## North Africa: Connecting Continents, Creating Opportunities — nacccoea

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### Overview
- North Africa sits between Europe’s industrial demand and Africa’s demographic dynamism and can deepen economic linkages with Europe and sub-Saharan Africa to build resilience and foster shared growth.
- Together, North Africa, Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa represent about 27 percent of the world economy.
- Geopolitical shifts and diversification efforts create momentum for trilateral integration across trade, investment, logistics, and energy.

### Current trade and investment patterns — opportunities and risks
- Trade composition and openness:
  - "63 percent of exports destined for Europe and only 4 percent to sub-Saharan Africa."
  - Exports average 28.5 percent of GDP; imports average 31.5 percent of GDP (average over past decade).
  - Non–commodity exports: 8.1 percent of GDP (up from 5.3 percent in 2013).
  - Services exports: 8.3 percent of GDP (up from 5.4 percent in 2013).
- Global value chain (GVC) participation:
  - Participation is limited and centered on raw materials and primary goods; forward linkages outweigh backward linkages.
  - Morocco and Tunisia exhibit relatively stronger backward linkages with the EU.
- Foreign direct investment (FDI):
  - North Africa attracted less than 1 percent of global FDI over the past decade.
  - Sub-Saharan Africa averaged 3.1 percent of total world FDI inflows from 2019 to 2023.
- External risks and opportunities:
  - Recent US tariff increases pose new risks.
  - The AfCFTA is a strategic opportunity to deepen intra-African trade and broaden partnerships.
- Energy potential:
  - Substantial traditional energy reserves and vast renewable potential (solar, wind, green hydrogen interest) can be leveraged for trilateral benefits.

### Empirical findings and model projections
- Gravity model estimates and structural scenarios:
  - North Africa’s trade could increase by "up to 50 percent" (various scenarios).
  - GDP could increase by "about 2 percent" under certain combined reforms.
  - FDI could increase by "roughly 40 percent" in some model estimates.
- GIMF simulations:
  - Project medium-term gains of "around 2 percent in GDP and 5 percent in exports for North Africa" from European nearshoring.
  - When combined with improved trade logistics and a better business environment, gains could nearly triple (example combined gains: real GDP up to about 7.3 percent and exports up to about 16 percent in the medium term).
- Gravity-model quantified outcomes for a combined 20 percent reduction in trade barriers between North Africa, Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa:
  - Increase North African trade by 25 percent.
  - Increase value chain participation by 13 percent.
  - Increase North African GDP by 2 percent.
  - For sub-Saharan Africa: trade +15 percent; value chain participation +12 percent; GDP +0.7 percent.
  - Europe: value chain participation +4 percent.
- With complementary structural reforms (human capital, business environment, infrastructure):
  - Trade gains of up to 58 percent.
  - Value chain participation gains of up to 27 percent.
  - GDP gains of up to 2.5 percent.
  - FDI increases of up to 15 percent.
- Country-specific gravity-model examples (EU-only 20 percent barrier reduction):
  - Tunisia: trade could increase by 41 percent and GDP by 3.5 percent.
  - Morocco: trade could increase by 47 percent and GDP by 2.6 percent.
  - EU overall effects: trade +0.4 percent; GDP +0.1 percent.
- Elasticities and supply-chain sensitivities:
  - Every 1 percent reduction in tariffs could increase backward participation by 1.2 percent.
  - Every 1 percent reduction in NTBs could increase backward participation by 4.3 percent.
  - Reducing NTBs has a greater impact on supply chains than reducing tariff barriers.

### Energy as a central pillar for trilateral integration
- Strategic role and resource endowments:
  - Algeria: 12.2 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves and 159 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas (as of 2024).
  - Libya: 48.4 billion barrels of oil and 53 Tcf of gas (as of 2024).
  - North Africa renewable technical potential (IRENA): up to 2,800 GW of solar; 220 GW of wind; 112 GW of hydropower.
- Electricity export illustrations:
  - If interconnections scaled and North Africa allocated 20 percent of its generation to Europe—after meeting domestic needs and accounting for transmission and distribution losses—this could redirect around 70 TWh annually to the EU, representing almost 3 percent of current electricity demand.
  - Alternative illustrative scenario: by scaling up infrastructure, North Africa could potentially supply over 100 TWh of electricity to Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, meeting 3 and 6 percent of demand, respectively.
- Green hydrogen:
  - IRENA estimates North Africa could supply around 18 percent of EU green hydrogen and related commodities by 2050.
- Renewable electricity targets (country-level):
  - Morocco: 52 percent renewable electricity generation by 2030.
  - Tunisia: 35 percent by 2030.
  - Egypt: 42 percent by 2030.
  - Mauritania: 48 percent by 2030.
  - Algeria: 27 percent by 2030.
  - Libya: goal of achieving 20 percent renewable energy by 2035.
- Energy access and development impacts:
  - Over 688 million people lacked access to electricity in 2022, 85 percent of whom live in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2025).
  - Sub-Saharan Africa electrification: just over 50 percent of the population having access to electricity.
  - A World Bank study: a 1 percent rise in electricity outages leads to an average 3.5 percent drop in business productivity.
- Infrastructure asymmetries and constraints:
  - Existing export corridors to Europe include the Trans-Mediterranean Pipeline (30 bcm) and the Maghreb–Europe Pipeline (12 bcm).
  - Morocco–Spain HVDC line: 1,400 MW; planned Tunisia–Italy ELMED interconnector: 600 MW.
  - North Africa already generates over 40 percent of the continent’s electricity.
  - North Africa attracted US$65 billion in energy-related FDI in 2023, with more than 60 percent directed toward renewables.
- Risks and transition dynamics:
  - European demand projections: oil projected to contract by approximately 70 percent by 2040; natural gas by approximately 60 percent by 2040.
  - Hydrocarbon-dependent fiscal vulnerability: oil and gas account for more than 40 and 90 percent of government revenues in Algeria and Libya, respectively.

### Policy recommendations — coordinated reform agenda
- Trade and investment reforms:
  - Reduce both tariff barriers and NTBs, with emphasis on NTBs for deeper GVC participation.
  - Harmonize standards and customs procedures; fully implement AfCFTA protocols (members committed to progressively reduce tariffs on 90 percent of goods over a period of 5 to 10 years depending on development level).
  - Streamline FDI screening and foreign equity limits; liberalize equity participation, approval requirements, personnel mobility, and operational activities to boost projects (easing barriers would increase inward projects by around 7 percent in North Africa).
- Infrastructure, logistics, and trade facilitation:
  - Upgrade logistics performance (example target: improving logistics performance by around 15 percent):
    - Could increase trade by 46 percent and translate into a 2 percent boost to GDP and increase inward FDI projects by 9 percent on average in North Africa.
    - For sub-Saharan Africa, a 15 percent improvement could increase trade by 58 percent, GDP by 2.5 percent, and FDI projects by 31 percent.
  - Invest in ports, cross-border corridors (Trans-Maghreb, Cairo–Dakar), and efficient customs systems; leverage ports and free zones (e.g., Tanger Med, Tanger Automotive City).
- Human capital and regulatory quality:
  - Increase human capital by about 10 percent in North Africa to potentially increase GDP by 1.5 percent and boost trade and investment; for sub-Saharan Africa a 13 percent increase yields similar gains.
  - Close regulatory quality gaps to potentially boost trade by 28 percent, GDP by 1.2 percent, and increase FDI projects by 15 percent.
  - Enhance financial development to increase trade by 15 percent and GDP by 0.6 percent.
- Energy and industrial policies:
  - Scale up renewable generation and electricity interconnections with sub-Saharan Africa and Europe; localize energy-intensive manufacturing and green value chains.
  - Pursue downstream processing (petrochemicals, refining), green hydrogen, and component manufacturing to capture more value added.
  - Ensure redistributive safeguards when exporting electricity to protect domestic consumers and political support.
- Regional coordination and financing:
  - Strengthen regional coordination within North Africa and trilaterally with Europe and sub-Saharan Africa for joint infrastructure (cross-regional railways, energy corridors, digital connectivity) and financial triangulation (regional development initiatives).

### Scenarios, shocks, and transition risks
- Higher US tariffs scenario (GIMF North Africa–focused):
  - Setup: permanently higher US tariffs (as announced in April, June, or July 2025, highest applied), tariffs temporarily disrupt supply chains and reduce productivity in trade-intensive sectors by 1 percent in 2026–27 before returning to baseline in 2028.
  - GDP impact: North Africa’s GDP declines by "around half a percent" through the medium term.
  - Investment effects: domestic investment falls by almost 3 percent; foreign investment from Europe declines by 1.5 percent.
  - Exchange rate effects: dollar appreciation creates REER depreciation pressures; managed exchange rates in North Africa absorb less of the shock, contributing to larger GDP losses than in countries with more flexible exchange rates.
  - Value chain dynamics: short-term expansion of linkages to European supply chains via trade diversion; by 2029 net impact on value chain exports broadly neutral.
- European nearshoring and stronger interregional linkages:
  - European nearshoring five-year outcomes: real GDP gains range from 0.1 percent (Algeria) to 2.9 percent (Tunisia); average increase 1.5 percent across North Africa; exports increase up to 10 percent (Tunisia).
  - Stronger interregional linkages five-year outcomes: North Africa real GDP gains 0.2 to 0.9 percent; sub-Saharan Africa GDP +0.3 percent after five years.
  - Investment climate improvements five-year outcomes: real GDP +1.8 to 3 percent; exports +1.6 to 2.5 percent.
  - Logistics upgrades: real GDP gains 1.5 to 5 percent; exports 6.2 to 12 percent.

