## THE FUTURE OF TRADE

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### Overview
- The 75th anniversary of the Bretton Woods multilateral institutions coincides with heightened doubts about multilateralisms and the functioning of the current trading system.
- A rules-based, predictable trading system contributed significantly to trade and trade-induced growth, especially in Europe and east Asia, but many countries—particularly in Africa and Latin America—were left behind.
- Recent trade tensions and rising protectionism threaten the multilateral trading system, with potentially adverse effects for developing economies that have not yet realized the benefits of globalization.

### Structural factors affecting global trade growth
Findings:
- Global trade growth slowed after the global financial crisis; trade collapsed during the crisis and recovered only slowly.
- Suggested cyclical explanations include sluggish demand for durable and investment goods, low corporate investment, and limited trade financing in the aftermath of the crisis.
- Two dominant structural explanations are emphasized:
  - (1) The rebalancing of the Chinese economy and associated increase in China’s domestic value added.
  - (2) The belief that fragmentation of production has run its course, leaving limited scope for further international specialization (Hoekman 2015; Constantinescu, Mattoo, and Ruta 2016).
- China experienced a pronounced decline in its domestic value added of exports until 2011, consistent with deep participation in global value chains, but since 2011 domestic value added in China has been steadily increasing.
- China commands a large share of the world export market; among comparable economies, only Korea exhibits the same steep increase in domestic value added starting in 2011.
- Two implications of changing fragmentation:
  - Trade measured in gross terms will fall if fragmentation declines, because previous increases were driven by double-counting of intermediate inputs crossing borders.
  - China’s large export market share means its trends have a large effect on aggregate global trade statistics.
- Evidence on whether fragmentation has run its course is mixed (Gaulier, Sztulman, and Ünal 2019):
  - Exports of intermediate goods (value-based) exhibited strong growth until 2013, declined steadily between 2013 and 2016, and are influenced by factors including commodity prices.
  - The share of parts and components in volume terms in manufacturing trade has increased at a moderate pace since the 1990s and has not shown signs of reversal since the global crisis.
  - Within electronics (a highly fragmented sector with a 40 percent share in parts and components trade), parts-and-components trade fell for office machinery and computers but rose for telecommunications equipment.
  - Global value chains continue to expand in product and country coverage, with growing geographic and product diversity of parts and components trade as measured by product-country combinations, net of new products.
- Automation and artificial intelligence have not produced empirical support for onshoring that would reduce trade; evidence suggests these advances may boost productivity and increase trade.

Key dates and numeric markers:
- 1990s: moderate pace increase in parts-and-components share in manufacturing trade.
- 2011: turning point—China’s domestic value added began increasing steadily after this year.
- 2013: exports of intermediate goods peaked and then declined through 2016.
- 2016: expansion of the Information Technology Agreement (originally signed in 1996) involved 53 members.
- 2013: adoption of the Trade Facilitation Agreement.
- 2016: year of the ITA expansion noted above.

### Silver lining and sources of dissatisfaction with the current trade system
Findings:
- Increasing inequality within advanced economies contributed to environments receptive to protectionism.
- Long-standing frustrations with the multilateral trading system include concerns over state subsidies, intellectual property rights, forced technology transfer, and exchange rate manipulation.
- Dissatisfaction centers on processes and interpretations of rules:
  - Debates over the effectiveness of dispute settlement.
  - Questions about the reach of subsidy disciplines and treatment of state-owned enterprises.
  - The WTO’s traditional all-or-nothing approach (requiring all members to agree on all issues) is increasingly a straightjacket; the Doha Round (started in 2001) is effectively stalled.
- Recognition of these challenges has led to pushes for more flexible approaches:
  - Plurilateral agreements among like-minded countries permit subsets of countries to adopt new rules and remain open to later accession by other WTO members, offering a second-best alternative when full multilateral deals are infeasible.
  - Examples: the Information Technology Agreement (1996, expanded 2016) with 53 members; the 2013 Trade Facilitation Agreement, which unbundled a specific issue from broader negotiations.

### Policy challenges and options going forward
Findings and policy-relevant points:
- The digital revolution changes trade: firms operate as links in global value chains, services (banking, insurance) can be purchased cross-border, and e-commerce is increasingly important.
- Progress in these areas requires addressing “behind the border” measures: harmonization of domestic regulations; agreement on intellectual property rights protection; consensus on data and privacy issues.
- Cross-national regulatory differences may reflect valid concerns (quality standards, exploitation of market power, data privacy); policymakers must balance legitimate domestic regulations with protectionist abuse.
- Trade policy alone is insufficient; regulatory cooperation and coordination are needed.
- Cooperation is more likely among economies at similar development stages with similar objectives; regional trade agreements could be a useful starting point and complement to multilateral platforms.
- The number of new regional trade agreements in 2018 fell to its lowest level since the early 1990s, indicating waning appetite for trade liberalization amid backlash against globalization.

Policy implications and recommendations (implicit in analysis):
- Pursue flexible WTO approaches where full multilateral consensus is infeasible, including plurilateral agreements and issue-specific multilateral deals.
- Focus negotiation agendas on digital-era trade issues and “behind the border” regulatory cooperation.
- Leverage regional agreements among similarly developed economies to build momentum for broader regulatory convergence.
- Use reforms to address concerns about fairness (state subsidies, IP, forced technology transfer, exchange rate practices) to restore confidence in the rules-based system.
- Preserve incentives for developing economies to participate by maintaining openness, predictable rules, and mechanisms that limit abuse of bargaining power by large countries.

### Conclusion
- International trade is not inevitably doomed to permanent slowdown; much depends on policy choices.
- Given mixed evidence on structural limits to fragmentation and signs that technology can boost trade, policy can play a key role in shaping the future of ailing multilateral trade systems.
- Constructive reform—balancing domestic regulatory objectives with cooperative rulemaking and greater flexibility in multilateralism—offers a path to reinvigorate trade and make gains from globalization more inclusive.

*Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, "The Future of Trade," Finance & Development, June 2019.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/fandd/article/2019/june/the-future-of-global-trade-goldberg.pdf_
