## 45546-growth-friendly-path-for-building-fiscal-buffers-for-cca

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [45546-growth-friendly-path-for-building-fiscal-buffers-for-cca](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/dp/2018/45546-growth-friendly-path-for-building-fiscal-buffers-for-cca.pdf)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/-/media/files/publications/dp/2018/45546-growth-friendly-path-for-building-fiscal-buffers-for-cca.pdf.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/publications/dp/2018/45546-growth-friendly-path-for-building-fiscal-buffers-for-cca.pdf.json)

---

### Executive Summary — Macroeconomic impact of external shocks
- Prior to 2013 the CCA region was one of the fastest-growing regions, with real output projected to expand at about 6 percent.
- The 2014–15 external shocks (persistent commodity price slump, abrupt decline in remittances, and lower import demand from key partners) substantially lowered growth prospects and exposed structural weaknesses, notably limited export diversification.
- Growth outcomes:
  - Average GDP growth in oil exporters fell from 6.7 percent in 2013 to 2.2 percent in 2016.
  - Average GDP growth in oil importers fell from 5.7 percent in 2013 to 3.3 percent in 2016.
- External positions:
  - In oil-exporting countries, current account balances fell from 2.9 percent of GDP at end-2013 to –5.9 percent of GDP at end-2016.
  - In oil-importing countries, current account balances fell from –5.8 percent of GDP to –7.9 percent of GDP over the same period.
- Conclusion: Medium-term growth is projected to remain below historical levels without far-reaching reform; returning to (near-)pre-crisis growth will require a new inclusive, employment-generating growth model based on forceful structural reforms and diversification.

### Executive Summary — Fiscal reaction to the shocks
- Pre-2014 behavior: deviations from fiscal targets were typically corrected by about 80 percent in the following year, with automatic stabilizers allowed to operate.
- 2014–16 response: fiscal policies were more accommodative and more countercyclical than predicted, weakening fiscal positions across the region.
- Country variation in fiscal reaction:
  - Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan deviated significantly from adjustment paths.
  - Georgia and Uzbekistan broadly matched predicted positions, though at lower levels.
  - Armenia and Kazakhstan saw fiscal balances weaken more rapidly than predicted.
- Aggregate effects on public debt and deficits (2013–2016):
  - Oil importers: gross public debt rose by about 12 percent of GDP to around 49 percent of GDP; fiscal balances weakened by about 4 percent of GDP to –6.1 percent of GDP.
  - Oil exporters (Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan): net public debt decreased by about 7 percent of GDP; fiscal balances deteriorated by about 7 percent of GDP on average, "to –26 percent and 3.3 percent of GDP, respectively."

### Executive Summary — Fiscal plans and scenarios
- Three stylized medium-term debt scenarios are outlined: no-adjustment, current projections/plans, and a more ambitious consolidation path.
- Under current projections:
  - Most countries aim to stabilize public debt ratios at present levels over the medium term.
  - For CCA oil exporters:
    - Fiscal deficits are projected to average about 1.1 percent of GDP in 2022 compared to an average surplus of 3.9 percent of GDP at end-2013.
    - Public gross debt is projected to increase from about 13 percent of GDP at end-2013 to about 22 percent of GDP in 2022.
- Assessment: Given the magnitude and persistence of shocks and the potential for sizable fiscal risks outside official budgets (SOEs and state-controlled banks), more ambitious consolidation to reduce debt to pre-crisis levels would be desirable to rebuild buffers, but current plans strike a balance between ambition and keeping consolidation growth-friendly and inclusive.

### Executive Summary — Key elements of a strengthened consolidation plan (policy levers)
- Tax policy reforms (growth-friendly and fairness-enhancing):
  - Broaden direct and indirect tax bases in many countries, even after reducing widespread tax exemptions.
  - Improve enforcement of tax collection.
  - More effectively tax higher net worth individuals to improve perceptions of tax fairness.
  - Address unequal distribution of the tax burden, which remains an investment climate concern in some countries.
- Expenditure-side measures:
  - Streamline government wage bills.
  - Further reform energy subsidies while strengthening social safety nets for the most vulnerable.
  - Protect and create fiscal space for well-designed, growth-raising public investments and improve their efficiency and productivity.
- Fiscal policy frameworks and institutions:
  - Well-designed fiscal rules can support consolidation but must be tailored to country-specific political landscapes to minimize circumvention (e.g., shifting spending to public-sector units outside government).
  - Improve public financial management, including more medium-term oriented budgeting, to help anchor consolidation plans.
- Structural reforms:
  - Structural reforms that boost the supply side can help offset contractionary effects of consolidation.
  - Comparisons with peers show considerable scope for reforms to improve the business climate across most CCA countries.

### Executive Summary — Overall conclusions and recommendations
- The 2014–15 shocks necessitate medium-term fiscal consolidation that is:
  - Ambitious enough to rebuild fiscal buffers and contain fiscal risks (including off-budget risks), yet
  - Growth-friendly and inclusive to preserve output and employment.
- Recommended policy mix:
  - Use tax-base broadening and better enforcement to raise revenues while improving fairness.
  - Rationalize spending (wage bills, energy subsidies) and strengthen targeted social protection.
  - Protect and enhance the quality and efficiency of public investment.
  - Strengthen fiscal anchors (tailored fiscal rules) and public financial management.
  - Step up structural reforms to support pro-growth consolidation and diversification.