### Structural reforms to maximize benefits
- Priority reforms and quantified impacts:
  - Reduce NTBs alongside tariffs to maximize backward participation and GVC integration.
  - Improve logistics (15 percent improvement example) to increase trade, GDP, and FDI substantially.
  - Expand technical and vocational education (target example: 10 percent human capital improvement) to raise GDP and FDI, and to increase backward linkages (human capital increases backward linkages by 14 percent in North Africa).
  - Strengthen regulatory quality to attract FDI and boost trade (regulatory quality closure could boost trade by 28 percent).
  - Liberalize FDI-related restrictions to increase project counts (around 7 percent increase in North Africa).
- Complementarity of reforms:
  - Combined trade liberalization plus logistics and business environment reforms amplify gains markedly (e.g., trade +58 percent; GDP up to 2.5 percent; FDI up to 15 percent in modeled scenarios).

### Key country and sector examples
- Morocco automotive industry:
  - Automotive exports rose from US$1.7 billion in 2013 to approximately US$8.4 billion in 2023.
  - Infrastructure and policy: Industrial Acceleration Plan (2014, renewed 2021); Tanger Med Port (2007); Tanger Automotive City (2014); port capacity 9 million containers and capacity to export 1 million vehicles annually.
  - Major investors: Renault, Stellantis, Valeo, Bosch; Renault’s Tangier plant operates with zero carbon emissions.
  - Human capital initiatives: IFMIA and codesigned vocational curricula with manufacturers.
- Algeria (Box 6):
  - Hosts Trans-Mediterranean, Medgaz, and Maghreb-Europe pipelines supplying over 20 percent of EU gas imports.
  - Sonatrach project to increase processing capacity by 17 percent; target to install 15 GW of solar capacity by 2035.
  - Strategic opportunity to move from transit to transformation via refining, petrochemicals, green and blue hydrogen projects.

### Conclusions and strategic aim
- Trade liberalization across North Africa, the EU, and sub-Saharan Africa is a powerful engine for growth and diversification; reduction of NTBs is particularly important to enable deeper GVC participation.
- Complementary structural reforms (logistics, human capital, regulatory quality, financial development, FDI openness) substantially amplify gains from trade liberalization.
- Realizing the trilateral opportunity requires bold policy action, political will, sustained reform, and strong regional coordination to position North Africa as a strategic economic connector and regional energy hub.

*Source: IMF staff calculations; IMF Departmental Papers — North Africa: Connecting Continents, Creating Opportunities (nacccoea).*

### Executive Summary ......................................................................................................

### Executive Summary

### Overview
- North Africa stands at a pivotal crossroads—geographically and economically—between Europe’s industrial demand and Africa’s demographic dynamism.
- Geopolitical shifts and ongoing diversification efforts are creating new momentum to deepen economic linkages between North Africa, Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa, build greater resilience, and foster shared growth across all three regions.
- Together, North Africa, Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa—representing about 27 percent of the world economy—can boost resilience and growth.

### Current trade and investment patterns — opportunities and risks
- North Africa’s trade remains heavily Europe focused:
  - "63 percent of exports destined for Europe and only 4 percent to sub-Saharan Africa."
- Participation in global value chains is limited and centered on raw materials and primary goods.
- Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows are modest:
  - FDI is "less than 1 percent of global FDI."
- External risks and opportunities:
  - Recent US tariff increases introduce new risks.
  - The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) presents a strategic opportunity to deepen intra-African trade and broaden economic partnerships.
- North Africa possesses substantial traditional energy reserves and vast renewable energy potential (solar, wind, emerging interest in green hydrogen) that can be leveraged for trilateral benefits.

### Empirical findings and model projections
- Gravity model estimates:
  - North Africa’s trade could increase by "up to 50 percent."
  - GDP could increase by "about 2 percent."
  - FDI could increase by "roughly 40 percent."
  - These effects include meaningful benefits for both sub-Saharan Africa and Europe through greater supply chain participation and investment.
- Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (GIMF) simulations:
  - Project medium-term gains of "around 2 percent in GDP and 5 percent in exports for North Africa," along with significant spillovers for sub-Saharan Africa and Europe.
- Amplification with complementary reforms:
  - When combined with improvements in logistics and the business environment, these gains could "nearly triple."
- Firms and policy trends:
  - Europe’s renewed interest in nearshoring manufacturing and sourcing capabilities creates an opening for North African countries that combine cost-effective human capital with industrial capabilities.
  - North Africa’s trade infrastructure and institutional capacity position it to serve as a gateway to the continent’s fast-growing consumer and industrial markets under AfCFTA.

### Energy as a central pillar for trilateral integration
- Energy can power trilateral economic integration:
  - Europe’s clean energy transition and rising AI-driven electricity demand, alongside sub-Saharan Africa’s urgent need for reliable power, position North Africa’s energy resources as a strategic asset.
  - North Africa can increase exports of traditional fuels and renewable energy, export electricity, invest in cross-border infrastructure, and share technical expertise.
  - Leveraging energy strengths can support Europe’s transition, alleviate Africa’s electricity gaps, and foster technology transfer and AI adoption across the three regions.

### Policy recommendations — coordinated reform agenda
- Key reform areas identified to realize trilateral integration:
  - Upgrading logistics and infrastructure.
  - Accelerating digital transformation.
  - Streamlining trade facilitation and regulations.
  - Promoting financial inclusion.
- Importance of regional coordination:
  - Strong regional coordination—within North Africa and with European and sub-Saharan partners—will be essential to translate ambition into action and unlock the full potential of trilateral integration.
- Role of trade barrier reductions and complementary reforms:
  - Reductions in trade barriers—particularly nontariff barriers (NTBs)—and complementary reforms such as improved trade infrastructure, human capital, and regulatory environment can significantly boost trade, investment, and participation in global value chains (GVCs).
  - Joint infrastructure projects (cross-regional railways, energy corridors, digital connectivity platforms) and financial triangulation (regional development initiatives) can support investment flows, risk-sharing, and economies of scale.

### Conclusion
- North Africa has a unique opportunity to enhance economic resilience and growth prospects through stronger economic connections with Europe and sub-Saharan Africa.
- Realizing this vision will require a concerted effort to pursue active policy reforms and strong regional and trilateral coordination.

*Source: Executive Summary — North Africa: Connecting Continents, Creating Opportunities*

### CHAPTER 2: THE STATE OF ECONOMIC

### CHAPTER 2: THE STATE OF ECONOMIC LINKAGES—OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS

### Overview: main findings
- Trade remains heavily Europe focused: 63 percent of North Africa’s exports destined for Europe and 43 percent of its imports in 2023.
- North Africa’s trade openness has been stagnant over the past decade: exports average 28.5 percent of GDP; imports average 31.5 percent of GDP.
- Non–commodity exports now represent 8.1 percent of GDP, up from 5.3 percent in 2013.
- Services exports increased from 5.4 percent to 8.3 percent of GDP since 2013.
- Participation in global value chains (GVCs) is limited and anchored to Europe, with forward linkages (supplying raw materials or primary goods) outweighing backward linkages (use of foreign value added).
- FDI inflows to North Africa are modest—less than 1 percent of global FDI—indicating untapped potential.
- Sub-Saharan Africa averaged 3.1 percent of total world FDI inflows from 2019 to 2023.
- Recent US tariff increases pose risks; the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) presents opportunities to deepen intra-African trade and diversify partnerships.
- To seize opportunities and mitigate risks, deep structural reforms are needed: improve the business environment, reduce trade barriers, upgrade infrastructure and logistics, and leverage abundant human capital.

### A. Limited trade links—with Europe predominant
- North Africa’s export and import shares:
  - Exports: 28.5 percent of GDP (average).
  - Imports: 31.5 percent of GDP (average).
- Export composition and change since 2013:
  - Non–commodity exports: 8.1 percent of GDP (up from 5.3 percent in 2013).
  - Services exports: 8.3 percent of GDP (up from 5.4 percent in 2013).
- Partner shares (2023):
  - Europe: 63 percent of North Africa’s exports; 43 percent of its imports.
  - Hydrocarbon exporters (Algeria and Libya) and Tunisia: about 70 percent of exports to Europe.
  - Trade with sub-Saharan Africa: 3.6 percent of North Africa’s exports; 1.1 percent of its imports.
- GVC integration:
  - Forward linkages dominate (raw materials/primary goods supplied abroad); backward linkages (foreign value added used in exports) are underdeveloped.
  - Morocco and Tunisia show stronger backward linkages with the EU but overall regional profile remains commodity-intensive.
  - Potential to develop backward linkages with sub-Saharan Africa by integrating raw materials and intermediate manufactured goods into North Africa’s emerging manufacturing industries (examples: automotive, renewables).

### Box: Morocco’s automotive industry (technology transfer and value chain integration)
- Automotive exports increased from US$1.7 billion in 2013 to approximately US$8.4 billion in 2023.
- Key policy and infrastructure elements:
  - Industrial Acceleration Plan launched in 2014 and renewed in 2021.
  - Tanger Med Port inaugurated in 2007; Tanger Automotive City created in 2014; port expansion in 2019.
  - Port capacity: 9 million containers and the capacity to export 1 million vehicles annually.
  - Free zones: Tanger Automotive City, Kenitra Atlantic Free Zone, Nouaceur Zone.
  - Major investors: Renault, Stellantis, Valeo, Bosch; Renault’s Tangier plant operates with zero carbon emissions (described as a benchmark for sustainable manufacturing).
  - Human capital initiatives: sector-specific vocational training centers such as the Institut de Formation aux Métiers de l’Industrie Automobile (IFMIA) with curricula codesigned with manufacturers.
- Regional opportunity:
  - AfCFTA could support regional sourcing of raw materials (e.g., copper, rubber, cobalt) and foster a more integrated African automotive value chain as industrial capacity in sub-Saharan Africa expands.

