## A Decline in Global Population Later This Century May Threaten Human Progress, or It May Lead to Better Lives

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**Canonical URL:** [A Decline in Global Population Later This Century May Threaten Human Progress, or It May Lead to Better Lives](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/fandd/article/2025/06/bloom.pdf)

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### Fertility trends and global projections
- Global population now exceeds 8 billion and may top 10 billion by 2050.
- In 1950, the global total fertility rate was 5.
- Replacement benchmark for long-term global population stability: 2.1.
- World population in 2000: 6.2 billion.
- Current (circa article) world total fertility rate: 2.24.
- Projected to drop below 2.1 around 2050.
- The UN agency expects world population to top out at 10.3 billion in 2084.
- Projections of global population in 2050 range from 8.9 billion to more than 10 billion, with fertility rates between 1.61 and 2.59.
- During 2000–25, fertility rates declined in every UN region and in every World Bank country income group.
- Exceptions: Africa and a number of low-income countries on other continents where fertility rates are still 4 or higher.
- Africa’s share of global population likely to increase from 19 percent in 2025 to 26 percent in 2050.
- Over the coming quarter century, 38 nations of more than 1 million people each will probably experience population declines, up from 21 in the past 25 years.

### Geographic concentration and magnitude of population decline
- Largest cumulative population drops, 2025–50 (selected countries as reported):
  - China: 155.8 million
  - Japan: 18 million
  - Russia: 7.9 million
  - Italy: 7.3 million
  - Ukraine: 7 million
  - South Korea: 6.5 million
- Highest average annual rates of population decline (reported examples):
  - 0.9 percent: Moldova; Bosnia and Herzegovina
  - 0.8 percent: Albania; Bulgaria; Lithuania
  - 0.7 percent: Latvia; Ukraine
- Historical comparison:
  - Black Death of 1346–53 resulted in average annual rate of population decline of 4 percent or more in Western Europe.
  - Moldova—the fastest-depopulating country this century—has fallen by roughly 1 percent annually since 2000.

### Demographic aging
- Between 2025 and 2050, the share of population ages 65 and older in countries experiencing population declines will almost double from 17.3 percent to 30.9 percent.
- In countries whose populations are not shrinking, the share ages 65 and older will expand from 3.2 percent to 5.5 percent.

### Potential challenges associated with low fertility and depopulation
- Fewer births and smaller populations imply fewer workers, savers, and spenders, potentially sending an economy into contraction.
- Risk of shortage of researchers, inventors, scientists, and other people-based sources of innovative ideas; cited concern that a drop in new ideas could strangle innovation and result in economic stagnation.
- Higher shares of older people may weigh on growth because:
  - Younger people tend to drive innovation.
  - Older people work and save less than the young.
  - Long-term care needs and health and economic security spending create burdens for prime-age workers.
- Relative population decline may reduce military might and political clout on the world stage (historical reference to France’s 1871 defeat).
- Side effects of policy inaction include declining per capita GDP, stagnating innovation and growth, and challenges supporting aging populations.

### Economic opportunities and countervailing forces
- Fewer children and smaller populations reduce need for spending on housing and childcare; resources could be reallocated to:
  - Research and development
  - Adoption of advanced technologies
  - Elevation of education quality
- Declines in fertility can stimulate economic growth by:
  - Driving up rates of labor force participation, especially among women
  - Increasing savings and capital accumulation
- Past demographic dividend following the end of the post–World War II baby boom contributed as much as 2–3 percentage points to per capita income growth.
- Productive characteristics (health and education) matter more than population size for knowledge creation and innovation.
- Population decline may reduce environmental pressures: land, air, and water pollution; climate change; deforestation; loss of biodiversity.

### Policy responses and adaptation strategies
- Types of policy choices mentioned:
  - Encourage fertility via family-friendly policies
  - Adjust migration policies
  - Expand education access and quality
  - Encourage innovation and adoption of advanced technologies
  - Retirement policy changes to encourage working longer
- Family-friendly policy examples:
  - Tax breaks for larger families
  - Extended and more flexible parental leave policies
  - Public or subsidized private childcare
  - Subsidies for infertility treatment
- Other adaptation measures:
  - Raise the age of retirement to forestall workforce shrinkage and remove disincentives to working longer
  - Combine policies (fertility supports, retirement changes, investments in youth and prime-age health and education) for stronger effect
  - Robust investments in health and education to enable productive work well past traditional retirement age
  - Policy attention to digitalization, robotics, automation, and artificial intelligence given their implications for job types, work performance, social interactions, and potential feedbacks to fertility
- Empirical caution:
  - Effective fertility policies are notoriously difficult to come by.
  - Falling birth rates may reflect societal preferences that policymakers must weigh against side effects.

### Summary assessments from the authors
- The precipitous fall in fertility is the main driver of the shift from rapid population growth to depopulation and a historically unprecedented rise in the number of people of advanced age.
- Policymakers should pay close heed to emerging evidence and global discourse on economic and social consequences and consider plausible strategies for addressing them.

*Source: F&D Special Report, June 2025 — "The Debate over Falling Fertility" by David E. Bloom, Michael Kuhn, and Klaus Prettner.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/fandd/article/2025/06/bloom.pdf_