### Public Net Debt in CCA Oil Exporters — Figures and notes
- Time axis labels used in figures: 20111213141516171819202122.
- Debt value markers shown in regional figure: –65, –25, –5, 40, 100, 20, 60, 80.
- Scenarios depicted: Before external shocks; External shocks; After external shocks.
- Policy option labels: Consolidation; Unchanged position; Fiscal plans.
- Note: CCA = Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan omitted for lack of data.
- Note 1: Public debt for oil exporters is measured on a net debt basis, taking into account foreign assets of country oil funds.
- Note 2: Unchanged position refers to a scenario in which the end-2017 fiscal balance is added to the stock of debt in each forecast year.
- Sources: IMF Regional Economic Outlook October 2017; IMF staff calculations.

### Country-specific net debt and fiscal balance markers (Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan)
- Kazakhstan — Net debt markers shown: –80, –40, –20, 0, 0, 15, –15, –10, –5, 5, 10.
- Kazakhstan — Fiscal balance value markers shown: –60, 20.
- Azerbaijan — Net debt markers shown: –80, –40, –20, 0, 0, 15, –15, –10, –5, 5, 10.
- Azerbaijan — Fiscal balance value markers shown: –60, 20.
- Note: Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan measured on a net debt basis, taking into account foreign assets of country oil funds.

### CCA oil importers — Debt and fiscal balance markers (selected)
- Common time axis labels: 20111213141516171819202122.
- Policy option labels shown: Consolidation; Unchanged position; Fiscal plans.
- Scenarios depicted: Before external shocks; External shocks; After external shocks.
- Armenia debt markers shown: 50, 90, 30, 40, 60, 70, 80.
- Armenia fiscal balance markers shown: 5, –10, –5, 0.
- Georgia debt markers shown: 50, 90.
- Georgia fiscal balance markers shown: 5, –10, –5, 0.
- Kyrgyz Republic debt markers shown: 50, 90, 30, 40, 60, 70, 80.
- Kyrgyz Republic fiscal balance markers shown: 7, 4, –11, –8, –5, –2, 1.
- Tajikistan panel uses the same time axis labels.

### Tajikistan Fiscal Balance Options — Fiscal outlook and debt dynamics
- Gross assets less government debt would fall from 34 percent of GDP in 2013 to close to 23 percent of GDP by 2022, diminishing buffers.
- For oil importers (context includes Tajikistan as an oil importer):
  - Fiscal deficit is expected to average about 1.9 percent of GDP in 2022, similar to the end-2013 average.
  - Public debt is projected to increase from an average of about 37 percent of GDP at the end of 2013 to 50 percent of GDP by 2022.

### Tajikistan — Composition of planned fiscal adjustment (2017–22)
- Countries typically focus on spending cuts; some are planning sizable cuts in public investment (Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan).
- Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan intend to protect investment plans.
- Most countries, except Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, will curtail current expenditures; Georgia and the Kyrgyz Republic plan sizable cuts in the wage bill.
- On the revenue side, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan will pursue policies to increase tax revenues; Uzbekistan will make limited effort; Azerbaijan’s tax revenues are expected to drop slightly.

### Tajikistan — Case for more ambitious consolidation
- More ambitious consolidation would rebuild buffers faster, creating room for countercyclical policies if shocks recur.
- Medium-term consolidation targets:
  - Oil importers would target a pre-shock level of gross public debt, requiring a consolidation of gross debt of about 15 percent of GDP.
  - Oil exporters would target a pre-crisis net debt-to-GDP ratio of –37 percent, requiring a consolidation effort of about 12.5 percent of GDP.
- Guidance on timing and speed:
  - Countries with limited fiscal space and facing budget funding crises should front-load consolidation and reduce debt to sustainable levels in the near term.
  - Countries with manageable debt could follow more gradual consolidation, implying constant improvement in the fiscal balance over the medium term.
  - Countries with ongoing fiscal stimulus or financial support programs may delay consolidation by 1–2 years, but would then need more ambitious consolidation to reduce debt levels.

### Tajikistan — Fiscal risks to consider
- Unanticipated shocks (e.g., decline in remittances, contraction in trading partners, lower commodity prices).
- SOEs represent a large portion of the economy and pose contingent liabilities risk.
- Financial and banking sector issues intensified after the drop in oil prices and may require additional funding or bailouts.

### Tax policy reform and revenue mobilization (regional observations)
- Medium-term projections under current plans:
  - Oil importers plan to increase the tax-to-GDP ratio by about 2 percentage points on average to 22 percent of GDP.
  - Oil exporters are expected, on average, to keep their non-oil tax levels at around 15 percent of GDP.
- Tax system facts and ranges:
  - Value-added tax rates in the CCA range between 12 percent (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic) to a maximum of 20 percent (Armenia, Uzbekistan).
  - Corporate income tax rates range from 8 percent (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) to 20 percent (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan).
- Shortcomings to address:
  - Widespread exemptions reducing the tax base (agriculture, special economic zones).
  - Low or no taxation of capital gains and dividends.
  - Underreporting and tax avoidance by liberal professionals and businesses not subject to regular regimes.
  - Difficulty auditing natural persons (including high net worth individuals).
  - Complex property tax systems leaving many properties undeclared.
  - Significant tax arrears, collection enforcement, and dispute resolution issues.