### B. Investment flows—untapped potential
- FDI trends:
  - North Africa attracted less than 1 percent of global FDI over the past decade.
  - Region’s FDI share is lower than its share of world GDP.
  - Post-2008 Global Financial Crisis and Arab Uprisings declines contributed to weak recovery of FDI inflows.
  - Sub-Saharan Africa outperformed North Africa in attracting FDI in recent years (average 3.1 percent of total world FDI inflows from 2019 to 2023).
- Sources and sectoral composition:
  - Europe (notably France, Italy, United Kingdom) is the principal source of FDI in North Africa.
  - Investments historically concentrated in oil and gas; recent diversification toward renewable energy, manufacturing, services, and real estate.
  - Greenfield investment shares show growing renewable energy activity but renewable investments have not yet translated into significant electricity export gains.
- Synergy between exports and FDI:
  - Sectors with robust export performance (chemicals and pharmaceuticals, transport industries, services) attract higher shares of FDI.

### C. Landscape of regional cooperation—momentum building
- Europe–North Africa cooperation:
  - Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED) launched in 1995.
  - Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument provides 70.5 billion euros in development assistance for trade, infrastructure, and intra-regional cooperation.
  - Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) negotiations stalled.
- Intra-African cooperation:
  - All North African countries are part of AfCFTA.
  - Members committed to progressively reduce tariffs on 90 percent of goods over a period of 5 to 10 years depending on development level.
  - An online portal for traders has been developed to report and monitor NTBs and serve as a dispute resolution mechanism.
- Trilateral cooperation:
  - G20 Compact with Africa (CwA), launched in 2017, aims to promote private investment in Africa; Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia participate.

### D. Toward stronger economic linkages—remaining challenges
- Tariffs and nontariff barriers:
  - Average North African import tariffs: 7.4 percent.
  - Algeria and Tunisia have tariffs exceeding 9 percent and pervasive nontariff measures.
  - Nontariff measures equivalent to roughly 15 percent on average.
  - High NTBs persist despite regional free trade agreements (Agadir Agreement, Arab Maghreb Union) that have bilateral tariffs close to zero.
- Intra-regional trade:
  - Bilateral trade flows within North Africa remain limited despite low tariffs in many bilateral arrangements.
- Infrastructure and logistics:
  - Most North African countries experienced declines in Logistics Performance Index scores over the past decade.
  - Morocco, Libya, and Tunisia show noticeable deterioration across logistics metrics.
  - Common challenges: poor road conditions, high transport and logistics costs, fragmented rail and highway networks.
- Regulatory and investment climate:
  - Worldwide Governance Indicators show deterioration in drivers of FDI such as regulatory quality.
  - North African countries are more restrictive on FDI than peers; foreign equity limits are common (except Tunisia, where screening/approval procedures also restrict inward FDI).
  - OECD FDI Restrictiveness Index places North African countries as more restrictive relative to OECD and some non-OECD peers (specific index values not provided in the chapter).
- External risks:
  - Recent shifts in US trade policy and imposition of (or potential for) higher tariffs could negatively affect growth, exchange rates, and investment in North Africa.
  - These shifts also create incentives to deepen linkages with Europe and sub-Saharan Africa and to position the region as a strategic connector in GVCs.

### Strengths and opportunities
- Human capital:
  - North Africa’s expected years of schooling are above ASEAN, sub-Saharan Africa, and the world average (exact values not provided in the chapter), indicating a potential skilled workforce to support competitiveness and stronger European connections.
- Strategic opportunities:
  - AfCFTA provides an avenue to boost links with sub-Saharan markets if logistical and infrastructural challenges are addressed.
  - Renewable energy investments and diversification of FDI could support new export activities and integration into higher-value segments of GVCs.
  - Morocco’s automotive example demonstrates how strategic policy, infrastructure, FDI, and human capital development can generate industrial upgrading and export growth.

### Policy recommendations (implied by chapter findings)
- Implement deep structural reforms to:
  - Improve the business environment and regulatory quality to attract FDI.
  - Reduce tariffs where appropriate and address pervasive nontariff measures to lower effective trade barriers.
  - Streamline FDI screening and foreign equity limits to reduce restrictiveness and foster investment.
- Invest in trade logistics and infrastructure:
  - Rehabilitate and interconnect road, rail, and port networks to reduce transport costs and improve Logistics Performance Index outcomes.
  - Leverage major ports and free zones (e.g., Tanger Med, Tanger Automotive City) as hubs for export-oriented manufacturing.
- Leverage human capital:
  - Expand sector-specific vocational training and codesigned curricula with industry to support technology transfer and higher-value manufacturing.
- Pursue regional integration gains:
  - Use AfCFTA provisions (tariff reductions on 90 percent of goods over 5 to 10 years) and the online NTB reporting portal to deepen intra-African trade, contingent on addressing logistical constraints.
- Manage external risks and diversify partnerships:
  - Monitor and adapt to global trade policy shifts (e.g., US tariff changes) while accelerating diversification toward intra-African and alternative global markets.

*Source: nacccoea - CHAPTER 2: THE STATE OF ECONOMIC.*

### 1. UN Human Development Index, 2023 2. UN Expected Years of Schooling, 2023

### UN Human Development Index, 2023 2. UN Expected Years of Schooling, 2023

### Potential impact of higher US tariffs on North Africa (Box 2)
- Direct exposure
  - The United States accounts for a small share of North African exports; main products affected include hydrocarbons, fertilizers, and textiles.
  - Direct impact of US tariffs on North African exports is likely to be modest; Europe has a higher share of exports going to the United States.
- Indirect effects and trade diversion
  - Tariffs and trade tensions may reduce global demand and supply, including for North African final and intermediate goods, and may weigh on investments.
  - North Africa could benefit from trade diversion if European firms nearshore production to North Africa to take advantage of lower production costs or to circumvent higher tariffs on European goods, especially in automotive, electronics, and textiles.
  - North Africa’s proximity to Europe and improving infrastructure position it as an attractive alternative for European firms.
- Model-based scenario (Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model; North Africa-focused)
  - Scenario setup: permanently higher US tariffs—set at the highest of either the reciprocal tariffs announced in April 2025 or those announced in June or July, with no retaliation. Tariffs temporarily disrupt global supply chains and reduce productivity in trade-intensive sectors by 1 percent in 2026–27 before returning to baseline in 2028.
  - GDP impact
    - North Africa’s GDP declines by around half a percent through the medium term (described as “around half a percent”).
  - Exchange rate effects
    - Dollar appreciation associated with higher tariffs would create corresponding real exchange rate depreciation pressures in North African countries.
    - Depreciation would be less than in Europe or sub-Saharan Africa given the managed exchange rates in the region; exchange rate absorbs less of the shock in North Africa, resulting in larger GDP losses than in countries with more flexible exchange rates.
  - Investment effects
    - Domestic investment in North Africa falls by almost 3 percent.
    - Foreign investment in North Africa from Europe declines by 1.5 percent.
    - The relative resilience of European FDI reflects increased competitiveness of European final goods exports due to euro depreciation and supply chain links with North African intermediate goods.
  - Value chain and trade-linkage dynamics
    - Short term: North Africa’s linkages to European supply chains initially expand as European final goods exports become more competitive with euro depreciation and as trade is diverted from regions facing higher tariffs.
    - By 2029: net impact on North Africa’s value chain exports would be broadly neutral.
    - Europe’s rising demand for imports from sub-Saharan Africa would create additional opportunities to strengthen supply chains among the three regions.

### Policy recommendations to mitigate risks and seize opportunities (Box 2 conclusion)
- Accelerate regional integration by reducing intra-regional trade barriers and investing in cross-border infrastructure, in line with AfCFTA and EU partnership frameworks.
- Diversify export markets and strengthen trilateral supply chains between North Africa, Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa to reduce vulnerability to external shocks.
- Upgrade trade logistics and the business environment to strengthen competitiveness, attract investment, and support value chain development.

