## The Macrofinancial Linkages in Shallow Markets

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### Executive Summary — Overview and Key Messages
- Paper assesses and disseminates experiences and lessons from low-income countries (LICs) in sub-Saharan Africa selected by the African Department in 2015–16 as pilots for enhanced analysis of macro-financial linkages in Article IV staff reports.
- Focuses on common characteristics across the pilot countries, tools used in the analysis, challenges encountered, and solutions deployed.
- Draws on the IMF’s institutional view on addressing macro-financial linkages in surveillance and demonstrates relevance to financial inclusion, poverty, and macroeconomic stability.
- Pilot coverage:
  - First phase (2016): Benin, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Tanzania, and Uganda.
  - Since then added: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of Congo, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and South Africa.
  - LIC-focused analysis excludes Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa.

### Executive Summary — Financial system structure and inclusion
- Financial systems largely bank-based:
  - Banking sector share of financial system assets: 61 percent in Malawi to 98 percent in São Tomé and Príncipe.
- Financial depth increased but remains low relative to other regions.
- Technology (mobile banking/payments) improved inclusion and depth in East African pilots.
- Persistent gender gap in financial access; barriers include financial literacy, weak property rights, absence of credit registries, and informality.
- Policy advice to improve financial development included:
  - strengthen legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks to increase credit supply;
  - increase bank competition;
  - improve physical infrastructure (power supply and internet services);
  - foster financial literacy.

### Executive Summary — Macro-financial linkages and transmission
- Fiscal dominance and lack of economic diversification were key drivers of shocks to the financial sector.
- Transmission channels:
  - Real → financial: corporate and household balance sheets.
  - External → financial: commodity price fluctuations affecting exporters.
  - Fiscal → financial: indirect exposure to government arrears, direct exposure to ailing state-owned enterprises, government demand for credit.
- Financial → macro: changing financial conditions affect the economy and interact with monetary-to-financial links through higher nominal interest rates.
- Bringing financial development in an average sub-Saharan African country up to its potential could raise GDP growth by about 1.5 percentage points (IMF 2016d).

### Executive Summary — Stress testing and stability
- Stress-testing framework quantified macro-financial impacts on banks.
- Concentration risk (failure of the largest borrowers) posed the greatest banking-system risk across pilots.
- Sovereign risk from government debt exposure generated negative feedback to banks.
- Stress-test results performed for Benin, Chad, Malawi, and Uganda.
- Recommendation: improve banking supervision through capacity development to reduce financial stability risks.

---

### Introduction — Key Financial Characteristics of the Pilot Countries
- Banking sector shares:
  - Malawi: 61 percent of financial system assets.
  - Tanzania: 71 percent.
  - São Tomé and Príncipe: 98 percent.
- Microfinance institutions (MFIs):
  - Account for less than 5 percent of financial sector assets in most pilots.
  - Benin: MFIs account for 5 percent.
  - Malawi: MFIs account for 3 percent.
- Financial depth:
  - Median private credit-to-GDP in sub-Saharan Africa: 14.8 percent in 2015, compared with 7.8 percent in 2006.
- Financial inclusion and access:
  - Household account and borrowing indicators highest in Benin, Tanzania, and Uganda; lowest in Guinea.
  - More than 50 percent of firms in Benin identified access to finance as a major constraint.
- Mobile payments:
  - Tanzania: nominal value and importance of mobile money transactions rose exponentially since 2010.
  - Mobile platforms can act as gateways to more sophisticated financial products (example: Uganda).

### Introduction — State of Macrofinancial Linkages (analytical approach and channels)
- Two-step analytical approach:
  1. How macro shocks and policies affect the financial sector.
  2. How financial developments magnify or dampen macro shocks and feed back to the economy.
- Prominent transmission channels:
  - Real sector: loan concentration risks, increases in NPLs, weak private-sector balance sheets, high dollarization in some countries.
  - External sector: commodity price shocks; foreign capital conditions; spillovers from parent banks.
  - Fiscal sector: fiscal dominance, crowding out of private credit, domestic payment arrears, holdings of government debt.
- Country examples:
  - Malawi: shocks to tobacco exports and maize harvest; domestic payment arrears driven by fiscal developments.
  - São Tomé and Príncipe: dollarization, asset concentration, high liquidity and low profitability in banks; revenue shortfalls affecting banks and fiscal position.
- Infrastructure bottlenecks example:
  - Electricity costs contributed to about 40 percent of operational expenses in São Tomé and Príncipe.

### Introduction — Methodological approaches and data issues
- Data constraints and frequent shocks/structural breaks limit quantification and integration of financial-sector analysis.
- Methods used:
  - Microfounded model simulations with limited firm-level data (Benin).
  - Time-series analysis linking credit growth to inflation dynamics driven by fiscal dominance (Malawi).
  - VAR analyses showing weak short-term but more robust long-term credit-growth links (Tanzania and Uganda).
  - Excel-based tool (IMF Research Department) to generate credit growth projections (Uganda).
  - Balance sheet analysis and stress tests where data allowed (Benin, Malawi, São Tomé and Príncipe, Tanzania).
  - Simple structural VAR to assess domestic and external shocks (Uganda).
- Annexes provide further methodological detail (Annex 1 and Annex 2 referenced).