### Selected country-specific tax reform recommendations (excerpts)
- Simplify the VAT: fewer rates and a broader base (reduce exemptions).
- Broaden tax base by rationalizing exemptions across taxes; move large agro-businesses, higher education and medical services, and Special Economic Zones to the regular tax system where applicable.
- Review Free Economic Zone taxation: target tax incentives on investment and employment rather than on profitability; limit tax preferences to indirect taxes but not direct profit taxes.
- Increase revenue productivity of excise taxes: limit excises to a selected list of products; improve targeting for cellular airtime and gambling (Armenia); double the excise on petroleum products (Kyrgyz Republic); target tobacco and beverages.
- Eliminate broad-based turnover tax on all businesses (Kyrgyz Republic).
- Simplify corporate taxation by eliminating multiple rate structures at firm level (Kyrgyz Republic).
- Simplify taxation of small businesses through flat rates, with two regimes: a patent system for micro-businesses and a presumptive tax based on turnover for small businesses, including small farmers (Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic).
- Reform mineral resource taxation to capture a fair share of rent for the budget (Kyrgyz Republic).
- Improve progressivity of personal taxation by raising the threshold for exempted income and introduce graduated rates (Armenia).
- Tax capital income (Armenia).
- Enhance property taxation with a modern and simplified system focused on the taxable asset and using an appropriate value threshold to protect the poor (Georgia); align cadastral value more closely with market levels (Kyrgyz Republic).
- Revamp tax and customs administration—strengthen large taxpayer units and introduce risk-based compliance systems.

### Streamlining and increasing efficiency of public spending
- Wage bill observations:
  - Most CCA countries have a moderate wage bill, averaging around 6 percent of GDP.
  - Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan have relatively high ratios, hovering around 9 percent of GDP.
  - Over the medium term, oil exporters (except Uzbekistan) plan to stabilize their wage bill at around 5.5 percent of GDP; oil importers (except Georgia) project lower wage bills.
- Structural weaknesses and civil service reform needs:
  - High share of public-sector employment in several countries.
  - Proliferation of allowances, low recruitment standards, and weak links between performance and promotion.
  - Recommendation: comprehensive reform of civil services and salaries to reduce inefficiencies and raise public-sector productivity and efficiency.

### Energy subsidies and reallocation (pre-tax energy subsidies, Percent of GDP, 2015)
- Armenia 0.06 0.04
- Azerbaijan 3.08 1.03
- Georgia 0.00 0.00
- Kazakhstan 0.82 0.80
- Kyrgyz Republic 14.76 8.16
- Tajikistan 3.34 3.30
- Turkmenistan 16.23 10.70
- Uzbekistan 18.21 11.91
- Average CCA Oil Importers 4.54 2.88
- Average CCA Oil Exporters 9.58 6.11
- Average selected EMDC 0.89 0.52
- of which: selected EM oil exporters 3.61 1.86
- Key recommendations:
  - Use relatively low oil prices to reform energy subsidies by aligning energy prices to market and cost recovery levels to reduce budgetary costs.
  - Create incentives to reduce energy intensity and inefficiency.
  - Reduce leaks to privileged segments and strengthen focus on vulnerable segments through better registry systems and better targeted social safety nets.
  - Refrain from ad hoc adjustments.

### Public investment: reorientation and efficiency
- Public investment varies considerably (Percent of GDP, 2015 examples):
  - Tajikistan public investment 13.8
  - Armenia public investment 2.9
  - Georgia 5.6
  - Azerbaijan 16.4
  - Kazakhstan 4.5
  - Uzbekistan 1.7
  - Emerging and developing economies average public investment 8.7 percent of GDP.
- Concerns:
  - Large part of public investment is not fully effective economically or socially.
  - Budgetary levels for education and health are below emerging market and developing economies.
- Average public investment efficiency (distance to frontier) — country scores:
  - CCA commodity exporters 0.79
  - Azerbaijan 0.94
  - Kazakhstan 0.65
  - CCA commodity importers 0.71
  - Armenia 0.79
  - Georgia 0.86
  - Kyrgyz Republic 0.57
  - Tajikistan 0.61
  - Emerging market economies 0.78
  - Low income developing economies 0.77
  - Advanced economies 0.89
- Policy implications:
  - Reorient public investment toward projects supporting diversification, education, and health.
  - Boost efficiency and productivity of public investment via a comprehensive public investment management framework with stricter selection and monitoring of high growth and social impact projects.
  - In low-efficiency countries (e.g., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan), consider structural reforms to increase efficiency before large public investment projects.

### Government Spending on Education, 2012; PFM and fiscal rules
- Figure 12 and Figure 13 provide regional comparisons of government spending on education (2012) and health services (2014) as percent of GDP and assess capital stock, infrastructure quality, and health efficiency frontiers across CCA countries.
- Strengthening credibility and sustainability of fiscal adjustment requires:
  - improving public financial management;
  - anchoring policies on well-defined long-term paths (for example through rules-based fiscal policy);
  - promoting transparency, credibility, and accountability.
- Key public financial management improvements recommended (best international standards, IMF 2014):
  - development of comprehensive medium-term fiscal frameworks, budget classification, program budgeting, and public procurement;
  - quantification and reporting in the budget of main quasi-fiscal activities, implicit energy subsidies, and contingent liabilities;
  - strengthened fiscal risks management and disclosure and the ways to address them (including those associated with PPPs and SOEs);
  - enhanced public investment management;
  - improved budget transparency, public participation, and oversight (pre-budget statement, midyear review, more comprehensive yearend report; public hearings, surveys);
  - stronger public-sector statistics.
- Example disclosure improvements: Armenia and Georgia include disclosure of risks in the budget documentation and Tajikistan has developed a fiscal risk statement.

### Fiscal rules: coverage, benefits, and design principles
- Use of fiscal rules has grown: by the end of 2015, the number of countries with fiscal rules surged to 92, of which more than 60 percent were emerging market and developing economies.
- Among CCA countries:
  - Armenia (2008), Georgia (2014), and Kazakhstan (2016) follow fiscal rules;
  - Azerbaijan and the Kyrgyz Republic are considering such rules.
- General principles for effective fiscal rules:
  - Introduce formal enforcement procedures to make fiscal rules binding on the outturn.
  - Expand coverage to general government to avoid incentives to shift unfunded spending responsibilities to local governments.
  - Include a plan to bring back deficits and expenditures when there are indications that current year’s outturn will breach the rules’ limits.
  - Enhance strategies to communicate targets and ways to achieve them.
  - Introduce well-defined escape clauses.
- Commodity exporters should consider rules that account for volatility and resource depletion (revenue split rules, price smoothing rules, structural balance rules).

