## 1surea2026002

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---

### Executive Summary — Context and Recent Developments
- Context:
  - Following successful completion of a Fund-supported program, economic growth has been robust, fiscal outturns have improved following the unwinding of pre-election excesses, and the sovereign has been able to tap global debt markets to fund liability management operations.
  - Efforts to contain reserve money growth have been insufficient and inflation has risen into double digits.
  - Starting in 2028, oil output is expected to increase significantly, boosting fiscal revenues, exports, and foreign exchange reserves.
  - Suriname’s credit outstanding to the Fund is projected to remain above 200 percent of quota through 2030.
  - Objective: focus on Suriname’s capacity to repay the Fund and the policies and risks that could affect that capacity.
- Recent developments (selected):
  - Non-natural resource GDP growth: estimated to have grown more than 4 percent in 2025.
  - Gold production: continued to disappoint in the second half of 2025 due to gold smuggling and less favorable geology; record high gold prices have had a large effect on nominal GDP.
  - Inflation:
    - Annual inflation rose to around 11 percent in recent months (reflecting loose monetary and fiscal policy in H1 2025).
    - Monthly inflation fell to 0.4 percent in March 2026.
  - Fiscal outcome 2025:
    - 2025 primary balance was 1.4 percent of GDP (excluding the recapitalization of the central bank, which amounted to 5.4 percent of GDP).
  - Credit growth:
    - Credit grew by 36 percent in 2025 (FX credit grew at 41 percent).
    - Credit growth slowed to 6 percent (annualized) in the first two months of 2026.
  - External sector:
    - Current account deficit widened to 53 percent of GDP in 2025.
    - SRD/USD exchange rate depreciated by 9 percent in 2025.
    - International reserves were US$ 1.8 billion or 112 percent of the reserve adequacy metric in March 2026.
  - Liability management and debt operations:
    - November 2025: issued US$ 1.6 billion in Eurobonds and bought back 2033 Eurobonds.
    - January 2026: oil-linked value recovery instruments (VRIs) were repurchased.
    - February 2026: issued an additional US$ 265 million in Eurobonds due in 2035 (of which US$ 186 million held as foreign exchange reserves at the central bank to finance social expenditures).
    - As at end-March, cash in the escrow (not part of international reserves) is about US$ 475 million or 8 percent of GDP.
    - Additional cash buffers held at CBvS are about US$ 400 million, including US$ 360 million in FX deposits.

### Outlook and Risks
- Growth and inflation outlook:
  - GDP growth expected to remain robust as oil investments gather steam; resource GDP to get a significant boost with commencement of new oil production in 2028.
  - Moderate positive spillovers to non-natural resource GDP.
  - Rise in global energy prices in Q1 2026 expected to postpone a decline in annual inflation; inflation now expected to return to single digits only in 2027.
- Fiscal and external outlook:
  - Elevated prices of oil and gold will boost fiscal revenues, especially once offshore oil production starts.
  - The new oil field is expected to add 20 percent of 2025 GDP to fiscal revenues by 2029.
  - A substantial portion of fiscal revenues is expected to be used to accumulate assets and reduce debt.
  - Debt net of sovereign wealth fund assets is expected to fall by 70 percent between end-2025 and end-2031.
  - Current account deficit expected to turn into a surplus after new oil production starts; shift to surplus by 2029.
  - FX reserves expected to grow modestly with majority of public savings placed in a separate sovereign wealth fund.
- Downside risks (selected):
  - Recent bond issuance could create pressures for higher untargeted spending.
  - Domestic drought (El Niño) could increase use of thermal electricity generation, adding to fiscal deficit.
  - Decline in gold prices or further decline in gold production would undermine export and fiscal revenues.
  - Adverse fiscal slippage scenario: primary balance reduction of about 1 percent and 2 percent of GDP relative to baseline in 2026 and 2027, respectively, could increase inflation, add to gross financing needs, reduce end-2027 foreign exchange reserves, and erode government cash buffers.
- Oil price scenarios (Text Table 1 summary):
  - Oil Price (Average Petroleum Spot Price) — Reference / Baseline / Adverse / Severe Adverse: 82 103 113 137 676 124 (as listed in source table).
  - Selected macro outcomes (examples):
    - Real GDP Growth: 3.9 / 3.9 / 3.4 (2026) and 4.4 / 4.2 / 3.7 (2027).
    - Inflation (EOP): 9.7 / 12.0 / 13.5 (2026) and 8.1 / 8.1 / 9.0 (2027).
    - Primary Balance: 1.6 / 1.5 / 1.4 (2026) and 2.0 / 2.0 / 1.9 (2027).
    - Current Account Balance: -44.8 / -45.8 / -46.2 (2026) and -42.2 / -42.5 / -44.2 (2027).
    - Gross International Reserves (excl. ring-fenced FX reserves): 1/1.7 / 1.5 / 1.3 (2026) and 2.0 / 1.8 / 1.4 (2027).
    - SRD Billion: 2.8 / 4.1 / 7.5 (2026).
    - Percent of baseline GDP: 1.2 / 1.7 / 2.6 (2026).
- Hydrocarbon revenue risks:
  - Upside: development of additional offshore oil and gas fields, conditional on sound resource management.
  - Downside: medium-term stress scenario of lower global oil prices and lower production from Block 58 would weaken fiscal revenues, exports, and GDP.

### Capacity to Repay — Overview and Metrics
- Timing and profile of IMF obligations:
  - Obligations under the EFF start in 2026 and are equivalent to about 25 percent of quota per year in the short term before rising to a peak of 66 percent of quota in 2030, with the last repurchase scheduled for 2035.
  - Outstanding IMF credit reached SDR 431 million (US$ 581 million or 334 percent of quota) in 2025 following last disbursements under the EFF in March 2025.
- Liquidity effects of liability management:
  - Liability management operations increased authorities’ liquidity and postponed some amortizations to after Block 58 oil revenues commence.
  - Amortizations include more than US$ 500 million of Eurobonds due in 2030.
- Capacity-to-repay metrics under current policies (adequacy assessment):
  - Outstanding IMF credit projected at 35 percent of gross international reserves excluding commercial banks’ ring-fenced reserves (GIR) in 2026 and 28 percent of GIR in 2027.
  - Nominal obligations peak in 2030 at US$ 118 million, equivalent to:
    - 2.5 percent of GIR
    - 0.9 percent of GDP
    - 1.1 percent of exports
    - 3.4 percent of fiscal revenues (ratio for revenues peaks at 3.7 percent in 2028-9)
  - Indicators decline significantly after 2030.
- Capacity under alternative scenarios (selected):
  - Short-term higher oil price scenarios: capacity-to-repay indicators based on fiscal revenues and gross exports improve; capacity metrics based on international reserves are modestly lower due to worse current account balance.
  - Fiscal slippage scenario: Fund credit outstanding could reach almost 40 percent of GIR with flow obligations of 3.4 percent of GIR in 2027.
  - Low oil revenue medium-term scenario (Annex II): outstanding IMF credit would be 28 percent of GIR in 2027; obligations would peak at 2.7 percent of GIR in 2028, 1.8 percent of exports in 2029, and 5.4 percent of fiscal revenues in 2029.

