## The IMF’s Annual Macroprudential Policy Survey—Objectives, Design, and Country Responses

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [The IMF’s Annual Macroprudential Policy Survey—Objectives, Design, and Country Responses](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/pp/2018/pp043018-the-imfs-annual-macroprudential-policy-surveyobjectives-design-and-country-responses.pdf)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/-/media/files/publications/pp/2018/pp043018-the-imfs-annual-macroprudential-policy-surveyobjectives-design-and-country-responses.pdf.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/publications/pp/2018/pp043018-the-imfs-annual-macroprudential-policy-surveyobjectives-design-and-country-responses.pdf.json)

---

### A. Introduction: objectives and genesis
- Objective: compile a global database cataloguing macroprudential measures taken by countries and over time; survey to be conducted every year.
- First vintage of the database records country responses received by the end of February 2018.
- Database uses information exclusively provided by IMF member countries (self-reported); inclusion or absence of a tool does not represent an IMF judgment on whether a tool is “macroprudential.”
- Database also provides global information on institutional arrangements supporting macroprudential policy across countries.
- Uses: inform policymakers; support researchers in central banks/supervisory agencies/IOs/academia; provide IMF staff with additional information for bilateral surveillance and multilateral analysis.
- Genesis: motivated by lessons from the global financial crisis (GFC) and growing country experience; IMF framework (IMF 2013) and Staff Guidance Note (IMF 2014) underpin the approach; joint IMF-FSB-BIS report to G20 in 2016 summarized practices.
- G20 endorsement: welcomed by G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors on March 18, 2017; included in the G20 Leaders’ Hamburg Action Plan of July 8, 2017.
- Publication: responses to the survey are being made available online at www.imf.org.

### B. Design and process of the survey
- Questionnaire development: prepared by IMF staff in consultation with the FSB and BIS; asks countries to report measures that aim to contain systemic risk, consistent with the definition of macroprudential policy as “the use of primarily prudential tools to limit systemic risk.”
- Format and reporting details:
  - For each listed tool, countries indicate whether it is in place (“yes”) or not in place (“no”).
  - If in place, respondents provide date/year introduced (and if applicable when removed), scope of application, and design/calibration details (e.g., LTV caps by loan type).
- Tool grouping: six broad categories aligned with sources of systemic risk:
  - (1) broad-based tools (all aggregate banking exposures)
  - (2) household sector tools
  - (3) corporate sector tools
  - (4) liquidity and foreign exchange tools (banking sector)
  - (5) nonbank tools (systemic liquidity and fire-sale risk)
  - (6) structural tools (systemically important institutions and interconnectedness)
- Flexibility: questionnaire includes “other” option for measures not in the pre-set list.
- Institutional questions: whether a macroprudential authority is identified; nature of arrangement (central bank; committee within central bank; committee/council outside central bank; supervisory agency outside central bank; or “other”); whether an additional interagency coordinating body exists; types of powers assigned.
- Data collection and verification:
  - Survey sent to all IMF members during April–May 2017 alongside AREAER survey processes.
  - For most countries, IMF staff prepopulated known measures from other IMF sources; IMF staff communicated with country authorities to improve quality and consistency.
- Coverage and reporting period:
  - 141 (out of 192) jurisdictions responded to the survey.
  - Reporting period for the first volume: generally January 1, 2016–December 31, 2016; many members also reported developments in 2017.
  - Respondents were requested to provide information starting from 2011 and include past changes since then where applicable; detailed past changes were provided only by a fraction of countries.
  - Going forward, members will be requested to update a separate “changes” table based on regulatory changes in the reporting year.
- Notes on responses: level of detail varied across countries; a small number included measures that IMF would consider microprudential (e.g., minimum capital requirements); some countries were reluctant to provide information on pre-set measures they considered microprudential.

