## ppea2019014

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### Executive summary and objectives
- Presents proposed reforms to conclude the 2018–19 Review of Facilities for Low-Income Countries (LICs), drawing on Executive Directors’ views from July 2018 and March 2019.
- Central objectives:
  - Provide higher levels of access to concessional financing, favoring poorest and most vulnerable LICs.
  - Respond to challenges in fragile or post-conflict situations (FCS) and countries vulnerable to natural disasters (higher RCF access limits).
  - Improve flexibility of PRGT instruments via SCF and ECF reforms to tailor program design.
  - Maintain self-sustainability of the PRGT financing framework.
- Related workstreams: companion paper on PRGT financing, parallel PRGT interest rate structure review, upcoming eligibility/graduation review, and links to ROC and May 2019 Board paper on natural disasters.

### Program performance, successor arrangements, and lessons (ROC foundations)
- Usage and program persistence:
  - Over half of PRGT-eligible members had at least one Fund-supported program during 2010–18.
  - Three-quarters of those with a program had repeat programs; over half had repeat disbursing programs.
  - Engagement for repeat disbursing subgroup averaged close to five years.
  - 13 successor programs within two years during 2011-17; nine of these successor programs were at least partially successful.
- Performance outcomes 2011-17:
  - About 25 percent successful, 50 percent partially successful, 25 percent unsuccessful.
  - Program completion raised probability of success by 40 percentage points.
  - Negative commodity price shocks increased likelihood of unsuccessful program by 7 percentage points.
- Debt and risk dynamics:
  - Debt sustainability risks were contained or improved in three-quarters of PRGT-supported programs; 91 percent for countries completing most/all reviews.
  - Net reduction of 8 percentage points in countries at high risk or in debt distress over program periods; 17 percentage points for countries with completed/mostly completed programs.
  - In contrast, among all PRGT-eligible countries between 2013 and 2018, share at high risk or in debt distress increased by 18 percentage points.
- Key lessons for program design:
  - Realistic projections, protect fiscal adjustment quality (e.g., revenue floors), strengthen debt transparency and debt management coverage, tailor and prioritize structural conditionality with realistic timelines, build program ownership.
  - Reforms align: enhanced emphasis on debt vulnerabilities, full ECF flexibility for countries emerging from conflict, ECF arrangements with initial duration of five years under selected circumstances.

### Access policies: generalized increase and calibrations
- Staff proposal: generalized increase of one-third (33.3 percent) in access norms and to annual and cumulative global PRGT access limits and RCF sub-limits.
  - Rationale: broadly restore access in relation to GDP and trade exposure to levels after past increases (2009, 2015) while preserving PRGT self-sustainability.
  - Noted that access relative to gross financing needs (GFN) would still be below previous post-increase levels for “prospective blenders.”
- Exact proposed overall PRGT limits (net of scheduled repayments) and related Decision I textual formulation:
  - Annual normal limit: 75.00 → 100.00 (percent of quota) (proposed).
  - Cumulative normal limit: 225.00 → 300.00 (percent of quota) (proposed).
  - Annual exceptional access limit: 100.00 → 133.33 (percent of quota) (proposed).
  - Cumulative exceptional access limit: 300.00 → 400.00 (percent of quota) (proposed).

### High access (HA) safeguards and Board engagement enhancements
- Two-dimensional safeguards:
  - Stock trigger: apply HA procedure where (i) amount requested exceeds 60 percent of cumulative normal access limit (180 percent of quota after proposed increase) over any 36-month period; or (ii) outstanding credit to PRGT exceeds or is projected to exceed three-quarters of cumulative normal limit (225 percent after proposed increase).
  - De minimis exemption where total commitment ≤ 15 percent of quota.
  - Based on past three years, the latter threshold would have been reached in the top 9 percent of PRGT financing requests.
- Informational/timing enhancements for informal HA Board meetings:
  - Typically require DSA charts (currently “if possible”).
  - Preliminary assessment of risk of debt distress and discussion of public debt data quality/coverage and contingent liabilities.
  - Assessment of capacity to repay including updated capacity-to-repay table.
  - Informal Board engagements to occur as soon as management agrees HA could be appropriate; applies to PRGT EA requests.

### Blending policy change for higher-income LICs with market access
- Proposal: remove blending exclusion for higher-income LICs at high risk of debt distress provided they have substantial market access (including prospective access).
  - Blending presumed for LICs at high risk (but not in debt distress) if:
    - per capita income above IDA operational cutoff threshold; and
    - substantial access to international financial markets on past and prospective basis.
  - Test for substantial past access: issued or guaranteed eligible external debt during at least three of past five years in cumulative amount ≥ 50 percent of member’s quota (closely aligned with graduation test; elsewhere Decision I references at least 2 of past 5 years and 25 percent of quota for exceptional access alignment).
- Rationale and considerations:
  - Better targeting scarce PRGT resources to poorer/vulnerable LICs.
  - Cost implications: blended PRGT-GRA financing averaged 1.3 percent in 2018, compared with 0.0 percent for ECF financing; IMF GRA rate 1.9 percent; market comparators: Avg market rate 7.5 percent; 10-year US Treasury 2.9 percent; Avg EM BI spread 463 bps. Example country spreads: Ghana 441, Kenya 446, Honduras 268, Senegal 406, Zambia 822, Cote d'Ivoire 393.
  - Example budgetary impact: exclusion from blending reduced Ghana’s interest bill in 2018 by about US$14 million (0.03 percent of GDP).
  - Proposal helps mitigate perverse incentives of non-concessional borrowing being effectively rewarded ex post.

### RCF, RFI, and natural disaster access proposals
- RCF (PRGT) changes:
  - Generalized one-third increase and an additional doubling of the annual RCF access limit under the regular window for FCS.
  - Regular RCF window annual access limit proposed: 18.75 → 50.00 (percent of quota).
  - Regular RCF cumulative limit proposed: 75.00 → 100.00 (percent of quota).
  - Per-disbursement limit for RCF (regular window): .. → 25.00 (percent of quota).
  - RCF (exogenous shocks window) annual limit: 37.50 → 50.00.
  - RCF (large natural disasters window) annual limit: 60.00 → 80.00; cumulative limit increased to 133.33 percent of quota (higher than other RCF windows).
  - Numeric implication note: with generalized increase, cumulative RCF limit for regular/exogenous windows would be 100 percent of quota; large natural disasters window cumulative limit 133.3 percent of quota; outstanding disbursements from all RCF (and RFI) windows included in cumulative access.
  - Safeguards to avoid higher limit becoming de facto average:
    - Norm for annual access under regular window = 25.00 percent of quota (neither floor nor ceiling).
    - Per disbursement limit = 25.00 percent; annual access above 25.00 percent only via additional disbursement linked to track record (e.g., SMP); current two-disbursements-in-12-months rule maintained.
- RFI (GRA instrument available to all members) proposals:
  - Annual access limit: 37.5 → 50 percent of quota.
  - Annual large natural disasters window: 60 → 80 percent of quota.
  - Cumulative access limit: 75 → 100 percent of quota.
  - Cumulative large natural disasters limit: 75 → 133.33 percent of quota.
  - Note: RCF safeguards (per-disbursement limits, norms) do not apply to RFI; consistent with parallel increases since 2015.

### SCF and ECF flexibility and program design for fragile states
- SCF precautionary support:
  - Proposals: extend maximum SCF duration from 24 to 36 months; abolish sub-limits on access for precautionary SCF use.
  - Rationale: permit three-year precautionary arrangements within concessional facilities and facilitate blending with SBA where called for; concerns re: tying up PRGT resources not realized.
- ECF initial duration:
  - Proposal: extend maximum initial duration of ECF arrangements from four to five years (presumption remains normally three years).
  - Rationale: when program success depends on longer-term reform efforts (e.g., national tax system, economic diversification), five-year initial arrangements allow realistic timetables; to justify five years, require well-sequenced reform plan, strong ownership, coherent TA, and linkage to country development/poverty reduction plan.
- ECF program design for fragile states:
  - At approval: describe broad objectives for full period with medium-term macro framework and DSA; detailed policies for first 12 months.
  - Structural conditionality streamlined/prioritized; medium-term objectives adaptable; Economic Development Document (EDD) normally expected by second review; extensions possible for limited capacity.
  - Case studies (Chad 2014, Mali 2013, Yemen 2010) illustrate streamlined initial conditionality, capacity-building sequencing, and donor catalytic roles.
- PRGS (renaming and standardization):
  - Rename EDD to Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (PRGS) while retaining function/content.
  - Require PRGS for ECF or SCF or PSI arrangements with initial duration > two years.
  - Timeline flexibility: extend PRGS deadline from first review to second review; for countries emerging from conflict or with significant instability, Board may approve extension up to fourth review, and one further extension up to sixth review with conditions (adequate justification; arrangement duration at least four years).

### Exceptional access (EA) and related threshold adjustments
- Align market access criterion for EA with blending: issuance/guarantee of eligible external debt during at least 2 of past 5 years in cumulative amount of at least 25 percent of quota (and GNI above 80 percent of IDA cutoff) to be treated consistently.
- Access-threshold triggers updated (in line with generalized access increase):
  - Require new DSA when new financing request brings total access to > 80.00 percent of quota (previously 60.00 percent).
  - Update threshold above which Lapse of Time procedures for augmentation requests are not permitted: 12.50 → 15.00 (percent of quota).

### PRGT financing framework projections, demand, and capacity
- Demand projections (revised model):
  - Projected average annual demand: SDR 1.0–1.7 billion on a subsidy-use basis over next decade.
  - On a subsidy-use basis the projection translates to SDR 0.9–1.5 billion (precautionary-use-adjusted).
  - Using revised model, annual demand over next 10 years: Low Case 1.02; High Case 1.70 (Table 3 baseline).
  - Sensitivity scenarios: No change in access until 2024: Change -0.15 (Low) / -0.25 (High); 50 percent increase in access in 2019: Change 0.24 / 0.40; Removal of blending exemption: Change -0.14 / -0.23.
- Self-sustained capacity estimates:
  - Updated long-term annual lending capacity estimated at SDR 1.31 billion (unchanged from April 2018 Update).
  - Self-sustained capacity projected to reach between SDR 1.2–1.5 billion in ten years.
  - Under reform package, projected self-sustained capacity to reach SDR 1.1–1.4 billion by 2028.
  - Base envelope reference: SDR 1¼ billion.
- Financing implications of reform package elements (simulated impacts):
  - P1 One-third access increase: raises annual demand by SDR 0.11–0.18 billion; reduces capacity by SDR 0.05–0.08 billion.
  - P2 SCF/ECF enhancements and supplemental RCF increase: raise demand by SDR 0.02–0.11 billion; reduce capacity by SDR 0.01–0.05 billion.
  - P3 Removal of blending exemption for higher-income high-risk countries with market access: reduces demand by SDR 0.08–0.14 billion; increases capacity by SDR 0.04–0.06 billion.
  - P5 Align SCF/ECF rates: reduces capacity by SDR 0.03 billion.
  - Consolidated Policy Package (P6): Demand-model change 0.04 (Low Case) / 0.15 (High Case); Supply-model change -0.05 (Low) / -0.10 (High).
- Key PRGT balance sheet and resource data:
  - PRGT loan resources mobilized in 2015 fundraising: SDR 11.4 billion.
  - Cumulative borrowing limit under PRGT raised by SDR 1 billion to SDR 38.5 billion in January 2018.
  - Uncommitted loan resources totaled SDR 14 billion at end-December 2018.
  - Liquidity buffer: SDR 3.3 billion.
  - PRGT Subsidy Accounts balances: about SDR 3.59 billion at end-February 2019 (General Subsidy Account 2.55; ECF Subsidy Account 1.00; RCF Subsidy Account 0.02; SCF Subsidy Account 0.02).
  - Reserve Account: SDR 3.81 billion; Reserve Account covers about 59 percent of total PRGT obligations; Reserve Account balance was about SDR 39 million lower at end-2018 than end-2017.
  - Stock of PRGT lending commitments: SDR 7.4 billion at end-March 2019; total credit outstanding SDR 6.4 billion; undrawn commitments SDR 1.0 billion.
  - ECF credit ≈ 86 percent of total loans outstanding; credit concentration: top five borrowers ≈ 44 percent of credit outstanding.
  - About 39.6 percent of credit outstanding to countries classified as high risk or in debt distress in most recent LIC DSA.
- Proposed legal/operational extensions:
  - Staff proposes extend PRGT loan commitment period by four years to end-2024 and establish end-2029 as normal drawdown period for new borrowing; current Instrument authorizes commitments until end-2020.

### CCRT funding, HIPC status, and resource gaps
- CCRT (Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust):
  - Total contributions as of end-February 2019: SDR 99.5 million; total Trust balance SDR 149 million.
  - Of 58 members approached in 2015 fundraising, six pledged US$93.3 million (US$84.7 million received), short of US$150 million target.
  - Estimated CCRT underfunding: SDR 200–275 million.
  - Underfunding drivers: original US$150 million target based on pre-14th Quota Review quotas; doubling of quotas increased shortfall proportionally; gaps roughly SDR 100–175 million (Post Catastrophe Relief) and SDR 100 million (Catastrophe Containment).
  - Staff options: new fundraising campaign and/or adjust CCRT access policy to realign with pre-14th quota access and available financing; to be explored for 2020 Update.
- HIPC and protracted arrears:
  - Fund provided SDR 2.6 billion in HIPC debt relief to 36 of 39 eligible countries.
  - Three pre-decision point countries remain: Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan.
  - PRG-HIPC Trust balance: SDR 0.24 billion at end-February 2019.
  - Overdue financial obligations from Sudan and Somalia: SDR 1.2 billion as of end-February 2019 (Sudan accounts for 80 percent of members’ outstanding arrears to Fund).
  - Additional resources required to cover debt relief for protracted arrears cases once countries ready.

### Key risks, mitigations, and implementation modalities
- Risks:
  - Strategic/reputational: mitigated by aligning toolkit to members’ evolving needs.
  - Use of Fund resources (UFR) and PRGT self-sustainability: higher access and longer arrangements add pressure on self-sustainability.
  - Credit risk: rising debt vulnerabilities in LICs could increase credit risks.
- Mitigations:
  - Removal of blending exemption for qualified high-risk market-access countries to offset cost.
  - Stronger procedural safeguards linking HA procedures to PRGT exposure and raising informational requirements for HA cases.
  - New LIC DSF realism tools and enhanced focus on public sector debt measurement and contingent liabilities.
  - Regular monitoring and annual updates on PRGT self-sustained financing integrity; contingency measures under three-pillar PRGT framework.
- Implementation specifics and applicability:
  - Adoption requires Executive Board approval by majority of votes cast; protected provisions not modified; changes proposed as package.
  - Timing: many clarifications and extensions effective immediately upon Board adoption (e.g., extend SCF max length to three years; abolish SCF precautionary sub-limits; standardize PRGS use); HA safeguard modifications apply to new financing requests exceeding proposed thresholds.
  - Proposed Decision amendments include detailed redlined amendments to PRGT Instrument, RFI Decision, PSI Decision, Transparency and Web Posting Decisions, and related operational texts.

*Source: ppea2019014 — 2018–19 Review of Facilities for Low‑Income Countries (excerpts).*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Objective and scope
- Presents a package of proposed reforms to conclude the 2018–19 Review of Facilities for Low-Income Countries (LICs).
- Draws on views of Executive Directors expressed at a formal Board meeting in July 2018 and at an informal session on a draft reform package in March 2019.
- Aims to enhance support for PRGT-eligible countries (used interchangeably with Low-Income Countries in the paper).

### Central objectives of the proposed reform package
- Provide higher levels of access to concessional financing, favoring the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable LICs.
- Respond to specific challenges faced by countries in fragile or post-conflict situations (FCS) and by countries vulnerable to natural disasters, including through higher access limits under the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF).
- Improve the flexibility of Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) instruments through reforms to the Standby Credit Facility (SCF) and the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) to allow better tailoring of program design to countries’ diverse circumstances.
- Maintain the self-sustainability of the PRGT financing framework.

### Related and parallel workstreams
- Companion paper: Review of the Financing of the Fund’s Concessional Assistance and Debt Relief to LICs (analyzes impact of proposed reforms on PRGT financing).
- Parallel Review of the PRGT Interest Rate Structure: proposes permanent unification of the interest rates on loans extended under the SCF and the ECF.
- Upcoming Review of Eligibility to Use the Fund’s Facilities for Concessional Financing: assesses countries’ readiness for graduation from concessional financing.
- Follows May 2019 Board paper on Building Resilience in Developing Countries Vulnerable to Large Natural Disasters and draws on conclusions of the 2018 Review of Program Design and Conditionality (ROC).

### Proposed changes beyond PRGT instruments
- Proposes an increase in access limits under the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI), the emergency lending instrument available to all IMF member countries.
- Rationale: expand scope for providing financial support to countries in fragile situations and/or vulnerable to natural disasters that are not eligible for concessional financing, while preserving broad harmonization of access limits across the RFI and the RCF.

### Context and rationale for reforms
- Demand for PRGT resources has receded since the global financial crisis but remains substantial: over half of PRGT-eligible countries had at least one Fund-supported program during 2010–18; nearly three-quarters of these countries had repeat Fund program engagement over the period; over half had at least two disbursing arrangements; engagement for this sub-group averaged close to five years.
- Evolving LIC conditions motivating reforms:
  - Continued growth in output, trade, and the external financing needs of LICs has resulted in the erosion of access levels relative to these metrics of potential demand for use of Fund resources.
  - An increasing number of LICs have tapped international capital markets, leaving them exposed to repricing and rollover risks should global financial conditions tighten.
  - A marked increase in public debt ratios in most LICs, with more than two-fifths of LICs now assessed to be at high risk of, or already in, debt distress.
  - One-half of LICs are in fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS).
  - Climate-related natural disasters are increasing in intensity and frequency, creating enhanced demand for emergency financial support, particularly in small states.
  - Global interest rates remain low, reducing the concessional element of PRGT loans.

### Stocktaking and analytical foundations
- The paper uses findings from the 2018 Review of Program Design and Conditionality (ROC) to inform proposals.
- The LIC Facilities Review is the second review of the Fund’s concessional facilities available to LICs since the current framework was established in 2009.

### ROC findings summarized (program performance and drivers)
- Program context: Half of PRGT-eligible countries are FCS; many LICs have concentrated export structures and high reliance on volatile commodities; weak institutional capacity often compounds challenges.
- Performance record for PRGT-supported programs during 2011-17:
  - Three-quarters of these were at least partially successful.
  - About 25 percent of PRGT-supported programs are assessed to have been successful, 50 percent partially successful, and 25 percent unsuccessful.
  - Pattern broadly similar to outcomes for GRA-supported programs.
- Drivers of unsuccessful programs:
  - Typically involved either weak program implementation, with programs going off-track, or adverse shocks (including civil conflict, terms of trade, natural disasters, and epidemics).
- Programs that remained on-track were predominantly successful (38 percent) or partially successful (47 percent).
- Quantitative impacts on success:
  - Program completion raised the probability of success by 40 percentage points.
  - Negative commodity price shocks increased the likelihood of an unsuccessful program by 7 percentage points.

### Package design and exclusions
- Reforms constitute an integrated package reflecting Executive Directors’ views from consultations.
- Excluded options (received little support) include:
  - Maintaining the normal cumulative access limit unchanged while making the exceptional access criteria more flexible.
  - Modifications to the Policy Support Instrument (PSI).
  - Introducing a short-term ECF.
  - Widening access to the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT) to provide relief on debt service to the Fund for members hit by large natural disasters.

### Organization of the report (structure)
- Section II: findings of the ROC and catalytic role of the Fund.
- Section III: proposed reforms to LIC facilities and the RFI.
- Section IV: implications of proposed reforms on the PRGT financing framework (analyzed in companion Board paper).
- Section V: impact on the Fund’s risk profile.
- Section VI: implementation issues.
- Final section: issues for discussion.

*Source: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY — 2018–19 Review of Facilities for Low-Income Countries (May 5, 2019).*

### 15.      Successor arrangements in LICs were common, consistent with the protracted nature

### ppea2019014 - 15.      Successor arrangements in LICs were common, consistent with the protracted nature

### Successor arrangements and program reuse
- Over half of PRGT-eligible members had at least one Fund-supported program during 2010–18.
- Three-quarters of those members with a program had repeat programs.
- Over half had repeat disbursing programs.
- Repeat use of the ECF is expected because the facility’s purpose is to enable members with a protracted balance of payment problem to make significant progress towards stable and sustainable macroeconomic positions consistent with strong and durable poverty reduction and growth.
- There were 13 cases of Fund-supported programs followed by new programs within two years during 2011-17; nine of these successor programs were at least partially successful.
- Of the four remaining successor programs, three were unsuccessful due to high debt vulnerabilities, including both back-to-back unsuccessful cases—highlighting the need to strengthen focus on debt vulnerabilities in program design.
- Program completion was associated with greater program success: of 10 successor programs that concluded all or most (all but one or two) reviews, four were successful and another four partially successful.

### Debt vulnerabilities
- Across all PRGT-supported programs, debt sustainability risks remained well-contained at low or moderate risk levels or improved in three-quarters of cases.
- For the sample of countries that completed most or all reviews, the share with contained or improved debt sustainability risks was 91 percent.
- Over the program period, there was a net reduction of 8 percentage points in the number of countries at high risk of debt distress or in debt distress; this number rises to 17 percentage points for countries with completed or largely completed programs.
- In contrast, in the broader group of PRGT-eligible countries between 2013 and 2018, the share of countries at high risk of debt distress or in debt distress increased by 18 percentage points.
- In most cases where debt risk ratings deteriorated, exogenous shocks and/or severe governance issues (e.g., undisclosed borrowing, misappropriation of funds) were important causes, although fiscal slippages also contributed.
- In 18 percent of programs, risk ratings improved from “in debt distress” or “high risk of debt distress” to moderate or low risk ratings over the three years following program approval; risk ratings worsened in 10 percent of programs.

### Conclusions and lessons for program design
- Design of future Fund-supported programs will be informed by lessons from the ROC and the upcoming Review of the Debt Limits Policy; recommendations will be incorporated into staff guidance including the Operational Guidance Note to IMF Staff on the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines and an updated Handbook of Facilities for Low Income Countries.
- Key program design lessons from the ROC include:
  - the importance of operating with realistic program projections;
  - the need to protect the quality of fiscal adjustment, including the potential role for more granular fiscal conditionality such as a floor on budgetary revenues;
  - the need to give greater attention to debt transparency, the adequacy of coverage of public sector debt, and improving debt management policies;
  - the need for better tailoring and prioritization of structural conditionality, coupled with realism in implementation timelines;
  - the need to build and support program ownership by national authorities and the wider public.
- Reforms proposed in the LIC Facilities Review align with ROC findings: enhanced emphasis on debt vulnerabilities via proposed new safeguards for high access programs; use of full ECF flexibility for countries emerging from conflict or facing domestic instability; and allowing ECF arrangements with an initial duration of five years under selected circumstances to reflect realism in implementation timetables.

### Catalytic role of the Fund and ODA trends
- Median ODA as a share of PRGT-eligible members’ GDP remained broadly unchanged at 11 percent until the late 2000s, then fell to about 7 percent in the last five years, with a more pronounced drop for better-off LICs and non-fragile states.
- Donor financing continued to play an important role in Fund-supported programs and was more sizeable for ECF-supported programs that remained on-track throughout most of the program period.
- The catalytic impact of on-track ECF programs on donor financing remained particularly strong.

### Reform proposals — Access policies and financing terms
- Proposal: A generalized increase of one-third in access limits and norms for all concessional facilities.
- At the Board discussion in July 2018, most Directors expressed openness to an appropriately calibrated generalized increase in access limits and norms for all concessional facilities, emphasizing compatibility with maintaining the financial sustainability of the PRGT.
- Staff proposal: a generalized increase of one-third (33.3 percent) applicable to access norms and to annual and cumulative global PRGT access limits and RCF sub-limits.
- The increase would broadly restore current access limits in relation to GDP and trade exposure to levels achieved when past generalized access increases took place (2009 and 2015).
- In relation to gross financing needs (GFN), access would still be below the levels after previous increases, especially for “prospective blenders” (comparatively better-off LICs meeting income or market access criteria for blending).
- The increase is calibrated to be consistent with preserving the PRGT’s self-sustainability in conjunction with other proposed reforms.
- The proposed increase is sufficiently ambitious that interim adjustments before the next review of LIC facilities are not envisaged; the case for greater frequency of smaller adjustments could be examined at the next LIC facilities review and would need to be linked to PRGT financial self-sustainability.