### Structural reforms to support growth-friendly consolidation
- Complementary structural reforms promote private-sector-led growth, diversification, productivity, competitiveness, and job creation.
- Priorities and observations:
  - CCA countries have advanced first-generation reforms but lag in deeper reforms that foster the business climate for private investment.
  - Labor market reform has advanced significantly in several countries, but corruption and cumbersome bureaucracy remain major hurdles.
  - Closing infrastructure gaps, improving quality of education, and expanding access to finance (particularly for small and medium-size enterprises) remain priorities.
  - Georgia leads in reform progress across several areas; Armenia has made progress fighting corruption.
  - Governance indicators deteriorated in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan still need improvements in rule of law and anti-corruption.
- Public enterprise reform:
  - SOE reform and further privatization are crucial given limited fiscal space and projected reduction in public investment.
  - Privatization can raise productivity and efficiency and reduce implied quasi-fiscal costs.
  - Georgia plans to strengthen monitoring of contingent liabilities from PPPs and SOEs; Tajikistan has measures to improve public service delivery.

### Fiscal consolidation strategy and revenue/expenditure policy recommendations
- Policy objectives for building buffers and ensuring debt sustainability while supporting growth:
  1. Tighten fiscal policies to reduce deficits and restore external balance and fiscal sustainability.
  2. Strengthen tax systems and tax collection and tilt expenditure toward a more productive and growth-enhancing composition.
  3. Implement public financial management reforms and strengthen fiscal institutions, including through fiscal rules.
- Revenue mobilization reforms should focus on:
  - rationalization of exemptions to broaden the tax base;
  - implementing excise taxes selectively;
  - eliminating broad-based turnover tax on all businesses;
  - avoiding multiple tax rate structures on companies;
  - simplifying taxation of small businesses;
  - revamping tax and customs administration (strengthen large taxpayer units; introduce risk-based compliance systems).
- Expenditure rationalization priorities:
  - rationalize the government wage bill where public-sector wages and employment are high relative to the private sector;
  - further reform energy subsidies while strengthening poorly targeted social safety nets;
  - safeguard social expenditures and prioritize pro-growth capital spending;
  - prior to large public investment scale-ups, implement reforms to boost efficiency and productivity.

### Fiscal policy reaction function — empirical summary and implications
- Fiscal response function used: b(t) – b(t-1) = α[b*(t)-b(t-1)] + β[Δy*(t)-Δy(t)] + ε(t).
  - α denotes an error-correction coefficient.
  - β is the size of the response of the fiscal position to output fluctuations.
  - ε(t) is an error term capturing other influences.
- Empirical estimates for 2000–13 suggest:
  - Estimates of α are very high, indicating that across the region a large share (about 80 percent) of the deviation from the fiscal target in year t-1 is already corrected in the next year t. A 1 percentage point deterioration in the fiscal balance in year t is almost fully corrected by year t+2.
  - Estimates of β indicate fiscal positions in most countries tend to fluctuate pro-cyclically; the size of β is in line with the expected size of automatic fiscal stabilizers.
  - Exception: Azerbaijan appears to respond counter-cyclically to output fluctuations.
- Annex Table 1 (estimates, 2000–2013) — preserved entries as reported:
  - Azerbaijan0.9920.355.600.57
  - Kazakhstan0.640.901.420.73
  - Turkmenistan0.950.232.500.58
  - Uzbekistan1.010.502.400.56
  - Armenia0.840.211.200.72
  - Georgia0.590.121.900.33
  - Kyrgyz Republic0.650.241.900.47
  - Tajikistan0.930.132.100.37
  - Average0.830.252.380.54

### Gross vs net debt concepts and country specifics
- Gross debt: sum of liabilities held in debt instruments; commonly reported and used in fiscal rules.
- Net debt / net financial worth: public debt minus financial assets; more appropriate for countries with substantial government financial assets (notably oil exporters).
- Country-specific financial asset holdings (end-2016):
  - Azerbaijan: $33 billion, or 88 percent of GDP.
  - Kazakhstan: $58 billion, or 44 percent of GDP.
- Given low financial assets in Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, analyses use gross public debt for those countries; for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, net debt or net financial worth is used.
- Government guarantees are not included in the debt definition due to data availability.

*Italic source: Executive Summary and selected sections from "A Growth-Friendly Path for Building Fiscal Buffers for CCA"*

### Executive Summary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������

### 45546-growth-friendly-path-for-building-fiscal-buffers-for-cca - Executive Summary

### Macroeconomic impact of external shocks
- Prior to 2013 the CCA region was one of the fastest-growing regions, with real output projected to expand at about 6 percent.
- The 2014–15 external shocks (persistent commodity price slump, abrupt decline in remittances, and lower import demand from key partners) substantially lowered growth prospects and exposed structural weaknesses, notably limited export diversification.
- Growth outcomes:
  - Average GDP growth in oil exporters fell from 6.7 percent in 2013 to 2.2 percent in 2016.
  - Average GDP growth in oil importers fell from 5.7 percent in 2013 to 3.3 percent in 2016.
- External positions:
  - In oil-exporting countries, current account balances fell from 2.9 percent of GDP at end-2013 to –5.9 percent of GDP at end-2016.
  - In oil-importing countries, current account balances fell from –5.8 percent of GDP to –7.9 percent of GDP over the same period.
- Conclusion: Medium-term growth is projected to remain below historical levels without far-reaching reform; returning to (near-)pre-crisis growth will require a new inclusive, employment-generating growth model based on forceful structural reforms and diversification.