### C. Institutional arrangements: authorities and powers
- Response coverage and multiplicity:
  - 111 countries provided information on macroprudential institutional arrangements; 30 reported that there was no macroprudential authority.
  - 45 out of 111 respondents indicated a macroprudential mandate was assigned to more than one entity.
- Central bank role:
  - 80 out of 111 jurisdictions indicated the central bank played an important role in macroprudential policy.
  - 39 countries reported that the central bank is the sole macroprudential authority.
  - 10 reported both the central bank and a committee within the central bank were jointly responsible.
  - 7 reported a committee within the central bank was the sole authority (including the U.K.).
- Other institutional arrangements:
  - 9 countries (including France, India, and the U.S.) reported a committee or council outside the central bank as the sole dedicated macroprudential authority.
  - 4 countries reported a supervisory agency (other than the central bank) as the sole macroprudential authority (Australia, Finland, Korea, and Sweden); these countries also report an additional coordinating body.
- Powers assigned (taxonomy per IMF 2013 and IMF-FSB-BIS 2016):
  - Hard powers: direct control over macroprudential instruments.
  - Semi-hard powers: formal recommendations with a “comply or explain” mechanism.
  - Soft powers: opinions or recommendations not subject to “comply or explain.”
- Reported distribution of powers:
  - Existence of hard powers was reported by 80 jurisdictions; hard powers were assigned to a total of 91 bodies (committees or agencies).
  - In 66 cases hard powers rested with the central bank or a committee within the central bank.
  - In only five cases a committee outside the central bank was assigned hard powers.
  - 31 jurisdictions reported semi-hard powers; 11 of these indicated the macroprudential authority was vested in a committee outside the central bank.
  - Soft powers were reported by 39 respondents and vested in 42 authorities; virtually all of these jurisdictions also reported hard powers.
- Regional and income-group patterns:
  - Arrangements do not differ markedly across income groups.
  - Central banks appear to play a lead role in both advanced economies (AEs) and emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs).
  - AEs more frequently report that an outside supervisory agency, or a supervisory agency supported by a council, was the macroprudential authority.
  - Asia and Pacific (APD) has the largest share of economies reporting a designated macroprudential authority; Africa (AFR) has the lowest.
  - Western Hemisphere (WHD) showed the lowest percentage of jurisdictions reporting that the central bank was one of the macroprudential authorities.

### D. Macroprudential measures: coverage and patterns (aggregate)
- Aggregate counts and averages:
  - 141 countries reported a total of 1,313 macroprudential measures.
  - Average number of measures per country: 9.3.
  - Average by income group: 9.9 for AEs and 9.1 for EMDEs.
- Tool-category frequency (global):
  - Most frequently reported globally: tools to manage liquidity and foreign exchange (FX) mismatches in the banking sector.
  - Next: tools to manage risks from exposures to the household sector.
  - Next: broad-based tools applying to all exposures.
- Income-group differences:
  - EMDEs make greater use of tools to manage liquidity and FX risks than AEs.
  - AEs more frequently employ tools aimed at household sector exposures, structural dimension risks, and nonbank financial sector risks.
- Regional differences (averages per country):
  - Asia and the Middle East: around 11 measures per country.
  - Africa: average of six measures per country.
  - Americas: just over eight measures per country.

### Broad-based tools (key frequencies)
- Capital conservation buffer (CCoB): in place in 76 countries.
- Basel III countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB):
  - Activated with a positive rate in three jurisdictions as of end–2016: Sweden, Hong Kong SAR, and Norway.
  - Activated with a positive rate in three additional jurisdictions during 2017: Slovak Republic, Czech Republic and Iceland.
  - The UK announced a positive buffer rate for 2018.
  - 73 economies reported they had in place a CCyB framework, including 12 economies which introduced the framework during 2017.
- Leverage ratio cap: introduced by 35 countries; expected to rise as the leverage ratio moves from a monitoring requirement to a limit under Basel III in 2018.
- Forward-looking loan loss provisioning requirements: applied outside the Basel framework and are quite common in both the Western Hemisphere and in Asia.
- Broad-based caps on credit growth: imposed in some countries; very rare in Europe (Albania being the only country reporting this tool).
- Broad-based tool frequency breakdown (aggregate counts from figures):
  - Capital conservation buffer: 76 (39% of broad-based measures)
  - Limit on leverage ratio: 35 (18%)
  - Forward-looking loan loss provisioning requirement: 23 (12%)
  - Cap on credit growth: 14 (7%)
  - Countercyclical capital buffer: 9 (5%)
  - Other tools: 37 (19%)