### Safeguards: strengthening HA procedures and Board engagement
- Proposal: To strengthen safeguards against credit risk by modifying high access (HA) procedures with an additional threshold on projected outstanding credit to the PRGT, and to provide for more timely and better-informed Board engagements for both HA and exceptional access (EA) requests.
- Rationale: rising debt vulnerabilities may affect the capacity of borrowing countries to repay the Fund; staff proposes strengthened procedural safeguards for HA requests along two dimensions.
- First dimension (additional trigger/“stock trigger”):
  - Currently, HA safeguards are triggered when access over any 36-month period exceeds 135 percent of quota (flow trigger).
  - Proposed: apply the HA procedure to all new financing requests (including augmentations) where (i) the amount requested exceeds 60 percent of the cumulative normal access limit (180 percent of quota, after the proposed access increase) over a 36-month period; or (ii) outstanding credit to the PRGT exceeds or is projected to exceed a threshold set at the equivalent of three-quarters of the cumulative normal limit (225 percent after the proposed access increase).
  - A de minimis exemption from the HA requirement is envisaged where the new program involves low access levels (i.e., where the new program entails a total commitment of not more than 15 percent of quota).
  - Based on experience of the past three years, the latter threshold would have been reached in the top 9 percent of PRGT financing requests.
- Second dimension (informational requirements and timing):
  - Proposed strengthening of informational requirements for informal HA Board meetings to enhance assessment of debt sustainability and capacity to repay, including typically requiring DSA charts (currently “if possible”); a preliminary assessment of the risk of debt distress and discussion of deficiencies in quality/transparency of public debt data; and an assessment of capacity to repay the Fund, including an updated capacity-to-repay table.
  - Proposed requirement that informal Board engagements take place as soon as management agrees that a new or augmented financing request involving HA could be appropriate, to allow Directors’ feedback to inform program design and access levels earlier.
  - The proposed changes to informational requirements and timing of informal Board briefings will also apply to EA requests under the PRGT.

*Source: ppea2019014 - 15.      Successor arrangements in LICs were common, consistent with the protracted nature*

### 27.      Rising debt levels in many countries underscore the importance of careful scrutiny of debt

### 27.      Rising debt levels in many countries underscore the importance of careful scrutiny of debt 

### Debt sustainability and LIC DSF findings
- The new LIC Debt Sustainability Framework (LIC DSF) introduces “realism” tools to assess the credibility of and risks associated with the program baseline and an enhanced focus on the correct measurement of public sector debt.
- Enhanced focus includes identification of data weaknesses and areas outside the perimeter of measured public debt where public liabilities (including contingent liabilities) may reside.
- These risk factors should feature as inputs in the discussion of capacity to repay the Fund.
- The upcoming review of the Fund’s debt limit policies will consider whether the policy has been effective in containing debt vulnerabilities and achieving its other objectives, and recommend reforms where shortcomings are identified.

### Blending policy context and problem statement
- Under the current blending policy, PRGT-eligible members are presumed to blend PRGT with GRA resources if they:
  - (i) meet either the market access or income criterion for blending; and
  - (ii) are not classified as in debt distress or at high risk of debt distress under the LIC DSF.
- Recent years have seen a significant increase in the number of LICs meeting the income and/or market access criteria but excluded from the presumption of blending because they have moved into the high debt risk category.
- The share of PRGT disbursements to PRGT-eligible members meeting the income and/or market access criterion but excluded due to high debt risk rose from near zero in 2014 to 30 percent of all PRGT disbursements in 2017 and 2018.
- Staff’s analysis of how the blending exclusion affects the PRGT’s self-sustained capacity is in the companion paper Review of the Financing of the Fund’s Concessional Assistance and Debt Relief to Low-Income Countries (text tables 4 and 5).

### Proposal: Remove blending exclusion for higher-income LICs with substantial market access
- Staff proposes removing the blending exclusion for higher-income LICs at high risk of debt distress provided they have substantial market access, including on a prospective basis.
- Blending would be presumed for LICs assessed to be at high risk of debt distress (but not in debt distress), if:
  - their per capita income is above the IDA operational cutoff threshold; and
  - they have substantial access to international financial markets on both a past and prospective basis.
- Test for substantial past access (closely aligned with graduation test): the country has issued or guaranteed eligible external debt during at least three of the past five years in a cumulative amount equivalent to at least 50 percent of the member’s quota.
- Assessment of prospective access would require judgement, based on factors such as:
  - evolution of debt vulnerabilities in the context of the program DSA;
  - evolution of sovereign spreads and credit ratings over time;
  - program assumptions on commercial financing;
  - scale and evolution of nonresident holdings of domestic-currency debt;
  - quality of public debt data—including coverage of public sector entities outside central government and of publicly guaranteed debt, and transparency on terms and conditions.
- Specific guidance on the assessment of prospective market access will be included in the Handbook on IMF Facilities for LICs.

### Rationale and considerations supporting the proposal
- Better targeting: Removing the exclusion would better target scarce PRGT resources to the poorer and more vulnerable LICs.
- Cost implications: The estimated increase in the average cost of accessing Fund resources for countries no longer benefitting from the exclusion is not large.
  - The interest rate for blended PRGT-GRA financing averaged 1.3 percent in 2018, compared with zero percent for ECF financing.
  - Market comparators in 2018: Avg market rate 7.5 percent; 10-year US Treasury 2.9 percent; Average EM BI spread 463 bps. Country spreads listed: Ghana 441, Kenya 446, Honduras 268, Senegal 406, Zambia 822, Cote d'Ivoire 393.
  - IMF GRA rate 1.9 percent; ECF rate 0.0 percent; Blended GRA-ECF rate 1.3 percent.
- Market access persistence: Countries that have accessed international markets in significant volumes often continue to tap market-priced loans and international bond markets during a Fund-supported program, maintaining market access despite high risk of debt distress.
- Private creditor assessment: Substantial market access signals that private creditors may view debt vulnerabilities as manageable even when the LIC DSF classification is high risk.
- Restructuring flexibility: Countries with substantial past market access have significant amounts of debt on commercial terms—debt that can be restructured should the country enter into debt distress.
- Mitigating perverse incentives: The proposal helps mitigate concerns that large-scale non-concessional borrowing is effectively rewarded ex post through greater subsidization under the current policy where high debt-risk countries obtain all Fund financing on PRGT terms.

### Interest rate setting mechanism (related)
- The companion paper PRGT—Review of Interest Rate Structure proposes harmonizing the SCF interest rate with the lower ECF rate schedule to simplify the PRGT financing framework and make Fund financing more concessional.
- The revised interest mechanism would imply zero interest rates for all three PRGT facilities until the next biennial review in mid-2021; this revision received broad support from Directors in July 2018.
- Example budgetary impact: the exclusion from the blending presumption reduced Ghana’s interest bill in 2018 by about US$14 million, a saving of some 0.03 percent of GDP.
- Example market access while at high risk: Ghana accessed sovereign bond markets (US$ 3.75 billion during 2015-18) while at high risk of debt distress.

### Supporting LICs in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations (FCS)
- Proposal: In addition to the generalized access increase, double the annual RCF access limit under the regular window, while introducing associated safeguards. For FCS facing substantial near-term uncertainties, make full use of the flexibility allowed under the ECF to focus attention on near-term targets fleshed out on an annual basis as the arrangement unfolds.
- Two concerns identified in July 2018:
  - (i) the access limit to the RCF was seen as unduly constraining financial support to countries unable to implement an upper tranche conditionality (UCT)-quality program; and
  - (ii) the three-year time horizon for ECF arrangements was seen as rather long for FCS facing emerging from conflict and/or elevated short-term uncertainties.
- Changes to the RCF regular window:
  - Proposal to double the RCF annual access limit under the regular window, in addition to the generalized one-third increase, bringing the annual access limit for the regular RCF window to 50 percent of quota (see Annex I).
  - Objective: provide greater flexibility to assist FCS in situations where a UCT-quality program is not yet feasible.
- Safeguards to prevent higher limit becoming de facto average:
  - Introduce a norm for annual access under the regular RCF window at one-half of the annual limit (implying a norm of around 25 percent of quota); the norm would be neither a floor nor a ceiling.
  - Introduce a “per disbursement limit” at 25 percent of quota; annual access in excess of 25 percent of quota could occur only through an additional RCF disbursement within the year and would be linked to a track record of adequate macroeconomic policies (e.g., through an SMP).
  - The current limit of not more than two RCF disbursements in any 12-month period would continue to apply.
  - The cumulative limit on access to the RCF via the regular window would increase only in line with the general increase.
- Flexible use of the ECF for FCS:
  - When a country lacks capacity to implement a UCT-quality program, the Fund can provide financial support through the RCF.
  - Where a UCT-quality program is feasible despite fragilities, the ECF can support a program with streamlined conditionality focusing on near-term stabilization needs, guided by broad medium-term objectives, and fleshing out further specifics as the arrangement unfolds.
  - Existing ECF policies require a detailed statement of policies and measures for the first twelve months of the arrangement, leaving scope to firm up policies beyond this period until later reviews; the 12-month statement is a rolling concept such that at each review the member presents policies for the next 12 months.
- Case studies (Chad 2014, Mali 2013, Yemen 2010) illustrate that a flexible and tailored ECF approach has been used:
  - Chad (2014): only four structural benchmarks at initiation (below average of ten in other ECF programs); structural conditionality focused on fiscal and debt management.
  - Mali (2013): five SBs at inception with gradual increase and expansion of functional areas as capacity improved; strong capacity development focus.
  - Yemen (2010): two PAs and three SBs focused on tax broadening and expenditure control; program derailed by escalation of civil conflict.
- Policy guidance:
  - Guidelines on Conditionality emphasize tailoring programs to a member’s circumstances, including implementation capacity.
  - Staff Guidance Note on the Fund’s Engagement with Countries in Fragile Situations specifies relevant principles: (i) pace of macroeconomic adjustment tailored to weak institutional capacity and cohesion-building needs; (ii) need for “quick wins” to build support for reforms; (iii) prioritized and gradual structural reform agenda.

*Italic: Source — ppea2019014 - 27.      Rising debt levels in many countries underscore the importance of careful scrutiny of debt*

### 40.      Programs supported under ECF arrangements with a near-term focus suitable for

### 40.      Programs supported under ECF arrangements with a near-term focus suitable for fragile states

### Program design for fragile states
- At approval, the program should:
  - describe broad objectives for the full program period supported by a medium-term macroeconomic framework and DSA;
  - include a detailed statement of the critical policies and measures the member intends to pursue for the first 12 months of the arrangement.
- The structural reform agenda and related conditionality should be streamlined to reflect capacity constraints and prioritization of immediate stabilization objectives.
- The medium-term framework will be subject to higher uncertainty, and medium-term policy objectives may have to be adapted as circumstances evolve.
- Specific policies and measures after the first 12 months will be defined in the context of future reviews, in line with the current provisions of the ECF.
- Medium-term program objectives should enable significant progress toward a stable and sustainable macroeconomic position consistent with strong and durable poverty reduction and growth, evidenced by, for example:
  - stronger fiscal or external positions;
  - reduced debt vulnerabilities;
  - higher levels of foreign exchange reserves;
  - more contained inflation.
- The program should aim to strengthen institutional capacity to implement appropriate macroeconomic policies.
- An Economic Development Document (EDD) would normally be expected by the time of the second review; the member may request Board approval for an extension of this deadline to accommodate limited institutional capacity.

### Supporting LICs vulnerable to natural disasters — RCF limits (proposal)
- Proposal: Raise the cumulative RCF access limit for disbursements associated with large natural disasters to a level that is one-third higher than the cumulative RCF limit applicable to all other RCF disbursements.
- Rationale and context:
  - A new annual access limit of 60 percent of quota was introduced in 2017 for urgent BoP needs arising from large natural disasters (where damage exceeds 20 percent of GDP).
  - The cumulative limit of 75 percent of quota under the RCF was left unchanged, limiting room to support members hit by a large natural disaster if they already have significant outstanding RCF exposure.
  - Raising the cumulative RCF limit for large natural disasters would increase scope for providing Fund support; given that the large natural disasters threshold is likely to be met mainly by small states, the impact on PRGT finances should be modest.
- Numeric implication note:
  - Given a generalized access increase of one-third, the cumulative access limit on RCF access under the regular and exogenous shocks windows would increase to 100 percent of quota.
  - Countries seeking a disbursement under the large natural disasters window would be subject to a higher cumulative limit of 133.3 percent of quota; outstanding disbursements from all RCF (and RFI) windows would be included in calculating cumulative access.
- Related enabling measures:
  - Generalized access increase and proposed changes to the SCF will allow higher levels of support and greater flexibility to provide precautionary support and assistance for short-term BoP needs.
  - ECF arrangements with an initial longer duration may better match the time-frame needed to implement resilience-building strategies in countries with protracted BoP problems.

### Reforms to the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI)
- Proposal: Raise the annual and cumulative access limits under the RFI by one-third and raise the cumulative access limit for disbursements associated with large natural disasters by an additional one-third.
- Specific proposed changes:
  - Annual access limit under the RFI: from 37.5 to 50 percent of quota.
  - Annual access limit under the large natural disasters window: from 60 to 80 percent of quota.
  - Cumulative access limit: from 75 to 100 percent of quota.
  - Cumulative access limit for large natural disasters: increased to 133.33 percent of quota.
- Notes:
  - The access safeguards proposed for the RCF (limits on individual disbursements under the regular window and an annual norm) do not apply to the RFI, which does not have separate “regular” and “exogenous shock” windows.
  - This approach is consistent with previous decisions since 2015 to increase access limits under the two instruments simultaneously.
  - Rationale: improve the Fund’s flexibility to support FCS and countries hit by large natural disasters.
  - Historical usage: 26 cases of RCF disbursements since inception of the facility in 2010, and 4 cases of disbursements under the RFI since it was approved in 2011 (two RFI cases were blended with RCF resources; two RFI cases were used for non-PRGT-eligible members).

### Enhancing flexibility in supporting reform programs
- Program design should be tailored to country circumstances to support the most critical medium-term reforms.
- Scope to enhance flexibility of both the SCF and ECF includes:
  - allowing higher access in cases of precautionary support;
  - extending the maximum length of SCF arrangements;
  - extending the maximum initial duration of ECF arrangements;
  - giving more time for the preparation of national development strategies.
- Staff guidance on the use of LIC Facilities will be updated to reflect lessons from the ROC.

### Precautionary support under the SCF (proposal)
- Proposal: Extend the maximum duration of an SCF arrangement from two to three years; abolish sub-limits on access for precautionary SCF use.
- Details and rationale:
  - Raise maximum length of the SCF from 24 to 36 months to provide LICs access to a three-year precautionary arrangement within concessional facilities and facilitate blending of SCF and SBA arrangements where called for.
  - The SCF remains for countries with short-term BoP needs expected to be resolved within “two years but in any case not more than three years.”
  - Removing sub-limits on SCF precautionary access is supported because concerns that precautionary use would tie up large PRGT resources have not materialized.

### Five-year ECF arrangement (proposal)
- Proposal: Extend the maximum initial duration of ECF arrangements from four to five years.
- Rationale and guidance:
  - Longer ECF arrangements (up to five years from the outset) may be appropriate when program success depends on longer-term reform efforts, e.g., building a national tax system or achieving significant economic diversification.
  - A five-year program allows more realistic timetables for critical reforms and can anchor government programs on specific medium-term strategies (such as a five-year plan or a medium-term revenue strategy).
  - To justify a five-year program from the outset, a well-sequenced reform plan with strong ownership should normally be in place, supported by coherent technical assistance from development partners and grounded in the country’s development and poverty reduction plan.
  - Presumption remains that the length of an ECF arrangement would normally be three years; staff would need to make the case for a longer-term arrangement.

### Strengthening program links to poverty reduction
- Current requirement: Countries receiving PRGT concessional support are expected to have a strategy for reducing poverty while supporting strong economic growth, currently met by producing an Economic Development Document (EDD).
- Proposal: Rename the EDD to Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (PRGS) while retaining current functions and required content.
  - Rationale: the label EDD is opaque; “Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy” is clearer and closely aligned with PRGT objectives.
- Proposal: Standardize PRGS use across ECF, SCF, and PSI:
  - Require a PRGS document whenever an ECF or SCF arrangement, or PSI, has an initial duration of more than two years.
  - Allow greater flexibility on the timeline for producing a PRGS for countries with weak capacity.
- Implementation details supported by Directors:
  - SCF arrangements with an initial duration exceeding two years have the same PRGS requirements as the ECF arrangement.
  - Extend the current deadline for meeting the PRGS requirement by the first program review to the second program review.
  - For countries emerging from conflict or with significant domestic instability: where limited institutional capacity prevents meeting PRGS requirements by the second review, the country may request Board approval of an extension up to the fourth review; one further request for an extension up to the sixth review may be made where (i) an adequate justification can be provided and (ii) the arrangement (when the second request is made) has a duration of at least four years.
  - When PRGS requirements are met by the second review, the good practice on PRS implementation review (PIR) would be for it to take place by the fifth review; in the event of extensions, PIR is not an expected practice.
  - Requests for extensions beyond the second review will not be permitted under SCF arrangements or under the PSI.

### Other issues and technical clarifications
- Exceptional access (EA) eligibility anomaly:
  - Under blending policy, countries are not presumed to blend on the basis of market access if their per capita GNI is at or below 80 percent of the IDA threshold.
  - Under current EA policy, countries are precluded from exceptional access if they meet the market access criterion with no linkage to GNI.
  - Proposal: Add language to the PRGT instrument to align the market access criterion used for EA with that used in blending, so only countries with market access and GNI per capita above 80 percent of the IDA threshold are excluded from EA on grounds of market access.
- Access-threshold trigger adjustments (in line with generalized access increase):
  - Require a new DSA when a new financing request brings total access to more than 80 percent of quota (previously 60 percent of quota).
  - Update the threshold from 12.5 percent of quota to 15 percent of quota above which Lapse of Time procedures for augmentation requests are not permitted.

### Resource implications of proposed reforms
- Overall assessment:
  - The proposed reform package would be generally consistent with the self-sustained PRGT financing framework, with risks evenly balanced over the coming decade.
- Projections and figures:
  - Projected average annual demand: SDR 1.0–1.7 billion on a subsidy-use basis over the next decade.
  - Self-sustained capacity projected to reach: SDR 1.1–1.4 billion by 2028.
  - Base envelope reference: SDR 1¼ billion.
- Offsets and risks:
  - Costs from higher access limits and norms, a lower SCF interest rate, and enhanced facilities flexibility would be partly offset by the proposed modification of the blending exemption.
  - The longer-term outlook is subject to considerable uncertainty, with downside risks from both supply and demand factors (e.g., low investment returns on PRGT assets or prolonged periods of high and rising aggregate financing needs).
  - The evolution of capacity will need careful monitoring; policies should be reviewed periodically to ensure alignment with the base envelope of SDR 1¼ billion.
  - A range of policy options and contingency measures can be triggered under the three-pillar PRGT framework in the event of a sustained disequilibrium between supply and demand.

*Source: ppea2019014 - 40.      Programs supported under ECF arrangements with a near-term focus suitable for (IMF).*

### 57.      While some aspects of the proposals may potentially generate new risks, these have

### ppea2019014 - 57. While some aspects of the proposals may potentially generate new risks, these have

### Key risks and mitigation measures
- Strategic Direction and Reputation
  - Addressing access erosion, improving targeting and tailoring, and increasing the flexibility of LIC facilities will further align the Fund’s lending toolkit with members’ changing needs and help sustain membership support for the Fund’s strategic agenda, thus mitigating strategic and reputational risks.
- Use of Fund resources (UFR) and self-sustainability of the PRGT
  - Making the Fund’s lending facilities more suited to evolving challenges and better able to help deliver viable outcomes for program countries meaningfully mitigates UFR risks.
  - Higher access norms and limits and longer arrangements may add pressures to the self-sustainability of the PRGT.
  - Mitigations: removal of the exemption from presumed blending for qualified countries at high risk of debt distress; regular monitoring and annual updates on the integrity of the PRGT’s self-sustained financing framework.
- Credit risk
  - Rising debt vulnerabilities in LICs could increase credit risks to Fund resources.
  - Mitigations: stronger procedural safeguards including linking high-access procedures to the PRGT’s overall exposure to program countries; raising informational requirements when keeping the Board informed on HA cases; the new LIC DSF better captures countries’ debt vulnerabilities; stronger focus on debt transparency and management in program design.

### Implementation issues and applicability
- Required Board Majorities
  - Adoption of the proposed changes requires the approval of the Executive Board by a majority of the votes cast.
  - Proposals do not modify protected provisions; no need to seek consent from affected lenders and contributors to the Trust.
  - Various changes are proposed as a unified package.
- Impact on existing arrangements on adoption
  - Blending policy modifications: will not affect existing arrangements and emergency financing requests already made; they apply to future new arrangements and outright RCF/RFI disbursements approved after adoption.
  - HA safeguards modifications: will apply to new financing requests (including augmentations under existing arrangements) that result in exceeding any thresholds proposed in para. 24.
  - Extensions and standardizations effective immediately upon Board adoption:
    - Extend maximum length of SCF arrangements to three years.
    - Abolish sub-limits on access for the precautionary SCF.
    - Standardize the use of PRGS.
  - Proposal to extend the maximum initial duration of ECF arrangements to five years will be effective for new ECF arrangements.
  - Proposed new access limits and clarifications to EA criteria immediately applicable; future access levels must be justified in accordance with standard access policies, including considerations on the size of the member’s BoP need.

### Issues for discussion (as listed)
- Do Directors support the proposed package of reforms to the LIC facilities?
- Do Directors agree with the proposal to make changes to the Rapid Financing Instrument?

### Annex I — Summary of norms, limits, and procedural safeguards (selected numeric limits preserved exactly)
- Cumulative access limits (Percent of quota)
  - All PRGT facilities-normal: 225.00 → 300.00 (proposed)
  - All PRGT facilities-exceptional: 300.00 → 400.00 (proposed)
  - RCF: 75.00 → 100.00 (133.33 see footnote 3/)
- Annual access limits (Percent of quota)
  - All PRGT-facilities-normal: 75.00 → 100.00 (proposed)
  - All PRGT-facilities-exceptional: 100.00 → 133.33 (proposed)
  - SCF (precautionary) – average annual: 37.50 → ..
  - SCF (precautionary), at approval: 56.25 → ..
  - RCF: 18.75 → 50.00
  - RCF (exogenous shocks window): 37.50 → 50.00
  - RCF (large natural disasters window): 60.00 → 80.00
- Per-disbursement-limit
  - RCF (regular window): .. → 25.00
- Norms 4/ 5/ (Percent of quota)
  - 3-year ECF – High access: 90.00 → 120.00
  - 3-year ECF – Low access: 56.25 → 75.00
  - 18-month SCF – High access: 90.00 → 120.00
  - 18-month SCF – Low access: 56.25 → 75.00
  - RCF (norm for annual access under the regular window): .. → 25.00
- Blending proportions applicable to members presumed to blend (PRGT:GRA)
  - 1:2 with concessional access capped at the applicable norm (all GRA thereafter) → 1:2 with concessional access capped at the applicable norm (all GRA thereafter)
- Triggers for procedural safeguards on high access requests
  - Total access in any 24-month period—for DSA: 60.00 → 80.00
  - High Access Safeguards: An informal Board Meeting in advance of new PRGT request:
    - Current: Total access in any 36-month period of 135 percent of quota
    - Proposed: Total access in any 36-month period in excess of 180 percent of quota, or total Fund credit outstanding to exceed 225 percent of quota at any point during the program period
- Triggers related to Lapse of Time procedures
  - Augmentations above which Lapse of Time procedures are not permitted: 12.50 → 15.00

### Annex II — Flexible use of the ECF for countries in fragile situations: case examples and key program design lessons
- General theme
  - Three case studies (Chad 2014, Mali 2013, Yemen 2010) show how a short-term focus can be embedded within a three-year program, conditionality can be streamlined and prioritized to immediate stabilization objectives, and institutional capacity can be strengthened over the program period.
- A. Chad (2014)
  - Context and fragility
    - Fragility from security challenges, weak institutional capacity, large development needs; ranked 184th out of 186 on UN’s 2013 Human Development Index.
  - Program design and near-term focus
    - Three-year ECF (120 percent of quota) followed an SMP; program catalyzed donor support.
    - Prioritized TA-informed fiscal and debt management reforms; structural benchmarks at first review focused on submission of the budget to Parliament, limits on emergency spending procedures, preparation and publication of budget execution data, and steps to improve debt management.
    - Program targeted to deliver a strong upfront fiscal adjustment while accommodating security and investment needs; built-in flexibility to relax the fiscal target by almost 1 percent of GDP if additional resources became available.
  - Performance
    - Declining oil prices and debt burden complicated implementation; access was augmented at the first review (19 percent of quota) and combined third and fourth reviews (24 percent of quota).
    - Four reviews completed; program was cancelled and replaced with a new three-year ECF arrangement of 160 percent of quota.
- B. Mali (2013)
  - Context and fragility
    - Emerged from security and political crisis in 2012; three-year ECF (32 percent of quota) approved in 2013.
    - Donors pledged €3.25 billion ($4.4 billion) at Brussels donor conference in May 2013.
  - Program design and near-term focus
    - Immediate focus on restoring social and economic stability and institutional capacity; staff report noted dual challenges of dealing with legacy issues and strengthening foundations for poverty-reducing growth while ensuring macroeconomic stability.
    - Structural conditionality initially streamlined, focused on building capacity, and progressively increased to cover banking sector, governance, and debt management.
  - Performance
    - Program had mixed start but was brought back on track; extended and augmented twice (by 32 and 47.5 percent of quota respectively); helped create foundations for solid growth and subdued inflation, though poverty reduction remained a challenge.
- C. Yemen (2010)
  - Context and fragility
    - High poverty, poor security, heavy dependence on declining oil revenues; requested a three-year ECF (100 percent of quota).
    - 2009 fiscal deficit reached a record high; deterioration in reserves and exchange rate pressures.
  - Program design and near-term focus
    - 2010 program focused on rein in central bank financing and avoid further reserve losses: revenue measures (new General Sales Tax, abolishing tax exemptions) and expenditure control (phased fuel price adjustment); some savings used to increase social transfers and floor on social spending.
    - Structural conditionality at approval streamlined and concentrated on fiscal measures due at first review (two prior actions and three structural benchmarks).
    - Medium-term objectives to be fleshed out in later reviews: reduce non-hydrocarbon primary deficit by about 1 percent of GDP annually; shift balance from current to capital spending and social transfers; civil service reforms planned for completion by end-2011 (steps not fleshed out at approval).
  - Performance
    - Limited donor support constrained program design; program relied on conservative identified external financing of 0.7 percent of GDP with automatic adjustment possibilities if donor support exceeded commitments.

