## ppea2020038 — EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [ppea2020038 — EXECUTIVE SUMMARY](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/pp/2020/english/ppea2020038.pdf)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/-/media/files/publications/pp/2020/english/ppea2020038.pdf.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/-/media/files/publications/pp/2020/english/ppea2020038.pdf.json)

---

### Purpose and mandate
- Reports to the Executive Board on its April 29, 2019 decision to prepare an IMF Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT) linked to the 2017 Review of the Standards and Codes Initiative (RSCI) for revision/update of the 1999 Monetary and Financial Policies Transparency Code (MFPT).
- Directors asked the CBT to:
  - remove overlap on financial policies covered by other international standards;
  - expand transparency standards to a broader set of activities undertaken by many central banks since the 2008 financial crisis;
  - reorient transparency standards to facilitate risk-based assessments to support policy effectiveness and address macroeconomic risks.
- Staff seeks Board endorsement of the proposed CBT.
- Date of document: June 4, 2020.

### Structure and content of the CBT
- Builds on the Board-approved CBT 5-pillar framework and consists of:
  - central bank transparency principles;
  - central bank transparency practices;
  - a glossary;
  - an annex with relevant transparency-related principles from financial policy standards (for information only; not for CBT compliance assessment).
- CBT is voluntary, central bank–focused, designed to encompass a broad range of mandates, governance frameworks, and institutional arrangements.
- CBT is not intended to serve as a central bank governance framework.

### The 5-pillar framework (key features)
- Pillar I. Transparency in governance — institutional issues.
- Pillar II. Transparency in policies — economics of policy decisions.
- Pillar III. Transparency in operations — implementation of policy decisions.
- Pillar IV. Transparency in outcome — how outcomes are reported to stakeholders to facilitate accountability.
- Pillar V. Transparency in official relations — interaction with government, domestic agencies, and international relations/commitments.

### Rationale and context
- Update needed to:
  - remove overlap with other standards developed since 1999;
  - reflect expanded mandates, functions, powers, and policy tools emerging since the 2008 financial crisis;
  - respond to central banks’ active and unconventional roles in the ongoing global response to the COVID-19 epidemic.
- Enhanced transparency practices reflect use of unconventional measures (including quantitative easing, forward guidance, lender and market-maker of last resort operations) and large-scale interventions requiring coordination with ministries of finance.

### Modular, voluntary, and proportional application
- Modular approach allows voluntary and proportional application considering country-specific circumstances.
- Central banks may use the CBT to map existing transparency frameworks, make informed transparency choices, and improve stakeholder dialogue.
- CBT offers a range of practices to implement principles across diverse legal frameworks, governance arrangements, and development levels.
- Practices are not intended as a tool for ranking central banks by transparency.

### Confidentiality and flexibility
- CBT recognizes need to balance transparency with legitimate confidentiality (market-sensitive information, financial stability considerations, personal data).
- Two-pronged approach:
  - Transparency requirements are qualified with respect to market sensitive information, financial stability considerations, and personal data.
  - Pillar I includes a principle calling for a clear confidentiality policy explaining and justifying disclosure choices and obligations.

### Use in IMF work and capacity development
- CBT will support Fund capacity building: Technical Assistance (TA) and Financial Sector Stability Reviews (FSSR).
- CBT will support Surveillance — Article IV Consultations and Financial Sector Stability Programs (FSAP); Use of Fund Resources (UFR); and the Fund’s Good Governance Framework for enhanced Fund engagement on governance.
- CBT can serve as a diagnostic tool in capacity development by delineating transparency benchmarks and allowing graduated assessment of central banks’ transparency practices to plan, implement, and monitor reforms.
- CBT framework could support Fund surveillance by highlighting strengths/weaknesses of central banks’ transparency practices and enabling modular assessments and prioritized transparency action plans to be monitored in Article IV surveillance, FSAPs, and Use-of-Fund Resources.

### Key drafting considerations
- Considerations included:
  - contribution of central bank transparency to policy effectiveness and accountability;
  - balancing transparency with confidentiality;
  - monetary policy practices altering traditional transparency norms (use of unconventional measures and expanded balance sheets);
  - broadening of mandates, functions, and powers (macroprudential oversight, crisis management, resolution, financial integrity, consumer protection);
  - practicality and flexibility across diverse central banking environments;
  - Fund’s governance approach, including April 2018 Board-approved framework for enhanced Fund engagement on governance with a central bank governance component.

### Consultation process and stakeholder input
- Extensive consultations with Executive Board, central banks, international institutions, and standard setters.
- An international High-Level Advisory Panel (AP) of former central bank governors and academics convened in late summer 2019.
- Staff held three AP meetings in October and December 2019, and March 2020, plus several rounds of written comments.
- AP issues raised (selected):
  - balance between transparency and confidentiality;
  - focus on transparency requirements vs governance aspects;
  - transparency of autonomy, risk management, audit, financial stability, inter-agency cooperation;
  - transparency of human capital management and code-of-ethics;
  - external accountability under Pillar IV.
- Actions taken in response: added confidentiality language, removed governance aspects from CBT, added human capital references, strengthened anti-corruption/internal code-of-conduct, clarified Pillar IV, adjusted transparency practices.
- Executive Board engagement: staff presentation on November 20, 2019; informal meeting on March 4, 2020 (Exposure Draft); two virtual iLab sessions on May 5 and 7, 2020.
- Directors’ concerns and staff responses:
  - Emphasized voluntary nature of CBT and country-specific adoption — staff explicitly noted CBT is voluntary and expanded application examples.
  - Balance between transparency and confidentiality — staff strengthened confidentiality language.
  - Removed remaining governance aspects and refined legal language — staff reviewed with IMF Legal Department and incorporated changes.

### External consultations, feedback, and thematic comments
- Exposure Draft circulated in late January 2020 to central banks and monetary unions worldwide, BIS, World Bank, and financial policy standard-setters (BCBS, IAIS, IOSCO, FATF).
- Staff received formal responses from 75 organizations in total, including 73 central banks and monetary unions, and 2 international organizations.
- European responses: 15 eurozone countries did not submit separate comments; the ECB coordinated a response on behalf of those national central banks.
- Aggregate feedback characteristics:
  - Broad support for CBT’s relevance given expanded mandates and consistency with MFPT and other international standards.
  - Support for removing overlap with other financial policy standards and for the CBT 5-pillar framework.
  - Around 8 percent of central bank respondents provided CBT-based assessments of certain elements of their current transparency practices.
  - Most comments aimed at clarification, including terminology.
- Responses by Region (as presented):
  - 49%
  - 16%
  - 13%
  - 8%
  - 11%
  - 3%
- Representative thematic comments and staff responses addressed nature/voluntary status of CBT, legal framework interactions, independence/autonomy clarifications (goal vs instrument autonomy), risk management scope, code-of-conduct practices, confidentiality linked to legal frameworks, decision-making process disclosures, foreign exchange and reserve management disclosures, and AML/CFT scope. Staff made detailed changes to relevant transparency practices and shared revisions with Directors.

### Summary, pilot plans, and next steps
- CBT expected benefits:
  - eliminates overlap with international financial standards adopted since the MFPT;
  - expands transparency criteria to cover broader central bank activities since the 2008 financial crisis;
  - facilitates cost-effectiveness via risk-based assessments to support policy effectiveness and address macroeconomic and financial risks;
  - improves communication with stakeholders, reduces uncertainty, anchors expectations, contributes to better policy choices, and enhances accountability.
- Pilot assessments:
  - Staff proposes several voluntary CBT reviews over the next two years in collaboration with relevant authorities.
  - Participating countries will reflect IMF membership diversity across regions, income levels, and exchange rate regimes; outcomes reported to the Board as aggregate analysis.
  - Pilot outcomes will inform a guidance note and template for future voluntary use of CBT in FSAP, AIV or UFR discussions.
  - Staff aims to conduct four to six reviews in the pilot phase.
  - Staff has not yet approached any central bank to conduct pilot reviews.
  - Six central banks from various regions have already used the CBT Exposure Draft to gauge existing transparency practices.
  - One emerging market central bank has established an internal working group to map transparency practices across functions as part of strategic planning.
- Issues for Board discussion (posed in the paper):
  - Do Directors agree with staff’s CBT proposal attached to the paper?
  - Do Directors agree that staff carry out CBT pilot reviews, in consultation with authorities and on a voluntary basis, and report the outcome to the Board?

### Annex I — Selected principles from international financial policy standards (high-level highlights)
- Acronyms listed (selected): AML/CFT; BCBS; BCP; CBT; CCP; CSD; CPSS; EC; ELA; EN; FMI; FS; FSB; IAIS; ICP; IOSCO; KA; ML/TF; PFMI; SSS; TR.
- General Principle: Central banks disclose governance, policies, operations, outcomes, and official relations while taking legitimate confidentiality needs into account.
- Pillar I (Governance) selected expectations include disclosure of legal structure, mandate, autonomy (institutional/operational, functional, personal, financial), decision-making arrangements, risk management (principal risks, risk governance), accountability framework (audited financial statements, internal/external audit, audit committee), anti-corruption/internal code of conduct, human capital management, communication arrangements, and confidentiality policy.
- Pillar II (Policies) selected expectations include clear public disclosure of monetary policy objectives, framework, instruments, policy decisions, and supporting analysis; cross-border financial flows/FX administration roles and decisions; FX management objectives and operational framework; FX reserve management objectives, oversight, and supporting analysis; macroprudential policy objectives, instruments, indicators, and supporting analysis; ELA scope/objectives with necessary confidentiality; financial integrity (AML/CFT) supervisory policies and consumer protection policies.
- Pillar III (Operations) selected expectations include disclosure of operational frameworks (operational targets, instruments, collateral, access), detailed implementation instruments and coverage for cross-border flows and FX administration, FX market operations and counterparties, reserve management principles and assessments (including adequacy/liquidity analysis), financial stability assessments and stress testing frameworks (methods, assumptions, coverage, use of results), macroprudential implementation and enforcement arrangements, and ELA disclosure once confidentiality needs cease.
- Pillar IV (Outcome) — excerpts emphasize disclosure of governance actions (accountability arrangements), policies (progress toward objectives and ex-post evaluations), and operations (volumes, interest rates, operational targets, aggregated balances) across monetary policy, cross-border flows, FX management, reserve management, macroprudential policy, ELA, AML/CFT, and consumer protection.
- Pillar V (Official Relations) — expectations for disclosure of relationships, policies, instruments, terms and outcomes of interactions with government, domestic financial agencies, foreign agencies, and other relations (investments, ownership of subsidiaries/joint ventures).

*International Monetary Fund — EXECUTIVE SUMMARY of ppea2020038*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### ppea2020038 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Purpose and mandate
- Reports to the Executive Board on its decision of April 29, 2019, to prepare an IMF Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT) linked to the 2017 Review of the Standards and Codes Initiative (RSCI) for a revision and update of the 1999 Monetary and Financial Policies Transparency Code (MFPT).
- Directors asked the CBT to:
  - remove the overlap on financial policies covered by other international standards;
  - expand transparency standards to a broader set of activities undertaken by many central banks since the 2008 financial crisis;
  - reorient transparency standards to facilitate risk-based assessments to support policy effectiveness and address macroeconomic risks.
- Staff is seeking Board endorsement of the proposed CBT.
- Date of document: June 4, 2020.

