## How to Deal with Debt’s Downside

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### Mounting debt in developing economies: overview
- Developing economies face mounting debt burdens; some countries (Sri Lanka, Zambia) have declared they cannot service their debts and sought international assistance.
- Many others face onerous debt service obligations amounting to several percentage points of GDP.
- Debt can finance roads, schools, hospitals, and other investments that, if yielding high returns, allow countries to service debt (example cited: Korea in the 1960s).

### Debt as blessing and curse: mechanisms and risks
- Benefits:
  - Enables investment that can convert promising prospects into realities when investment produces expected high returns.
  - Historical example: Korea borrowed about 10 percent of GDP a year while its domestic saving rate was less than 10 percent; fast growth generated high returns and the debt servicing ratio fell over time.
- Risks:
  - Debt used to finance current consumption or poorly conceived investment makes the country poorer if investment doesn’t pay off.
  - Mounting concerns about creditworthiness push up interest rates and reduce likelihood that further borrowing will produce higher returns.
  - Creditors may refuse to roll over debt if borrower prospects worsen.
- Lenders assess risks including macroeconomic policies, prospects, and commodity price swings; promises of reform (often with an IMF program) can induce rollovers.

### Sri Lanka case study: crisis dynamics and needed actions
- Crisis chronology and impact:
  - Sri Lanka faced a severe balance of payments crisis in 2021; could afford imports only of essentials (food and fuel).
  - Economic activity fell by 7.8 percent in 2022 and a further 3.8 percent in 2023.
  - Power outages were common; buses did not run; factories lacked inputs; grocery stores emptied; inflation spiked.
- Three essential elements for rebuilding credibility and enabling recovery:
  - A source of foreign exchange to buy essential imports to restart power plants, factories, transport, and other essential services.
  - Debt restructuring so lenders could be confident that debt would be serviced.
  - Domestic policy reform.
- Political economy:
  - Policy reform was politically difficult; protests overthrew the government and reform became possible only when a new president took office in 2024.
  - Reformers risk blame if reforms do not go far enough and fail.
- IMF involvement:
  - IMF’s core strength: assess a country’s macroeconomic situation and lend to support countries in difficulty.
  - IMF lending typically for not longer than three to five years and conditioned on reasonable assurances that the borrower will be able to service the loan.
  - Sri Lanka and the IMF agreed to a reform program, but debt restructuring was required to deal with arrears and regain market access.

### Holdout creditors, Paris Club, and challenges with China as creditor
- Historical process:
  - Previously, sovereign lenders met through the Paris Club to discuss restructuring plans consistent with IMF-supported programs; private creditors also met and the IMF was consulted.
  - Restructuring often involved a “haircut” (reduction in face value) and/or a pause in payments, followed by IMF lending.
- Recent changes and frictions:
  - In the past decade, China became a large sovereign creditor but has chosen to remain outside the Paris Club.
  - China has granted debt relief in many cases but does not have fully developed internal processes for considering haircuts and has given its lenders only limited discretion to reschedule debt service payments.
  - In Sri Lanka’s case, it took almost two years for the international community to work out an agreement that satisfied the Chinese, and the IMF program was delayed by nearly a year as a result, prolonging hardship.
- Holdout creditor problem:
  - If creditors suspect IMF lending will be used to service debt to a holdout sovereign creditor, the IMF cannot be expected to lend.
  - Delays in restructuring while awaiting a holdout creditor’s decision can pile pressure on the crisis country and postpone recovery.

### Proposed improvements and policy recommendations
- Minimum requirement:
  - Countries in crisis must be able to develop a restructuring plan with the IMF, the Paris Club, and other creditors.
- Stronger arrangements to address holdouts:
  - “There must be a stronger arrangement (beyond the incentives of the IMF’s lending into arrears policies) under which a holdout sovereign creditor will not receive debt service payments until it accepts the same terms as other creditors.”
  - It would be preferable for China to join the Paris Club.
- More ambitious reform:
  - An internationally agreed procedure and tribunal where creditors and debtors could present claims.
  - The tribunal could determine a settlement that enables normal economic activity and sustainable growth to resume while giving creditors as fair a settlement as possible under the circumstances.
- Rationale:
  - With mounting debt problems, existing international arrangements need reform to reduce delays, limit holdout leverage, and restore timely access to financing and recovery.

*Anne O. Krueger, “How to Deal with Debt’s Downside,” Point of View, March 2025.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/fandd/article/2025/03/krueger.pdf_