*2018 REVIEW OF FACILITIES FOR LICS, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND — excerpt from ppea2019014*

### 20.      No reviews were completed. The authorities cancelled the ECF arrangement in 2012

### ppea2019014 - 20.      No reviews were completed. The authorities cancelled the ECF arrangement in 2012

### Yemen: ECF cancellation and subsequent RCF request
- No reviews were completed. The authorities cancelled the ECF arrangement in 2012 following an intensification of the political crisis and civil unrest, which led to a fall in economic activity and policy paralysis.
- The initial program design focus on short-term priorities was considered sensible.
- Yemen subsequently requested Fund assistance under the RCF for urgent balance of payments needs in 2012, for 25 percent of quota.

### Proposed amendments to PRGT Instrument (Decision I) — major changes and exact limits
- Initial durations and extensions
  - Increase maximum initial duration of ECF arrangements from "up to four years" to "up to five years".
  - Increase maximum duration of SCF arrangements from "from one to two years" to "from one to three years".
  - Modify SCF non-precautionary use restriction from "not more than two and a half years out of a five-year period" to "not more than three years out of a six-year period".
- Overall PRGT access limits (net of scheduled repayments)
  - Annual normal limit: increase from 75 percent of quota to 100 percent of quota.
  - Cumulative normal limit: increase from 225 percent of quota to 300 percent of quota.
  - Annual exceptional access limit: increase from 100 percent of quota to 133.33 percent of quota.
  - Cumulative exceptional access limit: increase from 300 percent of quota to 400 percent of quota.
  - Textual formulation to be amended to: overall access subject to "(i) an annual limit of 100 percent of quota; and (ii) a cumulative limit of 300 percent of quota, net of scheduled repayments" with exceptional access capped at "(i) a maximum annual limit of 133.33 percent of quota, and (ii) a maximum cumulative limit of 400 percent of quota, net of scheduled repayments."
  - Exceptional access market-access specification: "issuance or guarantee of eligible external debt during at least 2 of the past 5 years in a cumulative amount of at least 25 percent of quota (as well as GNI above 80 percent of the IDA operational cut-off)."
- RCF sub-limits and windows
  - General one-third increase in annual and cumulative sub-limits for the RCF.
  - Regular RCF window:
    - Annual and cumulative sub-limits increased from 18.75 percent of quota to 50 percent of quota and from 75 percent to 100 percent of quota (net of scheduled repayments) respectively.
    - Introduce a "single disbursement" limit of 25 percent of quota for access under the regular window.
    - Double the annual limit applicable to RCF disbursements not associated with exogenous shocks (in addition to the one-third increase).
  - Exogenous shocks window:
    - Annual and cumulative sub-limits increased from 37.5 percent of quota to 50 percent of quota and from 75 percent to 100 percent of quota (net of scheduled repayments) respectively.
  - Large natural disasters window:
    - Annual access limit increased from 60 percent to 80 percent of quota.
    - Cumulative access limit increased from 75 percent to 133.33 percent of quota (net of scheduled repayments).
- Deletion of SCF precautionary sub-limits
  - Abolish sub-limits on access for SCF arrangements that are approved on a precautionary basis.
- PRS documentation requirements (renaming and timing)
  - Rename "Economic Development Document (EDD)" as the "Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (PRGS)".
  - Require PRGS documentation observance for members receiving support under SCF arrangements with an initial duration exceeding two years.
  - Extend deadline for meeting the PRGS requirement from the first review to the second review.
  - For ECF-supported countries with limited institutional capacity, allow Board-approved extensions of the PRGS deadline up to the fourth review if requested no later than the time of the request for completion of the second review; a further extension up to the sixth review may be requested provided (A) adequate justifications based on persistent limited institutional capacity and other urgent priorities; and (B) the arrangement has a duration of at least four years, or an extension of the arrangement to at least four years is requested. Any request for such additional extension must be made no later than the time of the request for completion of the review corresponding to the extended deadline.
- Alignment of market access criteria
  - Explicitly align the market access criterion used for exceptional access with the market access criterion used in blending, defined as issuance or guarantee of eligible external debt during at least 2 of the past 5 years in a cumulative amount of at least 25 percent of quota (and GNI above 80 percent of the IDA operational cut-off).
- LOT (lapse of time) threshold change for augmentation requests
  - Increase threshold above which LOT procedures for augmentation requests in an ad hoc review between scheduled reviews under ECF and SCF arrangements are not permitted from 12.5 percent of quota to 15 percent of quota.

### Proposed amendments to the RFI Decision (Decision II)
- Increase annual and cumulative access limits under the RFI by one-third:
  - Annual RFI limit: increase from 37.5 percent of quota to 50 percent of quota.
  - Cumulative RFI limit: increase from 75 percent to 100 percent of quota (net of scheduled repurchases).
- Large natural disasters window under RFI:
  - Annual limit increase from 60 percent to 80 percent of quota.
  - Cumulative limit for large natural disasters increased from 75 percent to 133.33 percent of quota (net of scheduled repurchases).

### Proposed amendments to the PSI Decision (Decision III)
- PRS documentation changes for PSI:
  - Rename the EDD as the PRGS.
  - Extend the deadline for meeting PRGS requirements from the first review to the second review.
  - Require the PRGS only for PSIs with an initial duration exceeding two years.

### Consequential changes to Transparency and Web Posting Decisions (Decisions IV and V)
- Transparency Policy Decision: amend references to include the renamed "Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (PRGS)" in addition to the EDD.
- Decision on web posting of PRS documentation: amend references to include the PRGS in addition to the EDD.

*Source: ppea2019014 - 20.      No reviews were completed. The authorities cancelled the ECF arrangement in 2012*

### Section II, Paragraph 2(b) on the access limits applicable to RCF disbursements shall be amended to

### ppea2019014 - Section II, Paragraph 2(b) on the access limits applicable to RCF disbursements shall be amended to

### Amendment to RCF access limits (Section II, Paragraph 2(b))
- The access of each eligible member under the RCF shall be subject to:
  - an annual limit of 50 percent of quota, and
  - a cumulative limit of 100 percent of quota, net of scheduled repayments,
  - subject to the following provisions:
    - (i) each disbursement shall not exceed 25 percent of quota except where the member requests assistance under the RCF to address an urgent balance of payments need resulting primarily from a sudden and exogenous shock (including a large natural disaster under (ii) below) and the member’s existing and prospective policies are sufficiently strong to address the shock;
    - (ii) the annual and cumulative access limits under the RCF shall be 80 percent of quota and 133.33  percent of quota, net of scheduled repayments, respectively, where (a) the member requests assistance under the RCF to address an urgent balance of payments need resulting from a natural disaster that occasions damage assessed to be equivalent to or to exceed 20 percent of the member’s gross domestic product (GDP), and (b) the member’s existing and prospective policies are sufficiently strong to address the natural disaster shock; and
    - (iii) outstanding credit by a member under the rapid-access component of the ESF or outstanding purchases from the General Resources Account under emergency post conflict/natural disaster assistance covered by Decision No. 12341-(00/117), shall count towards the annual and cumulative limits applicable to access under the RCF. With effect from July 1, 2015, any purchases from the General Resources Account under the Rapid Financing Instrument shall count towards the annual and cumulative limits applicable to access under the RCF.

### Sub-limit on precautionary use of the SCF
- Section II, Paragraph 2(c) establishing sub-limits on access at approval of precautionary SCF arrangements shall be deleted from the PRGT Instrument to abolish such sub-limits.

### Increase in threshold for lapse-of-time procedures for ECF and SCF augmentation requests (Section II, Paragraph 2(h))
- Amended provision:
  - The Trustee may increase resources committed to a qualifying member under an ECF or SCF arrangement in an ad-hoc review between scheduled reviews to address acute increases in underlying balance of payments problems, subject to program track record and compliance with continuous performance criteria or justified waivers.
  - Requests for augmentation of access that do not exceed 15 percent of quota would be considered for approval on a lapse-of-time basis as provided for in Decision/A/13207, as amended.
  - Following approval, the augmentation will not exceed the amount immediately needed and will become available in a single disbursement until the next scheduled disbursement availability date.
  - A program review after such an augmentation is expected to include a comprehensive review of policies and may not be completed on a lapse-of-time basis to allow the Trustee to undertake the assessment.

### Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRGT Instrument amendments)
- Section II, Paragraph 1(b)(3) (ECF review requirement) amended to read:
  - The Trustee shall not complete the second or any subsequent review under an ECF arrangement unless it finds that:
    - (A) the member has a poverty reduction strategy developed and made publicly available normally within the previous 5 years but no more than 6 years, covering the period leading up to and covering the date of the completion of the relevant review; and
    - (B) the poverty reduction strategy has been issued to the Executive Board and has been the subject of a staff analysis in the staff report on a request for an ECF arrangement or a review under an ECF arrangement.
  - A Poverty reduction strategy issued to the Executive Board on or after May 24, 2019 shall be named Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (PRGS) and a poverty reduction strategy that has been issued to the Executive Board as an Economic Development Document shall be deemed a PRGS.
  - A PRGS shall comprise:
    - (a) a document developed by a member country on its national development plan or strategy that is already in existence and publicly available, and documents its poverty reduction strategy; or
    - (b) a document newly prepared by a member country documenting its poverty reduction strategy.
  - A PRGS shall be accompanied by a cover letter from the member country to the Managing Director, issued to the Executive Board with the cover letter; the cover letter shall be deemed to constitute part of the PRGS.
- Extensions for limited institutional capacity:
  - A member may request an extension of the deadline for issuance of the PRGS up until the fourth review under the ECF arrangement; any such request must be made no later than the time of the request for completion of the second review.
  - A member may request approval of a further extension up until the sixth review if:
    - (A) adequate justifications based on persistent limited institutional capacity and other urgent priorities are provided; and
    - (B) the member’s arrangement has a duration of at least four years, or an extension to at least four years is requested.
  - Any request for such additional extension shall be made no later than the time of the request for completion of the review corresponding to the extended deadline.

### New SCF review requirement (new Section II, Paragraph 1(c)(4) of PRGT Instrument)
- The Trustee shall not complete the second or any subsequent review under an SCF arrangement with an initial duration exceeding two years unless it finds that:
  - (A) the member has a poverty reduction strategy developed and made publicly available normally within the previous 5 years but no more than 6 years, covering the period leading up to and covering the date of the completion of the relevant review; and
  - (B) the poverty reduction strategy has been issued to the Executive Board and has been the subject of a staff analysis in the staff report on a request for an SCF arrangement or a review under an SCF arrangement.
- Definition and issuance requirements for PRGS mirror those specified for ECF arrangements, including the cover letter requirement.

### Amendments to the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) Decision
- Paragraph 5 of the RFI decision shall be amended to read:
  - Assistance under this Decision shall be made available in the form of outright purchases.
  - Access by members under this Decision shall be subject to:
    - (a) an annual limit of 50 percent of quota, and
    - (b) a cumulative limit of 100 percent of quota, net of scheduled repurchases,
    - provided that the annual access limit shall be 80 percent of quota and the cumulative access limit shall be 133.33 percent of quota, net of scheduled repurchases, where:
      - (i) the member requests assistance under the RFI to address an urgent balance of payments need resulting from a natural disaster that occasions damage assessed to be equivalent to or to exceed 20 percent of the member’s gross domestic product (GDP), and
      - (ii) the member's existing and prospective policies are sufficiently strong to address the natural disaster shock.

### Amendments to Policy Support Instrument (PSI) Framework Decision
- Paragraph 5 of the PSI Decision amended to require that the member’s program will be based on the member’s poverty reduction strategy set forth in a Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (PRGS).
- Paragraph 8(ii) amended to mirror PRGS timeliness, issuance, analysis, naming (PRGS), and cover letter requirements for completion of second or subsequent reviews under a PSI with initial duration exceeding two years.

### Amendments to the Transparency Policy Decision
- Paragraph 4.a amended:
  - The Managing Director will not recommend Executive Board approval of (i) an arrangement under the PRGT or completion of a review under such arrangement, or (ii) a HIPC decision point or completion point decision, or (iii) a member’s request for a PSI or completion of a review under a PSI, if the member does not explicitly consent to publication of its I-PRSP, PRSP, PRSP preparation status report, PRSP annual progress report (APR), Economic Development Document (EDD) or PRGS (Document 10 or Document 15, as the case may be).
- Paragraph 11 amended:
  - After the Executive Board adopts a decision regarding a member’s use of Fund resources or adopts a decision approving a PSI or a PCI, or conducts a review under a PSI or PCI, or completes discussions on HIPC Initiative participation or PRSP-related documents, a Press Release containing a Chairman’s statement on the discussion will be issued to the public. The Chairman’s statement will, where relevant, summarize HIPC decisions and Executive Board views on PRSP-related documents. Waivers and other matters (Document 21 and Document 22) will be mentioned in the factual statement section of the Press Release or in lieu of a Chairman’s statement as provided for in paragraph 13(b). The Executive Director representing the member will have the opportunity to review the Chairman’s statement, propose minor revisions, and consent to its publication immediately after the Executive Board meeting. No Press Release published under this paragraph shall reference a discussion or decision pertaining to a member’s overdue financial obligations to the Fund where a Press Release following an Executive Board decision to limit the member’s use of Fund resources because of overdue financial obligations has not yet been issued. In the case of an Executive Board meeting pertaining solely to overdue financial obligations, no Chairman’s statement will be published.
- Paragraph 13.b(i) amended:
  - If a member does not consent to publication of a Press Release containing a Chairman’s statement under paragraph 11 where one would be applicable, or if no Chairman’s statement has been issued because a decision was taken on a lapse-of-time basis, a brief factual statement will be issued immediately after Board consideration. The factual statement will describe the Executive Board’s decision relating to (a) that member’s use of Fund resources (including HIPC initiative decisions (Document 8), waivers (Document 21), and consideration of PRSP documents, EDDs and PRGSs (Document 10), when relevant), or (b) the approval of a PSI or a PCI for that member, or the conduct of a review under that member’s PSI or PCI (including waivers (Document 22) and consideration of PRSP documents, EDDs and PRGSs (Document 15), when relevant).
- Paragraph 28 amended:
  - Documents may be published under this decision only after their consideration by the Executive Board, except for documents circulated for information only including:
    - (i) I-PRSPs, PRSPs, EDDs and PRGSs; and
    - (ii) Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) and Assessment of Financial Sector Supervision and Regulation (AFSSR) Reports.
  - Documents covered by this paragraph may be published immediately after circulation to the Executive Board.
- Indicative List amendments:
  - Item 10 amended to read: “10. I-PRSPs, PRSPs, PRSP Preparation Status Reports, APRs, EDDs and PRGSs”
  - Item 15 amended to read: “15. I-PRSPs, PRSPs, PRSP Preparation Status Reports, APRs, EDDs and PRGSs in the context of PSIs”

### Amendments to Decision on Web Posting of PRS Documentation (Decision No. 13816-(06/98))
- Web posting of PRSPs, Interim PRSPs, APRs of PRSPs, PRSP Preparation Status reports, EDDs and PRGSs in accordance with SM/06/359 (10/25/06) shall be taken to constitute issuance of such documents to the Executive Board for purposes of:
  - (1) Section II, paragraph 1(b)(3) and paragraph 1(c)(4) of the Instrument to Establish the PRGT, Annex to Decision No. 8759-(87/176), adopted December 18, 1987, as amended;
  - (2) Section III, paragraph 2(c) of the Instrument to Establish a Trust for Special PRGF Operations for HIPC and Interim PRGF Subsidy Operations, Annex to Decision No. 11436-(97/10), adopted February 4, 1997, as amended; and
  - (3) paragraph 8 of the Policy Support Instrument-Framework, Decision No. 13561-(05/85), adopted October 5, 2005, as amended.

*Source: ppea2019014 - Section II, Paragraph 2(b) on the access limits applicable to RCF disbursements shall be amended to*

### Section II. Trust Loans

### Section II. Trust Loans

### Eligibility and Conditions for Assistance

- (a) Eligibility:
  - The members on the list annexed to Decision No. 8240-(86/56) SAF, as amended, shall be eligible for assistance from the Trust.

- (b) Assistance under the ECF:
  - (1) Arrangement duration and structure:
    - ECF arrangements: single arrangement of no less than three years and up to four five years.
    - It would be expected that ECF arrangements would normally be approved for a period of three years, although arrangements for up to four five years may also be approved.
    - Member must present a detailed statement of policies and measures for the first twelve months and indicate how the program advances poverty reduction and growth objectives.
    - The ECF arrangement will prescribe:
      - total amount of resources committed;
      - amount to be made available during the first year;
      - phasing of disbursements during that year;
      - overall amounts to be made available during subsequent years.
    - Disbursements shall be phased at regular intervals no more than six months apart (one upon approval and at normally regular intervals thereafter).
    - Performance criteria applicable specifically to each disbursement and monitoring via quantitative benchmarks and structural benchmarks.
    - Structural benchmarks may be targeted for implementation either by a specific date or by the time of a specific review.
    - Reviews by the Trustee scheduled at the same intervals as disbursements to evaluate policies, implementation, and reach new understandings if necessary.
    - Determination of phasing and conditions for disbursements after the first year made by the Trustee in the context of reviews.
    - At each review, the member will present a detailed statement describing progress, policies for the next 12 months or remaining period, and how the program advances poverty reduction and growth objectives.
  - (2) Pre-approval condition:
    - The Trustee shall be satisfied that the member has a protracted balance of payments problem and is making an effort to strengthen substantially and in a sustainable manner its balance of payments position under a policy program supporting significant progress toward a stable and sustainable macroeconomic position consistent with strong and durable poverty reduction and growth.
  - (3) Review completion conditions (timing and PRS requirements):
    - (i) For ECF arrangements that will be approved starting January 1, 2016 Subject to subparagraph (ii) below, the Trustee shall not complete the first second or any subsequent review under an ECF arrangement unless it finds that:
      - (A) the member has a poverty reduction strategy developed and made publicly available normally within the previous 5 years but no more than 6 years, covering the period leading up to and covering the date of the completion of the relevant review; and
      - (B) the poverty reduction strategy has been issued to the Executive Board as an Economic Development Document (EDD) that and has been the subject of a staff analysis in the staff report on a request for an ECF arrangement or a review under an ECF arrangement.
    - Definitions and naming:
      - For purposes of this Instrument, the term EDD shall have the meaning as follows:
        - (a) an EDD may be A Poverty reduction strategy issued to the Executive Board on or after May 24, 2019 shall be named Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (PRGS) and a poverty reduction strategy that has been issued to the Executive Board as an Economic Development Document shall be deemed a PRGS.
        - A PRGS shall comprise any of the following:
          - (a) a document developed by a member country on its national development plan or strategy that is already in existence and publicly available, and documents its poverty reduction strategy; or
          - (b) an EDD may be a document newly prepared by a member country documenting its poverty reduction strategy. ; or
          - (c) a PRSP that has already been issued to the Executive Board as of June 22, 2015 and has been the subject of a staff analysis in a staff report on a request for an ECF arrangement or a review under an ECF arrangement so long as the poverty reduction strategy set out in the PRSP has been developed and made publicly available normally within the previous 5 years but no more than 6 years, and covers the period leading up to and covering the date of the completion of the relevant review.
        - An EDD A PRGS shall be accompanied by a cover letter from the member country concerned to the Managing Director, and shall be issued to the Executive Board with the cover letter. As such, the cover letter shall be deemed to constitute part of the EDD PRGS.
    - (ii) Transitional rule for arrangements in existence or approved June 22, 2015–December 31, 2015:
      - For ECF arrangements in existence as of June 22, 2015 or approved from June 22, 2015 to December 31, 2015, the Trustee shall not complete the second or any subsequent review unless it finds that the member has a poverty reduction strategy set out in:
        - (A) an EDD as defined in Section II, paragraph 1(b)(3)(i); or
        - (B) an IPRSP, PRSP preparation status report or APR that has been issued to the Executive Board normally within the previous 18 months and in any event not after December 31, 2015, and has been the subject of a staff analysis in the staff report on a request for an ECF arrangement or a review under an ECF arrangement.
    - (ii) (extension of deadline — numbering repeated in source) Extension for limited institutional capacity:
      - Members with limited institutional capacity may request Executive Board approval of an extension of the deadline for issuance of the PRGS up until the fourth review under the ECF arrangement.
      - Any request for an extension shall be made no later than the time of the request for completion of the second review.
      - A member may request approval of a further extension of the deadline up until the sixth review, provided that:
        - (A) the member can provide adequate justifications based on persistent limited institutional capacity for meeting the PRGS requirement and other urgent priorities; and
        - (B) the member’s arrangement has a duration of at least four years, or an extension of the arrangement to at least four years is requested.
      - Any request for such additional extension shall be made no later than the time of the request for completion of the review corresponding to the extended deadline.
    - (iii) Terminology:
      - For purposes of this Instrument, subject to Section II, paragraph 1(b)(3)(i)-(ii), the terms I-PRSP, PRSP, PRSP Preparation Status Report and APR shall have the meaning specified in Section I, paragraph 1 of the PRG-HIPC Trust Instrument (Annex to Decision No. 11436-(97/10), adopted February 4, 1997, as amended).
  - (4) Cancellation and automatic termination:
    - A member may cancel an ECF arrangement at any time by notifying the Fund.
    - An ECF arrangement for a member approved after the date of adoption of this decision will automatically terminate before its term if no program review under the arrangement has been completed over a period of eighteen months.
    - The Trustee may, at the authorities’ request, delay termination by up to three months where reaching understandings appears imminent.
    - The arrangement will automatically terminate at the end of the extended period unless a program review is completed within this period.
    - After expiration, cancellation, or automatic termination, the Trustee may approve additional ECF arrangements in accordance with this Instrument.

