## Pushed to the Brink: Fragility and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

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### Overview
- Title: “Pushed to the Brink: Fragility and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.” IMF Note 2025/002, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
- Note prepared by staff from the IMF African and Middle East and Central Asia Departments, under the guidance of Catherine Pattillo.
- Purpose: succinct IMF analysis on fragility and conflict dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa and policy implications for growth, stability, and human development.

### Key statistics and findings
- Fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS) are home to 1.3 billion people.
- As of 2024, 18 of the 39 FCS recognized by the IMF are in sub-Saharan Africa—accounting for over 670 million people.
- Nearly one in six residents of FCS in the region faces acute food insecurity.
- Fatalities in FCS are 64 percent higher than in other countries in the region.
- Projection: by 2040, the median FCS could face 74 days per year above 35°C.
- Over 60 percent of FCS in the region depend on natural resources—the median fragile country earns nearly 30 percent of revenues from resources extraction.
- Between 2000 and 2023, the region accounted for over 60 percent of the 69 attempted coups worldwide—and 40 percent of those took place in FCS.
- Over half of the region’s nearly 6 million refugees come from South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
- Median tax revenue-to-GDP ratio in FCS is 10 percent—5 percentage points lower than in non-FCS in the region.
- In 2023, FCS in the region received almost 60 percent of total official development assistance grants for sub-Saharan Africa, accounting for 20 percent of the global amount.
- Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo received $1.2 billion each in 2024, representing 1 percent and 1.5 percent of their respective GDP.
- Disbursements to South Sudan, at $750 million, accounted for up to 15 percent of GDP in 2024.
- USAID: sub-Saharan Africa was the recipient of about 40 percent of USAID’s global disbursements in 2024.
- By 2030, two-thirds of the world’s extreme poor will live in fragile states, with sub-Saharan Africa at the epicenter.
- Average annual growth in countries in conflict is about 3 percentage points lower than in non-conflict counterparts.
- Empirical association: in sub-Saharan Africa, 100 fatalities in neighboring states within 500 kilometers are associated with about a 2-percentage point reduction in growth.
- Median FCS potential GDP per capita growth projection: 1.8 percent a year; rest of the region: 2.5 percent a year.
- Growth spells: non-FCS have growth spells that last one year longer and occur more than twice as often as in FCS.
- Since 2000, sub-Saharan African countries have recorded 12 growth accelerations; only two episodes (Angola 2002–09 and Chad 2000–07) happened in countries classified as FCS at the time.
- Refugee cost example (Ethiopia, World Bank 2024b): annual cost per refugee could drop from $378 (relying solely on aid) to $210 under limited work opportunities, and to $78 with full participation in economic activities.
- Opinion-survey differentials (Afrobarometer Round 9 Survey 2023): higher shares of mistrust in the justice system, socioeconomic exclusion, unequal treatment of citizens, failure to prevent and resolve conflict, and salience of ethnic group over nationality in FCS versus non-FCS.

### Drivers of fragility and transmission mechanisms
- Weak institutions and social cohesion, governance failures, and economic instability trap millions in poverty.
- Natural disasters and climate shocks: lower resilience and limited adaptive capacity exacerbate impacts.
- Resource dependency: natural resource reliance often functions as a “resource curse,” deepening institutional vulnerabilities and instability.
- Political fragility: conflicts, coups d’etat, and regional spillovers amplify displacement and refugee flows.
- Fiscal constraints: limited access to financing, weak domestic revenue mobilization, structural decline in external aid.
- Macroeconomic procyclicality: during negative terms-of-trade shocks, FCS cut expenditures more aggressively—resulting in larger GDP per capita drops over a five-year period compared with non-FCS.

### Impacts on human development and long-term growth
- Life expectancy in many FCS lingers at 60 years.
- Poverty rates in FCS are twice as high as in non-FCS in the region.
- Elementary school completion remains among the lowest globally in FCS.
- Persistent fragility reduces GDP per capita over time and weakens human capital via cuts to health care, education, and infrastructure.
- Conflicts and fragility increase regional security risks and disrupt trade, migration, displacement, and investment flows.

