommended expenditure path and fiscal targets - Three phases of the recommended primary expenditure path: - Phase 1 (2026-27): constrained by financing limits that limit ramp up in developmental spending. - Phase 2 (2028-35): SDG attainment phase where Suriname spends more than the PIH-recommended level to achieve developmental goals; regular market access and oil revenues remove financing constraints and implementation capacity eases gradually. - Phase 3 (post-2035): convergence of expenditure to the PIH-calibrated path conditional on 2025-35 spending (illustrative drop in spending after 2035 noted as illustrative and not recommended). - 2030 debt target: - The target debt net of SSFS assets in 2030 stands at roughly SRD 201 billion, implying debt net of SSFS assets decreasing by about one third as a share of non-resource GDP over 2026-30. - Budgeting guidance: - Spending ceilings reported are maximum values, not spending targets; budgets are generally expected to be set below ceilings and execution below ceilings. - Spending should factor in the cyclical position of the economy: spending well below ceilings may be needed to reduce inflation and depreciation pressures; spending closer to ceilings may be appropriate during economic softness. - Budgeting primary spending within ceilings provides room for additional spending to respond to adverse shocks without invoking the escape clause. *Source: Annex V, Annex VI, and Annex VII text and figures from the provided IMF PDF content.* ### Annex VII. Figure 1. ### Annex VII. Figure 1. Suriname: Scaling Up in SDG Spending ### Multiannual Financial Plan: Key fiscal aggregates (SRD Millions, 2026–2030) - Primary Spending Ceiling: - 2026: 57,423 - 2027: 66,245 - 2028: 77,958 - 2029: 93,555 - 2030: 104,848 - Gross Public Debt: - 2026: 200,179 - 2027: 217,355 - 2028: 223,919 - 2029: 222,249 - 2030: 220,671 - SSFS Assets: - 2026: 0 - 2027: 0 - 2028: 0 - 2029: 10,231 - 2030: 19,230 - Debt net of SSFS Assets: - 2026: 200,179 - 2027: 217,355 - 2028: 223,919 - 2029: 212,019 - 2030: 201,441 ### Fiscal aggregates as percent of Non-resource GDP (2026–2030) - Primary Spending Ceiling (% of non-resource GDP): - 2026: 48.8 - 2027: 50.6 - 2028: 53.4 - 2029: 57.1 - 2030: 56.4 - Gross Public Debt (% of non-resource GDP): - 2026: 170.0 - 2027: 165.9 - 2028: 153.5 - 2029: 135.6 - 2030: 118.7 - SSFS Assets (% of non-resource GDP): - 2026: 0.0 - 2027: 0.0 - 2028: 0.0 - 2029: 6.2 - 2030: 10.3 - Debt net of SSFS Assets (% of non-resource GDP): - 2026: 170.0 - 2027: 165.9 - 2028: 153.5 - 2029: 129.4 - 2030: 108.4 ### Fiscal aggregates as percent of Total GDP (2026–2030) - Primary Spending Ceiling (% of total GDP): - 2026: 27.6 - 2027: 28.1 - 2028: 24.4 - 2029: 19.7 - 2030: 21.1 - Gross Public Debt (% of total GDP): - 2026: 96.2 - 2027: 92.1 - 2028: 70.0 - 2029: 46.7 - 2030: 44.3 - SSFS Assets (% of total GDP): - 2026: 0.0 - 2027: 0.0 - 2028: 0.0 - 2029: 2.2 - 2030: 3.9 - Debt net of SSFS Assets (% of total GDP): - 2026: 96.2 - 2027: 92.1 - 2028: 70.0 - 2029: 44.6 - 2030: 40.5 ### Memo: Nominal GDP and Non-Resource GDP (SRD Millions) - Nominal Non-Resource GDP: - 2026: 117,743 - 2027: 131,048 - 2028: 145,860 - 2029: 163,888 - 2030: 185,882 - Nominal GDP: - 2026: 208,013 - 2027: 236,008 - 2028: 320,079 - 2029: 475,733 - 2030: 497,622 ### SDG spending trajectory (annual change, % of non-resource GDP) - Annual change in SDG spending (% of non-resource GDP): - 2026: 0.0 - 2027: 1.0 - 2028: 2.4 - 2029: 2.4 - 2030: 1.3 ### Presented projections and scenario labels (figure elements) - Series and scenario labels shown in figure captions and axes: - Primary Balance - PIH - PIH with SDG and Fiscal Constraints - Anchor Calibration: Real annuity - Axis units and captions referenced in figures: - Billion 2025 prices - % non-resource GDP - Primary Expenditure (Billion 2025 prices and % non-resource GDP) - Time horizon shown: 2026 through 2056 (figure x-axes) *Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning; and IMF Staff calculations.