### Household sector tools (Section 2 details)
- Most frequently used household-sector tools globally: restrictions on loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-service-to-income (DSTI) ratios.
- Regional usage of LTV restrictions:
  - About half of the countries in Asia, Europe and the Middle East maintain a restriction on the LTV ratio.
  - Around a quarter of countries in the Western Hemisphere reported LTV restrictions (Brazil and Canada amongst them).
- Capital requirements: tighter capital requirements on exposures to the household sector are commonly used across all regions, with the exception of Africa.
  - Example: Argentina applies a higher risk weight for loans at LTV ratio of above 75 percent.
- Combinations and complementarities:
  - Other household tools—limits on amortization periods and restrictions on unsecured loans—are common and often used in combination with LTV and DSTI ratio caps.
  - Of 39 countries that reported having a DSTI limit, 19 countries also impose limits on amortization periods.
- Household sector frequency breakdown (aggregate counts from figures):
  - Restrictions on LTV ratio: 62 (20%)
  - Restrictions on DSTI ratio: 42 (14%)
  - Household sector capital requirements: 39 (13%)
  - Restrictions on unsecured loans: 28 (9%)
  - Limit on amortization periods: 26 (8%)
  - Cap on foreign-currency-denominated loans: 20 (6%)
  - Restrictions on loan-to-income ratio: 13 (4%)
  - Cap on credit growth to the household sector: 12 (4%)
  - Fiscal measures to contain systemic risks: 8 (3%)
  - Others: 60 (19%)

### Corporate sector tools
- Corporate-sector measures are much less commonly reported than household-sector tools.
- Most frequently used corporate tools:
  - Additional capital requirements on loans to the corporate sector: 28 jurisdictions.
  - Caps on lending in foreign currency (FX): 17 jurisdictions.
- Other corporate measures:
  - Cap on LTV ratios for commercial real estate credit: 12 jurisdictions.
  - Limits on lending to particular industries or sectors: 14 jurisdictions.
- Corporate sector frequency breakdown (aggregate counts from figures):
  - Corporate sector capital requirements: 28 (24%)
  - Cap on foreign-currency-denominated loans: 17 (14%)
  - Cap on lending to particular industries or sectors: 14 (12%)
  - Cap on loan-to-value ratio for commercial real estate credit: 12 (10%)
  - Cap on credit growth to the corporate sector: 4 (3%)
  - Others: 44 (37%)

### Liquidity and FX tools
- Liquidity and FX mismatch tools are the most frequently used macroprudential policy tools and exhibit a wide variety of designs.
- Prevalence and specific tools:
  - Net FX position limits: 75 countries.
  - Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR): 74 countries.
  - Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR): 12 jurisdictions.
- Regional notes:
  - LCR particularly frequently reported in Europe; other liquid asset ratio requirements used in other regions.
  - Many countries, especially in Central and South America, differentiate liquidity tools by currency or maintain other constraints on FX funding.
- Liquidity and FX tool frequency breakdown (aggregate counts from figures):
  - Net foreign exchange positions: 75 (17%)
  - Liquidity Coverage Ratio: 74 (17%)
  - Liquid asset ratio: 55 (13%)
  - Reserve requirements: 30 (7%)
  - Foreign exchange swaps or derivative positions: 24 (6%)
  - LCR differentiated by currency: 23 (5%)
  - Constraints on FX funding: 12 (3%)
  - Loan-to-deposit ratio: 20 (5%)
  - Reserve requirements and levies differentiated by currency: 17 (4%)
  - Liquid asset ratio differentiated by currency: 16 (4%)
  - Net Stable Funding Ratio: 12 (3%)
  - Others: 71 (17%)