### Fiscal reaction to the shocks
- Pre-2014 behavior: deviations from fiscal targets were typically corrected by about 80 percent in the following year, with automatic stabilizers allowed to operate.
- 2014–16 response: fiscal policies were more accommodative and more countercyclical than predicted, weakening fiscal positions across the region.
- Country variation in fiscal reaction:
  - Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan deviated significantly from adjustment paths.
  - Georgia and Uzbekistan broadly matched predicted positions, though at lower levels.
  - Armenia and Kazakhstan saw fiscal balances weaken more rapidly than predicted.
- Aggregate effects on public debt and deficits (2013–2016):
  - Oil importers: gross public debt rose by about 12 percent of GDP to around 49 percent of GDP; fiscal balances weakened by about 4 percent of GDP to –6.1 percent of GDP.
  - Oil exporters (Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan): net public debt decreased by about 7 percent of GDP; fiscal balances deteriorated by about 7 percent of GDP on average, "to –26 percent and 3.3 percent of GDP, respectively." (text preserved exactly)

### Fiscal plans and scenarios
- Three stylized medium-term debt scenarios are outlined: no-adjustment, current projections/plans, and a more ambitious consolidation path.
- Under current projections:
  - Most countries aim to stabilize public debt ratios at present levels over the medium term.
  - For CCA oil exporters:
    - Fiscal deficits are projected to average about 1.1 percent of GDP in 2022 compared to an average surplus of 3.9 percent of GDP at end-2013.
    - Public gross debt is projected to increase from about 13 percent of GDP at end-2013 to about 22 percent of GDP in 2022.
- Assessment: Given the magnitude and persistence of shocks and the potential for sizable fiscal risks outside official budgets (SOEs and state-controlled banks), more ambitious consolidation to reduce debt to pre-crisis levels would be desirable to rebuild buffers, but current plans strike a balance between ambition and keeping consolidation growth-friendly and inclusive.

### Key elements of a strengthened consolidation plan (policy levers)
- Tax policy reforms (growth-friendly and fairness-enhancing):
  - Broaden direct and indirect tax bases in many countries, even after reducing widespread tax exemptions.
  - Improve enforcement of tax collection.
  - More effectively tax higher net worth individuals to improve perceptions of tax fairness.
  - Address unequal distribution of the tax burden, which remains an investment climate concern in some countries.
- Expenditure-side measures:
  - Streamline government wage bills.
  - Further reform energy subsidies while strengthening social safety nets for the most vulnerable.
  - Protect and create fiscal space for well-designed, growth-raising public investments and improve their efficiency and productivity.
- Fiscal policy frameworks and institutions:
  - Well-designed fiscal rules can support consolidation but must be tailored to country-specific political landscapes to minimize circumvention (e.g., shifting spending to public-sector units outside government).
  - Improve public financial management, including more medium-term oriented budgeting, to help anchor consolidation plans.
- Structural reforms:
  - Structural reforms that boost the supply side can help offset contractionary effects of consolidation.
  - Comparisons with peers show considerable scope for reforms to improve the business climate across most CCA countries.

### Overall conclusions and recommendations
- The 2014–15 shocks necessitate medium-term fiscal consolidation that is:
  - Ambitious enough to rebuild fiscal buffers and contain fiscal risks (including off-budget risks), yet
  - Growth-friendly and inclusive to preserve output and employment.
- Recommended policy mix:
  - Use tax-base broadening and better enforcement to raise revenues while improving fairness.
  - Rationalize spending (wage bills, energy subsidies) and strengthen targeted social protection.
  - Protect and enhance the quality and efficiency of public investment.
  - Strengthen fiscal anchors (tailored fiscal rules) and public financial management.
  - Step up structural reforms to support pro-growth consolidation and diversification.

*Italic source: Executive Summary from "A Growth-Friendly Path for Building Fiscal Buffers for CCA"*

### 1. Public Net Debt in CCA Oil Exporters

### 1. Public Net Debt in CCA Oil Exporters

### Public debt options for the CCA (Figure 5)
- Time axis labels: 20111213141516171819202122
- Debt value markers shown: –65, –25, –5, 40, 100, 20, 60, 80
- Scenarios depicted: Before external shocks; External shocks; After external shocks
- Policy option labels shown: Consolidation; Unchanged position; Fiscal plans
- Note: CCA = Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan omitted for lack of data
- Note 1: Public debt for oil exporters is measured on a net debt basis, taking into account foreign assets of country oil funds.
- Note 2: Unchanged position refers to a scenario in which the end-2017 fiscal balance is added to the stock of debt in each forecast year.
- Sources: IMF Regional Economic Outlook October 2017; IMF staff calculations.

### Kazakhstan — Net debt and fiscal balance options (Figure 6)
- Time axis labels: 20111213141516171819202122
- Net debt value markers shown: –80, –40, –20, 0, 0, 15, –15, –10, –5, 5, 10
- Fiscal balance value markers shown: –60, 20
- Scenarios depicted: Before external shocks; External shocks; After external shocks
- Policy option labels shown: Consolidation; Unchanged position; Fiscal plans

### Azerbaijan — Net debt and fiscal balance options (Figure 6)
- Time axis labels: 20111213141516171819202122
- Net debt value markers shown: –80, –40, –20, 0, 0, 15, –15, –10, –5, 5, 10
- Fiscal balance value markers shown: –60, 20
- Scenarios depicted: Before external shocks; External shocks; After external shocks
- Note: Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan measured on a net debt basis, taking into account foreign assets of country oil funds.
- Sources: IMF Regional Economic Outlook, October 2017; IMF staff calculations.