* ### 2023. CD is needed to modernize the corporate income tax system and establish a tax policy ### 2023. CD is needed to modernize the corporate income tax system and establish a tax policy unit at the Ministry of Finance to actively guide policy reform. CD may also be needed to review the existing fiscal regime governing the operation of the mining companies and to broadly ### Capacity Development priorities and actions - Tax policy and revenue administration - Modernize the corporate income tax system and establish a tax policy unit at the Ministry of Finance to actively guide policy reform. - Review the existing fiscal regime governing the operation of the mining companies and broadly support strengthening of natural resource taxation given potential for significant oil revenues in the medium-term. - Prioritize targeted capacity development (CD) to support development of a program for administering the extractive industry integrated into the establishment of a semi-autonomous revenue agency (SARA); the Fund is providing CD support for SARA implementation readiness (mission: FAD, Sept 2025). - CD is supporting effective management and administration of the VAT focusing on filing and payment compliance, refunds, and arrears management; strengthening of audit function and compliance in both tax and customs; and upgrading of IT systems. - Expenditure policy - CD to identify immediate savings amid financing constraints and to resist spending pressures when the oil windfall materializes; examples include: - subsidy reforms, - rationalizing the government wage bill, - strengthening social safety nets. - CD to support reform of energy sector governance, management of the state-owned electricity company (EBS), and electricity tariff pricing structure. The IDB provided assistance for an independent financial assessment of EBS. A FAD TA on energy subsidies reform was completed in 2023 and guided electricity tariff reforms. - CD to improve design and targeting of social transfer programs; authorities developed a time bound action plan to strengthen social protection with ILO support. Additional CD needed for implementation of the social protection strategic plan. - Monetary operations and central bank governance - CD will support transition to inflation targeting. Authorities adopted a flexible exchange rate regime in 2021 and transitioned to a reserve money target (RMT) framework; RMT helped restore confidence, contain inflation, and rebuild international reserves. - An MCM diagnostic mission in October 2025 assisted the CBvS in developing a road map for a well-sequenced potential move to inflation targeting; CD will facilitate implementation of that road map. - CD focus areas: modelling and forecasting, monetary policy decision making, liquidity management, reserve management, communications, and developing a medium-term framework for foreign exchange operations and market development. - Authorities revised the CBvS law to improve governance; intend to align the foreign exchange regulation of 1947 with the central bank law 2022 with LEG support. - Financial regulation and supervision - CD to strengthen financial regulation and supervision; bank supervision law revised to facilitate risk-based supervision and give CBvS powers to assess banks’ business strategies, governance, risk management, capital planning, budget forecasting, valuation of collateral, and profit and loss projections. - Resolution framework strengthened to increase CBvS powers and tools for early intervention, recovery, and resolution. - LEG and MCM supporting development of the bank resolution law and operationalizing the Bank Resolution Unit; next steps include assistance in developing and implementing regulations related to bank resolution and establishing a macroprudential framework. - CARTAC to support development of a macroprudential framework focused on institutional arrangements, evaluating policy toolkits, and developing a roadmap to a fully-fledged framework. - Strengthening the quality of economic data - CD to strengthen statistical institutions: bureau of statistics, Debt Management Office (SDMO), and planning office. - Government finance statistics (GFS): enhance institutional arrangements, improve collection and processing of source data, establish and maintain an up-to-date list of public entities (Institutional Table), starting with central government entities. - Debt statistics: ongoing CD to strengthen SDMO on public debt data compilation and reporting; additional resources needed for hands-on support in fiscal and public debt data collection and compilation; CD will support development of domestic capital markets. - Real sector statistics: improve quality and timeliness of national accounts and prices; national accounts currently available only at annual frequency and published with an eight to nine-month lag. CD