### Introduction — Financial sector development and inclusion (indicators, constraints, and policy)
- Multidimensional assessment: depth, access, efficiency across institutions and markets; separate household and firm access.
- Indicators used include: private sector credit/GDP, M2/GDP, bank deposits/GDP, accounts at formal institutions, mobile money accounts per 1,000 adults, net interest margin, non-interest income to total income, overhead costs to total assets, return on assets, return on equity, branch and ATM density, SME access metrics.
- Country groupings by financial deepening:
  - Category 1 (at or above expected median): Malawi and Tanzania.
  - Category 2 (improving but below regional/peer averages): Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Republic of Congo, and Uganda.
- Mobile banking penetration (World Bank Findex, 2014):
  - Benin: 2 percent of adults.
  - Tanzania and Uganda: over 30 percent of adults.
- Structural constraints across pilots: low income and literacy, weak property rights and land title systems, absence/limited credit registries and national IDs, judicial inefficiencies, high informality, unstable macroeconomic conditions, high operating costs and poor infrastructure.
- Policy recommendations (selected, verbatim in source):
  - Strengthen legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks (protect property and creditor rights, enforce laws, streamline procedures).
    - Chad: develop appropriate frameworks as first step.
    - Tanzania: reassess regulatory and supervisory framework for electronic payments.
    - Côte d’Ivoire: issue regulations to facilitate bank agents and correspondent banking.
    - Benin: relax collateral constraints to improve access and reduce inequality.
    - Guinea: designate central agency to coordinate financial deepening efforts.
  - Reduce participation costs via increased bank competition, disclosure standards, credit information systems, collateral registries, upgraded trading/settlement systems, improved electronic payment efficiency, and optimized mobile/agent banking.
    - Uganda: require banks to disclose terms and conditions for consumer protection.
    - Guinea, Liberia, Malawi, Uganda: expand physical infrastructure (mobile coverage, power, internet, roads).
  - Restore or preserve macroeconomic stability to lower uncertainty and cost of funds.
    - Malawi example: inflation stuck above 20 percent after 2012 but has recently stabilized to single digits.
  - Foster financial literacy, especially for rural/uneducated populations and small enterprises (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Malawi, Uganda).
  - Enhance supervision across all financial system segments in parallel with inclusion expansion (banks, MFIs, insurers, pensions).
    - Benin: increase supervisory staff and enforce microfinance regulations.

### Introduction — Financial sector stability and stress testing
- Data limitations constrain stress-testing scope and quality; granular supervisory and sectoral data often lacking.
- Stress testing used to complement financial soundness indicators and supervisory early warning systems (Benin, Chad, Malawi, Uganda).
- Frameworks:
  - Some pilots built on central bank frameworks (Malawi and Uganda).
  - Benin and São Tomé and Príncipe adapted the Cihak (2007) framework.
  - Chad used stress tests prepared by IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department.
- Stress tests informed policy where data permitted.

---

### 1. Regulatory Capital to RWA — Stress-testing approaches and implementation
- Two predominant approaches:
  - Bottom-up: impact estimated using data from banks’ individual portfolios.
  - Top-down: centrally conducted tests using aggregated data (Jones, Hilbers, and Slack 2004).
- Pilots generally used top-down tests or a combination of bottom-up and top-down, often using Stress Tester 3.0 (Cihak 2007).
- Stress Tester 3.0 covers solvency and liquidity risks, contagion, reverse stress testing, and links to early-warning systems; focuses on bottom-up but can be complemented by top-down models.
- Typical focus: banks only.

### 1. Regulatory Capital to RWA — Country pilot implementations (selected examples)
- Chad:
  - Stress tests based on 2016 CEMAC consultations using end-2015 data from La Commission Bancaire de l’Afrique Centrale.
- Malawi:
  - Built on Stress Tester 3.0. Tests assess minor, moderate, and major shocks on credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk (interest rate and foreign exchange risks), and income risk.
  - Individual banks required to run stress tests each quarter.
  - Tests assumed a 100 percent provisioning of NPLs and were based on banking sector data from the end of 2014.
- Uganda:
  - Bank of Uganda conducts regular stress tests using Stress Tester 3.0; latest exercise used bank-by-bank data at end of 2014.
  - Ad hoc tests assessed foreign exchange risk and combined shocks.
- Benin:
  - Stress tests used institution-by-institution data as of June 30, 2015; due to lack of granular data, used large shocks to main aggregates.

### 1. Regulatory Capital to RWA — Data limitations and adjustments
- Reported data often did not reflect economic value of assets because of insufficient provisioning; reported high capital adequacy ratios were overstated.
- Example: provisioning coverage in Malawi is relatively low compared with other pilots.
- Recommended actions:
  - Carefully assess and, if necessary, adjust data to comply with international reporting standards.
  - Recognize that a bank’s economic value may differ from reported regulatory capital due to inclusion of non-capital items (for example, long-term loans).