- (c) Assistance under the SCF:
  - (1) Arrangement duration and structure:
    - SCF arrangement period shall range from one to two three years.
    - Member must present a detailed statement of policies and measures for the first year and how the program advances poverty reduction and growth objectives.
    - Member will make an explicit statement, where applicable, about its intention to treat the SCF arrangement as precautionary.
    - The SCF arrangement will prescribe total resources committed and the phasing of disbursements; if the period exceeds one year, it may prescribe amounts for the first year and phasing during that year.
    - Disbursements phased at intervals no more than six months apart (one upon approval and at approximately regular intervals thereafter) with performance criteria and monitoring via quantitative and structural benchmarks.
    - SCF arrangements provide for Trustee reviews scheduled at the same intervals as disbursements.
    - Where period exceeds one year, phasing and conditions for disbursements following the first year may be made by the Trustee in reviews.
    - At each review, member will present a detailed statement of progress and policies for the next twelve months or remaining period and how program advances poverty reduction and growth objectives.
    - Member may request any previously scheduled and undrawn disbursement at any time provided the most recently scheduled review prior to the request has been completed.
    - After expiration or cancellation, Trustee may approve additional SCF arrangements provided that, normally, no SCF arrangement shall be approved that could result in a member having had SCF arrangements in place for more than two and a half three years out of any five six-year period, assessed on a rolling basis.
    - Trustee shall not include previously approved SCF arrangements that expired with no disbursement or new SCF arrangements whose approval the member requested and for which the Trustee assesses the member does not have an actual balance of payments need.
  - (2) Pre-approval conditions:
    - Trustee must be satisfied that:
      - (a) member does not have a protracted balance of payments problem, and has an actual or potential short-term balance of payment need expected to be resolved within two years and in any event not later than three years;
      - (b) balance of payments difficulties are not predominantly caused by a withdrawal of financial support by donors;
      - (c) member is implementing, or committed to implement, policies aimed at resolving the balance of payments difficulties and achieving, maintaining or restoring a stable and sustainable macroeconomic position consistent with strong and durable poverty reduction.
  - (3) Effective date limitation:
    - Notwithstanding subparagraph 2 above, no SCF arrangement shall be approved before January 1, 2010, based solely on the existence of a potential balance of payments need.
  - (4) Review completion conditions for longer SCF arrangements:
    - The Trustee shall not complete the second or any subsequent review under an SCF arrangement with an initial duration exceeding two years unless it finds:
      - (A) the member has a poverty reduction strategy developed and made publicly available normally within the previous 5 years but no more than 6 years, covering the period leading up to and covering the date of the completion of the relevant review; and
      - (B) the poverty reduction strategy has been issued to the Executive Board and has been the subject of a staff analysis in the staff report on a request for an SCF arrangement or a review under an SCF arrangement.
    - A Poverty reduction strategy issued to the Executive Board on or after May 24, 2019 shall be named Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (PRGS) and shall comprise:
      - (a) a document developed by a member country on its national development plan or strategy that is already in existence and publicly available, and documents its poverty reduction strategy; or
      - (b) a document newly prepared by a member country documenting its poverty reduction strategy.
    - A PRGS shall be accompanied by a cover letter from the member to the Managing Director, and shall be issued to the Executive Board with the cover letter; the cover letter shall be deemed to constitute part of the PRGS.

### Amount of Assistance

- Paragraph 2. Amount of Assistance:
  - (a) Overall access under all Trust facilities (Section I, Paragraph 1(a)):
    - Subject to:
      - (i) an annual limit of 75100 percent of quota; and
      - (ii) a cumulative limit of 225 300 percent of quota, net of scheduled repayments.
    - Fund may approve access in excess of these limits where member is experiencing an exceptionally large balance of payments need, has a comparatively strong adjustment program and ability to repay the Fund, does not have sustained past access to international financial markets have sustained past and prospective access to capital markets, and has income at or below the prevailing operational cutoff for assistance from the International Development Association (IDA);
      - provided that access shall in no case exceed:
        - (i) a maximum annual limit of 100 133.33 percent of quota, and
        - (ii) a maximum cumulative limit of 300 400 percent of quota, net of scheduled repayments.
    - For this sub-paragraph, a member is deemed to have sustained past access to international financial markets if, in addition to having income above 80 percent of the IDA operational cutoff, the sovereign has issued or guaranteed eligible external debt during at least two of the past five years in a cumulative amount equivalent to at least 25 percent of the member’s quota.
  - (b) Access under the RCF:
    - The access of each eligible member under the RCF shall be subject to:
      - an annual limit of 18.75 50 percent of quota, and
      - a cumulative limit of 75 100 percent of quota, net of scheduled repayments,
    - Provided that:
      - (i)(A) each disbursement shall not exceed 25 percent of quota except where, (A), the annual and cumulative access limits under the RCF shall be 37.5 percent of quota and 75 percent of quota respectively, net of scheduled repayments, in cases where (i) the member requests assistance under the RCF to address an urgent balance of payments need resulting primarily from a sudden and exogenous shock (including a large natural disaster under (ii) below), and (ii) the member’s existing and prospective policies are sufficiently strong to address the shock;
      - (ii)(B) the annual and cumulative access limits under the RCF shall be 60 80 percent of quota and 75133.33  percent of quota respectively, net of scheduled repayments, respectively, where (a)(i) the member requests assistance under the RCF to address an urgent balance of payments need resulting from a natural disaster that occasions damage assessed to be equivalent to or to exceed 20 percent of the member’s gross domestic product (GDP) and (b)(ii) the member’s existing and prospective policies are sufficiently strong to address the natural disaster shock.
    - (iii) Outstanding credit by a member under the rapid-access component of the ESF or outstanding purchases from the General Resources Account under emergency post conflict/natural disaster assistance covered by Decision No. 12341-(00/117), shall count towards the annual and cumulative limits applicable to access under the RCF.
    - With effect from July 1, 2015, any purchases from the General Resources Account under the Rapid Financing Instrument shall count towards the annual and cumulative limits applicable to access under the RCF.
  - (c) SCF average and annual access limits (conditional):
    - Unless the member has an actual balance of payment need at the time of approval of the arrangement, the Trustee shall not approve an SCF arrangement that provides for an average annual access in excess of 37.5 percent of quota and provides for annual access in excess of

56.25 percent of quota.

### Ad-hoc Augmentations and Other Provisions

- (h) Augmentation between scheduled reviews for ECF or SCF:
  - The amount of resources committed under an ECF or SCF arrangement may be increased by the Trustee in an ad-hoc review between scheduled reviews to address acute increases in underlying balance of payments problems that cannot await the next scheduled review.
  - Trustee shall not approve augmentation at an ad hoc review if the scheduled review associated with the most recent availability date preceding the augmentation request has not been completed.
  - Member must describe in a letter of intent the nature and size of its balance of payments difficulties and any information relevant to program implementation, including exogenous developments.
  - Before approving augmentation, the Trustee shall be satisfied that the program remains on track to achieve its objectives at the time of the augmentation, and that the member is in compliance with any continuous performance criteria or that a waiver of nonobservance is justified and that all prior actions have been met.
  - Requests for augmentation of access that do not exceed 12.5 15 percent of quota would be considered for approval on a lapse-of-time basis as provided for in Decision/A/13207, as amended.
  - Following Trustee approval, the augmentation will not exceed the amount immediately needed and will become available in a single disbursement, which the member may request at any time until the availability date of the next scheduled disbursement.
  - A program review following an augmentation between scheduled reviews would be expected to include a comprehensive review of policies; such review may not be completed on a lapse of time basis to allow the Trustee to undertake a comprehensive assessment.

*Source: ppea2019014 - Section II. Trust Loans*

### Annex II. Rapid Financing Instrument—Redlined Version

### Annex II. Rapid Financing Instrument—Redlined Version

### Assistance modality and form
- Assistance under this Decision shall be made available to members in the form of outright purchases.

### Access limits and conditional higher access
- Access by members to resources under this Decision shall be subject to (a) an annual limit of 5037.5 percent of quota, and (b) a cumulative limit of 100 75 percent of quota, net of scheduled repurchases, provided that the annual access limit shall be 80 60  percent of quota and the cumulative access limit shall be 133.33 percent of quota, net of scheduled repurchases, where (i) the member requests assistance under the RFI to address an urgent balance of payments need resulting from a natural disaster that occasions damage assessed to be equivalent to or to exceed 20 percent of the member’s gross domestic product (GDP), and (ii) the member's existing and prospective policies are sufficiently strong to address the natural disaster shock.

*Annex II. Rapid Financing Instrument—Redlined Version*

### 2.      The automatic termination would apply only to new SCF arrangements approved after

### ppea2019014 - 2.      The automatic termination would apply only to new SCF arrangements approved after

### Automatic termination of SCF arrangements
- The automatic termination would apply only to new SCF arrangements approved after the adoption by the Executive Board of this reform.
- As is the case for ECF arrangements, the new framework would permit the Executive Board, at the authorities’ request, to extend the eighteen-month period for up to three additional months, provided that:
  - (i) this extension does not fall outside the existing period of the arrangement; and
  - (ii) an understanding between the authorities and staff on targets and measures to put the SCF-supported program back on track appears imminent.
- The arrangement would automatically expire at the end of the further extended period unless a program review is completed.
- Footnote: As is the case for ECF arrangements, the eighteen-month period will count from the date of approval of the SCF arrangement, or from the date when the Executive Board last completed a review under the SCF arrangement.
- SCF arrangements approved after the effectiveness of this amendment would include a clause referring to the automatic termination of the arrangement.

### Market access criterion alignment
- It is proposed to further modify the proposal on the alignment of the market access criterion for exceptional access with that used in blending as set forth in Decision I in Supp. 1.
- Decision I in Supplement 1 refers to issuance or guarantee of eligible external debt by the sovereign during at least 2 of the past 5 years in a cumulative amount of at least 25 percent of quota.
- It is proposed to further revise the reference to “eligible external debt” to align past market access with relevant definitions under the Executive Board Decision governing eligibility to concessional assistance under the PRGT (i.e., Decision No. 14521-(10/3), as amended).

### Package and documentation
- The reform proposal is part of the package of proposals set forth in the LIC Facilities Review.
- A revised proposed Decision I for consideration by Executive Directors sets forth:
  - (i) all the proposed amendments to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust Instrument set forth in Supp. 1;
  - (ii) the provisions on automatic termination of SCF arrangements; and
  - (iii) further modification to the proposal on alignment of the market access criterion for exceptional access with that for blending.
- A redlined version of the PRGT Instrument is attached in Annex I. Decisions II-V and redlined texts showing the proposed amendments (unchanged from Supp. 1) are also attached for Directors' convenience.

### Proposed amendments to the PRGT Instrument — duration and extensions
- Initial duration and extension of ECF arrangements:
  - In Section II, paragraph 1(b) (1) of the PRGT Instrument, the references to “up to four years” in the first and second sentences shall be replaced by “up to five years”.
- Initial duration and extension of SCF arrangements:
  - In Section II, paragraph 1(c) (1) of the PRGT Instrument:
    - the reference to “from one to two years” in the second sentence shall be replaced by “from one to three years”;
    - the word “or” shall be added in the ninth sentence after the words “the next twelve months”;
    - the reference to “or the automatic termination of the SCF arrangement” shall be added in the tenth sentence after the words “or the cancellation of the SCF arrangement by the member”;
    - the reference to “two and a half years out of any five-year period” in the penultimate sentence shall be replaced by “three years out of any six-year period”.

### Overall amount of access under PRGT arrangements
- Section II, Paragraph 2(a) shall be amended to read:
  - “(a) The overall access of each eligible member to the resources of the Trust under all facilities of the Trust as specified in Section I, Paragraph 1(a) shall be subject to (i) an annual limit of 100 percent of quota; and (ii) a cumulative limit of 300 percent of quota, net of scheduled repayments. The Fund may approve access in excess of these limits in cases where the member is experiencing an exceptionally large balance of payments need, has a comparatively strong adjustment program and ability to repay the Fund, does not have sustained past access to international financial markets, and has income at or below the prevailing operational cutoff for assistance from the International Development Association (IDA); provided that access shall in no case exceed (i) a maximum annual limit of 133.33 percent of quota, and (ii) a maximum cumulative limit of 400 percent of quota, net of scheduled repayments. For the purpose of this sub-paragraph, a member is deemed to have sustained past access to international financial markets if, in addition to having income above 80 percent of the IDA operational cutoff, the public debtor has issued or guaranteed external bonds or has received disbursements under external commercial loans contracted or guaranteed by the public debtor, as defined in Executive Board Decision No. 14521-(10/3), as amended, during at least two of the past five years in a cumulative amount equivalent to at least 25 percent of the member’s quota.”

### Sub-limits for access under the RCF
- Section II, Paragraph 2(b) shall be amended to read:
  - “(b) The access of each eligible member under the RCF shall be subject to an annual limit of 50 percent of quota, and a cumulative limit of 100 percent of quota, net of scheduled repayments, subject to the following provisions:
    - (i) each disbursement shall not exceed 25 percent of quota except where the member requests assistance under the RCF to address an urgent balance of payments need resulting primarily from a sudden and exogenous shock (including a large natural disaster under (ii) below) and the member’s existing and prospective policies are sufficiently strong to address the shock;
    - (ii) the annual and cumulative access limits under the RCF shall be 80 percent of quota and

133.33  percent of quota, net of scheduled repayments, respectively, where (a) the member requests assistance under the RCF to address an urgent balance of payments need resulting from a natural disaster that occasions damage assessed to be equivalent to or to exceed 20 percent of the member’s gross domestic product (GDP), and (b) the member’s existing and prospective policies are sufficiently strong to address the natural disaster shock; and
    - (iii) outstanding credit by a member under the rapid-access component of the ESF or outstanding purchases from the General Resources Account under emergency post conflict/natural disaster assistance covered by Decision No. 12341-(00/117), shall count towards the annual and cumulative limits applicable to access under the RCF. With effect from July 1, 2015, any purchases from the General Resources Account under the Rapid Financing Instrument shall count towards the annual and cumulative limits applicable to access under the RCF.”

### Sub-limit on precautionary use of the SCF
- Section II, Paragraph 2(c) establishing sub-limits on access at approval of precautionary SCF arrangements shall be deleted from the PRGT Instrument to abolish such sub-limits.

### Increase in the threshold for lapse of time procedures for ECF and SCF augmentation requests
- Section II, Paragraph 2(h) shall be amended to increase the threshold for lapse of time procedures for ECF and SCF augmentation requests.
- Amended text for Section II, Paragraph 2(h):
  - “(h) The amount of resources committed to a qualifying member under an ECF or SCF arrangement may also be increased by the Trustee in an ad-hoc review between scheduled reviews under the arrangement to address an increase in the underlying balance of payments problems of the qualifying member where the problem is so acute that the augmentation cannot await the next scheduled review under the arrangement. The Trustee, however, shall not approve requests for augmentation at an ad hoc review if the scheduled review associated with the most recent availability date preceding the augmentation request has not been completed. In support of a request for augmentation between scheduled reviews under an ECF or SCF arrangement, the member will describe in a letter of intent the nature and size of its balance of payment difficulties, and any information relevant to program implementation, including exogenous developments. Before approving such augmentation, the Trustee shall be satisfied that the program remains on track to achieve its objectives at the time of the augmentation, based on the information provided by the member, and, in particular, that the member is in

compliance with any continuous performance criteria or that a waiver of nonobservance is justified and that all prior actions have been met. Requests for augmentation of access that do not exceed 15 percent of quota would be considered for approval on a lapse-of-time basis as provided for in Decision/A/13207, as amended. Following its approval by the Trustee, the augmentation of access under the arrangement will not exceed the amount immediately needed by the member in light of its balance of payments difficulties and will become available to the member in a single disbursement, which the member may request at any time until the availability date of the next scheduled disbursement under the ECF or SCF arrangement. A program review following an augmentation of access under the arrangement between scheduled reviews would be expected to include a comprehensive review of policies under the program. In order to allow the Trustee to undertake such a comprehensive assessment of the member’s policies, this review may not be completed on a lapse of time basis.”

*Source: THE 2018–19 REVIEW OF FACILITIES FOR LOW–INCOME COUNTRIES–REVISED PROPOSED DECISION (excerpt).*

### Section II, Paragraph 1(b)(3) of the PRGT Instrument shall be amended to read:

### ppea2019014 - Section II, Paragraph 1(b)(3) of the PRGT Instrument shall be amended to read:

### Amendments to Section II, Paragraph 1(b)(3) — PRGT second and subsequent reviews
- Trustee prohibition: The Trustee shall not complete the second or any subsequent review under an ECF arrangement unless it finds both:
  - (A) the member has a poverty reduction strategy that has been developed and made publicly available normally within the previous 5 years but no more than 6 years, and covers the period leading up to and covering the date of the completion of the relevant review; and
  - (B) the poverty reduction strategy has been issued to the Executive Board and has been the subject of a staff analysis in the staff report on a request for an ECF arrangement or a review under an ECF arrangement.
- Naming and deeming:
  - "A Poverty reduction strategy issued to the Executive Board on or after May 24, 2019 shall be named Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (PRGS) and a poverty reduction strategy that has been issued to the Executive Board as an Economic Development Document shall be deemed a PRGS."
- What constitutes a PRGS:
  - (a) a document developed by a member country on its national development plan or strategy that is already in existence and publicly available, and documents its poverty reduction strategy; or
  - (b) a document newly prepared by a member country documenting its poverty reduction strategy.
- Accompanying documentation:
  - "A PRGS shall be accompanied by a cover letter from the member country concerned to the Managing Director, and shall be issued to the Executive Board with the cover letter. As such, the cover letter shall be deemed to constitute part of the PRGS."

### Extensions for members with limited institutional capacity
- Extension up to fourth review:
  - Members with limited institutional capacity may request Executive Board approval of an extension of the deadline for issuance of the PRGS up until the fourth review under the ECF arrangement.
  - Any request for an extension shall be made no later than the time of the request for completion of the second review.
- Further extension up to sixth review:
  - A member may request approval of a further extension of the deadline for issuance of the PRGS up until the sixth review under the ECF arrangement, provided that:
    - (A) the member can provide adequate justifications based on persistent limited institutional capacity for meeting the PRGS requirement and other urgent priorities; and
    - (B) the member’s arrangement has a duration of at least four years, or an extension of the arrangement to at least four years is requested.
  - Timing requirement: "Any request for such additional extension of the deadline for issuance of the PRGS shall be made no later than the time of the request for completion of the review corresponding to the extended deadline for the PRGS requirement."

### New requirement for SCF arrangements (Section II, Paragraph 1(c)(4))
- Trustee prohibition for SCF reviews: "The Trustee shall not complete the second or any subsequent review under an SCF arrangement with an initial duration exceeding two years unless it finds that:"
  - (A) the member has a poverty reduction strategy developed and made publicly available normally within the previous 5 years but no more than 6 years, covering the period up to the completion date of the relevant review; and
  - (B) the poverty reduction strategy has been issued to the Executive Board and has been the subject of a staff analysis in the staff report on a request for an SCF arrangement or a review under an SCF arrangement.
- PRGS definition for SCF: "A Poverty reduction strategy issued to the Executive Board on or after May 24, 2019 shall be named Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (PRGS) and shall comprise any of the following: (a) ... ; or (b) ... . A PRGS shall be accompanied by a cover letter from the member country concerned to the Managing Director, and shall be issued to the Executive Board with the cover letter. As such, the cover letter shall be deemed to constitute part of the PRGS."

### Defunct SCF arrangements and automatic termination (new Section II, paragraph 1(c)(5))
- Member cancellation: "A member may cancel an SCF arrangement at any time by notifying the Fund of such cancellation."
- Automatic termination trigger:
  - An SCF arrangement approved after adoption of this decision, with an initial duration of more than 24 months or extended to more than 24 months, will automatically terminate before its term if no program review under the arrangement has been completed over a period of eighteen months.
- Trustee discretion to delay termination:
  - "The Trustee, at the authorities’ request, may decide to delay the termination of the arrangement by up to three months in cases where the reaching of understandings between the authorities and the Trustee on targets and measures to put the SCF-supported program back on track within the term of the arrangement, appears imminent."
- Finality of termination: "The SCF arrangement will automatically terminate at the end of the extended period unless a program review under the arrangement is completed within this period."

### Amendments to the Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) Decision (Paragraph 5)
- Form of assistance: "Assistance under this Decision shall be made available to members in the form of outright purchases."
- Access limits:
  - Annual limit: "an annual limit of 50 percent of quota"
  - Cumulative limit: "a cumulative limit of 100 percent of quota, net of scheduled repurchases"
- Higher access limits for natural disaster cases:
  - Annual access limit becomes "80 percent of quota" and cumulative access limit becomes "133.33 percent of quota, net of scheduled repurchases" where both conditions apply:
    - (i) the member requests assistance under the RFI to address an urgent balance of payments need resulting from a natural disaster that occasions damage assessed to be equivalent to or to exceed 20 percent of the member’s gross domestic product (GDP), and
    - (ii) the member's existing and prospective policies are sufficiently strong to address the natural disaster shock.

### Amendments to the Policy Support Instrument (PSI) Framework Decision
- Paragraph 5 amendment:
  - "5. Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) Documents. The member’s program will be based on the member’s poverty reduction strategy, which will be set forth in a Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (PRGS)."
- Paragraph 8(ii) amendment — Trustee prohibition for PSI reviews:
  - Trustee shall not complete the second or any subsequent review under a PSI with an initial duration exceeding two years unless it finds:
    - (A) member has a poverty reduction strategy developed and made publicly available normally within the previous 5 years but no more than 6 years, covering the period up to the completion date of the relevant review; and
    - (B) the poverty reduction strategy has been issued to the Executive Board and has been the subject of a staff analysis in the staff report on a request for a PSI or a review under a PSI.
  - PRGS naming and deeming: "A Poverty reduction strategy issued to the Executive Board on or after May 24, 2019 shall be named Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (PRGS) as set forth in paragraph 5 above and a poverty reduction strategy that has been issued to the Executive Board as an Economic Development Document shall be deemed a PRGS."
  - PRGS composition and cover letter requirements identical to the PRGT amendments.

### Amendments to the Transparency Policy Decision
- Paragraph 4.a amendment — publication consent requirement:
  - The Managing Director will not recommend Executive Board approval of:
    - (i) an arrangement under the PRGT or completion of a review under such arrangement, or
    - (ii) a Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) decision point or completion point decision, or
    - (iii) a member’s request for a PSI or the completion of a review under a PSI,
  - if the member concerned does not explicitly consent to the publication of its I-PRSP, PRSP, PRSP preparation status report, PRSP annual progress report (APR), Economic Development Document ("EDD") or PRGS (Document 10 or Document 15, as the case may be).
- Paragraph 11 amendment — Press Release and Chairman’s statement procedures:
  - After Executive Board actions listed (i)–(iv), a Press Release containing a Chairman’s statement on the discussion will be issued to the public; where relevant, the Chairman’s statement will contain a summary of HIPC Initiative decisions and the Executive Board’s views on the member’s I-PRSP, PRSP, PRSP preparation status report, APR, EDD or PRGS in the context of use of Fund resources or a PSI.
  - Waivers and specified matters will be mentioned in the factual statement section of the Press Release or in a factual statement issued in lieu of a Chairman’s statement.
  - Chairman will read the Press Release if requested and the member’s Executive Director may review and propose minor revisions and consent to publication immediately after the Executive Board meeting.
  - Exception: No Press Release shall contain any reference to a discussion or decision pertaining to a member’s overdue financial obligations to the Fund where a Press Release limiting the member’s use of Fund resources because of overdue obligations has not yet been issued. For Executive Board meetings solely about overdue financial obligations, no Chairman’s statement will be published.
- Paragraph 13.b(i) amendment — factual statement when member does not consent:
  - If a member does not consent to publication of a Press Release containing a Chairman’s statement (or no Chairman’s statement issued because of lapse-of-time), a brief factual statement will be issued immediately after the Board consideration describing the Executive Board’s decision relating to:
    - (a) the member’s use of Fund resources (including HIPC initiative decisions (Document 8), waivers (Document 21), and consideration of PRSP documents, EDDs and PRGSs (Document 10), when relevant), or
    - (b) the approval of a PSI or a PCI for that member, or the conduct of a review under that member’s PSI or PCI (including waivers (Document 22) and consideration of PRSP documents, EDDs and PRGSs (Document 15), when relevant).
- Paragraph 28 amendment — publication timing exceptions:
  - "Documents may be published under this decision only after their consideration by the Executive Board, except for documents that are circulated for information only including: (i) I-PRSPs, PRSPs, EDDs and PRGSs; and (ii) Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) and Assessment of Financial Sector Supervision and Regulation (AFSSR) Reports. Documents covered by this paragraph may be published immediately after circulation to the Executive Board."
- Indicative list amendments:
  - Item 10 amended to read: "10. I-PRSPs, PRSPs, PRSP Preparation Status Reports, APRs, EDDs and PRGSs"
  - Item 15 amended to read: "15. I-PRSPs, PRSPs, PRSP Preparation Status Reports, APRs, EDDs and PRGSs in the context of PSIs"

### Amendments to the Decision on Web Posting of PRS Documentation
- Web posting constitutes issuance:
  - Web posting of PRSPs, Interim PRSPs, APRs of PRSPs, PRSP Preparation Status reports, EDDs and PRGSs in accordance with SM/06/359 (10/25/06) shall be taken to constitute issuance of such documents to the Executive Board for the purposes of:
    - (1) Section II, paragraph 1(b)(3) and paragraph 1(c)(4) of the Instrument to Establish the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, Annex to Decision No. 8759-(87/176), adopted December 18, 1987, as amended;
    - (2) Section III, paragraph 2(c) of the Instrument to Establish a Trust for Special PRGF Operations for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and Interim PRGF Subsidy Operations, Annex to Decision No. 11436-(97/10), adopted February 4, 1997, as amended; and
    - (3) paragraph 8 of the Policy Support Instrument-Framework, Decision No. 13561-(05/85), adopted October 5, 2005, as amended.