assisting compilation of annual expenditure-based GDP estimates and development of a residential property price index (RPPI). Shortening lag and producing quarterly national accounts are vital for economic management. - Improving governance, AML/CFT and anti-corruption - CD to strengthen AML/CFT framework to align with international standards with funding from Phase III of the Fund’s AML/CFT Thematic Trust Fund. - CD to strengthen income and assets provisions of the anti-corruption law and mandate income and asset declaration of high-ranking public officials and politically exposed persons. - CD needed to support development of a governance code for the public sector. ### Findings on SOEs and fiscal risks - Coverage and fiscal dependence - GFSM definition: Suriname has about 66 SOEs organized across sectors; the government counts 166 SOEs though most are not SOEs per GFS. - Government subsidies and transfers accounted for about 37.1 percent of total government expenditures in 2022 and declined to about 25.7 percent in 2024, partly reflecting reduction of fuel and electricity subsidies under EFF implementation. - Total liabilities of the SOE sector (22 SOEs with data) at end-June 2024 are about 26 percent of GDP with Staatsolie accounting for about 38 percent of the total. - For ten selected SOEs, total liability at end-2022 was 21 percent of GDP. - In May 2025, Staatsolie contracted a bank loan facility for its 20 percent equity participation in the Block 58 oil development project. - SOE financial health (IMF SOE Health Check Tool, period 2018–22) - The HCT compares profitability, liquidity, and solvency measures against international risk thresholds and produces composite overall risk ratings from very low risk to very high risk. - Data limitations: most SOEs have a backlog in publishing annual reports; only six of ten SOEs have consistent data for all years; for remaining SOEs, analysis used latest available data. - Key results: - Three SOEs fall into the high-risk category and three SOEs fall into the highest risk category in 2022. - Staatsolie (STA) is low risk due to strong profitability and solvency indicators. - Debt to earnings ratio exhibits the highest relative risk with eight SOEs in the very high-risk category. - Very few SOEs recover costs by generating revenues to cover operating expenses. - Profitability and liquidity trends: - Return on assets and return on equity increased marginally between 2020 and 2022 but remain very low relative to international benchmarks. - Only four of the 10 selected SOEs fall in the low to moderate risk category for profitability. - Liquidity improved but few SOEs can meet short-term liabilities with sufficient liquid assets. - SOE governance weaknesses - Decentralized management with no overarching policy on government ownership or the state's role. - Shareholding roles exercised by line ministries, merging ownership and policy responsibilities; financial oversight remains with Ministry of Finance. - Governance weaknesses identified: - No sector-wide ownership document stating government policies and ownership rationale for each SOE. - Ministries can constitute parastatals as statutory corporations, foundations, or companies under the Companies Act and retain policy direction, funding, regulation, and reform responsibilities. - Supervisory and board members nominated by line ministries and approved by the President, with no provisions for independence from political parties or conflict of interest regulation. - SOE Unit in the Ministry of Finance lacks a legal basis for financial oversight responsibilities and is understaffed; dual reporting lines persist. - Large implementation gap in financial oversight: most SOEs do not submit financial statements to the Ministry of Finance; compliance with legal provisions for publishing audited financial statements is uneven. - Rekenkamer mandate to audit SOEs is undermined by sporadic audits due to limited report availability and capacity constraints. ### Policy recommendations for SOEs and fiscal risk management - Short-term priorities - Enhance timely and regular collection of accessible financial data from major SOEs, including provision of financial statements to the Ministry of Finance and timely publication of audited financial statements to increase transparency. - Monitor SOEs with weak financial positions and integrate reporting to enhance fiscal transparency and oversight; extend