### Gravity-model results: quantifying gains from deeper trade and investment linkages (Chapter 3)
- Scenario baseline and methodology
  - Structural gravity models are used to quantify effects of active policy reforms, accounting for indirect general equilibrium effects.
  - Explanatory variables include geographical distance, common language, colonial ties, shared religion, common border; models include country fixed effects and controls such as log GDP, GDP per capita, manufacturing value added, and geographical position.
  - Trade liberalization assessed in two stages: first, North African countries and the EU lower tariffs and NTBs by 20 percent; second, North Africa connects with sub-Saharan Africa and the EU to achieve similar 20 percent reductions among all three regions.
  - Rationale for 20 percent: Globally, members of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) have about 20 percent lower trade barriers than nonmembers; therefore the analysis models a 20 percent reduction of average tariff and nontariff barriers (NTBs) between the three regions.
- Main quantitative findings (trade liberalization and complementary reforms)
  - A combined 20 percent reduction in trade barriers (especially NTBs) between North Africa, Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa could:
    - Increase North African trade by 25 percent.
    - Increase value chain participation by 13 percent.
    - Increase North African GDP by 2 percent.
  - For sub-Saharan Africa the same combined reduction could:
    - Boost trade by 15 percent.
    - Increase value chain participation by 12 percent.
    - Increase GDP by 0.7 percent.
  - For Europe:
    - Increase value chain participation by 4 percent.
  - With complementary structural reforms (leveraging human capital, improving business environment and infrastructure), North and sub-Saharan Africa could achieve:
    - Trade gains of up to 58 percent.
    - Value chain participation gains of up to 27 percent.
    - GDP gains of up to 2.5 percent.
    - FDI increases of up to 15 percent.
- Effects of reducing trade barriers with the EU only
  - A 20 percent reduction of average trade barriers with the EU could:
    - Boost North Africa’s trade by 23 percent.
    - Boost North Africa’s GDP by 2 percent (on average).
  - Country-specific examples:
    - Tunisia: trade could increase by 41 percent and GDP by 3.5 percent.
    - Morocco: trade could increase by 47 percent and GDP by 2.6 percent.
  - EU overall effects: trade +0.4 percent; GDP +0.1 percent.
- Trilateral supply chains and backward participation
  - Every 1 percent reduction in tariffs could increase backward participation by 1.2 percent.
  - Every 1 percent reduction in NTBs could increase backward participation by 4.3 percent.
  - North Africa could increase backward participation by 13 percent if trade barriers are brought in line with those in other regional trade agreements.
  - Sub-Saharan Africa could see a 12 percent increase in supply chain integration by reducing tariffs and NTBs; Europe could see additional linkages of around 4 percent.
  - For all regions, reducing NTBs has a greater impact on supply chains than reducing tariff barriers.
- North African intra-regional liberalization (Box 3)
  - Reducing tariffs and NTBs between North African countries could:
    - Increase their exports by 13 percent.
    - Increase GDP by 1.2 percent (on average).
  - Reducing tariffs alone would have a smaller effect: up to 5 percent on trade and 0.5 percent on GDP.
  - The trade union (North African trade integration) would contribute about one-third to the overall gains of the trilateral linkages analyzed in the chapter.

*Sources: United Nations; IMF staff calculations.*

### 4. North Africa: Reduction of Tariff and NTB

### 4. North Africa: Reduction of Tariff and NTB

### Contribution to Trade and GDP from Reducing Tariffs and NTBs
- Panel summaries (as presented):
  - Trade effects (percent): charts indicate trade increases up to 30 percent (trade % axis 0–30) with separate contributions from NTB and Tariffs.
  - GDP effects (percent): charts indicate GDP impacts up to 3.5 percent for individual components (GDP % axis 0.0–3.5) and up to 5.0 percent in aggregated views (GDP % axis up to 5.0).
  - Country-level GDP contribution panel lists: DZA, EGY, LBY, MAR, MRT, TUN (GDP % axis 0.0–7.0) showing heterogeneity across North African countries.

- Overall finding: Reducing tariffs and, more importantly, NTBs can significantly boost exports and GDP in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa by facilitating deeper participation in GVCs, enabling cheaper inputs, specialization, knowledge transfer, and productivity increases.

### Structural Reforms to Maximize the Benefits of Stronger Linkages
- Improving trade infrastructure:
  - Improving logistics performance by around 15 percent on average in North Africa could:
    - increase trade by 46 percent,
    - translate into a 2 percent boost to GDP,
    - increase the number of inward FDI projects by 9 percent on average.
  - For hydrocarbon exporters, logistics reforms would translate into a 3.5 percent boost to GDP (on average).
  - For sub-Saharan Africa, a 15 percent improvement (with a larger gap) could:
    - increase trade by 58 percent,
    - increase GDP by 2.5 percent,
    - increase the number of FDI projects by 31 percent.
  - Improving trade logistics could increase backward linkages by 27 percent, on average, in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.

- Leveraging human capital:
  - Increasing human capital by about 10 percent on average in North Africa could:
    - increase GDP by 1.5 percent,
    - increase trade and investment in all countries.
  - For sub-Saharan Africa, a 13 percent increase in human capital on average yields similar gains.
  - For sub-Saharan Africa, human capital development boosts FDI by 15 percent (largest impact on FDI).
  - Human capital investment increases backward linkages by 14 percent in North Africa and 22 percent in sub-Saharan Africa.
  - Recommended focus: targeted investments in technical and vocational education and training to strengthen workforce skills.

- Strengthening regulatory quality and financial development:
  - Closing North Africa’s gap in regulatory quality could:
    - boost trade by 28 percent,
    - boost GDP by 1.2 percent,
    - increase FDI projects by 15 percent (regulatory quality identified as the single most powerful lever to attract investment in North Africa).
  - Enhancing financial development could:
    - increase trade by 15 percent,
    - increase GDP by 0.6 percent.
  - In sub-Saharan Africa, closing these gaps could:
    - boost trade by 22 to 30 percent,
    - lift growth between 1.1 and 1.8 percent.

- Enhancing attractiveness to FDI (liberalizing equity participation, approval requirements, personnel mobility, operational activities):
  - In North Africa, easing these barriers would increase the number of projects by around 7 percent.
  - In sub-Saharan Africa, the gain would reach 4 percent.
  - Potential gains especially large in Algeria, Egypt, and Libya with targeted liberalization.

### Model Simulations and Medium-Term Macroeconomic Outcomes
- GIMF model simulations (chapter summary):
  - Nearshoring and positioning North Africa as a production hub could yield medium-term gains of around:
    - real GDP: 2 percent,
    - exports: 5 percent.
  - When combined with improved trade logistics and a better business environment, these gains could nearly triple, producing substantially higher growth, exports, and human capital development.

- Global context and nearshoring trends:
  - Economist Impact’s Trade in Transition 2025 report: 42 percent of global businesses are turning to nearshoring and reshoring strategies, up from 17 percent in 2021.
  - Business sentiment:
    - Two-thirds of European firms plan to restructure their supply chains over the next five years; over 40 percent favor nearshoring and 25 percent aim for regional supplier diversification.
    - QIMA Sourcing Survey: half of EU-based companies expect to increase nearshoring and reshoring activity in 2025.
  - Greenfield FDI pledges (2022–2023): more than US$82 billion pledged in manufacturing projects across 15 nearshoring destinations in North Africa and Central and Eastern Europe (a 62 percent increase from prepandemic levels); North Africa accounted for close to one-third of this total.
    - Egypt: nearly US$12 billion in announced investments in chemicals and metals.
    - Morocco: about US$7 billion in electronic components (largely EV battery production).
    - Nearshoring to sub-Saharan Africa was limited at around US$3 billion (about half to metals).

### Supply Chain Integration Patterns and Opportunities
- Country patterns:
  - Morocco and Tunisia: diversified industrial bases (automotive, textiles, agribusiness, electronics) with balanced backward and forward linkages into European value chains.
  - Egypt: largely forward oriented integration with Europe (basic chemicals, pharmaceuticals, fresh produce, horticultural products).
  - Algeria and Mauritania: likely commodity-export models (oil and gas; minerals, metals, fisheries).
- North Africa–sub-Saharan Africa linkages:
  - Modest but growing forward and backward linkages, with Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia showing backward integration in agribusiness, chemicals, and textiles—indicating sub-Saharan Africa as a source of intermediate inputs.
  - These linkages remain far smaller than those with Europe but show untapped potential for regional supply chain development and diversification.

### Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
- Trade liberalization across North Africa, the EU, and sub-Saharan Africa is a powerful engine for growth and diversification; reducing NTBs is particularly important to enable deeper GVC participation.
- Complementary structural reforms (logistics performance, human capital, regulatory quality, financial market development, FDI openness) substantially amplify the gains from trade liberalization.
- Policy priorities:
  - Prioritize reducing NTBs alongside tariff liberalization to maximize export and GDP gains.
  - Invest in trade logistics to capture large trade and FDI benefits (example targets: 15 percent logistics improvement).
  - Scale technical and vocational education and training to raise human capital (example targets: 10 percent human capital improvement in North Africa).
  - Strengthen regulatory quality and financial development to attract FDI and boost trade.
  - Liberalize FDI-related restrictions (equity, approvals, personnel mobility, operations) to unlock new projects, particularly in Algeria, Egypt, and Libya.
- Analytical approach: combine granular gravity-model empirical evidence with dynamic general equilibrium simulations to quantify trade opportunities and how they shape medium-term growth, investment, and fiscal outcomes.
- Strategic aim: a coordinated and integrated policy agenda to enable North Africa to emerge as a strategic economic connector between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, fostering sustainable growth and long-term prosperity.

*Source: IMF staff calculations; IMF Departmental Papers — North Africa: Connecting Continents, Creating Opportunities (Chapter 4 content).*

### 1. Forward and Backward GVC Participation

### 1. Forward and Backward GVC Participation

### Definitions and data sources
- Backward GVC participation (B) is defined as the share of foreign value added in a country’s gross exports. Forward GVC participation (F) is the share of domestic value added embodied in destination countries’ gross exports. Both are measured as percentage of total gross exports.
- By activity, backward integration into Europe’s value chain is defined as the share of Europe’s value added in a country’s gross exports of that activity.
- Sources: OECD TiVA Database; and IMF staff calculations. Note: GVC = global value chain.

