## The debt pandemic

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### Pandemic impact and emerging concerns
- The COVID-19 pandemic has greatly lengthened the list of developing and emerging market economies in debt distress; for some, a crisis is imminent, and for many more, only exceptionally low global interest rates may be delaying a reckoning.
- The IMF reports emerging market governments issued "$124 billion in hard currency debt during the first six months of 2020, with two-thirds of the borrowing coming in the second quarter."
- Remittances from emerging market citizens working in other countries are expected to drop "by more than 20 percent this year."
- Private capital flows retreated sharply early in the pandemic; multilateral lenders (IMF, World Bank, regional banks) quickly provided funding and the G20 granted a debt moratorium to the world’s poorest countries, encouraging—but not succeeding in—private creditor participation.
- Although many emerging market governments have borrowed more in local currencies, businesses have continued to accumulate foreign currency debt; under severe duress, governments may face pressure to bail out corporate national champions.

### Historical patterns and preexisting conditions
- Historical evidence: a review of "89 default episodes from 1827 to 2003 shows the typical experience to be a sharp rise in borrowing, both external and domestic, in the run-up to default (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009)."
- Two "preexisting conditions" that impede effective debt workouts:
  - Private creditors increasingly claim outsize shares of repayment in restructurings, weakening official sector seniority despite theoretical priority.
  - The length of sovereign debt crises: "Default episodes have taken, on average, seven years to resolve and typically involve multiple restructurings." Chart data show descriptive statistics (in years): Average 7.2; Median 5; Max 30; No. of observations 107.
- Litigation and holdout tactics have risen: an increasing share of sovereign debt restructurings involve lawsuits (reference: Schumacher, Trebesch, and Enderlein 2018), complicating restructurings and favoring private creditor negotiating power.
- Official creditors frequently step in when private investors retrench, which historically has resulted in official sector shouldering a large portion of losses (examples: 1980s debt crisis; Greece; Horn, Reinhart, and Trebesch 2020; Schlegl, Trebesch, and Wright 2019).

### Risks ahead
- The riskiest period for emerging market access to capital may lie ahead: the first wave of the pandemic is not over; historical analog (1918 influenza) suggests possibility of a more severe second wave, especially if an effective vaccine is not widely available until mid-2021 (or later).
- Even in the best-case scenario, international travel and consumer/business uncertainty are likely to remain elevated; world poverty has risen sharply and many people may not return to work quickly.
- Rising budget pressures have coincided with a new wave of sovereign debt downgrades, "surpassing peaks during prior crises."
- The COVID-19 crisis could, in the worst case, lead to another "lost decade" in development, with long delays in debt resolution.

### Practical policy proposals to improve debt workouts
- More transparency on debt data and debt contracts:
  - The World Bank, the IMF, and the G20 should continue to insist on strengthening debt statistics.
  - China’s lending complicates external indebtedness assessment because lending is often shrouded in nondisclosure clauses; more granular data on private sector creditor exposure would facilitate expedient negotiations and identification of bonds at risk of holdout or litigation tactics.
  - An encompassing transparency initiative would include full disclosure on sovereign bond ownership and credit default swaps, improved data on domestic debt and debt owed by state-owned enterprises, and accounting for pension burdens.
- Realistic economic forecasts that incorporate downside risks:
  - Realistic growth forecasts are critical to avoid underestimating near-term financing needs and overestimating capacity to service debt.
  - James Boughton’s historical note: during much of the 1980s debt crisis, overoptimistic growth expectations persisted, especially in Latin America.
  - Earlier detection of insolvency and identification of cases requiring large write-downs can help speed resolution.
- New legislation to support orderly sovereign debt restructurings:
  - National legislation in jurisdictions governing international bonds (notably New York and London) or where payments are processed can promote a more level playing field between sovereign debtors and creditors.
  - Examples: United Kingdom enacted a law in 2010 for countries taking part in the HIPC debt relief initiative; Belgium passed the Anti–Vulture Funds Law in 2015 to prevent litigious creditors from disrupting payments made via Euroclear.
  - Legislation could cap amounts reclaimable on defaulted government bonds bought at deep discounts and facilitate majority restructurings, allowing a sovereign and a qualified majority of creditors to reach an agreement binding on all creditors subject to the restructurings.

### Objectives and concluding assessment
- The global pandemic merits a generous response from official and private creditors toward emerging market and developing economies to preserve the global trading system and help countries weather debt problems.
- To ensure official aid and soft loans benefit debtor country citizens rather than uncompromising creditors, it is essential to secure inter-creditor equity and fair burden sharing, especially between official and private creditors.
- Greater transparency, realistic downside-aware forecasts, and legal reforms to support orderly restructurings are practical steps to make debt workouts more expedient and equitable.

*Source: “The Debt Pandemic,” Jeremy Bulow, Carmen Reinhart, Kenneth Rogoff, and Christoph Trebesch, Finance & Development, September 2020.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/fandd/article/2020/september/debt-pandemic-reinhart-rogoff-bulow-trebesch.pdf_