monitoring to entities receiving on-lending from the central government. - Improve coverage of SOE debt and transparency on transactions with the central government and among SOEs to better identify potential fiscal risks. - Governance and institutional reforms - Review the underlying legal framework and develop a consistent ownership policy while strengthening financial oversight. - Establish a centralized and well-equipped SOE oversight unit, separating policy and regulatory functions from oversight; international experience suggests centralized oversight units in ministries of finance or independent authorities are better equipped to assess fiscal risks. - Strengthen appointment mechanisms and criteria, safeguard board member tenure, emphasize merit-based selection and technical expertise to improve SOE performance. - Sector rationalization and privatization - Rationalize the sector by closing non-performing enterprises and/or privatizing them to improve efficiency and reduce reliance on government subsidies. - A bill to rationalize SOEs is expected to be submitted to the National Assembly with IDB support; a privatization law has been drafted and approved by the Council of Ministers. - Reforms should follow OECD guidelines: strengthen state oversight, enhance competition with private sector, professionalize governing bodies, increase data transparency, and strengthen regulation. ### Challenges, risks, and mitigation factors - Risks to CD implementation - Key constraints: limited skilled human resources, weak information technology infrastructure, and absorption capacity constraints increase risk of delayed implementation of CD recommendations. - Incorporation of CD recommendations into surveillance priorities and advice can help mitigate risks and strengthen traction. - Under the EFF, critical CD recommendations were adopted and incorporated into the program, yielding significant progress in reliability, transparency, and consistency of information. - Given turnover of technical staff and recent changes in government, follow-up and repeat CD activities are unavoidable; CD recommendations should be implemented gradually but steadily with sufficient planning and resource allocation. - The Fund’s resident representative office will continue to play a critical role in coordinating CD between the authorities and CD providers. *Source: IMF staff summary of capacity development priorities, SOE assessment, and policy recommendations contained in the provided document.* ### Annex XI. Table 2. Suriname: Selected SOEs ### Annex XI. Table 2. Suriname: Selected SOEs ### Selected State-Owned Enterprises - Staatsolie Maatschappij Suriname N.V. (STA) — Exploration, exploitation, and commercialization of hydrocarbons — Mining - N.V. Energiebedrijven Suriname (EBS) — Transmission of electrical energy — Energy - N.V. Telecommunicatiebedrijf Suriname (TEL) — Provide telecommunication services — Telecommunications - N.V. Havenbeheer Suriname (HVB) — Port and shipping services — Transport - N.V. Surinaamsche Waterleiding Maatschappij (SWM) — Water supply and sewage — Water - Suriname American Industries Ltd. (SAIL) — Fish processing — Fisheries - Melkcentrale Paramaribo N.V. (MCP) — Manufacture of dairy products — Dairy - Canawaima Ferry Service (CAN) — Crossborder maritime transport Suriname-Guyana — Transport - Nationaal Vervoer Bedrijf N.V. (NVB) — Public transportation services by road and water — Transport - Surinaamse Televisie Stichting (STVS) — Programming and broadcasting activities — Media *Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning* ### SOE Financial Indicators — Key observations (Figures 3 and 4) - Coverage period and indicators shown: 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022 for multiple series including Total Assets (LHS), Return on Assets (RHS), Total Equity (LHS), Return on Equity (RHS), Total Current Assets, Total Current Liabilities, Current Ratio (RHS), Total Liabilities (Percent of GDP), EBITDA, Debt to EBITDA (RHS), Debt to Assets, Debt to Equity, Solvency, Interest Coverage, Cash Interest Coverage, Net Worth by Sector (Percent of GDP). - Aggregate asset and profitability markers (as depicted): - Repeated plotted values include 0.0 and 0.1 for asset/return series across the 2018–2022 period (labels show 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.1, 0.1 in graph annotations). - Equity and returns: - Total Equity (LHS) and Return