### Nonbank sector tools
- Far fewer countries reported macroprudential rules for systemic liquidity and other risks in the nonbank financial sector.
- Coverage:
  - About a third of respondents reported having some macroprudential rules in the nonbank sector.
  - Advanced Economies used nonbank tools relatively more frequently.
  - Asian countries reported nonbank rules relatively frequently across regions.
  - Nonbank tools were infrequently used in Africa.
- Targeted nonbank segments (aggregate counts and shares):
  - Asset management industry: 28 measures (23% of nonbank measures).
  - Insurance companies: 27 measures (23%).
  - Central counterparty clearing: 19 measures (16%).
  - Pension funds: 18 measures (15%).
  - Securities lending market: 18 measures (15%).
  - Securitization: 6 measures (5%).
  - Other: 4 measures (3%).

### Structural tools
- Focus and prevalence:
  - Most often take the form of additional capital surcharges for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).
  - Limits (including large exposure limits) on exposures between financial institutions are also frequently reported.
- Regional detail:
  - SIFI surcharges are very common in Europe, with around 75 percent of European countries reporting use of these surcharges.
  - SIFI surcharges are also being implemented quite actively in Asia.
  - (Large) exposure limits between financial institutions are used equally frequently in all regions.
- Structural tool frequency breakdown (aggregate counts from figures):
  - Capital surcharges for systemically important institutions: 61 measures (43%)
  - Limits on size of exposures between financial institutions: 40 measures (28%)
  - Additional risk weights on exposures between financial institutions: 8 measures (6%)
  - Others: 32 measures (23%)

### Recent developments and changes during 2016
- Time window: changes effective or announced during January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016.
- General activity:
  - Most countries reported at least one change in macroprudential settings during the period.
  - Activity was strongest in Europe: more than three changes per country on average.
  - Asia and Pacific: just over two changes per country on average.
- Direction of changes:
  - The overwhelming majority of changes amounted to a tightening of macroprudential measures, although easing is also observed.
- Tool-specific changes:
  - Liquidity tools were most frequently modified: a total of 87 tightening changes became effective in 2016 (reflecting in part a phase-in of the LCR).
  - Many tightening changes reflect phasing-in or adjustments of Basel measures, including the CCoB.
  - Tightening instances in 2016 by category:
    - Broad-based tools: 54 instances of tightening.
    - Household sector tools: 43 instances of tightening.
- Average number of changes (per country) reported in figures: charts show region-by-region tightening-easing breakdowns for broad-based tools and other categories.

### Institutional framework snapshot (2016–17) and aggregate figures
- Table 1 totals and subtotals (number of authorities reported):
  - Total reporting jurisdictions by number of authorities: 80 reporting a single authority, 25 reporting two, 31 reporting three, 23 reporting four, 18 reporting five.
  - Total row: 80 25 31 23 18.
- Aggregate counts from survey figures:
  - Total number of reported measures across all categories: 1,313.
  - Average number of measures per country (All Countries): 9.3.
  - Advanced Economies total: 336; Average: 9.9.
  - Emerging and Developing Economies total: 977; Average: 9.1.
- Representative counts from tool-category figures provided above.

### Conclusion and next steps
- The macroprudential policy database will be updated on an annual basis; the next cycle will start in April 2018 with the survey sent to all country authorities again.
- The second round will allow country authorities to review responses and record changes in macroprudential policy settings that occurred over January 2017 to December 2017.
- Expected improvements over time:
  - Participation, consistency and quality of responses should further improve as experience is accumulated.
  - Maintaining the database indefinitely will generate reliable time series information of macroprudential policy actions across the IMF membership, increasing its usefulness for research and policy purposes.
- Acknowledgement: IMF staff express appreciation to authorities of member countries for input and to the G20 for support of the initiative.