### CCA oil importers — Debt and fiscal balance options (Figure 7)
- Time axis labels (common across panels): 20111213141516171819202122
- Policy option labels shown repeatedly: Consolidation; Unchanged position; Fiscal plans
- Scenarios depicted repeatedly: Before external shocks; External shocks; After external shocks

Armenia (Panels 1 and 2)
- Debt value markers shown: 50, 90, 30, 40, 60, 70, 80
- Fiscal balance value markers shown: 5, –10, –5, 0

Georgia (Panels 3 and 4)
- Debt value markers shown: 50, 90
- Fiscal balance value markers shown: 5, –10, –5, 0

Kyrgyz Republic (Panels 5 and 6)
- Debt value markers shown: 50, 90, 30, 40, 60, 70, 80
- Fiscal balance value markers shown: 7, 4, –11, –8, –5, –2, 1

Tajikistan (Panel 7)
- Time axis labels: 20111213141516171819202122

- Sources for CCA oil importers: IMF Regional Economic Outlook, October 2017; IMF staff calculations.

*Source: IMF Regional Economic Outlook, October 2017; IMF staff calculations.*

### 8. Tajikistan Fiscal Balance Options

### 8. Tajikistan Fiscal Balance Options

### Fiscal outlook and debt dynamics
- Gross assets less government debt would fall from 34 percent of GDP in 2013 to close to 23 percent of GDP by 2022, diminishing buffers.
- For oil importers (context includes Tajikistan as an oil importer): 
  - Fiscal deficit is expected to average about 1.9 percent of GDP in 2022, similar to the end-2013 average.
  - Public debt is projected to increase from an average of about 37 percent of GDP at the end of 2013 to 50 percent of GDP by 2022.

### Composition of planned fiscal adjustment (2017–22)
- Countries typically focus on spending cuts; some are planning sizable cuts in public investment (Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan).
- Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan intend to protect investment plans.
- Most countries, except Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, will curtail current expenditures; Georgia and the Kyrgyz Republic plan sizable cuts in the wage bill.
- On the revenue side, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan will pursue policies to increase tax revenues; Uzbekistan will make limited effort; Azerbaijan’s tax revenues are expected to drop slightly.

### Case for more ambitious consolidation
- More ambitious consolidation would rebuild buffers faster, creating room for countercyclical policies if shocks recur.
- Medium-term consolidation targets:
  - Oil importers would target a pre-shock level of gross public debt, requiring a consolidation of gross debt of about 15 percent of GDP.
  - Oil exporters would target a pre-crisis net debt-to-GDP ratio of –37 percent, requiring a consolidation effort of about 12.5 percent of GDP.
- Guidance on timing and speed:
  - Countries with limited fiscal space and facing budget funding crises should front-load consolidation and reduce debt to sustainable levels in the near term.
  - Countries with manageable debt could follow more gradual consolidation, implying constant improvement in the fiscal balance over the medium term.
  - Countries with ongoing fiscal stimulus or financial support programs may delay consolidation by 1–2 years, but would then need more ambitious consolidation to reduce debt levels.

### Fiscal risks to consider
- Unanticipated shocks (e.g., decline in remittances, contraction in trading partners, lower commodity prices).
- SOEs represent a large portion of the economy and pose contingent liabilities risk.
- Financial and banking sector issues intensified after the drop in oil prices and may require additional funding or bailouts.

### Advancing growth-friendly tax policy reform
- Medium-term projections under current plans:
  - Oil importers plan to increase the tax-to-GDP ratio by about 2 percentage points on average to 22 percent of GDP.
  - Oil exporters are expected, on average, to keep their non-oil tax levels at around 15 percent of GDP.
- Key descriptive tax system facts and ranges from the region:
  - Value-added tax rates in the CCA range between 12 percent (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic) to a maximum of 20 percent (Armenia, Uzbekistan).
  - Corporate income tax rates range from 8 percent (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) to 20 percent (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan).
- Shortcomings to address:
  - Widespread exemptions reducing the tax base (agriculture, special economic zones).
  - Low or no taxation of capital gains and dividends.
  - Underreporting and tax avoidance by liberal professionals and businesses not subject to regular regimes.
  - Difficulty auditing natural persons (including high net worth individuals).
  - Complex property tax systems leaving many properties undeclared.
  - Significant tax arrears, collection enforcement, and dispute resolution issues.

- Country-specific tax reform recommendations (selected):
  - Simplify the VAT: fewer rates and a broader base (reduce exemptions).
  - Broaden tax base by rationalizing exemptions across taxes; move large agro-businesses, higher education and medical services, and Special Economic Zones to the regular tax system where applicable.
  - Review Free Economic Zone taxation: target tax incentives on investment and employment rather than on profitability; limit tax preferences to indirect taxes but not direct profit taxes.
  - Increase revenue productivity of excise taxes: limit excises to a selected list of products; improve targeting for cellular airtime and gambling (Armenia); double the excise on petroleum products (Kyrgyz Republic); target tobacco and beverages.
  - Eliminate broad-based turnover tax on all businesses (Kyrgyz Republic).
  - Simplify corporate taxation by eliminating multiple rate structures at firm level (Kyrgyz Republic).
  - Simplify taxation of small businesses through flat rates, with two regimes: a patent system for micro-businesses and a presumptive tax based on turnover for small businesses, including small farmers (Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic).
  - Reform mineral resource taxation to capture a fair share of rent for the budget (Kyrgyz Republic).
  - Improve progressivity of personal taxation by raising the threshold for exempted income and introduce graduated rates (Armenia).
  - Tax capital income (Armenia).
  - Enhance property taxation with a modern and simplified system focused on the taxable asset and using an appropriate value threshold to protect the poor (Georgia); align cadastral value more closely with market levels (Kyrgyz Republic).
  - Revamp tax and customs administration—strengthen large taxpayer units and introduce risk-based compliance systems.