### 1. Regulatory Capital to RWA — Loan provisioning rules (as stated in source)
- 1 percent general provision for past loans
- 5 percent general provision for special mention loans
- 20 percent specific provision for substandard loans
- 50 percent specific provision for doubtful loans
- 100 percent for loss loans

### 1. Regulatory Capital to RWA — Main risks to banking systems (stress-test findings)
- Credit Risks:
  - Concentration risk (name concentration and sector concentration) is the greatest risk in pilot banking systems.
  - Sectoral structures create loan concentration (examples: Benin—commerce linked to Nigeria; Malawi—dependence on tobacco exports; Chad—exposure to construction, public works, transport, communication via public sector contracts).
  - Simulation highlights:
    - Malawi: four banks would become undercapitalized in a moderate shock (NPLs increasing by 40 percent and a provisioning rate of 100 percent), but the system overall remains resilient.
    - Benin: high current NPLs imply significant balance-sheet deterioration with further loan-quality deterioration.
    - Chad: if NPLs increased by only 25 percent (to more than 20 percent of total loans), the solvency ratio would fall below the regulatory threshold.
    - Uganda: system can withstand shocks such as increased NPLs; capital buffers sufficient to absorb shock.
- Sovereign Risks:
  - Rising exposure to government debt creates sovereign–bank links that may generate negative feedback under fiscal stress.
  - Capital buffers generally inadequate to cover potential sovereign risks.
  - Benin: banks’ capital adequacy could fall below the minimum 8 percent in case of a partial default in sovereign bonds.
  - Chad: central government, public agencies, and nonfinancial public enterprises accounted for about 28 percent of banks’ total credit as of December 2015.
  - Malawi: government securities represented 24 percent of banking system assets; exposure rose from 14 percent of GDP in 2012 to a projected 24 percent of GDP in 2016.
- Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Risks:
  - Interest rate risk identified as a source of vulnerability.
  - Exchange rate risk negligible in Benin and Chad; foreign exchange risk present in Malawi and Uganda.
  - Malawi: banks resilient to interest rate risk under assumptions; provision rate for resulting NPLs set at 100 percent; most banks resilient to major foreign exchange risk.
  - Uganda: a depreciation of the shilling against the US dollar by up to 50 percent left net open FX position and capital adequacy within required thresholds.

### 1. Regulatory Capital to RWA — Key quantitative findings and scenarios (verbatim)
- Tests assumed a 100 percent provisioning of NPLs (Malawi framework).
- Malawi: NPL shock example—NPLs increasing by 40 percent with 100 percent provisioning → four banks undercapitalized.
- Chad: NPLs increased to 16.5 percent of total banks’ loans as of end-2015 from 9.5 percent in June 2014.
- Chad: solvency ratio stood at 14.6 percent at end-2015.
- Chad: sight deposits are 85 percent of total deposits.
- Benin: banks’ capital adequacy ratio could fall below the minimum 8 percent in case of a partial default in sovereign bonds.
- Benin liquidity test: By day five, seven banks would become illiquid.
- Malawi: Tier 1 capital ratio could decline from 12.6 percent to 11.0 percent and 7.3 percent, in the minor and major shock scenario, respectively.
- Malawi: Tier 1 capital ratio of the banking sector falls from 12.6 percent to 8.4 percent when the two largest borrowers default and falls to 5.6 percent when all five borrowers default.
- Malawi: In two minor shock cases (20 percent appreciation and 20 percent depreciation against currencies of major trading partners), the Tier 1 ratio will increase from 12.6 percent to nearly 16 percent and 16.5 percent, respectively.
- Malawi: In the event of a 50 percent depreciation, the Tier-1 capital would increase slightly to 13.3 percent.
- Malawi: Tier-1 capital ratio falls from 12.6 percent to 12.1 percent when the interest rate increases by 1,000 basis points under stated assumptions.
- Malawi: Liquidity ratio declined from 57.8 percent (pre-shock) to 47.3 percent for the major shocks scenario (30 percent drop of deposits); minimum regulatory requirement is 30.0 percent.
- São Tomé and Príncipe: share of credit to public sector was 1 percent of gross claims in 2015.
- Uganda: share of government securities as share of net domestic bank financing remains low at 13 percent in 2015.
- Table note entries retained: end-June 2015; end-2015; As of June 2015; As of June 2015.

### 1. Regulatory Capital to RWA — Supervision, legal, and policy recommendations
- Strengthen banking supervision and enforcement to reduce risks and enhance efficiency.
  - Malawi: adopted a prompt corrective action framework with IMF technical assistance.
  - Need for consolidated supervision where pan-African banks have growing presence (Benin, Chad, Uganda).
- Address weaknesses in exercising collateral because of lengthy legal procedures.
- Improve interaction between regional and national authorities (Chad example).
- Benin: strengthen supervision and enforcement, including enhanced training in commerce and finance for judges, to sustain MFIs’ role.
- Uganda: approval of Financial Institutions Act and Microfinance Development Institutions Act could help prevent regulatory arbitrage.
- Malawi: update of e-money regulations expected to strengthen financial inclusion.
- Broader reforms to deepen financial development:
  - Improve laws that protect property and creditor rights.
  - Increase bank competition.
  - Promote credit information and collateral registries.
  - Foster financial literacy.
  - Maintain a stable macroeconomic environment with sustained and inclusive growth and single-digit inflation.

---

### Conclusions — Shallow markets, transmission channels, and policy implications
- Shallow and undiversified financial markets limited ability to absorb external shocks (aid and commodity price volatility).
- Equity prices emerged as an important transmission channel from external to financial sector.
- Fiscal dominance adversely affected shallow financial markets and triggered negative feedback to growth.
- Stress tests highlighted credit risk and concentration risk as principal banking-system threats.
- Policy implications:
  - Holistic supervisory approach across all financial system segments is necessary to manage trade-offs between financial inclusion and stability.
  - Strengthening supervision and monitoring of credit concentration and credit risk is a priority.
  - Macrofinancial models integrating financial-sector dynamics and evolving capital flow composition (increasing FDI and portfolio flows) are important to better assess spillover risks.