*Source: ppea2019014 - Section II, Paragraph 1(b)(3) of the PRGT Instrument shall be amended to read (excerpt).*

### Section II. Trust Loans

### Section II. Trust Loans

### Eligibility and Conditions for Assistance

- (a) The members on the list annexed to Decision No. 8240-(86/56) SAF, as amended, shall be eligible for assistance from the Trust.

- (b) Assistance under the ECF
  - (1) Assistance under the ECF shall be committed and made available to a qualifying member under a single arrangement of no less than three years and up to four five years (hereinafter called an “ECF arrangement”) in support of a macroeconomic and structural adjustment program presented by the member.
  - ECF arrangements would normally be approved for a period of three years, although arrangements for up to four five years may also be approved, where appropriate, and if the member so requests.
  - The member shall present a detailed statement of the policies and measures it intends to pursue for the first twelve months of the arrangement, and indicate how the program advances the member’s poverty reduction and growth objectives, in line with the objectives and policies of the program.
  - The ECF arrangement will prescribe:
    - the total amount of resources committed to the member,
    - the amount to be made available during the first year of the arrangement,
    - the phasing of disbursements during that year,
    - and the overall amounts to be made available during the subsequent years of the arrangement.
  - Disbursements shall be phased at regular intervals no more than six months apart (one upon approval and at normally regular intervals thereafter) with performance criteria applicable specifically to each disbursement and appropriate monitoring of key financial variables in the form of quantitative benchmarks and structural benchmarks for critical structural reforms.
  - Structural benchmarks may be targeted for implementation either by a specific date or by the time of a specific review under the ECF arrangement.
  - The ECF arrangement shall also provide for reviews by the Trustee of the member’s program scheduled at intervals that are the same as those applicable to disbursements to evaluate the macroeconomic and structural reform policies of the member and the implementation of its program and reach new understandings if necessary.
  - Determination of the phasing of, and the conditions applying to, disbursements after the first year of the ECF arrangement will be made by the Trustee in the context of reviews of the program with the member.
  - At each review, the member will present a detailed statement describing:
    - progress made under the program,
    - the policies it will follow during the next 12 months or up to the remaining period of the arrangement to further the realization of the objectives of the program,
    - and how the program advances the country’s poverty reduction and growth objectives, with such modifications as may be necessary to assist it to achieve its objectives in changing circumstances.
  - (2) Before approving an ECF arrangement, the Trustee shall be satisfied that the member has a protracted balance of payments problem and is making an effort to strengthen substantially and in a sustainable manner its balance of payments position under a policy program that supports significant progress toward a stable and sustainable macroeconomic position consistent with strong and durable poverty reduction and growth.
  - (3) (i) With respect to ECF arrangements that will be approved starting January 1, 2016 Subject to subparagraph (ii) below, the Trustee shall not complete the first second or any subsequent review under an ECF arrangement unless it finds that:
    - (A) the member concerned has a poverty reduction strategy that has been developed and made publicly available normally within the previous 5 years but no more than 6 years, and covers the period leading up to and covering the date of the completion of the relevant review; and
    - (B) the poverty reduction strategy has been issued to the Executive Board as an Economic Development Document (EDD) that and has been the subject of a staff analysis in the staff report on a request for an ECF arrangement or a review under an ECF arrangement.
  - For purposes of this Instrument, the term EDD shall have the meaning as follows:
    - (a) an EDD may be A Poverty reduction strategy issued to the Executive Board on or after May 24, 2019 shall be named Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (PRGS) and a poverty reduction strategy that has been issued to the Executive Board as an Economic Development Document shall be deemed a PRGS.
    - A PRGS shall comprise any of the following:
      - (a) a document developed by a member country on its national development plan or strategy that is already in existence and publicly available, and documents its poverty reduction strategy; or
      - (b) an EDD may be a document newly prepared by a member country documenting its poverty reduction strategy. ; or
      - (c) a PRSP that has already been issued to the Executive Board as of June 22, 2015 and has been the subject of a staff analysis in a staff report on a request for an ECF arrangement or a review under an ECF arrangement so long as the poverty reduction strategy set out in the PRSP has been developed and made publicly available normally within the previous 5 years but no more than 6 years, and covers the period leading up to and covering the date of the completion of the relevant review.
    - An EDD A PRGS shall be accompanied by a cover letter from the member country concerned to the Managing Director, and shall be issued to the Executive Board with the cover letter. As such, the cover letter shall be deemed to constitute part of the EDD PRGS.
  - (ii) With respect to ECF arrangements that are in existence as of June 22, 2015 or will be approved from June 22, 2015 to December 31, 2015, the Trustee shall not complete the second or any subsequent review unless it finds that the member concerned has a poverty reduction strategy set out in:
    - (A) an EDD as defined in Section II, paragraph 1(b)(3)(i) above; or
    - (B) an IPRSP, PRSP preparation status report or APR that has been issued to the Executive Board normally within the previous 18 months and in any event not after December 31, 2015, and has been the subject of a staff analysis in the staff report on a request for an ECF arrangement or a review under an ECF arrangement.
  - (ii) In cases where a member has limited institutional capacity for meeting the PRGS requirement specified in subparagraph (i) above, the member may request approval by the Executive Board of an extension of the deadline for issuance of the PRGS up until the fourth review under the ECF arrangement.
    - Any request for an extension shall be made no later than the time of the request for completion of the second review.
    - A member may request approval of a further extension of the deadline for issuance of the PRGS up until the sixth review under the ECF arrangement, provided that:
      - (A) the member can provide adequate justifications based on persistent limited institutional capacity for meeting the PRGS requirement and other urgent priorities; and
      - (B) the member’s arrangement has a duration of at least four years, or an extension of the arrangement to at least four years is requested.
    - Any request for such additional extension of the deadline for issuance of the PRGS shall be made no later than the time of the request for completion of the review corresponding to the extended deadline for the PRGS requirement.
  - (iii) For purposes of this Instrument, subject to the terms of Section II, paragraph 1(b)(3)(i)-(ii) above, the terms I-PRSP. PRSP, PRSP Preparation Status Report and APR shall have the meaning specified in Section I, paragraph 1 of the PRG-HIPC Trust Instrument (Annex to Decision No. 11436-(97/10), adopted February 4, 1997, as amended).
  - (4) A member may cancel an ECF arrangement at any time by notifying the Fund of such cancellation.
    - An ECF arrangement for a member approved after the date of adoption of this decision will automatically terminate before its term if no program review under the arrangement has been completed over a period of eighteen months.
    - The Trustee, at the authorities’ request, may decide to delay the termination of the arrangement by up to three months in cases where the reaching of understandings between the authorities and the Trustee on targets and measures to put the ECF-supported program back on track within the term of the arrangement, appears imminent.
    - The ECF arrangement will automatically terminate at the end of the extended period unless a program review under the arrangement is completed within this period.
    - After the expiration of an ECF arrangement for a member, the cancellation of the ECF arrangement by the member, or the automatic termination of the ECF arrangement, the Trustee may approve additional ECF arrangements for an eligible member in accordance with this Instrument.

- (c) Assistance under the SCF
  - (1) Assistance under the SCF shall be committed and made available to a qualifying member under an arrangement (hereinafter called an “SCF arrangement”) in support of a macroeconomic and structural adjustment program presented by the member.
  - The period for an SCF arrangement shall range from one to two three years.
  - The member shall present a detailed statement of the policies and measures it intends to pursue during the first year of the arrangement, and how the program advances the member’s poverty reduction and growth objectives.
  - The member will make an explicit statement, where applicable, about its intention to treat the SCF arrangement as precautionary.
  - The SCF arrangement will prescribe the total amount of resources committed to the member and the phasing of disbursements during the period of the arrangement; provided that in cases where the period of a SCF arrangement exceeds one year, the arrangement may prescribe the amount to be made available during the first year of the arrangement and the phasing of disbursements during that year.
  - Disbursements shall be phased at regular intervals no more than six months apart (one upon approval and at approximately regular intervals thereafter) with performance criteria applicable specifically to each disbursement and appropriate monitoring of key financial variables in the form of quantitative benchmarks and structural benchmarks for critical structural reforms.
  - The SCF arrangement shall also provide for reviews by the Trustee of the member’s program scheduled at intervals that are the same as those applicable to disbursements to evaluate the macroeconomic and structural reform policies of the member and the implementation of its program and reach new understandings if necessary.
  - In cases where the period of a SCF arrangement exceeds one year, the determination of the phasing of, and the conditions applying to, disbursements during the period of the arrangement following the first year may be made by the Trustee in the context of reviews of the program with the member.
  - At the time of each review, the member will present a detailed statement describing progress made under the program, the policies it will follow during the next twelve months or up to the remaining period of the arrangement to further the realization of the objectives of the program, and how the program advances the country’s poverty reduction and growth objectives, with such modifications as may be necessary to assist it to achieve its objectives in changing circumstances.
  - The member may request at any time any previously scheduled and undrawn disbursement under an SCF arrangement, provided that the most recently scheduled review under the arrangement prior to the request has been completed.
  - After the expiration of an SCF arrangement for a member, or the cancellation of the SCF arrangement by the member, or the automatic termination of the SCF arrangement, the Trustee may approve additional SCF arrangements for that member in accordance with the Instrument provided that, normally, no SCF arrangement shall be approved that could result in a member having had SCF arrangements in place for more than two and a half three years out of any five six-year period, assessed on a rolling basis.
  - In applying this limitation, the Trustee shall not include previously approved SCF arrangements that have expired with no disbursement having taken place or new SCF arrangements whose approval the member has requested and for which the Trustee, at the time of consideration of the request, assesses that the member does not have an actual balance of payments need.
  - (2) Before approving a SCF arrangement, the Trustee shall be satisfied that:
    - (a) the member does not have a protracted balance of payments problem, and has an actual or potential short-term balance of payment need that is expected (or in the case of a potential balance of payments need, would be expected) to be resolved within two years and in any event not later than three years;
    - (b) the member’s balance of payments difficulties are not predominantly caused by a withdrawal of financial support by donors; and
    - (c) the member is implementing, or is committed to implement, policies aimed at resolving the balance of payments difficulties it is encountering or could encounter, and at achieving, maintaining or restoring a stable and sustainable macroeconomic position consistent with strong and durable poverty reduction.
  - (3) Notwithstanding subparagraph 2 above, no SCF arrangement shall be approved before January 1, 2010, based solely on the existence of a potential balance of payments need.
  - (4) The Trustee shall not complete the second or any subsequent review under an SCF arrangement with an initial duration exceeding two years unless it finds that:
    - (A) the member concerned has a poverty reduction strategy that has been developed and made publicly available normally within the previous 5 years but no more than 6 years, and covers the period leading up to and covering the date of the completion of the relevant review; and
    - (B) the poverty reduction strategy has been issued to the Executive Board and has been the subject of a staff analysis in the staff report on a request for an SCF arrangement or a review under an SCF arrangement.
  - A Poverty reduction strategy issued to the Executive Board on or after May 24, 2019 shall be named Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (PRGS) and shall comprise any of the following:
    - (a) a document developed by a member country on its national development plan or strategy that is already in existence and publicly available, and documents its poverty reduction strategy; or
    - (b) a document newly prepared by a member country documenting its poverty reduction strategy.
  - A PRGS shall be accompanied by a cover letter from the member country concerned to the Managing Director, and shall be issued to the Executive Board with the cover letter. As such, the cover letter shall be deemed to constitute part of the PRGS.
  - (5) A member may cancel an SCF arrangement at any time by notifying the Fund of such cancellation.
    - An SCF arrangement for a member approved after the date of adoption of this decision, which has an initial duration of more than 24 months or is extended to more than 24 months, will automatically terminate before its term if no program review under the arrangement has been completed over a period of eighteen months.
    - The Trustee, at the authorities’ request, may decide to delay the termination of the arrangement by up to three months in cases where the reaching of understandings between the authorities and the Trustee on targets and measures to put the SCF-supported program back on track within the term of the arrangement, appears imminent.
    - The SCF arrangement will automatically terminate at the end of the extended period unless a program review under the arrangement is completed within this period.

### Amount of Assistance

- (a) Overall limits
  - The overall access of each eligible member to the resources of the Trust under all facilities of the Trust as specified in Section I, Paragraph 1(a) shall be subject to:
    - (i) an annual limit of 75100 percent of quota; and
    - (ii) a cumulative limit of 225 300 percent of quota, net of scheduled repayments.
  - The Fund may approve access in excess of these limits in cases where the member is experiencing an exceptionally large balance of payments need, has a comparatively strong adjustment program and ability to repay the Fund, does not have sustained past access to international financial markets have sustained past and prospective access to capital markets, and has income at or below the prevailing operational cutoff for assistance from the International Development Association (IDA);
    - provided that access shall in no case exceed:
      - (i) a maximum annual limit of 100 133.33 percent of quota, and
      - (ii) a maximum cumulative limit of 300 400 percent of quota, net of scheduled repayments.
  - For the purpose of this sub-paragraph, a member is deemed to have sustained past access to international financial markets if, in addition to having income above 80 percent of the IDA operational cutoff, the public debtor has issued or guaranteed external bonds or has received disbursements under external commercial loans contracted or guaranteed by the public debtor, as defined in Executive Board Decision No. 14521-(10/3), as amended, during at least two of the past five years in a cumulative amount equivalent to at least 25 percent of the member’s quota.

- (b) Access under the RCF
  - The access of each eligible member under the RCF shall be subject to an annual limit of 18.75 50 percent of quota, and a cumulative limit of 75 100 percent of quota, net of scheduled repayments, subject to the following provisions:
    - (i)(A) each disbursement shall not exceed 25 percent of quota except where, (A) the annual and cumulative access limits under the RCF shall be 37.5 percent of quota and 75 percent of quota respectively, net of scheduled repayments, in cases where (i) the member requests assistance under the RCF to address an urgent balance of payments need resulting primarily from a sudden and exogenous shock (including a large natural disaster under (ii) below), and (ii) the member’s existing and prospective policies are sufficiently strong to address the shock;
    - (ii)(B) the annual and cumulative access limits under the RCF shall be 60 80 percent of quota and 75133.33  percent of quota respectively, net of scheduled repayments, respectively, where (a)(i) the member requests assistance under the RCF to address an urgent balance of payments need resulting from a natural disaster that occasions damage assessed to be equivalent to or to exceed 20 percent of the member’s gross domestic product (GDP) and (b)(ii) the member’s existing and prospective policies are sufficiently strong to address the natural disaster shock; and .
    - (iii) Outstanding credit by a member under the rapid-access component of the ESF or outstanding purchases from the General Resources Account under emergency post conflict/natural disaster assistance covered by Decision No. 12341-(00/117), shall count towards the annual and cumulative limits applicable to access under the RCF.
    - With effect from July 1, 2015, any purchases from the General Resources Account under the Rapid Financing Instrument shall count towards the annual and cumulative limits applicable to access under the RCF.

- (c) Unless the member has an actual balance of payment need at the time of approval of the arrangement, the Trustee shall not approve an SCF arrangement that provides for an average annual access in excess of 37.5 percent of quota and provides for annual access in excess of

*Source: ppea2019014 - Section II. Trust Loans*

### 56.25 percent of quota.

### ppea2019014 - 56.25 percent of quota.

### Augmentation of ECF/SCF arrangements between scheduled reviews
- The Trustee may increase resources committed to a qualifying member under an ECF or SCF arrangement in an ad-hoc review between scheduled reviews to address an increase in the underlying balance of payments problems where the problem is so acute that the augmentation cannot await the next scheduled review.
- The Trustee shall not approve augmentation at an ad hoc review if the scheduled review associated with the most recent availability date preceding the augmentation request has not been completed.
- Requirements for a member requesting augmentation between scheduled reviews:
  - The member will describe in a letter of intent the nature and size of its balance of payment difficulties, and any information relevant to program implementation, including exogenous developments.
  - The Trustee must be satisfied that the program remains on track to achieve its objectives at the time of the augmentation, based on the information provided by the member.
  - The member must be in compliance with any continuous performance criteria or a waiver of nonobservance must be justified and all prior actions must have been met.
- Procedural and quantum features:
  - Requests for augmentation of access that do not exceed 12.5 15 percent of quota would be considered for approval on a lapse-of-time basis as provided for in Decision/A/13207, as amended.
  - Following Trustee approval, the augmentation of access under the arrangement will not exceed the amount immediately needed by the member in light of its balance of payments difficulties and will become available in a single disbursement, which the member may request at any time until the availability date of the next scheduled disbursement under the ECF or SCF arrangement.
  - A program review following an augmentation of access under the arrangement between scheduled reviews would be expected to include a comprehensive review of policies under the program; this review may not be completed on a lapse of time basis to allow the Trustee to undertake a comprehensive assessment.

### Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) access limits and exceptional natural disaster provision
- Assistance under the Decision is made available as outright purchases.
- Access limits (as written):
  - Annual limit of 5037.5 percent of quota.
  - Cumulative limit of 100 75 percent of quota, net of scheduled repurchases.
- Exceptional natural disaster access (conditional higher limits):
  - The annual access limit shall be 80 60  percent of quota and the cumulative access limit shall be 133.33 percent of quota, net of scheduled repurchases, where:
    - (i) the member requests assistance under the RFI to address an urgent balance of payments need resulting from a natural disaster that occasions damage assessed to be equivalent to or to exceed 20 percent of the member’s gross domestic product (GDP), and
    - (ii) the member's existing and prospective policies are sufficiently strong to address the natural disaster shock.

### Policy Support Instrument (PSI) review and PRS/EDD/PRGS requirements
- Program assessment cadence:
  - Implementation under a PSI will be assessed through program reviews, scheduled normally at regular intervals no more than six months apart.
  - A review can be completed only if the Executive Board is satisfied that the member’s program is on track and that the conditions for the approval of a PSI continue to be met.
  - Having conducted, but not completed, a scheduled review, the Executive Board may subsequently return to that review, unless the previous scheduled review was not completed. Documentation supporting a return must be issued prior to the earliest test date of the periodic quantitative assessment criteria linked to the next scheduled review, except the staff report may be issued up to one month after that earliest test date.
- Duration-related documentary requirements:
  - The Trustee shall not complete the first second or any subsequent review under a PSI with an initial duration exceeding two years unless it finds that:
    - (A) the member has a poverty reduction strategy developed and made publicly available normally within the previous 5 years but no more than 6 years, covering the period leading up to and covering the date of the completion of the relevant review; and
    - (B) the poverty reduction strategy has been issued to the Executive Board as an EDD that has been the subject of a staff analysis in the staff report on a request for a PSI or a review under a PSI.
  - Definitions and naming:
    - For purposes of this Instrument, an EDD may be A Poverty reduction strategy issued to the Executive Board on or after May 24, 2019 shall be named Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (PRGS) as set forth in paragraph 5 above and a poverty reduction strategy that has been issued to the Executive Board as an Economic Development Document shall be deemed a PRGS.
    - A PRGS shall comprise any of the following: (a) a document developed by a member country on its national development plan or strategy that is already in existence and publicly available, and documents its poverty reduction strategy; or (b) an EDD may be a document newly prepared by a member country documenting its poverty reduction strategy. ; or (c) a PRSP that has already been issued to the Executive Board as of June 22, 2015 and has been the subject of a staff analysis in a staff report on a request for a PSI or a review under a PSI so long as the poverty reduction strategy set out in the PRSP has been developed and made publicly available normally within the previous 5 years but no more than 6 years, and covers the period leading up to and covering the date of the completion of the relevant review.
    - An EDD A PRGS shall be accompanied by a cover letter from the member country concerned to the Managing Director, and shall be issued to the Executive Board with the cover letter; the cover letter shall be deemed to constitute part of the EDD PRGS.
  - Transitional provisions:
    - For PSIs in existence as of June 22, 2015 or approved from June 22, 2015 to December 31, 2015, the Trustee shall not complete the second or any subsequent review unless it finds that the member has a poverty reduction strategy set out in: (A) an EDD as defined; or (B) an I-PRSP, PRSP preparation status report or APR that has been issued to the Executive Board normally within the previous 18 months and in any event not after December 31, 2015, and has been the subject of a staff analysis in the staff report on a request for a PSI or a review under a PSI.
  - Definitions I-PRSP/PRSP/PRSP preparation status report/APR for the Instrument are those given in Section I, paragraph 1 of the PRG-HIPC Trust Instrument (Annex to Decision No. 11436-(97/10), adopted February 4, 1997, as amended).

### Transparency Policy Decision: publication, consent, and factual statements
- Publication consent requirements:
  - The Managing Director will not recommend Executive Board approval of (i) an arrangement under the PRGT or completion of a review under such arrangement, or (ii) a HIPC decision point or completion point decision, or (iii) a member’s request for a PSI or the completion of a review under a PSI, if the member does not explicitly consent to publication of its I-PRSP, PRSP, PRSP preparation status report, APR, or EDD or PRGS (Document 10 or Document 15, as the case may be).
  - The Managing Director will generally not recommend approval of (i) access to resources in the General Resources Account or the PRGT, or (ii) access to Fund resources under the HIPC Trust, or (iii) assistance through a PSI or a PCI, unless the member explicitly consents to publication of the associated staff report.
  - For the PCI, where a member does not provide consent to publication of an interim performance update, the Managing Director may take this into account when determining whether to recommend that the Executive Board approve a subsequent review of the member’s PCI.
- Press Releases and Chairman’s statements:
  - After the Executive Board adopts a decision regarding a member’s use of Fund resources, approves a PSI or a PCI, conducts a review under a PSI or PCI, or completes discussions on HIPC participation or I-PRSP/PRSP/PRSP preparation status report/APR/EDD/PRGS, a Press Release containing a Chairman’s statement emphasizing key points will be issued to the public.
  - Where relevant, the Chairman’s statement will contain a summary of HIPC Initiative decisions pertaining to the member and the Executive Board’s views on the member’s I-PRSP/PRSP/PRSP preparation status report/APR/EDD/PRGS.
  - Waivers for nonobservance of performance criteria and other matters (Document 21 and Document 22) will be mentioned in the factual statement section of the Press Release or in a factual statement issued in lieu of a Chairman’s statement as provided in paragraph 13(b).
  - Before a Press Release is issued, if any Executive Director so requests, it will be read by the Chairman to the Executive Board and Executive Directors will have an opportunity to comment. The Executive Director elected, appointed, or designated by the member concerned will have the opportunity to review the Chairman’s statement, propose minor revisions, if any, and consent to its publication immediately after the Executive Board meeting.
  - No Press Release published under this paragraph shall contain any reference to a discussion or decision pertaining to a member’s overdue financial obligations to the Fund where a Press Release following an Executive Board decision to limit the member’s use of Fund resources because of the overdue financial obligations has not yet been issued. In the case of an Executive Board meeting pertaining solely to overdue financial obligations, no Chairman’s statement will be published.
- Brief factual statements (paragraph 13):
  - For Article IV consultations, regional surveillance discussions, FSSA reports, post-program monitoring, ex post assessments or ex post evaluations:
    - (i) If, after twenty-eight calendar days from the relevant Board consideration, a member does not consent to publication of a Press Release pertaining to the Board consideration, a brief factual statement will be issued stating the fact of the Board’s consideration.
    - (ii) If, after twenty-eight calendar days from the relevant Board consideration, the staff report has not been published, a brief factual statement will be issued stating the fact of the Board’s consideration and clarifying the authorities’ publication intention with respect to the staff report.
  - For use of Fund resources, a PCI, or a PSI:
    - (i) If a member does not consent to publication of a Press Release containing a Chairman’s statement under paragraph 11, or if no Chairman’s statement has been issued because a decision was taken on a lapse-of-time basis, a brief factual statement will be issued immediately after the Board consideration describing the Executive Board’s decision relating to the member’s use of Fund resources (including HIPC initiative decisions (Document 8), waivers (Document 21), and consideration of PRSP documents, and EDDs and PRGSs (Document 10), when relevant), or the approval of a PSI or a PCI for that member, or the conduct of a review under that member’s PSI or PCI (including waivers (Document 22) and consideration of PRSP documents and EDDs and PRGSs (Document 15), when relevant).
    - (ii) With respect to the consent provisions set forth in paragraph 4(b), if, after twenty-eight calendar days from the relevant Board consideration, the staff report has not been published, a brief factual statement will be issued stating the fact of the Board’s consideration and clarifying the authorities’ publication intention with respect to the staff report.
- Publication timing rule for certain documents:
  - Documents may be published under this decision only after their consideration by the Executive Board, except for documents circulated for information only including: (i) I-PRSPs, PRSPs, and EDDs and PRGSs; and (ii) Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) and Assessment of Financial Sector Supervision and Regulation (AFSSR) Reports. Documents covered by this paragraph may be published immediately after circulation to the Executive Board.
- Indicative list highlights (Country Documents covered):
  - Staff Reports for Article IV consultations and Combined Article IV consultation/Use of Fund Resources Staff Reports, Combined Article IV consultations/PSI, Combined Article IV consultations/PCI, and regional surveillance discussions.
  - Selected Issues Papers and Statistical Appendices.
  - ROSCs, FSSA Reports, and AFSSR Reports.
  - Press Releases following Article IV consultations, regional surveillance discussions, and stand-alone Board consideration of FSSA reports.
  - I-PRSPs, PRSPs, PRSP Preparation Status Reports, APRs, and EDDs and PRGSs; Letters of Intent and Memoranda of Economic and Financial Policies (LOIs/MEFPs); Technical Memoranda of Understanding (TMUs) with policy content.
  - PSI and PCI related documents including JSANs, LOIs/MEFPs, Program Statements for PCIs, TMUs, staff reports, and Press Releases containing a Chairman’s Statement.