*Source: IMF staff background note (April 2018) summarizing the first vintage of the IMF’s Annual Macroprudential Policy Survey; responses recorded by end–February 2018.*

### Section 1

### The IMF’s Annual Macroprudential Policy Survey—Objectives, Design, and Country Responses

### A. Introduction: objectives and genesis
- Objective: compile a global database cataloguing macroprudential measures taken by countries and over time; survey to be conducted every year.  
- First vintage of the database records country responses received by the end of February 2018.  
- Database uses information exclusively provided by IMF member countries (self-reported); inclusion or absence of a tool does not represent an IMF judgment on whether a tool is “macroprudential.”  
- Database also provides global information on institutional arrangements supporting macroprudential policy across countries.  
- Uses: inform policymakers, support researchers in central banks/supervisory agencies/IOs/academia, and provide IMF staff with additional information for bilateral surveillance and multilateral analysis.  
- Genesis: motivated by lessons from the global financial crisis (GFC) and growing country experience; IMF framework (IMF 2013) and Staff Guidance Note (IMF 2014) underpin the approach; joint IMF-FSB-BIS report to G20 in 2016 summarized practices.  
- G20 endorsement: G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors welcomed the effort on March 18, 2017; included in the G20 Leaders’ Hamburg Action Plan of July 8, 2017.  
- Publication: responses to the survey are being made available online at www.imf.org.

### B. Design and process of the survey
- Questionnaire development: prepared by IMF staff in consultation with the FSB and BIS; asks countries to report measures that aim to contain systemic risk, consistent with the definition of macroprudential policy as “the use of primarily prudential tools to limit systemic risk.”  
- Format: for each listed tool, countries indicate whether it is in place (“yes”) or not in place (“no”); if in place, respondents provide date/year introduced (and if applicable when removed), scope of application, and design/calibration details (e.g., LTV caps by loan type).  
- Tool grouping: six broad categories aligned with sources of systemic risk:
  - (1) broad-based tools (all aggregate banking exposures)
  - (2) household sector tools
  - (3) corporate sector tools
  - (4) liquidity and foreign exchange tools (banking sector)
  - (5) nonbank tools (systemic liquidity and fire-sale risk)
  - (6) structural tools (systemically important institutions and interconnectedness)  
- Flexibility: questionnaire includes “other” option for measures not in the pre-set list.  
- Institutional questions: whether a macroprudential authority is identified; nature of arrangement (central bank; committee within central bank; committee/council outside central bank; supervisory agency outside central bank; or “other”); whether an additional interagency coordinating body exists; types of powers assigned.  
- Data collection: survey sent to all IMF members during April–May 2017 alongside AREAER survey processes.  
- Prepopulation and verification: for most countries, IMF staff prepopulated known measures from other IMF sources (e.g., the 2013 Global Macroprudential Policy Instruments survey); IMF staff communicated with country authorities to improve quality and consistency of submissions.  
- Coverage and reporting period:
  - 141 (out of 192) jurisdictions responded to the survey.
  - Reporting period for the first volume: generally January 1, 2016–December 31, 2016; many members also reported developments in 2017.
  - Respondents were requested to provide information starting from 2011 and include past changes since then where applicable; detailed past changes were provided only by a fraction of countries.
  - Going forward, members will be requested to update a separate “changes” table based on regulatory changes in the reporting year.  
- Notes on responses: level of detail varied across countries; a small number included measures that IMF would consider microprudential (e.g., minimum capital requirements); some countries were reluctant to provide information on pre-set measures they considered microprudential.