### Structure and content of the CBT
- The proposal builds on the Board-approved CBT 5-pillar framework and consists of:
  - central bank transparency principles;
  - central bank transparency practices;
  - a glossary;
  - an annex with relevant transparency related principles from financial policy standards (for information only; not for CBT compliance assessment).
- The CBT is voluntary and central bank–focused, designed to encompass a broad range of mandates, governance frameworks, and institutional arrangements.
- The CBT is not intended to serve as a central bank governance framework.

### The 5-pillar framework (key features)
- The CBT’s 5-pillar framework covers transparency in governance, policies, operations, outcome, and official relations:
  - Pillar I. Transparency in governance, covering institutional issues.
  - Pillar II. Transparency in policies, focusing on the economics of the central bank policy decisions.
  - Pillar III. Transparency in operations, highlighting how policy decisions are implemented.
  - Pillar IV. Transparency in outcome, focusing on how the outcome of central bank policies and other actions are reported to stakeholders to facilitate accountability.
  - Pillar V. Transparency in official relations, covering the central bank interaction with the government and other domestic agencies, and international relations and commitments.

### Rationale and context
- Need to remove overlap with other standards and to reflect expanded mandates, functions, powers and policy tools that emerged since the 2008 financial crisis.
- The ongoing global response to the COVID-19 epidemic, where central banks have taken active and unconventional roles, further reinforced the need for greater transparency to maintain public trust and policy effectiveness.
- Enhanced transparency practices reflect central banks’ resort to unconventional measures (including quantitative easing, forward guidance, lender and market-maker of last resort operations) and large-scale interventions requiring coordination with ministries of finance.

### Modular, voluntary, and proportional application
- The CBT’s modular approach allows voluntary and proportional application that takes into account country-specific circumstances.
- Central banks could use the CBT to map their transparency frameworks, make informed choices on transparency arrangements, and improve dialogue with stakeholders.
- The CBT provides a range of practices for implementing principles to be relevant across diverse legal frameworks, governance arrangements, and levels of economic and financial development.
- The practices are not intended to be a tool for transparency ranking of central banks.

### Confidentiality and flexibility
- The CBT recognizes the need to balance transparency with legitimate confidentiality needs (market sensitive information, financial stability considerations, and personal data).
- Two-pronged approach to confidentiality:
  - Transparency requirements are qualified with respect to market sensitive information, financial stability considerations, and personal data.
  - In Pillar I, the principle of confidentiality calls for a clear confidentiality policy that explains and justifies choices on disclosure of sensitive information and obligations.

### Use in IMF work and capacity development
- The CBT will support Fund capacity building activities: Technical Assistance (TA) and Financial Sector Stability Reviews (FSSR).
- The CBT will support Surveillance—Article IV Consultations and Financial Sector Stability Programs (FSAP); Use of Fund Resources (UFR); and the Fund’s Good Governance Framework for enhanced Fund engagement on governance.
- The CBT can serve as a diagnostic tool in capacity development by delineating transparency benchmarks and allowing graduated assessment of central banks’ transparency practices to plan, implement, and monitor reforms.
- The CBT framework could help support Fund surveillance by highlighting strengths and weaknesses of central banks’ transparency practices and enabling modular assessments and prioritized transparency action plans to be monitored in the context of Article IV surveillance, FSAPs, and Use-of-Fund Resources.

### Key drafting considerations
- Factors considered in drafting the CBT included:
  - The contribution of central bank transparency to increased policy effectiveness and enhanced accountability.
  - The balance between transparency and legitimate needs for confidentiality.
  - Monetary policy practices that altered norms underpinning traditional transparency principles, including use of unconventional measures and expanded balance sheets.
  - The broadening of mandates, functions, and powers—de jure and de facto—of central banks, including macroprudential oversight, crisis management, resolution authority, and other objectives (e.g., financial integrity and consumer protection).
  - The need for the CBT to be practical and flexible across diverse central banking environments.
  - The Fund’s approach to governance issues, including the April 2018 Board-approved framework for enhanced Fund engagement on governance, which includes a central bank governance component examining transparency and accountability arrangements.

### Consultation process and stakeholder input
- Extensive consultations informed the CBT: Executive Board, central banks, international institutions, and standard setters.
- An international High-Level Advisory Panel (AP) composed of eminent former central bank governors and academics was convened in late summer of 2019.
- Staff held three meetings with the AP in October and December 2019, and in March 2020, plus several rounds of written comments.
- Feedback, notably on balancing transparency and confidentiality, improved the CBT’s flexibility to reflect diverse legal and structural backgrounds across jurisdictions.

*International Monetary Fund — EXECUTIVE SUMMARY of ppea2020038*

### Box 1. Central Bank Transparency Code—Advisory Panel

### Box 1. Central Bank Transparency Code—Advisory Panel

### Advisory Panel membership
- Ms. Aziz, Zeti Akthar — Former Governor, Bank Negara Malaysia
- Mr. Blinder, Alan — Academic, Princeton University
- Mr. De Gregorio, José — Former Governor, Central Bank of Chile
- Mr. El Okdah, Farouk — Former Governor, Central Bank of Egypt
- Ms. Geraats, Petra — Academic, Cambridge University
- Mr. Ndulu, Benno — Former Governor, Central Bank of Tanzania
- Mr. Praet, Peter — Former ECB Executive Board Member
- Mr. Reddy, Y.V. — Former Governor, Reserve Bank of India
- Mr. Shirakawa, Masaaki — Former Governor, Bank of Japan
- Mr. Tarullo, Daniel — Former Governor, US Federal Reserve

### Advisory Panel contributions and issues raised
- The AP provided advice shaping the CBT’s development and final outcome.
- Key issues raised by the AP included:
  - further nuancing the balance between transparency and confidentiality;
  - ensuring a clear focus on transparency requirements versus governance aspects;
  - finetuning issues relating to transparency of central bank autonomy, risk management and audit, financial stability and stress testing, and inter-agency cooperation;
  - incorporating transparency of human capital management and code-of-ethics;
  - clarifying the approach to external accountability by further strengthening descriptions of practices under Pillar IV.
- Actions taken in response to AP input:
  - added language in the CBT’s introduction on confidentiality;
  - deleted remaining governance aspects from the CBT;
  - added explicit references to human capital management in the CBT;
  - strengthened presentation of anti-corruption measures and internal code-of-conduct;
  - clarified and consolidated discussions on external accountability in Pillar IV;
  - adjusted relevant transparency practices accordingly.
- Meeting schedule notes:
  - The last AP meeting was planned at HQ on March 16, 2020; due to the Covid-19 epidemic this was replaced by a series of conference calls that took place during the week of March 23, 2020.

### Executive Board engagement and Directors’ concerns
- Staff engagement with the Board included:
  - staff presentation on November 20, 2019, to discuss approach, high-level principles, and consultation process;
  - informal meeting-to-engage on March 4, 2020, to discuss the CBT Exposure Draft;
  - two virtual iLab sessions on May 5 and 7, 2020, to discuss staff’s response to central banks’ comments on the CBT Exposure Draft.
- Directors highlighted several issues:
  - clarifying the voluntary nature of the CBT and its application in Fund surveillance and capacity building, and that adoption depends on country-specific situations;
  - refining the balance between transparency and confidentiality;
  - removing any remaining references to central bank governance aspects;
  - finetuning descriptions of risk management, audit, and financial stability;
  - ensuring consistency of legal language throughout the CBT.
- Responses to Directors’ concerns:
  - explicitly noted the CBT is voluntary and expanded examples of how the CBT could be applied;
  - reviewed language with the IMF’s Legal Department to ensure consistency;
  - incorporated finetuning, deletion of governance aspects, and strengthened confidentiality language, taking AP suggestions into account.

### External consultations, feedback, and thematic comments
- Circulation and respondents:
  - The Exposure Draft was circulated in late January 2020 to central banks and monetary unions worldwide, the Bank for International Settlements, the World Bank, and financial policy standard-setters (BCBS, IAIS, IOSCO, FATF).
  - Staff received formal responses via the online CBT feedback form and other interactions from 75 organizations in total, including 73 central banks and monetary unions, and 2 international organizations.
  - Response from countries in the European region includes 15 eurozone countries that did not submit separate comments; the ECB indicated its response was coordinated with and on behalf of those national central banks.
- Aggregate feedback characteristics:
  - Central banks and international organizations broadly supported the CBT, recognizing its relevance in the context of expanded mandates, consistency with the MFPT and other international standards, support for removing overlap with other financial policy standards, support for the CBT 5-pillar framework, and a broadly acknowledged balance between transparency and confidentiality.
  - Around 8 percent of central bank respondents provided CBT-based assessments of certain elements of their current transparency practices.
  - Most comments were intended for clarification, including on terminology.
- Responses by Region (as presented):
  - 49%
  - 16%
  - 13%
  - 8%
  - 11%
  - 3%
- Representative comments of broader relevance and staff responses:
  - Nature of the CBT: clarify voluntary nature and concerns about ranking central banks.
  - Legal framework: note domestic legal frameworks requiring transparency or confidentiality and recognize frameworks for central banks in currency unions.
  - Independence/Autonomy: clarify difference between the two terms; expand clarification of goal and instrument autonomy; enhance components of financial autonomy.
  - Risk management: clarify coverage of certain risks (compliance and strategic) and concerns about exposing central banks to risks by disclosing risk information and mitigation strategies.
  - Code of conduct: expand good and advanced practices; include transparency on presence of Ethics Officers and on use, protection, and preservation of information, and mechanisms to prevent conflicts of interest.
  - Confidentiality: further clarify approach to confidentiality, including links to the legal framework.
  - Decision-making process: clarify practices regarding policy decision making and disclosure of supporting analysis to achieve policy objectives and prevent excessive speculation.
  - Foreign exchange management: clarify transparency practices regarding timing and scale of foreign exchange management and interventions.
  - Foreign exchange reserve management: disclosure of composition of reserve assets, short-term liabilities, and drains should follow related codes of conduct (IRFCL; COFER; and SDDS).
  - Financial integrity: clarify AML/CFT components relating to “internal activities” of central banks versus their role as AML/CFT supervisor.
- Staff addressed these comments by detailed changes to relevant transparency practices and shared revisions with Directors.

### Summary, pilot plans, and next steps
- Context:
  - The paper contains a staff proposal for the IMF Central Bank Transparency Code and responds to the Executive Board decision on April 29, 2019, building on the 2017 RSCI.
- Expected benefits:
  - The CBT eliminates overlap with international financial standards adopted since the MFPT was created;
  - expands transparency criteria to the broader set of activities undertaken by central banks since the 2008 financial crisis;
  - creates cost-effectiveness by facilitating risk-based assessments to support policy effectiveness and address macroeconomic and financial risks.
  - The CBT will facilitate more effective communication between the central bank and stakeholders, reduce uncertainty, anchor public expectations, contribute to better policy choices, and enhance accountability.
- Pilot assessments:
  - Staff proposes to carry out several CBT reviews on a voluntary basis over the next two years, in collaboration with relevant authorities.
  - Participating countries will be reflective of IMF membership, cover diversity of regions, income levels, and exchange rate regimes, and the outcome will be reported to the Board in the form of aggregate analysis.
  - The outcome of the pilots will be used to develop a guidance note and template for future voluntary applications of the CBT in FSAP, AIV or UFR discussions.
  - Staff are looking forward to conduct four to six reviews in the pilot phase.
  - The staff has not yet approached any central bank for the purpose of conducting the pilot reviews.
  - Six central banks from various regions have already used the CBT’s Exposure Draft to gauge existing transparency practices.
  - Additionally, one (emerging market) central bank indicated it has established an internal working group to map transparency practices for all its functions as part of strategic planning.
- Issues for Board discussion (as posed in the paper):
  - Do Directors agree with staff’s CBT proposal as attached to this paper?
  - Do Directors agree that staff carry out CBT pilot reviews, in consultation with the authorities and on a voluntary basis, and report the outcome to the Board?