### Capacity to Repay — Authorities’ Assessment and Fund Indicators (selected exact values)
- Authorities:
  - Assessed the risks to oil production to be small due to robust well testing and ongoing additional drilling.
  - Committed to timely repayment of their obligations to the Fund.
- Indicators of Fund Credit — Baseline Scenario (selected time series 2024–2035, SDR million unless noted):
  - Existing and prospective Fund credit (Disbursements): 186.9, 46.8, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0.
  - Stock of existing and prospective Fund credit: 383.9, 430.7, 420.9, 404.4, 363.8, 295.9, 224.2, 152.4, 90.4, 35.1, 3.9, 0.0.
  - Obligations: 17.6, 19.3, 28.7, 34.8, 57.9, 83.3, 84.9, 82.5, 70.3, 61.7, 35.8, 7.8.
  - Principal (repayments/repurchases): 0.0, 0.0, 9.8, 16.4, 40.6, 67.9, 71.8, 71.8, 61.9, 55.4, 31.2, 3.9.
  - Charges and interest: 17.6, 19.3, 18.9, 18.3, 17.2, 15.4, 13.1, 10.7, 8.4, 6.3, 4.7, 3.9.
  - Fund obligations (repurchases and charges) in percent of Quota: 13.6, 15.0, 22.3, 27.0, 44.9, 64.6, 65.8, 64.0, 54.5, 47.9, 27.8, 6.0.
  - Fund credit outstanding in percent of Quota: 297.8, 334.1, 326.5, 313.8, 282.2, 229.6, 173.9, 118.2, 70.2, 27.2, 3.0, 0.0.
  - Memorandum items: Quota (SDR million) 129 (each year 2024–2035); Gross domestic product (USD million): 4,434; 4,664; 5,855; 6,642; 8,813; 12,914; 13,404; 13,859; 14,170; 13,940; 13,654; 13,486.
- Indicators of Fund Credit — Medium-Term Adverse Scenario (selected):
  - Disbursements: 186.9, 46.8, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0.
  - Stock of existing and prospective Fund credit: 383.9, 430.7, 420.9, 404.4, 363.8, 295.9, 224.2, 152.4, 90.4, 35.1, 3.9, 0.0.
  - Obligations: 17.6, 19.3, 28.7, 34.8, 57.9, 83.3, 84.9, 82.5, 70.3, 61.7, 35.8, 7.8.
  - Principal (repayments/repurchases): 0.0, 0.0, 9.8, 16.4, 40.6, 67.9, 71.8, 71.8, 61.9, 55.4, 31.2, 3.9.
  - Charges and interest: 17.6, 19.3, 18.9, 18.3, 17.2, 15.4, 13.1, 10.7, 8.4, 6.3, 4.7, 3.9.
  - Fund obligations (repurchases and charges) in percent of GDP: 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.7, 1.2, 1.4, 1.1, 1.0, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.1.
  - Fund credit outstanding in percent of GDP: 11.5, 12.5, 9.9, 8.6, 7.3, 5.0, 3.0, 1.9, 1.0, 0.4, 0.0, 0.0.
  - Memorandum items (GDP USD million): 4,434; 4,664; 5,855; 6,499; 6,917; 8,232; 10,457; 10,947; 12,847; 13,183; 13,120; 13,036.

### Policies and Recommendations (summarized)
- Fiscal policy (findings and recommendations):
  - Findings:
    - Draft 2026 budget targets a primary balance of -1.7 percent of GDP and plans to boost social transfers, goods and services spending, and capital investment.
    - Draft budget incorporates conservative revenue assumptions; capacity constraints may limit spending execution.
    - Staff estimates targeting a primary surplus of around 3.4 percent of GDP in 2026 would be appropriate.
    - Consolidation of around 1 percent of GDP relative to 2025 (excluding one-off election spending and central bank recapitalization) is consistent with Article IV recommendations.
  - Recommendations:
    - Contain spending growth and save more of the windfall from current high mineral prices.
    - Implement consolidation of around 1 percent of GDP to help bring down inflation and contain overheating risks.
    - Phase out untargeted fuel and electricity subsidies (especially for businesses and at higher consumption levels) and focus on targeted social support while strengthening the social safety net.
    - Broaden the tax base: increase scope of excise taxes, expand use of information technology, and transition to a Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authority (SARA).
    - Tackle gold smuggling through enforcement measures; note that gold royalties were reduced to incentivize small miners to formalize operations.
    - Urgently operationalize the fiscal rule and the Savings and Stabilization Fund Suriname (SSFS):
      - Approve the 2026 budget based on realistic assumptions and prepare the five-year plan to accompany the 2027 budget.
      - Constitute the Board of Directors and Investment Advisory Committee of the SSFS and present an investment strategy for approval by the Minister of Finance.
      - Fully implement the Public Financial Management Priority Action Plan.
      - Develop a deeper and more predictable domestic bond market to strengthen fiscal framework and debt and cash management.
- Monetary and exchange rate policy (findings and recommendations):
  - Findings:
    - CBvS has made limited progress in closing the gap between reserve money and the central bank’s own target.
    - Inflation is in double digits; anchoring inflation expectations and reducing inflation to single figures is an immediate priority.
    - MCP arises from use of lagged exchange rates in exchange transactions; 2025 FX auction rules need alignment with best practice and MCP policy requirements.
  - Recommendations:
    - Eliminate the gap between reserve money and the central bank’s target through significant sterilization efforts (which will put upward pressure on interest rates).
    - Allow the currency to float without constraints that impede price discovery; limit FX intervention to narrowly-defined disorderly market conditions.
    - Maintain adequate FX reserves as buffers and to preserve capacity to meet debt obligations, including to the Fund.
    - Eliminate the MCP and align FX auction rules and implementation with best practice.
    - Prepare for a shift away from reserve money as a nominal anchor by:
      - Strengthening operations and institutional capacity, integrating data, forecasting, and policy decisions.
      - Facilitating a transition to an interest rate–based framework with a deposit facility and gradually developing an interbank market.
      - Forming a monetary policy committee and assuring independence of supervisory and management councils.
- Financial stability (findings and recommendations):
  - Findings:
    - Rapid credit growth and banks’ FX exposures require careful management.
    - Some banks have publication backlogs of IFRS audited financial statements.
    - A weak state-owned bank underwent a change in management.
  - Recommendations:
    - Banks should strengthen internal risk management, lending practices, liquidity and solvency stress testing.
    - CBvS liquidity facilities should remain available; banks’ net open FX positions (NOP) should be closely monitored and temporary breach provisions eliminated.
    - Convert the weak state-owned bank to a public limited company and remove bottlenecks for necessary laws or responses from CBvS or the Ministry of Finance.
    - Implement recapitalization plans for weak banks with strict deadlines; persistent undercapitalization of a private bank should trigger CBvS resolution.
    - Implement macroprudential toolkit (capital surcharge, sectoral buffer for systemic banks, minimum core funding ratio) supported by capacity development and improved data collection.
    - Provide regulatory amendments and coordination guidelines to support enforceability and coherence of new measures.
- Governance and transparency (findings and recommendations):
  - Findings:
    - Continued compliance with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is occurring: regularization of reporting cycle, publication of the 2023–24 report, and improved reliability of resource revenue data.
  - Recommendations:
    - Timely disclosure of payments and revenues; publish oil and gas contracts; strengthen beneficial ownership provisions in mining legislation; increase transparency of state-owned enterprises’ quasi-fiscal activities; enhance disclosure of gold royalty collections.
    - Swiftly pass amendments to the anti-corruption law to strengthen income and asset declaration regime and ensure effective implementation.
    - Make public investments in budget documentation more visible and regularly publish financial statements of state-owned enterprises.
- Statistics and data (findings and recommendations):
  - Findings:
    - National accounts data remain untimely and incomplete (especially for gold and oil sectors).
    - Improvements in frequency, coverage, and integration of central Government Finance Statistics are underway with IMF Technical Assistance.
    - Further progress needed on Financial Management Information System coverage to the general government and on non-bank financial institutions coverage.
  - Recommendation:
    - Overcome data and statistical limitations with capacity development to aid macroeconomic analysis and policymaking.