### C. Institutional arrangements: authorities and powers
- Response coverage: 111 countries provided information on macroprudential institutional arrangements; 30 reported that there was no macroprudential authority.  
- Multiple authorities: 45 out of 111 respondents indicated a macroprudential mandate was assigned to more than one entity (for example, both the central bank and an additional committee).  
- Central bank role:
  - 80 out of 111 jurisdictions indicated the central bank played an important role in macroprudential policy.
  - 39 countries (about 35 percent of all countries with a macroprudential authority) reported that the central bank is the sole macroprudential authority.
  - An additional 10 reported both the central bank and a committee within the central bank were jointly responsible.
  - Seven reported a committee within the central bank was the sole authority (including the U.K.).  
- Committees outside central bank: nine countries (including France, India, and the U.S.) reported a committee or council outside the central bank as the sole dedicated macroprudential authority; such outside committees more commonly combine with other agencies (e.g., supervisory agency as in Germany; central bank as in China and the Netherlands; both as in Iceland).  
- Supervisory agency as sole authority: four countries reported a supervisory agency (other than the central bank) as the sole macroprudential authority (Australia, Finland, Korea, and Sweden); these countries also report an additional coordinating body.  
- Powers assigned (taxonomy per IMF 2013 and IMF-FSB-BIS 2016):
  - Hard powers: give the macroprudential authority direct control over macroprudential instruments.
  - Semi-hard powers: enable formal recommendations to other agencies coupled with a “comply or explain” mechanism.
  - Soft powers: enable the authority to express an opinion or make recommendations not subject to “comply or explain.”  
- Reported distribution of powers:
  - Existence of hard powers was reported by 80 jurisdictions; hard powers were assigned to a total of 91 bodies (committees or agencies).
  - In 66 cases hard powers rested with the central bank or a committee within the central bank.
  - In only five cases a committee outside the central bank was assigned hard powers.
  - Thirty-one jurisdictions reported semi-hard powers; just over a third (11) of these were jurisdictions indicating the macroprudential authority was vested in a committee outside the central bank.
  - Soft powers were reported by 39 respondents and vested in 42 authorities; virtually all of these jurisdictions also reported hard powers.  
- Regional and income-group patterns:
  - Arrangements do not differ markedly across income groups.
  - Central banks appear to play a lead role in both advanced economies (AEs) and emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs).
  - AEs more frequently report that an outside supervisory agency, or a supervisory agency supported by a council, was the macroprudential authority.
  - Regional notes: Asia and Pacific (APD) has the largest share of economies reporting a designated macroprudential authority; Africa (AFR) has the lowest. Western Hemisphere (WHD) showed the lowest percentage of jurisdictions reporting that the central bank was one of the macroprudential authorities.

### D. Macroprudential measures: coverage and patterns
- Overall measures reported:
  - 141 countries reported a total of 1,313 macroprudential measures.
  - Average number of measures per country: 9.3.
  - Average by income group: 9.9 for AEs and 9.1 for EMDEs.  
- Tool-category frequency (six categories reported in survey):
  - Most frequently reported globally: tools to manage liquidity and foreign exchange (FX) mismatches in the banking sector.
  - Next: tools to manage risks from exposures to the household sector.
  - Next: broad-based tools applying to all exposures.  
- Income-group differences:
  - EMDEs make greater use of tools to manage liquidity and FX risks than AEs.
  - AEs more frequently employ tools aimed at household sector exposures, structural dimension risks, and nonbank financial sector risks.  
- Regional differences (averages per country):
  - Asia and the Middle East: around 11 measures per country.
  - Africa: average of six measures per country.
  - Americas: just over eight measures per country.
- Broad-based tools:
  - Capital conservation buffer (CCoB) is the most frequently used broad-based measure: in place in 76 countries.
  - Basel III countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB):
    - Activated with a positive rate in three jurisdictions as of end–2016: Sweden, Hong Kong SAR, and Norway.
    - Activated with a positive rate in three additional jurisdictions during 2017: Slovak Republic, Czech Republic and Iceland.
    - The UK announced a positive buffer rate for 2018.
    - 73 economies reported they had in place a CCyB framework, including 12 economies which introduced the framework during 2017.
  - Leverage ratio cap: introduced by 35 countries; expected to rise as the leverage ratio moves from a monitoring requirement to a limit under Basel III in 2018.
  - Forward-looking loan loss provisioning requirements: applied outside the Basel framework and are quite common in both the Western Hemisphere and in Asia.
  - Broad-based caps on credit growth: imposed in some countries; very rare in Europe (Albania being the only country reporting this tool).  
- Household sector tools: (section begins in source text; details follow in subsequent text not included in this section.)