*Source: IMF staff*

### Introduction

### Introduction

### Importance of central bank transparency
- Transparency is important for effective monetary and financial policies.
- Transparency guides decisions of economic agents and stabilizes market expectations and conduct, boosting policy effectiveness.
- Transparency ensures public accountability of central banks and their autonomy/independence, which underpins operational effectiveness.
- Effective central bank transparency arrangements are one of the sound principles of monetary policy.

### Changing context since 1999 and drivers for an update
- The 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic have heightened the importance of central bank transparency and broadened central bank mandates, functions, and powers—both de jure and de facto.
- Central banks have:
  - Expanded balance sheets significantly, often using unconventional monetary policies to support price stability objectives.
  - Been given a financial stability mandate that informs monetary policy actions and decisions.
  - Seen financial stability functions broaden to include macroprudential oversight, crisis management, and resolution.
  - In some cases, assumed responsibility for areas such as anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) supervision and consumer protection.
- An update of the IMF’s 1999 “Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies” (MFPT) was needed because of:
  - advances in international standards for financial policies since 1999;
  - monetary policy practices of many central banks since the 2008 financial crisis;
  - the broadening of mandates, functions, and powers of central banks in recent years;
  - the 2017 IMF “Review of the Standards and Codes Initiative” recommendation to gear the Fund’s transparency guidance toward facilitating the implementation of policy objectives;
  - the Fund’s enhanced approach to good governance issues.

### Endorsement and scope of the new Code
- On April 29, 2019, the Executive Board of the IMF endorsed a staff proposal to replace the 1999 MFPT with a new Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT).
- The CBT is a comprehensive set of principles and practices that apply to all central banks, regardless of mandates, governance frameworks, and institutional arrangements.
- The CBT’s five-pillar framework comprises transparency on:
  - governance,
  - policies,
  - operations,
  - outcome,
  - official relations,
  covering transparency in every area of central banking.

### Objectives and approach of the CBT
- The CBT better reflects the new realities of central banking by:
  - focusing on facilitating the implementation of policy objectives to support policy effectiveness and address macroeconomic risks rather than primarily disclosing operational processes;
  - recognizing that central banks operate under diverse circumstances and levels of economic and financial development.
- This recognition facilitates assessments of transparency that are outcome-focused, modular, risk-based, and proportional.
- The CBT allows central banks to assess and shape their accountability and increase policy effectiveness by mapping existing transparency frameworks against a range of practices and clarifying transparency choices stemming from domestic legal frameworks.

### Balance between transparency and confidentiality
- The CBT recognizes that transparency cannot be indiscriminate or excessive because many central bank activities legitimately require confidentiality.
- The MFPT (1999) noted: “Transparency is not an end in itself, nor is transparency a substitute for pursuing sound policies; rather, transparency and sound policies are better seen as complements.”
- The degree of central bank transparency is shaped by domestic legal frameworks, which may:
  - restrict disclosure (e.g., personal data or commercial/trade secrecy);
  - require transparency (e.g., “freedom of information” laws);
  - impose obligations through membership in a currency union or international agreements.
- The CBT strives to strike a balance by:
  a. qualifying transparency requirements for market-sensitive information, financial stability considerations, and personal data; and
  b. requiring central banks to articulate a clear confidentiality policy to explain and justify disclosure choices and obligations.

### Voluntary nature and applicability
- The CBT is a voluntary code intended to help central banks assess transparency frameworks and facilitate informed dialogue with stakeholders.
- The CBT stresses transparency of central banks’ legal frameworks because these shape the degree of transparency.
- The CBT applies only to central banks. When central bank functions are shared with other agencies, the CBT does not apply to those other agencies’ transparency frameworks.
- In monetary unions, the CBT should be applied at both the level of the monetary union and of each national central bank where functions are allocated across members.

### Exclusions and supporting material
- The CBT will not assess central bank functions like micro-prudential supervision (banking or insurance), securities regulation, resolution, or financial market infrastructure responsibilities; these areas have established international standards.
- The Annex contains selected excerpts from these standards related to transparency for informational purposes only; the Annex is not to be used for assessing central banks’ transparency practices in those areas.

### The five Transparency Pillars
- Pillar I. Transparency in governance, covering institutional issues.
- Pillar II. Transparency in policies, including policy framework and decision-making processes.
- Pillar III. Transparency in operations, highlighting how policy decisions are implemented.
- Pillar IV. Transparency in outcome, focusing on reporting of policy outcomes to facilitate accountability.
- Pillar V. Transparency in official relations, covering central bank interactions with the government, other domestic agencies, and international relations and commitments.

*Source: Introduction, Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT), IMF.*

### ANNEX I. SELECTED PRINCIPLES FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL POLICY STANDARDS ................. 93

### ANNEX I. SELECTED PRINCIPLES FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL POLICY STANDARDS

### Acronyms
- AML/CFT Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism
- BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
- BCP Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
- CBT IMF Central Bank Transparency Code
- CCP Central Counterparty Clearing House
- CSD Central Securities Depository
- CPSS Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems
- EC Essential Criterion
- ELA Emergency Liquidity Assistance
- EN Explanatory Notes
- FMI Financial Market Infrastructures
- FS Financial Stability
- FSB Financial Stability Board
- IAIS International Association of Insurance Supervisors
- ICP Insurance Core Principles
- IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions
- KA Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions
- ML/TF Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing
- PFMI Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures
- SSS Securities Settlement System
- TR Trade Repositories

### General Principle on Central Bank Transparency
- "To strengthen their accountability, and as a prerequisite for their autonomy, whilst taking legitimate needs for confidentiality into account, central banks disclose their governance, policies, operations, and outcome of their policies and operations, as well as the official relations they maintain with government, domestic, foreign, and international agencies, and other institutions."

### Pillar I—Central Bank Governance
- 1.1. Legal Structure: "The central bank discloses its legal framework to the public in a manner that is clear and easily accessible."
  - Selected principles from BCP, ICP, IOSCO, KA, and PFMI (see Annex).
- 1.2. Mandate: "The central bank discloses its mandate—including its objectives, functions, and legally defined powers—in a manner that is clear and easily accessible to the public."
  - Selected principles from BCP, ICP, IOSCO, KA, and PFMI (see Annex).
- 1.3. Autonomy: "The central bank discloses its autonomy—as defined in relevant legislation or regulations, allowing it to reveal the extent to which it is autonomous or not, in what forms, and under which conditions—in a manner that is clear and easily accessible for the public."
  - Selected principles from BCP, ICP, IOSCO, KA, and PFMI (see Annex).
- 1.3.1. Institutional/Operational Autonomy:
  - "There is clarity on whether the central bank is prohibited from seeking or taking instructions from any private or public body."
  - "The extent to which the central bank’s autonomy varies for the various elements of its mandate is clearly disclosed."
  - "Where appropriate, a central bank’s governing law clarifies whether it has goal or instrument autonomy concerning its various objectives."
- 1.3.2. Functional Autonomy: "There is clarity on whether the central bank can perform its duties without prior approval from the government."
- 1.3.3. Personal Autonomy:
  - "Whether there is security of tenure for the members of the central bank’s decision-making bodies is clear, as is the nature of such security."
  - "Security of tenure encompasses the eligibility and disqualification criteria for the appointment of the members of a central bank’s decision-making bodies, the appointment procedure, the dismissal criteria and procedure, their remuneration, and the duration of their tenure."
- 1.3.4. Financial Autonomy:
  - "The central bank’s financial resources available to fulfill its mandate, and the nature of those resources, are clearly disclosed."
  - "There is clarity regarding the central bank’s capital, the rules governing any recapitalization of the central bank, its budget, reserves, provisions, profit distribution mechanism, monetary financing, and applicable accounting standards."
- 1.4. Decision-Making Arrangement: "The central bank discloses a clear overview of the organizational structure or allocation of responsibilities to its decision-making bodies: policy making, day-to-day management, and internal oversight of the central bank."
  - Selected principles from BCP, ICP, IOSCO, KA, and PFMI (see Annex).
- 1.5. Risk Management:
  - "The central bank discloses the principal risks that it needs to take to meet its objectives (such as financial, operational, and legal risks), and the framework to manage these risks. This includes information on the risk governance structure and risk strategy."
  - 1.5.1. Risk Exposure: "The central bank discloses the principal risks that it needs to take to meet its objectives."
  - 1.5.2. Risk Framework: "The central bank discloses the process for identifying financial and nonfinancial risks, the overall risk strategy, and the accompanying risk governance structure designed to monitor and evaluate risks effectively."
- 1.6. Accountability Framework:
  - "The central bank discloses its accountability framework that provides transparency and reporting mechanisms to internal decision-making bodies, political institutions, and the general public."
  - 1.6.1. Arrangements: Accountability arrangements are clearly identified, including:
    - "(i) internal and external audit arrangements and compliance;"
    - "(ii) reporting to an audit committee or Board having an oversight responsibility; and"
    - "(iii) the external publication of audited financial statements and annual reports."
  - 1.6.2. Tools:
    - Independently Audited Financial Statements: "The central bank discloses its auditing and accounting standards and compliance frameworks and gives the public sufficient information to assess and understand the central bank’s financial performance, use of resources, and transactions with the government and other stakeholders."
    - Internal Audit: "The central bank provides the public with information regarding its internal audit function, discloses its framework and compliance with the framework, and the scope of its responsibilities."
    - Audit Committee: "It is clear whether an internal oversight body that reports to the Board exists, and which of the activities are published."
  - 1.6.3. Anti-corruption Measures and Internal Code of Conduct: "It is clear whether domestic anti-corruption legislation and measures apply to the decision-makers, staff, and agents of the central bank. The central bank discloses its internal Code of Conduct with additional requirements specific to central bank management and staff."
  - 1.6.4. Human Capital Management: "The central bank discloses its policies and practices concerning the governance and management of human capital."
- 1.7. Communication:
  - "The central bank discloses means and methods of communication and the forms of disclosure of information to its stakeholders."
  - 1.7.1. Arrangement: "The central bank discloses the organizational structure, responsibilities, and processes relevant for communication."
  - 1.7.2. Strategy/Tools: "The central bank discloses the objectives, target audiences, channels, and tools of communication policy."
- 1.8. Confidentiality: "The central bank discloses its policy on confidentiality or secrecy of central bank information, including the reasons underlying the choices it has made on disclosure or non-disclosure of sensitive information."
  - Selected principles from BCP, ICP, IOSCO, KA, and PFMI (see Annex).