### Empirical context and key scenarios
- European nearshoring scenario: assumes Europe doubles its demand for GVC tradable goods from North Africa. North Africa currently supplies less than 3 percent of Europe’s GVC-related imports.
- Stronger interregional linkages scenario: assumes (i) elimination of all NTBs in the GVC tradable goods sector; (ii) abolition of tariffs on GVC tradable and investment goods imports from Europe; (iii) removal of all tariffs on trade within North Africa; and (iv) elimination of tariffs on GVC tradable and investment goods imports from sub-Saharan Africa while allocating around one-third of the increase in North Africa’s imports from European nearshoring to sub-Saharan African sources.

### GIMF model features (as used for scenario analysis)
- Model type: a version of the Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (GIMF) with global value chain dynamics; an annual, multiregional dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with 10 regions including the five North Africa countries, the European Union, the United States, China, sub-Saharan Africa, and the rest of the world.
- Production structure: production broken down into tradable goods (GVC and non-GVC) and nontradable goods; GVC tradable goods are produced using other GVC tradable goods in addition to capital and labor.
- Trade granularity: bilateral trade tracked for GVC and non-GVC tradable, consumption, and investment goods; trade costs include tariffs, nontariff barriers (NTBs), and transportation costs.
- Household heterogeneity: dynamics rely on the share of liquidity-constrained households versus saving households.
  - Mauritania has the highest calibrated share of liquidity-constrained households at 80 percent.
  - Morocco has the lowest calibrated share at 40 percent.
  - The average calibrated share for advanced economies (including Europe) is 25 percent.
- Exchange rate regimes: North Africa’s managed exchange rate regimes (managed against a basket of the US dollar and euro) yield different short-term dynamics relative to floating regimes, leading to slower adjustment in real effective exchange rates (REERs).

### Quantified impacts from model simulations
- Medium-term aggregate gains from European nearshoring and positioning North Africa as a production hub:
  - Model simulations suggest North Africa could experience medium-term gains in real GDP of around 2 percent and in exports of around 5 percent from European nearshoring alone.
  - When combined with improved trade logistics and a better business environment, these gains could nearly triple.
  - Potential combined gains (nearshoring plus comprehensive reforms): real GDP in North Africa increasing by about 7.3 percent in the medium term, and exports increasing by about 16 percent.
- European nearshoring (five-year outcomes):
  - Real GDP gains range from 0.1 percent (Algeria) to 2.9 percent (Tunisia) after five years, with an average increase of 1.5 percent across North Africa.
  - Exports increase from 0.5 percent (Algeria) to 10 percent (Tunisia) after five years.
- Stronger interregional linkages (five-year outcomes for North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa):
  - North Africa: real GDP gains range from 0.2 to 0.9 percent after five years; export gains range from 0.3 to 2.2 percent after five years.
  - Sub-Saharan Africa: real GDP increases by 0.3 percent after five years.
- Investment climate improvements (five-year outcomes):
  - Real GDP could increase by 1.8 to 3 percent after five years.
  - Exports could increase by 1.6 to 2.5 percent after five years.
- Trade logistics upgrades (guided by Munim and Schramm 2018):
  - Real GDP gains could range from 1.5 to 5 percent across the region.
  - Exports could rise by 6.2 to 12 percent.
  - Exports from Europe and sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa would increase by 1 percent and 0.6 percent, respectively, relative to the case without logistic upgrades.
- Labor and employment effects (five-year outcomes):
  - Overall five-year gain in hours worked is modest—under 1 percent.
  - Reallocation to the GVC tradable sector yields substantial increases in labor hours:
    - Tunisia, Mauritania, and Morocco: increases of 2.7 to 4.7 percent in GVC tradable sector hours worked after five years.
    - Egypt: 1.1 percent increase in GVC tradable sector hours worked after five years.
    - Algeria: 0.3 percent increase in GVC tradable sector hours worked after five years.
    - Sub-Saharan Africa: 0.3 percent increase in hours worked after five years.

### Mechanisms driving the results
- European nearshoring acts as a positive terms-of-trade shock by raising the relative price of North African exports, boosting real income, consumption, and investment.
- Removing trade barriers—tariffs and NTBs—reduces marginal costs of production, increases productivity in tradables and GVC tradable goods sectors, and bolsters exports and domestic purchasing power.
- Trade logistics upgrades reduce transportation costs, encourage exports, and increase consumer demand via lower import prices.
- Household composition matters: a larger share of liquidity-constrained households amplifies short-term consumption responses to temporary shocks.
- Managed exchange rate regimes moderate short-term REER and trade adjustments relative to floating regimes.

### Policy recommendations (concise)
- Reduce intra- and interregional trade barriers to foster industrial linkages:
  - Remove tariffs, nontariff measures, and inefficient customs procedures that hinder cross-border value chain formation within North Africa and with Europe.
  - Expand efforts to include sub-Saharan Africa to strengthen regional integration and complementary sourcing.
  - Eliminate barriers to trade in intermediate goods; invest in cross-border infrastructure and digital connectivity; harmonize technical standards and customs processes.
  - Focus on high-potential sectors such as automotive, electronics, and agribusiness aligned with European and sub-Saharan African demand.
- Address structural bottlenecks to support GVC expansion:
  - Create a more predictable and business-friendly environment to attract domestic and foreign investment.
  - Streamline government regulations, reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies, and ensure transparent and fair enforcement.
  - Enhance quality and reliability of trade logistics, including transport infrastructure, border management, and supply chain services.
- Pursue coordinated regional reforms (trade facilitation, infrastructure investment, regulatory convergence) to raise output, increase exports, and generate employment and human capital development opportunities.

*Source: IMF Departmental Paper, “North Africa: Connecting Continents, Creating Opportunities,” chapter section 1. Forward and Backward GVC Participation.*

### References

### nacccoea - References

### Key references cited
- Ahn, Jae Bin; Era Dabla-Norris; Romain Duval; Bingjie Hu; and Lamin Njie. 2016. “Reassessing the Productivity Gains from Trade Liberalization.” Review of International Economics 27 (1): 130–54. https://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12364.
- Basu, Susanto. 1995. “Intermediate Goods and Business Cycles: Implications for Productivity and Welfare.” American Economic Review 85 (3): 512–31.
- Budina, Nina; Christian H. Ebeke; Florence Jaumotte; Andrea Medici; Augustus J. Panton; Marina Mendes Tavares; and Bella Yao. 2023. “Structural Reforms to Accelerate Growth, Ease Policy Trade-offs, and Support the Green Transition in Emerging Market and Developing Economies.” IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/2023/007.
- Economist Impact. 2023. “Trade in Transition 2023: Global Report.” https://impact.economist.com/projects/trade-intransition/pdfs/Trade_in_Transition_Global_Report_2023.pdf.
- Economist Impact. 2025. “Trade in Transition 2025: Global Report.” https://impact.economist.com/projects/trade-in-transition/pdfs/Trade_in_Transition_Global_Report_2025.pdf.
- INVERTO. 2023. “Nearshoring Study 2023: Results and Recommendations for Action.” October. https://www.inverto.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/INVERTO-Nearshoring-Study-2023-new.pdf.
- Kalinova, Blanka; Angel Palerm; and Stephen Thomsen. 2010. “OECD’s FDI Restrictiveness Index: 2010 Update.” OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2010/03.
- Kireyev, Alexei P.; Boaz Nandwa; Lorraine Ocampos; Babacar Sarr; Ramzy Al Amine; Allan G. Auclair; Yufei Cai; and others. 2019. “Economic Integration in the Maghreb: An Untapped Source of Growth.” IMF Departmental Paper 19/003.
- Martins Guilhoto, Joaquim; Colin Webb; and Norihiko Yamano. 2022. “Guide to OECD TiVA Indicators, 2021 edition.” OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Paper 2022/02.
- Munim, Ziaul Haque; and Hans-Joachim Schramm. 2018. “The Impacts of Port Infrastructure and Logistics Performance on Economic Growth: The Mediating Role of Seaborne Trade.” Journal of Shipping and Trade 3 (1): 1—19.
- QIMA. 2025. “Q2 2025 Barometer: As the Fog of Trade War Descends on the West, Emerging Regions May Offer Opportunities for Global Trade. Paris: QIMA.” https://content.qima.com/rs/944-QDO-384/images/Q2%202025%20Barometer%20%5BEN%5D.pdf

### GIMF: model structure and key features
- Model class and regions:
  - GIMF is an annual, multiregional, micro-founded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model.
  - In this chapter, GIMF comprises 10 regions: 5 North African countries—Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia—sub-Saharan Africa; the European Union; China; the United States; and the rest of the world.
- Household types and behavior:
  - Two household types: finitely lived/overlapping generations (OLG) households and liquidity-constrained (LIQ) households.
  - OLG households follow the OLG model and have a planning horizon of 20 years.
  - LIQ households receive only labor income and lump-sum government transfers and cannot save (consume all posttax income each period).
  - OLG households treat government bonds as wealth, making the model non-Ricardian and endogenizing the long-term real global interest rate.
- Firms, production, and GVCs:
  - Firms produce intermediate goods that are tradable and part of GVCs, non-GVC tradable, or nontradable.
  - GVC tradables produced using a roundabout production function (as in Basu 1995) including capital-labor bundle and a GVC tradable goods bundle (domestic + imported GVC tradables).
  - Intermediate goods firms operate in monopolistically competitive markets with price markups.
  - Final goods combine nontradables and a bundle of GVC and non-GVC tradables; production benefits from public infrastructure if useful.
  - Distributors operate in monopolistically competitive markets combining domestically produced and imported final goods subject to price markups.
- Financial and investment dynamics:
  - Private investment relies on the Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) financial accelerator.
  - Firms borrow from financial intermediaries; fall in earnings can lead intermediaries to seize capital net of auditing and bankruptcy costs, creating endogenously determined corporate risk premiums.
- Nominal side and monetary policy:
  - Nominal dynamics governed by implicit Phillips curves and monetary policy via an interest rate reaction function reliant on expected inflation.
  - Default monetary regime for China is an inflation forecast–targeting regime.
  - Monetary policy influences dynamics over the first 5 to 10 years but not long-term real outcomes.