*Source: IMF staff background note (April 2018) summarizing the first vintage of the IMF’s Annual Macroprudential Policy Survey; responses recorded by end–February 2018.*

### Section 2

### Section 2

### Household sector tools
- Restrictions on loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-service-to-income (DSTI) ratios are the most frequently used household-sector tools globally.
- Regional usage:
  - About half of the countries in Asia, Europe and the Middle East maintain a restriction on the LTV ratio.
  - Around a quarter of countries in the Western Hemisphere reported LTV restrictions (Brazil and Canada amongst them).
- Capital requirements:
  - Tighter capital requirements on exposures to the household sector are commonly used across all regions, with the exception of Africa.
  - Example: Argentina applies a higher risk weight for loans at LTV ratio of above 75 percent.
- Combinations and complementarities:
  - Other household tools—limits on amortization periods and restrictions on unsecured loans—are common and often used in combination with LTV and DSTI ratio caps.
  - Of 39 countries that reported having a DSTI limit, 19 countries also impose limits on amortization periods.

### Corporate sector tools
- Corporate-sector measures are much less commonly reported than household-sector tools.
- Most frequently used corporate tools:
  - Additional capital requirements on loans to the corporate sector: 28 jurisdictions.
  - Caps on lending in foreign currency (FX): 17 jurisdictions.
- Other corporate measures:
  - Cap on LTV ratios for commercial real estate credit: 12 jurisdictions.
  - Limits on lending to particular industries or sectors: 14 jurisdictions.
- Overall pattern: borrower-based measures are relatively less utilized.

### Liquidity and FX tools
- Liquidity and FX mismatch tools are the most frequently used macroprudential policy tools and exhibit a wide variety of designs.
- Prevalence and specific tools:
  - Net FX position limits: 75 countries (about a half of respondents) reported maintaining a net FX position limit to limit systemic risk.
  - Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR): 74 countries reported imposing an LCR.
  - Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR): 12 jurisdictions reported NSFR use (rules in the Basel III framework were finalized only recently).
- Regional notes:
  - LCR particularly frequently reported in Europe; other liquid asset ratio requirements used in other regions.
  - Many countries, especially in Central and South America, differentiate liquidity tools by currency or maintain other constraints on FX funding.

### Nonbank sector tools
- Far fewer countries reported macroprudential rules for systemic liquidity and other risks in the nonbank financial sector.
- Coverage:
  - About a third of respondents reported having some macroprudential rules in the nonbank sector.
  - Advanced Economies used nonbank tools relatively more frequently.
  - Asian countries reported nonbank rules relatively frequently across regions.
  - Nonbank tools were infrequently used in Africa.
- Targeted nonbank segments (frequencies reported in figures):
  - Asset management industry: 28 measures (23% of nonbank measures).
  - Insurance companies: 27 measures (23%).
  - Central counterparty clearing: 19 measures (16%).
  - Pension funds: 18 measures (15%).
  - Securities lending market: 18 measures (15%).
  - Securitization: 6 measures (5%).
  - Other: 4 measures (3%).

### Structural tools
- Structural-tools focus and prevalence:
  - Most often take the form of additional capital surcharges for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).
  - Limits (including large exposure limits) on exposures between financial institutions are also frequently reported.
- Regional detail:
  - SIFI surcharges are very common in Europe, with around 75 percent of European countries reporting use of these surcharges.
  - SIFI surcharges are also being implemented quite actively in Asia.
  - (Large) exposure limits between financial institutions are used equally frequently in all regions.
- Frequency breakdown (from figures):
  - Capital surcharges for systemically important institutions: 61 measures (43%).
  - Limits on size of exposures between financial institutions: 40 measures (28%).
  - Additional risk weights on exposures between financial institutions: 8 measures (6%).
  - Others: 32 measures (23%).

### Recent developments and changes during 2016
- Time window: changes effective or announced during January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2016.
- General activity:
  - Most countries reported at least one change in macroprudential settings during the period.
  - Activity was strongest in Europe: more than three changes per country on average.
  - Asia and Pacific: just over two changes per country on average.
- Direction of changes:
  - The overwhelming majority of changes amounted to a tightening of macroprudential measures, although easing is also observed.
- Tool-specific changes:
  - Liquidity tools were most frequently modified: a total of 87 tightening changes became effective in 2016 (reflecting in part a phase-in of the LCR).
  - Many tightening changes reflect phasing-in or adjustments of Basel measures, including the CCoB.
  - Tightening instances in 2016 by category:
    - Broad-based tools: 54 instances of tightening.
    - Household sector tools: 43 instances of tightening.
- Average number of changes (per country) reported in figures:
  - Broad based tools: tightening and easing indicated in figure metrics (chart shows average number of changes and tightening-easing breakdown by region).