### Pillar II—Central Bank Policies
- 2.1 Monetary Policy: "The central bank publicly and clearly discloses the objectives, policy framework, and instruments of monetary policy."
  - 2.1.1. Objectives and Framework: "The central bank discloses its monetary policy framework and strategy for achieving its objectives."
  - 2.1.2. Policy Decisions: "The central bank discloses its monetary policy decisions in a timely manner and indicates how the decisions foster the achievement of its monetary policy objective(s). The central bank discloses the process by which policy decisions are taken, including with respect to the meeting calendar of its monetary policy decision-making bodies and their voting procedures."
  - 2.1.3. Supporting Analysis: "The central bank discloses relevant economic information and supporting analysis that informs its monetary policy decisions."
- 2.2. Cross-Border Financial Flows and Foreign Exchange Administration:
  - "The central bank is clear about its role in determining and implementing the policy on cross-border financial flows and foreign exchange administration. It discloses the objective(s), the legal and institutional frameworks it is acting under, its policy decisions, as well as the process by which policy decisions are taken."
  - 2.2.1. Objectives and Framework: "The central bank discloses the policy’s objective(s), legal and institutional frameworks, and the strategy to achieve the policy objectives. There is clarity whether the central bank can delegate some of its functions to implement policy decisions to other entities and on the modalities of such delegation."
  - 2.2.2. Policy Decisions: "Policy decisions, whether on new actions or changes to standing policy or other changes in the regulatory framework, are publicly announced, explained, and disclosed in a timely manner. The central bank is clear about the process by which policy decisions are taken."
  - 2.2.3. Supporting Analysis: "The central bank discloses in a timely manner the supporting analysis, including the intended outcome that informs its policy decisions."
- 2.3. Foreign Exchange Management:
  - "The central bank clearly and publicly discloses its foreign exchange policy objectives, including the hierarchy of objectives and the operational framework and instruments of foreign exchange interventions."
  - 2.3.1. Objectives and Framework: "The central bank discloses its policy objectives and legal, operational, and institutional frameworks, consistent with the chosen foreign exchange regime."
  - 2.3.2. Policy Decisions: "The central bank discloses its decision-making process, including the rationale for foreign exchange management instruments, and the means and methods of reaching a decision. The potential impact of its policy decisions is explained in a timely manner."
  - 2.3.3. Supporting Analysis: "The central bank discloses its assumptions, transmission channels, and analysis backing the intervention policy decisions, as well as ex-post evaluation of economic impact."
- 2.4. Foreign Exchange Reserve Management:
  - "The central bank discloses its policy objectives for foreign exchange reserve management, along with key considerations behind the policy, details on how oversight responsibility is allocated, and the potential impact of the policy."
  - 2.4.1. Objectives and Framework: "The central bank discloses broad investment objectives, operative models, how it allocates oversight responsibility, and the institutional framework of its policy decisions."
  - 2.4.2. Policy Decisions: "The central bank discloses key elements of policy formulation, related risk exposures, instruments, decision-making hierarchy, and the oversight allocation process."
  - 2.4.3. Supporting Analysis: "The central bank discloses the key assumptions and assessment process related to its policy decisions."
- 2.5. Macroprudential:
  - "The objectives, decision-making process, and instruments of macroprudential policy are clearly communicated to the public. Indicators and supporting analysis to assess the need for macroprudential measures are disclosed alongside policy decisions."
  - 2.5.1. Objectives and Framework: "The central bank discloses its macroprudential policy framework, including its objectives, instruments, and strategy for achieving its objectives."
  - 2.5.2. Policy Decisions: "The central bank publicly announces its macroprudential policy decisions in a timely manner, and discloses the decision-making process leading up to macroprudential action."
  - 2.5.3. Supporting Analysis: "The central bank discloses the key indicators and analyses used to assess the need for macroprudential measures. It explains the rationale and the expected transmission channels of policy instruments in achieving their objectives."
- 2.6. Microprudential Supervision: "Selected principles from BCP, ICP, and IOSCO (see Annex)."
- 2.7. Emergency Liquidity Assistance: "The central bank discloses the scope and objectives of emergency liquidity assistance, while maintaining the necessary confidentiality, to preserve financial stability and in support of monetary policy and its implementation."
- 2.8. Resolution: "Selected principles from KA (see Annex)."
- 2.9. Financial Market Infrastructures: "Selected principles from PFMI (see Annex)."
- 2.10. Financial Integrity: "The central bank discloses its policies and powers for Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism supervision, and a description of its internal control framework relating to the activities or services that may give rise to Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing risk."
- 2.11. Consumer Protection: "The central bank discloses its policies relating to consumer protection, conducted solely or jointly with other agencies."

### Pillar III—Central Bank Operations
- 3.1. Monetary Policy: "The central bank discloses its operational framework with a   well-defined operational target, objectives, instruments, collateral, and access criteria."
  - 3.1.1. Instruments: "The central bank discloses its monetary policy instruments."
  - 3.1.2. Coverage: "The central bank discloses: (i) the type of instrument (open market operations, standing facilities, other facilities, reserve requirements, and direct instruments of monetary control); (ii) the characteristics of each instrument; and (iii) the collateral framework."
  - 3.1.3. Access: "The central bank discloses the monetary policy counterparties’ framework."
- 3.2. Cross-Border Financial Flows and Foreign Exchange Administration:
  - "The central bank discloses how it implements this policy in terms of the instruments and the scope of its operations and actions."
  - 3.2.1. Instruments: "The central bank’s instruments for implementing the policy and the circumstances in which they can be used are clearly defined and disclosed."
  - 3.2.2. Coverage: "The central bank discloses information about the persons (entities and individuals), transactions, and other aspects of the foreign exchange system that it can and does regulate; persons, transactions, and activities that it can license, approve, monitor, and sanction; and foreign exchange transactions that it can perform."
- 3.3. Foreign Exchange Management:
  - "The central bank discloses how it implements its foreign exchange policies framework in terms of instruments, markets, size, and mode of access."
  - 3.3.1. Instruments: "The central bank discloses the set of instruments used for foreign exchange management policy, key considerations under which these instruments are chosen, and eligibility criteria of counterparties and mode of access."
  - 3.3.2. Coverage: "The central bank discloses the markets and agents who are targeted by the foreign exchange management policy."
- 3.4. Foreign Exchange Reserve Management:
  - "The central bank discloses the general principles governing its foreign exchange reserve management operations, including relationships with counterparties and service providers."
  - 3.4.1. Instruments: "The central bank discloses the broad selection criteria for eligible asset classes, composition of instruments, investment horizon and constraints."
  - 3.4.2. Coverage: "The central bank discloses the criteria to select eligible market counterparties and service providers and eligible markets to conduct its operations."
  - 3.4.3. Assessment: "The central bank discloses criteria to assess adequacy and liquidity parameters and discloses such analysis regularly, at predetermined times."
- 3.5. Financial Stability Assessments and Stress Testing:
  - "The central bank periodically discloses its assessment of domestic financial stability to the public and is transparent about the methods used for such assessments, including its framework for stress testing."
  - 3.5.1. Financial Stability Assessments: "The central bank periodically provides to the public its assessment of risk to financial stability, including new and emerging sources of vulnerability."
  - 3.5.2. Macroprudential Stress Testing Methods: "The central bank discloses the methods and key assumptions of the stress testing framework."
  - 3.5.3. Stress Testing Coverage: "The central bank discloses the coverage of the stress testing exercise."
  - 3.5.4. Central Bank Use of Stress Test Results: "There is clarity about the ways the central bank uses the stress test results."
- 3.6. Macroprudential Policy Implementation:
  - "The central bank discloses how it implements macroprudential policies, including the design of policy instruments and enforcement arrangements."
  - 3.6.1. Instruments: "The central bank discloses the precise design and objectives of its macroprudential instruments, including the scope of entities and financial instruments subject to macroprudential constraints."
  - 3.6.2. Enforcement: "The central bank discloses enforcement mechanisms and responsibilities for all entities and financial instruments subject to macroprudential constraints."
- 3.7. Microprudential Supervision: "Selected principles from BCP, ICP, and IOSCO (see Annex)."
- 3.8. Emergency Liquidity Assistance:
  - "The central bank may disclose any ongoing provision of emergency liquidity assistance (including bilateral and market-wide support) and its conditions and parameters once the need for confidentiality has ceased."
- 3.9. Resolution: "Selected principles from KA (see Annex)."
- 3.10. Financial Market Infrastructures: "Selected principles from PFMI (see Annex)."
- 3.11. Financial Integrity: "The central bank discloses its Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism supervisory processes as well as details about resources allocated to its internal Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism controls."
- 3.12. Consumer Protection: "The central bank discloses its operations relating to consumer protection conducted solely or jointly with other agencies."

### Pillar IV—Central Bank Outcome
- (Pillar IV heading present; content not included in the supplied excerpt.)

*International Monetary Fund — THE CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY CODE (ANNEX I).*

### 4.1 Monetary Policy: The central bank is transparent about the outcome of its monetary policy

### 4.1 Monetary Policy: The central bank is transparent about the outcome of its monetary policy conduct.

### 4.1 — Monetary policy transparency principles and dimensions
- 4.1.1. Governance Actions: The accountability of the central bank on monetary policy is clear as to whom accountability is owed and how it is discharged.  
- 4.1.2. Policies: The central bank discloses progress toward achieving its monetary policy objective(s) as well as prospects for achieving them.  
- 4.1.3. Operations: The central bank discloses the volumes and interest rates of the operations, as well as the level of the operational target achieved.

### 4.2 — Cross-Border Financial Flows and Foreign Exchange Administration
- 4.2.1. Governance Actions: The central bank discloses information about to whom its accountability on the policy is owed and how it is discharged.  
- 4.2.2. Policies: The central bank discloses on a regular basis information about the results in achieving the policy objectives.  
- 4.2.3. Implementation: The central bank discloses on a regular basis information about the results of the policy implementation.

### 4.3 — Foreign Exchange Management
- 4.3.1. Governance Actions: The central bank discloses its decision-making structure and how it is accountable for Foreign Exchange Management.  
- 4.3.2. Policies: The central bank discloses the role of Foreign Exchange Management toward achieving its policy objective(s) as well as its interaction with broader monetary policy objectives.  
- 4.3.3. Operations: The central bank discloses the results of its market operations, the volume of activity, and the direction of interventions on its website at a predefined time lag.

### 4.4 — Foreign Exchange Reserve Management
- 4.4.1. Governance Actions: The central bank publicly discloses the general principles of internal governance to ensure the integrity of its policy formulation and operations.  
- 4.4.2. Reporting on Implementation: The central bank discloses data relating to the level and composition of reserve assets, short-term liabilities, and drains that can lead to demand on reserves at a predefined frequency.  
- 4.4.3. Financial Results: There is clarity in audited financial statements on the amount, composition, profit/loss, and risks arising from foreign exchange reserves.

### 4.5 — Macroprudential Policy
- 4.5.1. Governance Actions: The accountability of the central bank on macroprudential policies is clear as to whom accountability is owed and how it is discharged.  
- 4.5.2. Policies: The central bank discloses ex-post evaluations of its macroprudential policies.

### Other supervisory and operational domains
- 4.6. Microprudential Supervision: Selected principles from BCP, ICP, and IOSCO (see Annex).  
- 4.7. Emergency Liquidity Assistance: The Emergency Liquidity Assistance framework allows for appropriate disclosure of the provision of liquidity support, terms and conditions, and amounts provided, while maintaining confidentiality as long as required.  
- 4.8. Resolution: Selected principles from KA (see Annex).  
- 4.9. Financial Market Infrastructures: Selected principles from PFMI (see Annex).  
- 4.10. Financial Integrity: The central bank discloses the outcome of its Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism supervisory actions as well as details about the oversight of its internal Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism controls.  
- 4.11. Consumer Protection: There is clarity about the results and implications of consumer protection policies and operations conducted solely or jointly with other agencies.