### Streamlining and increasing efficiency of public spending
- Wage bill observations:
  - Most CCA countries have a moderate wage bill, averaging around 6 percent of GDP.
  - Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan have relatively high ratios, hovering around 9 percent of GDP.
  - Over the medium term, oil exporters (except Uzbekistan) plan to stabilize their wage bill at around 5.5 percent of GDP; oil importers (except Georgia) project lower wage bills.
- Structural weaknesses and civil service reform needs:
  - High share of public-sector employment in several countries.
  - Proliferation of allowances, low recruitment standards, and weak links between performance and promotion.
  - Recommendation: comprehensive reform of civil services and salaries to reduce inefficiencies and raise public-sector productivity and efficiency.

### Energy subsidies and reallocation
- Pre-tax energy subsidies (Percent of GDP, 2015):
  - Armenia 0.06 0.04
  - Azerbaijan 3.08 1.03
  - Georgia 0.00 0.00
  - Kazakhstan 0.82 0.80
  - Kyrgyz Republic 14.76 8.16
  - Tajikistan 3.34 3.30
  - Turkmenistan 16.23 10.70
  - Uzbekistan 18.21 11.91
  - Average CCA Oil Importers 4.54 2.88
  - Average CCA Oil Exporters 9.58 6.11
  - Average selected EMDC 0.89 0.52
  - of which: selected EM oil exporters 3.61 1.86
- Key recommendations:
  - Use relatively low oil prices to reform energy subsidies by aligning energy prices to market and cost recovery levels to reduce budgetary costs.
  - Create incentives to reduce energy intensity and inefficiency.
  - Reduce leaks to privileged segments and strengthen focus on vulnerable segments through better registry systems and better targeted social safety nets.
  - Refrain from ad hoc adjustments.

### Public investment: reorientation and efficiency
- Public investment varies considerably:
  - Examples (Percent of GDP, 2015): Tajikistan public investment 13.8; Armenia public investment 2.9; Georgia 5.6; Azerbaijan 16.4; Kazakhstan 4.5; Uzbekistan 1.7.
  - Emerging and developing economies average public investment 8.7 percent of GDP.
- Concerns:
  - Large part of public investment is not fully effective economically or socially.
  - Budgetary levels for education and health are below emerging market and developing economies.
  - Average public investment efficiency in the CCA (distance to frontier) is below estimates for low-income and emerging market economies; country scores include:
    - CCA commodity exporters 0.79
    - Azerbaijan 0.94
    - Kazakhstan 0.65
    - CCA commodity importers 0.71
    - Armenia 0.79
    - Georgia 0.86
    - Kyrgyz Republic 0.57
    - Tajikistan 0.61
    - Emerging market economies 0.78
    - Low income developing economies 0.77
    - Advanced economies 0.89
- Policy implications:
  - Reorient public investment toward projects supporting diversification, education, and health.
  - Boost efficiency and productivity of public investment via a comprehensive public investment management framework with stricter selection and monitoring of high growth and social impact projects.
  - In low-efficiency countries (e.g., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan), consider structural reforms to increase efficiency before large public investment projects.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/dp/2018/45546-growth-friendly-path-for-building-fiscal-buffers-for-cca.pdf*

### 1. Government Spending on Education, 2012

### 1. Government Spending on Education, 2012

### CCA social spending and expenditure quality
- Figure 12 and Figure 13 provide regional comparisons of government spending on education (2012) and health services (2014) as percent of GDP and assess capital stock, infrastructure quality, and health efficiency frontiers across CCA countries.
- Sources for indicators include: World Development Indicators; IMF Investment and Capital Stock Dataset; World Economic Forum; IMF Fiscal Affairs Department Expenditure Assessment Tool; World Economic Outlook; World Bank; World Health Organization.
- Note: Countries with unavailable data for a given category are omitted from that column.

### Main findings on fiscal frameworks and public financial management
- Strengthening credibility and sustainability of fiscal adjustment requires stronger fiscal frameworks, including:
  - improving public financial management;
  - anchoring policies on well-defined long-term paths (for example through rules-based fiscal policy);
  - promoting transparency, credibility, and accountability.
- Key public financial management improvements recommended (best international standards, IMF 2014):
  - development of comprehensive medium-term fiscal frameworks, budget classification, program budgeting, and public procurement;
  - quantification and reporting in the budget of main quasi-fiscal activities, implicit energy subsidies, and contingent liabilities;
  - strengthened fiscal risks management and disclosure and the ways to address them (including those associated with public-private partnerships (PPPs) and SOEs);
  - enhanced public investment management to help ensure that government spending plans are efficient and will yield economic and social benefits;
  - improved budget transparency, public participation, and oversight by, among other initiatives, producing and publishing a pre-budget statement and a midyear review, and increasing the comprehensiveness of the yearend report; and establishing credible and effective mechanisms (that is, public hearings, surveys, and so on) for capturing different public perspectives on budget matters;
  - stronger public-sector statistics.
- Example disclosure improvements: Armenia and Georgia include disclosure of risks in the budget documentation and Tajikistan has developed a fiscal risk statement.