### Authorities’ Views and Staff Appraisal (selected)
- Authorities’ views (summarized):
  - Reaffirmed commitment to fiscal discipline, robust fiscal frameworks with Fund technical support, and price stability.
  - Indicated price caps on fuel products are intended to be temporary to cushion households from higher international oil prices arising from hostilities in the Middle East.
  - Noted additional oil revenues from increased prices currently exceed subsidy costs.
  - Acknowledge broad subsidies are being provided in absence of comprehensive targeting mechanisms and are working on improving targeting capabilities.
  - Social and infrastructure investments will be carefully executed; authorities appreciate scaled up expert support for fiscal framework design and implementation.
  - On monetary policy, authorities are considering measures to improve cost efficiency and reduce fiscal burden of higher interest costs, but structural features like insufficient bank liquidity may hinder reduction of reserve money to existing targets.
  - FX intervention decisions are rules-based and subject to safeguards.
- Staff appraisal — key points:
  - Economic activity remains robust: non-resource GDP estimated to have grown by 4.4 percent in 2025.
  - Short-term non-resource growth projected to remain relatively resilient, supported by higher capital and social spending ahead of significant scaling up of oil production from 2028 onwards.
  - Suriname posted a stronger fiscal performance in the second half of 2025, benefiting from high gold prices and expenditure restraint; this reversed erosion of cash buffers.
  - Further consolidation of 1 percent would help bring down inflation, improve confidence, and build buffers.
  - War in the Middle East produces offsetting effects: windfall revenue from higher oil prices broadly offset by increased spending on subsidies; inflation remains in double digits due to lagged pre-election fiscal slippages and overly loose monetary policy.
  - Risks from oil prices are two-sided: lower-than-expected hydrocarbon production is a tail risk; material upside risks exist from potential additional hydrocarbon resources.
  - Additional liquidity from recent bond issuances should be used prudently; recommendation to save most of the windfall from current high oil and gold prices rather than spend on poorly targeted energy subsidies or inadequately planned projects.
  - Significant scope to improve the social safety net, broaden the tax base, and improve revenue administration.

### Assessment Conclusion and Key Projections (selected exact values)
- Assessment: Suriname’s capacity to repay the Fund is adequate.
  - Rationale: capacity-to-repay metrics under baseline and adverse scenarios are comfortable because debt service to the Fund is expected to peak only after the expected onset of oil production; assessment also informed by the authorities’ reform track record and policy intentions.
- Key macroeconomic projections and indicators (selected exact values):
  - Real GDP (percent change): 2023: 2.4; 2024: 1.7; 2025: 1.5; 2026: 3.9; 2027: 4.4; 2028: 28.5; 2029: 4.3; 2030: 3.5; 2031: 3.1.
  - Non-Natural Resource Real GDP (percent change): 2023: 5.1; 2024: 5.1; 2025: 3.4; 2026: 4.4; 2027: 4.7; 2028: 5.0; 2029: 5.5; 2030: 6.0; 2031: 5.5.
  - Consumer prices (period average): 2023: 51.6; 2024: 16.2; 2025: 9.2; 2026: 12.1; 2027: 10.9; 2028: 5.8; 2029: 5.0; 2030: 5.0; 2031: 5.0.
  - Unemployment rate (percent): 2023: 10.6; 2024: 10.3; 2025: 9.5; 2026: 9.0; 2027: 8.0; 2028: 7.5; 2029: 7.0; 2030: 7.0; 2031: 6.8.
  - Fiscal metrics (percent of GDP): Revenues: 2023: 27.2; 2024: 25.9; 2025: 29.8; 2026: 27.0; 2027: 24.8; 2028: 24.2; 2029: 24.1; 2030: 25.4; 2031: 25.0. Total expenditure: 2023: 28.9; 2024: 29.3; 2025: 37.3; 2026: 30.4; 2027: 27.2; 2028: 22.6; 2029: 17.6; 2030: 19.0; 2031: 20.3.
  - Central government debt (percent of GDP): 2023: 97.7; 2024: 88.0; 2025: 105.8; 2026: 87.3; 2027: 77.1; 2028: 58.1; 2029: 40.6; 2030: 35.8; 2031: 35.1.
  - External sector and reserves (selected exact values): Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2023: -3.7; 2024: -12.9; 2025: -53.3; 2026: -45.2; 2027: -43.1; 2028: -4.9; 2029: 32.9; 2030: 30.6; 2031: 29.4. Gross international reserves (USD millions): 2023: 1,346; 2024: 1,632; 2025: 1,616; 2026: 1,924; 2027: 2,255; 2028: 3,255; 2029: 5,067; 2030: 4,948; 2031: 5,172.
  - Monetary and financial highlights (selected exact values): Broad money (12-month percent change): 2023: 19.5; 2024: 9.3; 2025: 22.7; 2026: 16.5; 2027: 12.3; 2028: 16.5; 2029: 13.9; 2030: 11.0; 2031: 11.0. Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (Dec 2025): 20.0. NPL to gross loans (Dec 2025): 2.8. Foreign currency loans to total loans (Dec 2025): 59.6.

### Annex I — Risk Assessment Matrix (selected risks and policy responses)
- External conjunctural risks (high likelihood):
  - Geopolitical Tensions and Intensification of Conflicts — Likelihood: High; Impact: Medium.
    - Policy response: remain committed to fiscal discipline; reduce energy subsidies while protecting targeted fiscal support; maintain appropriately restrictive monetary policy.
  - Protectionism and Trade Disruptions — Likelihood: High; Impact: Medium.
    - Policy response: keep exchange rate flexibility; keep appropriately tight monetary policy.
  - Commodity Price Volatility — Likelihood: High; Impact: High.
    - Policy response: calibrate multi-annual spending ceilings; maintain tight monetary policy; continue electricity tariff adjustments.
- Policy and social conjunctural risks:
  - Policy Uncertainty — Likelihood: High; Impact: Medium.
    - Policy response: maintain fiscal discipline and tight monetary policy; seek additional financing from IFIs and bilateral donors.
  - Social Discontent — Likelihood: Medium; Impact: High.
    - Policy response: reprioritize spending to target vulnerable; strengthen social safety nets; maintain tight monetary policy.
- Domestic risks (selected):
  - Loss of reform momentum — Likelihood: High; Impact: High.
    - Policy response: raise social and development spending only gradually; counter inflationary pressures through tighter monetary policy and not FXI.
  - Decline in gold output — Likelihood: Medium; Impact: High.
    - Policy response: invest in enforcement to counter smuggling; accelerate fiscal consolidation if needed; keep exchange rate flexible.
  - Higher-than-expected hydrocarbon output — Likelihood: High; Impact: High.
    - Policy response: build fiscal buffers and accumulate sovereign wealth fund assets; avoid windfall spending increases.
  - Delays in hydrocarbon production or lower than expected production — Likelihood: Low; Impact: High.
    - Policy response: continue building fiscal buffers and international reserves; avoid difficult-to-reverse spending increases.