### Successful transitions and lessons
- Countries that implemented sound macroeconomic policies, diversified the economy, and strengthened institutions have transitioned out of extreme fragility.
- Policies that supported inclusion and local economic benefits in host countries:
  - Uganda: free movement, work permits, full access to public services.
  - Kenya: transforming camps into municipalities.
  - Chad and Ethiopia: integrating refugees into financial systems and national development plans.
- Effective approaches: gradual sequencing of structural reforms, prioritizing binding constraints, targeted investments in human capital, and leveraging pivotal moments post-conflict to rebuild trust and institutions (examples: Rwanda, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Liberia).

### Policy priorities and the IMF’s role
- IMF Strategy for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (launched 2022) provides a tailored engagement approach for countries facing fragility and conflict.
- Recent IMF engagement metrics:
  - Capacity development spending more than doubled between 2022 and 2024 and is set to almost triple by 2026 (relative to GDP).
  - Financial disbursements to the region’s FCS quintupled between 2017 and 2024 (relative to GDP).
- Recurring policy priorities:
  - Strengthening fiscal and institutional foundations: reinforce fiscal institutions, improve public financial management, bolster domestic revenue collection, and invest in health care, education, and infrastructure.
  - Enhancing governance and transparency reforms: improve rule of law, accountability, resource management, anti-corruption measures, procurement guidelines, and legal frameworks.
  - Promoting government structures that create opportunities for engagement: reduce excessive political and fiscal centralization, broaden citizen participation, and ensure fairer resource allocation.
  - Forming long-term partnerships: coordinate action with humanitarian, peace, and development actors; donors to support capacity building, financing social programs, and shock mitigation.

### Classification and identifiers
- ISBN: 9798229008792 (paper)
- ISBN: 9798229009058 (ePub)
- ISBN: 9798229009119 (WebPDF)
- Subjects (LCSH): Political Stability—Africa, Sub-Saharan. | Africa, Sub-Saharan—Economic conditions.
- Classification: JQ1875.C4 2025

*Chen, Wenjie, Michele Fornino, Vidhi Maheshwari, Hamza Mighri, Annalaura Sacco, and Can Sever. 2025. “Pushed to the Brink: Fragility and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.” IMF Note 2025/002, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.*

### references.

### insea2025002 - references

### Overview
- Title: “Pushed to the Brink: Fragility and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.”
- Publication: IMF Note 2025/002, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
- Note prepared by staff from the IMF African and Middle East and Central Asia Departments, under the guidance of Catherine Pattillo.
- DISCLAIMER: IMF Notes aim to quickly disseminate succinct IMF analysis on critical economic issues to member countries and the broader policy community. The views expressed in IMF Notes are those of the author(s), although they do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, or its Executive Board, or its Management.