### Calibration, steady state, and trade openness statistics
- Data and steady-state targets:
  - Calibration uses the GLORIA multiregional input-output (MRIO) database for 2023.
  - The calibration represents a steady state where every region has converged to a global real growth rate of 2 percent and global real interest rate of 2.5 percent.
  - It is assumed all regions have net foreign asset positions of zero (baseline current account zero; exports equal imports).
- North Africa size and openness:
  - Egypt is the largest economy in the region, accounting for 0.4 percent of global GDP.
  - Export-to-GDP ratios: Tunisia 45.3 percent; Mauritania 42 percent; Morocco 37 percent; Egypt 21 percent; Algeria 26.8 percent.
  - Exports to Europe (percent of GDP): Tunisia 33.7 percent; followed by Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, and Mauritania (order preserved as in text).
  - GVC tradable exports to Europe (percent of GDP): Tunisia 13.1 percent; followed by Mauritania, Morocco, Egypt, and Algeria.
  - GVC tradable imports (percent of GDP): Tunisia 16.7 percent; followed by Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, and Egypt.
  - Mauritania imports the highest share of investment goods relative to GDP at 20 percent.
- Calibration notes:
  - Some adjustments made to reconcile global data with a well-defined steady state; Annex Table 4.1.1 presents national expenditure calibration.
  - Discrepancies noted for Mauritania’s export and import-to-GDP ratios between GLORIA and the IMF Staff Report; ratios adjusted based on Staff Report consistent with Mauritanian authorities.

### Elasticities, short-term rigidities, and their implications
- Consumption and LIQ households:
  - Intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption common across regions at 0.5.
  - Share of LIQ households: 25 percent for the United States, EU, and China; 50 percent for the rest of the world.
  - Regions with higher LIQ shares exhibit more GDP volatility due to reduced consumption smoothing.
- GVC and trade elasticities:
  - Demands for goods in the GVC sector assumed relatively inelastic at 0.8.
  - Demand and trade elasticities for final consumption and investment goods and non-GVC tradable goods are elastic at 1.5.
  - Final goods are a combination of nontradable and all tradable goods with an elasticity of 0.5.
  - All tradable goods are a bundle of non-GVC and GVC tradable goods with an elasticity of substitution of 0.95.
  - Lower elasticities in the GVC sector imply larger price and real exchange rate movements for regions more dependent on GVC goods.
- Short-term real and nominal adjustment costs:
  - Real rigidities set to one across most variables, but set to 1.5 for short-term labor demand adjustments.
  - Nominal adjustment costs are the same across domestic sectors, with higher values for the European Union.
  - Import nominal adjustment costs vary across regions:
    - The United States has the highest nominal adjustment costs.
    - Small open economies’ import nominal adjustment costs are 10 percent of those of the United States.
    - Europe’s import nominal adjustment costs are about 50 percent of that of the United States (so still around five times higher than that of North African countries).
- Trade frictions and policy instruments:
  - Trade can be restricted by transportation costs, tariffs, and NTBs.
  - Tariffs are charged by the importing region; government collects revenues; exporting regions bear reduced demand and lower prices indirectly.
  - NTBs are imposed by the importing region and impose iceberg deadweight loss on exporting regions directly.
  - Transportation cost reductions lower deadweight losses similar to reducing NTBs.
- Fiscal policy instruments:
  - Fiscal instruments include public consumption, public investment, general lump-sum transfers, transfers targeted to LIQ or OLG households, tariffs, and taxes on consumption, labor, and corporate income.
  - Fiscal authority targets a deficit-to-GDP ratio consistent with a debt-to-GDP target, typically adjusting general lump-sum transfers exogenously to hit the target.
  - In the short term, the fiscal authority uses an automatic stabilizer varying general lump-sum transfers countercyclically using a measure of the output gap.

### Model implications highlighted in the text
- GVC dependence:
  - Regions dependent on GVC tradable goods face larger short- and long-term price and real exchange rate movements when shocks affect GVC goods because of lower GVC elasticities.
- Role of household composition:
  - Higher shares of LIQ households increase short-term GDP volatility due to limited consumption smoothing.
- Policy transmission:
  - Monetary policy shapes dynamics over the first 5 to 10 years through interest rate responses to expected inflation.
  - Fiscal policy has a broad toolkit to target deficit-to-GDP and to stabilize through lump-sum transfers and public investment.

*Source: nacccoea - References (nacccoea - References).*

### References

### References

### Key empirical and modeling foundations
- Cited methodological and modeling works informing analysis:
  - “Getting to Know GIMF: The Simulation Properties of the Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model.” IMF Working Paper 2013/055.
  - “The Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (GIMF)—Theoretical Structure.” IMF Working Paper 10/34.
  - “GIMF-GVC: Introducing Global Value Chains into the Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model and Their Impacts.” (Forthcoming IMF Working Paper).
  - Foundational macro and micro studies: Basu (1995); Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999); Blanchard (1985); Buiter (1988); Ireland (2001); Rotemberg (1982); Weil (1987); Yaari (1965).
- Global value chain and multi-regional IO data sources:
  - “The Global MRIO Lab—Charting the World Economy.” Economic Systems Research 29: 158–86.

### Regional energy analysis and data sources
- Energy potential and statistics drawn from:
  - Energy Institute (2025); ESMAP and World Bank (2020); Technical University of Denmark and World Bank (2025); IEA (2025a, 2025b, 2025c); IRENA (2023a, 2025a, 2025b); EMBER (2025); European Commission (2024); European Council of the European Union (2025); Eurostat (2025a, 2025b); US EIA (2024).
- Population and development sources referenced:
  - World Bank (2025); United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2024).

### Major findings, projections, and quantitative facts
- North Africa’s hydrocarbon reserves and shares:
  - Algeria: 12.2 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves and 159 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas (as of 2024).
  - Libya: 48.4 billion barrels of oil and 53 Tcf of gas (as of 2024).
  - North African energy exports are oriented toward Europe: over half of energy exports destined for EU markets.
  - Algeria accounts for 14 percent of the EU’s gas imports; Libya accounts for close to 10 percent of oil imports.
- Projected European demand shifts by 2040 (European Commission projections):
  - European demand for oil projected to contract by approximately 70 percent by 2040.
  - European demand for natural gas projected to contract by approximately 60 percent by 2040.
  - Europe accounts for 15 percent of AI data center electricity consumption.
- North Africa renewable technical potential (IRENA estimates):
  - Up to 2,800 gigawatts (GW) of solar.
  - 220 GW of wind.
  - 112 GW of hydropower.
- Illustrative electricity export scenario and related figures:
  - If interconnections scaled and North Africa allocated 20 percent of its generation to Europe—after meeting domestic needs and accounting for transmission and distribution losses—this could redirect around 70 TWh annually to the EU, representing almost 3 percent of current electricity demand.
  - An alternative illustrative scenario referenced earlier: by scaling up infrastructure, North Africa could potentially supply over 100 TWh of electricity to Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, meeting 3 and 6 percent of demand, respectively.
- Green hydrogen potential:
  - IRENA estimates North Africa could supply around 18 percent of EU green hydrogen and related commodities by 2050.
- Renewable electricity targets (country-level, as noted):
  - Morocco: 52 percent renewable electricity generation by 2030.
  - Tunisia: 35 percent by 2030.
  - Egypt: 42 percent by 2030.
  - Mauritania: 48 percent by 2030.
  - Algeria: 27 percent by 2030.
  - Libya: goal of achieving 20 percent renewable energy by 2035 (National Strategy for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency).
- Current regional electricity generation share:
  - North Africa already generates over 40 percent of the continent’s electricity.
- Sub-Saharan Africa energy access statistics and impacts:
  - Over 688 million people lacked access to electricity in 2022, 85 percent of whom live in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 2025).
  - Sub-Saharan Africa’s electrification: just over 50 percent of the population having access to electricity (Box 5).
  - Africa accounts for nearly 18 percent of the world’s population but less than 6 percent of global energy use.
  - A World Bank study in 23 African countries: a 1 percent rise in electricity outages leads to an average 3.5 percent drop in business productivity.
- Data center electricity consumption projection:
  - Data center electricity consumption set to more than double by 2030, growing at four times the rate of total electricity consumption (IEA 2025b).