### Annex II — Adverse Scenario (Block 58 oil production stress test) — Shock design and simulated impacts
- Shock features (joint):
  - Oil prices assumed one standard deviation lower (US$21 per barrel) than the WEO average petroleum spot price baseline over 2027–31, averaging US$ 53 instead of US$ 74 per barrel over the period, before immediately returning to the baseline.
  - Commencement of oil production delayed from the 2nd half of 2028 to the 2nd half of 2029.
  - Total oil production from Block 58 is 34 percent lower over 2029-41.
- Key simulated impacts:
  - By 2031, nominal GDP would be 21 percent lower than under the baseline.
  - Fiscal revenues would be 21 percent lower in 2031.
  - Export receipts would be 29 percent lower in 2031, though the effect on the current account is partly offset by slightly lower oil profit outflows and imports.
  - Gross debt falls more slowly than under the baseline and accumulation of SSFS is slower; by 2032, net total public debt is about zero in the baseline whereas it is about SRD -200 billion under the adverse scenario.
  - Gross international reserves are marginally lower than under the baseline (for example by 3 percent in 2027).
  - Although the oil price recovers, permanently lower output and small spending adjustment means GDP, exports, fiscal revenues, reserves and net SWF assets remain permanently lower than under the baseline.
- Note: Annex II. Figure 1 compares select economic indicators between Baseline (B) and Adverse Scenario (Ad). Gross International Reserves exclude ring-fenced FX reserves.

*Source: IMF staff Executive Summary, 1surea2026002 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY; IMF staff calculations and IMF country report text as presented in the content unit.*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Context
- Following successful completion of a Fund-supported program, economic growth has been robust, fiscal outturns have improved following the unwinding of pre-election excesses, and the sovereign has been able to tap global debt markets to fund liability management operations.
- Efforts to contain reserve money growth have been insufficient and inflation has risen into double digits.
- Starting in 2028, oil output is expected to increase significantly, boosting fiscal revenues, exports, and foreign exchange reserves.
- Suriname’s credit outstanding to the Fund is projected to remain above 200 percent of quota through 2030.
- Objective of the assessment: focus on Suriname’s capacity to repay the Fund and the policies and risks that could affect that capacity.

### Recent developments
- Non-natural resource GDP growth: estimated to have grown more than 4 percent in 2025.
- Gold production: continued to disappoint in the second half of 2025 due to gold smuggling and less favorable geology; record high gold prices have had a large effect on nominal GDP.
- Inflation:
  - Annual inflation rose to around 11 percent in recent months (reflecting loose monetary and fiscal policy in H1 2025).
  - Monthly inflation fell to 0.4 percent in March 2026.
- Fiscal outcome 2025:
  - 2025 primary balance was 1.4 percent of GDP (excluding the recapitalization of the central bank, which amounted to 5.4 percent of GDP).
- Credit growth:
  - Credit grew by 36 percent in 2025 (FX credit grew at 41 percent).
  - Credit growth slowed to 6 percent (annualized) in the first two months of 2026.
- External sector:
  - Current account deficit widened to 53 percent of GDP in 2025.
  - SRD/USD exchange rate depreciated by 9 percent in 2025.
  - International reserves were US$ 1.8 billion or 112 percent of the reserve adequacy metric in March 2026.
- Liability management and debt operations:
  - November 2025: issued US$ 1.6 billion in Eurobonds and bought back 2033 Eurobonds.
  - January 2026: oil-linked value recovery instruments (VRIs) were repurchased.
  - February 2026: issued an additional US$ 265 million in Eurobonds due in 2035 (of which US$ 186 million held as foreign exchange reserves at the central bank to finance social expenditures).
  - As at end-March, cash in the escrow (not part of international reserves) is about US$ 475 million or 8 percent of GDP.
  - Additional cash buffers held at CBvS are about US$ 400 million, including US$ 360 million in FX deposits.

### Outlook and risks
- Growth outlook:
  - GDP growth expected to remain robust as oil investments gather steam; resource GDP to get a significant boost with commencement of new oil production in 2028.
  - Moderate positive spillovers to non-natural resource GDP.
- Inflation outlook:
  - Rise in global energy prices in Q1 2026 expected to postpone a decline in annual inflation; inflation now expected to return to single digits only in 2027.
- Fiscal outlook:
  - Elevated prices of oil and gold will boost fiscal revenues, especially once offshore oil production starts.
  - The new oil field is expected to add 20 percent of 2025 GDP to fiscal revenues by 2029.
  - A substantial portion of fiscal revenues is expected to be used to accumulate assets and reduce debt.
  - Debt net of sovereign wealth fund assets is expected to fall by 70 percent between end-2025 and end-2031.
- External outlook:
  - Current account deficit expected to turn into a surplus after new oil production starts; shift to surplus by 2029.
  - FX reserves expected to grow modestly with majority of public savings placed in a separate sovereign wealth fund.
- Downside risks highlighted:
  - Recent bond issuance could create pressures for higher untargeted spending.
  - Domestic drought (El Niño) could increase use of thermal electricity generation, adding to fiscal deficit.
  - Decline in gold prices or further decline in gold production would undermine export and fiscal revenues.
  - Adverse fiscal slippage scenario: primary balance reduction of about 1 percent and 2 percent of GDP relative to baseline in 2026 and 2027, respectively, could increase inflation, add to gross financing needs, reduce end-2027 foreign exchange reserves, and erode government cash buffers.
- Oil price scenarios (summary from Text Table 1):
  - Reference / Baseline / Adverse / Severe Adverse: Oil Price (Average Petroleum Spot Price) values listed as 82 103 113 137 676 124 in table format.
  - Selected macro outcomes (2026/2027 examples from table):
    - Real GDP Growth: 3.9 / 3.9 / 3.4 (2026) and 4.4 / 4.2 / 3.7 (2027)
    - Inflation (EOP): 9.7 / 12.0 / 13.5 (2026) and 8.1 / 8.1 / 9.0 (2027)
    - Primary Balance: 1.6 / 1.5 / 1.4 (2026) and 2.0 / 2.0 / 1.9 (2027)
    - Current Account Balance: -44.8 / -45.8 / -46.2 (2026) and -42.2 / -42.5 / -44.2 (2027)
    - Gross International Reserves (excl. ring-fenced FX reserves): 1/1.7 / 1.5 / 1.3 (2026) and 2.0 / 1.8 / 1.4 (2027)
    - SRD Billion: 2.8 / 4.1 / 7.5 (2026)
    - Percent of baseline GDP: 1.2 / 1.7 / 2.6 (2026)
- Two-sided hydrocarbon revenue risks:
  - Upside: development of additional offshore oil and gas fields, conditional on sound resource management.
  - Downside: medium-term stress scenario of lower global oil prices and lower production from Block 58 would weaken fiscal revenues, exports, and GDP.