### Pillar V — Central Bank Official Relations (summary of principles)
- 5.1. Government: The central bank discloses its relationship with the government, including the exchange of information, coordination of policies, and financial aspects such as rules on profit distribution, clearly distinguishing the different roles and modalities this can take.  
  - 5.1.1. The institutional relationship between the central bank and the government/its agencies is clearly defined and publicly disclosed.  
  - 5.1.2. The central bank publicly discloses its policies and terms and conditions governing financial transactions with the government, including its fiscal agent role, the management of the current account, deposit taking, advances, guarantees, loans and credit arrangements to the public sector, as well as agency services performed on behalf of the government.  
  - 5.1.3. The instruments used in interaction (including the financial transactions) between the central bank and the government/its agencies are clearly defined and publicly disclosed.  
  - 5.1.4. The central bank discloses publicly on a regular basis the outcome of its interaction (including operations) with the government/its agencies.  
- 5.2. Domestic Financial Agencies: The central bank discloses its relationships with domestic financial agencies as relevant to the pursuit of its mandate and the execution of its functions.  
  - 5.2.1. The relationship between the central bank and relevant domestic financial agencies is clearly defined and publicly disclosed, including cooperation and (co-) decision-making modalities and arrangements for the formal/informal sharing of information.  
  - 5.2.2. The policies and instruments used in the interaction of the central bank with domestic financial agencies, and the outcome of the interaction are transparent.  
  - 5.2.3. With respect to macroprudential policy, the central bank discloses its role, responsibly, and actions—and those of any other authority it collaborates with. The central bank also discloses any advice it receives.  
  - 5.2.4. With respect to financial stability, all arrangements to restore or maintain financial stability are clearly disclosed, including arrangements on data sharing, liquidity support, and who is responsible for which type of decision or action at what stage.  
- 5.3. Foreign Agencies: The central bank discloses its dealings with international organizations, foreign governments, other central banks, and other relevant foreign agencies, including the nature of the involvement or interactions, and any obligations and commitments that may arise from these relationships.  
  - 5.3.1. The relationship for the exchange of information and coordination of actions and policies between the central bank and international organizations, foreign governments, other central banks, and other relevant foreign agencies is clearly defined and publicly disclosed.  
  - 5.3.2. The central bank publicly discloses its policies, terms, and conditions governing interaction with international organizations, foreign governments, other central banks, and other relevant foreign agencies.  
  - 5.3.3. The instruments used in the interaction (including financial transactions) between the central bank and international organizations, foreign governments, other central banks, and other relevant foreign agencies are clearly defined and publicly disclosed.  
  - 5.3.4. The central bank discloses publicly on a regular basis the outcome of its relationship with international organizations, foreign governments, other central banks, and other relevant foreign agencies.  
- 5.4. Other Relations: The central bank discloses its involvement with private or semi-public institutions.  
  - 5.4.1. The central bank discloses its investments in and ownership of subsidiaries and joint ventures with private, semi-public, or public entities.

### Annex A — Description of core, expanded, and comprehensive practices (selected highlights)
- General Principle: Central banks disclose governance, policies, operations, and outcomes, while taking legitimate needs for confidentiality into account.  
- Pillar I — Governance: detailed disclosure across Legal Structure, Mandate, Autonomy (Institutional/Operational, Functional, Personal, Financial), Decision-making Arrangement, Risk Management, Accountability Framework, Anti-Corruption Measures and Internal Code of Conduct, Human Capital Management, Communication, and Confidentiality.  
- Pillar II — Policies: includes disclosure standards for Monetary Policy (2.1), Cross-Border Financial Flows and Foreign Exchange Administration (2.2), Foreign Exchange Management (2.3), Foreign Exchange Reserve Management (2.4), and Macroprudential Policy (2.5).  
- Selected specific expectations (non-exhaustive, per dimension):  
  - 2.1.2. Policy Decisions: disclose in a timely manner decisions regarding policy instruments, including implications about the size and composition of the central bank balance sheet.  
  - 2.1.3. Supporting Analysis: disclose relevant economic data and analysis, with macroeconomic forecasts and scenario analysis as expanded practices.  
  - 2.2.2. Policy Decisions: disclose decision-making stages, role of decision-making bodies, and provide sufficient lead time for those affected by changes.  
  - 2.3.3. Supporting Analysis: disclose assumptions, transmission channels, ex-post evaluations of economic impact, and committee statements.  
  - 2.4.1–2.4.3: disclose objectives, governance, risk exposure, investment benchmarks, decision-making hierarchy, and supporting analysis including ex-post evaluations at a defined frequency.  
  - 2.5.1–2.5.2: disclose macroprudential framework, instruments, strategy, indicators (early warning and stress tests), and timely announcement of macroprudential policy decisions.

*Source: THE CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY CODE — INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (excerpts from chapter headings and principles).*

### Introduction of or

### Introduction of or

### Macroprudential Policy Disclosure
- Introduction of or adjustments to macroprudential tools are publicly announced in a timely manner with due consideration given to frontloading issues (in the case of flow-based macroprudential tools).
- The information on the composition and structure of the macroprudential policy decision-making body of the central bank and its upcoming meeting schedule are disclosed.
- In addition to core practices:
  - The central bank provides a detailed explanation of the rationale and benefits of macroprudential policy decisions in the context of macroprudential policy objectives.
  - It provides a comprehensive account of policy deliberations within a reasonable amount of time.
- In addition to expanded practices:
  - The central bank discloses its assessment of potential vulnerabilities and provides justification in the event it did not take mitigating policy actions.
  - It provides a comprehensive account of policy within a reasonable amount of time, disclosing how decisions (e.g., voting records) about the level of its macroprudential policy tools are taken.

### Supporting Analysis
- The central bank discloses the key indicators and analyses used to assess the need for macroprudential measures.
- It explains the rationale and the expected transmission channels of policy instruments in achieving their objectives.
- The central bank publishes statements (e.g., a Financial Stability Report) analyzing financial stability issues and discloses how macroprudential tools are expected to mitigate the risk.
- In addition to core practices:
  - The central bank periodically publishes indicators (such as early warning indicators or stress test results) and explains how they relate to the need for macroprudential policy action.
- In addition to expanded practices:
  - The central bank publishes ex post evaluations of policy actions that examine whether tools had the intended effects.

### Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA)
- The central bank discloses the scope and objectives of emergency liquidity assistance, while maintaining the necessary confidentiality, to preserve financial stability and in support of monetary policy and its implementation.
- While maintaining confidentiality, the central bank discloses the scope of ELA mechanisms at its disposal, and the objectives for their use.
- The central bank discloses the basic features of its ELA mechanism that allows it to provide (in a discretionary manner) bilateral or market-wide emergency liquidity support to the financial system.
- The level of transparency provided must not interfere with the financial stability objective or impair any confidentiality requirements and should not diminish the central bank’s discretion/freedom to decide on a case-by-case basis.
- In addition to core practices:
  - The central bank discloses the different forms/operations in which liquidity support may be provided, distinguishing between bilateral and market-wide liquidity support, clarifying institutional eligibility, decision-making process, whether other agencies are involved, and its disclosure policy.
- In addition to expanded practices:
  - The central bank discloses the general rules, parameters, and conditions for each form of liquidity support, including: (i) institutional eligibility; (ii) conditionality; (iii) supervisory intrusion; and (iv) financial parameters (including the applied interest rate, eligible collateral, maturity, and currency).

### Microprudential Supervision, Resolution, and FMIs
- Selected principles from BCP, ICP, IOSCO, KA, and PFMI are referenced for microprudential supervision, resolution, and financial market infrastructures; central banks should follow the applicable selected principles (see Annex referenced in original).

### Financial Integrity (AML/CFT)
- The central bank discloses its policies and powers for Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism supervision, and a description of its control framework relating to the activities or services that may give rise to money laundering/terrorist financing risk.
- The central bank discloses an overview of its AML/CFT supervisory policies, related guidance, and information on its AML/CFT supervisory powers.
- In addition to core practices:
  - The central bank discloses whether revisions of supervisory policies and guidance are in consultation with the private sector.
- In addition to expanded practices:
  - The central bank discloses how it ensures consideration of the private sector’s feedback on the implementation of the policies and guidance.
- The central bank discloses a description of its internal AML/CFT control framework relating to its activities or services that give rise to money laundering and financing of terrorism risk.
- The AML/CFT internal control policies are audited by an independent party, preferably an independent and reputable third party, and the results are presented to the Board; confirmation that the results were presented to the Board is published.
- The central bank discloses how it ensures the timely remediation of any identified weaknesses; confirmation that all results have been addressed is published.

### Consumer Protection
- The central bank publishes its consumer protection policies. This includes policies relating to disclosure measures and transparency of financial institutions, fair treatment and business conduct, data protection and privacy usage of customer data, an ombudsman or other official appointed to investigate consumer protection-related complaints (where the central bank holds such an oversight function, or cooperates with an agency that does), or practices in information-sharing and dispute resolution mechanisms.

### Pillar III — Operations: Monetary Policy (Instruments, Coverage, Access)
- 3.1 Monetary Policy: The central bank discloses its operational framework with a well-defined operational target, objectives, instruments, collateral, and access criteria.
- 3.1.1 Instruments:
  - The set of monetary policy instruments is disclosed to the public.
  - In addition to core practices: The operational target is clearly defined and disclosed to the public.
  - In addition to expanded practices: The operational target and the link between the operational framework and monetary policy objectives is disclosed. The role of reserve requirements is disclosed.
- 3.1.2 Coverage:
  - The central bank discloses the terms and conditions of monetary operations and reserve requirements.
  - The eligible collateral is defined and published.
  - The general characteristics of each instrument are published.
  - Reserve requirements’ ratio, remuneration, and averaging provision (if any) are published.
  - In addition to core practices: Terms and conditions that explain how the level of reserve requirements is determined are disclosed.
  - In addition to expanded practices: Detailed regulations on monetary operations and reserve requirements are published and regularly updated, including detailed characteristics (maturity, interest rate, auctioning method, collateral and haircuts, etc.).
- 3.1.3 Access:
  - The categories of monetary policy counterparties and respective access rights are clearly defined and disclosed.
  - In addition to core practices: The eligibility criteria of counterparties and terms and conditions for participating are disclosed.
  - In addition to expanded practices: The list of eligible institutions, counterparties of monetary operations, and their respective access rights is published and regularly updated.