### Analysis: strategic opportunities and risks
- Dual advantage and strategic positioning:
  - North Africa is geographically and economically positioned between Europe (decarbonizing, diversifying away from Russian hydrocarbons) and sub-Saharan Africa (urgent electrification needs), giving it a dual advantage in hydrocarbons and renewables to act as a regional energy corridor.
- Market and transition risks:
  - Europe’s decarbonization (European Green Deal, CBAM, REPowerEU, ETS and ETS2, ICE ban) implies reduced fossil fuel imports but rising demand for low-carbon alternatives and possible increased energy for AI, creating uncertain demand mixes.
  - Hydrocarbon-dependent fiscal vulnerability: oil and gas account for more than 40 and 90 percent of government revenues in Algeria and Libya, respectively, exposing fiscal and macroeconomic risk if European demand contracts.
- Value-add and structural transformation imperatives:
  - Success requires moving beyond raw energy exports to strengthen regional linkages, local manufacturing, processing, services, technology transfer, and human capital development to capture greater value added and generate job creation.
- Transmission, equity, and infrastructure constraints:
  - Scaling cross-border electricity interconnections entails economic efficiency concerns (transmission and distribution losses, coordination) and social equity considerations (risks of higher domestic energy prices in exporting countries); redistributive measures are needed to secure political support.
  - Example of coordinated project: Morocco’s Sila Atlantik project coordinates generation and offtake to minimize inefficiencies and maximize export viability.

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Diversify export destinations and energy mix:
  - North African policymakers should diversify hydrocarbon export destinations beyond Europe, with active pursuit of sub-Saharan African markets as demand for oil, gas, and renewables grows.
- Scale cross-border infrastructure with equity safeguards:
  - Prioritize scaling electric interconnections while ensuring redistributive policies so gains from trade reach domestic consumers and preserve political support.
  - Invest in sufficient quality infrastructure and coordination to mitigate long-distance transmission and distribution losses.
- Promote value addition and regional industrial linkages:
  - Invest in local manufacturing, processing, and services related to energy (including green hydrogen and renewables) to climb global value chains and foster technology transfer and human capital development.
- Support electrification and structural transformation in sub-Saharan Africa:
  - Use cross-border links to address urgent electrification needs, recognizing the large economic gains from improved reliability (manufacturing, agriculture, digital services, health) and the substantial costs of outages to productivity.
- Prepare for AI-driven demand shifts:
  - Strengthen electricity infrastructure capacity anticipating that AI-related electricity demand (especially data centers) will accelerate, with data center consumption set to more than double by 2030.

*Italicized source: nacccoea - References, nacccoea - References (PDF chapter/section).*

### Box 5. (concluded)

### Box 5. (concluded)

### Sub-Saharan Africa: energy challenges and potential
- Half of total export value is derived from fossil fuels in sub-Saharan Africa.
- Hydrocarbon exports are concentrated in a small group of countries; most countries in the region are net energy importers (IEA 2022a).
- The region has significant untapped oil and gas resources that could support higher production in the coming decades, but development is uneven.
- On average, the region’s installed renewable-based electricity generation capacity represents less than 3 percent of the global total (IRENA 2024b).
- Obstacles to scaling up hydrocarbons production include limited and asymmetric investment, weak infrastructure and grid constraints, policy and regulatory hurdles, and systemic and institutional challenges.

### Cross-border energy linkages and illustrative impact
- Current electricity connectivity between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa remains limited, but planned infrastructure projects offer a pathway to expand trade.
- Strengthening electric interconnections and advancing gas pipeline projects (examples cited: Morocco–Mauritania transmission line; Nigeria–Morocco and Trans-Saharan gas pipelines) can enable surplus energy from the north to flow southward.
- North Africa generates over 40 percent of the continent’s electricity and has significant capacity in both hydrocarbons and renewables.
- Illustrative scenario: if interconnections were scaled and North Africa allocated 10 percent of its generation to sub-Saharan Africa—after meeting domestic needs and exports to Europe and accounting for transmission and distribution losses—this could lead to the redirection of around 35 TWh annually to sub-Saharan Africa.
  - This would represent over 6 percent of the region’s current annual electricity consumption.
  - The redirection has potential to raise electrification rates commensurately, given progress in the domestic enabling environment.
- Alignment with initiatives:
  - World Bank and African Development Bank’s Mission 300 aims to connect 300 million people in sub-Saharan Africa to electricity.
  - Blue Raman submarine Cable (part of the EU Global Gateway and the Mattei Plan; co-funded by the European Commission and Sparkle) will enhance digital connectivity and technological convergence between Europe, Africa, and India.
- Expected benefits: help meet rising energy demand, support regional linkages, reduce energy costs, enhance reliability of supply, and amplify economic and social benefits of electrification across sectors.

### Infrastructure and investment patterns in transition (North Africa)
- Hydrocarbons still dominate North Africa’s energy mix, but investment trends are shifting toward electricity and renewables.
- North Africa’s renewable potential is beginning to attract growing investment.
- In 2023, North Africa attracted US$65 billion in energy-related FDI, with more than 60 percent directed toward renewables.
- Between 2010 and 2019, 122 fossil fuel power plants were built; only 22 have been added since 2020, indicating a pivot toward cleaner energy sources.
- Over the past five years, energy-related FDI largely originated from the GCC and Europe, led by the UAE, France, Saudi Arabia, and other European countries.
- Financing for renewable energy is uneven: Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria received the bulk of investment commitments (IRENA 2023a).

### Asymmetry in infrastructure for energy trade
- Hydrocarbons infrastructure is well developed toward Europe but sparse southward.
  - Established export corridors to Europe include the Trans-Mediterranean Pipeline (30 bcm), the Maghreb–Europe Pipeline (12 bcm), and Algeria’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals—altogether supplying over 20 percent of EU gas imports (ENTSOG 2024).
  - Links with sub-Saharan Africa are limited. Projects under development include the Nigeria–Morocco Gas Pipeline (described as the world’s longest planned offshore pipeline) and the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (connecting Nigeria to Algeria), but these are progressing slowly (Agbetiloye 2025; Energy Capital & Power 2025a).
- Electricity transmission networks similarly favor Europe.
  - Examples: Morocco–Spain HVDC line (1,400 MW) and planned Tunisia–Italy ELMED interconnector (600 MW).
  - Infrastructure linking to sub-Saharan Africa is nascent; Morocco–Mauritania line (300 MW, targeted for 2025) is still in early stages (ONEE 2023; Tunisian Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines and Terna Italy 2023).
- Regulatory and institutional fragmentation constrains electricity trade expansion:
  - Requirements for effective cross-border trade include harmonized technical standards, third-party grid access, transparent tariff structures, and functioning platforms for long-term power purchase agreements.
  - Regional initiatives (AfSEM; Continental Power System Master Plan) offer vision but have struggled to move from planning to implementation.
  - Multilateral platforms (UfM; MED-GEM) and bilateral partnerships (EU–Morocco Green Partnership; Algeria–Mauritania MOUs) align policy goals but rarely translate into binding investment commitments or infrastructure delivery.
  - Result: power generation investments often outpaced transmission and market readiness, creating stranded capacity and unrealized export potential.

### Existing energy value chains—limitations and patterns
- North Africa remains weakly integrated into global energy value chains for both renewables and hydrocarbons, limiting capture of technology and human capital spillovers.
- Participation in global clean energy value chains is low due to:
  - Limited local manufacturing capacity.
  - Fragmented industrial ecosystems.
  - Minimal upstream integration into global supply chains for solar panels, wind turbines, and grid components (IRENA 2023a; SEforALL 2023).
  - Most renewable infrastructure is built with imported technology, curbing domestic value addition, job creation, and technology transfer.
  - Government localization strategies have been announced but implementation and impact remain limited.
- Hydrocarbon value chain participation is concentrated and shallow:
  - Exporters like Algeria and Libya: hydrocarbons account for nearly 70 percent of their total exports, showing strong forward linkages but narrow roles in global energy trade compared with more vertically integrated GCC economies.
  - Weak backward linkages: limited participation in upstream services or technology-intensive processes.
  - Energy importers like Morocco and Tunisia have more diversified trade structures and stronger backward linkages in non-energy sectors, but electricity trade—particularly for renewables—remains underdeveloped despite rising generation capacity.
- North Africa’s energy trade structure is narrow and asymmetric:
  - Forward and backward energy linkages are overwhelmingly oriented toward Europe, particularly for hydrocarbon-exporting countries.
  - Energy value chains within North Africa and with sub-Saharan Africa remain minimal, though Mauritania has begun to diversify trade relations across a wider range of sectors.
  - Overall, the region's energy linkages are highly asymmetric—deeply tied to northern markets while largely disconnected from southern opportunities.