*Source: THE 2018–19 REVIEW OF FACILITIES FOR LOW–INCOME COUNTRIES–REVISED PROPOSED DECISION (excerpt).*

### Annex V. Web Posting of PRS Documentation—Redlined

### Annex V. Web Posting of PRS Documentation—Redlined

### Web posting and issuance
- Web posting of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), Interim PRSPs, Annual Progress Reports of PRSPs, PRSP Preparation Status reports, and Economic Development Documents and Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategies in accordance with the procedures outlined in SM/06/359 (10/25/06) shall be taken to constitute issuance of such documents to the Executive Board for the purposes of:
  - (1) Section II, paragraph 1(b)(3) and paragraph 1(c)(4) of the Instrument to Establish the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust, Annex to Decision No. 8759-(87/176), adopted December 18, 1987, as amended;
  - (2) Section III, paragraph 2(c) of the Instrument to Establish a Trust for Special PRGF Operations for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and Interim PRGF Subsidy Operations, Annex to Decision No. 11436-(97/10), adopted February 4, 1997, as amended; and
  - (3) paragraph 8 of the Policy Support Instrument-Framework, Decision No. 13561-(05/85), adopted October 5, 2005, as amended.

### PRGT financing framework
- Purpose and design:
  - The Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) is financed by an endowment-based model designed to provide concessional financial support to low-income countries (LICs) on a self-sustained basis.
- Three-pillar strategy (adopted 2012):
  - (i) a base lending envelope of SDR 1¼ billion in annual PRGT lending capacity;
  - (ii) contingent measures to cover sustained periods of high demand for PRGT resources; and
  - (iii) an expectation that modifications to PRGT facilities are consistent with maintaining the self-sustaining financing framework.
- Structure and mechanics:
  - The PRGT financing framework consists of Loan Accounts, Subsidy Accounts, and the Reserve Account.
  - Loan resources are borrowed from bilateral contributors at market rates (contributors may optionally provide below market rates).
  - Subsidy costs are financed from PRGT Subsidy Accounts (bilateral contributions and Fund SDA resources).
  - The Reserve Account contains Fund contributions in the form of Special Disbursement Account (SDA) resources derived from gold sales and generates investment income to support subsidies.
- Operational caveats:
  - Existing loan and subsidy resources are generally sufficient to cover concessional lending over the medium term, conditional on extensions of contributors’ loan agreements and Board approval to update the PRGT Instrument for operations beyond 2020.

### Demand and capacity projections
- Projected annual demand for PRGT loans (staff revised demand model):
  - Annual demand projected to average between SDR 1.0-1.7 billion over the next decade under high and low demand scenarios.
  - Translated on a subsidy-use basis to an annual average of SDR 0.9–1.5 billion (excluding precautionary support).
- Demand uncertainties:
  - Demand estimates are subject to significant uncertainties, especially over the longer term.
  - Sensitivity analysis indicates demand is most sensitive to access and blending assumptions.
- Self-sustained capacity estimates:
  - Updated capacity model estimates the self-sustained annual lending capacity at SDR 1.31 billion, modestly above the target envelope and unchanged from last year’s update.
  - This estimate is sensitive to factors including the assumed investment premia on PRGT assets.
  - Taking into account the updated demand baseline, capacity could reach between SDR 1.2–1.5 billion in ten years.

### Reform package implications (2018–19 LIC FR)
- Proposed reform package elements (simulated by staff):
  - (i) a one-third increase in access across all facilities;
  - (ii) an additional doubling of the annual limit for the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) under the regular window;
  - (iii) flexibility enhancements to the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) and Standby Credit Facility (SCF);
  - (iv) removal of the blending exemption for higher income countries at high risk of debt distress that have substantial access to international financial markets; and
  - (v) alignment of the SCF interest rate to the ECF rate schedule.
- Projected impacts:
  - The reforms would moderately increase demand to an annual average of SDR 1.0–1.7 billion on a subsidy-use basis over the next decade.
  - Under the reform package, the PRGT’s self-sustained lending capacity is projected to reach SDR 1.1–1.4 billion by 2028.
- Policy implications:
  - The reforms can be accommodated within the self-sustained PRGT with risks evenly balanced over the medium term.
  - The longer-term outlook is subject to greater uncertainty; evolution of capacity would need to be monitored carefully and policies reviewed periodically to ensure alignment with the self-sustaining framework.

### Debt relief and CCRT funding
- Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT):
  - The CCRT is currently underfunded by an estimated SDR 200–275 million, limiting the Fund’s ability to assist countries hit by natural disasters.
  - Staff will explore options to address the underfunding, including through additional fundraising and/or policy changes to reflect the impact of the 14th Quota Review.
- PRG-HIPC and protracted arrears:
  - Remaining protracted arrears cases (Somalia and Sudan) would require the mobilization of new resources once these countries are ready to participate in the HIPC Initiative.

### Context and key statistics
- Contextual drivers:
  - The outlook for LICs is adversely affected by the global slowdown, internal fragility, natural disasters, and rising debt vulnerabilities.
  - Key global risks include an escalation of trade tensions and a sudden, sharp tightening of financial conditions.
- Usage and outcomes:
  - About 57.1 percent of PRGT-eligible countries have received concessional financial support from the Fund since the new PRGT facilities architecture became effective in 2010.
  - Based on the findings of the 2019 Review of Conditionality, three-quarters of PRGT programs are estimated to have been at least partially successful from 2011–2017.
- Paper scope and next steps:
  - The paper reviews the PRGT financing framework, projects medium-term demand against lending capacity under different scenarios with sensitivity analysis, estimates financial implications of the LIC FR reform package, reports on the PRG-HIPC Trust and CCRT funding, and concludes with proposed decisions.

*Annex V. Web Posting of PRS Documentation—Redlined (May 2, 2019)*

### 8.      Existing loan resources are sufficient to cover PRGT operations over the medium term,

### 8.      Existing loan resources are sufficient to cover PRGT operations over the medium term, provided that the PRGT loan commitment period is extended.

### PRGT loan resources and encashment regime
- The 2015 fundraising round mobilized SDR 11.4 billion in new loan resources from 15 PRGT lenders.
- Nine lenders participate in the encashment regime of the PRGT.
- In January 2018, the cumulative borrowing limit under the PRGT was raised by SDR 1 billion to SDR 38.5 billion.
- Uncommitted loan resources from existing and new loan agreements totaled SDR 14 billion at end-December 2018.
- A liquidity buffer of SDR 3.3 billion for possible encashment calls is held; uncommitted PRGT loan resources, net of that buffer, are deemed sufficient to meet expected demand well into the next decade.
- Table 1 (new PRGT loan agreements, in millions of SDRs; as of end-March 2019) shows a Total of 11,400.

### Proposed amendments to PRGT Instrument and bilateral borrowing agreements
- The Instrument currently authorizes the commitment of loan resources until end-2020.
- Staff proposes to:
  - extend the commitment period for PRGT lending by four years to end-2024; and
  - establish end-2029 as the normal drawdown period for new borrowing, corresponding to the longest initial arrangement period of five years for PRGT financing arrangements.
- Current borrowing agreements with loan contributors would also need to be extended to provide for drawdown periods until end-2029.
- Staff will reach out to members on this proposal and provide an update to the Executive Board by April 2020.
- Decision 2 would provide the legal basis in the PRGT Instrument for these extensions.

### PRGT Subsidy Accounts and PRG-HIPC Trust
- Balances in the PRGT Subsidy Accounts amounted to about SDR 3.6 billion at end-February 2019.
- SDR 245 million is presumed to be available from the PRG-HIPC Trust.
- These resources are sufficient to subsidize PRGT lending over the medium to longer term, although a more in-depth analysis is required to assess PRGT self-sustainability.
- Pending subsidy contributions and investment shortfalls:
  - At end-February 2019, total pending subsidy contributions amounted to about SDR 185 million from 28 countries.
  - Contributions generated from bilateral deposit and investment agreements reached only SDR 12.9 million in NPV terms compared to SDR 61.4 million pledged.
- Table 2. Balances of PRGT Accounts (in billions of SDRs; as of end-February 2019)
  - Subsidy Accounts 3.59
  - General Subsidy Account 2.55
  - ECF Subsidy Account 1.00
  - RCF Subsidy Account 0.02
  - SCF Subsidy Account 0.02
  - Reserve Account 3.81
  - Memorandum item: PRG-HIPC Trust 0.24

### PRGT Reserve Account adequacy and coverage
- The PRGT Reserve Account was SDR 3.8 billion as of end-February 2019.
- As of end-December 2018, the Reserve Account balance was about SDR 39 million lower than at end-2017 due to administrative fees reimbursed to the GRA exceeding net investment returns.
- The Reserve Account balance covers about 59 percent of total PRGT obligations.
- The reserve ratio remains well above the 40 percent historical average prior to HIPC/MDRI delivery and is considered a sufficient level to back PRGT payments.
- Absent large shocks to PRGT demand or the credit portfolio, this ratio is expected to gradually increase over the medium to long term.

### Assessment framework: demand and capacity models
- Adequacy of resources under the self-sustaining PRGT is assessed annually from two perspectives:
  i. A demand model deriving a range of plausible projections of average annual concessional lending over the medium to longer run.
  ii. A capacity (“supply”) model estimating the PRGT’s self-sustained lending capacity based on available subsidy resources.
- The analysis informs staff’s assessment of the overall framework, affordability of policy refinements, and potential need for contingency measures.

### 2018 annual review findings and capacity versus demand
- The 2018 annual review assessed the PRGT’s self-sustaining financing framework to be intact.
- Permanent lending capacity was estimated at SDR 1.31 billion annually, slightly above the target of SDR 1¼ billion.
- Demand was projected to range between SDR 1.0 and 1.7 billion annually over the coming 10-year period.
- On a subsidy-use (disbursement) basis demand was projected at SDR 0.9–1.5 billion.
- On balance, the PRGT’s lending capacity was assessed to be adequate under a range of plausible scenarios.

### Recent trends in demand and stock
- Demand for PRGT resources has receded since the global financial crisis, averaging about SDR 1.1 billion over the past five years.
- Total PRGT commitments in 2018 fell to SDR 0.3 billion, compared to SDR 1.7 billion in 2017, and a ten-year average of SDR 1.2 billion.
- Disbursements in 2018 amounted to SDR 0.9 billion (20 arrangements), broadly unchanged from 2017 and in line with the ten-year average.
- New commitments in 2019 are projected to rebound to [SDR 1.6 billion or SDR 1.1 billion when probability-adjusted] based on a survey of country teams.
- Stock and exposure:
  - The stock of PRGT lending commitments reached SDR 7.4 billion at end-March 2019.
  - Total credit outstanding was SDR 6.4 billion.
  - Undrawn commitments under existing arrangements stood at SDR 1.0 billion.
  - ECF credit amounted to about 86 percent of total loans outstanding.
  - Credit concentration: about 44 percent of credit outstanding by the top five borrowers (compared to about 84 percent in the GRA).
  - Debt vulnerabilities: about half of the countries (accounting for about 39.6 percent of credit outstanding) classified as high risk or in debt distress in the most recent LIC DSA.

### Usage, access, and volatility
- The share of eligible countries receiving PRGT support has declined: from around 50 percent in the wake of the global financial crisis to around 25 percent in recent years.
- Since the inception of the new facilities framework, usage has averaged 35 percent, with:
  - 26 percent of PRGT-eligible countries using ECF arrangements,
  - 4 percent SCF arrangements,
  - 5 percent receiving RCF disbursements.
- Access levels have varied but on average remained broadly in line with applicable norms.
- Total disbursements have been below total commitments on average, largely explained by timing differences and non-disbursement of precautionary SCF arrangements.

### Demand model design and recent refinements
- Demand is projected within two benchmark scenarios (a “low case” and a “high case”), distinguished by the assumed share of countries using PRGT facilities.
- Model refinements include:
  - improved projections of longer-term GDP and access growth;
  - better calibration of assumed levels of access per facility and probability of facility use to historical experience since the 2009 reforms;
  - full reflection of the impact of the current exemption from blending for countries with elevated debt vulnerabilities;
  - better matching of timing for countries moving to blending and graduation with historical experience (including market access and short-term vulnerabilities);
  - an explicit subsidy-use (disbursement-based) demand measure to complement the commitments-based measure.

*Italic: Source — ppea2019014 - 8.      Existing loan resources are sufficient to cover PRGT operations over the medium term*

### 20.      Using the revised model, annual demand for PRGT resources over the next 10 years is

### ppea2019014 - 20.      Using the revised model, annual demand for PRGT resources over the next 10 years is

### Projected Demand for PRGT Resources
- Using the revised model, annual demand for PRGT resources over the next 10 years is projected to average between SDR 1.0–1.7 billion (Table 3).
- On a precautionary-use-adjusted (subsidy-use) basis, this projection translates into a range of SDR 0.9–1.5 billon in average annual demand involving the use of subsidy resources.
- On average, disbursements in nominal SDR terms would be around 40 percent above the 2018 level, broadly in line with the projected increase in nominal GDP over the coming decade.
- Demand projected over the next 20 years (on a subsidy-use basis) ranges between SDR 1.1–1.8 billon per year.

### Uncertainty and Drivers of Demand
- Demand projections are subject to considerable uncertainty, particularly in the longer run.
- Sensitivity analysis indicates demand is most sensitive to access and blending assumptions.
- Factors that could affect future PRGT use include countries’ longer-term developments, global factors, structural changes in access to alternative financing, geopolitical developments, natural disasters, and climate change.

### Table 3 — Key Baseline Figures (as presented)
- Baseline 2018 Update Paper: Low Case 1.00; High Case 1.68.
- New Baseline: Demand for PRGT resources (total) Low Case 1.02; High Case 1.70.
- Demand involving subsidy resources: Low Case 0.93; High Case 1.54.

### Sensitivity Scenarios (Table 3 / Box 2)
- 1. No change in access until next review in 2024: Change -0.15 (Low Case) and -0.25 (High Case).
- 2. 50 percent increase in access in 2019: Change 0.24 (Low Case) and 0.40 (High Case).
- 3. Faster GDP and demand growth by 1pp per year starting in 2023: Change 0.02 (Low Case) and 0.03 (High Case).
- 4. Removal of blending exemption for countries at high-risk of debt distress: Change -0.14 (Low Case) and -0.23 (High Case).
- 5. Faster graduation from the PRGT (by 2-years on average): Change -0.01 (Low Case) and -0.02 (High Case).
- 6. Full disbursement of precautionary SCFs: Change 0.09 (Low Case) and 0.16 (High Case).

### Sensitivity Analysis — Qualitative Summary (Box 2)
- Access: Keeping access unchanged until 2024 would reduce annual average demand by SDR 0.15–0.25 billion over the next decade; raising access by 50 percent in 2019 would increase annual average demand by SDR 0.24–0.40 billion.
- GDP: Higher GDP growth modestly increases demand.
- Blending: Eliminating the exclusion from blending for qualified countries at high risk of debt distress would reduce average annual PRGT credit demand by SDR 0.14–0.23 billion over the next decade, shifting demand to GRA resources by a similar magnitude.
- Graduation: Demand projections are not very sensitive to graduation assumptions; limited savings from more rapid graduation.
- Precautionary vs. disbursing SCFs: Full disbursement of all SCF arrangements would raise demand by SDR 0.09–0.16 billion.

### PRGT Self-Sustained Capacity — Model and Estimates
- The capacity model estimates the PRGT’s self-sustained annual lending capacity as the perpetual average annual level of new concessional lending the Trust can finance based on available subsidy and Reserve Account resources.
- Key determinants: initial balances of PRGT Subsidy Accounts and Reserve Account, investment returns, GRA reimbursement for administrative expenses, realization of pledged contributions, PRGT credit outstanding, and average subsidy element of PRGT loans.
- Updated model enhancements include: improved projections of longer-term GDP and access growth; better calibration of access and probability of facility use; full reflection of exemption from blending for countries with elevated debt vulnerabilities; and better timing of blending and graduation.

### Capacity Projections (Table 4 and text)
- The PRGT’s self-sustained long-term average annual lending capacity is estimated at SDR 1.31 billion (unchanged from the April 2018 Update Paper).
- Capacity projected to reach between SDR 1.2–1.5 billion in ten years using the new baseline demand estimates (high and low cases).
- Average annual demand of SDR 1.4 billion over the next decade would bring the PRGT lending capacity to the target of SDR 1¼ billion by the end of the period.
- On current trends, capacity will more likely than not exceed the SDR 1¼ billion target by 2028.

### Sensitivity of Capacity (Table 4 / Box 3)
- April 2018 Update Paper estimated capacity: 1.31.
- Updated Estimate (as of January 2019): 1.31.
- PRGT Self-Sustained Capacity Target: 1.25.
- Sensitivity impacts (Change relative to Updated Capacity Estimate):
  - 1. Investment premium (lower by 40 basis points): -0.17.
  - 2. SDR Rate (Decrease by 50 basis points): 0.02.
  - 3. GRA Reimbursement (Increase by 15mn): -0.08.
  - 4. Pledged Contributions (Decrease by SDR 300mn): -0.06.
  - 5. Short-term demand Shock: -0.07.
- Box 3 qualitative points:
  - Short-term demand shock: Two years of elevated demand at historical 15-year average plus two standard deviations lowers capacity by SDR 0.06 billion.
  - Investment premium: Baseline assumes a 90 bp investment premium; lowering this by 40 bp reduces capacity by SDR 0.17 billion.
  - SDR rate: Lowering SDR rate by 100 bp increases annual lending capacity by about SDR 0.02 billion.
  - GRA reimbursement: Increasing reimbursement by SDR 15 million decreases capacity by about SDR 0.08 billion.
  - Pledged contributions: Non-receipt of SDR 300 million lowers capacity by SDR 0.06 billion.

### Financing the Reform Package Under Self-Sustained PRGT
- Staff-simulated policy package elements:
  - (a) generalized increase in access norms and limits by one-third in 2019;
  - (b) flexibility enhancements to the SCF and ECF, including longer durations;
  - (c) doubling of the annual access limit under the RCF regular window to match the shocks window;
  - (d) alignment of the SCF interest rate to the ECF rate schedule;
  - (e) removal of exemption from presumed blending for higher income countries at high risk of debt distress with substantial market access.
- Projected impact of the proposed reform package: average annual demand of SDR 1.0–1.7 billion on a subsidy-use basis over the next decade.

### Policy Package Impact — Quantified Effects (Table 5 and text)
- i. One-third access increase: raises annual demand by SDR 0.11–0.18 billion; reduces self-sustained capacity by SDR 0.05–0.08 billion by the end of the period (P1).
- ii. SCF and RCF enhancements: raise annual demand by SDR 0.02–0.11 billion; reduce self-sustained capacity by SDR 0.01–0.05 billion (P2).
- iii. Eliminating blending exemption for higher income high-risk countries with market access: reduces annual demand by about SDR 0.08–0.14 billion; increases self-sustained capacity by SDR 0.04–0.06 billion (P3).
- iv. Alignment of SCF rate to ECF rate schedule: reduces self-sustained capacity by SDR 0.03 billion (P5).
- v. Graduations in the forthcoming PRGT eligibility review: not expected to alter the picture materially.

### Consolidated Policy Package Outcomes (Table 5)
- New Baseline Demand for PRGT Resources: Low Case 1.02; High Case 1.70.
- New Baseline Demand Involving Subsidy Resources: 0.93 (Low Case); 1.54 (High Case).
- 10-year Demand Benchmark: 1.43 (Low Case); 1.25 (High Case).
- Benchmark Policy Package (Demand-Model Impact):
  - P1 - Access Increase (33% in 2019): 0.11 (Low Case); 0.18 (High Case). Supply-model impact: -0.05; -0.08.
  - P2 - SCF/ECF Enhancements and Supplemental RCF Access Increase: 0.02; 0.11. Supply-model impact: -0.01; -0.05.
  - P3 - Blending Exemption (Countries with Market Access and meet the income threshold can blend): -0.08; -0.14. Supply-model impact: 0.04; 0.06.
  - P4 - Combined (Scenarios 1-3): 0.04; 0.15. Supply-model impact: -0.02; -0.07.
  - P5 - Align SCF/ECF Rates: supply-model impact -0.03; -0.03.
- Consolidated Impact (P6): Demand-model change 0.04 (Low Case); 0.15 (High Case). Supply-model change -0.05 (Low Case); -0.10 (High Case).
- Estimated capacity (use of subsidy resources) — Avg. Annual Demand (2019-28) and Estimated Capacity (Medium-term, as of end-2028):
  - Avg. Annual Demand (2019-28): Low Case 0.98; High Case 1.69.
  - Estimated Capacity (Medium-term): Low Case 1.41; High Case 1.10 (table layout indicates consolidated impacts and levels).

### Overall Assessment and Monitoring
- The proposed reform package would be generally consistent with the self-sustained PRGT financing framework, with risks evenly balanced over the coming decade.
- Based on projected demand ranges, self-sustained capacity would reach SDR 1.1–1.4 billion by 2028.
- The longer-term outlook carries greater uncertainty, with downside risks from low investment returns on PRGT assets or prolonged periods of high aggregate financing needs.
- The evolution of capacity will need careful monitoring and periodic policy review; a range of policy options and contingency measures can be triggered under the three-pillar PRGT framework in the event of sustained disequilibrium between supply and demand.

*Source: ppea2019014 - 20. Using the revised model, annual demand for PRGT resources over the next 10 years is (IMF PDF content provided).*

### 30.      Additional resources are needed to fund the existing mandate of the CCRT. The CCRT

### Additional resources are needed to fund the existing mandate of the CCRT

### CCRT mandate, funding history, and current balance
- The CCRT was created in 2015 to provide grants for debt relief under two windows:
  - Post-Catastrophe Relief window for catastrophic natural disasters.
  - Catastrophe Containment window for fast-spreading major public health disasters with international spillover potential.
- Of the 58 members approached under the 2015 CCRT fund-raising campaign, only six pledged a total amount of US$93.3 million (of which US$84.7 million received), short of the US$150 million target.
- As of end-February 2019, total CCRT contributions amounted to SDR 99.5 million, for a total balance of the Trust of SDR 149 million.
- In December 2018, five countries repurposed their maturing HIPC deposits, for a total of SDR 12.7 million, to be invested in BIS obligations to generate income for the benefit of the CCRT.
- In 2018, Mexico disbursed SDR 1.74 million of the SDR 7.97 million pledged under the 2015 fundraising round.

### Estimated underfunding and its drivers
- The estimated CCRT underfunding stands between SDR 200 and 275 million.
- The original US$150 million fund-raising target was based on members’ quota levels before the 14th General Review of Quotas; doubling of quotas under the 14th General Review of Quotas is estimated to have proportionally increased the initial shortfall.
- The underfunding reflects:
  - A gap of about SDR 100-175 million under the Post Catastrophe Relief window.
  - A gap of SDR 100 million under the Catastrophe Containment window.
- The first stage of the LIC FR assessed that reforms to widen access to the CCRT would increase demand for debt relief under the CCRT and therefore require additional fundraising.