### Conclusions — Integrating the financial sector into macroeconomic modeling: Uganda (Annex 1)
- Uganda’s 2015 Article IV staff report used econometric techniques and VARs for quarterly data from 1997 to 2014 to assess spillovers from external shocks and domestic policy changes on growth, inflation, exchange rate, and the financial sector.
- Findings:
  - High foreign interest rates (six-month LIBOR) would raise domestic inflation and reduce GDP growth in Uganda, although the impact was not statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level.
  - Benign result reflected strong external buffer with international reserves and relatively low foreign holdings of government securities.
  - Historical-data-driven results may understate risks given increasing importance of FDI and portfolio flows.
  - With a shallow foreign exchange market and low daily turnover (about $50 million), sharp unwinding of foreign exchange positions or large profit repatriation could significantly impact the exchange rate and pose risks to banks.

### Conclusions — Databases and empirical sources used (Annex 2)
- IMF Financial Access Survey database (IMF-FAS)
- FINStats
- FinScope Surveys (FinMark Trust)
- World Bank Global Financial Development dataset (Global Findex) — available for 2011 and 2014
- World Bank Global Enterprise Survey
- G20 Financial Inclusion Indicators (Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion)
- Datasets compiled by Sahay and others (2015a) and Chapter 3 of the African Department’s April 2016 Regional Economic Outlook (IMF 2016d)
- Country authorities’ data (central banks and ministries of finance)

*Source: Conclusions (Chapter 5) of "The Macrofinancial Linkages in Shallow Markets," IMF staff document.*

### Executive Summary ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������

### Executive Summary

### Overview
- This paper assesses and disseminates experiences and lessons from low-income countries (LICs) in sub-Saharan Africa selected by the African Department in 2015–16 as pilots for enhanced analysis of macro-financial linkages in Article IV staff reports.
- The paper focuses on common characteristics across the pilot countries, highlights tools used in the analysis, challenges encountered, and solutions deployed in overcoming them.
- It draws on the IMF’s institutional view on addressing macro-financial linkages in surveillance and demonstrates their relevance to financial inclusion, poverty, and macroeconomic stability.

### Financial system structure and inclusion
- Financial systems in the pilot countries are largely bank-based: ranging from 61 percent of financial system assets in Malawi to 98 percent in São Tomé and Príncipe.
- Financial systems have deepened over time but lag behind those in the Middle East, East Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Pilots in East Africa found that the use of technology, especially mobile banking and payments, has improved financial inclusion and depth while upgrading efficiency.
- The gender gap in financial access is substantial and reinforced by barriers including:
  - financial literacy,
  - weak property rights,
  - the absence of credit registries,
  - a high degree of informality.
- Policy advice to improve financial development in LICs included:
  - strengthening the legal, regulatory, and institutional framework to increase the supply of credit,
  - increasing bank competition,
  - improving physical infrastructure (power supply and internet services) to reduce participation costs,
  - fostering financial literacy through increased awareness of financial services.

### Macro-financial linkages and transmission channels
- Fiscal dominance and the lack of economic diversification were key drivers of shocks to the financial sector.
- Transmission channels from the real to the financial sector operated through corporate and household balance sheets.
- Fluctuations in commodity prices (external to real) were another transmission channel affecting borrowers in export sectors.
- In all countries, fiscal dominance (fiscal to financial) adversely affected shallow financial markets through:
  1. indirect exposure of banks to government arrears,
  2. direct exposure of banks to ailing state-owned enterprises,
  3. government demand for credit.
- Financial-to-macro linkages arose from the impact of changing financial conditions on the economy and interplayed with monetary-to-financial links through higher nominal interest rates.
- Bringing financial development in an average sub-Saharan African country up to its potential level, estimated on the basis of country characteristics, could raise GDP growth by about 1.5 percentage points (IMF 2016d).

### Stress testing and financial stability
- The stress-testing framework provided insights in quantifying how macro-financial linkages affect banks.
- Concentration risk—involving the failure of the largest borrowers—posed the greatest risk to banking systems among pilot countries.
- Sovereign risk arising from exposure to government debt was found to generate negative feedback to the banking system.
- Looking ahead, improvements in banking supervision through capacity development would help reduce risks to financial stability.
- Stress-test results and analyses were performed for pilot countries including Benin, Chad, Malawi, and Uganda.

### Pilot coverage and scope
- The first phase of the pilot in 2016 included: Benin, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Tanzania, and Uganda.
- Since then, five more countries integrated macro-financial issues into their Article IV consultations: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of Congo, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and South Africa.
- Because the paper focuses on LICs, the three most financially advanced pilot countries (Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa) are not included in the LIC-focused analysis.
- The paper covers how financial development and inclusion affect growth and poverty and how macro-financial links affect macroeconomic stability and vice versa, with country-level emphasis varying by pilot.