on Equity (RHS) series display small magnitudes with annotations including -0.1, -0.1, 0.0, 0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.2 across the plotted years. - Liquidity structure (2022, percent of GDP, cross-SOE comparisons): - Liquid Assets, Current Liabilities, Net Liquid Assets are shown by SOE for 2022 with an order of SOEs in several charts: EBS, SWM, NVB, CAN, STVS, MCP, SAIL, HVB, TEL, STA. - Liabilities and profitability by SOE (2022): - Total Liabilities (LHS), EBITDA (LHS), Debt to EBITDA (RHS) are displayed per SOE in 2022 with an SOE order: STA, EBS, TEL, HVB, SWM, SAIL, MCP, CAN, STVS, NVB. - Current assets and liabilities (indicator series): - Total Current Assets and Total Current Liabilities plotted 2018–2022 with Current Ratio (RHS); repeated chart annotations include values such as 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4 that describe the Current Ratio and related scales. - Solvency and leverage metrics (2018–2022): - Debt to Assets, Debt to Equity, Solvency series show repeated annotation values of 0.5 and 0.6 across years (charts annotate 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6, 0.6). - Total Liabilities are shown as Percent of GDP with chart axis ticks 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20 for 2018–2022. - Share of Total Liabilities by SOE (Percent of GDP, 2022): - SOEs listed in cumulative-share charts: STA, EBS, TEL, HVB, SWM, SAIL, MCP, STVS, CAN, NVB; cumulative-share axis labeled 0, 20, 40, 60, 80, 100. - SOE liability size versus overall risk (Percent of GDP, 2022): - Chart denotes "Overall Risk Rating" categories including "Category 1" through "Category 5" and plots Total Liabilities with axis ticks 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25. - Interest coverage (2018–2022): - Interest Coverage, Cash Interest Coverage, and Interest Coverage series annotated with values up to 3.0 on the vertical scale for 2018–2022 and separate plotted range showing negative to positive values labeled -10, 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 for sectoral net worth series. - Net worth by sector (Percent of GDP, 2018–2022): - Sectors displayed: Electricity and Gas, Mining, Transportation, Water Utilities, Other activities, Other Industries, Total. Sectoral net worth plotted across 2018–2022 with axis ticks -10, 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60. ### Visual and data structure notes (as presented) - Multiple figure panels repeat indicator sets across Figures 3 and 4, with consistent SOE ordering in per-company bar/column charts: STA, EBS, TEL, HVB, SWM, SAIL, MCP, CAN, STVS, NVB. - Axes and annotation ticks reproduced in source figures include exact sequences such as: - 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 (percent of GDP axes) - -40, -30, -20, -10, 0, 10, 20, 30, 40 (liability/EBITDA axes) - 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6 (ratio axes) - 0.0, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0 (interest coverage axes) *Annex XI. Table 2 and Figures 3–4 — Source: Ministry of Finance and Planning* ### Annex VI of the Staff Report). Key CD activities delivered in the last decade is presented below. ### SURINAME — Capacity Development Activities, 2020–25 and Statements (Annex VI of the Staff Report) ### Capacity Development activities (overview) - Resident Representative: The Fund has an office in Paramaribo opened in June 2022 by the current resident representative, Charles Amo-Yartey. - Major capacity development areas delivered (2020–25) included technical assistance and training across: - Tax Policy and Revenue Administration (e.g., TADAT Assessment; VAT auditing; strengthening management of VAT refunds; assessing SARA readiness). - Public Financial Management (e.g., Moving to a Modern Treasury Function; Accounting and Financial Reporting; Strengthening Budget Planning and Preparation; macrofiscal forecasting; Charts of Accounts; Debt recording and debt management strategy; PFM priority action plan and expenditure control; Institutional development of the SDMO; Expenditure controls and arrears management). - Financial Market Supervision (e.g., enhancing stress testing framework; IFRS 9 and 17 implementation Insurance Sector; enhancing systemic risk monitoring; operational risk management and capital requirement; strengthening liquidity risk management). - Central Bank Operations and Monetary Policy (e.g., Monetary policy, FX operations & framework and Debt market development; Calibration of Reserve Money Targets; Transition to IFRS phase I and II; Enhancing reserve management framework and operations; Liquidity forecasting and participation in open market operations; Transition to inflation targeting). - National Accounts and Price Statistics (e.g., national account statistics to improve GDP estimates; residential property price index work). - External Sector Statistics and Government Finance Statistics (multiple reviews and missions). - Other areas: AML/CFT framework and anti-corruption; Monetary and financial statistics; Public sector debt compilation and reporting; Risk-based AML/CFT supervision; Strengthening AML/CFT legal framework; Governance and anti-corruption. - Multiple providers engaged: FAD, CARTAC, MCM, STA, LEG and others across targeted mission dates between 2020 and 2025. ### Statement by the IMF Staff Representative (January 26, 2026) — key points - VRI buyout and financing: - VRIs issued in the 2023 debt restructuring had an initial notional value of US$ 315 million and an accrual rate of 9 percent per year. - Authorities used proceeds from the November 2025 bond issuance (part of a liability management operation) to finance the repayment. - The government repaid the entire outstanding balance of US$ 381 million on January 12, 2026. - Fiscal and cash implications: - Immediate decline in escrow cash balances; escrow balances expected to be run down faster than under the staff report baseline. - The transaction frees up royalty payments that would have been made to VRI holders, producing lower primary spending than under the baseline from 2028 onwards. - Under the baseline, the freed royalty payments are equivalent to an average of 0.5 percent of GDP per year between 2028 and 2038. - No immediate change in the debt stock relative to the staff report because future VRI claims had been projected and the bond issued to finance the buyout was already incorporated. ### Statement by Mr. Roncaglia (Executive Director for Suriname) and Mr. Antunes — authorities’ views (January 26, 2026) - Context and political cycle: - Pre-election fiscal slippages contributed to exchange rate and price pressures. - A complex, homegrown stabilization program under an IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF) was implemented between 2021 and Q1 2025. - Post-program and pre-election period (March–May 2025) saw moderated reform momentum and incomplete anchoring of achievements. - Oil and investment outlook: - Final Investment Decision for offshore oil development reached in October 2024. - Planned investments of USD 10.5 billion between 2025 and 2028 to extract a minimum of 750 million barrels from Block 58. - Development of additional oil and natural gas blocks planned for 2026 and 2027 by companies including Petronas, Shell, and Chevron. - Authorities expect material oil-related inflows starting in 2028 and emphasize the need to safeguard transparency and governance for large revenues. - Inflation and monetary policy: - Inflation declined from 60 percent in 2021 to around 6 percent in February 2025, rose to 11 percent due to pre-election policy misalignments, and fell to a low of 5.7 percent in March–April 2025. - Inflation rose in June 2025 amid domestic demand pressures and exchange rate depreciation; estimated to return to single-digit levels in 2026. - CBvS has tightened monetary policy since March 2025 via open market operations; FX interventions are rule-based and aimed at addressing disorderly market conditions. - Transition planned from reserve money targeting to a new monetary policy framework in anticipation of oil inflows; focus on developing an interbank market and modernizing liquidity management. - Public debt and fiscal stance: - Public debt burden remained steady at 120 percent of GDP after the significant recapitalization of the CBvS in January 2025. - Authorities renegotiated with bondholders to lower near-term repayment and interest burdens, and to buy out expensive loans and the VRI; VRI buyback finalized in the second week of January 2026. - New administration preparing measures to rationalize and monitor spending, improve revenue collection, and tighten monetary policy. - Monthly expenditure caps are ongoing; discussions on the 2026 Budget were postponed from December 2025 to January 2026 to explore further containment of pre-election