### Capacity to Repay
- Timing and profile of IMF obligations:
  - Obligations under the EFF start in 2026 and are equivalent to about 25 percent of quota per year in the short term before rising to a peak of 66 percent of quota in 2030, with the last repurchase scheduled for 2035.
  - Outstanding IMF credit reached SDR 431 million (US$ 581 million or 334 percent of quota) in 2025 following last disbursements under the EFF in March 2025.
- Liquidity effects of liability management:
  - Liability management operations increased authorities’ liquidity and postponed some amortizations to after Block 58 oil revenues commence.
  - Amortizations include more than US$ 500 million of Eurobonds due in 2030.
- Capacity-to-repay metrics under current policies (adequacy assessment):
  - Outstanding IMF credit projected at 35 percent of gross international reserves excluding commercial banks’ ring-fenced reserves (GIR) in 2026 and 28 percent of GIR in 2027.
  - Nominal obligations peak in 2030 at US$ 118 million, equivalent to:
    - 2.5 percent of GIR
    - 0.9 percent of GDP
    - 1.1 percent of exports
    - 3.4 percent of fiscal revenues (ratio for revenues peaks at 3.7 percent in 2028-9)
  - These indicators decline significantly after 2030.
- Capacity under alternative scenarios:
  - Short-term higher oil price scenarios (prolonged war in the Middle East): capacity-to-repay indicators based on fiscal revenues and gross exports improve; capacity metrics based on international reserves are modestly lower due to worse current account balance.
  - Fiscal slippage scenario: Fund credit outstanding could reach almost 40 percent of GIR with flow obligations of 3.4 percent of GIR in 2027.
  - Low oil revenue medium-term scenario (Annex II): outstanding IMF credit would be 28 percent of GIR in 2027; obligations would peak at 2.7 percent of GIR in 2028, 1.8 percent of exports in 2029, and 5.4 percent of fiscal revenues in 2029.

### Policies and recommendations (summary)
- Fiscal policy:
  - Reduce the fiscal deficit to build confidence and lower inflation.
  - Fiscal consolidation measures recommended:
    - Broaden the tax base.
    - Improve revenue administration.
    - Phase out electricity subsidies.
  - Reallocate spending to protect the vulnerable through the social safety net; health and education investment should rise only gradually over the medium term.
  - Improve public financial management and procurement practices.
  - Strengthen governance and anticorruption frameworks.
  - Make the fiscal rule a binding institutional constraint.
  - Operationalize the savings and stabilization fund law.
- Monetary and financial policy:
  - Steadfast control over reserve money to lower inflation.
  - For the central bank: improve the monetary policy framework and operationalize the macroprudential toolkit to bolster macroeconomic and financial stability.
- Institutional capacity:
  - Urgent need to build institutions necessary to safeguard macroeconomic stability and to manage incoming oil revenues transparently and efficiently.
  - Tasks complicated by capacity constraints, political consensus-building needs, and social pressures to increase spending.

*Source: IMF staff Executive Summary, 1surea2026002 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY*

### 18.      The authorities appreciated the scenarios underpinning the capacity to repay analysis.

### 18.      The authorities appreciated the scenarios underpinning the capacity to repay analysis.

### Capacity to Repay and Authorities' Assessment
- The authorities assessed the risks to oil production to be small due to robust well testing and the ongoing additional drilling.
- The authorities committed to timely repayment of their obligations to the Fund.

### Indicators of Fund Credit — Baseline Scenario (selected highlights)
- Existing and prospective Fund credit (SDR million) — Disbursements: 186.9, 46.8, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0 (2024–2035).
- Stock of existing and prospective Fund credit (SDR million): 383.9, 430.7, 420.9, 404.4, 363.8, 295.9, 224.2, 152.4, 90.4, 35.1, 3.9, 0.0 (2024–2035).
- Obligations (SDR million): 17.6, 19.3, 28.7, 34.8, 57.9, 83.3, 84.9, 82.5, 70.3, 61.7, 35.8, 7.8 (2024–2035).
- Principal (repayments/repurchases) (SDR million): 0.0, 0.0, 9.8, 16.4, 40.6, 67.9, 71.8, 71.8, 61.9, 55.4, 31.2, 3.9 (2024–2035).
- Charges and interest (SDR million): 17.6, 19.3, 18.9, 18.3, 17.2, 15.4, 13.1, 10.7, 8.4, 6.3, 4.7, 3.9 (2024–2035).
- Fund obligations (repurchases and charges) in percent of Quota: 13.6, 15.0, 22.3, 27.0, 44.9, 64.6, 65.8, 64.0, 54.5, 47.9, 27.8, 6.0 (2024–2035).
- Fund credit outstanding in percent of Quota: 297.8, 334.1, 326.5, 313.8, 282.2, 229.6, 173.9, 118.2, 70.2, 27.2, 3.0, 0.0 (2024–2035).
- Memorandum items (selected): Quota (SDR million) 129 (each year 2024–2035); Gross domestic product (USD million) 4,434; 4,664; 5,855; 6,642; 8,813; 12,914; 13,404; 13,859; 14,170; 13,940; 13,654; 13,486 (2024–2035).

Source: IMF staff calculations. Note: Gross international reserves exclude ring-fenced FX reserves.

### Indicators of Fund Credit — Medium-Term Adverse Scenario (selected highlights)
- Disbursements (SDR million): 186.9, 46.8, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0 (2024–2035).
- Stock of existing and prospective Fund credit (SDR million): 383.9, 430.7, 420.9, 404.4, 363.8, 295.9, 224.2, 152.4, 90.4, 35.1, 3.9, 0.0 (2024–2035).
- Obligations (SDR million): 17.6, 19.3, 28.7, 34.8, 57.9, 83.3, 84.9, 82.5, 70.3, 61.7, 35.8, 7.8 (2024–2035).
- Principal (repayments/repurchases) (SDR million): 0.0, 0.0, 9.8, 16.4, 40.6, 67.9, 71.8, 71.8, 61.9, 55.4, 31.2, 3.9 (2024–2035).
- Charges and interest (SDR million): 17.6, 19.3, 18.9, 18.3, 17.2, 15.4, 13.1, 10.7, 8.4, 6.3, 4.7, 3.9 (2024–2035).
- Fund obligations (repurchases and charges) in percent of GDP: 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.7, 1.2, 1.4, 1.1, 1.0, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.1 (2024–2035).
- Fund credit outstanding in percent of GDP: 11.5, 12.5, 9.9, 8.6, 7.3, 5.0, 3.0, 1.9, 1.0, 0.4, 0.0, 0.0 (2024–2035).
- Memorandum items (selected): Gross domestic product (USD million) 4,434; 4,664; 5,855; 6,499; 6,917; 8,232; 10,457; 10,947; 12,847; 13,183; 13,120; 13,036 (2024–2035).

Source: IMF staff calculations. Note: Gross international reserves exclude ring-fenced FX reserves.

### Fiscal Policy and Fiscal Institutions — Findings and Recommendations
- Findings:
  - Draft 2026 budget targets a primary balance of -1.7 percent of GDP and plans to boost social transfers, goods and services spending, and capital investment.
  - Draft budget incorporates conservative revenue assumptions; capacity constraints may limit spending execution.
  - Staff estimates targeting a primary surplus of around 3.4 percent of GDP in 2026 would be appropriate.
  - Consolidation of around 1 percent of GDP relative to 2025 (excluding one-off election spending and central bank recapitalization) is consistent with Article IV recommendations.
- Recommendations:
  - Contain spending growth and save more of the windfall from current high mineral prices.
  - Implement consolidation of around 1 percent of GDP to help bring down inflation and contain overheating risks.
  - Phase out untargeted fuel and electricity subsidies (especially for businesses and at higher consumption levels) and focus on targeted social support while strengthening the social safety net.
  - Broaden the tax base: increase scope of excise taxes, expand use of information technology, and transition to a Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authority (SARA).
  - Tackle gold smuggling through enforcement measures; note that gold royalties were reduced to incentivize small miners to formalize operations.
  - Urgently operationalize the fiscal rule and the Savings and Stabilization Fund Suriname (SSFS):
    - Approve the 2026 budget based on realistic assumptions and prepare the five-year plan to accompany the 2027 budget.
    - Constitute the Board of Directors and Investment Advisory Committee of the SSFS and present an investment strategy for approval by the Minister of Finance.
    - Fully implement the Public Financial Management Priority Action Plan.
    - Develop a deeper and more predictable domestic bond market to strengthen fiscal framework and debt and cash management.

### Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies — Findings and Recommendations
- Findings:
  - CBvS has made limited progress in closing the gap between reserve money and the central bank’s own target.
  - Inflation is in double digits; anchoring inflation expectations and reducing inflation to single figures is an immediate priority.
  - MCP arises from use of lagged exchange rates in exchange transactions; 2025 FX auction rules need alignment with best practice and MCP policy requirements.
- Recommendations:
  - Make every effort to eliminate the gap between reserve money and the central bank’s target through significant sterilization efforts (which will put upward pressure on interest rates).
  - Allow the currency to float without constraints that impede price discovery; limit FX intervention to narrowly-defined disorderly market conditions.
  - Maintain adequate FX reserves as buffers and to preserve capacity to meet debt obligations, including to the Fund.
  - Eliminate the MCP and align FX auction rules and implementation with best practice.
  - Prepare for a shift away from reserve money as a nominal anchor by:
    - Strengthening operations and institutional capacity, integrating data, forecasting, and policy decisions.
    - Facilitating a transition to an interest rate–based framework with a deposit facility and gradually developing an interbank market.
    - Forming a monetary policy committee and assuring independence of supervisory and management councils.

### Financial Stability — Findings and Recommendations
- Findings:
  - Rapid credit growth and banks’ FX exposures require careful management.
  - Some banks have publication backlogs of IFRS audited financial statements.
  - A weak state-owned bank underwent a change in management.
- Recommendations:
  - Banks should strengthen internal risk management, lending practices, liquidity and solvency stress testing.
  - CBvS liquidity facilities should remain available; banks’ net open FX positions (NOP) should be closely monitored and temporary breach provisions eliminated.
  - Convert the weak state-owned bank to a public limited company and remove bottlenecks for necessary laws or responses from CBvS or the Ministry of Finance.
  - Implement recapitalization plans for weak banks with strict deadlines; persistent undercapitalization of a private bank should trigger CBvS resolution.
  - Implement macroprudential toolkit (capital surcharge, sectoral buffer for systemic banks, minimum core funding ratio) supported by capacity development and improved data collection.
  - Provide regulatory amendments and coordination guidelines to support enforceability and coherence of new measures.

### Governance and Transparency — Findings and Recommendations
- Findings:
  - Continued compliance with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is occurring: regularization of reporting cycle, publication of the 2023–24 report, and improved reliability of resource revenue data.
- Recommendations:
  - Timely disclosure of payments and revenues; publish oil and gas contracts; strengthen beneficial ownership provisions in mining legislation; increase transparency of state-owned enterprises’ quasi-fiscal activities; enhance disclosure of gold royalty collections.
  - Swiftly pass amendments to the anti-corruption law to strengthen income and asset declaration regime and ensure effective implementation.
  - Make public investments in budget documentation more visible and regularly publish financial statements of state-owned enterprises.

### Statistics and Data — Findings and Recommendations
- Findings:
  - National accounts data remain untimely and incomplete (especially for gold and oil sectors).
  - Improvements in frequency, coverage, and integration of central Government Finance Statistics are underway with IMF Technical Assistance.
  - Further progress needed on Financial Management Information System coverage to the general government and on non-bank financial institutions coverage.
- Recommendations:
  - Overcome data and statistical limitations with capacity development to aid macroeconomic analysis and policymaking.

### Authorities’ Views (summarized)
- Reaffirmed commitment to fiscal discipline, robust fiscal frameworks with Fund technical support, and price stability.
- Indicated price caps on fuel products are intended to be temporary to cushion households from higher international oil prices arising from hostilities in the Middle East.
- Noted additional oil revenues from increased prices currently exceed subsidy costs.
- Acknowledge broad subsidies are being provided in absence of comprehensive targeting mechanisms and are working on improving targeting capabilities.
- Social and infrastructure investments will be carefully executed; authorities appreciate scaled up expert support for fiscal framework design and implementation.
- On monetary policy, authorities are considering measures to improve cost efficiency and reduce fiscal burden of higher interest costs, but structural features like insufficient bank liquidity may hinder reduction of reserve money to existing targets.
- FX intervention decisions are rules-based and subject to safeguards.

### Staff Appraisal — Key Points
- Economic activity remains robust: non-resource GDP estimated to have grown by 4.4 percent in 2025.
- Short-term non-resource growth projected to remain relatively resilient, supported by higher capital and social spending ahead of significant scaling up of oil production from 2028 onwards.
- Suriname posted a stronger fiscal performance in the second half of 2025, benefiting from high gold prices and expenditure restraint; this reversed erosion of cash buffers.
- Further consolidation of 1 percent would help bring down inflation, improve confidence, and build buffers.
- War in the Middle East produces offsetting effects: windfall revenue from higher oil prices broadly offset by increased spending on subsidies; inflation remains in double digits due to lagged pre-election fiscal slippages and overly loose monetary policy.
- Risks from oil prices are two-sided: lower-than-expected hydrocarbon production is a tail risk; material upside risks exist from potential additional hydrocarbon resources.
- Additional liquidity from recent bond issuances should be used prudently; recommendation to save most of the windfall from current high oil and gold prices rather than spend on poorly targeted energy subsidies or inadequately planned projects.
- Significant scope to improve the social safety net, broaden the tax base, and improve revenue administration.

*Source: IMF staff calculations and IMF staff report text.*

### 38.      Monetary policy is too loose. The CBvS should not limit its sterilization operations over

### 38–39. Monetary policy is too loose; reform momentum has slowed

### Monetary policy: assessment and recommendations
- Finding: "Monetary policy is too loose."
- Finding: The central bank "should not limit its sterilization operations over concerns about the cost of open market operations."
- Finding: "There is a need to absorb far more domestic currency liquidity to weigh against the ongoing rise in inflation."
- Recommendation: "It is critical to put in place a new monetary policy framework prior to the oil boom that is centered on short-term interest rates as the primary policy instrument."
- Recommendation: "The intent to form a monetary policy committee is a positive step and it will be important to allow members of the central bank’s supervisory and management councils to complete their statutory terms."

### Fiscal and governance reforms: status and priorities
- Finding: "Reform momentum has slowed."
- Finding: "The implementation of the new fiscal framework is now expected to be phased in over three years."
- Recommendation: "Agreeing on a five-year fiscal plan and associated spending limits (as part of the 2027 budget) and operationalizing the sovereign wealth fund are essential to safeguard policy credibility."
- Recommendation: "There is also a need to quickly implement the procurement law and revise anti-corruption legislation."

*Source: IMF country report text (paragraphs 38–39).*

### 40.      Suriname’s capacity to repay the Fund is adequate.  This assessment is informed by

### Suriname’s capacity to repay the Fund is adequate.

### Assessment of Repayment Capacity
- Suriname’s capacity to repay the Fund is assessed as adequate.
- This assessment is informed by capacity to repay metrics under baseline and adverse scenarios, which are comfortable because debt service to the Fund is expected to peak only after the expected onset of oil production.
- The assessment is also informed by the authorities’ reform track record and policy intentions.

### Rationale and Stress Factors
- Debt service timing: debt service to the Fund is expected to peak only after the expected onset of oil production.
- Scenario analysis: capacity-to-repay metrics under both baseline and adverse scenarios are described as "comfortable" in the assessment.
- Institutional factors: the authorities’ reform track record and stated policy intentions are part of the judgment.