*Source: Executive Summary, "The Macrofinancial Linkages in Shallow Markets" (pilot studies summary).*

### Introduction

### Introduction

### Key Financial Characteristics of the Pilot Countries
- Financial systems are largely bank-based:
  - Banking sector accounted for 61 percent of financial system assets in Malawi, 71 percent in Tanzania, and 98 percent in São Tomé and Príncipe.
  - Microfinance institutions have grown significantly but account for less than 5 percent of the financial sector’s assets in most pilot countries.
    - Microfinance institutions account for 5 percent of the financial sector’s assets in Benin and 3 percent in Malawi.
- Financial depth has increased but remains low relative to other regions:
  - Median credit-to-GDP ratio in sub-Saharan Africa was 14.8 percent in 2015, compared with 7.8 percent in 2006.
  - Many pilot countries fall below the sub-Saharan African median on traditional metrics (private credit/GDP and bank deposits/GDP).
  - Substantial cross-country variation: private credit/GDP in Benin and Côte d’Ivoire is more than twice that in Sierra Leone.
- Financial inclusion and access vary substantially across pilots:
  - Household account and borrowing indicators highest in Benin, Tanzania, and Uganda and lowest in Guinea.
  - All pilots trail the sub-Saharan African average for accounts held at a financial institution.
  - A persistent gender gap in financial access in almost all pilots.
  - More than 50 percent of firms in Benin identified access to finance as a major constraint.
- Mobile payments and banking services are expanding access in several pilots:
  - Tanzania: nominal value and importance of mobile money transactions rose exponentially since 2010.
  - Mobile money platforms act as gateways to more sophisticated financial products (example: banking in Uganda).
  - Rapid mobile money growth benefited from strengthened regulatory environment.

### The State of Macrofinancial Linkages
- Analytical two-step approach used in country studies:
  1. How macro shocks and policies affect the financial sector (links from fiscal, external, and real sectors to the financial sector).
  2. How financial sector developments magnify or dampen macro shocks or policies and feed back to the rest of the economy (links from financial to macro).
- Prominent macro-to-financial transmission channels identified (Table 1 highlights common links across pilots):
  - From real sector:
    - Loan concentration risks and increases in NPLs.
    - Weak private sector balance sheets; high dollarization in some countries.
  - From external sector:
    - Commodity price shocks are a major source of shocks.
    - Foreign capital market conditions and spillovers from parent banks in some cases.
  - From fiscal sector:
    - Fiscal dominance, crowding out of bank credit to private sector, domestic payment arrears, and holdings of government debt.
- Examples of country snapshots:
  - Malawi:
    - Exogenous shocks to tobacco exports and maize harvest; aid flows; domestic payment arrears driven by fiscal developments.
  - São Tomé and Príncipe:
    - Dollarization and exchange risk; asset concentration; high liquidity and low profitability in banks; revenue shortfalls affecting banks and fiscal position.
- Real-to-financial channels:
  - Weather-related shocks harm corporate and household balance sheets, reduce deposits and credit demand, and raise NPLs.
  - Low economic diversification amplifies vulnerability due to lending concentration.
  - Infrastructure bottlenecks raise operational costs (example: electricity costs contributed to about 40 percent of operational expenses in São Tomé and Príncipe).
- External-to-financial channels:
  - Commodity price fluctuations reduce export revenues, push sector borrowers into distress, and increase NPLs.
  - High dollarization (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Uganda) increases vulnerability to exchange rate volatility.
  - Foreign-owned banks are common but not a major concern; need for consolidated supervision noted in some pilots.
- Fiscal-to-financial channels:
  - Government arrears are an important source of financial sector risk and reduce supply of credit.
    - Malawi’s government domestic arrears of about 5.5 percent of GDP in 2015 contributed to a higher inflation premium, higher NPLs, and tighter bank lending conditions.
  - Direct exposure to weak state-owned enterprises appeared in Tanzania and Côte d’Ivoire.
  - Large government demand for bank credit crowds out private credit; government securities represented 24 percent of banking system assets in Malawi.
  - Policy and institutional weaknesses (examples: BCEAO refinancing in Benin, money-targeting regime in Tanzania, tight monetary to offset loose fiscal in Malawi) exacerbated fiscal-financial links.
- Financial-to-macro channels:
  - Credit channel dominates: tightening financial conditions reduce affordable private credit, depressing real activity.
  - Direct fiscal costs from bank recapitalization and contingent liabilities observed in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone.
- Monetary-to-financial channels:
  - High nominal interest rates and risk premiums (Malawi) constrained private credit growth.
  - Shallow financial markets complicate monetary policy transmission (example: Uganda analyses).

### Methodological Approaches and Data Issues
- Data constraints and frequent shocks/structural breaks limit ability to quantify transmission channels and integrate financial sector analysis coherently.
- Diverse methods used to assess financial impact on growth despite data shortcomings:
  - Microfounded model simulations with limited firm-level data (Benin).
  - Time-series analysis linking credit growth to inflation dynamics driven by fiscal dominance (Malawi).
  - Vector autoregression (VAR) analyses to assess credit-growth links; short-term responses weak, long-term impact more robust (Tanzania and Uganda).
  - Excel-based tool (IMF Research Department) to generate credit growth projections consistent with other sector forecasts (Uganda).
  - Balance sheet analysis and stress tests where data allowed (Benin, Malawi, São Tomé and Príncipe, Tanzania).
  - Simple structural VAR to assess impact of domestic and external shocks (Uganda).
- Annexes and tools provide further methodological detail (Annex 1 and Annex 2 referenced).