### Options under consideration to address underfunding
- Staff will consider options including:
  - Launching a new fund-raising campaign.
  - Adjusting the CCRT access policy with the objective of realigning it with access prior to the 14th General Review of Quotas and with available financing.
- These options will be further explored in the context of the 2020 Update paper, informed by indications of countries’ willingness to contribute in filling the financing gap, including through their informal responses from the 2015 campaign.

### HIPC Initiative status and PRG-HIPC Trust resources
- The HIPC Initiative is nearly completed: the Fund provided SDR 2.6 billion in debt relief to 36 of the 39 eligible countries.
- Three pre-decision point countries (Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan) have yet to start the HIPC qualification process.
- For Liberia, pledges totaling SDR 17.7 million (March 2008 NPV terms) are yet to be received from eight countries; the PRG-HIPC Trust covered the shortfall in the interim.
- As of end-February 2019, the balance in the PRG-HIPC Trust stood at SDR 0.24 billion.
- Expiring PRG-HIPC deposit agreements were renewed or repurposed:
  - In December 2018, 21 deposit agreements (SDR 120.3 million) reached maturity.
  - At end-March 2019, 17 deposit agreements (SDR 65.1 million) were renewed or repurposed.
  - Four countries, with total deposits of SDR 55.2 million, requested to be repaid.
  - One renewed deposit was augmented by SDR 5.4 million; total renewed deposit agreements for the benefit of the PRG-HIPC stood at SDR 33.7 million, of which SDR 28.3 million was already in the Trust.

### Overdue financial obligations: Sudan and Somalia
- As of end-February 2019, overdue financial obligations to the Fund from Sudan and Somalia totaled SDR 1.2 billion.
- Sudan and Somalia have been in arrears to the Fund since 1984 and 1987, respectively.
- Providing debt relief for Sudan and Somalia would require additional resources because the costing of HIPC debt relief excluded the three protracted arrears cases to avoid undermining the Fund’s financial capacity as a result of debt forgiveness.
- A new fundraising campaign would be needed once these countries are ready to clear their arrears and participate in the HIPC Initiative and potentially “beyond-HIPC” debt relief.
- Sudan:
  - Sudan accounts for 80 percent of the total amount of members’ outstanding arrears to the Fund.
  - Sudan remains on the US list of countries sponsoring terrorism, preventing meaningful progress towards debt relief.
  - Political developments noted: President Bashir stepped down in April amid protests, leading to formation of a military-backed transition government.
  - The country faces severe economic imbalances, scarce reserves and social unrest.
- Somalia:
  - Under successive Staff-Monitored Programs since 2016, Somalia is pursuing reforms to establish a track record of sound policy performance to normalize relations and make progress toward possible HIPC debt relief.
  - Discussions on a fourth SMP have been initiated; Board endorsement that this SMP meets the upper credit tranche (UCT)-policy standards could put Somalia on a path towards debt relief.
  - Reaching the HIPC Decision Point will require sustained policy commitment under that UCT SMP, reconciliation of external debt data, preparation of a poverty reduction strategy, cooperation with the Fund on policies and payments, and broad donor support to provide financial resources needed for arrears clearance and to cover the Fund’s cost of debt relief.

### Issues for Directors’ discussion
- Do Directors agree that the proposed package of PRGT reform measures is consistent with the self-sustained PRGT financing framework?
- Do Directors agree that options for addressing the underfunding of the CCRT should be discussed in the 2020 Update paper?
- Do Directors support the proposal to amend the PRGT Instrument to extend the commitment and drawdown periods for concessional lending to end-2024 and end-2029 respectively?

### Proposed decisions (high level)
- Decision 1: The Executive Board notes the report entitled “Review of the Financing of the Fund’s Concessional Assistance and Debt Relief to Low-Income Countries,” and decides that the annual review of the financing of the Trust for Special Poverty Reduction and Growth Operations for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries and Interim ECF Subsidy Operations, contemplated in paragraph 2 of Decision No. 11436-(97/10), adopted on February 4, 1997, as amended, is completed.
- Decision 2: Amendments to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust Instrument:
  - In Section II, paragraph 1 (e)(2), “December 31, 2024” shall be substituted for “December 31, 2020.”
  - In Section III, paragraph 3, third sentence, “December 31, 2029” shall be substituted for “December 31, 2024.”

*International Monetary Fund. “FUND’S CONCESSIONAL ASSISTANCE AND DEBT RELIEF TO LICS” (excerpts).*

### Appendix Table 1. PRGT Borrowing Agreements (concluded)

### Appendix Table 1. PRGT Borrowing Agreements (concluded)

### PRGT borrowing commitments and outstanding balances (selected entries; in millions of SDRs; as of end-December 2018)
- OPEC Fund for International Development
  - Effective date: 20-Dec-1994; Expiration date for drawings: 31-Dec-2005
  - Loan commitments: 37.0
  - Amount disbursed: 37.0
  - In percent of commitment: 100.0
  - Amount outstanding: 25.7
- Saudi Arabia — Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency
  - Effective date: 13-May-2011; Expiration date for drawings: 31-Dec-2024
  - Loan commitments: 500.0
  - Amount disbursed: 104.9
  - In percent of commitment: 21.0
  - Amount outstanding: 104.9
- Spain — Bank of Spain and Government of Spain (multiple agreements)
  - 20-Jun-1988 / 30-Jun-1993: Loan commitments: 220.0; Amount disbursed: 216.4; In percent: 98.4
  - 08-Feb-1995 / 31-Dec-2005: Loan commitments: 67.0; Amount disbursed: 67.0; In percent: 100.0
  - 14-Feb-2000 / 31-Dec-2014: Loan commitments: 425.0; Amount disbursed: 425.0; In percent: 100.0; Amount outstanding: 61.7; Early repayment related to the MDRI: 32.3
  - 17-Dec-2009 / 31-Dec-2024: Loan commitments: 405.0; Amount disbursed: 116.3; In percent: 28.7; Amount outstanding: 116.3
  - 22-Feb-2017 / 31-Dec-2024: Loan commitments: 450.0; Amount disbursed: -; In percent: -; Amount outstanding: -
- Sweden
  - Sweden (17-Nov-2016 / 31-Dec-2024): Loan commitments: 500.0; Amount disbursed: -; In percent: -; Amount outstanding: -
- Switzerland (multiple lenders)
  - Swiss Confederation (23-Dec-1988 / 31-Dec-1997): Loan commitments: 200.0; Amount disbursed: 200.0; In percent: 100.0
  - Swiss National Bank 1/ (22-Jun-1995 / 31-Dec-2014): Loan commitments: 401.7; Amount disbursed: 401.7; In percent: 100.0; Amount outstanding: 73.2; Early repayment related to the MDRI: 14.3
  - Swiss National Bank 2/ (21-Apr-2011 / 31-Dec-2024): Loan commitments: 500.0; Amount disbursed: 102.5; In percent: 20.5; Amount outstanding: 102.5
  - Swiss National Bank 2/ (30-Aug-2017 / 31-Dec-2024): Loan commitments: 500.0; Amount disbursed: -; In percent: -; Amount outstanding: -
- United Kingdom (Government of the United Kingdom, multiple agreements)
  - 03-Sep-2010 / 31-Dec-2024: Loan commitments: 15.6; Amount disbursed: 15.6; In percent: 100.0; Amount outstanding: 14.4
  - 30-Nov-2015 / 31-Dec-2024: Loan commitments: 1,312.5; Amount disbursed: 1,312.5; In percent: 100.0; Amount outstanding: 1,312.5
  - 23-Jan-2017 / 31-Dec-2024: Loan commitments: 2,000.0; Amount disbursed: -; In percent: -; Amount outstanding: -
- Subtotal (all listed agreements)
  - Loan commitments total: 37,594.8
  - Amount disbursed total: 22,402.5
  - In percent of commitment (aggregate): 59.6
  - Early repayment related to the MDRI (aggregate): 2,543.0
  - Amount outstanding aggregate: 6,360.5
- Associated Agreement — Saudi Fund for Development (SFD)
  - Effective date: 28-Feb-1989; Expiration date for drawings: -- 13/
  - Loan commitments: 49.5; Amount disbursed: 49.5; In percent of commitment: 100.0
- Total Loan and Associated Loan Agreements 14/
  - Loan commitments total: 37,644.3
  - Amount disbursed total: 22,452.0
  - In percent of commitment (aggregate): 59.6
  - Early repayment related to the MDRI (aggregate): 2,543.0
  - Amount outstanding aggregate: 6,360.5

### Footnotes included in table (selected)
- 1/ Including additional loan commitments for interim PRGF operations.
- 2/ Committed to the General Loan Account of the PRGT.
- 3/ Committed to the ECF Loan Account of the PRGT.
- 9/ Committed to the SCF Loan Account and RCF Loan Account of the PRGT in equal proportion; the SCF component of the loan has been extended till end-2024.
- 10/ The loan commitment is for the SDR equivalent of US$50 million.
- 11/ The original loan commitment of the Bank of Spain was SDR 220 million; however, only SDR 216.4 million was drawn and disbursed by the expiration date for drawings.
- 12/ The full loan commitment of SDR 200 million was drawn in January 1989; this amount was fully disbursed to borrowers by March 1994.
- 13/ On August 26, 1998, the SFD indicated that it did not intend to make further loans in association with the PRGF.
- 14/ Any mismatch of outstanding resources between the amount owed by PRGF borrowers and the amount owed to PRGF lenders arises because of mismatches in timing between drawdowns from lenders to the Trust and disbursements of PRGF loans to borrowers.

*Italic source: ppea2019014 - Appendix Table 1. PRGT Borrowing Agreements (concluded)*

### Appendix Table 2. Bilateral Commitments to the PRGF-ESF and PRG-HIPC Trusts

### Aggregate totals and regional breakdowns (in millions of SDRs; as of end-February 2019)
- TOTAL: 2,195.9 (PRGF-ESF Trust subsidy contributions) ; 1,120.0 (Subsidies and HIPC grant contributions) ; Total: 3,315.9 ; For subsidization: 1,562.3 ; For MDRI debt relief: 25.9
- Major industrial countries total: 1,422.6 (PRGF-ESF Trust) ; 818.8 (PRG-HIPC Trust) ; Total: 2,241.3 ; For subsidization: 880.5
- Selected country entries (PRGF-ESF Trust / PRG-HIPC Trust / Total / For subsidization / For MDRI):
  - Canada: 144.8 / 84.8 / 229.6 / 48.8 / --
  - France: 232.9 / 116.4 / 349.3 / 82.2 / --
  - Germany: 113.7 / 66.1 / 179.8 / 127.2 / --
  - Italy: 128.3 / 84.4 / 212.7 / 63.6 / --
  - Japan: 435.6 / 253.4 / 689.0 / 144.0 / --
  - United Kingdom: 267.2 / 155.4 / 422.6 / 82.2 / --
  - United States: 100.2 / 58.3 / 158.4 / 332.6 / --
- Other advanced countries total: 646.8 / 250.4 / 897.2 / 299.7 / --
  - Australia: 12.6 / 3.7 / 16.3 / 24.8 / --
  - Netherlands: 128.5 / -- / 128.5 / 45.4 / --
  - Spain: 13.0 / 3.1 / 16.2 / 23.3 / --
  - Sweden: 109.0 / 65.0 / 174.0 / 18.3 / --
  - Switzerland: 65.3 / 38.5 / 103.8 / 37.0 / --
- Fuel exporting countries total: 10.2 / 6.1 / 16.3 / 114.3 / 23.2
  - Saudi Arabia: 9.2 / 5.5 / 14.7 / 53.5 / --
  - Venezuela: -- / -- / 20.4 / 20.4
- Other developing countries total: 104.6 / 44.8 / 149.4 / 224.7 / 2.7
  - China: 9.8 / 4.2 / 14.0 / 19.7 / --
  - India: 11.7 / -- / 11.7 / 22.9 / --
  - South Africa: -- / -- / 28.6 / --
- Countries in transition total: 11.8 / -- / 11.8 / 42.9 / --

### Footnotes (selected)
- 1/ Pre-2006 fund-raising initiatives. Subsidy contributions pledged before 2006 to the benefit of the PRGF Trust, the remainder of which is now available for the PRGT, and for PRG-HIPC Trust.
- 2/ Excludes SDR 100 million in end-2005 NPV terms committed by the G-8 to compensate for transfer from the PRGF Trust to the MDRI and subsidy resources pledged and/or received under fundraising rounds since 2006.
- 3/ Estimated values of total contributions pledged before 2006. Amounts correspond to the nominal sum of contributions and earnings on outstanding balances.
- 4/ Amounts transferred in early 2006 from the PRGF Subsidy Accounts to the MDRI Trust.
- 5/ Amounts reported on "as needed" basis, corresponding to the nominal sum of concessional assistance taking into account the profile of subsidy needs associated with PRGF lending and the provision of HIPC assistance, respectively. Estimates were made at end-1999 in the context of HIPC fundraising based on members' pledges.

*Italic source: Appendix Table 2. Bilateral Commitments to the PRGF-ESF and PRG-HIPC Trusts (as of end-February 2019)*

### Appendix Table 3. ESF Subsidy Contributions

### ESF fundraising and contributions (in millions of currency units; as of end-February 2019; SDR equivalent shown)
- Canada: Form of contribution: Grant; Contribution pledged: CAN$25.0; Contribution received (Amount): 14.3 (SDR equivalent)
- France: Concessional loan; Contribution pledged: SDR 20.0; Contribution received (SDR equivalent): 20.0; Total implicit subsidy: 4.8
- Iceland: Grant; Contribution pledged: ISK 10.2; Contribution received (SDR equivalent): 0.1
- Japan: Grant; Contribution pledged: SDR 20.0; Contribution received (SDR equivalent): 20.0
- Norway: Grant; Contribution pledged: SDR 24.7; Contribution received (SDR equivalent): 24.7
- Oman: Grant; Contribution pledged: SDR 3.0; Contribution received (SDR equivalent): 3.0; Contribution received (Amount): 2.2
- Russian Federation: Grant; Contribution pledged: SDR 30.0; Contribution received (SDR equivalent): 30.0
- Saudi Arabia: Deposit agreement 5/; Contribution pledged: SDR 40.0; Contribution received (SDR equivalent): 40.0; Contribution received (Amount): 7.1
- Spain: Grant; Contribution pledged: SDR 5.3; Contribution received (SDR equivalent): 5.3
- Trinidad and Tobago: Deposit agreement; Contribution pledged: SDR 0.8; Contribution received (SDR equivalent): 0.8; Contribution received (Amount): 0.2
- United Kingdom: Grant; Contribution pledged: £50.0; Contribution received (Amount): 53.1 (SDR equivalent: 53.1)
- Totals:
  - Total Grant: 150.5 (Contribution pledged); 150.4 (Contribution received)
  - Total Implicit Subsidy: 20.0 (pledged); 4.8 (received)
  - Total Investment and Deposit: 40.8 (pledged); 7.3 (received)
  - Total: 211.3 (pledged); 162.4 (received)

### Footnotes (selected)
- 1/ 2005 Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) fundraising campaign.
- 2/ To be generated as an implicit subsidy from the concessional loan at 0.5 percent or 6-month rate, whichever is lower.
- 3/ Contributions received/generated in end-2005 NPV terms.
- 4/ Received in five tranches during 2006-2012.
- 5/ The investment guided by provisions of 2006 Memorandum of Understanding was converted to a BIS deposit based on June 2018 agreement.
- 6/ Reflecting net investment income (in end-2005 NPV terms) to be generated from deposit/investment agreements.
- 7/ Trinidad and Tobago's deposit matured on September 18, 2017 and was repaid before generating the pledged amount of contribution.

*Italic source: Appendix Table 3. ESF Subsidy Contributions (as of end-February 2019)*

### Appendix Table 4. Pledges and Contributions of Bilateral Subsidy Resources for the PRGT

### Pledges, investment income, and contributions received (in millions; SDR equivalents shown; as of end-February 2019)
- Algeria: Grant; Contribution pledged: SDR 2.3; Contribution received: 2.30; Total contributions received: 2.30
- Argentina: Grant; Contribution pledged: SDR 3.9; Contribution received: 3.90; Total contributions received: 3.90
- Australia: Grant; Contribution pledged: A$30.0; SDR equivalent pledged: 17.63; Contributions received: 17.63; Investment/net income: 0.06; Total contributions received: 17.69
- Austria: Grant; Contribution pledged: SDR 3.9; Contribution received: 3.90; Investment/net income: 0.04; Total contributions received: 3.94
- Canada: Grant; Contribution pledged: CAN$40 and SDR 2.8; SDR equivalent pledged: 27.96; Contribution received: 27.96; Investment/net income: 0.77; Total contributions received: 28.73
- China: Investment; Contribution pledged: SDR 17.5; SDR equivalent pledged: 17.50; Investment/net income: 4.70; Income earned: 0.08; Total contributions received: 4.78 (note: entries reflect net investment income in end-2008 NPV terms)
- Italy: Grant; Contribution pledged: SDR 22.1; Contribution received: 22.10
- Japan: Grant; Contribution pledged: SDR 28.8; Contribution received: 28.80
- Netherlands: Grant; Contribution pledged: SDR 9.5; Contribution received (note): 10.33; Investment/net income: 1.25; Total contributions received: 11.58
- Saudi Arabia: Grant; Contribution pledged: SDR 11.0; Contribution received: -; Contribution received (amount): 0.15; footnote: a pledge of SDR 16,709,643 is to be received following expiry of existing deposit agreement with the PRGT on 12/31/2021; estimated as SDR 11 million in end 2008 NPV terms at the time when the pledge was made.
- Sweden: Grant; Contribution pledged: SEK 50.0; SDR equivalent pledged: 4.81; Contribution received: 4.77; Investment/net income: 3.15; Total contributions received: 7.92
- Switzerland: Grant; Contribution pledged: CHF 16.0; SDR equivalent pledged: 11.11; Contribution received: 11.11; Investment/net income: 0.36; Total contributions received: 11.47
- United Kingdom: Grant; Contribution pledged: SDR 19.8; SDR equivalent pledged: 19.80; Contribution received: 21.34; Investment/net income: 1.60; Total contributions received: 22.94
- Totals:
  - Total Investment: 20.6
  - Total Grants and other: 193.5 (pledged); 180.6 (received)
  - Total: 214.1 (pledged); 186.8 (received); Investment/net income: 8.2; Grand total received: 194.5

### Footnotes (selected)
- 1/ 2009 LIC fundraising campaign.
- 2/ Transfer of members' share in the balance of EPCA/ENDA Administered Subsidy Account upon the Account's Termination on February 1, 2014.
- 3/ Reflecting net investment income (in end-2008 NPV terms) to be generated from investment agreements.
- 4/ Reflecting end-February 2019 net income earned on the investment (in end-2008 NPV terms).
- 5/ Initial pledge of SDR 9.5 million has been changed to SDR 10.33 million, last payment received in February 2018.
- 6/ A pledge of SDR 16,709,643 is to be received following expiry of existing deposit agreement with the PRGT on 12/31/2021; estimated as SDR 11 million in end 2008 NPV terms at the time when the pledge was made.

*Italic source: Appendix Table 4. Pledges and Contributions of Bilateral Subsidy Resources for the PRGT (as of end-February 2019)*

### Appendix Table 5. Distribution of the General Reserve Associated with Gold Windfall Profits

### Distribution entries (in millions of SDR; as of end-April 2019; selected member entries)
- Algeria
  - Distribution of SDR 700 Million (Pledges): 3.69
  - Date of Transfer/Equivalent Bilateral Contribution: 10/23/2012
  - Distribution of SDR 1,750 Million (Pledges): 9.22
  - Date of Transfer/Equivalent Bilateral Contribution: 10/22/2013
- Argentina
  - Distribution of SDR 700 Million: 6.22 (10/23/2012)
  - Distribution of SDR 1,750 Million: 15.56 (10/22/2013)
- Australia
  - Distribution of SDR 700 Million: 9.51 / 9.55 (dates 4/26/2013 and 23/7/2014 appear adjacent)
  - Distribution of SDR 1,750 Million: 23.79 / 23.28 (dates 4/26/2013 and 7/23/2014)
- Canada
  - Distribution of SDR 700 Million: 18.72 (10/23/2012)
  - Distribution of SDR 1,750 Million: 46.81 (10/22/2013)
- China
  - Distribution of SDR 700 Million: 28.00 (10/23/2012)
  - Distribution of SDR 1,750 Million: 70.01 (10/22/2013)
- France
  - Distribution of SDR 700 Million: 31.57 (10/23/2012)
  - Distribution of SDR 1,750 Million: 78.92 (10/22/2013)
- Italy, Spain, Germany, and many other members appear with specified SDR distributions, dates of transfer, and pending statuses in the full table.

### Notes on table formatting and entries
- Table columns shown in source: Member; Distribution of SDR 700 Million (Pledges / Date of Transfer/Equivalent Bilateral Contribution); Distribution of SDR 1,750 Million (Pledges / Date of Transfer/Equivalent Bilateral Contribution).
- Several entries indicate "pending" or "-" for one of the distributions or dates.
- Entries marked with footnotes and varying dates reflect transfer timing and pledge status as of end-April 2019.

*Italic source: Appendix Table 5. Distribution of the General Reserve Associated with Gold Windfall Profits (as of end-April 2019)*

### Appendix Table 5. Distribution of the General Reserve Associated

### Appendix Table 5. Distribution of the General Reserve Associated with Gold Windfall Profits

### Summary totals and overall coverage
- Total (Distribution of SDR 700 Million) — Pledges: 664.6; Payment/Transfer Amount: 623.5
- Total (Distribution of SDR 1,750 Million) — Pledges: 1,663.7; Payment/Transfer Amount: 1,563.9
- Total in percent of distribution (SDR 700 Million) — Pledges: 94.9; Payment/Transfer Amount: 89.1
- Total in percent of distribution (SDR 1,750 Million) — Pledges: 95.1; Payment/Transfer Amount: 89.4

### Selected member contributions (Distribution of SDR 700 Million / Distribution of SDR 1,750 Million)
- United States: 123.83 / 309.57 (Payment/Transfer Amounts: 123.83 / 309.57) — Date of Transfer/Equivalent Bilateral Contribution: 10/23/2012 / 10/22/2013
- Japan: 45.94 / 114.86 (Payment/Transfer Amounts: 38.09 / 110.55) — Date of Transfer/Equivalent Bilateral Contribution: 3/11/2013 / 3/4/2014
- United Kingdom: 31.57 / 78.92 (Payment/Transfer Amounts: 32.21 / 78.83) — Date of Transfer/Equivalent Bilateral Contribution: 3/21/2013 / 4/7/2014
- Germany: 42.82 / 107.05 (Payment/Transfer Amounts: 42.82 / 107.05) — Date of Transfer/Equivalent Bilateral Contribution: 12/6/2012 / 10/24/2013
- Saudi Arabia: 20.54 / 51.34 (Payment/Transfer Amounts: 20.54 / 51.34) — Date of Transfer/Equivalent Bilateral Contribution: 10/23/2012 / 10/22/2013
- India: 17.11 / 42.78 (Payment/Transfer Amounts: 17.11 / 42.78) — Date of Transfer/Equivalent Bilateral Contribution: 10/23/2012 / 10/22/2013
- Russia: 17.48 / 43.69 (Payment/Transfer Amounts: 17.49 / 43.69) — Date of Transfer/Equivalent Bilateral Contribution: 10/10/2013 / 10/22/2013
- Switzerland: 10.17 / 25.42 (Payment/Transfer Amounts: 10.17 / 27.04) — Date of Transfer/Equivalent Bilateral Contribution: 1/23/2015 / 1/24/2018
- Korea: 9.90 / 24.74 (Payment/Transfer Amounts: 9.90 / 24.76) — Date of Transfer/Equivalent Bilateral Contribution: 1/24/2013 / 9/18/2014
- Netherlands: 15.18 / 37.94 (Payment/Transfer Amounts: 15.18 / 37.94) — Date of Transfer/Equivalent Bilateral Contribution: 10/23/2012 / 10/22/2013

(Note: the table contains individual entries for many additional members with pledges, payment/transfer amounts, and dates; the selection above highlights several of the largest contributors recorded in the table.)

### Implementation dates and payment status highlights
- The distribution of SDR 700 Million became effective on October 12, 2012 and was implemented on October 23, 2012. The amount distributed to members was based on the quota shares in place on the day the distribution was effected.
- The distribution of SDR 1,750 Million became effective on October 10, 2013 and was implemented on October 22, 2013. The amount distributed to members was based on the quota shares in place on the day the distribution was effected.
- Several members are shown as “pending” for payment/transfer amounts for one or both distributions (examples in the table include Ghana, Hungary, Indonesia, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco (second distribution entries), Papua New Guinea (second distribution pending), Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania (first distribution not shown), and others).
- Some member entries show payment/transfer amounts that differ from the original pledge because the actual contribution includes interest earned in the Interim Administered Account or differences arising from foreign exchange rates on value date of payment (see footnotes).