### Key Macroeconomic Projections and Indicators (selected, exact values)
- Real sector (Real GDP, percent change): 2023: 2.4; 2024: 1.7; 2025: 1.5; 2026: 3.9; 2027: 4.4; 2028: 28.5; 2029: 4.3; 2030: 3.5; 2031: 3.1.
- Non-Natural Resource Real GDP (percent change): 2023: 5.1; 2024: 5.1; 2025: 3.4; 2026: 4.4; 2027: 4.7; 2028: 5.0; 2029: 5.5; 2030: 6.0; 2031: 5.5.
- Nominal GDP (percent change): 2023: 36.3; 2024: 14.8; 2025: 18.6; 2026: 35.3; 2027: 21.4; 2028: 35.6; 2029: 46.1; 2030: 3.8; 2031: 3.4.
- Consumer prices (period average): 2023: 51.6; 2024: 16.2; 2025: 9.2; 2026: 12.1; 2027: 10.9; 2028: 5.8; 2029: 5.0; 2030: 5.0; 2031: 5.0.
- Unemployment rate (percent): 2023: 10.6; 2024: 10.3; 2025: 9.5; 2026: 9.0; 2027: 8.0; 2028: 7.5; 2029: 7.0; 2030: 7.0; 2031: 6.8.

### Fiscal Metrics (central government, percent of GDP and levels)
- Revenues (percent of GDP): 2023: 27.2; 2024: 25.9; 2025: 29.8; 2026: 27.0; 2027: 24.8; 2028: 24.2; 2029: 24.1; 2030: 25.4; 2031: 25.0.
- Total expenditure (percent of GDP): 2023: 28.9; 2024: 29.3; 2025: 37.3; 2026: 30.4; 2027: 27.2; 2028: 22.6; 2029: 17.6; 2030: 19.0; 2031: 20.3.
- Overall balance (net lending/borrowing, percent of GDP): 2023: -1.7; 2024: -3.4; 2025: -7.5; 2026: -3.3; 2027: -2.4; 2028: 1.6; 2029: 6.5; 2030: 6.4; 2031: 4.7.
- Primary balance (percent of GDP): 2023: 1.4; 2024: -0.6; 2025: -4.0; 2026: 1.6; 2027: 2.0; 2028: 5.0; 2029: 9.0; 2030: 8.7; 2031: 6.8.
- Central government debt (percent of GDP): 2023: 97.7; 2024: 88.0; 2025: 105.8; 2026: 87.3; 2027: 77.1; 2028: 58.1; 2029: 40.6; 2030: 35.8; 2031: 35.1.

### External Sector and Reserves (selected, exact values)
- Current account balance (percent of GDP): 2023: -3.7; 2024: -12.9; 2025: -53.3; 2026: -45.2; 2027: -43.1; 2028: -4.9; 2029: 32.9; 2030: 30.6; 2031: 29.4.
- Exports of goods and services (USD millions): 2023: 2,533; 2024: 2,794; 2025: 3,184; 2026: 4,466; 2027: 5,218; 2028: 7,411; 2029: 11,682; 2030: 10,745; 2031: 10,747.
- Imports of goods and services (USD millions): 2023: 2,664; 2024: 3,402; 2025: 5,499; 2026: 6,562; 2027: 7,490; 2028: 7,189; 2029: 6,668; 2030: 5,938; 2031: 6,029.
- Gross international reserves (USD millions): 2023: 1,346; 2024: 1,632; 2025: 1,616; 2026: 1,924; 2027: 2,255; 2028: 3,255; 2029: 5,067; 2030: 4,948; 2031: 5,172.
- Adjusted gross international reserves (USD millions): 2023: 1,107; 2024: 1,390; 2025: 1,337; 2026: 1,665; 2027: 1,996; 2028: 2,995; 2029: 4,808; 2030: 4,689; 2031: 4,912.
- Reserve adequacy (Adjusted reserves, percent of risk-weighted measure): 2023: 102; 2024: 120; 2025: 90; 2026: 102; 2027: 116; 2028: 161; 2029: 236; 2030: 259; 2031: 286.

### Monetary and Financial Highlights (selected, exact values)
- Broad money (12-month percent change): 2023: 19.5; 2024: 9.3; 2025: 22.7; 2026: 16.5; 2027: 12.3; 2028: 16.5; 2029: 13.9; 2030: 11.0; 2031: 11.0.
- Broad money (percent of GDP): 2023: 62.7; 2024: 59.7; 2025: 72.1; 2026: 53.0; 2027: 49.0; 2028: 42.1; 2029: 32.8; 2030: 35.1; 2031: 37.7.
- Private sector credit (percent change): 2023: 18.4; 2024: 16.1; 2025: 36.3; 2026: 31.8; 2027: 28.7; 2028: 10.1; 2029: 9.6; 2030: 9.1; 2031: 9.1.
- Financial soundness indicators (selected, percent):
  - Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (Dec 2025): 20.0.
  - NPL to gross loans (Dec 2025): 2.8.
  - Return on assets (ROA, annualized, Dec 2025): 2.7.
  - Liquid assets to total assets (Dec 2025): 48.7.
  - Foreign currency loans to total loans (Dec 2025): 59.6.

### Fiscal Operations (levels, selected)
- Central government revenues (SRD millions): 2023: 34,750; 2024: 37,967; 2025: 51,804; 2026: 63,591; 2027: 70,884; 2028: 93,793; 2029: 136,593; 2030: 149,357; 2031: 151,984.
- Central government expenditures (SRD millions): 2023: 36,884; 2024: 42,888; 2025: 64,816; 2026: 71,381; 2027: 77,691; 2028: 87,688; 2029: 99,664; 2030: 111,557; 2031: 123,596.
- Central government overall balance (SRD millions): 2023: -2,134; 2024: -4,921; 2025: -13,012; 2026: -7,791; 2027: -6,807; 2028: 6,105; 2029: 36,928; 2030: 37,800; 2031: 28,388.
- Public (central government) debt (SRD millions): 2023: 124,822; 2024: 129,021; 2025: 183,951; 2026: 205,379; 2027: 220,227; 2028: 225,116; 2029: 229,878; 2030: 210,446; 2031: 213,296.

### Balance of Payments (selected, USD millions and percent of GDP)
- Current account (USD millions): 2023: -128.0; 2024: -570.4; 2025: -2,484; 2026: -2,644; 2027: -2,864; 2028: -431; 2029: 4,246; 2030: 4,095; 2031: 4,076.
- Capital and financial account (USD millions): 2023: -748; 2024: -543; 2025: -1,556; 2026: -2,963; 2027: -3,214; 2028: -1,483; 2029: 2,346; 2030: 4,121; 2031: 3,759.
- Foreign direct investment (USD millions): 2023: -506; 2024: -675; 2025: -2,039; 2026: -2,328; 2027: -2,693; 2028: -1,057; 2029: 2,267; 2030: 3,144; 2031: 3,303.

*Source: Surinamese authorities and IMF staff calculations and projections as presented in the content unit.*

### Annex I. Risk Assessment Matrix

### Annex I. Risk Assessment Matrix

### External Conjunctural Risks
- Geopolitical Tensions and Intensification of Conflicts  
  - Likelihood: High  
  - Impact: Medium  
  - Economic effects:  
    - Disruptions to energy supply and increase in food prices, worsening fiscal and current account balances in the short run due to higher subsidy costs and import prices.  
  - Policy response:  
    - Remain committed to fiscal discipline, reduce energy subsidies while protecting targeted fiscal support to ensure delivery of essential services and social assistance transfers. Submit budgets with a margin with respect to fiscal rule spending ceilings.  
    - Maintain appropriately restrictive monetary policy to keep inflation expectations anchored.