### Key statistics and findings
- Fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS) are home to 1.3 billion people.
- As of 2024, 18 of the 39 FCS recognized by the IMF are in sub-Saharan Africa—accounting for over 670 million people.
- Nearly one in six residents of FCS in the region faces acute food insecurity.
- Fatalities in FCS are 64 percent higher than in other countries in the region.
- Projection: by 2040, the median FCS could face 74 days per year above 35°C.
- Over 60 percent of FCS in the region depend on natural resources—the median fragile country earns nearly 30 percent of revenues from resources extraction.
- Between 2000 and 2023, the region accounted for over 60 percent of the 69 attempted coups worldwide—and 40 percent of those took place in FCS.
- Over half of the region’s nearly 6 million refugees come from South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
- Median tax revenue-to-GDP ratio in FCS is 10 percent—5 percentage points lower than in non-FCS in the region.
- In 2023, FCS in the region received almost 60 percent of total official development assistance grants for sub-Saharan Africa, accounting for 20 percent of the global amount.
- Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo received $1.2 billion each in 2024, representing 1 percent and 1.5 percent of their respective GDP.
- Disbursements to South Sudan, at $750 million, accounted for up to 15 percent of GDP in 2024.
- USAID: sub-Saharan Africa was the recipient of about 40 percent of USAID’s global disbursements in 2024.
- By 2030, two-thirds of the world’s extreme poor will live in fragile states, with sub-Saharan Africa at the epicenter.
- Average annual growth in countries in conflict is about 3 percentage points lower than in non-conflict counterparts.
- Empirical association: in sub-Saharan Africa, 100 fatalities in neighboring states within 500 kilometers are associated with about a 2-percentage point reduction in growth.
- Median FCS potential GDP per capita growth projection: 1.8 percent a year; rest of the region: 2.5 percent a year.
- Growth spells: non-FCS have growth spells that last one year longer and occur more than twice as often as in FCS.
- Since 2000, sub-Saharan African countries have recorded 12 growth accelerations; only two episodes (Angola 2002–09 and Chad 2000–07) happened in countries classified as FCS at the time.
- Refugee cost example (Ethiopia, World Bank 2024b): annual cost per refugee could drop from $378 (relying solely on aid) to $210 under limited work opportunities, and to $78 with full participation in economic activities.
- Opinion-survey differentials (Afrobarometer Round 9 Survey 2023): higher shares of mistrust in the justice system, socioeconomic exclusion, unequal treatment of citizens, failure to prevent and resolve conflict, and salience of ethnic group over nationality in FCS versus non-FCS (percentage-point differences shown in Figure 3).

### Drivers of fragility and transmission mechanisms
- Weak institutions and social cohesion, governance failures, and economic instability trap millions in poverty.
- Natural disasters and climate shocks: lower resilience and limited adaptive capacity exacerbate impacts.
- Resource dependency: natural resource reliance often functions as a “resource curse,” deepening institutional vulnerabilities and instability.
- Political fragility: conflicts, coups d’etat, and regional spillovers amplify displacement and refugee flows.
- Fiscal constraints: limited access to financing, weak domestic revenue mobilization, structural decline in external aid.
- Macroeconomic procyclicality: during negative terms-of-trade shocks, FCS cut expenditures more aggressively—resulting in larger GDP per capita drops over a five-year period compared with non-FCS (see Figure 2).

### Impacts on human development and long-term growth
- Life expectancy in many FCS lingers at 60 years.
- Poverty rates in FCS are twice as high as in non-FCS in the region.
- Elementary school completion remains among the lowest globally in FCS.
- Persistent fragility reduces GDP per capita over time and weakens human capital via cuts to health care, education, and infrastructure.
- Conflicts and fragility increase regional security risks and disrupt trade, migration, displacement, and investment flows.

### Successful transitions and lessons
- Countries that implemented sound macroeconomic policies, diversified the economy, and strengthened institutions have transitioned out of extreme fragility.
- Examples of policies that supported inclusion and local economic benefits in host countries: Uganda (free movement, work permits, full access to public services), Kenya (transforming camps into municipalities), Chad and Ethiopia (integrating refugees into financial systems and national development plans).
- Effective approaches included gradual sequencing of structural reforms, prioritizing binding constraints, targeted investments in human capital, and leveraging pivotal moments post-conflict to rebuild trust and institutions (examples: Rwanda, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Liberia).

### Policy priorities and the IMF’s role
- IMF Strategy for Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (launched 2022) provides a tailored engagement approach for countries facing fragility and conflict.
- Recent IMF engagement metrics:
  - Capacity development spending more than doubled between 2022 and 2024 and is set to almost triple by 2026 (relative to GDP).
  - Financial disbursements to the region’s FCS quintupled between 2017 and 2024 (relative to GDP).
- Recurring policy priorities:
  - Strengthening fiscal and institutional foundations: reinforce fiscal institutions, improve public financial management, bolster domestic revenue collection, and invest in health care, education, and infrastructure.
  - Enhancing governance and transparency reforms: improve rule of law, accountability, resource management, anti-corruption measures, procurement guidelines, and legal frameworks.
  - Promoting government structures that create opportunities for engagement: reduce excessive political and fiscal centralization, broaden citizen participation, and ensure fairer resource allocation.
  - Forming long-term partnerships: coordinate action with humanitarian, peace, and development actors; donors to support capacity building, financing social programs, and shock mitigation.