### Cross-Border Financial Flows and Foreign Exchange Administration (Pillar III)
- 3.2 The central bank discloses how it implements this policy in terms of instruments and the scope of its operations and actions.
- 3.2.1 Instruments:
  - The set of instruments (regulatory framework, licenses/approvals, reports, monitoring and enforcement instruments, and foreign exchange transactions conducted by the central bank) are clearly defined and disclosed.
  - In addition to core practices: The central bank provides and discloses a brief description of each regulatory instrument (e.g., the objective and scope of an act).
  - The central bank discloses the most recent consolidated version of each regulatory instrument that incorporates all changes in a timely manner.
- 3.2.2 Coverage:
  - The regulatory framework clearly defines and discloses the types of activities, persons, and transactions the central bank is entitled to regulate/license/approve/perform/monitor/sanction; rules and conditions; licensing/approval requirements; considerations underlying decisions; procedures and time limits for decisions; reporting requirements; forms and compilation guidelines; monitoring instruments; and types, scope, and extent of sanctions.
  - In addition to core practices: The central bank discloses detailed descriptions of licensing/approval requirements and documents to be submitted; conditions for automatic granting of licenses (if any); and the procedure for imposing sanctions.
  - In addition to expanded practices: Aspects related to granting licenses/approvals and use of/access to other policy instruments are explained to the public through Q&As that are easily accessible.
  - Decisions in individual cases, including considerations underlying rejection of a request for license/approval (if any), are communicated to affected persons in a timely manner.

### Foreign Exchange Management and Reserve Management (Pillar III)
- 3.3 Foreign Exchange Management:
  - 3.3.1 Instruments: The central bank discloses the main instruments used for foreign exchange intervention, counterparties, eligibility criteria, and access to operations. In addition to core practices: the central bank discloses choice of instruments, modalities, rationale, eligibility criteria, and publishes regulation governing conduct and sanction rules.
  - 3.3.2 Coverage: The central bank discloses the markets and agents targeted by foreign exchange management policy, markets of operation (e.g., spot and derivatives), and framework for choosing institutions to transact with. In addition to expanded practices: coverage, rules, modes, markets, and eligibility criteria are regularly updated and available on the central bank’s website.
- 3.4 Foreign Exchange Reserve Management:
  - 3.4.1 Instruments: The central bank discloses broad selection criteria for eligible asset classes, composition of instruments, investment horizon, and constraints. In addition to core practices: disclosure of composition of eligible reserve assets and instruments, and risk disclosures by asset class.
  - 3.4.2 Coverage: The central bank discloses broad criteria to select eligible counterparties and service providers. In addition to core practices: disclosure of rules and procedures for selection of markets, counterparties, custodians, and service providers.
  - 3.4.3 Assessment: The annual report contains general discussion of reserve adequacy and liquidity arising from investment activities. In addition to expanded practices: the central bank conducts annual liquidity stress tests and publishes a reserve adequacy assessment and a risk statement outlining financial, operational, and other risks with a defined time lag.

### Financial Stability Assessments and Stress Testing
- 3.5 Financial Stability Assessments:
  - The central bank periodically discloses its assessment of risks to financial stability, including new and emerging sources of vulnerability, and is transparent about the methods used.
  - In addition to core practices: The central bank regularly publishes a comprehensive assessment of the main risks to financial stability.
  - In addition to expanded practices: The central bank discloses the methods and underlying data used for such assessments, to the extent compatible with data protection rules.
- 3.5.2 Macroprudential Stress Testing Methods:
  - The central bank discloses the methods and key assumptions of the stress testing framework and results on an aggregated basis.
  - In addition to expanded practices: The central bank discloses details including exercise type (bottom-up, top-down, or combination), design of macroeconomic stress scenario, risks covered, models used, evolution of financial statements, full set of assumptions, and regulatory framework considered.
- 3.5.3 Stress Testing Coverage:
  - The central bank discloses the type of institutions covered and the number of institutions.
  - In addition to expanded practices: The central bank discloses the names of institutions participating in the stress test.
- 3.5.4 Central Bank Use of Stress Test Results:
  - The central bank discloses the main purpose of stress tests and whether/how aggregate and individual results may affect policy decisions and dealings with financial institutions.

### Macroprudential Policy — Design and Enforcement
- 3.6.1 Design of Macroprudential Tools:
  - The central bank discloses the design and scope of application of macroprudential tools, including types of financial institutions and financial instruments subject to constraints.
  - In addition to core practices: The central bank discloses clear and accessible statements on key design features and how they may affect market participants; documents may have an educational purpose.
  - In addition to expanded practices: The central bank consults the public before enacting major changes to the design of macroprudential tools.
- 3.6.2 Enforcement:
  - The central bank discloses which agencies enforce macroprudential regulations and discloses both incentive mechanisms and penalties.

### Emergency Liquidity Assistance (Operations and Disclosure)
- 3.8 The central bank may disclose ongoing provision of ELA (including bilateral and market-wide support) and its conditions and parameters once confidentiality need has ceased.
- In addition to core practices: The central bank discloses the forms of market-wide liquidity support and provides timely and complete information in support of financial stability, including eligible institutions, type of operation, financial parameters (interest rates, eligible collateral, maturities), and procedural requirements.
- In addition to expanded practices: The central bank discloses the forms of market-wide liquidity support and both additional channels outlined in expanded practices.
- For bilateral liquidity support, information is disclosed only after the financial stability risk has passed and confidentiality requirements no longer violated; disclosure should not diminish central bank discretion.

### Pillar IV — Outcome: Monetary Policy and Other Policy Outcomes
- 4.1 Monetary Policy — Governance Actions:
  - The central bank discloses responsibilities of governing bodies to report on the conduct of monetary policy to designated public authorities, describe performance in achieving objectives, and exchange views on the state of the economy.
  - In addition to core practices: Periodic communication to public and designated authorities on actions taken to achieve policy objectives, or reasons/explanations when objectives not achieved.
  - In addition to expanded practices: Transparency about interactions with designated public authorities on monetary policy.
- 4.1.2 Policies:
  - The central bank discloses indicators relating to monetary policy objectives and releases periodic public statements on progress.
  - In addition to core practices: Publishes evaluations of efforts to meet targets and information about economic developments affecting prospects.
  - In addition to expanded practices: Methods, techniques, and data underlying monetary policy evaluations are publicly accessible.
- 4.1.3 Operations:
  - The level of the operational target is published; outstanding volumes and interest rates of each instrument are published; aggregated bank balances at the central bank (bank reserves) are published.
  - The level of the operational target is disclosed daily; auction results are published in a timely manner; aggregated bank balances and realized autonomous liquidity factors are published frequently and in a timely manner on the central bank’s website.

### Outcomes: Cross-Border Flows, FX Management, Reserve Management, Macroprudential Policy, ELA, AML/CFT, Consumer Protection
- 4.2 Cross-Border Financial Flows and FX Administration:
  - The central bank discloses to whom its accountability on the policy is owed, frequency and manner of reporting, interactions with other policies, results in achieving policy objectives, detailed information on actions taken, reasons for not achieving objectives, and implementation results (licenses/approvals, inspections, sanctions, and aggregated data on cross-border flows).
  - The central bank publishes lists of entities/individuals licensed to perform foreign exchange activities and updates them regularly.
- 4.3 Foreign Exchange Management:
  - Governance: The central bank discloses governance structure and responsibilities of governing bodies with respect to FX management.
  - Policies: The central bank discloses supporting analysis backing intervention policy decisions, policy decisions and outcomes in annual reports, and (in expanded practices) mode, instruments, and data underlying policy evaluations in monetary policy reports at a defined frequency.
  - Operations: The central bank publishes aggregated data on interventions (purchases and sales) with a predefined lag of not more than a month (consistent with official reserves reporting standards) in expanded practices.
- 4.4 Foreign Exchange Reserve Management:
  - Governance actions: The central bank discloses institutional obligations and general principles of policy framework and operations.
  - Reporting on Implementation: The central bank publishes information about the level of foreign exchange reserve assets and liabilities according to a predefined schedule; in expanded practices publishes outcomes per reserve data template and the Special Data Dissemination Standard.
  - Financial Results: See Pillar I practices on Independently Audited Financial Statements and Risk Exposures.
- 4.5 Macroprudential Policy Outcomes:
  - Governance Actions: Legislation, agreements, or Memorandums of Understanding specifying macroprudential objectives and responsibilities are disclosed; key interactions with designated public authorities are disclosed.
  - Policies: The central bank publishes statements on how macroprudential policies affect financial stability and vulnerabilities; in addition to core practices it publishes dedicated policy evaluations; in addition to expanded practices methods, techniques, and data underlying dedicated policy evaluations are made public to the extent possible.
- 4.7 Emergency Liquidity Assistance Outcomes:
  - The ELA framework provides details on previous support and outcomes while maintaining confidentiality as long as required; for market-wide support, amount, conditions, and types of entities that received support are disclosed.
  - In addition to core practices: Information on how the measure contributed to restoring/maintaining financial stability and the central bank’s risk taking is provided.
  - In addition to expanded practices: The framework discloses how liquidity support measures impact other parts of the financial system and the economy, including cross-border effects.
  - For bilateral liquidity support, disclosure occurs only after the financial stability risk has passed and confidentiality no longer violated; disclosure supports accountability without diminishing central bank discretion.
- 4.10 Financial Integrity (AML/CFT) Outcomes:
  - The central bank discloses the outcome of its AML/CFT supervisory actions and publishes outcomes annually including analysis where appropriate.
  - In addition to core practices: When sanctions are imposed, information is published on the name of the financial institution, enforcement actions, and a brief description of breaches, with case-by-case exceptions to protect market stability or ongoing investigations.
  - In addition to expanded practices: The central bank publishes information regarding implementation of remedial actions and findings of an independent audit of the effectiveness of internal AML/CFT controls.
- 4.11 Consumer Protection Outcomes:
  - The central bank publishes an annual report on outcomes of consumer protection operations, including any appearances before designated public authorities and statistics on measures taken by an ombudsman or other official appointed to investigate consumer protection-related complaints.

### Pillar V — Official Relations (Government)
- 5.1 The central bank discloses its relationship with the government. This includes the exchange of information, the coordination of policies, and financial aspects such as rules on profit distribution, clearly distinguishing the different roles and modalities.
- 5.1.1 The institutional relationship between the central bank and the government/its agencies:
  - The central bank’s functions with respect to the government (and public sector) and provisions are disclosed.
  - In addition to core practices: The central bank clearly defines and discloses (text continues beyond supplied excerpt).

*Source: ppea2020038 - Introduction of or (excerpt).*

### Section 5.1 covers the central bank’s cashier, depositary, fiscal agent, credit, advisory, debt management, and cooperat

### Section 5.1 covers the central bank’s cashier, depositary, fiscal agent, credit, advisory, debt management, and cooperat

### Disclosure of central bank functions with respect to the government
- The central bank discloses to the public, on a regular basis, policies, instruments used in interactions (including financial transactions) between the central bank and the government, and the outcomes of such interactions.
- The legal framework contains a clear mechanism for the establishment of the terms and conditions of the central bank’s functions with respect to the government.
- The central bank discloses procedures for the approval and reporting/accountability on the exercise of the central bank’s functions with respect to the government, as well as the main terms and conditions governing those functions.
- The central bank discloses on a regular basis information about its interactions with governmental agencies (e.g., with customs authorities in the context of information sharing) and the outcomes of such interactions. The relevant legal framework, instruments for sharing responsibilities, and delegated powers are disclosed.

### Specific disclosure principles and items (numbered)
- 5.1.2. The central bank publicly discloses its policies and terms and conditions governing financial transactions with the government, including its fiscal agent role, the management of the current account, deposit taking, advances, guarantees, loans and credit arrangements to the public sector, as well as agency services performed on behalf of the government.
- 5.1.3. The instruments used in interaction (including the financial transactions) between the central bank and the government/its agencies are clearly defined and publicly disclosed.
- 5.1.4. The central bank discloses publicly on a regular basis the outcome of its interaction (including operations) with the government/its agencies.

