## 全球金融稳定依然面临风险

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [全球金融稳定依然面临风险](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/fmu/0111c.pdf)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/-/media/files/publications/fmu/0111c.pdf.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/publications/fmu/0111c.pdf.json)

---

### 总体评估
- The Global Financial Stability Report (January 2011) assesses that nearly four years after the crisis peak, global financial stability has not been firmly reestablished and major policy challenges remain.
- Asset-liability restructuring is incomplete and progressing slowly; leverage remains high.
- A "split" global recovery continues: advanced economies grow much more slowly than other parts of the world, posing policy challenges.
- Loose policies in advanced economies combined with relatively strong fundamentals in some emerging markets are driving capital into emerging market economies, raising concerns about asset price bubbles and excessive credit.

### 主权与银行部门风险之间的相互作用
- The report finds an adverse interaction between sovereign and bank credit risk, concentrated in the euro area but with spillovers to more countries.
- Correlations between Greek and Irish average sovereign yields and those of Portugal, Spain (and Italy to a lesser degree) have increased.
- Countries with the largest sovereign stress have experienced the largest rises in financial institutions' CDS spreads; the sovereign–bank CDS relationship is stronger now than in 2008.
- Smaller, domestically focused banks have seen private wholesale funding channels shrink; banks that can still access funding face higher costs and shorter maturities.
- Several countries face substantial 2011 financing needs because government and bank debt ratios to GDP rose significantly in recent years.

### 去杠杆过程与银行体系脆弱性
- Private sector total debt reversals, where present, are generally only partial.
- As recovery proceeds, private debt-to-GDP ratios should decline, but high current debt levels and lagging loan losses mean banking systems may still face risks.
- Many banking systems have mitigated vulnerabilities by raising Tier 1 capital ratios, but improving funding structures is harder.
- U.S. banks continue to face downside risks from commercial and residential real estate nonperforming loans; government debt-to-GDP ratios remain high.
- Low policy rates and quantitative easing, while appropriate for supporting recovery, can have adverse financial-stability effects by encouraging higher-risk investments and creating difficulties for fixed-income investors such as pension funds and insurers.

### 资本重新涌入新兴市场
- Net capital inflows to emerging markets are currently about equal to GDP’s 4% (图7).
- Pre-crisis capital inflows were over 6% of GDP.
- Capital inflows are associated with substantial increases in equity and bond issuance, which may partly mitigate asset-price impacts.
- Flows are driven by structural reallocation by institutional investors and by carry-trade/arbitrage motivated by interest-rate differentials and expected exchange-rate appreciation.
- Forward rates imply widening policy-rate differentials between emerging markets and advanced economies, reinforcing arbitrage incentives.
- Risks of reversal exist if advanced-economy rates rise unexpectedly, emerging-market growth prospects change, or risk aversion increases.
- Retail inflows to emerging market equity funds are particularly strong; limited local asset supply can contribute to asset bubbles in some markets.
- In several Asian and Latin American economies, nonfinancial private sector debt is approaching maxima seen in 1996–2010 (examples cited: Brazil, Chile, China, India, Korea).
- Increased issuance by lower-rated borrowers has raised the share of lower-quality assets in markets.

### 政策重点与建议
- The report emphasizes the need for policies to ensure necessary restructuring and asset-liability repair for both banks and governments, and to advance regulatory reform.
- Structural measures are necessary to address sovereign risk and financial vulnerabilities; monetary and fiscal support cannot substitute for these measures.
- To break the sovereign–bank adverse loop, highly indebted countries must make decisive, credible medium-term fiscal consolidation progress and better manage public debt according to the Stockholm principles, extending debt maturities and reducing reliance on rollovers.
- The IMF warns that delayed fiscal consolidation in the United States could eventually push up interest rates with spillovers to global borrowing costs; Japan also needs continued efforts to reduce high debt levels in light of population aging.
- Banking-system repair: targeted remedial measures to strengthen banks, remove tail risks, and build a better regulatory framework are required.
- Specific recommendations for the European Union include:
  - Conducting further rigorous and credible bank stress tests with time-bound follow-up plans; recapitalize and restructure viable but undercapitalized institutions and close nonviable ones.
  - Increasing the effective scale and flexibility of the European Financial Stability Mechanism to ensure sufficient funding beyond national support where banks form a large share of the economy.
  - Deploying and strengthening euro-area-wide insolvency resolution mechanisms, including a pan-European bank resolution framework and an EU-wide fiscal backstop to help alleviate sovereign–bank linkages.
  - The ECB should continue to provide liquidity to banks in need and ensure effective operation of its securities programs, while recognizing these are temporary measures.
- For the United States:
  - Address adverse links from the weak housing market, including large "hidden inventories" of homes in foreclosure or expected default.
  - Revive securitization markets while ensuring structured credit products meet systemic stability goals.
  - Undertake comprehensive reform of the U.S. housing finance system and reorient the role of government-sponsored mortgage entities, including options such as privatization or conversion to explicitly guaranteed utilities.
- For many advanced economies, bank balance-sheet and business restructurings are needed to preserve long-term viability and reduce contingent pressures on sovereign balance sheets; effective resolution regimes are essential so losses fall on creditors rather than taxpayers.
- Regulatory reform priorities:
  - Continue progress on microprudential bank supervision while developing macroprudential frameworks to safeguard systemwide stability; macroprudential policymaking remains at an early stage in most countries.
  - New systemic oversight bodies should rapidly collect and analyze data and issue policy recommendations, especially given low-rate environments that can foster new vulnerabilities.
  - Work on guiding principles to identify systemically important institutions and to measure their systemic contributions is underway, but mitigation of risks posed by systemically important nonbank institutions and markets remains unresolved.
  - Improving supervisory quality and devising fully operational cross-border resolution plans are outstanding tasks.
- Emerging markets facing large inflows should deploy macroprudential policies as complements—not substitutes—to traditional macroeconomic policies; countries with strong inflows and procyclical policies should shift toward neutrality.
- Countries with undervalued exchange rates should allow exchange rates to help absorb inflows; if appreciation is infeasible, use monetary and/or fiscal measures, and complement macroeconomic policies with macroprudential tools (e.g., higher loan-to-value ratios, limits on maturities) and, in some cases, capital controls.

### 结论要点
- Despite progress, global financial stability remains at risk.
- Renewed concerns about sovereign debt sustainability and banking health—first in Greece and then Ireland—underscore the need for comprehensive action to break adverse sovereign–financial loops beyond the euro-area small states.
- Advancing regulatory and market reforms is critical; without further progress, global financial stability and sustainable growth will remain elusive.

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/fmu/0111c.pdf_