### Financial Sector Development and Inclusion
- Rationale for focus:
  - Financial development linked to higher growth, greater stability, and poverty reduction.
  - Financial inclusion reduces inequality of opportunity and affects effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies.
- Framework for assessment:
  - Multidimensional approach encompassing depth, access, and efficiency across financial institutions and financial markets.
  - Differentiation between household and firm access.
  - Use of multiple indicators (private sector credit/GDP, M2/GDP, bank deposits/GDP, accounts at formal institutions, mobile money accounts per 1,000 adults, net interest margin, non-interest income to total income, overhead costs to total assets, return on assets, return on equity, branch and ATM density, SME access metrics, etc.).
  - Use of composite indices to benchmark countries against peers (Sahay and others 2015a; Svirydzenka 2016).
- Country groupings by financial deepening:
  - Category 1 (at or above expected median): Malawi and Tanzania.
  - Category 2 (improving but below regional/peer averages): Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Republic of Congo, and Uganda.
- Role of microfinance institutions (MFIs):
  - Mixed impact across pilots: strong contribution in Liberia and Benin (Benin’s microfinance access rate triple that for banks), limited role in Chad, Guinea, Tanzania, and Uganda due to concentration and weak repayment.
- Mobile banking:
  - Rapid development in East Africa; limited in Francophone West Africa.
  - World Bank Findex data: penetration from 2 percent of adults in Benin to over 30 percent in Tanzania and Uganda in 2014.
  - Mobile accounts have in some cases exceeded traditional bank accounts; mobile banking likely raises money multiplier and improves financial sector efficiency.
- Structural constraints identified across pilots:
  - Low income and low literacy/financial illiteracy.
  - Weak property rights and land title systems constrain collateral.
  - Absence or limited effectiveness of public credit registries and national identification systems.
  - Judicial inefficiencies weaken lender protection.
  - High informality and poor business environment reduce bankable firms and hinder new business creation.
  - Unstable macroeconomic conditions raise cost of funds and account maintenance costs (example: Malawi).
  - High operating costs and poor infrastructure impede rural banking expansion (example: Guinea).
- Policy recommendations to improve financial development and inclusion:
  - Strengthen legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks (protect property and creditor rights, enforce laws, streamline procedures). Examples:
    - Chad: develop appropriate frameworks as first step.
    - Tanzania: reassess regulatory and supervisory framework for electronic payments.
    - Côte d’Ivoire: issue regulations to facilitate bank agents and correspondent banking.
    - Benin: relax collateral constraints to improve access and reduce inequality.
    - Guinea: designate central agency to coordinate financial deepening efforts.
  - Reduce participation costs via increased bank competition, disclosure standards, credit information systems, collateral registries, upgraded trading/settlement systems, improved electronic payment efficiency, and optimized mobile/agent banking.
    - Uganda: require banks to disclose terms and conditions for consumer protection.
    - Guinea, Liberia, Malawi, Uganda: expand physical infrastructure (mobile coverage, power, internet, roads).
  - Restore or preserve macroeconomic stability to lower uncertainty and cost of funds, encourage account use, and reduce net interest margins.
    - Malawi example: inflation stuck above 20 percent after 2012 but has recently stabilized to single digits.
  - Foster financial literacy, especially for rural/uneducated populations and small enterprises (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Malawi, Uganda).
  - Enhance supervision across all financial system segments in parallel with inclusion expansion (banks, MFIs, insurers, pensions).
    - Benin: increase supervisory staff and enforce microfinance regulations.

### Financial Sector Stability: Zooming in on Stress Testing
- Data availability constrains stress-testing scope and quality; granular supervisory and sectoral data are often lacking.
- Despite limitations, stress testing was useful to quantify macro-financial impacts on banks in many pilots.
  - Stress testing used to complement financial soundness indicators and supervisory early warning systems (Benin, Chad, Malawi, Uganda).
  - Some pilots built on existing central bank frameworks (Malawi and Uganda).
  - Benin and São Tomé and Príncipe adapted the Cihak (2007) framework.
  - Chad used stress tests prepared by IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department.
  - São Tomé and Príncipe experimenting with stress tests despite lack of formal supervisory application.
- Stress tests helped fine-tune other analyses and informed policy recommendations where data permitted.

*Source: Introduction section of the provided content unit.*

### 1. Regulatory Capital to RWA

### 1. Regulatory Capital to RWA

### Stress-testing approaches and implementation
- Two predominant approaches:
  - Bottom-up: impact estimated using data from banks’ individual portfolios.
  - Top-down: centrally conducted tests using aggregated data (Jones, Hilbers, and Slack 2004).
- Pilots generally used top-down tests or a combination of bottom-up and top-down, often using Stress Tester 3.0 (Cihak 2007).
- Stress Tester 3.0 covers basic solvency and liquidity risks, contagion, reverse stress testing, and links between stress tests and early-warning systems; focuses on bottom-up implementation but can be complemented by top-down models.
- Typical focus: banks only (lack of data; banks dominate financial systems).