### Domestic financial agencies (Section 5.2) — relationships and transparency
- Principle: The central bank discloses its relationships with domestic financial agencies as relevant to the pursuit of its mandate and the execution of its functions.
- 5.2.1. The relationship between the central bank and relevant domestic financial agencies is clearly defined and publicly disclosed, including cooperation and (co-) decision-making modalities and arrangements for the formal/informal sharing of information.
  - The legal framework contains provisions establishing cooperation between the central bank and domestic financial regulatory and supervisory authorities, as well as basic terms and conditions with a view to information sharing, coordination of activities, or any other cooperation arrangement.
  - The central bank discloses the instruments used in the interaction between the central bank and domestic financial agencies.
- 5.2.2. The policies and instruments used in the interaction of the central bank with domestic financial agencies, and the outcome of the interaction are transparent.
  - The central bank discloses regular reports on the interaction between the central bank and domestic financial agencies.
- 5.2.3. With respect to financial stability, all arrangements to restore or maintain financial stability are clearly disclosed, including arrangements on data sharing, liquidity support, and who is responsible for which type of decision or action at what stage.
  - Insofar as the central bank is part of an interagency committee, it discloses the provisions governing such a committee in regard to its composition, the respective members’ roles, the nature of the cooperation, and the mechanism of the cooperation.

### Foreign agencies (Section 5.3) — international relationships and obligations
- Principle: The central bank discloses its dealings with international organizations, foreign governments, other central banks, and other relevant foreign agencies, including the nature of the involvement or interactions, and any obligations and commitments that may arise from these relationships.
- The central bank clearly defines and discloses the relationship for exchange of information and coordination of actions/policies between the central bank and international organizations, foreign governments, other central banks, and other relevant foreign agencies.
- The central bank discloses its policies, terms, and conditions governing interaction with these bodies.
- The central bank clearly defines and discloses instruments used in the interaction (including financial transactions) between the central bank and these bodies.
- The central bank discloses on a regular basis the outcome of its relationship with these bodies.
- Expanded practices include disclosure of detailed terms and conditions of cooperation, disclosure of agreements with foreign agencies, and disclosure of information on international or bilateral relations and (mandatory) obligations arising from such relations.

### Other relations (Section 5.4)
- 5.4.1. The central bank discloses its involvement with private or (semi) public institutions.
- The central bank discloses its investments in and ownership of subsidiaries, and joint ventures with private, semi-public, or public entities.

### Glossary — selected definitions and usage relevant to Sections 5.1–5.4
- Audit committee (or similar financial matters oversight body): oversight of the financial reporting process, internal and external audit arrangements, and the central bank's system of internal controls.
- Autonomy: Synonymous with “independence,” relating to four core aspects: (a) institutional autonomy; (b) functional autonomy; (c) personal autonomy; and (d) financial autonomy. Academic literature also distinguishes goal and instrument autonomy.
- Disclose / Publicly Available / Easily accessible: Publication of the legal framework and policy decisions in official gazettes and posting on the central bank’s website; other documents published in printed or electronic mass media and posted on the central bank’s website; should be easily accessible.
- Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA): Encompasses bilateral and market-wide liquidity support, usually collateralized lending or, for market-wide support, asset swaps or outright purchases; usually temporary (see CBT 2.7., 3.8., and 4.7.).
- Functions (tasks): Activities undertaken to achieve objectives, including monetary policy and other core functions established by law (see CBT 1.2.).
- Legal Framework: Constitution, treaties, central bank law, and other relevant laws, regulations, and instruments.
- Monetary Policy Collateral: Assets accepted as collateral for central bank credit operations; may include marketable fixed income securities and, in specific circumstances, equities, loans, real estate, or commodities (see CBT 3.1.).
- Monetary Policy Instruments: Include Open Market Operations, Standing Facilities, Reserve Requirements, and direct instruments of monetary control (see CBT 2.1. and 3.1).
- Emergency and risk-related terms: Definitions and descriptions for Emergency Liquidity Assistance, Enforcement instruments, Exchange of information, Risk Exposure, Risk Framework, Risk Governance Structure, Risk Management Process, Risk Statement, Risk Strategy, and Security of Tenure are provided and used where indicated across the Code.

*Source: ppea2020038 - Section 5.1 covers the central bank’s cashier, depositary, fiscal agent, credit, advisory, debt management, and cooperat (IMF PDF).*

### ANNEX I. SELECTED PRINCIPLES FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL

### ANNEX I. SELECTED PRINCIPLES FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL POLICY STANDARDS

### Purpose and scope
- The transparency-related principles listed in this Annex are for information purposes only.
- Excerpts reflect selections by IMF staff of relevant transparency related texts; underlining is added to highlight key words or phrases.
- The excerpts do not represent an interpretation, assessment, or guidance for the relevant financial policy standards by the IMF, its Executive Board, its Management, or any of its staff or affiliated agents.
- Any interpretation or guidance is the prerogative of the respective international standard-setter.
- The Annex presents selected principles from international standards that relate to transparency and is not to be used for assessing compliance with the Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT).
- The Annex does not contain a description of maturity of practices (e.g., core, expanded, or comprehensive) on transparency of banking, insurance, securities sectors supervisors, resolution authorities, and FMI overseers.
- Transparency issues in this Annex will not be assessed in the context of the CBT, but rather by respective assessors in banking, insurance, securities, resolution, and financial market infrastructure when they undertake assessments in their entirety or when preparing technical notes.

### International standards relied on by the Central Bank Transparency Code
- Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s (BCBS) Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision.
- International Association of Insurance Supervisors’ (IAIS) Insurance Core Principles and Common Framework for the Supervision of Internationally Active Insurance Groups.
- International Organization of Securities Commissions’ (IOSCO) Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation.
- Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions.
- Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and IOSCO’s (CPMI-IOSCO) Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure.

### Statements of principles and methodology differences across standards
- Banking (BCP):
  - The Basel Core Principles (BCP) state the core principles, essential criteria, and additional criteria in one BCBS document.
  - “Core principles” are a framework of minimum standards for sound supervisory practices and are considered universally applicable.
  - “Essential criteria” are elements that should be present to demonstrate compliance with a Principle.
  - “Additional criteria” may be particularly relevant to the supervision of more sophisticated banking organizations, and countries with such institutions should aim to achieve them.
- Insurance (ICP):
  - Insurance Core Principles (ICP) include statements, standards, and guidance in one IAIS document.
  - “Principle statements” set out essential elements that must be present to protect policyholders, promote the maintenance of fair, safe, and stable insurance markets, and contribute to financial stability.
  - “Standards” set out key high-level requirements fundamental to implementing the principle statement and should be met for a jurisdiction to demonstrate observance.
  - “Guidance” facilitates understanding and application of the principle statement or standards; they do not represent any requirements.
- Securities (IOSCO):
  - IOSCO sets out the Principles (P) in one document and the methodology in another.
  - The principles are based on three objectives: protecting investors; ensuring that markets are fair, efficient, and transparent; and reducing systemic risk.
  - The methodology provides IOSCO’s interpretation of principles and guidance on conducting self-assessments or third-party assessments of principles implementation.
- Resolution (FSB):
  - The FSB’s Key Attributes (KA) set out core elements necessary for an effective resolution regime.
  - “Key Attributes Assessment Methodology for the Banking Sector” proposes a set of essential criteria (EC) to assess compliance with the relevant KA.
  - The methodology includes explanatory notes (EN) that provide examples, explanations, and cross-references to other relevant KAs, and specific definitions not included in the definitions of key terms.
- Financial Market Infrastructure (FMI):
  - IOSCO’s Payments and Market Infrastructures provides Principles (P) in one document and disclosure frameworks and assessment methodology in another.
  - The principles document has two sections: requirements to be met by the FMI related to safety, soundness, and efficiency; and responsibilities and roles of the authorities regulating, supervising, and overseeing FMI.

### References cited in the Annex (as listed)
- “Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems; Financial Regulation and Supervision.” Financial Stability Board, 2020.
- “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision.” Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2012.
- “The Basel Framework.” Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2020.
- “Insurance Core Principles and Common Framework for the Supervision of Internationally Active Insurance Groups.” International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 2019.
- “Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation.” International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2017.
- “Methodology for assessing implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation.” International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2017.
- “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions.” Financial Stability Board, 2014.
- “Key Attributes Assessment Methodology for the Banking Sector.” Financial Stability Board.

*ANNEX I. SELECTED PRINCIPLES FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL POLICY STANDARDS (pp. 94–96)*

### 2016. Available at https://www.fsb.org/2016/10/key-attributes-assessment-methodology-for-

### ppea2020038 - 2016

### Major international standards and guidance (selected citations)
- “Public Disclosures on Resolution Planning and Resolvability - Discussion Paper for Public Consultation.” Financial Stability Board, 2019. Available at https://www.fsb.org/2019/06/public-disclosure-of-resolution-planning-and-resolvability-discussion-paper-for-public-consultation/.
- “Principles on Bail-in Execution.” Financial Stability Board, 2018. Available at https://www.fsb.org/2018/06/principles-on-bail-in-execution-2/.
- “Recovery and Resolution Planning for Systemically Important Financial Institutions: Guidance on Developing Effective Resolution Strategies.” Financial Stability Board, 2013. Available at https://www.fsb.org/2013/07/r_130716b/.
- “Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI).” CPMI-IOSCO, 2012. Available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD377-PFMI.pdf.
- Financial Sector Assessment Program, IMF/World Bank, 2020. Available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/fssa.aspx.
- 2016. Available at https://www.fsb.org/2016/10/key-attributes-assessment-methodology-for-the-banking-sector.

### Pillar I — Transparency in Governance (banking, insurance, securities)
- BCBS Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCP1, BCP2):
  - BCP1: Effective system has clear responsibilities and objectives for each authority; legal framework provides powers to authorize banks, conduct ongoing supervision, address compliance, and undertake timely corrective actions.
  - BCP1 EC1: Responsibilities and objectives of each authority are clearly defined in legislation and publicly disclosed; framework to avoid regulatory and supervisory gaps where multiple authorities exist.
  - BCP2: Supervisor possesses operational independence, transparent processes, sound governance, budgetary processes that do not undermine autonomy, adequate resources, and legal protection.
  - BCP2 EC9: Laws provide protection to the supervisor and its staff against lawsuits for actions/omissions in good faith; staff protected against costs of defending such actions/omissions.
  - BCP2 EC1: Operational independence, accountability and governance prescribed in legislation and publicly disclosed; no government or industry interference that compromises independence; supervisor has full discretion to take supervisory actions.
  - BCP2 EC2: Appointment/removal processes for heads are transparent; minimum term and removal only for reasons specified in law; reasons for removal publicly disclosed.
  - BCP2 EC6: Supervisor has adequate resources and financing that do not undermine autonomy.
- IAIS Insurance Core Principles (ICP1, ICP2):
  - ICP1: Objectives, powers and responsibilities of insurance supervisor clearly defined; publicly defined objectives foster transparency.
  - ICP1.2: Objectives include at least: protect policyholders; promote a fair, safe and stable insurance market; contribute to financial stability.
  - ICP2: Supervisor is operationally independent, accountable, transparent, and adequately resourced.
  - ICP2.0.4: Supervisory requirements, processes and information about responsibilities should be publicly disclosed consistent with confidentiality.
  - ICP2.2 / ICP2.1.1–.3: Legal protection for supervisor and staff; financing should not undermine independence; institutional relationships with government defined in legislation.
  - ICP2.3 / ICP2.3.1–.3: Transparent procedures for appointment/dismissal, disclosure of criteria, and balanced governing body composition.
- IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation:
  - P1: Regulator responsibilities should be clear and objectively stated, preferably in law.
  - P3: Regulator should have adequate powers, proper resources and capacity.
  - P2: Regulator should be operationally independent and accountable.