- Protectionism and Trade Disruptions  
  - Likelihood: High  
  - Impact: Medium  
  - Economic effects:  
    - Reduction of investment, increased import prices, inflation, and currency depreciation.  
  - Policy response:  
    - Keep flexibility in exchange rate to act as a shock absorber.  
    - Keep appropriately tight monetary policy stance, communicating and signaling strong commitment to keeping inflation in check.

- Commodity Price Volatility  
  - Likelihood: High  
  - Impact: High  
  - Economic effects:  
    - An increase in fuel and/or food prices would increase fuel import bill, worsen current account and external financing needs in the short run; increase inflation and exchange rate pressures. An increase in fuel prices could increase fuel subsidies.  
    - On the upside, an increase in gold prices would increase fiscal revenues, while an increase in oil prices would increase revenues in the medium term.  
    - On the downside, a decrease in gold prices would make fiscal and external balances deteriorate, making financing constraints more acute.  
  - Policy response:  
    - Calibrate multi-annual spending ceilings to avoid procyclicality and build buffers if upside risk materializes. Reprioritize spending to provide targeted fiscal support to the most vulnerable.  
    - Maintain appropriately tight monetary policy to keep inflation expectations anchored.  
    - Continue and if needed accelerated electricity tariff adjustments.

### Policy and Social Conjunctural Risks
- Policy Uncertainty  
  - Likelihood: High  
  - Impact: Medium  
  - Economic effects:  
    - Lower resources for growth friendly capital expenditure and social spending for the vulnerable. Policy uncertainty scales back domestic consumption and private investment subduing growth.  
  - Policy response:  
    - Maintain fiscal discipline and tight monetary policy.  
    - Seek additional financing from IFIs and bilateral donors.  
    - Continue reform momentum to increase efficiency of capital expenditure and social spending.

- Social Discontent  
  - Likelihood: Medium  
  - Impact: High  
  - Economic effects:  
    - Social discontent leads to protests, weakens the reform momentum, damages investor confidence, and slows growth.  
  - Policy response:  
    - Reprioritize spending to provide targeted fiscal support to the vulnerable.  
    - Strengthen social safety nets.  
    - Maintain appropriately tight monetary policy.  
    - Improve transparency and accountability, including through effective asset disclosure by politically exposed persons.

### External Structural Risks
- Climate Change  
  - Likelihood: Medium  
  - Impact: Medium  
  - Economic effects:  
    - Extreme climate shocks, like drought, would weaken fiscal position through higher spending on food and electricity subsidies and reduce government ability to mobilize revenues while increasing the need for more priority spending.  
  - Policy response:  
    - Continue building capacity to monitor and assess climate change risks, including building a data collection mechanism.  
    - Accelerate investment into climate resilient infrastructure that could mitigate disaster risk; and continue seeking climate financing to safeguard from natural disaster shocks.

### Domestic Risks
- Loss of reform momentum  
  - Likelihood: High  
  - Impact: High  
  - Economic effects:  
    - Policy uncertainty could undermine confidence and hurt investment and growth. High spending could reduce purchasing power through exchange rate depreciation and inflation.  
  - Policy response:  
    - Spending to meet social and development should be raised only gradually to allow for an improvement in the government’s capacity to effectively execute such spending and the economy’s ability to absorb it.  
    - Inflationary and exchange rate pressures should be countered through tighter monetary policy and not FXI.

- Accumulation of debt arrears  
  - Likelihood: Low  
  - Impact: Medium  
  - Economic effects:  
    - Accumulation of arrears could increase NPLs in the financial sector, erode bank capital, constraining financial intermediation and requiring fiscal resources to bail out troubled banks. Missed payments to the central bank could weaken its balance sheet and reduce its willingness to mop up liquidity.  
  - Policy response:  
    - Prioritize debt service payments by adhering to fiscal consolidation and improving debt management.

- Decline in gold output  
  - Likelihood: Medium  
  - Impact: High  
  - Economic effects:  
    - A decline in gold production would worsen the current account and external financing needs; increased inflation and exchange rate pressures would reduce resources for capital expenditure for sustainable growth. Fiscal revenues would be lower than expected, aggravating financing constraints and depleting cash balances.  
  - Policy response:  
    - Invest in enforcement efforts to counter smuggling.  
    - Adhere and if needed accelerate fiscal consolidation. Reprioritize spending.  
    - Keep exchange rate flexible.

- Higher-than-expected hydrocarbon output  
  - Likelihood: High  
  - Impact: High  
  - Economic effects:  
    - More hydrocarbon flows. More resources for growth friendly capital expenditure and social spending for the vulnerable.  
  - Policy response:  
    - Continue building fiscal buffers and accumulating sovereign wealth fund assets. Avoid windfall increase in spending to avoid loss of competitiveness in non-natural resource sector. Incorporate latest available information in regular update of medium-term financial plan.

- Delays in hydrocarbon production or lower than expected production  
  - Likelihood: Low  
  - Impact: High  
  - Economic effects:  
    - A lower or delayed production would create liquidity challenges in meeting the debt service, which can manifest in FX reserves loss, inflation and sudden spending cuts affecting growth.  
  - Policy response:  
    - Continue building fiscal buffers and international reserves. Avoid windfall increase in spending that would be difficult to reverse.

---

### Annex II. Adverse Scenario (Block 58 oil production stress test)

- Purpose and approach:  
  - The adverse scenario adjusts production volumes, project ramp-up timing, and international oil prices unfavorably to evaluate sensitivity of Suriname’s capacity to repay the Fund to assumptions surrounding offshore oil production and oil prices.

- Shock features (joint):  
  - Oil prices are assumed to be one standard deviation lower (US$21 per barrel) than the WEO average petroleum spot price baseline over 2027–31, averaging US$ 53 instead of US$ 74 per barrel over the period, before immediately returning to the baseline.  
  - The commencement of oil production is delayed from the 2nd half of 2028 to the 2nd half of 2029.  
  - Total oil production from Block 58 is 34 percent lower over 2029-41.

- Key simulated impacts:  
  - By 2031, nominal GDP would be 21 percent lower than under the baseline.  
  - Fiscal revenues would be 21 percent lower in 2031. Spending falls only slightly as a share of non-resource GDP, mainly because of lower electricity subsidy costs.  
  - Export receipts would be 29 percent lower in 2031, though the effect on the current account is partly offset by slightly lower oil profit outflows and imports.  
  - Gross debt falls more slowly than under the baseline and accumulation of SSFS is slower than under the baseline; by 2032, net total public debt (gross total public debt net of SSFS assets) is about zero in the baseline whereas it is about SRD -200 billion under the adverse scenario.  
  - Gross international reserves are marginally lower than under the baseline (for example by 3 percent in 2027) as the authorities are assumed to need to intervene only minimally to keep the currency stable.  
  - Although the oil price recovers, permanently lower output and small spending adjustment means that GDP, exports, fiscal revenues, reserves and net SWF assets remain permanently lower than under the baseline.

- Note on figures:  
  - Annex II. Figure 1 compares select economic indicators between Baseline (B) and Adverse Scenario (Ad). Gross International Reserves exclude ring-fenced FX reserves.

*International Monetary Fund — Annex I. Risk Assessment Matrix (content unit).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2026/english/1surea2026002.pdf_