### Country pilot implementations (selected examples)
- Chad
  - Stress tests based on 2016 CEMAC consultations using end-2015 data provided by La Commission Bancaire de l’Afrique Centrale.
- Malawi
  - Built on Stress Tester 3.0. Tests assess minor, moderate, and major shocks on credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk (interest rate and foreign exchange risks), and income risk.
  - Individual banks required to run stress tests each quarter.
  - Tests assumed a 100 percent provisioning of NPLs and were based on banking sector data from the end of 2014.
- Uganda
  - Bank of Uganda conducts regular stress tests using Stress Tester 3.0 framework; latest exercise used bank-by-bank data at end of 2014.
  - Ad hoc tests assessed foreign exchange risk and combined shocks.
- Benin
  - Stress tests used institution-by-institution data as of June 30, 2015; due to lack of granular data, used large shocks to main aggregates (increase in NPLs and category shift, concentration risk, liquidity risk).

### Data limitations and adjustments
- Stress tests often revealed that reported data did not properly reflect economic value of assets because of insufficient provisioning.
- Reported high capital adequacy ratios were overstated because of insufficient provisioning.
- Example: provisioning coverage in Malawi is relatively low compared with other pilots (Figure 11).
- Recommended actions:
  - Carefully assess and, if necessary, adjust data to comply with international reporting standards.
  - Recognize that a bank’s economic value may differ from reported regulatory capital due to inclusion of non-capital items (for example, long-term loans).

### Loan provisioning rules (as stated in source)
- 1 percent general provision for past loans
- 5 percent general provision for special mention loans
- 20 percent specific provision for substandard loans
- 50 percent specific provision for doubtful loans
- 100 percent for loss loans

### Main risks to banking systems (findings from stress tests)
- Credit Risks
  - Concentration risk is the greatest risk in pilot banking systems (name concentration and sector concentration).
  - Sectoral structure of real economies leads to loan concentration (examples: Benin—commerce linked to Nigeria; Malawi—dependence on tobacco exports; Chad—construction, public works, transport, communication exposure to public sector contracts).
  - Simulation results:
    - Malawi: four banks would become undercapitalized in a moderate shock (NPLs increasing by 40 percent and a provisioning rate of 100 percent), but the system overall remains resilient.
      - Aggregate Tier 1 capital ratio would fall below 10 percent after default of the largest borrower of each bank.
    - Benin: due to current high level of NPLs, banks’ balance sheets would significantly deteriorate with any further deterioration in loan quality.
    - Chad: if NPLs increased by only 25 percent (to more than 20 percent of total loans), the solvency ratio would fall below the regulatory threshold.
    - Uganda: system can withstand shocks such as increased NPLs; capital buffers sufficient to absorb shock.
- Sovereign Risks
  - Rising exposure to government debt creates sovereign–bank links that may generate negative feedback under fiscal stress or tight liquidity.
  - Capital buffers generally inadequate to cover potential sovereign risks.
  - Benin: banks’ capital adequacy could fall below the minimum 8 percent in case of a partial default in sovereign bonds.
  - Chad: central government, public agencies, and nonfinancial public enterprises accounted for about 28 percent of banks’ total credit as of December 2015.
  - Malawi: government securities represented 24 percent of banking system assets; exposure rose from 14 percent of GDP in 2012 to a projected 24 percent of GDP in 2016.
- Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Risks
  - Interest rate risk confirmed as a source of vulnerability.
  - Exchange rate risk negligible in Benin and Chad (credit mostly in domestic currency); foreign exchange risk present in Malawi and Uganda.
  - Malawi: banks resilient to interest rate risk under assumptions; provision rate for resulting NPLs set at 100 percent; most banks resilient to major foreign exchange risk.
  - Uganda: a depreciation of the shilling against the US dollar by up to 50 percent left net open FX position and capital adequacy within required thresholds.

### Key quantitative findings and scenarios (preserved verbatim)
- Tests assumed a 100 percent provisioning of NPLs (Malawi framework).
- Malawi: NPL shock example—NPLs increasing by 40 percent with 100 percent provisioning → four banks undercapitalized.
- Chad: NPLs increased to 16.5 percent of total banks’ loans as of end-2015 from 9.5 percent in June 2014.
- Chad: solvency ratio stood at 14.6 percent at end-2015.
- Chad: sight deposits are 85 percent of total deposits.
- Benin: banks’ capital adequacy ratio could fall below the minimum 8 percent in case of a partial default in sovereign bonds.
- Benin liquidity test: By day five, seven banks would become illiquid.
- Malawi: Tier 1 capital ratio could decline from 12.6 percent to 11.0 percent and 7.3 percent, in the minor and major shock scenario, respectively.
- Malawi: Tier 1 capital ratio of the banking sector falls from 12.6 percent to 8.4 percent when the two largest borrowers default and falls to 5.6 percent when all five borrowers default.
- Malawi: In two minor shock cases (20 percent appreciation and 20 percent depreciation against currencies of major trading partners), the Tier 1 ratio will increase from 12.6 percent to nearly 16 percent and 16.5 percent, respectively.
- Malawi: In the event of a 50 percent depreciation, the Tier-1 capital would increase slightly to 13.3 percent.
- Malawi: Tier-1 capital ratio falls from 12.6 percent to 12.1 percent when the interest rate increases by 1,000 basis points under stated assumptions.
- Malawi: Liquidity ratio declined from 57.8 percent (pre-shock) to 47.3 percent for the major shocks scenario (30 percent drop of deposits); minimum regulatory requirement is 30.0 percent.
- São Tomé and Príncipe: share of credit to public sector was 1 percent of gross claims in 2015.
- Uganda: share of government securities as share of net domestic bank financing remains low at 13 percent in 2015.
- Table note entries retained: end-June 2015; end-2015; As of June 2015; As of June 2015.