### Pillar II — Transparency in Policies
- BCBS:
  - BCP1 EC4: Banking laws, regulations and prudential standards are updated as necessary and are subject to public consultation, as appropriate.
  - BCP5 EC2: Licensing authority has power to set criteria for licensing banks.
- IAIS:
  - ICP2.9 / ICP2.9.1–.2, .4: Supervisor publishes requirements, policies and supervisory procedures; consults publicly on significant changes; ensures instruments (guidance/advice) are publicly available; encourages stakeholder participation in consultations; participates in external legislative consultations where appropriate.
- IOSCO:
  - P4: Regulator to adopt clear and consistent regulatory processes; consult with public and disclose policies in important operational areas.

### Pillar III — Transparency in Operations
- Instruments (tools) and enforcement:
  - BCP1 EC6: Supervisor powers when a bank is non-compliant or engaging in unsafe/unsound practices include: (a) require timely corrective action; (b) impose sanctions; (c) revoke license; (d) cooperate to achieve orderly resolution, including triggering resolution where appropriate.
- IAIS:
  - ICP2.8.1: Supervisor should publish information about itself and the insurance sector including objectives, goals/priorities, activities, resources, data and analysis, and supervisory measures taken in relation to problem or failed insurers (subject to confidentiality).
  - ICP4 Licensing: Licensing requirements and procedures must be clear, objective, public and consistently applied.
  - ICP10: Supervisor requires and enforces preventive and corrective measures and imposes sanctions that are timely, necessary, and based on clear, objective, consistent, and publicly disclosed criteria; additional parts of the framework may be released publicly where beneficial.

### Pillar IV — Transparency in Outcome
- BCBS:
  - BCP2 EC1 / EC3: Operational independence, accountability and governance prescribed in legislation and publicly disclosed; supervisor publishes objectives and is accountable through a transparent framework.
- IAIS:
  - ICP2.8 / ICP2.8.1–.2: Supervisor is transparent to public and government about how responsibilities are exercised; should publish information listed under ICP2.8.1 and seek to publish a report at least annually that contains those elements and audited financial statements.
- IOSCO:
  - P2: Accountability implies periodic public reporting on performance and transparency in process and conduct.

### Pillar V — Transparency in Official Relations
- Government relations:
  - IAIS ICP2.1.3: Institutional relationships and accountability frameworks between supervisor and government should be clearly defined in legislation, specifying circumstances and processes for sharing information, consultation or approval; daily operations should not require government consultation/approval except in exceptional socio-economic circumstances.
- Domestic/foreign cooperation:
  - BCBS BCP3: Laws/regulations provide framework for cooperation and collaboration with domestic authorities and foreign supervisors, reflecting need to protect confidential information.
  - IAIS ICP25: Supervisor cooperates and coordinates with involved supervisors and relevant authorities for effective cross-border supervision.
  - IOSCO ¶14: Regulators should establish information sharing mechanisms that set out when/how to share public and non-public information with domestic and foreign counterparts.

### Resolution (selected excerpt)
- KA 2 Resolution authority:
  - 2.1: Where multiple resolution authorities exist within a jurisdiction their respective mandates, roles and responsibilities should be clearly defined and coordinated.

*Source: Excerpts from the Central Bank Transparency Code (pages and sections as provided in the supplied content).*

### 2.2 Where different resolution authorities are in charge of resolving entities

### 2.2 Where different resolution authorities are in charge of resolving entities

### Coordination and lead authority
- "2.2 Where different resolution authorities are in charge of resolving entities of the same group within a single jurisdiction, the resolution regime of that jurisdiction should identify a lead authority that coordinates the resolution of the legal entities within that jurisdiction."
- EC2.1: "The legal framework clearly identifies one or more resolution authorities and provides it or them with a clear mandate. Where there are multiple resolution authorities or where multiple authorities are involved in a resolution process, the resolution regime provides for the identification of a lead authority; sets out clear arrangements to coordinate the resolution of affiliated legal entities, or the resolution of a single bank, within that jurisdiction; and provides for a clear allocation of objectives, functions and powers of those authorities."
- KA 2 Resolution authority (related): "2.1 [...] Where there are multiple resolution authorities within a jurisdiction their respective mandates, roles and responsibilities should be clearly defined and coordinated."

### Legal protection and liability
- "2.6. The resolution authority and its staff should be protected against liability for actions taken and omissions made while discharging their duties in the exercise of resolution powers in good faith, including actions in support of foreign resolution proceedings."
- EC2.6: "The legal framework provides legal protection through statute for the resolution authority, its head, members of the governing body and its staff and any agents against liability for actions taken or omissions made while discharging their duties in good faith and acting within the scope of their powers, including actions taken in support of foreign resolution proceedings; including indemnification against any costs of defending any such actions."

### Operational independence, governance, and accountability
- KA 2 Resolution authority: "2.5 The resolution authority should have operational independence consistent with its statutory responsibilities, transparent processes, sound governance and adequate resources and be subject to rigorous evaluation and accountability mechanisms to assess the effectiveness of any resolution measures. It should have the expertise, resources and the operational capacity to implement resolution measures with respect to large and complex firms."
- EC2.3: "The resolution authority is, by law and in practice, operationally independent in the performance of its statutory responsibilities."
- EC2.4: "The resolution authority is accountable through a transparent framework for the discharge of its duties in relation to its statutory responsibilities."
- EN2(d) Operational Independence: "Appropriate safeguards could include transparent appointment procedures; statutory constraints that would prevent the head of the resolution authority being removed during his or her term of office for reasons other than those specified in law; and public disclosure of the reason(s) for that early dismissal."
- EN2(e) Accountability: guidance that procedures for review and evaluation may be internal or external, and that the resolution authority "should also publish periodic reports on its resolution actions and policies" while not required to disclose operational resolution plans or results of resolvability assessments of individual banks.

### Resolution powers and entry criteria
- KA 3 Resolution powers: "3.2 Resolution authorities should have at their disposal a broad range of resolution powers, which should include powers to do the following: [not shown]"
- EN3(e): "Powers of the resolution authority—Where the EC refer to powers of the resolution authority to take specific resolution actions, those powers should be clearly set out in the legal framework applicable to the authority."
- KA 3 Resolution powers: "3.1 [...] There should be clear standards or suitable indicators of non-viability to help guide decisions on whether firms meet the conditions for entry into resolution."
- EC3.1: "The legal framework includes clear criteria that provide for timely and early entry into resolution before a bank is balance sheet insolvent, when a bank is no longer viable or when it is likely to be no longer viable and, in either case, has no reasonable prospect of return to viability."
- EN3(c): "Quantitative or qualitative criteria to assess non-viability the conditions for entry into resolution or exercise of resolution powers should be clear and transparent and set out in law:"
- EN3(f)(iii): "Exercisable without shareholder or creditor consent–[...] In order to ensure legal certainty and transparency to shareholders and creditors, the powers to override any requirement for consent should be clear."
- EN3(r): "Regulatory requirements for bridge institutions—The legal framework should be transparent as to what capital and other regulatory requirements, if any, will apply to bridge institutions."

### Set-off, netting, collateralization, and client assets
- KA 4 Set-off, netting, collateralization, segregation of client assets: "4.1 The legal framework governing set-off rights, contractual netting and collateralization agreements and the segregation of client assets should be clear, transparent and enforceable during a crisis or resolution of firms, and should not hamper the effective implementation of resolution measures."
- EN4(a): "Prohibition or Temporary stay of early termination rights— [...] Where the legal framework includes both kinds of provision, it should be clear in advance, for any type of such contract, which provision would apply to those early termination rights in a resolution of the financial institution under the domestic regime."

### Safeguards and creditor treatment
- KA 5 Safeguards: "5.1 Resolution powers should be exercised in a way that respects the hierarchy of claims while providing flexibility to depart from the general principle of equal (pari passu) treatment of creditors of the same class, with transparency about the reasons for such departures, if necessary to contain the potential systemic impact of a firm’s failure or to maximize the value for the benefit of all creditors as a whole."
- KA 6 Funding of firms in resolution: EN6(b): "Use of deposit insurance funds for resolution—Where a deposit insurance fund can be used in resolution, there should be transparent rules and policies on the use of such funds, including clarity on the extent of the contribution that may be made."

### Cross-border cooperation and recognition of foreign measures
- KA 7 Legal framework conditions for cross-border cooperation: "7.4 [...] The treatment of creditors and ranking in insolvency should be transparent and properly disclosed to depositors, insurance policy holders and other creditors."
- KA 7 Legal framework conditions for cross-border cooperation: "7.5 Jurisdictions should provide for transparent and expedited processes to give effect to foreign resolution measures, either by way of a mutual recognition process or by taking measures under the domestic resolution regime that support and are consistent with the resolution measures taken by the foreign home resolution authority."
- KA 9 Institution-specific cross-border cooperation agreements: "9.2 The existence of agreements should be made public. The home authorities may publish the broad structure of the agreements, if agreed by the authorities that are party to the agreement."

### Access, scope, and unimpeded premises access
- KA 1 Scope: "1.1 The regime should be clear and transparent as to the financial institutions (hereinafter 'firms') within its scope."
- EC1.1: "The scope of application of the resolution regime and the circumstances in which it applies are clearly defined in the legal framework."
- KA 2 Resolution authority: "2.7 The resolution authority should have unimpeded access to firms where that is material for the purposes of resolution planning and the preparation and implementation of resolution measures."
- EC2.7: "Under the legal framework, the resolution authority has unimpeded access to the domestic premises of banks where necessary for the purposes of resolution planning and the preparation and implementation of resolution measures."

### Transparency for FMIs, decision-making, and cooperation
- Policy decisions and disclosure: "Central banks, market regulators, and other relevant authorities should clearly define and disclose their regulatory, supervisory, and oversight policies with respect to FMIs."
- Key considerations: authorities should "publicly disclose their relevant policies with respect to the regulation, supervision, and oversight of FMIs."
- Responsibility A / P4.1.2: "Authorities should clearly define and publicly disclose the criteria used to identify FMIs that should be subject to regulation, supervision, and oversight."
- Coverage / Responsibility D: "Authorities should adopt the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures" and "ensure that these principles are, at a minimum, applied to all systemically important payment systems, CSDs, SSSs, CCPs, and TRs."
- P1.20: "The presumption is that all CSDs, SSSs, CCPs, and TRs are systemically important, at least in the jurisdiction where they are located..."
- Cooperation (Responsibility E / P4.5.1–P4.5.3, P4.5.10): authorities should "cooperate with each other, both domestically and internationally" and "provide advance notification, where practicable and otherwise as soon as possible thereafter, regarding pending material regulatory changes and adverse events with respect to the FMI that may significantly affect another authority’s regulatory, supervisory, or oversight interests."

*Source: ppea2020038 - 2.2 Where different resolution authorities are in charge of resolving entities*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/pp/2020/english/ppea2020038.pdf_