### Classification and identifiers
- ISBN: 9798229008792 (paper)
- ISBN: 9798229009058 (ePub)
- ISBN: 9798229009119 (WebPDF)
- Subjects (LCSH): Political Stability—Africa, Sub-Saharan. | Africa, Sub-Saharan—Economic conditions.
- Classification: JQ1875.C4 2025

*Chen, Wenjie, Michele Fornino, Vidhi Maheshwari, Hamza Mighri, Annalaura Sacco, and Can Sever. 2025. “Pushed to the Brink: Fragility and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.” IMF Note 2025/002, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.*

### References

### References

### Listed references
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Currency.
- Bisca, Paul, Alexei Miksjuk, Thomas Augsten, Jocelyn Boussard, John-Paul Fanning, Romina Kazandjian, Tokhir Mirzoev, Gaelle Pierre, Bjoern Rother, Yipei Zhang, Lavinia Zhao. Forthcoming. “Macroeconomic Challenges and Policy Design Under Fragility.” IMF Departmental Paper, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
- Boussard, Jocelyn, Chiara Castrovillari, Tomohide Mineyama, Marta Spinella, Bilal Tabti, and Maxwell Tuuli. 2024. “Global Shocks Unfolding: Lessons from Fragile and Conflict-affected States.” IMF Working Paper WP/24/214, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
- Cebotari, Aliona, Jesus E. Chueca-Montuenga, Yoro Diallo, Yunsheng Ma, Rima A. Turk, Weining Xin, and Harold Zavarce. Forthcoming. “State Fragility: Toward a Conceptual Framework.” IMF Working Paper, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
- Collier, Paul. 2007. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Ghossein, Tania, and Ahmed Nauraiz Rana. 2023. “Business Environment Reforms in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations: What Works and Why?” Private Sector Development (blog), World Bank, March 14.
- Hausmann, Ricardo, Lant Pritchett, and Dani Rodrik. 2005. “Growth Accelerations.” Journal of Economic Growth 10 (4): 303–29.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2022. Regional Economic Outlook : Sub-Saharan Africa—Notes: “Digital Currency Innovations in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Washington, DC, October.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2024. Regional Economic Outlook : Sub-Saharan Africa—Notes : “The Clock is Ticking: Meeting Sub-Saharan Africa’s Urgent Job Creation Challenge.” Washington, DC, October.
- Jordà, Òscar. 2005. “Estimation and Inference of Impulse Responses by Local Projections.” American Economic Review 95(1): 161–82. doi: 10.1257/0002828053828518
- Koopman, Eline, and Konstantin M. Wacker. 2023. “Drivers of Growth Accelerations: What Role for Capital Accumulation?” World Development 169 (September): 106297. doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2023.106297
- Novta, Natalija, and Evgenia Pugacheva. 2021. “The Macroeconomic Costs of Conflict.” Journal of Macroeconomics 68 (June): 103286. doi: 10.1016/j.jmacro.2021.103286
- Pompe, Sebastiaan, and Joel Turkewitz. 2022. “Addressing Corruption in Fragile Country Settings.” Chapter 7 in “Good Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, Opportunities and Lessons.” International Monetary Fund.
- World Bank. 2011. World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank. 2024a. “Classification of Fragility and Conflict Situations (FCS) for World Bank Group Engagement.” Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank. 2024b. “Expanding Development Approaches to Refugees and Their Hosts in Ethiopia.” Washington, DC: World Bank.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and World Bank. 2021. “Social Cohesion and Forced Displacement.”

*Pushed to the Brink: Fragility and Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa APRIL 2025 • INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/imf-notes/2025/english/insea2025002.pdf_