### Fiscal rules: coverage, benefits, and design principles
- Use of fiscal rules has grown: by the end of 2015, the number of countries with fiscal rules surged to 92, of which more than 60 percent were emerging market and developing economies.
- Among CCA countries:
  - Armenia (2008), Georgia (2014), and Kazakhstan (2016) follow fiscal rules;
  - Azerbaijan and the Kyrgyz Republic are considering such rules.
- Fiscal rules can enhance credibility, reduce fiscal bias, and support long-term sustainability. General principles for effective fiscal rules:
  - Introduce formal enforcement procedures to make fiscal rules binding on the outturn.
  - Expand coverage to general government to avoid incentives to shift unfunded spending responsibilities to local governments.
  - Include a plan to bring back deficits and expenditures when there are indications that current year’s outturn will breach the rules’ limits.
  - Enhance strategies to communicate targets and ways to achieve them.
  - Introduce well-defined escape clauses.
- Choice of fiscal rule should be based on structural and country-specific factors. Common operational rules in emerging markets include:
  - debt rules (Armenia);
  - budget-balanced rules (Kazakhstan);
  - expenditure rules;
  - Georgia uses a combination of the three.
- Commodity exporters should consider rules that account for volatility and resource depletion (revenue split rules, price smoothing rules, structural balance rules).

### Structural reforms to support growth-friendly consolidation
- Complementary structural reforms enhance the effectiveness of growth-friendly fiscal policy by promoting private-sector-led growth, diversification, productivity, competitiveness, and job creation.
- Priorities and observations:
  - CCA countries have advanced first-generation reforms but lag in deeper reforms that foster the business climate for private investment.
  - Labor market reform has advanced significantly in several countries, but corruption and cumbersome bureaucracy remain major hurdles.
  - Closing infrastructure gaps, improving quality of education, and expanding access to finance (particularly for small and medium-size enterprises) remain priorities.
  - Georgia leads in reform progress across several areas; Armenia has made progress fighting corruption.
  - Governance indicators deteriorated in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan still need improvements in rule of law and anti-corruption.
- Public enterprise reform:
  - SOE reform and further privatization are crucial given limited fiscal space and projected reduction in public investment.
  - Privatization can raise productivity and efficiency and reduce implied quasi-fiscal costs.
  - Georgia plans to strengthen monitoring of contingent liabilities from PPPs and SOEs; Tajikistan has measures to improve public service delivery.

### Fiscal consolidation strategy and revenue/expenditure policy recommendations
- Policy objectives for building buffers and ensuring debt sustainability while supporting growth:
  1. Tighten fiscal policies to reduce deficits and restore external balance and fiscal sustainability.
  2. Strengthen tax systems and tax collection and tilt expenditure toward a more productive and growth-enhancing composition.
  3. Implement public financial management reforms and strengthen fiscal institutions, including through fiscal rules.
- Revenue mobilization reforms should focus on:
  - rationalization of exemptions to broaden the tax base;
  - implementing excise taxes selectively;
  - eliminating broad-based turnover tax on all businesses;
  - avoiding multiple tax rate structures on companies;
  - simplifying taxation of small businesses;
  - revamping tax and customs administration (strengthen large taxpayer units; introduce risk-based compliance systems).
- Expenditure rationalization priorities:
  - rationalize the government wage bill where public-sector wages and employment are high relative to the private sector;
  - further reform energy subsidies while strengthening poorly targeted social safety nets;
  - safeguard social expenditures and prioritize pro-growth capital spending;
  - prior to large public investment scale-ups, implement reforms to boost efficiency and productivity.

### Institutional recommendations
- Strengthen public financial management institutions to enable adequate fiscal policies.
- Well-designed fiscal rules can support fiscal credibility and fiscal space while allowing flexibility for shocks or exceptional circumstances.
- An ambitious structural reform agenda is needed to complement fiscal consolidation: better governance, enhanced competition, improved labor markets, less bureaucracy, stronger business climate, and export diversification.

### Fiscal policy reaction function: empirical summary and implications
- Fiscal response function used: b(t) – b(t-1) = α[b*(t)-b(t-1)] + β[Δy*(t)-Δy(t)] + ε(t), where:
  - α denotes an error-correction coefficient;
  - β is the size of the response of the fiscal position to output fluctuations;
  - ε(t) is an error term capturing other influences.
- Empirical estimates for 2000–13 suggest two broad conclusions:
  - Estimates of α are very high, indicating that across the region a large share (about 80 percent) of the deviation from the fiscal target in year t-1 is already corrected in the next year t. A 1 percentage point deterioration in the fiscal balance in year t is almost fully corrected by year t+2.
  - Estimates of β indicate fiscal positions in most countries tend to fluctuate pro-cyclically; the size of β is in line with the expected size of automatic fiscal stabilizers.
  - Exception: Azerbaijan appears to respond counter-cyclically to output fluctuations.
- Annex Table 1 (estimates, 2000–2013) — preserved entries as reported:
  - Azerbaijan0.9920.355.600.57
  - Kazakhstan0.640.901.420.73
  - Turkmenistan0.950.232.500.58
  - Uzbekistan1.010.502.400.56
  - Armenia0.840.211.200.72
  - Georgia0.590.121.900.33
  - Kyrgyz Republic0.650.241.900.47
  - Tajikistan0.930.132.100.37
  - Average0.830.252.380.54

### Gross vs net debt concepts and country specifics
- Gross debt: sum of liabilities held in debt instruments; commonly reported and used in fiscal rules.
- Net debt / net financial worth: public debt minus financial assets; more appropriate for countries with substantial government financial assets (notably oil exporters).
- Country-specific financial asset holdings (end-2016):
  - Azerbaijan: $33 billion, or 88 percent of GDP.
  - Kazakhstan: $58 billion, or 44 percent of GDP.
- Given low financial assets in Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, analyses use gross public debt for those countries; for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, net debt or net financial worth is used.
- Government guarantees are not included in the debt definition due to data availability.

*Italic: Source — Content extracted from "A Growth-Friendly Path for Building Fiscal Buffers for CCA" (selected sections).*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/dp/2018/45546-growth-friendly-path-for-building-fiscal-buffers-for-cca.pdf_