expenditures. - Revenue mobilization and tax administration: - VAT introduced in 2023; Tax Office reports VAT revenues are 25 percent higher than projected. - Authorities aim to strengthen enforcement rather than increase tariffs; expect to collect more tax from the gold sector. - A project to reform the small-scale gold subsector includes registering small-scale miners, registering miners’ equipment, training field rangers as inspectors, and establishing a remote revenue collection system. - Tax Amnesty program covers the period from 2023 to December 2025; until November 2025, more than SRD 600 million was collected, exceeding the SRD 500 million target. - Asycuda system is being evaluated by UNCTAD; establishment of the Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authority (SARA) is ongoing with IDB financial support. - Social policy and inclusion: - Social spending closely monitored; efforts to enhance efficiency to ensure eligible households receive cash transfers. - Administration emphasizes job creation from agro-industry and eco-tourism, and expanded agricultural education across educational levels. - Spending ceilings to be included in the 2026 budget and the multi-annual financial plan; IMF/FAD technical assistance scheduled starting the third week of January 2026 to support arrears management and reconciliation. - Governance, PFM, and international support: - PFM Act and Savings and Stabilization Fund (SSFS) Act enacted on December 31, 2024. - Fund supported quantifications of primary expenditure and total public debt rules incorporated in the PFM law. - CARTAC assisting Ministry of Finance and Planning to make the Medium-term Fiscal Framework (MTFF) operational. - State Decree to operationalize the SSFS and PFM Act is in an advanced stage. - Authorities seek tailored technical assistance to enhance capacity, transparency, and governance ahead of large revenue inflows from 2028. - Supreme Audit Institution (Rekenkamer) and Central Government Auditing Bureau (CLAD) need staff and financial capacity strengthening; internal audit departments of ministries are severely understaffed. - Continued support from development partners (e.g., IDB, Netherlands, UNCTAD, CARTAC) highlighted as essential. - Central Bank and financial sector: - CBvS published 2023 financial statement reporting a profit of more than SRD 4 billion after IFRS corrections, ending four years of operational losses. - Recapitalization of CBvS in early 2025 strengthens capital and reserves; future audit-related recapitalization needs remain subject to usual uncertainties. - Energy and infrastructure: - Energy supply vulnerabilities exposed by reduced hydro-electricity capacity during droughts; emergency generator plans were shelved when rains returned. - State electricity company (EBS) plans to increase capacity by 300 to 400 MW through several phases; first phase to add 84 MW at a cost of approximately USD 200 million. - Plans to increase renewable energy production, especially solar, expected to materialize later in the year. ### Key numeric indicators and benchmarks (preserved values) - VRI initial notional value: US$ 315 million. - VRI accrual rate: 9 percent per year. - Outstanding VRI balance repaid: US$ 381 million (repaid on January 12, 2026). - Average fiscal benefit under baseline from freed royalty payments: 0.5 percent of GDP per year between 2028 and 2038. - Final Investment Decision investments: USD 10.5 billion (between 2025 and 2028) to extract a minimum of 750 million barrels from Block 58. - Public debt burden: 120 percent of GDP (after CBvS recapitalization in January 2025). - Inflation path: 60 percent in 2021; around 6 percent in February 2025; rose to 11 percent before the elections; low of 5.7 percent in March–April 2025; estimated single-digit levels in 2026. - CBvS 2023 profit: more than SRD 4 billion. - VAT revenues: 25 percent higher than projected. - Tax Amnesty collections until November 2025: more than SRD 600 million (exceeding SRD 500 million target). - Energy capacity expansion: EBS aims to increase capacity by 300 to 400 MW; first phase adds 84 MW costing approximately USD 200 million. - PFM and SSFS Acts enactment date: December 31, 2024. *Annex VI (Staff Report) — Suriname: Capacity Development Activities, statements, and authorities’ views (as contained in the supplied content).* --- _Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1surea2026001-source-pdf.pdf_