### Institutional framework snapshot (2016–17)
- Table 1 totals and subtotals (by number of authorities reported):
  - Total reporting jurisdictions: 80 reporting a single authority, 25 reporting two, 31 reporting three, 23 reporting four, 18 reporting five (table presents breakdowns by Central Bank, Committee within a CB, etc.; totals: 80, 25, 31, 23, 18).
  - Total row: 80 25 31 23 18.
- Figures summarizing macroprudential tools (aggregate counts from survey):
  - Total number of reported measures across all categories: 1,313.
  - Average number of measures per country (All Countries): 9.3.
  - Advanced Economies total: 336; Average: 9.9.
  - Emerging and Developing Economies total: 977; Average: 9.1.
- Representative counts from tool-category figures:
  - Broad based tools (total frequency by measure): Capital conservation buffer: 76 (39% of broad-based measures); Limit on leverage ratio: 35 (18%); Forward-looking loan loss provisioning requirement: 23 (12%); Cap on credit growth: 14 (7%); Countercyclical capital buffer: 9 (5%); Other tools: 37 (19%).
  - Household sector tools (frequencies): Restrictions on LTV ratio: 62 (20%); Restrictions on DSTI ratio: 42 (14%); Household sector capital requirements: 39 (13%); Restrictions on unsecured loans: 28 (9%); Limit on amortization periods: 26 (8%); Cap on foreign-currency-denominated loans: 20 (6%); Restrictions on loan-to-income ratio: 13 (4%); Cap on credit growth to the household sector: 12 (4%); Fiscal measures to contain systemic risks: 8 (3%); Others: 60 (19%).
  - Corporate sector tools (frequencies): Corporate sector capital requirements: 28 (24%); Cap on foreign-currency-denominated loans: 17 (14%); Cap on lending to particular industries or sectors: 14 (12%); Cap on loan-to-value ratio for commercial real estate credit: 12 (10%); Cap on credit growth to the corporate sector: 4 (3%); Others: 44 (37%).
  - Liquidity and FX tools (frequencies): Net foreign exchange positions: 75 (17%); Liquidity Coverage Ratio: 74 (17%); Liquid asset ratio: 55 (13%); Reserve requirements: 30 (7%); Foreign exchange swaps or derivative positions: 24 (6%); LCR differentiated by currency: 23 (5%); Constraints on FX funding: 12 (3%); Loan-to-deposit ratio: 20 (5%); Reserve requirements and levies differentiated by currency: 17 (4%); Liquid asset ratio differentiated by currency: 16 (4%); Net Stable Funding Ratio: 12 (3%); Others: 71 (17%).
  - Nonbank tools (frequencies): see Nonbank sector tools section above.
  - Structural tools (frequencies): see Structural tools section above.

### Conclusion and next steps
- The macroprudential policy database will be updated on an annual basis; the next cycle will start in April 2018 with the survey sent to all country authorities again.
- The second round will allow country authorities to review responses and record changes in macroprudential policy settings that occurred over January 2017 to December 2017.
- Expected improvements over time:
  - Participation, consistency and quality of responses should further improve as experience is accumulated.
  - Maintaining the database indefinitely will generate reliable time series information of macroprudential policy actions across the IMF membership, increasing its usefulness for research and policy purposes.
- Acknowledgement: IMF staff express appreciation to authorities of member countries for input and to the G20 for support of the initiative.

*Source: IMF Macroprudential Policy Survey (Section 2).*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/pp/2018/pp043018-the-imfs-annual-macroprudential-policy-surveyobjectives-design-and-country-responses.pdf_