### Footnotes and special arrangements (as presented)
- 1/ Self-sustained PRGT fundraising campaign.
- 2/ Madagascar was not approached with the request for contributing under either distribution; Sudan's and Somalia's shares were applied against their arrears.
- 3/ The distribution became effective on October 12, 2012 and was implemented on October 23, 2012. The amount distributed to members was based on the quota shares in place on the day the distribution was effected. Payments also include interest earned in Interim Administered Account on originally pledged amount, where applicable.
- 4/ The distribution became effective on October 10, 2013 and was implemented on October 22, 2013. The amount distributed to members was based on the quota shares in place on the day the distribution was effected. Payments also include interest earned in Interim Administered Account on originally pledged amount, where applicable.
- 5/ Member's actual contribution differs from initial pledge on account of foreign exchange rates on value date of payment.
- 6/ The actual contribution includes interest earned in the Interim Administered Account.
- 7/ In lieu of its pledge to contribute shares in both distributions (SDR 21.39 million in total), effective April 9, 2019 Indonesia agreed to invest in BIS deposits SDR 35.9 million with income of up to 2 percent annually to be transferred to the PRGT.
- 8/ Switzerland pledged to contribute its shares under both distributions in five equal annual installments. The last installment received on January 24, 2018.

*Appendix Table 5. Distribution of the General Reserve Associated with Gold Windfall Profits (in millions of SDR; as of end-April 2019) — INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND*

### Appendix Table 6. PRGT Subsidy Agreements

### Appendix Table 6. PRGT Subsidy Agreements (concluded) (in millions of SDR; as of end-April 2019)

### Key agreements and amounts
- Trinidad and Tobago — Government of Trinidad and Tobago; Effective date: Dec. 7, 2006; Vehicle: Subsidy Account Investments; Agreed: 3.0; Outstanding: --; Interest Rate (percent): 1.0; Maturity (years): 10
- Tunisia — Banque Centrale de Tunisie; Effective date: May 4, 1994; Vehicle: Subsidy Account Investments; Agreed: 3.6; Outstanding: --; Interest Rate (percent): 0.5; Maturity (years): 10
- Uruguay — Banco Central del Uruguay; Effective date: Jul. 7, 1994; Vehicle: Subsidy Account Investments; Agreed: 7.2; Outstanding: --; Interest Rate (percent): --; Maturity (years): 10
- Uruguay — Banco Central del Uruguay; Effective date: Mar. 11, 2010; Vehicle: Subsidy Account Investments; Agreed: 2.0; Outstanding: 2.0; Interest Rate (percent): --; Maturity (years): 10
- Total: Agreed 1,075.1; Outstanding 293.3

### Notes and operational details (selected)
- 1/ Agreements to provide subsidy contributions to the PRGT in the form of income earned on the deposit/investment in the Trust, net of below market rate of interest paid to the contributor on the principal of the deposit/investment. These do not include subsidies provided to the Trust as direct grants.
- 2/ Starting from July 2017 contributors have an option to invest in Trust assets ("pooled investment") or separately in BIS obligations. Prior to this change all investments were part of other invested assets unless they were held separately in a dedicated Administered Account.
- 3/ Extended or repurposed upon maturity.
- 4/ Equivalent of US$10 million (at the exchange rate of June 29, 1994).
- 5/ The Fund made early repayments to Botswana, Malaysia, and Singapore on March 1, 2004.
- 6/ No interest is paid if net investment earnings are lower than 0.1 percent per annum.
- 7/ In August 2017, the agreement was temporary extended to August 30, 2022, and then in April 2018 renewed until August 30, 2023. The deposit is invested with the BIS obligations, separately from the Trust's assets.
- 8/ In November 2017, the agreement was extended until pledged contribution of SDR 17.5 million in 2008 NPV terms is generated from the investment.
- 9/ Interest rate paid was equivalent to return obtained on the investment (net of costs) less 2 percent per annum. If net return was less than 2 percent per annum, the deposit bore zero interest. The investment was extended in 2004 for another 10 years to benefit the HIPC Trust.
- 10/ This was a temporary deposit agreement, which matured on October 27, 2014, when a new deposit agreement was finalized. The PRGT General Subsidy Account had benefited from the investment income of up to 2 percent while any excess of the 2 percent investment income had to be for the benefit of Bank Indonesia.
- 11/ The deposit became effective on October 27, 2014 (replacing June 2014 temporary agreement) with maturity of December 31, 2018 which was temporarily extended to June 30, 2019. On April 9, 2019 the extended agreement was replaced by a new one, with augmented principal, to benefit the PRGT in lieu of Indonesia's pledge to contribute its shares in both gold profits distributions to the PRGT. The investment income of up to 2 percent shall be transferred for the benefit of the PRGT General Subsidy Account and any excess above the 2 percent shall benefit Bank Indonesia. The principal of the deposit is invested separately from other Trust's assets in BIS obligations.
- 12/ In March 2017, Morocco extended its investment agreement by additional six months and then by additional five years to September 22, 2022.
- 13/ Several deposits totaling SDR 10 million, which were all repaid in March 2010, sixteen years after the effective date of the first deposit.
- 14/ In January 2017, Peru extended its investment agreement by additional seven years, until January 29, 2024.
- 15/ The principal includes (i) a new investment of SDR 38.2 million and (ii) a rollover of two investments of SDR 49.8 million and SDR 27.9 million from the PRG-HIPC Trust upon their maturities in 2011–14. Based on a revised agreement, starting from July 2018 the investment is placed in BIS obligations and earns 0.5 percent or BIS rate, whichever is lower.
- 16/ Based on a revised agreement (see above), the investment is placed in BIS obligations and earns zero rate. Upon maturity on 12/31/2021 the principal will be transferred as grant to the PRGT.
- 17/ The investment was made from repayments of each of the first nine (out of ten) semiannual drawings of SDR 67 million loan from the Government of Spain (the Instituto de Crédito Oficial) to the PRGT. The agreement expired in November 2012.
- 18/ Deposit encashed/repaid before maturity in January 1998 due to BOP problems.
- 20/ Interest rate paid was equivalent to return obtained on the investment (net of costs) less 2.6 percent per annum. No interest paid if net return was 2.6 percent per annum or less.

*Source: Finance Department*

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### Appendix Table 7. PRG‑HIPC Trust—Bilateral Deposit/Investment Agreements (in SDRs; as of end‑April 2019)

### Selected contributors, agreed amounts, outstanding amounts, interest rates, and maturities
- Algeria — Type: Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 3/27/2001; Amount: 7,600,000; Amount outstanding: 7,600,000; Interest rate (per annum): 0%; Term/date of maturity: 3/27/2021
- Argentina — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 5/4/2001; Amount: 15,628,059; Amount outstanding: 15,628,059; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 5/4/2020
- Botswana — Investment Agreement; Effective date: 4/25/1997; Amount: 14,607,060; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 2%; Maturity: 4/30/2002 2/
- Botswana — Investment Agreement; Effective date: 8/9/2002; Amount: 15,065,760; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 1%, variable 3/; Term: 5 years
- Botswana — Investment Agreement; Effective date: 5/9/2008; Amount: 6,142,590; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 1%, variable 3/; Term: 5 years
- Brunei Darussalam — Pooled Investment; Effective date: 10/24/2001; Amount: 52,351; Amount outstanding: 52,351; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 1/12/2028 4/
- Chile — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 10/1/1999; Amount: 15,000,000; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 0.5%; Term: 5 years
- Colombia — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 9/21/2001; Amount: 1,181,774; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 12/31/2018
- Croatia — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 4/9/2001; Amount: 519,161; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 12/31/2018
- Croatia — Deposit in BIS; Effective date: 1/1/2019; Amount: 519,161; Amount outstanding: 519,161; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 12/31/2023
- Czech Republic — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 2/22/2000; Amount: 5,664,038; Amount outstanding: 5,664,038; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 2/24/2020
- Egypt — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 6/16/2000; Amount: 1,723,680; Amount outstanding: 1,723,680; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 6/30/2019 5/
- Fiji — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 8/28/2003; Amount: 194,021; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 12/31/2018 2/
- Finland — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 2/22/2001; Amount: 5,811,869; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 12/31/2018 2/
- Germany — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 1/31/2000; Amount: 220,656,300; Amount outstanding: - 6/; Interest rate: 0%; Term: 10 years
- Ghana — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 5/10/2000; Amount: 982,328; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 0.5%; Term: 10 years
- Greece — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 2/22/2001; Amount: 5,440,000; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 0%; Term: 10 years
- Hungary — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 12/8/2000; Amount: 9,237,105; Amount outstanding: 9,237,105; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 12/9/2019 7/
- India — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 3/31/2000; Amount: 31,370,304; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 12/31/2018
- Indonesia — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 7/18/2000; Amount: 4,850,030; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 4/9/2019 8/
- Indonesia — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 4/9/2019; Amount: 10,296,317; Amount outstanding: 10,296,317; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 12/31/2023 8/
- Indonesia — The Instrument for the Administered Account Indonesia; Effective date: 6/30/2004; Amount: 25,000,000; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: Variable 9/; Maturity: June, 2014 2/
- Iran, Islamic Republic of — Investment Agreement; Effective date: 5/30/1997; Amount: 5,000,000; Amount outstanding: - 10/; Interest rate: 0.5%; Term: 10 years
- Kuwait — Pooled Investment; Effective date: 7/25/2000; Amount: 4,196,595; Amount outstanding: 4,196,595; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 1/12/2024 4/
- Libya — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 10/8/2002; Amount: 9,950,370; Amount outstanding: 9,950,370; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 12/31/2019
- Malaysia — Investment Agreement; Effective date: 6/26/1998; Amount: 20,000,000; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 0.5%, variable 11/; Term: 10 years
- Malaysia — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 5/29/2001; Amount: 7,368,106; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 12/31/2018 2/
- Morocco — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 6/22/2000; Amount: 2,186,968; Amount outstanding: 2,186,968; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 6/22/2020
- Oman — Pooled Investment; Effective date: 7/5/2001; Amount: 1,057,041; Amount outstanding: 1,057,041; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 1/12/2024 4/
- Pakistan — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 6/22/2000; Amount: 4,659,307; Amount outstanding: 4,659,307; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 6/22/2020
- Paraguay — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 12/18/2001; Amount: 310,097; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 1%; Term: 5 years
- Peru — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 1/28/2000; Amount: 6,143,881; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 1.5%; Term: 10 years 2/
- Poland — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 6/12/2000; Amount: 7,073,780; Amount outstanding: 7,073,780; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 6/12/2020
- Qatar — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 5/25/2000; Amount: 749,713; Amount outstanding: 749,713; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 6/30/2019 5/
- Saudi Arabia — Memorandum of Understanding; Effective date: 3/16/2001; Amounts: 27,850,000; 49,820,000; 16,709,643 (three separate entries); Select outstanding or interest entries shown as: Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 0.5% (where noted); Terms: 10 years or 12/31/2018 2/
- Singapore — Investment Agreement; Effective date: 11/20/1998; Amount: 40,000,000; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 0.5%, variable 13/; Term: 10 years
- Singapore — Deposit Agreements; Effective date: 4/24/2001; Amount: 4,045,647; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 12/31/2018
- Sri Lanka — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 4/24/2000; Amount: 788,783; Amount outstanding: 788,783; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 12/31/2023 14/
- St. Lucia — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 8/23/2000; Amount: 100,000; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 0.5%; Term: 10 years
- Sweden — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 11/1/2001; Amount: 18,600,000; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 12/31/2018
- Thailand — Investment Agreement; Effective date: 3/14/2001; Amount: 6,128,354; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 12/31/2018 2/
- Tonga — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 8/28/2003; Amount: 25,898; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 12/31/2018 2/
- Tunisia — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 3/20/2001; Amount: 2,361,605; Amount outstanding: 2,361,605; Interest rate: 0.5%; Maturity: 3/20/2021
- United Arab Emirates — Pooled Investment; Effective date: 7/24/2001; Amount: 5,141,462; Amount outstanding: 5,141,462; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 1/12/2024 4/
- Uruguay — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 3/13/2002; Amount: 7,940,000; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: Variable 15/; Term/date: 10 years
- Vietnam — Deposit Agreement; Effective date: 5/24/2000; Amount: 522,962; Amount outstanding: -; Interest rate: 0%; Maturity: 12/31/2018 2/

### Selected explanatory notes
- 1/ Some agreements specified the maturity date and others a term (e.g., a "10 years" term indicates that the deposit is due in 10 years from the effective date of the agreement).
- 2/ Repurposed upon maturity for the benefit of another concessional initiative (PRGT or CCRT).
- 3/ Original interest rate was 2% per annum; in August 2004, the rate was amended to 1% per annum, but could have been reverted to 2% per annum if the return on investment reached 3% per annum.
- 4/ Original deposit agreement maturing on December 31, 2018 was extended as a pooled investment.
- 5/ Original deposit agreement maturing on December 31, 2018 was temporarily extended to June 30, 2019 pending further decisions.
- 6/ The agreed amount was Euro 300 million and the deposit was denominated in Euro over its lifetime.
- 7/ Original deposit agreement maturing on December 9, 2018 was temporarily extended to December 9, 2019 pending further decisions.
- 8/ Original deposit agreement maturing on December 31, 2018 was temporarily extended to June 30, 2019. It was replaced by a new agreement on April 9, 2019 extending the deposit to end-2023 and augmenting its principal by one quarter of Indonesia's shares in both gold profits distributions.
- 9/ 2% per annum of the net investment earnings (or any lesser amount if the returns on investments was below 2%) was to be transferred to the PRGF-HIPC Trust and the remainder to the depositor. Upon maturity of the deposit in June 2014, the Indonesian authorities agreed to put the SDR 25 million principal in a temporary deposit, pending an agreement to reinvest it in October 2014 for the benefit the PRGT.
- 10/ Five annual installments of 10 year maturity, each equivalent to SDR 1 million.
- 11/ Two installments (received in June 1998 and August 1999) with maturity date of 10 years each. Original interest rate of 2% per annum was amended in June 2004 to 0.5% per annum, with an option to be reverted to 2% per annum if the return on investment reached 2% per annum.
- 12/ The investment consisted of 14 installments, each of 10 year maturity, with the first one received on March 27, 2001 and the last one on September 27, 2004. The installments originated from repayments of the outstanding amounts of associated loans made by the SFD to PRGF borrowers and the date of each installment corresponded to the date of repayment of the loans. Upon maturity, each subsequent installment has been reinvested to benefit the PRGT.
- 13/ Four annual instalments of SDR 10 millions each (received in November 1998, August 1999, August 2000, and August 2001, respectively) and 10 year maturity. Original interest rate of 2% per annum was amended in August 2004 to 0.5% per annum, with an option to revert to 2% per annum if the return on investment reached 2% per annum.
- 14/ Original deposit agreement maturing on December 31, 2018 was extended to December 31, 2023 pending decision on a form of investment.
- 15/ Interest rate obtained by the Trust minus 2.6% per annum; if the interest rate was 2.6% per annum or less, no interest was paid to the depositor.

*Source: Finance Department.*

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### Appendix Table 8. Pending Bilateral Contributions of Subsidy Resources to PRGT, PRG‑HIPC and CCRT (in millions of SDR; as of end‑April 2019)

### Summary of pledges, amounts received, and amounts pending (selected rows and subtotals)
- Under the CCRT fundraising round (in USD million): Mexico — Amount received: 7.97; Amount pending: 1.74; Amount pledged: 6.23; Subtotal: 7.97 received; 1.74 pending; 6.23 pledged
- Subtotal (first block): Amount received: 26.48; Amount pending: 0.60; Amount pledged: 25.88
  - Bahrain: 0.90 received; - pending; 0.90 pledged
  - Dominican Republic: 0.50 received; - pending; 0.50 pledged
  - Gabon: 2.50 received; 0.60 pending; 1.90 pledged
  - Grenada: 0.10 received; - pending; 0.10 pledged
  - Lebanon: 0.40 received; - pending; 0.40 pledged
  - Maldives: 0.01 received; - pending; 0.01 pledged
  - Trinidad & Tobago: 1.62 received; - pending; 1.62 pledged
  - Vanuatu: 0.10 received; - pending; 0.10 pledged
  - Venezuela: 20.35 received; - pending; 20.35 pledged
- Subtotal (second block): Amount received: 3.80; Amount pending: 2.37; Amount pledged: 1.43
  - Oman: 3.00 received; 2.20 pending; 0.80 pledged
  - Trinidad and Tobago: 0.80 received; - pending; 0.17; Amount pending 0.63 2/
- Subtotal (third block): Amount received: 20.70; Amount pending: -; Amount pledged: 20.70
  - Saudi Arabia: 16.70 received; - pending; 16.70 pledged 3/
  - South Africa: 3.40 received; - pending; 3.40 pledged
  - Trinidad and Tobago: 0.60 received; - pending; 0.60 pledged
- Subtotal (fourth block): Amount received: 33.91; Amount pending: -; Amount pledged: 33.91
  - Brazil: 12.50 received; - pending; 12.50 pledged
  - Costa Rica: 0.48 received; - pending; 0.48 pledged
  - Grenada: 0.03 received; - pending; 0.03 pledged
  - Hungary: 3.05 received; - pending; 3.05 pledged
  - Indonesia 4/: 6.11 received; - pending; 6.11 pledged
  - Lebanon: 0.78 received; - pending; 0.78 pledged
  - Libya: 3.30 received; - pending; 3.30 pledged
  - Peru: 1.88 received; - pending; 1.88 pledged
  - Poland: 4.96 received; - pending; 4.96 pledged
  - Uzbekistan: 0.81 received; - pending; 0.81 pledged
- Subtotal (fifth block): Amount received: 96.71; Amount pending: -; Amount pledged: 96.71
  - Azerbaijan: 1.18
  - Bahrain: 0.99
  - Brazil: 31.24
  - Colombia: 5.57
  - Costa Rica: 1.21
  - Equatorial Guinea: 0.38
  - Ghana: 2.71
  - Hungary: 7.63
  - Indonesia 4/: 15.28
  - Lebanon: 1.96
  - Libya: 8.26
  - Papua New Guinea: 0.97
  - Peru: 4.69
  - Poland: 12.41
  - Qatar: 2.22
- Total: Amount received: 189.58; Amount pending: 4.71; Amount pledged: 184.86

### Explanatory notes (selected)
- 1/ Estimated on "as needed" basis.
- 2/ Contribution generated from a ten year deposit, repaid upon maturity in September 2017, estimated as SDR 0.17 million in 2005 NPV terms.
- 3/ Agreed to be paid at end‐2021; estimated as SDR 11 million in 2008 NPV terms.
- 4/ In lieu of its pledge to contribute shares in both distributions (SDR 21.39 million in total), effective April 9, 2019 Indonesia agreed to invest in BIS deposits SDR 35.9 million with income of up to 2 percent annually to be transferred to the PRGT.

*Table sections labeled "Under the second distribution of the general reserve associated with gold windfall profits (of SDR 1,750 million)", "Under the first distribution of the general reserve associated with gold windfall profits (of SDR 700 million)", "Under the 2009 fundraising round", "Under the ESF fundraising round", and "Under the HIPC Initiative fundraising round" are presented in the source table; amounts above correspond to those groupings.*

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### Appendix Table 9. PRGT Reserve Account Coverage (in millions of SDR; as of end of period)

### Annual reserve balances, outstanding PRGT credit, and reserve coverage ratio (A)(B)(A)/(B)
- 1988 — Reserve Account balance: 169; Outstanding PRGT credit: 103; Reserve coverage ratio (In percent): 164.1
- 1989 — 272; 510; 53.3
- 1990 — 395; 795; 49.7
- 1991 — 513; 1,320; 38.9
- 1992 — 630; 1,786; 35.3
- 1993 — 793; 2,005; 39.6
- 1994 — 1,009; 2,786; 36.2
- 1995 — 1,336; 3,919; 34.1
- 1996 — 1,716; 4,446; 38.6
- 1997 — 2,093; 4,892; 42.8
- 1998 — 2,345; 5,421; 43.3
- 1999 — 2,548; 5,820; 43.8
- 2000 — 2,714; 5,773; 47.0
- 2001 — 2,917; 5,971; 48.9
- 2002 — 3,079; 6,636; 46.4
- 2003 — 3,115; 6,703; 46.5
- 2004 — 3,174; 6,632; 47.9
- 2005 — 3,285; 6,185; 53.1
- 2006 — 3,392; 3,656; 92.8 1/
- 2007 — 3,557; 3,673; 96.8
- 2008 — 3,818; 3,895; 98.0
- 2009 — 3,926; 4,965; 79.1
- 2010 — 3,967; 5,068; 78.3
- 2011 — 3,981; 5,092; 78.2
- 2012 — 3,962; 2/5,581; 71.0
- 2013 — 3,919; 2/5,972; 65.6
- 2014 — 3,861; 2/6,063; 63.7
- 2015 — 3,826; 2/6,398; 59.8
- 2016 — 3,880; 6,380; 60.8
- 2017 — 3,816; 2/6,434; 59.3
- 2018 — 3,778; 2/6,361; 59.4

### Memorandum items and notes
- PRGT repayments: January-December 2018 — 940
- 1/ The decline in total PRGT credit outstanding by about 40 percent from 2005 reflects early repayments arising from the delivery of HIPC and MDRI debt relief.
- 2/ The decline in Reserve Account balances during 2012-15 and in 2017-18 is on account of the administrative fees reimbursed to the GRA that have exceeded net investment returns.
- 3/ Credit outstanding to PRGT lenders.

*Source tables as presented in the PDF chapter.*

### Appendix Table 10. Pledges and Contributions of Bilateral Subsidy Resources for the CCRT

### Appendix Table 10. Pledges and Contributions of Bilateral Subsidy Resources for the CCRT

### Grants received (in SDR million)
- Argentina: 0.40
- Australia: 0.13
- Austria 2/: -
- Bangladesh: 0.01
- Belgium: 1.37
- Botswana: 0.02
- Canada: 2.94
- Chile: 0.05
- China: 0.15
- Denmark: 0.82
- Egypt: 0.15
- Fiji: - (SDR column: - ; SDR equivalent: 0.19)
- Finland: 0.53 (SDR equivalent: 5.81)
- France: 4.04
- Germany: 2.29 (SDR equivalent: 30.00; other columns: 21.49; 23.79)
- Greece: 0.46
- Iceland: 0.05
- Indonesia 3/: 0.07 (SDR equivalent column entries include 5.45)
- Ireland: 0.08
- Italy: 2.93
- Japan: 8.80 (SDR equivalent: 7.30; other columns: 5.34; 14.14)
- Korea: 0.73
- Malaysia: 0.39
- Malta: 0.02
- Mexico: - (SDR equivalent: 11.00; other columns: 1.74; 1.74)
- Morocco: 0.11
- Norway: 0.54
- Pakistan: 0.01
- Portugal: 0.05 (SDR equivalent: 2.00; other columns: 1.45; 1.50)
- Saudi Arabia: 0.19
- Singapore: 0.22
- Spain: 0.11
- Sweden: 2.26
- Switzerland: 1.34
- Thailand: 0.15 (SDR equivalent column entries include 6.13)
- Tonga: - (SDR column: - ; SDR equivalent: 0.03)
- Tunisia: 0.01
- Turkey: - (SDR equivalent: 1.00; other columns: 0.74; 0.74)
- United Kingdom: 5.40 (SDR equivalent: 42.00; other columns: 29.92; 35.32)
- United States: 2.02
- Uruguay: 0.02
- Vietnam: - (SDR column: - ; SDR equivalent: 0.52)

### Aggregate figures and totals (as of end-April 2019)
- Total (Grants Received in SDR million): 38.86
- Total (SDR equivalent column): 93.30
- Total (other related column): 60.68
- Total (Total contributions received column): 99.54
- Total (Invested / Principal of Deposit column): 18.13

### Footnotes and implementation notes from the table
- 2/ CCR pledge was rescinded pending a budget allocation of grant resources.
- 3/ Indonesia decided to invest in BIS deposits one quarter of its shares in both distributions of gold sales profits for the benefit of the CCRT. The related agreement became effective on April 9, 2019.
- 1/ Former HIPC deposits repurposed upon maturity in December 2018 and invested in BIS obligations for 5 to 15 years to generate income for the benefit of the CCRT.

*Appendix Table 10. Pledges and Contributions of Bilateral Subsidy Resources for the CCRT (in millions of SDR unless otherwise indicated; as of end-April 2019)*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/pp/2019/ppea2019014.pdf_