### The energy value chain opportunity and policy directions
- Strategic positioning:
  - North Africa can act as a middle node linking sub-Saharan Africa’s upstream resources (critical minerals) with Europe’s downstream industrial demand and capital.
- Sub-Saharan Africa’s upstream role:
  - Provides critical minerals: cobalt, manganese, chromium, platinum, aluminum, and uranium—inputs for solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, and other clean technologies (SEforALL 2023; Chen and others 2024).
  - Historical reliance on raw exports constrained value addition and exposed countries to commodity price shocks (Abdel-Latif, Khandelwal, and Zhang 2025).
  - Mitigation through investment in mineral processing, refining, and low-level manufacturing—activities North Africa is well placed to support.
- Europe’s downstream role:
  - Strong in high-value manufacturing (electrolyzers, wind turbines, EV components).
  - European institutions (EIB, EBRD) and private investors can finance infrastructure and green industry development, and support skills training, technology transfer, and regulatory reform (Karkare and Medinilla 2023; SEforALL 2023).
  - EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act promotes nearshoring and sustainable partnerships, reinforcing North Africa’s intermediary role (European Commission 2023).
- North Africa’s manufacturing and industrial potential:
  - Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia can develop manufacturing segments: solar panel module assembly, battery packaging, and mineral refining due to infrastructure readiness, labor competitiveness, and proximity to raw materials and end markets (SEforALL 2023).
  - Examples: Morocco refining cobalt and attracting EV battery investment; Egypt and Morocco producing fertilizer, ammonia, and green hydrogen; Tunisia’s automotive components sector positioned to support green mobility supply chains; Algeria expanding pipelines, refining capacity, and new hydrogen and solar plans.
- Required policy mix and actions:
  - Investment in technical education, R&D, and digital infrastructure.
  - Harmonization of industrial and energy policies under the AfCFTA.
  - Targeted incentives to attract green manufacturing.
  - Public–private partnerships, regional coordination, and strategic alliances with Europe and sub-Saharan Africa.
  - Scale up human capital development through technical and vocational training in energy-related engineering, management, and manufacturing.
  - Facilitate technology transfer via joint ventures, licensing agreements, and supplier development programs in sectors such as solar, hydrogen, and battery technologies.
  - Ensure sound governance and transparent fiscal regimes to avoid replicating past extractive patterns; reinvest revenues from mineral processing and clean energy exports in infrastructure, public services, and social development (Arezki 2024).
- AI and digital demand linkage:
  - Europe’s AI ecosystem is expanding rapidly and is already one of the largest and fastest-growing regions for data center electricity demand to support model training, industrial automation, and smart infrastructure (IEA 2025b).
  - Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest data center electricity consumption per capita and significant potential to benefit from AI-enabled development, but persistent energy deficits and infrastructure gaps are barriers (Signé 2025).
  - North Africa can serve as a strategic energy bridge by scaling renewable and hydrocarbon dispatchable capacity, modernizing grids, and expanding cross-border interconnections to deliver reliable electricity to European data centers and support sub-Saharan Africa’s digitalization goals.
  - North Africa can also deploy AI locally to optimize energy systems, improve industrial productivity, and enhance service delivery; early example: AI algorithms optimizing processes in Morocco’s paper industry.
  - Needed investments: digital skills, data infrastructure, and regulatory frameworks to evolve North Africa into a regional AI-energy hub, deepen trilateral linkages, power inclusive growth, and support new industries.

*Sources: European Commission (2025); IEA (2022a, 2025b); IRENA (2023a, 2024b); SEforALL (2023); World Bank (2025); Agbetiloye (2025); Energy Capital & Power (2021, 2024a, 2024b, 2025a, 2025b); ENTSOG (2024); ONEE (2023); Tunisian Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mines and Terna Italy (2023); Signé (2025); Arezki (2024); Abdel-Latif, Khandelwal, and Zhang (2025); Chen and others (2024); Karkare and Medinilla (2023); IMF staff.*

### Box 6. Algeria and Energy Value Chain Integration—from Transit to Transformation

### Box 6. Algeria and Energy Value Chain Integration—from Transit to Transformation

### Strategic position and role
- Algeria is emerging as a strategic anchor in trilateral energy value chains linking sub-Saharan Africa’s upstream resources, North Africa’s midstream processing and transit capacity, and Europe’s downstream industrial demand.
- This evolving role positions Algeria beyond a traditional energy exporter toward a potential regional transformation hub.

### Infrastructure and transit capacity
- Algeria hosts three major gas pipelines to Europe—the Trans-Mediterranean, Medgaz, and Maghreb-Europe (GME) pipelines—collectively supplying over 20 percent of EU gas imports.
- Algeria has significant liquefied natural gas (LNG) capacity and is investing in new interconnections with Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania.
- These assets make Algeria a natural transit point for regional energy flows and underpin trilateral pipeline projects linking:
  - Upstream: Nigeria and other sub-Saharan countries supplying natural gas and critical minerals.
  - Midstream and downstream: Algeria processing, storing, and transiting energy products while developing refining and petrochemical capacity.
  - Downstream: Europe providing capital, technology, and industrial demand, particularly for clean fuels and green hydrogen.

### Domestic processing, industrial upgrading, and renewables targets
- Algeria’s current refining capacity allows for full coverage of the local market with fuel.
- Sonatrach is investing in a new project that would increase its processing capacity by 17 percent.
- Algeria has developed its petrochemical industry (methanol, ammonia) and aims to increase processing capacity of higher value–added products such as polypropylene.
- With target investment, Algeria could develop local manufacturing and processing capabilities in mineral refining (for example, phosphates, rare earths) and renewable energy production and transportation.
- Algeria has developed a national strategy for the development of green and blue hydrogen, complemented by the launch of two pilot projects and plans to install 15 GW of solar capacity by 2035.
- These renewable targets could foster component manufacturing for solar, wind, and battery technologies.

### Value capture, technology transfer, and labor market implications
- Deeper integration into regional and global value chains could enable Algeria to capture more value-added domestically.
- Expected channels for technology transfer include joint ventures, licensing agreements, and supplier development programs—especially with European firms seeking proximate partners in the green transition.
- The transition would create demand for a more skilled workforce. Algeria can leverage this by investing in:
  - Technical and vocational education in energy and industrial engineering.
  - Partnerships with European institutions for training and certification.
  - On-the-job learning through FDI-linked employment.

### Regional and policy implications (link to North Africa conclusions)
- Moving beyond hydrocarbon exports, Algeria can become a pivotal node in trilateral energy value chains linking African resources with European markets and fostering inclusive industrial development across the region.
- Broader North Africa policy guidance in the chapter includes two prongs applicable to Algeria:
  - Reinvent the hydrocarbon export model: diversify markets, expand linkages with sub-Saharan Africa, move up the energy value chain (petrochemicals, refining, energy services), and strengthen backward linkages through domestic industrial inputs and service providers.
  - Scale up renewables and cross-border electricity trade: North Africa’s over 2,800 GW in solar potential could enable exports of renewable electricity to Europe and sub-Saharan Africa and green hydrogen globally; priorities include upgraded transmission systems, harmonized technical standards, and accelerated implementation of regional frameworks (African Single Electricity Market, Continental Power System Master Plan, Mission 300).
- Infrastructure links with sub-Saharan Africa—particularly high-voltage cross-border transmission—should be a priority to realize trilateral integration benefits.

### Expected economic and strategic outcomes
- Deeper integration would catalyze industrial development, technology transfer, job creation, and human capital development, while strengthening regional resilience and positioning Algeria as a regional leader in green energy value chains.

*Source: IMF Departmental Paper — North Africa: Connecting Continents, Creating Opportunities; Box 6.*

### CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY

### CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

### Strategic context and opportunities
- North Africa is positioned between Europe’s industrial demand and sub-Saharan Africa’s demographic dynamism, offering an opportunity to become a strategic economic connector.
- Global supply chains shifting, energy systems transforming, and regional frameworks like the AfCFTA increase the region’s potential to reshape its economic trajectory.
- Geopolitical tensions and supply chain disruptions have increased interest in regional economic linkages, positioning North Africa as an ideal nearshoring hub for Europe because of competitive labor, industrial base, and preferential EU market access.
- AfCFTA unlocks intra-African trade potential, allowing North Africa to serve as a critical link between European and African markets.

### Empirical findings and projected gains
- Empirical evidence from gravity models and dynamic general equilibrium simulations indicates that deep reforms are required to fully seize the trilateral opportunity.
- Reducing trade barriers, improving logistics, and strengthening the business environment can boost exports, GDP, and participation in global value chains for Europe, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa.
- Targeted investments in human capital and infrastructure, particularly in sectors like energy and manufacturing, can boost North Africa’s GDP by up to 7 percent.
- Capital, innovation, and expertise from Europe can flow into African markets, while African exports can gain better access to Europe.

### Sectoral focus: energy and industrial upgrading
- The energy sector offers a transformative opportunity due to North Africa’s abundant traditional and renewable resources and proximity to European and African markets.
- Moving beyond extractive models toward downstream processing and manufacturing can:
  - Foster job creation.
  - Enable industrial upgrading.
  - Facilitate technological transfer and the rise of artificial intelligence.
- Energy integration priorities include scaling up renewable generation, expanding electricity interconnections with sub-Saharan Africa, and localizing energy-intensive manufacturing to position North Africa as a regional energy hub.

### Policy recommendations (priority actions)
- Trade and investment reforms:
  - Reduce both tariff barriers and NTBs.
  - Harmonize standards and customs procedures.
  - Fully implement AfCFTA protocols.
  - Expected outcome: lower trade costs and facilitation of regional value chain formation.
- Infrastructure and logistics upgrades:
  - Invest in modern ports and efficient customs systems.
  - Develop cross-border corridors such as the Trans-Maghreb and Cairo–Dakar highways.
  - Expected outcome: dramatically improved connectivity and competitiveness.
- Business environment and human capital:
  - Streamline regulations and enhance contract enforcement.
  - Expand vocational training aligned with the needs of energy and manufacturing sectors.
  - Expected outcome: attract FDI and support industrial transformation.
- Energy integration and industrial localization:
  - Scale up renewable generation.
  - Expand electricity interconnections with sub-Saharan Africa.
  - Localize energy-intensive manufacturing.
  - Expected outcome: position North Africa as a regional energy hub and enable technology transfer.

### Implementation and governance
- Realizing the vision requires bold policy action, political will, ambition, coordination, and sustained reform.
- Regional coordination—within North Africa and with European and sub-Saharan partners—is essential for moving from aspiration to implementation.
- Joint ventures—such as manufacturing hubs, infrastructure links, and financial partnerships—could streamline trade, build interconnected value chains, and support balanced, sustainable development.

*Source: CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, nacccoea - CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY (nacccoea - CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/dp/2026/english/nacccoea.pdf_