### Supervision, legal, and policy challenges (work ahead and recommendations)
- Strengthen banking supervision and enforcement to reduce risks and enhance banks’ efficiency.
  - Malawi adopted a prompt corrective action framework with IMF technical assistance.
  - Need for consolidated supervision where pan-African banks have growing presence (Benin, Chad, Uganda).
- Address weaknesses in exercising collateral because of lengthy legal procedures.
- Improve interaction between regional and national authorities (Chad example).
- Benin: strengthen supervision and enforcement, including enhanced training in commerce and finance for judges, to sustain microfinance institutions’ role.
- Uganda: approval of Financial Institutions Act and Microfinance Development Institutions Act could help prevent regulatory arbitrage.
- Malawi: update of e-money regulations expected to strengthen financial inclusion.
- Broader reforms to deepen financial development:
  - Improve laws that protect property and creditor rights.
  - Increase bank competition.
  - Promote credit information and collateral registries.
  - Foster financial literacy.
  - Maintain a stable macroeconomic environment with sustained and inclusive growth and single-digit inflation.

*Source: IMF staff report excerpts and country staff calculations as presented in the chapter.*

### Conclusions

### Conclusions

### Shallow financial markets and transmission channels
- Shallow and undiversified financial markets limited the ability of the countries studied to absorb external shocks (volatility in aid and commodity prices).
- Equity prices emerged as an equally important transmission channel from the external to the financial sector.
- In all countries, fiscal dominance had an adverse effect on shallow financial markets, triggering a negative feedback to growth.
- Stress tests revealed that credit risk and concentration risk pose the greatest risk to banking systems.
- Enhancing supervision of all segments of the financial system will help balance the synergies between financial inclusion and stability.
- Recommendations pointed to the need for a holistic approach to strengthening supervision of all segments of the financial system.
- The growing presence of pan-African banks underscores the need for comprehensive supervisory frameworks.

### Integrating the financial sector into macroeconomic modeling: Uganda (Annex 1)
- An innovative analytical approach in Uganda’s 2015 Article IV staff report assessed spillovers from potential external shocks and risks from domestic policy changes on the economy, including the financial sector (IMF 2015d).
- The model used relatively simple econometric techniques and vector autoregressions for quarterly data from 1997 to 2014; separate models assessed the impact of each shock on growth, inflation, and the exchange rate.
- The analysis explored the impact of several global and domestic shocks on macroeconomic aggregates, including the financial sector.
- Results showed that high foreign interest rates (as measured by the six-month London Inter-bank Offered Rate (LIBOR)) would raise domestic inflation and reduce GDP growth in Uganda, although the impact was not found to be statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level (Annex Figure 1.1).
- The report noted that this benign result reflected the economy’s strong external buffer with international reserves and the relatively low foreign holdings of government securities.
- The historical-data-driven results may understate risks given the increasing importance of FDI and portfolio flows.
- With a shallow foreign exchange market and low daily turnover (about $50 million), a sharp unwinding of companies’ or households’ foreign exchange positions or unusually large profit repatriation could have a significant impact on the exchange rate and pose risks to banks, widening open positions and deteriorating credit quality.
- The analysis highlighted increased deposit and swap operations in foreign currency and large profits of foreign firms operating in Uganda as potential amplifiers of foreign exchange volatility effects.

### Databases and empirical sources used in the pilot studies (Annex 2)
- IMF Financial Access Survey database (IMF-FAS), which provides global supply-side data on financial access for 187 jurisdictions
- FINStats, a tool to benchmark financial inclusion indicators across countries and over time
- FinScope Surveys, developed by FinMark Trust and covering 20 sub-Saharan African countries so far
- World Bank Global Financial Development dataset (Global Findex), which records how people in 148 countries save, borrow, and make payments; available for 2011 and 2014
- World Bank Global Enterprise Survey, containing firm-level data on access to finance for a representative sample of enterprises in 135 economies
- G20 Financial Inclusion Indicators, developed by the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion
- Datasets compiled by Sahay and others (2015a) and Chapter 3 of the African Department’s April 2016 Regional Economic Outlook (IMF 2016d)
- Pilots also used data collected from country authorities (mostly central banks and ministries of finance) to provide snapshots of the number and size of financial institutions and markets.

### Key findings and implications for policy
- Shallow markets amplify vulnerability to external volatility (aid, commodity prices, portfolio and FDI flows).
- A holistic supervisory approach across all segments of the financial system is necessary to manage trade-offs between financial inclusion and financial stability.
- Strengthening supervision and monitoring of credit concentration and credit risk is a priority given stress-test findings.
- Macrofinancial models that integrate financial-sector dynamics and account for evolving capital flow composition (increasing FDI and portfolio flows) are important to better assess spillover risks.

*Source: Conclusions (Chapter 5) of "The Macrofinancial Linkages in Shallow Markets," IMF staff document.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/dp/2018/45983-dp1812-microfinancial-linkages-shallow-markets.pdf_
